Tag Archives: 2017

Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

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Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-14
Administrative Law Judge Dorinda M. Lang
Outcome The ALJ found that the Petitioner did not establish a violation of the Respondent's CC&Rs and recommended the petition be denied. The ALJ specifically noted the lack of proof that fees were inappropriate and that Petitioner failed to provide legal authority requiring equal benefit. The petition was denied, and the Respondent was not ordered to pay the Petitioner's filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay Janicek Counsel —
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Counsel Evan Thompson

Alleged Violations

Article 11. Section 11.5 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Petitioner did not establish a violation of the Respondent's CC&Rs and recommended the petition be denied. The ALJ specifically noted the lack of proof that fees were inappropriate and that Petitioner failed to provide legal authority requiring equal benefit. The petition was denied, and the Respondent was not ordered to pay the Petitioner's filing fee.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs regarding disproportionate assessment fees

Petitioner alleged Respondent was in violation of its CC&Rs because Master HOA fees were disproportionately borne by existing homeowners and did not benefit the whole development equally. Petitioner failed to establish a violation because required evidentiary documents (plat attached as 'Exhibit B') were missing, and Petitioner offered no legal authority requiring fees to be equally beneficial or even-handed.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied. Respondent shall not pay the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01 to the Petitioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&Rs, Master HOA, Assessment Fees, Common Areas, Burden of Proof, Rule Against Perpetuities
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717033-REL Decision – 575166.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:21 (39.1 KB)

17F-H1717033-REL Decision – 582189.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:24 (69.4 KB)

17F-H1717033-REL Decision – 584918.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:27 (674.1 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key findings and legal proceedings in case number 17F-H1717033-REL, wherein Petitioner Jay Janicek filed a complaint against Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA. The petition was ultimately denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), a decision formally adopted and finalized by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

The core of the dispute centered on the Petitioner’s allegation that the HOA’s fee structure violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Janicek argued that payments made by his first-level association to a master association for common area expenses—most egregiously for a roadway loan—were improper because the benefits were not distributed equally among all homeowners.

The denial of the petition hinged on a critical failure of proof by the Petitioner. The CC&Rs define “Common Areas” by referencing a plat map (“Exhibit B”) that was not submitted into evidence by the Petitioner. Without this crucial document, it was impossible to prove that the fees collected by the HOA were for purposes outside the scope of the CC&Rs. Furthermore, the Petitioner failed to provide any legal authority or provision within the governing documents requiring that association fees be “even-handed or equally beneficial to all homeowners.” A secondary argument regarding the “rule against perpetuities,” introduced post-hearing, was also addressed and dismissed by the ALJ as legally inapplicable to the matter.

Case Overview

The following table outlines the principal parties and details of the administrative hearing.

Case Detail

Information

Petitioner

Jay Janicek

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Respondent’s Counsel

Evan Thompson, Thompson Krone PLC

Respondent’s Representative

Steve Russo

Case Number

17F-H1717033-REL

Docket Number

17F-H1717033-REL

Hearing Date

July 12, 2017

Presiding Judge

Dorinda M. Lang, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Observers

John Shields, Margery and Mathew Janicek

Petitioner’s Allegations

The petition filed by Jay Janicek alleged that Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA was in violation of its governing CC&Rs. The central arguments presented were:

• Unequal Distribution of Costs and Benefits: The Petitioner contended that expenses paid by the Respondent association to the Sycamore Vista Master Home Owner’s Association (“Master HOA”) did not benefit all homeowners equally. The most “egregious” example cited was the payment toward a loan for a roadway within the master development.

• Violation of CC&Rs: The Petitioner argued that this unequal cost burden was a direct violation of Article 11, Section 11.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs. This section stipulates:

• Discrepancy Among Associations: The Petitioner asserted that another first-level association within the master development receives more benefit from the common areas but does not pay into the Master HOA.

• Rule Against Perpetuities: In a post-hearing submission, the Petitioner introduced a new argument that a “rule against perpetuities” was at stake in the matter.

Adjudication and Findings of Fact

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the Petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof through a preponderance of the evidence.

Evidentiary Failure

The Petitioner’s case failed primarily due to a lack of sufficient evidence to prove a violation of the CC&Rs.

• Missing ‘Exhibit B’: The definition of “Common Areas” was essential to the case. According to Article 1, Section 1.6 of the CC&Rs, these areas are delineated on a plat that was supposed to be attached as “Exhibit B.”

• Critical Finding: The ALJ noted, “Unfortunately, there was no plat attached to the document that was offered into evidence and it was not to be found among the other exhibits. Therefore, Petitioner was unable to establish that Respondent’s fees pay for anything that is not provided for in the CC&Rs.”

• Petitioner’s Concession: The Petitioner did not dispute the Respondent’s argument that the Master HOA fees, including those for roads, were for Common Areas.

Lack of Legal Authority

The Petitioner’s core premise—that fees must be proportional to benefits received—was not substantiated by legal or documentary support.

• The ALJ found that the “Petitioner offered no legal authority that requires that all first level associations must pay the same into a master association or that all homeowners must receive the same benefit from or contribute the same amount (or even a proportionate share) to the common areas.”

• The argument that association fees were “disproportionately heavy” was not established to be a violation of any provision in the CC&Rs.

Post-Hearing Submissions

The record was held open until August 1, 2017, allowing for additional documentation from both parties.

• Petitioner (Exhibit 6): Submitted financial documentation, emails, and the argument concerning the rule against perpetuities.

• Respondent (Exhibit H): Submitted a Notice of Lien and attachments. This exhibit demonstrated that, regarding a lien for water services on properties not part of the Respondent HOA, the “Respondent’s homeowners are not responsible for it.”

Conclusions of Law and Final Decision

Based on the evidence and arguments presented, the ALJ denied the petition, a decision later finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Denial of Petition

• The primary conclusion of law was that the “Petitioner has not established that Respondent is in violation of its CC&Rs.”

• The payment for Common Areas was found to be in comportment with the CC&Rs.

Rejection of Key Arguments

• Equal Benefit: The ALJ explicitly concluded: “Petitioner has offered no legal authority or provision of the CC&Rs that requires the association fees to be even-handed or equally beneficial to all homeowners.”

• Rule Against Perpetuities: While this argument was not part of the original petition, the ALJ addressed it to “lay a concern to rest.” The judge explained that the rule, which states that property ownership must vest within a lifetime plus 21 years, evolved from estate law and does not apply to HOA property sales where ownership vests immediately in the developer or a new owner. The judge concluded, “the rule against perpetuities does not apply to a homeowner’s association and it clearly does not apply in this matter.”

Timeline of Orders

1. July 12, 2017: An “Order Holding Record Open” was issued by ALJ Dorinda M. Lang.

2. August 14, 2017: The “Administrative Law Judge Decision” was issued, ordering that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

3. August 21, 2017: A “Final Order” was issued by Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, adopting the ALJ’s decision and officially denying the petition.

Post-Decision Procedures

The Final Order, effective August 21, 2017, concluded the administrative action and outlined the subsequent options available to the parties.

• The order is binding unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed within 30 days of the service of the final order.

• A rehearing may be granted for the following causes:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings or any order or abuse of discretion that deprived a party of a fair hearing.

2. Misconduct by the Department, ALJ, or the prevailing party.

3. Accident or surprise that could not have been prevented by ordinary prudence.

4. Newly discovered material evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the original hearing.

5. Excessive or insufficient penalties.

6. Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.

7. The findings of fact or decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

8. The findings of fact or decision is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.

• Parties may appeal the final administrative action by filing a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1717033-REL, Jay Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their designated roles?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent?

3. Which specific article and section of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) did the Petitioner claim the Respondent had violated?

4. Explain the key piece of evidence that was missing and why its absence was critical to the case’s outcome.

5. What was the Respondent’s main argument regarding the fees paid to the Master HOA?

6. According to the case documents, who held the burden of proof, and what was the required standard of proof?

7. What was the “rule against perpetuities,” and what reason did the Administrative Law Judge give for its inapplicability to this case?

8. What was the ultimate decision of the Administrative Law Judge, and on what date was it issued?

9. After the hearing, the record was held open. What was the purpose of this, and what types of materials were submitted by the parties during this period?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate take after receiving the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jay Janicek, designated as the Petitioner, and Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, designated as the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the party against whom the complaint was filed.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA was in violation of its CC&Rs. He argued that the fees his association paid to the Master HOA for a roadway loan did not benefit the whole development equally and were therefore inappropriate expenses for all homeowners to pay.

3. The Petitioner cited Article 11, Section 11.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs. This section, titled “Costs of Improvements,” details how the costs for improving Unimproved Lots and Common Areas in Phase 3 and Phase 4 are to be borne by the owners of lots within those specific phases.

4. The key missing evidence was a plat, referred to as “Exhibit B” in the CC&Rs. This plat was supposed to define the “Common Areas,” and without it, the Petitioner was unable to establish that the fees paid by the Respondent were for anything not provided for in the governing documents.

5. The Respondent argued that the Master HOA fees were used to pay for the development’s common areas. They maintained that the CC&Rs permit these payments and that there is no legal authority requiring all homeowners to receive the same benefit or for all first-level associations to contribute equally.

6. Pursuant to A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner, Jay Janicek, had the burden of proof in this matter. The standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, as established by A.A.C. R2-19-119(A).

7. The rule against perpetuities states that property ownership must vest within a time frame of an existing lifetime plus 21 years. The Judge ruled it did not apply because it evolved to handle estates bequeathed to a series of heirs and is not generally applicable to property sales where rights transfer at once; in the HOA’s case, ownership of undeveloped lots had already vested in the developer.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This decision was made on August 14, 2017.

9. The record was held open until August 1, 2017, to allow the Respondent to submit additional documentation and for the Petitioner to submit written objections. During this time, the Petitioner submitted financial documentation, emails, and a new argument about the rule against perpetuities (admitted as Exhibit 6), while the Respondent submitted a Notice of Lien (admitted as Exhibit H).

10. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This was formalized in a Final Order dated August 21, 2017, which accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and denied the Petitioner’s petition.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-style response for each.

1. Analyze the critical evidentiary failure that led to the denial of Jay Janicek’s petition. How did the absence of the plat referred to as “Exhibit B” directly impact his ability to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof?

2. Discuss the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that there is no requirement for HOA fees to be “even-handed or equally beneficial to all homeowners.” How does this principle relate to the hierarchical structure of Master and first-level associations described in the case?

3. Explain the concept of the “rule against perpetuities” as described in the legal decision. Detail why the Administrative Law Judge, despite noting the argument was outside the original petition, addressed it and ultimately found it inapplicable to the case of a homeowner’s association.

4. Trace the procedural path of this case from the initial hearing to the final binding order. Identify the key dates, decisions, and entities involved at each stage, including the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate.

5. Based on the Final Order, outline the process and potential grounds for requesting a rehearing. What were the eight specific causes listed in the order that could materially affect a moving party’s rights and justify a rehearing or review?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, Dorinda M. Lang served as the ALJ.

A.A.C.

Abbreviation for Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of all the laws of the state of Arizona.

Areas of Association Responsibility

Locations that the Homeowner’s Association is responsible for maintaining, as defined within its governing documents.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision.

Common Areas

Areas within a housing development that are owned by the association for the use and benefit of all homeowners. The definition of these areas was a central issue in the case.

Commissioner

The head of a government department. In this context, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, who adopted the ALJ’s decision.

First Level Association

An individual homeowner’s association within a larger development that also has a master association. The Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, is a first level association.

Master HOA

The Sycamore Vista Master Home Owner’s Association. An overarching organization that governs expenses and common areas concerning an entire development composed of multiple first-level associations.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts administrative hearings for other state agencies. This case was referred to the OAH by the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, Jay Janicek.

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The missing plat in this case was intended to show the “Common Areas.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires that the evidence shows a claim is more likely to be true than not true.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a legal action. In this case, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA.

Rule Against Perpetuities

A legal rule that prevents a property owner from controlling the disposition of their property for an indefinite period after their death. The ALJ found it did not apply in this HOA context.

Unimproved Lot Assessments

Fees imposed on the owners of undeveloped lots to pay for the costs of improving certain areas, as described in Section 6.13 of the CC&Rs.

Unimproved Lots

Parcels of land within the development that have not yet been built upon.

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575166.pdf
582189.pdf
584918.pdf

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17F-H1717033-REL

3 sources

These documents chronicle the legal proceedings of a dispute between Jay Janicek, the Petitioner, and Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, the Respondent, before the Office of Administrative Hearings. The first source is an “Order Holding Record Open,” dated July 12, 2017, which temporarily extends the deadline for submitting additional evidence. The subsequent sources contain the “Administrative Law Judge Decision” issued on August 14, 2017, which outlines the hearing details and the judge’s recommendation to deny the petition because Janicek failed to establish a violation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Finally, the third document presents the “Final Order” from the Department of Real Estate Commissioner on August 21, 2017, which accepts and affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to deny the petition. Janicek’s core claim argued that certain master association fees were disproportionately applied and did not benefit all homeowners equally, which the judge ultimately dismissed due to a lack of supporting legal authority or CC&R provisions.

3 sources

Based on 3 sources

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NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jay Janicek (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Evan Thompson (HOA attorney)
    Thompson Krone PLC
    Attorney for Respondent
  • Steve Russo (respondent representative)

Neutral Parties

  • Dorinda M. Lang (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Dan Gardner (HOA Coordinator)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Addressee for rehearing request

Other Participants

  • John Shields (observer)
  • Margery Janicek (observer)
  • Mathew Janicek (observer)
  • M. Aguirre (unknown)
    Thompson Krone PLC
    Listed on transmittal documents

William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:09 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:12 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:15 (95.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.

Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (No. 17F-H1717032-REL), heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It covers the central conflict, the legal arguments, the statutory interpretations, and the final resolution of the dispute.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.

1. What was the initial action taken by William M. Brown on February 6, 2017, and what was Terravita Country Club’s response?

2. On what legal grounds did Terravita justify its refusal to provide the requested records?

3. What was William M. Brown’s primary legal argument against Terravita’s position during the hearing?

4. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Terravita’s argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2), and why was it rejected?

5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this case?

6. What key fact regarding the “pending litigation” was central to the Judge’s final decision?

7. What was the final conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Terravita’s actions?

8. Identify the three specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Recommended Order.”

9. What state department adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, making it a “Final Order”?

10. Besides complying with the records request and paying the filing fee, what specific penalty was explicitly not levied against Terravita?

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Answer Key

1. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown requested records from Terravita Country Club. On February 14, 2017, Terravita responded via email, refusing to disclose the records because they were allegedly part of pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

2. Terravita justified its refusal by citing Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805(B)(2). The club argued that this statute allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

3. Mr. Brown’s primary argument was that Terravita had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide records within 10 business days. He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” in § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only when the association itself is a party to that litigation, which Terravita was not in his criminal case.

4. The Judge interpreted Terravita’s argument to mean that an association could deny any records request if the documents related to pending litigation between any two parties anywhere. This interpretation was rejected because it would lead to the “absurd result” of broadly denying access to records, which was not the statute’s intent.

5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the evidentiary standard where the trier of fact must be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that Terravita violated the statute, while the Respondent (Terravita) bore the burden of proving its affirmative defenses.

6. The central fact was that Terravita Country Club was not a party to the criminal case brought against Mr. Brown by the City of Scottsdale. Because the association was not a party, the judge ruled that the statutory exemption for withholding records related to pending litigation did not apply.

7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Brown had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his records request within the required 10 business days. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

8. The Judge ordered that: (1) the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) be deemed the prevailing party; (2) Terravita must comply with the records request within 10 days of the Order; and (3) Terravita must pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within 30 days of the Order.

9. The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This action, dated July 24, 2017, made the decision a binding Final Order.

10. The Recommended Order, which was adopted as the Final Order, explicitly states that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal principles, and arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) presented by William M. Brown and Terravita Country Club. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to resolve this dispute, including the principle of avoiding “absurd results.”

