Kurt Gronlund vs. Cottonfields Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID17F-H1716024-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2017-05-11
Administrative Law JudgeDiane Mihalsky
OutcomeThe Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, recommending dismissal of the petition due to the Department's lack of statutory jurisdiction over the dispute, which involved a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the rights of a third-party Golf Course Owner.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerKurt GronlundCounsel
RespondentCottonfields Community AssociationCounselTroy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, recommending dismissal of the petition due to the Department's lack of statutory jurisdiction over the dispute, which involved a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the rights of a third-party Golf Course Owner.

Why this result: The Department lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute because the REMA was not considered a 'community document' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) and the requested relief implicated the rights of a non-party (the Golf Course Owner) over whom the Department has no jurisdiction.

Key Issues & Findings

Jurisdiction over REMA Amendment Dispute

Petitioner sought a finding that REMA Amendments 2 and 3 were void because the HOA board unilaterally amended the REMA without the required member vote (two-thirds majority) as specified in the CC&Rs and REMA, and sought an order for the removal of the amendments from the record.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge recommended granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the Complaint.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(2)
  • CC&Rs 14.2
  • REMA Article 12

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, summary judgment, golf course, REMA, third party
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • CC&Rs 14.2
  • REMA 5.1
  • REMA Article 12

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 563660.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-29T10:12:19 (99.8 KB)

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 568840.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-29T10:12:24 (854.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Gronlund vs. Cottonfields Community Association (Case No. 17F-H1716024-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and decision in the case of Kurt Gronlund versus the Cottonfields Community Association, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute centers on the petitioner’s allegation that the Homeowners Association (HOA) board improperly amended a critical land-use agreement in 2011 without a required vote of the membership, ultimately enabling the commercial rezoning of an adjacent golf course.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the HOA’s motion for summary judgment, and the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted this decision, dismissing the petition. The dismissal was not based on the merits of the petitioner’s claim but on a crucial lack of jurisdiction. The ALJ determined that the Department of Real Estate could not rule on the matter for two primary reasons:

1. The governing agreement in question (the REMA) is not a “community document” as defined by the relevant Arizona statute, placing it outside the Department’s purview.

2. The relief sought by the petitioner would directly implicate the property rights of a third party (the Golf Course Owner) and a prior legal settlement, which exceeds the Department’s statutory authority.

While acknowledging the petitioner’s concerns about the golf course development may be “well-founded,” the decision concluded that the petitioner’s available remedies lie in electing a new HOA board, filing a lawsuit in a judicial forum, or seeking legislative change.

Case Overview

This case involves a dispute between a homeowner and his HOA regarding the amendment of a land-use agreement governing a golf course property.

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

Kurt Gronlund

A homeowner within the Cottonfields community and a member of the Respondent association.

Respondent

Cottonfields Community Association

The Homeowners Association (HOA) for the Cottonfields development.

Third Party

The Golf Course Owner

A separate legal entity that owns the golf course property adjacent to the community.

Case Chronology

December 11, 2001: The developer records both the Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the community’s CC&Rs.

March 2011: The Cottonfields HOA board votes 3-2 to amend the REMA.

March 3 & May 16, 2011: Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA, which alter the legal description of the golf course property, are officially recorded.

2014: Litigation (Case No. CV2014-000639) begins in Maricopa County Superior Court between the HOA and the Golf Course Owner regarding the REMA and its amendments.

July 2015: The HOA and the Golf Course Owner execute a settlement agreement.

August 7, 2015: The superior court lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice.

October 5, 2016: The HOA president represents to the City Council that homeowners favor rezoning the golf course. The Council approves a rezone from “GC” (Golf Course) to Commercial, relying on the 2011 REMA amendments.

February 3, 2017: Kurt Gronlund files a Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

April 27, 2017: The HOA files a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

May 10, 2017: Oral arguments on the motion are held.

May 11, 2017: The Administrative Law Judge issues a decision recommending dismissal.

May 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision and dismissing the case.

Core Dispute: Unilateral Amendment of the REMA

The petitioner’s case is founded on the claim that the HOA board acted in violation of its own governing documents when it facilitated changes to the REMA without consulting the community’s homeowners.