2. Describe the complete timeline of the case, from the initial records request to the issuance of the Final Order. For each key date, explain the event’s significance to the progression and outcome of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain how this standard was applied to both the Petitioner’s claim and the Respondent’s affirmative defense and why the Judge ultimately found that the Petitioner had met this burden.

4. Examine the role of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in resolving disputes within planned communities, as demonstrated by this case. How does the process flow from an initial petition to a binding order?

5. Based on the Judge’s decision, formulate an argument about the balance between a homeowner’s right to access association records and an association’s right to protect its interests in legal matters. How does A.R.S. § 33-1805 attempt to strike this balance, and how did the ruling in this case clarify its limits?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments raised by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. Terravita’s claim that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) exempted them was their affirmative defense.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that requires a planned community association to make financial and other records available for member examination within 10 business days.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that allows an association to withhold books and records from disclosure if the portion withheld relates to “pending litigation.”

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

The Arizona statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of statutes or community documents.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. The Petitioner bore the burden to prove the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden to establish its defense.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that received the Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown and ultimately adopted the ALJ’s decision, making it final.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which adopted the ALJ’s Recommended Order. This order is an administrative action and is effective immediately upon service.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct hearings on disputes, such as the one between Mr. Brown and Terravita.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or hearing by filing a petition. In this case, William M. Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Prevailing Party

The party who is successful in a legal case. The Final Order deemed William M. Brown the prevailing party.

Recommended Order

The initial decision and orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. This decision is then sent to the relevant state agency (in this case, the Department of Real Estate) for adoption.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. In this case, Terravita Country Club, Inc. was the Respondent.

Your HOA Can’t Use “Pending Litigation” to Hide Records. This Homeowner Proved It.

Introduction: The Wall of Secrecy

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like confronting an organization that operates with total authority and little transparency. Board decisions can seem arbitrary, and getting straight answers or access to official documents can be a frustrating, uphill battle. But what happens when an HOA flatly denies a simple request for records, citing a vague legal reason?

One homeowner decided to find out. The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a fascinating look at how a single individual challenged his HOA’s interpretation of state law. In doing so, he not only won access to the records he sought but also revealed a crucial limit on an HOA’s power to operate in secret.

The Takeaways: Four Lessons from a Landmark HOA Dispute

This case offers several powerful and practical lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt stonewalled by their association’s board.

Takeaway 1: “Pending Litigation” Isn’t a Blank Check to Deny Records

At the heart of the dispute was a simple request. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown asked his HOA, Terravita, for access to association records. The HOA denied the request, citing an exemption in Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)) that allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

Terravita’s argument was that this exemption applied because of a pending criminal case against Mr. Brown. Crucially, they argued this was not just any unrelated case; the criminal charges stemmed from allegations that Mr. Brown had threatened the HOA’s board members and property. From their perspective, the records request was directly linked to a hostile legal situation involving the association’s leadership. However, the critical fact remained that the HOA itself was not a formal party to the criminal case.

The judge’s ruling was definitive and clear: the “pending litigation” exemption can only be used to withhold records if the litigation is between the association and the member. Because Terravita was not a party to Mr. Brown’s criminal case, it had no legal grounds to use that case as an excuse to withhold its records from him. This ruling draws a bright line: The “pending litigation” shield cannot be borrowed from a separate case, even one that feels highly relevant to the HOA.

Takeaway 2: Legal Interpretations Must Be Sensible, Not Absurd

The HOA argued for a literal interpretation of the law, claiming the statute didn’t explicitly state that the association had to be a party to the litigation. Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson rejected this line of reasoning, stating that it would lead to an “absurd result.”

This is a critical lesson for homeowners. Judges are tasked with ensuring laws are applied sensibly. When an HOA’s interpretation of a rule would create an illogical or unfair outcome, it is vulnerable to legal challenge. The judge highlighted the flaw in the HOA’s logic with a powerful statement in her decision:

Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.

Takeaway 3: A Single Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge Their HOA

Perhaps the most empowering aspect of this case is who argued it. The court documents show that while the HOA was represented by legal counsel (“Joshua Bolen, Esq. appeared on behalf of Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.”), Mr. Brown represented himself (“Petitioner William M. Brown appeared on behalf of himself”).

Despite being outmatched on paper, Mr. Brown successfully researched the law, presented a logical argument, and held his ground. His victory demonstrates that the legal process is not just for lawyers. A well-researched, logical argument from a homeowner can be more powerful than a law firm’s flawed interpretation of a statute. The judge ultimately found that “Mr. Brown established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within 10 business days.”

Takeaway 4: Misapplying the Law Can Have Financial Consequences

This wasn’t just a moral victory. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017, came with tangible consequences for the HOA. For its failure to correctly apply the law, Terravita faced direct and tangible consequences.

• The HOA was ordered to provide the requested records within 10 days.

• The homeowner, Mr. Brown, was deemed the “prevailing party.”

• The HOA, Terravita, was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.

This outcome underscores a critical point: when an HOA oversteps its authority or misinterprets the law, it can be held financially responsible for the costs incurred by the homeowner forced to challenge its actions.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

The story of William M. Brown’s dispute with his HOA serves as a powerful reminder that HOAs do not have unlimited power. They are governed by specific state laws, and understanding those laws is the most effective tool a homeowner possesses.

The central lesson is that an HOA’s authority is not absolute, and its interpretation of its own rules—and, more importantly, state law—must be reasonable and sensible. This case affirms the right of members to transparency and proves that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully stand up for those rights.

After seeing how one homeowner held his board accountable, will you take the time to learn your rights before you need them?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William M. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Joshua Bolen (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:42:37 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:42:43 (789.4 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:51 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:55 (789.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

• February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

• February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

• March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

• March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

• July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

• July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

• August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

• August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

• August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

• August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

• September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

• June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

• July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

• July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

• Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

• Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

• Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

◦ Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

◦ Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

◦ Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

◦ Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

• Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

• Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

• Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

• Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.

Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing decision concerning William M. Brown’s records request to the Terravita Country Club. The case centers on the interpretation and application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing information exclusively from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was their established relationship?

2. What specific failure by Terravita Country Club, Inc. led Mr. Brown to file his Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to A.R.S. § 33-1805, what is the required timeframe for an association to fulfill a member’s request to examine its records?

4. What were the primary arguments Terravita presented to defend its failure to provide the requested records?

5. How did the Administrative Law Judge assess the credibility of the testimony provided by Mr. Brown and Terravita’s witness, Ms. Fran Wiley?

6. What piece of documentary evidence did Mr. Brown submit to prove he had sent the records request on July 30, 2016?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this hearing, and how is that standard defined in the decision?

8. What two specific actions did the final Recommended Order compel Terravita to take as a result of the ruling?

9. Why was Terravita’s argument that Mr. Brown failed to follow its internal rules for submitting records requests ultimately unsuccessful?

10. What was the role of the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate after the Administrative Law Judge issued her decision?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was William M. Brown, and the Respondent was Terravita Country Club, Inc. At all times relevant to the matter, Mr. Brown was a member of the Terravita Country Club.

2. Mr. Brown filed the petition because Terravita failed to respond to his July 30, 2016, request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). This failure to provide timely access to the records was the central violation alleged.

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that the association must fulfill a request for examination of its records within ten business days. If copies are requested, the association has ten business days to provide them and may charge up to fifteen cents per page.

4. Terravita argued that it never received the July 30, 2016, request from Mr. Brown. They also contended that his email evidence was falsified and that he failed to comply with their internal policy requiring such requests be sent to the General Manager or Director of Administration.

5. The Administrative Law Judge found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be credible. Conversely, the Judge found the testimony of Ms. Wiley, who testified on behalf of Terravita, to be unreliable.

6. Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016, forwarded email that contained his original July 30, 2016, email to Ms. Wiley. This original email contained the records request dated July 29, 2016.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as having “the most convincing force” or “superior evidentiary weight.”

8. The Recommended Order compelled Terravita to pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee within thirty days of the order. It also ordered Terravita to comply with the records request and provide the documents within ten days of the order.

9. The argument was unsuccessful because the Judge concluded that Terravita violated the plain meaning of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805. The ruling focused on this statutory violation, noting that Terravita did not contend that any of the law’s specific exceptions for withholding records applied.

10. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, was responsible for reviewing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. The Commissioner accepted the decision and issued a Final Order, which made the Judge’s recommendations legally binding and enforceable.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based solely on the provided source documents.

1. Analyze Terravita’s defense strategy. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments regarding not receiving the email, the alleged falsification of evidence, and the club’s internal policies for records requests.

2. Explain the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this standard to the conflicting testimonies of William Brown and Fran Wiley to reach her conclusion?

3. Discuss the significance of A.R.S. § 33-1805 in the context of planned communities. Based on the details in the case, why is a member’s right to access association records important, and what protections does this statute provide?

4. Trace the procedural path of this dispute from Mr. Brown’s initial records request to the Final Order. What roles did the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Department of Real Estate play in this process?

5. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision rested heavily on findings of credibility. Explore the factors detailed in the case documents that might have led the judge to find Mr. Brown’s testimony “credible” and Ms. Wiley’s “unreliable.”

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, evaluates evidence and testimony, and issues a recommended decision based on the law.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute at the heart of the case. It mandates that a planned community association must make all financial and other records reasonably available for a member’s examination within ten business days of a request.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove an assertion. The Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that the Respondent (Terravita) violated the statute.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency where Mr. Brown filed his Petition for Hearing. Its Commissioner (Judy Lowe) has the authority to accept an ALJ’s decision and issue a final, binding order.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent agency that conducts formal hearings for disputes concerning violations of planned community statutes, as authorized by A.R.S. § 41-1092.01.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this matter, the Petitioner was William M. Brown.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to prove his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Prevailing Party

The party who is successful and wins the legal dispute. The Administrative Law Judge’s order deemed the Petitioner, William M. Brown, to be the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the Respondent was Terravita Country Club, Inc.

He Sued His HOA Over an Unanswered Email—And Won. Here Are 4 Lessons from the Judge’s Ruling.

1. Introduction: The Black Hole of Bureaucracy

We’ve all been there. You draft a clear, important request, send it to a large organization, and wait. And wait. The silence that follows can feel like your message was sent into a black hole. This frustration is especially common for homeowners dealing with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA), where getting a straight answer or a timely response can seem impossible.

But what if being ignored is more than just frustrating? What if it’s a violation of the law? The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a powerful real-world example of one member who fought back against being ignored—and won. His persistence offers crucial lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt powerless against their association’s bureaucracy.

2. Takeaway 1: The “We Never Got the Email” Defense Isn’t Bulletproof

When faced with Mr. Brown’s petition, Terravita’s primary defense was simple: they claimed they never received his July 30, 2016, email requesting association records. They went even further, contending that the email evidence he provided was falsified.

This defense crumbled under scrutiny. Mr. Brown presented a forwarded email as evidence of his original request. In the end, the case came down to witness testimony, and the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion was direct and unambiguous. The judge made two critical findings on the credibility of the parties involved:

I find Mr. Brown’s testimony to be credible.

And regarding the testimony from Terravita’s representative, the Secretary Ms. Wiley:

I find Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be unreliable.

The judge’s conclusion was not arbitrary; it was based on a clear contradiction in the evidence. Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the specific email address where Mr. Brown sent the request for association business. However, evidence presented to the court showed that just a few months prior, she had successfully received and processed two separate records requests sent to that very same email address, proving it was a valid and functioning channel for communication. This detail demonstrates how an individual’s careful documentation can expose an organization’s flawed defense.

3. Takeaway 2: State Law Overrules Internal Red Tape

Terravita offered a second line of defense: even if they had received the email, Mr. Brown hadn’t followed their internal “Rules, Policies and Procedures.” The association argued that members were required to submit records requests to the General Manager or Director of Administration, not the association’s Secretary, whom Mr. Brown had emailed.

This argument was deemed irrelevant by the judge. The decision hinged not on Terravita’s internal rules, but on the plain language of Arizona state law, A.R.S. § 33-1805. The statute simply requires the association to make records available within ten business days of a request; it does not specify which officer or employee must receive that request.

By failing to respond, Terravita violated the statute, regardless of its own procedural preferences. This is a critical reminder for all homeowners: your rights are often enshrined in state law, and those rights cannot be diminished or negated by an HOA’s internal bylaws or policies.

4. Takeaway 3: A Simple Request Has a Firm Deadline

The core violation in this case was a failure to meet a specific, legally mandated deadline. Under Arizona law A.R.S. § 33-1805, an association has ten business days to fulfill a member’s request for the examination of records.

The timeline of events was clear:

• Mr. Brown sent his records request via email on July 30, 2016.

• The judge found that “Terravita did not respond to Mr. Brown’s records request within 10 business days.”

Adding weight to this was the fact that the association had previously proven itself more than capable of handling requests sent from Mr. Brown’s email account. Earlier that year, another individual had successfully requested records through the same channel. In those instances, Terravita had been prompt, often acknowledging requests within a day or two and making records available well within the legal deadline. This history undermined any claim of inability to respond. The law’s ten-day deadline is not a vague guideline; it is a specific and enforceable protection for members’ right to information.

5. Takeaway 4: Persistence Can Literally Pay Off

After reviewing the evidence, the judge ruled that Mr. Brown was the “prevailing party.” This victory was not just symbolic; it came with concrete orders that held the association accountable.

The judge’s final decision included the following orders:

• Terravita was ordered to comply with the records request within 10 days.

• Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.

Mr. Brown’s persistence didn’t just get him the documents he was legally entitled to; it also resulted in the full reimbursement of his filing costs. This outcome serves as a powerful example that standing up for your rights as a homeowner is not always a futile or expensive endeavor. With proper documentation and an understanding of the law, a single member can hold their association accountable.

6. Conclusion: Your Rights Are Written in Law

While homeowners are obligated to follow their HOA’s rules, the association is equally obligated to follow state law. These laws provide clear rights and protections designed to ensure transparency and fairness. The case of William M. Brown is a testament to the power of a single, well-documented request and the importance of understanding the laws that govern your association.

The next time you feel ignored by a large organization, what’s the one simple step you can take to ensure your request is not only heard, but documented?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William M. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself
  • Anita Bell (records requester)
    Requested records via Mr. Brown's e-mail account

Respondent Side

  • Joshua Bolen (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Appeared for Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Fran Wiley (secretary/witness)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
    Terravita Secretary; testified on behalf of Terravita
  • Tom Forbes (general manager)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Cici Rausch (director of administration)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Signed the Final Order
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed for rehearing requests and signed mailing notice

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel —
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 622756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:50 (85.6 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:58 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:02:06 (566.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

• March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

• June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

• July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

• July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

• Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

• Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

• Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

• Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

• Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

• Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

• Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

• Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

• Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

• Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.

Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative legal case involving Thomas Satterlee and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. It covers the core legal issues, arguments, and final rulings as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision and the Final Order from the Department of Real Estate.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central legal question that Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil had to decide?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, argue that the case should be dismissed?

4. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4), what specific criteria must an entity meet to be legally defined as a “planned community”?

5. What two key arguments did the Petitioner, Thomas Satterlee, present to persuade the Office of Administrative Hearings to accept jurisdiction over his case?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge address the Petitioner’s point about a previous case presided over by Judge Douglas?

7. Explain the legal principle that “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived” and how it was applied in this decision.

8. What was the final recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge, and what does the term “with prejudice” signify in this context?

9. What final action was taken by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

10. Although the petitions were dismissed, what alternative path was the Petitioner advised he could still pursue?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas Satterlee, who served as the Petitioner, and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who brought the case, and the Respondent is the party against whom the case was filed.

2. The central legal question was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions. The case hinged on determining if the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant the OAH authority to hear the dispute.

3. The Respondent argued for dismissal by filing a motion to vacate, alleging that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. They contended they were not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because the association did not own or operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

4. To be defined as a “planned community,” an entity must be a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by, or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways by, a nonprofit corporation or association of owners. The owners of separate lots are mandatory members required to pay assessments to the association for these purposes.

5. The Petitioner argued that the OAH should exercise jurisdiction because a former Administrative Law Judge (Douglas) had previously done so in a different case involving the same parties. He also argued that the Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the law governing planned communities.