Petitioner’s Allegations

On February 3, 2017, Kurt Gronlund filed a petition asserting that the HOA board’s actions in 2011 were illegal and directly led to the loss of protection for homeowner property values.

The Unilateral Action: The petition states, “[In] March 2011 the HOA board voted 3-2 to unilaterally amend REMA 5.1’s use restriction on the golf course property without the required vote of the approximately 450 eligible class members…”

The Consequence: These amendments were used as justification for the HOA president to support a commercial rezoning of the golf course property before the City Council on October 5, 2016. The petitioner argues this “stripped away that last layer of protection” for homeowners who believed the golf course could not be developed without their approval.

Homeowner Reliance: During oral arguments, the petitioner testified that members relied on the protections within the CC&Rs and REMA when purchasing their homes, believing development required a two-thirds majority vote.

Petitioner’s Requested Relief

The petitioner respectfully requested that the Administrative Court issue the following orders:

1. Find that REMA Section 5.1 may not be amended without the member vote required by REMA Article 12 and CC&Rs Section 14.2.

2. Find that Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA are void and unenforceable.

3. Order the HOA Board to remove Amendments 2 and 3 from the public record.

Analysis of Governing Document Provisions

The dispute hinges on the interpretation of and interaction between two key legal documents: the REMA and the HOA’s CC&Rs.

Document

Section

Description

Key Language

Section 5.1

Use Restriction: Restricts the golf course property’s use to either a golf course or open space.

“The Golf Course Property shall be used solely and exclusively for Golf Course Use or as open space, and for no other purposes.”

Article 12

Amendment Procedure: Stipulates that changes to Section 5.1 require the same member vote as an amendment to the HOA’s Declaration (CC&Rs).

“…no termination, cancellation, change, modification or amendment of paragraph 5.1… shall be made without the written approval thereof by the number of Members… required to amend the Declaration pursuant to Section 13.2 thereof.”

Section 14.2

Member Vote Requirement: Defines the threshold for amending the CC&Rs.

“…may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than two-thirds (2/3) of all Class A votes then entitled to be cast; and (b) Members holding not less than two thirds (2/3) of all Class B votes…”

Section 14.17

Third-Party Rights: Protects the rights of the Golf Course Owner, stating that provisions benefiting them cannot be amended without their written consent.

“…no provision of this Declaration… which grants to or confers upon the Golf Course Owner or the Golf Course Property any rights… shall be modified, amended or revoked in any way without the express written consent of the Golf Course Owner.”

Jurisdictional Challenge and Legal Rationale for Dismissal

The HOA’s defense focused not on the factual allegations but on the argument that the Department of Real Estate was the improper forum for this dispute. The ALJ ultimately agreed with this position.

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Cottonfields Community Association argued that the Department could not grant the petitioner’s requested relief because:

1. The REMA is not a “community document” as defined under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)).

2. The Golf Course Owner is a third party over whom the Department lacks jurisdiction.

3. Any ruling would affect the rights of this third party and could impact the 2015 settlement agreement from the superior court case.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The ALJ’s decision was based on a strict interpretation of the Department’s statutory authority.

REMA is Not a “Community Document”: The judge found that although the REMA references the CC&Rs, it does not meet the legal definition of a community document under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), which defines them as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The Department’s authority under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) is limited to violations of these specific documents.

Implication of Third-Party Rights: The decision states that the petitioner’s request to void the amendments “implicates the Golf Course Owner’s interests in its property and may affect the settlement that the Golf Course Owner entered into with Respondent.” The law does not grant the Department “jurisdiction over disputes that implicate the rights of third parties.”

Petitioner’s Available Remedies: While validating the petitioner’s underlying worries, the judge outlined specific alternative courses of action. The decision states: “Petitioner’s concerns about development of the golf course may be well-founded. However, under applicable statutes, at this time, his available remedies are to elect a board that will better protect members’ interest in maintaining the golf course, to file suit in a judicial forum against Respondent and the Golf Course Owner, or to ask the legislature to amend A.R.S. §§ 33-1802(2) and 32-2199.01(A).”

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the legal conclusions regarding jurisdiction, the case was dismissed.

ALJ Recommendation: On May 11, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky recommended that the complaint be dismissed.

Commissioner’s Final Order: On May 11, 2017, Judy Lowe, Commissioner for the Arizona Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order stating: “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that the petition in this matter be dismissed.”

Further Action: The Final Order noted that a party may file for a rehearing or review within thirty days, or may appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide: Gronlund v. Cottonfields Community Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Kurt Gronlund v. Cottonfields Community Association (No. 17F-H1716024-REL), focusing on the key legal arguments, governing documents, and the court’s final decision regarding jurisdiction.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided legal documents.

1. Who are the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What central allegation did the Petitioner make regarding the HOA board’s actions in March 2011?

3. What specific relief did the Petitioner request from the Administrative Court in his petition?

4. Identify the two key legal documents at the heart of the dispute and briefly explain their respective roles.

5. According to REMA Article 12 and CC&Rs Section 14.2, what was the required procedure to amend the use restriction on the golf course property?

6. On what primary grounds did the Respondent, Cottonfields Community Association, file a motion for summary judgment?

7. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s key legal conclusion regarding the status of the Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA)?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked the jurisdiction to grant the Petitioner’s requested relief?

9. What alternative remedies did the Administrative Law Judge suggest were available to the Petitioner?

10. What was the final outcome of the case as determined by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Kurt Gronlund, a homeowner and member of the Cottonfields Community Association. The Respondent is the Cottonfields Community Association, which is the Homeowners Association (HOA) for the residential development where the Petitioner owns a home.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the HOA board voted 3-2 to unilaterally amend REMA Section 5.1’s use restriction on the golf course property. This action was allegedly taken without the required vote of the approximately 450 eligible class members, which constituted a violation of the governing documents.

3. The Petitioner requested that the court find Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA to be void and unenforceable, order the HOA Board to remove these amendments from the public record, and issue a finding that REMA 5.1 may not be amended without the member vote required by the CC&Rs.

4. The key documents are the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA). The CC&Rs are the primary governing documents for the HOA, while the REMA is a separate agreement between the developer/HOA and the Golf Course Owner specifically governing the use of the golf course property.

5. REMA Article 12 required that any amendment to Section 5.1 (the use restriction) receive written approval from the number of Members specified in the CC&Rs. CC&Rs Section 14.2 stipulates this requires an affirmative vote or written consent of members holding at least two-thirds (2/3) of all Class A and Class B votes.

6. The Respondent argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to rule on the matter. This argument was based on two points: the REMA was not a “community document” as defined by Arizona statute, and the dispute involved the rights of the Golf Course Owner, a third party over whom the Department had no authority.

7. The Judge concluded that although the REMA references the CC&Rs, it is not a “community document” as defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2). This determination was central to the case, as the Department’s jurisdiction is limited to disputes concerning community documents.

8. The Department’s jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) does not extend to disputes that implicate the rights of third parties. Because the Petitioner’s request would affect the property interests of the Golf Course Owner and a 2015 legal settlement, the Department was not statutorily authorized to resolve the issue.

9. The Judge suggested three potential remedies: elect a new HOA board that will better protect members’ interests, file a lawsuit in a judicial forum against both the HOA and the Golf Course Owner, or ask the state legislature to amend the relevant statutes governing HOAs and community documents.

10. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s recommendation in a Final Order dated May 11, 2017. The Commissioner accepted the decision that the Department lacked jurisdiction and ordered that the Petitioner’s complaint be dismissed.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “community document” and the REMA as presented in this case. Why was this distinction the pivotal point in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to recommend dismissal for lack of jurisdiction?

2. Discuss the procedural history of the dispute over the golf course property, beginning with the REMA amendments in 2011 and including the 2014 litigation, the 2015 settlement, and the 2016 rezoning. How did these prior events impact the arguments and outcome of Gronlund’s 2017 petition?

3. Explain the conflict between the powers granted to the HOA Board and Golf Course Owner in REMA Article 12 and the protections afforded to homeowners in the same article’s reference to CC&Rs Section 14.2. How did the Petitioner and Respondent interpret these clauses differently?