6. The Administrative Law Judge reviewed the prior decision by Judge Douglas and found that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction had not been raised or considered in that case. Therefore, Judge Douglas’s prior action did not set a binding precedent on the jurisdictional question.

7. This principle means that a court’s or agency’s fundamental authority to hear a type of case is determined by statute and cannot be created by the agreement, consent, or failure to object (estoppel) of the parties involved. In this case, even if the parties had previously acted as if the OAH had jurisdiction, the judge was required to dismiss the case because the statutory requirements for jurisdiction were not met.

8. The Administrative Law Judge recommended that the petitions be dismissed “with prejudice.” This means the dismissal is final and the Petitioner is barred from filing the same claim again within the same administrative forum (the OAH).

9. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in full. The Commissioner issued a Final Order on July 7, 2017, formally dismissing the petitions with prejudice.

10. The Petitioner was advised that he remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction. This means he could pursue his claims against the Respondent in the appropriate state court system as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the provided source material.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Marwil to reject the Petitioner’s arguments. Discuss the specific statutes and case law she cited (e.g., Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas) and explain how they supported her conclusion that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Discuss the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802. How did the pre-2014 and post-2014 definitions of a “planned community” differ, and why was the Respondent found not to qualify under either definition?

3. Explore the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction as presented in the case documents. Explain why it is a critical issue that cannot be waived by the parties or established by estoppel, citing the legal authorities mentioned in the decision (Ariz. Bd. of Regents and Swichtenberg).

4. Evaluate the Petitioner’s arguments for jurisdiction. Why might he have believed that the previous ruling by Judge Douglas and the language in the community’s documents were sufficient grounds for the OAH to hear his case, and why were these arguments ultimately unpersuasive from a legal standpoint?

5. Trace the procedural history of the case from the filing of the Respondent’s motion to the Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Describe each key step and the role played by the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and often issues a recommended decision to an agency head. In this case, Suzanne Marwil.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which is the complete body of laws enacted by the Arizona State Legislature.

Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate

The head of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, who has the authority to adopt, reject, or modify the recommended decisions of an ALJ. In this case, Judy Lowe.

Consolidated Matters

Two or more separate legal cases (in this instance, No. 17F-H1716022-REL and No. 17F-H1716018-REL) that are combined into a single proceeding for efficiency.

Estoppel

A legal principle that prevents a party from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what they have previously stated or agreed to by their own actions. The decision notes jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel.

Motion to Vacate

A formal request made to a court or administrative body to cancel or set aside a prior judgment, order, or hearing.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The Arizona state agency responsible for conducting impartial administrative hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a formal complaint or petition, bringing a case before a court or administrative body. In this case, Thomas Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development where an association owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways, and where property owners are mandatory, assessment-paying members.

Recommended Order

The proposed decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge following a hearing or argument. This order is not final until it is adopted by the relevant agency director or commissioner.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The legal authority of a court or administrative agency to hear and decide a particular type of case. Its absence is a fatal flaw that cannot be overlooked or waived.

With Prejudice

A legal term for the dismissal of a case, indicating that the action is final and the petitioner is barred from bringing the same case on the same grounds before that same body again.

⚖️

17F-H1716018-REL

2 sources

These sources document the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. The initial source contains the Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, which recommends the dismissal of Satterlee’s petitions due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction is based on the finding that the Property Owners Association does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” because it does not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant, which are requirements under Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802. The second source, a Final Order from the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, accepting the recommendation that the consolidated matters be dismissed with prejudice. Both documents confirm that Satterlee’s only recourse is to pursue his claims in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas Satterlee (petitioner)
    Represented himself

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Handled mailing of the Final Order and addressed requests for rehearing
  • Douglas (former ALJ)
    Former ALJ who exercised jurisdiction in a prior related case (15F-H1515008-BFS)

Jason West vs. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner’s petition alleging the HOA failed to fill board vacancies (Bylaw § 3.6 violation), finding that the HOA had made reasonable efforts, but vacancies could not be filled because no eligible members were willing to serve, partly due to the Petitioner's actions.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jason West Counsel —
Respondent Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Counsel Stewart F. Salwin, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaw § 3.6

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner’s petition alleging the HOA failed to fill board vacancies (Bylaw § 3.6 violation), finding that the HOA had made reasonable efforts, but vacancies could not be filled because no eligible members were willing to serve, partly due to the Petitioner's actions.

Why this result: Respondent established that the Board performed all reasonable actions to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner's obstructionist tactics, rendering enforcement of the Bylaw impossible as it would lead to an absurdity.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusing to fill vacancies on Respondent’s Board of Directors

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on the Board of Directors. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board had done all it could to fill vacancies, but no eligible members were willing to serve, and Bylaw § 3.6 does not empower the Board to conscript unwilling members.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona, 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Board Vacancies, Bylaw 3.6, Obstructionist Tactics, Refusal to Serve
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • Mail Boxes v. Industrial Comm’n of Arizona
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 572314.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:04:00 (137.9 KB)

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 576049.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:04:04 (1160.4 KB)

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 572314.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:29 (137.9 KB)

17F-H1716031-REL Decision – 576049.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:32 (1160.4 KB)

Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative hearing and final order concerning a petition filed by homeowner Jason West (“Petitioner”) against the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The Petitioner alleged that the HOA’s Board of Directors violated its own Bylaw § 3.6 by failing to fill vacant board positions.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the petition, a decision that was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The central finding was that the Respondent had made repeated and reasonable efforts to fill the vacancies but was unsuccessful due to a lack of willing and eligible candidates. The ALJ concluded that the governing bylaw mandates the appointment of willing members but does not grant the power to conscript individuals to serve against their will. Furthermore, the decision determined that the shortage of volunteers was attributable, in part, to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics,” which created a hostile and dysfunctional environment, leading to a series of board member resignations and deterring potential candidates.

Case Overview

• Case Number: 17F-H1716031-REL

• Petitioner: Jason West, a homeowner and member of the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.

• Respondent: Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, representing a small community of approximately 40 homes.

• Core Allegation: On April 10, 2017, the Petitioner filed a single-issue petition alleging the Respondent violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

• Hearing Date: June 21, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

• Final Disposition: The Petitioner’s petition was denied in a decision dated June 28, 2017. This decision was adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017, making it binding on the parties.

Governing Bylaw in Dispute

The central issue revolved around the interpretation of Section 3.6 of the HOA’s Bylaws, which states:

Vacancies. Vacancies on the Board caused by any reason other than the removal of a director in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.3 of these Bylaws shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the first regular or special meeting of the Board held after the occurrence of such vacancy, even though the directors present at such meeting may constitute less than a quorum. Each person so elected shall serve the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

Key Parties and Witnesses

Role / Affiliation

Key Testimony / Actions

Jason West

Petitioner, Homeowner, Former Board President

Filed the petition alleging bylaw violation. Previously filed recall petitions against other board members, resigned from the board himself, and proposed a bylaw amendment that disqualified newly elected members.

Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray

Respondent’s Board President

Testified that the board made repeated efforts to find volunteers, but no one was willing to serve, citing the Petitioner’s behavior as a major cause for resignations and lack of interest.

Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla

Community Manager, National Property Service (NPS)

Testified about sending multiple email requests for board candidates on behalf of the board, which yielded no interested parties other than those who would later be disqualified.

Christina Van Soest

Former Board Member

Resigned on Feb. 8, 2017, stating, “I have found the direction of some of the board does not appear to be in the best interest of the community as a whole.” Testified she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner.

Elizabeth Mayhew

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 4, 2017, citing stress directly related to the Petitioner: “I have enough stress daily with my job and cannot handle this or him. It is making me physically ill and he is not worth that.”

Myron (“Ray”) Elmer

Former Board Member

Resigned on Apr. 5, 2017, with the stated reason: “[d]ue to continued problems Jason etc.”

Korey Hjelmeir & Debra Epstein

Former Board Members

Testified for the Petitioner’s rebuttal. Both had previously resigned in June 2016 in response to the Petitioner’s recall petitions and were later disqualified from serving by a bylaw amendment he proposed.

Chronology of Board Destabilization and Resignations

The hearing evidence established a pattern of significant board turnover and dysfunction between June 2016 and June 2017.

• June 23, 2016: Board members Adrian Justiniano, Debra Epstein, and Korey Hjelmeir resigned after the Petitioner filed recall petitions against them.

• August 3, 2016: The Petitioner, June Thompson, and Christina Van Soest were elected to the Board. The Petitioner served as president.

• August 18, 2016: The Board expanded from 3 to 5 members, appointing Gina Murray and Ray Elmer.

• August 29, 2016: June Thompson resigned.

• February 8, 2017: Christina Van Soest resigned, citing the board’s direction and her discomfort with the Petitioner’s “research into members’ backgrounds and history, and the way he was making Board decisions.”

• February 18, 2017: The Petitioner resigned from the Board because he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

• April 4, 2017: Elizabeth Mayhew resigned, stating she could not handle the stress caused by the Petitioner and his “verbal assaults, constant lashing out, and personal attacks.”

• April 5, 2017: Ray Elmer resigned, attributing his departure to “continued problems Jason etc.” This left Gina Murray as the sole remaining board member.

Respondent’s Efforts to Fill Vacancies

The Respondent provided evidence of multiple, documented attempts to recruit new board members.

• February 23, 2017: Following the resignations of Ms. Van Soest and the Petitioner, Community Manager Eddie Padilla sent an email requesting “motivated and dedicated individuals” to serve on the Board. No one responded.

• March 31, 2017: At an open Board Meeting with “Board appointments” on the agenda, Gina Murray asked for volunteers and nominations from the floor. No one responded.

• April 4 & 18, 2017: Mr. Padilla sent two further emails requesting members interested in serving on the board to submit biographies for an upcoming annual meeting. The only individuals to respond and submit biographies were Mr. Justiniano and Ms. Hjelmeir.

• May 15, 2017: At the annual meeting, Ms. Murray again accepted nominations from the floor. Debra Epstein was nominated.

• June 5, 2017: After the newly elected board was disqualified, Mr. Padilla sent another email asking for volunteers.

Petitioner’s Actions and Their Consequences

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision identified the Petitioner’s own actions as a primary cause for the board’s inability to fill vacancies.

• Instigation of Resignations: The Petitioner’s recall petitions in June 2016 and behavior cited in the 2017 resignation letters from Van Soest, Mayhew, and Elmer directly contributed to the board vacancies.

• Contradictory Claims: The Petitioner testified that four individuals (Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti) were interested in serving. However, the sign-in sheet for the March 31, 2017 meeting, where appointments were to be made, showed none of these individuals were present.

• Disqualifying Bylaw Amendment: The Petitioner proposed a new bylaw, § 3.12, which was passed at the May 15, 2017 meeting. It stated:

• Attempted Removal of Remaining Director: On June 12, 2017, the Petitioner submitted a petition to remove Gina Murray, the last remaining original board member, which would have left the board entirely vacant.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The ALJ’s conclusions of law were decisive in denying the petition.

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated its bylaws.

2. Interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6: The Judge ruled that while the bylaw requires the Board to appoint members to fill vacancies, “it does not empower the Board to conscript members who are not willing to serve on the Board.”

3. Principle of Absurdity: Citing legal precedent, the decision stated that bylaws must be construed to avoid an absurd result. Forcing an HOA to operate without a board because no eligible members are willing to serve, especially when the situation is exacerbated by the Petitioner, would be such an absurdity.

4. Respondent’s Due Diligence: The Judge found that “Respondent established that the Board has done all it could to fill vacancies.”

5. Petitioner’s Culpability: The final conclusion explicitly states that “at this time, no eligible members are willing to serve, in part due to Petitioner’s obstructionist tactics, including Petitioner and his claimed supporters.”

Based on these findings, the ALJ ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The order became final and binding upon adoption by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 12, 2017.

Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1716031-REL, Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Jason West, in his April 10, 2017 petition?

2. According to the text of Bylaw § 3.6, how are vacancies on the Board of Directors supposed to be filled?

3. Who was the sole remaining member of the Board of Directors at the time of the mass resignations in April 2017, and what was her stated reason for not resigning?

4. Describe the circumstances that led to the resignations of board members Christina Van Soest and Jason West in February 2017.

5. What was the immediate and paradoxical outcome of the May 15, 2017 annual meeting election?

6. Explain the purpose and effect of the proposed Bylaw § 3.12, which was sponsored by the Petitioner.

7. What efforts did the Respondent’s management company, National Property Service (NPS), make to recruit new board members?

8. On what grounds did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky deny the Petitioner’s petition?

9. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, why were certain individuals he named hesitant to volunteer for the Board?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate take regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

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Answer Key

1. Jason West’s single-issue petition alleged that the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (the Respondent) had violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

2. Bylaw § 3.6 states that vacancies on the Board (for reasons other than removal) shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the next meeting. The person elected serves the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

3. Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray was the sole remaining board member. She stated she had no intention of resigning because it was important for someone to serve the community’s interests, such as negotiating the insurance contract and handling other community affairs.

4. Christina Van Soest resigned on February 8, 2017, stating the board’s direction was not in the community’s best interest and she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner’s methods. On February 18, 2017, Jason West resigned, citing his belief that he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

5. At the May 15, 2017 meeting, Eugenia Murray, Debra Epstein, Adrian Justiniano, and Korey Hjelmeir were elected to the Board. However, a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner also passed at the same meeting, which made Epstein, Justiniano, and Hjelmeir ineligible to serve because they had resigned within the previous year.

6. The proposed Bylaw § 3.12 was designed to ban any director who resigns or is removed from serving on the board again for one year. Its passage at the May 15, 2017 meeting had the immediate effect of disqualifying three of the four newly elected board members.

7. NPS, through Community Manager Edward Padilla, sent out multiple emails requesting that interested individuals submit biographies to be considered for board positions. These requests were sent on February 23, April 4, April 18, and June 5, 2017.

8. Judge Mihalsky denied the petition because the Respondent had established that the Board did all it could to fill the vacancies. The judge concluded that the Bylaws cannot be construed to empower the Board to conscript unwilling members and that the lack of volunteers was due in part to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics.”

9. The Petitioner testified that Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti were interested but had two conditions. They were concerned about serving with certain other members (Murray, Hjelmeir, Justiniano, or the Epsteins) and wanted assurance that the directors’ insurance policy would be renewed, which was questionable due to petitions filed by West himself.

10. On July 12, 2017, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order made the denial of the Petitioner’s petition binding on the parties.

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Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of Jason West in the series of board resignations and the difficulty in finding new board members, citing specific evidence presented by the Respondent and testimony from former board members.

2. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6. How does the judge balance the literal requirement to fill vacancies with the practical realities faced by the Board, and what legal principles support this interpretation?

3. Trace the timeline of board membership from March 2016 to May 2017. What patterns emerge regarding appointments, resignations, and elections, and how do these events illustrate the internal conflict within the Desert Sage Two community?

4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Bylaw amendment (§ 3.12) proposed by Jason West. Did it achieve its likely intended purpose, and what were its immediate, perhaps unintended, consequences for the governance of the homeowners’ association?

5. Based on the evidence presented, construct an argument for why the Respondent, Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, successfully defended itself against the Petitioner’s claim. Your answer should focus on the actions taken by the Board and its management company and the legal conclusions drawn by the judge.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Bylaw § 3.12 (Proposed)

An amendment proposed by the Petitioner that would ban any director who resigns or is removed from the board from serving again for a period of one year. This amendment was passed at the May 15, 2017 annual meeting.

Bylaw § 3.6

The section of the Respondent’s bylaws that was the central issue of the petition. It requires the remaining directors to fill board vacancies by a majority vote at the next regular or special meeting.

Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; a small homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 40 condominium homes.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which formally adopts the ALJ’s decision. This order makes the ruling effective and outlines the process for requesting a rehearing.

Jason West

The Petitioner in the case. He is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a petition alleging the Board violated Bylaw § 3.6.