4. Evaluate the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over third parties like the Golf Course Owner. Why would resolving Gronlund’s petition necessarily implicate the rights of this third party?

5. The Judge outlines three potential remedies for the Petitioner: electoral, judicial, and legislative. Describe each of these remedies and discuss the potential challenges and benefits of each path in seeking to protect the golf course from development.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over administrative hearings at a government agency, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The ALJ in this matter was Diane Mihalsky.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of all the laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Specific statutes, such as A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) and § 33-1802(2), were central to this case.

CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions)

The primary governing legal documents for a planned community or homeowners’ association that outline the rules and member obligations.

Commissioner

The head of a government department. In this case, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, issued the Final Order.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these include a planned community’s declaration (CC&Rs), bylaws, articles of incorporation, and rules. The REMA was determined not to fall under this definition.

Dismissed with Prejudice

A legal term for a final judgment that prevents the plaintiff from filing another case on the same claim. The 2014 lawsuit between the HOA and the Golf Course Owner was dismissed with prejudice.

Golf Course Owner

A separate legal entity that owned the golf course property and was a primary party to the REMA, but was not a party to this administrative case.

HOA (Homeowners Association) | An organization in a subdivision or planned community that creates and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Cottonfields Community Association. | | Jurisdiction | The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The central legal issue of the case was whether the Arizona Department of Real Estate had jurisdiction over the dispute. | | Motion for Summary Judgment | A request made by a party asking the court to decide a case in their favor without a full trial, arguing that there are no material facts in dispute and that they are entitled to win as a matter of law. | | Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) | An independent Arizona state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies to ensure fair and impartial decisions. | | Petitioner | The party who files a petition or brings an action before a court or administrative body. In this case, Kurt Gronlund. | | REMA (Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement) | A recorded legal agreement between the original developer/HOA and the Golf Course Owner that established mutual rights, easements, and obligations, including the critical use restriction on the golf course property. | | Respondent | The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Cottonfields Community Association. |

The provided sources consist of an Administrative Law Judge Decision and a subsequent Final Order from the Arizona Department of Real Estate concerning a dispute between homeowner Kurt Gronlund, the Petitioner, and the Cottonfields Community Association, the Respondent. The administrative law judge recommended granting the Association’s motion for summary judgment because the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter, a recommendation which the Commissioner ultimately accepted. The core of the conflict was Gronlund’s petition challenging the Association’s 2011 amendments to a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA), which governed the use of a golf course adjacent to the community. The decision clarified that the REMA was not classified as a “community document” under the relevant statutes, and furthermore, the requested relief would improperly implicate the rights of the Golf Course Owner, a third party over whom the Department had no authority. The final ruling therefore dismissed the petition, suggesting judicial action or legislative change as alternative remedies for the petitioner.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Kurt Gronlund (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Troy B. Stratman (attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Responsible for processing rehearing requests and listed on ADRE service email list.
  • LDettorre (administrative staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed ([email protected])
  • djones (administrative staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed ([email protected])
  • jmarshall (administrative staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed ([email protected])
  • ncano (administrative staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed ([email protected])

John Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID17F-H1716021-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2017-03-30
Administrative Law JudgeDiane Mihalsky
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the Respondent HOA complied with A.R.S. § 33-1258 by providing documents related to expenditures, and was not required to provide bank signature cards or read-only online access credentials.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerJohn SellersCounsel
RespondentRancho Madera Condominium AssociationCounselLydia Peirce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the Respondent HOA complied with A.R.S. § 33-1258 by providing documents related to expenditures, and was not required to provide bank signature cards or read-only online access credentials.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 because the statute does not require the association to provide records (like signature cards or usernames/passwords) which are not financial records showing actual expenditures and are often held by the financial institution.