National Property Service (NPS)

The management company employed by the Respondent, represented in the hearing by Community Manager Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for cases referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Jason West.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has the greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.

Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1716031-REL, Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Jason West, in his April 10, 2017 petition?

2. According to the text of Bylaw § 3.6, how are vacancies on the Board of Directors supposed to be filled?

3. Who was the sole remaining member of the Board of Directors at the time of the mass resignations in April 2017, and what was her stated reason for not resigning?

4. Describe the circumstances that led to the resignations of board members Christina Van Soest and Jason West in February 2017.

5. What was the immediate and paradoxical outcome of the May 15, 2017 annual meeting election?

6. Explain the purpose and effect of the proposed Bylaw § 3.12, which was sponsored by the Petitioner.

7. What efforts did the Respondent’s management company, National Property Service (NPS), make to recruit new board members?

8. On what grounds did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky deny the Petitioner’s petition?

9. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, why were certain individuals he named hesitant to volunteer for the Board?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate take regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Jason West’s single-issue petition alleged that the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (the Respondent) had violated Bylaw § 3.6 by refusing to fill vacancies on its Board of Directors.

2. Bylaw § 3.6 states that vacancies on the Board (for reasons other than removal) shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining directors at the next meeting. The person elected serves the unexpired portion of the prior director’s term.

3. Eugenia (“Gina”) Murray was the sole remaining board member. She stated she had no intention of resigning because it was important for someone to serve the community’s interests, such as negotiating the insurance contract and handling other community affairs.

4. Christina Van Soest resigned on February 8, 2017, stating the board’s direction was not in the community’s best interest and she was uncomfortable with the Petitioner’s methods. On February 18, 2017, Jason West resigned, citing his belief that he had “more important things to worry about than the management of this dysfunctional community.”

5. At the May 15, 2017 meeting, Eugenia Murray, Debra Epstein, Adrian Justiniano, and Korey Hjelmeir were elected to the Board. However, a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner also passed at the same meeting, which made Epstein, Justiniano, and Hjelmeir ineligible to serve because they had resigned within the previous year.

6. The proposed Bylaw § 3.12 was designed to ban any director who resigns or is removed from serving on the board again for one year. Its passage at the May 15, 2017 meeting had the immediate effect of disqualifying three of the four newly elected board members.

7. NPS, through Community Manager Edward Padilla, sent out multiple emails requesting that interested individuals submit biographies to be considered for board positions. These requests were sent on February 23, April 4, April 18, and June 5, 2017.

8. Judge Mihalsky denied the petition because the Respondent had established that the Board did all it could to fill the vacancies. The judge concluded that the Bylaws cannot be construed to empower the Board to conscript unwilling members and that the lack of volunteers was due in part to the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics.”

9. The Petitioner testified that Linda Siedler, Teresa Price, Bret Morse, and Bryan Brunatti were interested but had two conditions. They were concerned about serving with certain other members (Murray, Hjelmeir, Justiniano, or the Epsteins) and wanted assurance that the directors’ insurance policy would be renewed, which was questionable due to petitions filed by West himself.

10. On July 12, 2017, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order made the denial of the Petitioner’s petition binding on the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the role of Jason West in the series of board resignations and the difficulty in finding new board members, citing specific evidence presented by the Respondent and testimony from former board members.

2. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Bylaw § 3.6. How does the judge balance the literal requirement to fill vacancies with the practical realities faced by the Board, and what legal principles support this interpretation?

3. Trace the timeline of board membership from March 2016 to May 2017. What patterns emerge regarding appointments, resignations, and elections, and how do these events illustrate the internal conflict within the Desert Sage Two community?

4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the Bylaw amendment (§ 3.12) proposed by Jason West. Did it achieve its likely intended purpose, and what were its immediate, perhaps unintended, consequences for the governance of the homeowners’ association?

5. Based on the evidence presented, construct an argument for why the Respondent, Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, successfully defended itself against the Petitioner’s claim. Your answer should focus on the actions taken by the Board and its management company and the legal conclusions drawn by the judge.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Bylaw § 3.12 (Proposed)

An amendment proposed by the Petitioner that would ban any director who resigns or is removed from the board from serving again for a period of one year. This amendment was passed at the May 15, 2017 annual meeting.

Bylaw § 3.6

The section of the Respondent’s bylaws that was the central issue of the petition. It requires the remaining directors to fill board vacancies by a majority vote at the next regular or special meeting.

Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; a small homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 40 condominium homes.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which formally adopts the ALJ’s decision. This order makes the ruling effective and outlines the process for requesting a rehearing.

Jason West

The Petitioner in the case. He is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a petition alleging the Board violated Bylaw § 3.6.

National Property Service (NPS)

The management company employed by the Respondent, represented in the hearing by Community Manager Edward (“Eddie”) Padilla.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for cases referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Jason West.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has the greater weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jason West (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; testified on his own behalf
  • Linda Siedler (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Teresa Price (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Bret Morse (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; submitted absentee ballot; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray
  • Bryan Brunatti (witness, member)
    Allegedly interested in serving on the Board; attended meeting and counted ballots; signed petition to remove Ms. Murray

Respondent Side

  • Stewart F. Salwin (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Represented the Respondent
  • Eugenia Murray (board president, witness)
    Only current Board member at the time of hearing; testified for Respondent
  • Edward Padilla (property manager, witness)
    National Property Service (NPC)
    Community Manager; testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    ADRE Commissioner who adopted the ALJ Decision

Other Participants

  • Korey Hjelmeir (witness, former board member)
    Testified for Petitioner as former Board member; resigned and later sought re-election
  • Debra Epstein (witness, former board member)
    Testified for Petitioner as former Board member; resigned and later sought re-election; appeared via Skype at a meeting
  • Adrian Justiniano (former board member)
    Resigned and later sought re-election
  • June Thompson (former board member)
    Elected and resigned in 2016
  • Christina Van Soest (former board member)
    Elected and resigned in 2017
  • Myron Elmer (former board member)
    Appointed and resigned in 2017
  • Elizabeth Mayhew (former board member)
    Appointed and resigned in 2017
  • David Epstein (member)
    Appeared via Skype at a meeting; expressed interest in serving on Board
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Individual to whom requests for rehearing should be addressed

Mark Virden vs. Lakeside Ski Village HOA

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Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717027-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-27
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The petition was denied because the Tribunal found that the HOA's Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the internet tower under the governing documents (CC&Rs) without requiring ratification or disclosure of potential conflicts to the members acting as the board, thus avoiding a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1811 in this instance.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Mark Virden Counsel —
Respondent Lakeside Ski Village HOA Counsel Stewart F. Salwin

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Outcome Summary

The petition was denied because the Tribunal found that the HOA's Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the internet tower under the governing documents (CC&Rs) without requiring ratification or disclosure of potential conflicts to the members acting as the board, thus avoiding a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1811 in this instance.

Why this result: The decision to approve the tower was made by the Architectural Committee, which had independent authority under the CC&Rs. Therefore, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1811 regarding disclosure of compensation to the members acting as the board were found not to apply to the Committee's action.

Key Issues & Findings

Board of Directors, Contracts, and Conflicts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1811 when it allowed the construction of an internet service tower after a board member's spouse paid the upfront fee in exchange for permanent free service (compensation). Petitioner argued this compensation required disclosure in an open meeting of the board before approval, which did not occur.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: conflict_of_interest, architectural_committee, board_authority, internet_tower, compensation, CC&Rs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717027-REL Decision – 571928.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:04:26 (82.2 KB)

17F-H1717027-REL Decision – 575046.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:04:32 (736.4 KB)

17F-H1717027-REL Decision – 571928.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:48 (82.2 KB)

17F-H1717027-REL Decision – 575046.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:52 (736.4 KB)

Briefing: Virden v. Lakeside Ski Village HOA (Case No. 17F-H1717027-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the legal dispute between homeowner Mark Virden (Petitioner) and the Lakeside Ski Village Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning the construction of an internet service tower on HOA common property. The Petitioner alleged a violation of Arizona’s conflict of interest statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811), asserting that HOA officials received undisclosed compensation—lifelong free internet service—in exchange for approving the tower.

The case culminated in a definitive ruling against the Petitioner. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the petition, a decision that was subsequently adopted and finalized by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the ruling rested on the HOA’s unique governance structure. The decision to approve the tower was made not by the general “board of directors” (in this HOA, the members act as the board), but by the Architectural Committee, which was vested with independent authority to do so by the HOA’s governing documents (CC&Rs). Consequently, the ALJ concluded that the state law requiring conflict of interest disclosures before the board was not applicable to the committee’s action, rendering the Petitioner’s central argument invalid. The approval of the tower was deemed proper under the HOA’s governing rules.

Case Overview

Entity

Name / Description

Case Number

17F-H1717027-REL

Petitioner

Mark Virden

Respondent

Lakeside Ski Village HOA

Presiding ALJ

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Timeline of Key Events

• Circa 2017: The internet company AireBeam approached the HOA to install a service tower but did not secure enough subscribers to fund the project.

• Circa 2017: Lou Talarico, husband of an Architectural Committee member, offered to pay the tower’s upfront cost in exchange for free service for himself and HOA Vice President Carl Rygg. The Architectural Committee subsequently approved construction.

• March 23, 2017: Mark Virden filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging a conflict of interest violation.

• June 7, 2017: A hearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• June 27, 2017: ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer issued a decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

• July 10, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate issued a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

The petition filed by Mark Virden centered on a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1811, which governs contracts and conflicts of interest for HOA boards of directors.

Primary Allegation: Undisclosed Conflict of Interest

The Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated state law by failing to disclose a conflict of interest related to the tower’s approval.

• The Conflict: Susan Talarico, a licensed realtor serving on the Architectural Committee, had a conflict because her husband, Lou Talarico, paid an upfront fee to the tower company. In exchange for this payment, the Talaricos and HOA Vice President Carl Rygg were to receive free internet service for as long as the tower remained operational.

• The Alleged Violation: According to the petition, this arrangement constituted compensation that should have been formally declared in an open meeting before any action was taken, as required by law. The petition states: “This law states that if a member of the board is receiving compensation, and has not declared that conflict in advance, then any contract entered into in violation of this law is void and unenforceable!”

• Perceived Inadequate Compensation: The Petitioner claimed the value of the free service far exceeded the cash contribution, stating, “…their contribution would only pay the equivalent of about 1-2 years of service for the two households.”

• Lack of Transparency: The petition alleges a refusal by the involved board members to provide details of their arrangement. When asked about the compensation, the Vice President reportedly stated, “it’s none of your business.”

Secondary Argument

The Petitioner alternatively argued that the Architectural Committee exceeded its authority. Because the tower could provide service to individuals outside the HOA, it was not exclusively “for the benefit of all or portions” of the HOA, as stipulated by the governing documents.

Personal Grievance

The petition notes a direct personal impact on the Petitioner, stating that the tower was constructed within 150 feet of his front door and that he found it to be “a huge eye sore.”

Respondent’s Governance and Authority

The Lakeside Ski Village HOA’s defense rested on its specific governing documents and organizational structure, which were found to be central to the case’s outcome.

• Unconventional Board Structure: The HOA does not have a traditional, separate board of directors. Its Bylaws stipulate that “The affairs of the Association will be managed by the Members, who by the Association’s Articles of Organization are authorized to exercise all powers normally exercised by a board of directors.”

• Delegated Authority to Architectural Committee: The HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs) grants specific and independent power to its Architectural Committee. The CC&Rs state: “The Architectural Committee may permit one or more aerial satellite dishes or satellite communication systems, and/or other apparatus and equipment for an antenna or cable system for the benefit of all or portions of the Project.”

This structure meant that the authority to approve the tower resided with the committee, not the general membership acting as a board.

Adjudication and Final Ruling

The dispute was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings, with the final decision adopted by the Department of Real Estate. The Petitioner’s claims were ultimately rejected.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The ALJ’s decision, issued on June 27, 2017, denied the petition based on the following legal rationale:

• Architectural Committee’s Authority Was Dispositive: The ALJ found that the CC&Rs explicitly empowered the Architectural Committee to approve the communication tower. Crucially, the decision established that “Nothing in the CC&Rs requires that the Architectural Committee’s decision must be ratified by the members acting as a board.”

• Conflict of Interest Law Not Applicable: A.R.S. § 33-1811 applies to actions and decisions taken “by or on behalf of the board of directors.” Because the Architectural Committee acted under its own authority granted by the CC&Rs, its decision was not an action of the “board” as defined by the statute.

• Conclusion on Disclosure: The ALJ concluded that even if the free internet service was considered compensation (assuming arguendo), the arrangement “did not have to be disclosed to the members acting as a board.”

• Rejection of Secondary Argument: The ALJ dismissed the argument that the tower did not benefit the HOA, noting that the CC&R language “does not require that the satellite dish or other system may benefit exclusively all or portions of the HOA.”

The final conclusion of the tribunal was that “the Architectural Committee’s approval of the AireBeam tower was proper under Respondent’s governing documents.”

Final Order of the Department of Real Estate

On July 10, 2017, Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order that formally adopted the ALJ’s decision.

• Outcome: The Petitioner’s petition was officially denied.

• Binding Nature: The Order is binding on the parties and represents a final administrative action.

• Avenues for Appeal: The Order noted that a party may request a rehearing within 30 days for specific causes, such as procedural irregularity, newly discovered evidence, or an arbitrary or capricious decision. Furthermore, a party may appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide: Virden v. Lakeside Ski Village HOA

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Petitioner Mark Virden and Respondent Lakeside Ski Village HOA, concerning the construction of an internet service tower. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What specific Arizona Revised Statute did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what does this statute govern?

3. Describe the unique governance structure of the Lakeside Ski Village HOA as noted in the hearing’s findings of fact.

4. What was the arrangement between AireBeam, Lou Talarico, and Carl Rygg that led to the construction of the internet tower?

5. According to the HOA’s governing documents (CC&Rs), what specific authority was granted to its Architectural Committee?

6. On what key legal basis did the Administrative Law Judge reject the Petitioner’s claim of a conflict of interest violation?

7. What was the Petitioner’s alternative argument regarding the tower not being for the “benefit of all or portions” of the HOA, and how did the Judge rule on it?

8. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and identify which party had the burden of meeting this standard.

9. What was the final outcome of Mark Virden’s petition, as determined by the Administrative Law Judge and subsequently adopted?

10. After the Final Order was issued on July 10, 2017, what were the potential next steps for a party wishing to challenge the decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Mark Virden (Petitioner) and the Lakeside Ski Village HOA (Respondent). The central dispute was Virden’s allegation that the HOA improperly allowed the construction of an internet service tower on common property due to an undisclosed conflict of interest involving board members.

2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1811. This statute governs contracts and conflicts of interest for an HOA’s board of directors, requiring a board member to declare a conflict in an open meeting if a decision would benefit them or a close family member.

3. The Lakeside Ski Village HOA does not have a traditional board of directors. Instead, its Bylaws state that the affairs of the Association are managed directly by the members, who are authorized to exercise all powers normally held by a board.

4. After the HOA failed to secure enough subscribers for AireBeam to build the tower, Lou Talarico offered to pay the upfront cost. In exchange for his payment, AireBeam agreed to provide free internet service to Mr. Talarico and HOA Vice President Carl Rygg for as long as the tower was operational.

5. The HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs) grants the Architectural Committee the authority to “permit one or more aerial satellite dishes or satellite communication systems, and/or other apparatus and equipment for an antenna or cable system for the benefit of all or portions of the Project.”

6. The Judge rejected the claim because the HOA’s CC&Rs empowered the Architectural Committee to approve the tower directly, without needing ratification from the members acting as a board. Therefore, the disclosure requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1811, which apply to actions taken “by or on behalf of the board of directors,” were not applicable to the Committee’s decision.

7. The Petitioner argued that because people outside the HOA could subscribe to the service, the tower was not for the “benefit of all or portions” of the HOA, meaning the Architectural Committee exceeded its authority. The Judge ruled that the language of the CC&Rs does not require that the system exclusively benefit the HOA.

8. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Mark Virden, bore the burden of proving his allegations by this standard.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied, concluding that the Architectural Committee’s approval of the tower was proper. This decision was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, making it the Final Order.

10. A dissatisfied party could request a rehearing within thirty (30) days for specific causes, such as procedural irregularity, misconduct, or newly discovered evidence. Alternatively, a party could appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review in court.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the central conflict between the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1811, which governs board actions, and the specific powers granted to the Architectural Committee in the Lakeside Ski Village HOA’s CC&Rs. Explain in detail how this conflict, and its interpretation by the Judge, determined the outcome of the case.

2. Discuss the concept of “conflict of interest” as presented in the Petitioner’s complaint. Evaluate whether the actions of the Talaricos and Carl Rygg constituted a conflict of interest, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge’s decision did not ultimately hinge on this point, referencing the use of the term arguendo in the Conclusions of Law.

3. Explain the procedural journey of this case, from the initial petition filing on or about March 23, 2017, to the Final Order issued on July 10, 2017. Identify the key bodies and officials involved at each stage (e.g., Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge, Commissioner).

4. The Petitioner’s complaint details his frustration with a perceived lack of transparency from board members regarding their compensation agreement with AireBeam. Despite these ethical concerns, the petition failed. Based on the “Conclusions of Law,” explain the legal reasoning that rendered the Petitioner’s arguments about transparency and fairness insufficient to prove a violation under the cited statute.

5. The Final Order outlines eight specific causes for which a rehearing or review could be granted. Choose two of these causes (e.g., “The findings of fact or decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion,” or “Newly discovered material evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the original hearing”) and construct a hypothetical argument that Mark Virden could have made for a rehearing based on them, using the facts presented in the case documents.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing, reviews evidence, makes findings of fact, draws conclusions of law, and issues a decision. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of all the laws passed by the Arizona legislature. The statute at the center of this case was A.R.S. § 33-1811.

Arguendo

A Latin term meaning “for the sake of argument.” The Judge used this to temporarily accept a point as true (that the free service was compensation) in order to show that even if it were true, the Petitioner’s argument would still fail on other legal grounds.

An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements. These are the governing legal documents that establish the rules and operational framework for a homeowners association.

Common Area

Property within the HOA, such as land for a community tower, that is owned and shared by all members of the association.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has jurisdiction to hear certain disputes between property owners and their homeowners associations.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a planned community or subdivision that creates and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Lakeside Ski Village HOA.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Mark Virden.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means the evidence presented must be of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing a fact is more probable than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Lakeside Ski Village HOA.

How Two HOA Insiders Got Free Internet For Life—And Why the Law Couldn’t Stop Them

Introduction: The Rules Aren’t Always What They Seem

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowner Association (HOA) is built on a simple assumption: while the rules can be strict, they exist to protect the community from abuses of power. We trust that state laws and an HOA’s own documents prevent board members from using their position for personal enrichment. The concept of a “conflict of interest” seems straightforward—board members can’t vote on deals that benefit themselves or their families.

But what if a deal that looks like a textbook conflict of interest was found to be perfectly legal? This is the cautionary tale of Mark Virden v. Lakeside Ski Village HOA, a shocking case from Arizona that turns our assumptions on their head. It’s a story where insiders secured a deal for free lifetime internet service, and despite a homeowner’s legitimate outrage, the law was powerless to stop them. The case wasn’t decided on fairness or ethics, but on the fine print buried in the HOA’s governing documents.

This case is a crucial lesson for every homeowner. It reveals how seemingly innocuous clauses can be weaponized to bypass transparency laws, effectively legalizing what would otherwise be considered a blatant conflict of interest. It demonstrates that in the world of community associations, power doesn’t always reside where you think it does, and the only thing protecting you is a deep understanding of your own community’s rules.

Takeaway 1: A Committee’s Power Can Sidestep Conflict-of-Interest Laws

The petitioner’s argument was simple and seemed like a slam dunk. An internet company needed to build a service tower on HOA common property but lacked enough subscribers to fund it. Lou Talarico, whose wife Susan was on the HOA’s Architectural Committee, offered to pay the upfront installation costs. In exchange, Mr. Talarico and the HOA’s Vice President, Carl Rygg, would receive free internet service for life.

This arrangement reeks of a conflict of interest, and on its face, appears to be a direct violation of Arizona’s statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811). The law requires that if an action “taken by or on behalf of the board of directors” would benefit a board member’s spouse, the conflict must be declared in an open meeting. Here, no such declaration was made.

But here is the stunning legal twist: the Administrative Law Judge found that the decision to approve the tower was made not by the “board,” but exclusively by the “Architectural Committee.” The HOA’s governing documents explicitly granted this committee the power to approve communication systems. Because the state’s conflict-of-interest law applies specifically to actions taken by the board, it had no jurisdiction over a decision made independently by the committee. In essence, the state law was watching the front door (the board), but the HOA’s documents gave the Architectural Committee a back door—one with no legal supervision for conflicts of interest. This technicality meant the deal, and the conflict of interest at its core, was entirely proper under the law.

Takeaway 2: An HOA ‘Board’ Might Not Be a Board at All

The second critical fact that enabled this outcome was the highly unusual structure of the Lakeside Ski Village HOA itself. The judge noted that the association “does not have a traditional Board.” Instead, all the members collectively act as the board.

The HOA’s Bylaws lay out this unique governance model:

“[t]he affairs of the Association will be managed by the Members, who by the Association’s Articles of Organization are authorized to exercise all powers normally exercised by a board of directors.”

This structure is fundamentally important. State laws governing HOAs are written with a traditional model in mind—a small group of elected directors making decisions for the community. But at Lakeside Ski Village, the power of the “members acting as a board” was limited by specific authority delegated to other entities, most notably the Architectural Committee. This decentralized structure created a loophole the state’s conflict-of-interest law was not designed to close.

The lesson for homeowners is that you can never assume all HOAs are structured alike. The very definition of the “board” and the scope of its power can be radically different from one community to another. Here, that unique structure was the key that unlocked the committee’s unchecked power.

Takeaway 3: The Fine Print Is All That Matters

Ultimately, this entire dispute was decided not by broad principles of transparency or fiduciary duty, but by specific phrases written in the HOA’s founding documents years ago. The petitioner, Mark Virden, expressed understandable outrage that the insiders involved refused to be transparent.

He recounted a particularly telling exchange with the association’s Vice President when he asked about the terms of the internet deal:

When we initially asked the VP what their compensation was, he stated “it’s none of your business”.

While this response would infuriate any homeowner, the court’s final decision effectively proved it right. Because the Architectural Committee was acting within its sole authority, the details of its agreement were not subject to the disclosure rules that govern the board. The response, “it’s none of your business,” turned out to be legally correct.

The petitioner’s frustration was compounded by the professional background of the committee member at the center of the conflict. In his filing, he wrote: “To make things worse, the board member whose spouse paid the upfront fee to the tower company is a licensed realtor, Susan Talarico. If anyone should understand the fiduciary responsibility to owners of a HOA, it’s a realtor serving on a Board of that HOA.” His belief that a real estate professional should have known better underscores the feeling of betrayal.

And in a final, dramatic turn that reinforces the theme of insiders benefiting, the petitioner noted what happened after the deal was done: “She has since resigned but her husband has taken her place on the board.” This illustrates the most vital lesson of all: your sense of what is “fair” is legally irrelevant if the governing documents allow for a specific action. The CC&Rs and Bylaws are the ultimate source of truth and power in any HOA dispute.

Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know Your Rules?

The case of Virden v. Lakeside Ski Village HOA serves as a stark reminder that HOA governance is a world of legal technicalities, where the written word of the founding documents is supreme. It shows how specific, delegated authority can create outcomes that defy the spirit, if not the letter, of the law. What appears to be a clear-cut case of self-dealing can be rendered perfectly permissible by a few key sentences in the bylaws or CC&Rs.

This case was decided on the specific authority granted to a single committee—do you know which committees in your HOA have the power to make decisions without board approval?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Mark Virden (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Stewart F. Salwin (attorney)
    Lakeside Ski Village HOA
  • Susan Talarico (board member)
    Lakeside Ski Village HOA
    Licensed realtor; spouse of Lou Talarico; resigned but husband took her place on the board
  • Lou Talarico (board member)
    Lakeside Ski Village HOA
    Spouse of Susan Talarico; paid upfront tower cost; received free internet service; referred to as Treasurer in petition excerpt
  • Carl Rygg (board member)
    Lakeside Ski Village HOA
    Vice President; received free internet service
  • Emmett Mitchell (board member)
    Lakeside Ski Village HOA
    President

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Addressee for rehearing requests

Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ decision, certified as the final administrative decision, dismissed the Petitioner's claim after rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The challenged $660 fee was determined to be a permissible working capital contribution under the CC&Rs, not a fee restricted by the statutory cap on resale disclosure services.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ decision, certified as the final administrative decision, dismissed the Petitioner's claim after rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The challenged $660 fee was determined to be a permissible working capital contribution under the CC&Rs, not a fee restricted by the statutory cap on resale disclosure services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in question was determined to be a working capital fee/assessment governed by the CC&Rs and ARS § 33-1242(A)(2), and not subject to the limitation set forth in ARS § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged excessive fee collection for resale disclosure/transfer services

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 fee, which he argued exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure/transfer services. The Association argued the $660 fee was a working capital contribution mandated by CC&R section 8.13 and was mislabeled, and therefore not subject to the statutory limitations of § 33-1260.

Orders: Brian D. Sopatyk’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fee dispute, Working capital fee, Transfer fee, Resale disclosure, Statutory interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:00:00 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:00:09 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

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17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

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17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:41 (67.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:44 (154.0 KB)

Briefing: Sopatyk v. Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and outcomes of an administrative legal case brought by petitioner Brian Sopatyk against The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute was Mr. Sopatyk’s allegation that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660 upon the sale of a condominium unit, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at an aggregate of $400.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition on both occasions. The central finding was that the petitioner failed to prove a statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 charge was not a resale disclosure fee governed by A.R.S. § 33-1260, but rather a “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association admitted that this fee had been historically mislabeled as a “transfer fee,” an error it had since identified and corrected. The actual fee charged for resale disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “statement fee.” The ALJ’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision in the matter on August 10, 2017.

Case Overview

Case Number

17F-H1716004-REL (Initial Hearing)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Jurisdiction

State of Arizona, Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Core Allegation

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits fees for resale disclosure services to a maximum of $400.

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a disclosure statement for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, showing a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

May 18, 2016

Prompted by Mr. Sopatyk, the Association’s Board discusses the fee structure. It concludes the $660 fee is a mislabeled “working capital fee” and not a statutory violation.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the violation.

November 14, 2016

The initial administrative hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate adopts the ALJ’s recommendation, issuing a Final Order to dismiss the petition.

Post-Dec. 2016

Mr. Sopatyk requests a rehearing of the matter.

June 9, 2017

The rehearing is conducted, again before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, once again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 10, 2017

With no modifying action from the Department of Real Estate, the ALJ’s June 26 decision is certified as the final administrative decision.

Core Dispute Analysis

The case centered on the interpretation and classification of two fees charged by the Association during the sale of Mr. Sopatyk’s condominium unit.

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

• Allegation of Violation: Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660, which directly contravened the $400 statutory maximum established by A.R.S. § 33-1260 for services related to resale disclosure.

• Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted a March 2, 2015 disclosure form from the Association listing both a “660transferfee”anda”30 statement fee.” A HUD-1 disclosure statement for the purchase was also entered, showing the $660 “Transfer Fee” was split, with $330 paid from the buyer’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the seller’s funds.

• Contradictory Testimony: The ALJ noted a discrepancy in the petitioner’s statements. The sworn petition stated the $660 fee was split between him and the seller, while his testimony at the rehearing claimed he “had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price.” The ALJ decision stated, “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

• Requested Remedies: Mr. Sopatyk requested that the Association be ordered to comply with the statute, that refunds be paid to those who paid fees in excess of the statutory maximum, and that a civil penalty be imposed against the Association.

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc.)

• Distinction Between Fees: The Association’s central argument was that two separate and legally distinct fees were assessed:

1. A $30 Resale Statement Fee: This was the charge for preparing documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260 and was well within the $400 limit.

2. A $660 Working Capital Fee: This fee was authorized under a separate provision, Section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, which mandates an assessment from each new owner equal to two monthly installments to fund the Association’s working capital (reserve) fund.

• “Mislabeled” Fee: The Association acknowledged that the $660 working capital fee was incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee.” Association Manager Amy Telnes testified that she received erroneous information from the prior manager and had been using the wrong label.

• Board Action and Corrective Measures: The minutes from the May 18, 2016 Board meeting show that the Board, after reviewing a legal opinion, concluded the issue was one of “labeling, not violating the statute.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected into the Reserve Account. To prevent future confusion, the Board also voted to assess a single $400 transfer fee on all future transactions, with no other fees.

• Fund Allocation: Ms. Telnes testified that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, consistent with its purpose as a working capital contribution, while the $30 fee was the charge pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260(C).

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

ALJ Thomas Shedden presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing, reaching the same conclusion in both instances.

Key Rulings and Legal Reasoning

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• Core Finding: The evidence demonstrated that the Association charged two distinct fees. The $30 fee was for document preparation under A.R.S. § 33-1260, while the $660 fee was a working capital assessment authorized by CC&R Section 8.13. The ALJ concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1260 was not applicable to the $660 fee.

• Conclusion on Violation: Based on the evidence, including the testimony of the Association manager and the board meeting minutes, the ALJ found that the $660 fee was mislabeled but was not collected for services related to resale disclosure. Therefore, Mr. Sopatyk did not meet his burden to show that the Association violated the statute.

• Rejection of Harm-Based Argument: The ALJ did not accept the Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Mr. Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400. The judge clarified that A.R.S. § 33-2199.01 “does not require this type of particularized harm, but rather applies to all statutory violations.”

• Dismissal of Petition: In both the November 29, 2016 decision and the June 26, 2017 decision, the order was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition and deem the Association the prevailing party.

Final Disposition and Legal Status

The decision issued by ALJ Shedden on June 26, 2017, was transmitted to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The Department had until August 1, 2017, to accept, reject, or modify the decision. As no action was taken by the deadline, the Office of Administrative Hearings issued a Certification of Decision of Administrative Law Judge on August 10, 2017. This certification established the ALJ’s decision as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate in the matter.

Key Legal Citations and Definitions

• A.R.S. § 33-1260 (Resale of Units; Information Required): This Arizona statute governs the information a condominium association must provide to a prospective purchaser. It explicitly limits the fees an association can charge for these services:

• CC&R Section 8.13 (Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund): This section of The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association’s governing documents provides the authority to collect a fee from new owners for a different purpose:

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof required for the petitioner to prevail, defined in the legal decisions as:

Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and state the core legal violation the petitioner alleged.

2. What specific fees were charged during the petitioner’s condominium purchase that became the central point of the dispute?

3. According to the Association, what was the true nature of the $660 fee, and how did it explain the “transfer fee” label on the disclosure documents?

4. What role did Amy Telnes, the Association manager, play in explaining the history of the disputed fee?

5. What actions did the Association’s Board take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, to address the petitioner’s concerns and correct its internal procedures?

6. Who held the burden of proof in this matter, and what was the legal standard required to meet that burden?

7. What was the official outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?

8. Why was a re-hearing conducted, and what was the final outcome of that hearing on June 9, 2017?

9. According to the re-hearing decision, there was a significant contradiction between the petitioner’s sworn petition and his later testimony. What was this contradiction?

10. What was the legal basis, according to the Association’s CC&Rs, for collecting the $660 working capital fee?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Brian Sopatyk, and the respondent was The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 by charging a transfer fee in excess of the statutory maximum of $400.

2. The disputed fees were a $660 “transfer fee,” which was split between the buyer (Mr. Sopatyk) and the seller, and a separate $30 “statement fee” or “Resale Statement Fee.” The petitioner’s claim focused on the $660 fee being above the legal limit for resale disclosure services.

3. The Association argued the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was a “working capital fee” authorized by its CC&Rs. It explained that the fee had been mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to an error passed down from a previous property manager.

4. Amy Telnes testified that when she became the Association manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She further testified that the $660 was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, and the actual fee charged for disclosure under the statute was the separate $30 statement fee.

5. At the May 18, 2016, meeting, the Board concluded it was not in violation of the law but that its fee labeling was confusing. The Board directed Amy Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all mislabeled fees into the Reserve Account and voted to assess a single, correctly labeled $400 transfer fee on all future transactions.

6. The petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

7. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The judge ordered that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition be dismissed.

8. A re-hearing was conducted after Mr. Sopatyk requested one following the initial decision. The final outcome of the June 9, 2017, re-hearing was the same as the first: the Administrative Law Judge found the petitioner did not meet his burden of proof and ordered the petition to be dismissed.

9. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 transfer fee was split between him and the seller. However, during his testimony at the re-hearing, he stated that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.

10. The legal basis was Section 8.13 of the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section, titled “Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund,” called for an assessment from each new owner of two monthly installments of the annual fee to be deposited into the working capital fund.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, incorporating specific facts, legal arguments, and procedural details from the source documents.

1. Trace the complete timeline of the case, beginning with the filing of the petition. Include key dates of filings, hearings, decisions, and final certifications, and describe the significance of each event in the legal process.

2. Analyze the central legal argument of the Respondent, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association. Explain how the distinction between a “transfer fee” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 and a “working capital fee” under the Association’s CC&Rs was crucial to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain why the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the re-hearing, citing specific evidence presented by the Association.

4. Evaluate the importance of the Association’s Board Meeting Minutes from May 18, 2016, as a piece of evidence. Detail the specific findings and resolutions from that meeting and explain how they were used to build the Association’s defense.

5. Examine the roles of the key individuals and entities in this administrative action. Describe the functions and contributions of Brian Sopatyk (Petitioner), Amy Telnes (Association Manager), Michael Cibellis (Association President), Thomas Shedden (Administrative Law Judge), and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to provide certain disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser. It also limits the fee an association can charge for the preparation of these documents to an aggregate of four hundred dollars.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. In this case, section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs authorized the collection of a fee from new owners for a working capital fund.

Final Administrative Decision

The ultimate, legally binding decision in the administrative matter. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision became the final administrative decision after the Department of Real Estate did not act to accept, reject, or modify it within the statutory time limit.

HUD-1 Disclosure Statement

A document used in the petitioner’s property purchase that itemized all charges imposed upon a borrower and seller for a real estate transaction. It was used as evidence to show how the $660 “Transfer Fee” and $30 “Resale Statement Fee” were assessed and paid.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Brian Sopatyk was the petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Reserve Fund

An account maintained by the Condominium Association. The Association referred to its “working capital fund” as the Reserve Fund, into which the disputed $660 fees were deposited.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. was the respondent.

Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee

A $30 fee charged by the Association for the preparation of disclosure documents. The Association argued this was the fee governed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260, which was compliant with the $400 statutory cap.

Transfer Fee

In the context of the petitioner’s allegation, a fee charged for resale disclosure services, limited to $400 by statute. In the context of the Association’s defense, this was the erroneous label applied to the working capital fee.

Working Capital Fee

A fee authorized by section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, assessed to each new owner to be deposited into the working capital fund (or Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 fee was this type of fee, not one for resale disclosure.

How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute

We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?

For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.

1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm

A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.

The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.

Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.

The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.

2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form

Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.

The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.

3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War

How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.

Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.

In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”

As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.

4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase

What it really means to have to prove your case.

In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.

5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility

When every word you say (and write) is on the record.

A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.

There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”

The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.

Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details

This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.

The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brian Sopatyk (petitioner)
    Represented himself at the initial hearing; sought rehearing
  • Nathan Andrews (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Jill M. Kennedy (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Judy Sopatyk (petitioner's wife)
    Co-purchaser of the condominium unit,
  • Chance Peterson (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group

Respondent Side

  • Bradley R. Jardine (HOA attorney)
    Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston
  • Amy Telnes (property manager/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Association manager who testified,
  • Michael Cibellis (Association president/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Testified at the rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Contact for requests for rehearing
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    OAH
    Signed the Certification of Decision,

Other Participants

  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (administrative staff)
    Administrative staff for transmission/mailing,

Tom Pyron vs Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717026-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-19
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Pyron Counsel —
Respondent Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws, Article III, §§ 3.02 and 3.06, and Article IV, § 4.06

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA correctly identified only one Board position (the one-year term) was up for election in 2017 based on the Bylaws' staggered term provisions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Dispute over the number of Board of Director positions available for the 2017 election.

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated Bylaws by stating only one Board position was up for election for a one-year term in 2017, when Petitioner contended two positions (one-year and two-year terms) were open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Bylaw Violation, Board Term, Staggered Terms, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • R4-28-1310

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:04:17 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 570560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:38 (120.2 KB)

17F-H1717026-REL Decision – 576045.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:41 (959.2 KB)

  • 2016

Study Guide: Pyron v. Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1717026-REL between Tom Pyron (Petitioner) and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (Respondent). It covers the central arguments, key evidence, relevant bylaws, and the final legal decision.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. What was the single issue at the heart of Tom Pyron’s petition filed on March 16, 2017?

2. According to the Association’s bylaws, how are Board of Director terms structured when the board consists of three members?

3. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding Jeff Oursland’s term on the Board of Directors?

4. What was the Respondent’s counter-argument regarding Barbara Ahlstrand’s 2015 election and, subsequently, Jeff Oursland’s term?

5. What actions did the Respondent take in an attempt to resolve the dispute with the Petitioner before the hearing?

6. Who was the key witness for the Respondent, and what was their role?

7. Explain the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined in the case documents.

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s core legal reasoning for concluding that only one board position was open in 2017?

9. What was the final outcome of the case as stated in the Recommended Order and adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

10. Following the Final Order issued on July 12, 2017, what legal recourse was available to a party dissatisfied with the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Tom Pyron’s petition alleged that the Respondent violated its bylaws by announcing only one Board position was open for a one-year term in the 2017 election. Pyron contended that two positions—one for a one-year term and another for a two-year term—should have been up for election.

2. Bylaw Article III, § 3.02 specifies that for a three-person board, the directors hold staggered terms of one year, two years, and three years. The bylaw further dictates which terms end at which annual meetings (e.g., the two-year term ends at the second, fourth, sixth, etc., annual meetings).

3. The Petitioner argued that Barbara Ahlstrand was elected to a two-year term in 2015. Therefore, when Jeff Oursland was appointed to fill her vacancy, his term should have expired in 2017, meaning his two-year position should have been on the 2017 ballot.

4. The Respondent argued that under the plain language of Bylaw § 3.02, only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since Sandra Singer received the most votes and secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, meaning Mr. Oursland’s appointed term expired in 2016.

5. In response to the petition, the Respondent twice rescheduled the 2017 annual meeting and re-issued ballots to include all candidates who had submitted an application. The Association also offered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with this resolution.

6. The key witness for the Respondent was Cynthia Quillen. She served as the Community Manager for the Association’s management company, Associated Property Management, and testified about the Board’s composition and her interpretation of the bylaws.

7. “A preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence, which is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The Judge’s decision was based on the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02. This bylaw dictated that only the one-year and three-year terms were up for election in 2015. Since the parties agreed Ms. Singer won the three-year term, the Judge concluded Ms. Ahlstrand must have been elected to the one-year term, making the Respondent’s subsequent actions and election notices correct.

9. The Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This order was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate in a Final Order, making it binding on the parties.

10. According to the Final Order, a dissatisfied party could request a rehearing within thirty days by filing a petition setting forth the reasons. The document lists eight specific causes for a rehearing. A party could also appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the 2015 election presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the “plain language” of Bylaw § 3.02 to resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the interpretation of governing documents in legal disputes?

2. Trace the chain of events from the 2012 election to the 2017 dispute. Explain how the board composition, terms of office, and specific actions (like Ms. Ahlstrand’s resignation) compounded to create the disagreement at the heart of this case.

3. Discuss the burden of proof in this administrative hearing. Define “preponderance of the evidence” and explain why the Petitioner, Tom Pyron, failed to meet this standard in the view of the Administrative Law Judge.

4. Examine the roles and authorities of the different entities involved: the homeowners’ association Board, the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Administrative Law Judge. How do these bodies interact to resolve disputes within a planned community?

5. Based on the Final Order, outline the legal recourse available to Tom Pyron following the denial of his petition. What specific grounds for a rehearing are mentioned, and what is the process for further appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Acclamation

A form of election where a candidate is declared elected without opposition, as when Sandra Singer’s election was “unanimously passed by acclamation” in 2014.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, draws conclusions of law, and issues a recommended decision. In this case, the ALJ was Diane Mihalsky.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations. The Commissioner of the Department, Judy Lowe, issued the Final Order in this case.

Bylaws

The governing documents of the homeowners’ association that outline its rules and procedures, including the number of directors, terms of office, and process for filling vacancies.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which accepts and adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This order becomes effective and can only be changed by a successful rehearing or judicial appeal.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner was Tom Pyron, a homeowner in the association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing, defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The Petitioner bore this burden to prove the Respondent violated its bylaws.

Recommended Order

The decision and order issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. In this case, it recommended that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Rehearing

A formal request to have a case heard again. The Final Order specifies that a petition for rehearing must be filed within thirty days and may be granted for specific causes, such as newly discovered evidence or an arbitrary decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, Inc.

Staggered Terms

A system where not all board members are elected at the same time. As defined in Bylaw § 3.02, the three-person board had terms of one, two, and three years to ensure continuity.

Unexpired Portion of the Prior Director’s Term

The remainder of a board member’s term that an appointee serves after the original member resigns or is removed, as specified in Bylaw § 3.6.

We Read an HOA Lawsuit So You Don’t Have To: 3 Shocking Lessons Hidden in the Bylaws

1. Introduction: The Hidden Drama in Your Community’s Fine Print

If you live in a condominium association or a planned community, you’re familiar with the thick packet of governing documents you received at closing—the Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Bylaws. For many, these documents are filed away and forgotten, seen as a collection of mundane rules about trash cans and paint colors. But hidden within that legalese is the complete operating manual for your community, and a simple misunderstanding of its contents can have significant consequences.

What happens when a homeowner’s interpretation of the rules clashes with the association’s? In a case from Arizona involving homeowner Tom Pyron and the Cliffs at North Mountain Condominium Association, the dispute escalated into a formal administrative hearing. The central question was simple: how many board seats were open for election in 2017? But this wasn’t just a procedural disagreement. Court documents reveal that before the hearing, the association offered to re-issue ballots to include all candidates and even “offered to pay Petitioner’s $500 single-issue filing fee if he was satisfied with the proposed resolution.” The homeowner refused.

This decision transforms the case from a simple rules dispute into a cautionary tale about how a deeply held belief can override a pragmatic, no-cost compromise. The official court documents offer a fascinating look at how community governance can go awry, revealing powerful, practical lessons for any homeowner or board member who believes they know what the rules should say.

2. Takeaway 1: Your Beliefs Don’t Overrule the Bylaws

What You Think the Rules Say Doesn’t Matter—Only What They Actually Say

The core of the dispute rested on a belief held by a former board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, who was elected in 2015. She testified that she believed she had been elected to a two-year term. Based on this belief, the petitioner argued that the director appointed to replace her after her resignation should have served until 2017, meaning a two-year position was open for election that year.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, looked not at what anyone believed, but at the “plain language” of the community’s governing documents. The judge’s conclusion was a matter of inescapable logic derived directly from the bylaws:

1. First, Bylaw § 3.02 clearly states that in an election with multiple open seats, “the person receiving the most votes will become the Director with the longest term.”

2. Next, the court record shows that “the parties agreed that… because she got the most votes, Ms. Singer was elected to a three-year term” in the 2015 election.

3. Finally, the judge determined that according to the same bylaw, only the one-year and three-year terms were available in 2015. Since Ms. Singer secured the three-year term, Ms. Ahlstrand, by definition, must have been elected to the only other available position: the one-year term.

The lesson is stark and unambiguous: an individual’s interpretation or assumption, however sincere, cannot change the written rules. The bylaws are the ultimate authority. As the judge stated in the final decision, the documents speak for themselves.

The Bylaws do not allow their plain language to be modified or amended by a member’s understanding.

3. Takeaway 2: The Domino Effect of a Single Resignation

A Single Resignation Can Create Years of Confusion

This entire legal conflict was set in motion by a single, routine event: a board member’s resignation. The timeline of events shows how one small action, when combined with a misunderstanding of the rules, can create a ripple effect with long-lasting consequences.

1. On August 3, 2015, the newly elected board member, Ms. Ahlstrand, resigned.

2. The Board then appointed another member, Jeff Oursland, to serve the remainder of her term, as permitted by the bylaws.

3. The critical point of contention became the length of that “remainder.” Was it the rest of a one-year term ending in 2016, or a two-year term ending in 2017?

4. The judge’s determination that Ahlstrand’s original term was only one year (as explained above) meant that Mr. Oursland’s appointed term correctly expired in 2016. He was then properly elected to a new two-year term at the 2016 meeting.

5. This sequence confirmed that the association was correct all along: only one board position (a one-year term) was actually open for election in 2017.

A single resignation created two years of confusion that ultimately required an administrative hearing to resolve. It’s a powerful reminder of how crucial it is for boards to precisely follow their own procedures, especially when handling vacancies and appointments, as one small error can cascade into years of conflict.

4. Takeaway 3: The Hidden Complexity of “Staggered Terms”

“Staggered Terms” Are Designed for Stability, But Can Cause Chaos

Many associations use staggered terms for their board of directors. The concept, outlined in Bylaw § 3.02 for the Cliffs at North Mountain, is simple: instead of all directors being elected at once, they serve terms of varying lengths (in this case, one, two, and three years). This is a common and effective practice designed to ensure leadership continuity and prevent the entire board from turning over in a single election.

However, this case reveals the hidden downside of that system: complexity. The staggered terms created an election cycle where the available term lengths changed every single year. The court documents show that in 2014, the one-year and two-year positions were on the ballot. In 2015, the one-year and three-year terms were available. This rotating schedule was difficult for members—and apparently even some board members—to track accurately.

This built-in complexity was the root cause of the entire disagreement. The system’s lack of intuitive clarity created the exact conditions necessary for a personal belief, like Ms. Ahlstrand’s, to seem plausible even when it was contrary to the bylaws. The very governance structure intended to create stability inadvertently created the fertile ground for confusion, allowing a misunderstanding to grow into a lawsuit.

5. Conclusion: The Power Is in the Paperwork

The overarching theme from this case is that in the world of community associations, the governing documents are the ultimate source of truth. They are not merely suggestions; they are the binding legal framework that dictates how the community must operate. A board’s actions and a homeowner’s rights are all defined within that paperwork.

In the end, the homeowner’s petition was denied, and the judge’s order affirmed the association’s position. The written rules, as found in the bylaws, prevailed over individual beliefs and interpretations. The case stands as a powerful testament to the importance of reading, understanding, and strictly adhering to your community’s foundational documents.

This entire conflict stemmed from a few lines in a legal document—when was the last time you read yours?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Pyron (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Cynthia Quillen (property manager)
    Associated Property Management
    Community Manager

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (coordinator)
    HOA Coordinator/Admin Official listed for rehearing requests and transmission

Other Participants

  • Anne Fugate (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Barbara Ahlstrand (witness)
    Elected to the Board in 2015
  • Kevin Downey (witness)
    Candidate for 2017 election
  • John Haunschild (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012
  • Ron Cadaret (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2012, re-elected 2013
  • Sandra Singer (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2014 and 2015
  • Jeff Oursland (board member)
    Appointed to the Board in 2015, elected 2016
  • Steve Molever (board member)
    Elected to the Board in 2016

Linda Haderli vs. Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717029-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-06-18
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The HOA (Respondent) was found to have acted beyond the scope of its authority under its governing documents by removing the Petitioner as the Pickleball Club President and banning her from holding office for 24 months. The imposed discipline was quashed, and the HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Linda Haderli Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc. Counsel Samuel E. Arrowsmith

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The HOA (Respondent) was found to have acted beyond the scope of its authority under its governing documents by removing the Petitioner as the Pickleball Club President and banning her from holding office for 24 months. The imposed discipline was quashed, and the HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA lacked authority to impose discipline (removal as club president and 24-month ban on holding office) under governing documents.

Petitioner alleged Respondent lacked authority pursuant to governing documents to remove her as President of the Pickleball Club and preclude her from serving as any officer for 24 months as purported discipline. The Tribunal concluded the Board’s decision was in excess of its authority because Respondent did not establish that removal and the prohibition on holding office were remedies available under the governing documents.

Orders: Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party; Respondent's imposed discipline was quashed; Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&R’s Section 14.2
  • CC&R’s Section 15.2B
  • CC&R’s Section 12.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: discipline, governing documents, authority, club officer removal, homeowner vs HOA
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&R’s Section 14.2
  • CC&R’s Section 15.2B
  • CC&R’s Section 12.2

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717029-REL Decision – 570378.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:04:51 (84.2 KB)

17F-H1717029-REL Decision – 575026.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:04:55 (700.9 KB)

17F-H1717029-REL Decision – 570378.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:59 (84.2 KB)

17F-H1717029-REL Decision – 575026.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:04 (700.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Haderli vs. Carriage Manor RV Resort Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key findings and legal conclusions from an administrative hearing concerning a dispute between resident Linda Haderli (Petitioner) and the Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc. (Respondent). The core of the dispute was the Association’s decision to remove Ms. Haderli from her position as President of the Pickleball Club and to bar her from holding any club office for 24 months as a disciplinary measure.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of Ms. Haderli. The central finding was that the disciplinary action imposed by the Association was in excess of the authority granted by its own governing documents (CC&Rs). While the Association’s rules allowed for remedies such as financial assessments up to $500 or the suspension of common area use rights for violations, they did not provide for the removal of a resident from an elected club office. Consequently, the ALJ ordered that Ms. Haderli be deemed the prevailing party, the Association’s disciplinary action be quashed, and the Association reimburse Ms. Haderli’s $500 filing fee. This decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, making it a final administrative order.

Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Linda Haderli

◦ Respondent: Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc., a homeowners association in Mesa, Arizona.

• Legal Venue: The Office of Administrative Hearings, State of Arizona.

• Case Number: 17F-H1717029-REL

• Hearing Date: May 30, 2017

• Core Issue: On March 28, 2017, Ms. Haderli filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. She alleged that the Association lacked the authority under its governing documents to remove her as President of the Pickleball Club and to prohibit her from serving in any club officer position for two years as a form of discipline.

The Association’s Disciplinary Action and Justification

The Association took disciplinary action against Ms. Haderli and provided three specific reasons for its decision in a formal letter:

1. Challenging Board Policies: The letter accused Ms. Haderli of harassing Association employees and circumventing established systems designed to implement Association policies.

2. Improper Officer Representation: The Association stated that Ms. Haderli had permitted Ms. Joyce Wooton to represent herself as an “Advisor” to the Pickleball Club, a position not recognized as an official Officer position in the Pickleball By-Laws.

3. Unauthorized Representation to External Entities: The Association claimed Ms. Haderli had represented herself to the City of Mesa and SRP (Salt River Project) as having the authority to make decisions on behalf of the Association, which had not been granted by the Board of Directors.

Analysis of Allegations and Testimony

During the May 30, 2017 hearing, testimony was presented by both parties regarding the three justifications for the disciplinary action.

Allegation 1: Harassment of an Association Employee

• Respondent’s Testimony (Mary Candelaria, General Manager): Ms. Candelaria testified that on January 4, 2017, Ms. Haderli had a “contentious interaction” with an employee, Barb Putnam. According to some observers, Ms. Haderli was yelling. The following day, Ms. Putnam was hospitalized with a hemorrhage in her eye. Ms. Candelaria “theorized” that the stress from the encounter caused the medical issue. She collected written statements from observers but did not speak with Ms. Haderli about the incident, citing confidentiality concerns.

• Petitioner’s Testimony (Linda Haderli): Ms. Haderli denied yelling at Ms. Putnam, explaining that her hearing loss sometimes causes her to speak louder than intended, which can be misinterpreted as yelling. She stated she was attempting to reserve dates for Pickleball Club fundraising events and that Ms. Putnam was uncooperative. Ms. Haderli testified she was unaware of the harassment accusation until reviewing exhibits for the hearing with her attorney.

Allegation 2: Improper Officer Representation (Joyce Wooton)

• Petitioner’s Testimony (Linda Haderli): Ms. Haderli testified that Ms. Wooton was already serving as an advisor to the Pickleball Club when Ms. Haderli was elected Vice President, a full year before she became President on March 1, 2016.

Allegation 3: Unauthorized Representation to External Entities

• Respondent’s Testimony (Mary Candelaria, General Manager): Ms. Candelaria stated that while the Pickleball Club was exploring a project to build a small structure, Ms. Haderli contacted the City of Mesa and SRP directly, representing herself as acting on behalf of the Association. This continued even after Ms. Haderli was advised to work through the project’s architect for technical questions.

• Petitioner’s Testimony (Linda Haderli): Ms. Haderli denied representing herself as having authority to act for the Association. She testified that her intent was merely to gather background information to be better informed about the project. She initially did not want to provide her name or address to the entities for fear of appearing to act in an official capacity, only providing the address when required because regulations differ by city area.

Governing Documents and Permitted Remedies

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the specific remedies available to the Association as outlined in its governing documents, the CC&Rs. The Association clarified that the discipline was imposed on Ms. Haderli in her capacity as a resident who violated community rules, not as a disciplinary action against the Pickleball Club itself.

The following sections of the CC&Rs were cited as relevant:

CC&R Section

Description

Authorized Remedy

Section 14.2

Employee Abuse: Prohibits physical or verbal harassment of employees by residents.

Enforcement as an “Other Violation” under Section 15.2B.

Section 15.2B

Other Violations: Stipulates that such violations are subject to a financial penalty.

An assessment set by the Board of Directors, not to exceed $500.00.

Section 12.2

Suspension of Rights: Grants the Association the right to suspend an Owner’s rights for infractions.

Suspension of an Owner’s voting rights and Common Areas use rights.

Legal Conclusions and Final Ruling

The Administrative Law Judge reached several key conclusions of law that led to the final order.

• Burden of Proof: The petitioner, Linda Haderli, bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association acted without the authority granted by its governing documents.

• Excess of Authority: The Respondent (the Association) “did not establish that removal as the Pickleball Club President and/or a prohibition of holding any other officer position for a period of 24 months is a remedy available under the governing documents.”

• Final Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the Board of Directors’ decision to impose this specific discipline was in excess of its authority.

Recommended and Final Order

Based on these conclusions, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issued a recommended order on June 18, 2017:

1. Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party: Linda Haderli was declared the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Discipline Quashed: The disciplinary action imposed by the Association against Ms. Haderli was ordered to be quashed.

3. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Association was ordered to pay Ms. Haderli her $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.

On June 21, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order adopting the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in its entirety. This order became a final administrative action, effective immediately.

Study Guide: Haderli v. Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central violation alleged by the Petitioner, Linda Haderli, in her petition?

3. What specific disciplinary action did the Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc. impose on Linda Haderli?

4. List the three reasons the Association provided to justify its disciplinary action against the Petitioner.

5. How did Linda Haderli explain her interaction with the Association employee, Barb Putnam, which the Association characterized as harassment?

6. What was the Petitioner’s explanation for contacting the City of Mesa and SRP regarding the Pickleball Club’s building project?

7. According to the Association’s governing documents (CC&R’s), what specific remedies are available for non-monetary infractions and “Other Violations”?

8. What is the legal standard of proof that the Petitioner was required to meet in this case, and how is it defined in the document?

9. What was the final conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge regarding the Association’s authority to impose its chosen discipline?

10. What were the three components of the Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, which was later adopted as the Final Order?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Linda Haderli, the Petitioner, and Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner is the individual homeowner who filed the dispute, while the Respondent is the homeowners association (HOA) that took disciplinary action against her.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent did not have the authority under its own governing documents to take the disciplinary action it imposed. Specifically, she challenged her removal as President of the Pickleball Club and the subsequent ban from holding any officer position.

3. The Association removed Linda Haderli from her position as President of the Pickleball Club. Additionally, it precluded her from serving as any officer of the Pickleball Club for a period of 24 months.

4. The Association cited three reasons: (1) harassing Association employees and circumventing policies; (2) improperly permitting Ms. Joyce Wooton to represent herself as an “Advisor,” a non-existent officer position; and (3) representing herself to the City of Mesa and SRP as having authority to make decisions on behalf of the Association.

5. Ms. Haderli denied yelling at Ms. Putnam, attributing her loud voice to hearing loss which can be misinterpreted. She stated she was simply trying to reserve dates for Pickleball Club fundraising events and that the employee was not being cooperative in providing information.

6. The Petitioner testified that she approached the City of Mesa and SRP merely to gather background information to be more informed about the building project. She denied ever representing herself as having authority to act for the Association and was initially hesitant to even provide her name for fear of creating that impression.

7. For “Other Violations,” Section 15.2B of the CC&R’s allows for a monetary assessment up to $500.00. For non-monetary infractions, Section 12.2 allows the Association to suspend an Owner’s voting rights and Common Areas use rights until the infraction is cured.

8. The Petitioner was required to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence. The document defines this as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Board’s decision to remove the Petitioner as Pickleball Club President and ban her from holding office for 24 months was in excess of its authority. The judge found that this specific penalty was not a remedy available to the Association under its governing documents.

10. The Order dictated that (1) the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the matter, (2) the Respondent’s imposed discipline against the Petitioner be quashed (nullified), and (3) the Respondent pay the Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following prompts for longer, essay-style responses. Use evidence and specific details from the case documents to construct your arguments.

1. Analyze the discrepancy between the disciplinary penalties available to the Association under its CC&R’s (Sections 12.2 and 15.2B) and the penalty it actually imposed on Linda Haderli. Explain why this discrepancy was the pivotal factor in the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

2. Discuss the three allegations made by the Association against Linda Haderli. For each allegation, present the evidence and testimony offered by the Association (via Mary Candelaria) and the counter-evidence or explanation provided by the Petitioner.

3. Trace the procedural timeline of this case, starting from the filing of the Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition. Describe each key step, including the date of filing, the Notice of Hearing, the hearing itself, the Administrative Law Judge Decision, and the final adoption of that decision by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate.

4. The Respondent stated that the discipline was against Linda Haderli in her capacity as a resident, not as a representative of the Pickleball Club. Evaluate this argument in the context of the specific penalties imposed. Did the nature of the discipline align with the Association’s claim?

5. Explain the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did the Petitioner, Linda Haderli, successfully meet the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association acted outside its authority?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial officer, Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presided over the administrative hearing, evaluated evidence, and issued a decision and recommended order.

Answer

The formal response filed by the Respondent (Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc.) denying the violation alleged in the Petitioner’s petition.

CC&R’s

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are part of the Association’s governing documents that outline the rules for residents and the remedies available to the Association for violations.

Commissioner

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, who has the authority to adopt the ALJ’s decision, making it a Final Order.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between homeowners and homeowners associations.

Final Order

The official, binding order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate that adopts the ALJ’s decision. This order becomes effective immediately and is appealable through judicial review.

Governing Documents

The collection of rules, bylaws, and CC&R’s that legally govern the operation of the Homeowners Association and the conduct of its members.

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by the Petitioner (Linda Haderli) with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about March 28, 2017, to initiate the legal dispute against the Association.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, homeowner Linda Haderli.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Prevailing Party

The party that wins the legal dispute. The Administrative Law Judge’s order deemed the Petitioner, Linda Haderli, to be the prevailing party.

Quashed

A legal term meaning to nullify, void, or set aside. The Judge’s order quashed the disciplinary action that the Respondent had imposed on the Petitioner.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition is filed and who is responding to the allegations. In this case, Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc.

She Fought Her HOA Over Pickleball—And Won on a Technicality. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons.

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath of Neighborhood Disputes

For many homeowners, a dispute with their Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like an unwinnable battle. The board holds what seems like absolute power, leaving residents feeling powerless. However, a recent administrative hearing in Arizona offers a powerful counter-narrative and a series of crucial lessons for anyone living in a planned community. The case involved Linda Haderli, the President of a community Pickleball Club, and her HOA, the Carriage Manor RV Resort Association, Inc. What started as a disagreement over her conduct escalated into a formal disciplinary action that was ultimately overturned. The story of her victory reveals surprising truths about the limits of an HOA’s authority.

Takeaway 1: Your HOA’s Power Isn’t Unlimited—It’s Written in Black and White

An HOA Board Can’t Invent Punishments.

The core of the dispute was the punishment the HOA Board imposed on Linda Haderli. In response to alleged rule violations, the Board removed her from her elected position as President of the Pickleball Club and banned her from holding any club office for 24 months.

However, a close look at the Association’s own governing documents—the CC&Rs—revealed a critical flaw in the Board’s action. The documents specified exactly which remedies were available for violations. These included a monetary assessment not to exceed $500, or the suspension of an owner’s voting rights and their right to use common areas.

The punishment the Board chose—removal from an elected position and a ban from future office—was simply not on that list. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was unequivocal on this point:

Therefore, this Tribunal concludes that the Board’s decision to remove Petitioner as the Pickleball Club President and to preclude her from holding any other officer position for a period of 24 months was in excess of its authority under the Association’s governing documents.

Ultimately, the HOA was bound by the rules it had created. Its failure to adhere to its own documents was the key to its defeat.

Takeaway 2: It Might Not Matter Who Was “Right”

The Case Can Hinge on Procedure, Not on the Facts of the Dispute.

The HOA levied three main accusations against Haderli: harassing an Association employee during a contentious interaction, improperly allowing an “Advisor” to participate in the club, and misrepresenting herself to the City of Mesa while researching a project. For her part, Haderli explained that her hearing loss can cause her to speak loudly, that the advisor had served in that capacity previously, and that she was only gathering information from the city and never claimed to have authority.

Here is the counter-intuitive twist: the judge never ruled on whether Haderli was actually guilty of any of these actions. The final decision did not weigh the evidence to determine who was “right” or “wrong” about the incidents. The entire case was decided on the grounds that the punishment itself was invalid because it was not authorized by the HOA’s governing documents, regardless of the alleged offenses that prompted it.

This procedural victory underscores the first lesson: it didn’t matter if the Board’s accusations were 100% true, because they attempted to enforce their judgment with a punishment they had no authority to invent. This is a crucial lesson. In an HOA dispute, winning isn’t always about proving your innocence regarding an incident. It can be about proving the board failed to follow its own established rules and procedures for discipline.

Takeaway 3: You May Have to Prove the HOA is Wrong

The Burden of Proof Can Fall on the Homeowner.

Many might assume that an HOA, as the governing body imposing discipline, would be required to prove it had the authority to do so. In this case, however, the legal burden was reversed. The administrative ruling states that the homeowner, referred to as the “Petitioner,” had the “burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA acted without authority. This is not unusual; in an administrative hearing, the person who files the petition is the one bringing the complaint, and it is standard procedure for them to carry the burden of proving their claim.

The court defined “preponderance of the evidence” as:

[E]vidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.

This is a significant hurdle. It meant that Haderli couldn’t just question the Board’s power; she had to affirmatively prove, with more convincing evidence, that they didn’t have the authority they claimed. Despite this challenge, she successfully met that burden.

Takeaway 4: Victory Can Be Found in the Fine Print

Knowing Your Governing Documents is Your Greatest Weapon.

This case was not won through complex legal maneuvering or emotional arguments about who was to blame. Victory was found in a straightforward reading of the HOA’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The judge’s decision specifically cited Sections 14.2, 15.2B, and 12.2 of the CC&Rs as the foundation for what constituted authorized punishments—namely, fines and the suspension of privileges. By pointing out that the Board’s chosen discipline was absent from these sections, Haderli demonstrated that the Board had overstepped.

This reinforces the central lesson for every homeowner. The most powerful tool you have in a dispute with your association is a copy of your own governing documents. The answer to whether a board is overstepping its authority is often written right there in the text. Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a dusty rulebook, but as a binding contract that holds their Board accountable.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

In the end, Linda Haderli was officially deemed the “prevailing party.” The judge ordered that the HOA’s imposed discipline be “quashed” and that her $500 filing fee be returned. This victory was possible for one primary reason: the HOA board exceeded the specific authority granted to it by its own rules. The case serves as a powerful reminder that an HOA’s power is not absolute; it is defined and limited by its documents.

The Board’s power ended where their documents said it did. Do you know where that line is drawn in your community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Linda Haderli (petitioner)
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (attorney)
  • Ashley C. Hill (attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Samuel E. Arrowsmith (attorney)
  • Ryan J. McCarthy (attorney)
  • Mary Candelaria (general manager)
    Respondent's General Manager; testified
  • Barb Putnam (employee)
    Association employee allegedly harassed by Petitioner

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)

Other Participants

  • Joyce Wooton (involved individual)
    Individual associated with the Pickleball Club, subject of allegation

Barry Saxion vs. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716023-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-05-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted the ALJ Decision, ordering the petition be dismissed because the governing documents require the claim be handled through internal dispute resolution prior to administrative action.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Barry Saxion Counsel —
Respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Declaration Section 12.1

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted the ALJ Decision, ordering the petition be dismissed because the governing documents require the claim be handled through internal dispute resolution prior to administrative action.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to use the mandatory dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Declaration before filing the administrative action.

Key Issues & Findings

Requirement for mandatory dispute resolution procedures

The Petition was dismissed because the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II requires that all covered claims must be resolved using internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of initiating administrative proceedings.

Orders: The ALJ recommended that the Petition be dismissed, and the Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Mandatory Dispute Resolution, Dismissal, Standing Issue Denied
Additional Citations:

  • Declaration Section 12.1
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564668.pdf

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17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564672.pdf

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17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 568837.pdf

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17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564668.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:09 (51.2 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 564672.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:11 (54.6 KB)

17F-H1716023-REL Decision – 568837.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:14 (425.5 KB)

Briefing on Case No. 17F-H1716023-REL: Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing details the administrative proceedings and final disposition of the case involving petitioners Barry and Sandra Saxion and respondent Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. The petition was ultimately dismissed by the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which adopted the recommendation of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The dismissal was based on a procedural failure by the petitioners to adhere to the mandatory dispute resolution process outlined in the HOA’s governing documents before initiating administrative action.

The respondent’s motion for dismissal presented two primary arguments. The first, challenging petitioner Barry Saxion’s standing due to non-ownership of property, was denied by the ALJ, who found that co-petitioner Sandra Saxion did own property and had standing. The second, and decisive, argument was that the HOA’s Declaration explicitly requires all “covered claims” to be resolved through its internal dispute resolution procedures in lieu of administrative proceedings. The ALJ agreed with this argument, leading to a recommendation for dismissal, the vacating of a scheduled hearing, and the issuance of a final order confirming the dismissal.

Case Overview

This section outlines the primary participants, key identifiers, and procedural timeline of the administrative action.

Affiliation

Petitioner

Barry Saxion

Petitioner

Sandra Saxion

Property owner within the Association

Respondent

Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Adjudicator

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Judy Lowe

Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Respondent’s Counsel

Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Identifier

Case Number

HO 17-16/023

Docket Number

17F-H1716023-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), Phoenix, Arizona

Referring Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

• Petition Filed: Both Barry and Sandra Saxion signed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

• Referral to OAH: The Department of Real Estate referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings, creating the caption Barry Saxion v. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

• Motion for Summary Judgment: The Respondent HOA filed a motion to dismiss the petition.

• May 16, 2017: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issued a decision recommending the petition be dismissed.

• May 16, 2017: A Minute Entry was issued, vacating the hearing scheduled for May 22, 2017, based on the dismissal recommendation.

• May 30, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, issued a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision and officially dismissing the petition.

Analysis of the Motion for Summary Judgment

The Silverton II HOA’s Motion for Summary Judgment was the pivotal filing in this case. It presented two distinct arguments for dismissal, which were addressed separately by the Administrative Law Judge.

Respondent’s Arguments

1. Lack of Standing: The initial argument was that the petitioner, identified in the case caption as Barry Saxion, did not own property within the Association and therefore lacked the legal standing necessary to pursue the action.

2. Failure to Adhere to Governing Documents: The second argument was that the petition must be dismissed because it violated the procedural requirements set forth in the HOA’s governing documents. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II (the “Declaration”) mandates a specific internal dispute resolution process for all “covered claims.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The ALJ’s decision, issued on May 16, 2017, analyzed both of the respondent’s arguments and made distinct recommendations for each.

• The ALJ recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied on the grounds of standing.

• The judge acknowledged the fact, undisputed by the petitioner, that Barry Saxion does not own property within the association.

• However, the judge’s review of the original HOA Dispute Process Petition revealed that Sandra Saxion, who does own property, had also signed the petition as a petitioner. The judge concluded that the case caption, which named only Barry Saxion, was an administrative creation by the Department of Real Estate upon referral.

• The finding was that Sandra Saxion clearly “has standing to pursue this action,” thereby nullifying the argument for dismissal based on a lack of standing.

• The ALJ recommended that the petition be dismissed for failing to follow the mandatory dispute resolution procedures outlined in the HOA’s Declaration.

• The judge cited Section 12.1 of the Declaration, which defines “covered claims” as “all claims, grievances, controversies, disagreements, or disputes that arise in whole or part out of . . . the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the Declaration or the other Project Documents.”

• The judge found that the current dispute fell squarely within this definition.

• The decision states that the “plain language of the Declaration prevents this dispute… to be brought in the Office of Administrative Hearings and mandates that the dispute must be handled through the dispute resolution process set forth in the Declaration and Bylaws.”

• The conclusion was that the petition was improperly filed, as the internal remedies had not been pursued first.

Final Disposition and Subsequent Actions

The ALJ’s recommendation to dismiss directly led to the final resolution of the case.

Vacating of Hearing

A Minute Entry dated May 16, 2017, formally vacated the hearing that was scheduled for May 22, 2017. The order was a direct result of the ALJ’s decision recommending the complaint be dismissed.

Final Order from the Department of Real Estate

On May 30, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order that officially concluded the matter.

• Adoption of ALJ Decision: The Order explicitly states, “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that the petition in this matter be dismissed as the applicable governing documents require that the claim must be handled through the dispute resolution process prior to administrative proceedings being brought.”

• Effective Date: The Order was designated a “final administrative action” and was effective immediately from the date of service.

• Appellate Rights: The parties were informed of their right to file for a rehearing or review within 30 days of the order. They were also advised of their right to appeal for a judicial review by filing a complaint pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6. A court-obtained stay would be required to delay the order during a judicial review.

Official Communications

The Final Order and related documents were formally transmitted to all parties of record via certified mail or electronic means on May 30, 2017. Recipients included:

• Barry Saxion

• Troy B. Stratman, Esq. (counsel for the HOA)

• The Office of Administrative Hearings

• Judy Lowe and other staff at the Arizona Department of Real Estate

Study Guide: Saxion v. Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the primary parties involved in case number 17F-H1716023-REL and their respective roles.

2. What was the initial argument made by the Respondent, Silverton II HOA, in its Motion for Summary Judgement?

3. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) resolve the issue of Barry Saxion’s standing to pursue the action?

4. What was the second, and ultimately successful, argument presented by the Respondent for the case’s dismissal?

5. According to the HOA’s governing documents, what is the definition of a “covered claim”?

6. What was the final recommendation made by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer in her decision dated May 16, 2017?

7. What immediate procedural action was taken as a result of the ALJ’s recommended decision on May 16, 2017?

8. Who formally accepted the ALJ’s decision, and what was the title of the document that finalized this acceptance?

9. What process must the petitioners now follow to resolve their dispute with the HOA, according to the final ruling?

10. Following the issuance of the Final Order on May 30, 2017, what right did the parties have if they disagreed with the decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, Barry and Sandra Saxion, and the Respondent, Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc. The Saxions initiated the dispute process, and the Homeowners Association was the entity against which the claim was filed.

2. The Respondent initially argued that the case should be dismissed because Petitioner Barry Saxion did not own property within the Association. This lack of ownership, they claimed, meant he did not possess the legal standing required to pursue the action.

3. The ALJ found that although Barry Saxion did not own property, Sandra Saxion did own property and had also signed the petition. Therefore, Sandra Saxion had standing to pursue the action, and the ALJ recommended denying the motion to dismiss on these grounds.

4. The Respondent’s successful argument was that Section 12.1 of the HOA’s Declaration required all covered claims to be resolved using the internal dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Declaration and Bylaws. They argued this must be done in lieu of initiating administrative proceedings.

5. A “covered claim” is defined as “all claims, grievances, controversies, disagreements, or disputes that arise in whole or part out of . . . the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the Declaration or the other Project Documents.”

6. On May 16, 2017, the ALJ recommended that the Petition be dismissed. She concluded that the plain language of the HOA’s governing documents required the claim to be handled through the internal dispute resolution process before any administrative proceedings could be brought.

7. As a result of the ALJ’s recommendation, an order was issued vacating the hearing that was scheduled for May 22, 2017. The parties were advised of this through a Minute Entry.

8. Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, formally accepted the ALJ’s decision. This was finalized in a document titled “Final Order,” dated May 30, 2017.

9. The petitioners must handle their claim through the dispute resolution process set forth in the Silverton II Declaration and Bylaws. The Final Order mandates that this internal process must be used prior to bringing administrative proceedings.

10. After the Final Order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a party had the right to file a motion for rehearing or review within thirty (30) days. They also had the right to appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions require a more detailed analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing connections between the different documents and legal concepts presented.

1. Analyze the concept of “standing” as it was presented and resolved in this case. Discuss why Barry Saxion’s lack of property ownership did not result in the case’s dismissal on those grounds, and explain the role of the original Petition in the ALJ’s finding.

2. Explain the legal hierarchy and procedural flow of this dispute. Trace the case from the initial petition to the Final Order, identifying the specific roles and actions of the Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

3. Discuss the significance of Section 12.1 of the “Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II.” How did the “plain language” of this specific clause determine the ultimate outcome of the administrative proceeding?

4. Evaluate the two distinct arguments made by the Respondent in their Motion for Summary Judgement. Compare the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge in her recommendations for each argument and explain why one argument failed while the other succeeded.

5. Describe the post-decision options available to the parties following the issuance of the Final Order on May 30, 2017. What specific steps could a party take if they disagreed with the outcome, what were the associated deadlines, and to whom would a request for rehearing be addressed?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, and issues a recommended decision. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Administrative Law Judge Decision

The formal written recommendation of the ALJ. In this matter, the decision recommended that the petition be dismissed based on the HOA’s governing documents.

Commissioner

The head of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. In this case, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision and issued the Final Order.

Covered Claims

A specific category of disputes defined in the HOA’s Declaration. It includes all claims, grievances, or disputes related to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the HOA’s governing documents.

Declaration

The short name for the “Declaration of Homeowners Benefits and Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Silverton II.” This is a core governing document for the HOA that dictates required procedures, such as dispute resolution.

Department of Real Estate (Department)

The Arizona state agency that referred the HOA dispute to the Office of Administrative Hearings and whose Commissioner issued the Final Order.

Final Order

A binding order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate that accepts the ALJ’s decision. This order made the dismissal of the petition official and effective immediately.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The governing body for the Silverton II community, which was the Respondent in this case.

Minute Entry

A brief entry on the case record noting a court or judge’s order or action. In this case, a Minute Entry was issued to vacate the scheduled May 22, 2017 hearing.

Motion for Summary Judgement

A formal request made by a party (in this case, the Respondent) asking the judge to rule in their favor without a full hearing, based on the argument that there are no disputed facts and the law is on their side.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state office where the case was heard. It provides a neutral forum for resolving disputes involving state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the petitioners were Barry and Sandra Saxion.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Silverton II Homeowners Association, Inc.

Standing

The legal right to bring a lawsuit or administrative action. In this context, standing was initially questioned based on property ownership within the HOA.

Why This Homeowner’s Complaint Against Their HOA Was Dismissed Before It Began

Dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can be one of the most frustrating aspects of homeownership. When you feel the association is overstepping its bounds or failing to enforce the rules fairly, the natural impulse is to seek a formal resolution. Homeowners have rights, and there are official channels, like administrative hearings, designed to address these disputes.

But what if the path to justice has a mandatory detour you didn’t know about? The case of Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA is a powerful cautionary tale for any homeowner who believes they have a legitimate grievance. A close look at the official documents reveals surprising lessons, and it’s a stark reminder that in an HOA dispute, being right is not enough; you must also be procedurally perfect.

1. The Fine Print Is Your First Hurdle

The primary reason the homeowners’ petition was dismissed had nothing to do with the merits of their actual complaint. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) never weighed in on whether the homeowners were right or the HOA was wrong. Instead, the case was dismissed because the homeowners failed to follow the mandatory dispute resolution process required by their own HOA’s governing documents before they filed for an administrative hearing.

The association’s own rules legally required an internal process to be completed first. By going straight to an administrative filing, the homeowners had unintentionally bypassed a mandatory first step outlined in their governing documents. The ALJ pointed to the specific language in the HOA’s Declaration, which was the ultimate authority on the matter.

all covered claims “must be resolved using the dispute resolution procedures set forth . . . in [the] Declaration and the Bylaws in lieu of filing a lawsuit or initiating administrative proceedings.”

2. A Simple Clerical Error Can Jeopardize Your Entire Case

Before even getting to the core procedural issue, the HOA made another challenge that could have ended the case immediately. They argued that the petitioner officially named in the case caption, Barry Saxion, didn’t actually own property in the association and therefore had no legal standing.

This error, however, wasn’t made by the homeowners. The case documents reveal a critical lesson: when the Arizona Department of Real Estate referred the matter for a hearing, it was the agency that created the incorrect caption. This bureaucratic mistake could have been fatal, but the petition was saved because the ALJ noted that the original paperwork was signed by both Barry Saxion and Sandra Saxion, who did own property. Because both their names and signatures were on the petition, the ALJ could overlook the agency’s error. This highlights the need for homeowners to be vigilant, double-checking all official documents—even those prepared by a state agency.

3. A “Win” Doesn’t Always Mean Justice Was Served

The final outcome was not a judgment on the underlying disagreement. The petition was simply “dismissed.” This means the core issues the homeowners wanted to resolve were never actually heard or ruled on by the Administrative Law Judge.

The process itself is revealing. On May 16, 2017, the ALJ, Tammy L. Eigenheer, issued a recommendation that the complaint be dismissed. This recommendation was then reviewed by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, who accepted it and issued a FINAL ORDER making the dismissal official on May 30, 2017. For the HOA, this was a victory won on a technicality. For the homeowners, it was a procedural dead end, preventing their core complaints from being heard in the administrative hearing. This shows how a legal victory can be won entirely on procedure, preventing the central conflict from ever being addressed.

Conclusion

The core lesson from the Saxion vs. Silverton II HOA case is clear: in a dispute with your HOA, understanding the procedural rules in your governing documents is just as important as the substance of your complaint. Failing to read and follow these rules can render your entire effort, no matter how justified, completely invalid. It can cost you time, money, and the opportunity to have your case heard at all. Before you take on your HOA, have you read the rulebook they require you to play by?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Barry Saxion (petitioner)
  • Sandra Saxion (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Troy B. Stratman (Respondent attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • L. Dettorre (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D. Jones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • J. Marshall (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • N. Cano (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M. Aguirre (Staff)