Key Issues & Findings

Association financial and other records; applicability

Petitioner, a member of the HOA, alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 by refusing access to bank account signature cards and read-only user names/passwords. The ALJ found that these items were not 'financial and other records' that the association was statutorily required to provide, as they related to mechanisms for disbursement rather than actual expenditure, and would be maintained by the bank, not the association.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied and dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Condominium Act, Access to Records, Financial Records, Bank Records
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716021-REL Decision – 549566.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:03:00 (60.9 KB)

17F-H1716021-REL Decision – 554490.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:03:04 (88.6 KB)

17F-H1716021-REL Decision – 558591.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:03:09 (757.3 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the proceedings and outcome of the administrative case John Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association. The core of the dispute was Petitioner John Sellers’s allegation that the Respondent, Rancho Madera Condominium Association, violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1258 by refusing to produce specific records: bank account signature cards and read-only online banking credentials for the association’s account with Mutual of Omaha.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately recommended the petition be denied, a decision that was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The ruling hinged on a narrow interpretation of the statute. The ALJ concluded that the requested items were not “financial and other records of the association” as required by law. Key findings supporting this conclusion were:

Custody: The signature cards, if they exist, are records held by the bank (Mutual of Omaha), not the association.

Nature of Request: Online user names and passwords constitute “information,” not a “document” or “record” in the statutory sense.

Sufficient Disclosure: The association had already provided a comprehensive set of financial documents (bank statements, contracts, resolutions, etc.) sufficient for a member to ascertain whether the association was prudently managing its funds, thereby satisfying the plain-meaning purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1258.

The petitioner’s arguments that such records must exist under federal banking regulations and that electronic access is superior to paper records were deemed policy arguments to be addressed to the legislature, not grounds for finding a statutory violation.

Case Overview

Case Name

John Sellers, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association, Respondent

Case Number

No. 17F-H1716021-REL (also listed as DOCKET NO. 17F-H1716021-REL and CASE NO. HO 17-16/021)

Petitioner

John Sellers (Appeared on his own behalf)

Respondent

Rancho Madera Condominium Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Lydia Peirce Linsmeier, Esq., Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Reviewing Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Diane Mihalsky

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation and Legal Framework

Petitioner’s Claim

On or about December 20, 2016, John Sellers, a condominium owner and member of the Rancho Madera Condominium Association, filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The petition alleged that the association had violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 by refusing to provide two specific items related to its bank account at Mutual of Omaha:

1. Bank account signature cards.

2. Read-only user names and passwords for online access to the account.

Sellers argued that these documents must exist, citing federal banking statutes and regulations intended to combat terrorism.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1258

The case revolved around the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1258, “Association financial and other records.” The key provisions of this statute state:

A. Right to Examine: “Except as provided in subsection B of this section, all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member…”

Timeline: An association has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination and ten business days to provide copies upon request.

Fees: An association may charge a fee of not more than fifteen cents per page for copies.

B. Withholdable Records: The statute allows an association to withhold records related to:

1. Privileged attorney-client communication.

2. Pending litigation.

3. Records of board meetings not required to be open to all members.

4. Personal, health, or financial records of individual members or employees.

5. Records related to job performance or complaints against employees.

C. Legal Prohibitions: An association is not required to disclose records if doing so would violate state or federal law.

The Uniform Condominium Act, of which this statute is a part, does not provide a more specific definition of “financial and other records.”

Factual Findings and Evidence Presented

Records Provided by the Association

Prior to the hearing, the Respondent had already provided the Petitioner with a substantial volume of financial records. Emails attached to the initial petition indicated that the following documents were furnished:

• All bank statements

• Account opening documentation

• Forms for members’ direct debit authorizations

• The Board’s resolution authorizing the opening of the bank account

• Agreements between the property management company, Trestle Management Group, and Mutual of Omaha regarding fees, indemnities, and netting

• The association’s insurance certificate

• The association’s management contract with Trestle Management Group

Witness Testimony

A hearing was held on March 7, 2017, where testimony was presented by both parties.

Petitioner’s Testimony: John Sellers testified on his own behalf and submitted ten exhibits.

Respondent’s Witnesses:

Marc Vasquez (Vice President of Trestle Management Group): Testified that all signature cards for the association’s bank accounts were held by the bank at which the accounts were opened. He stated that Mutual of Omaha was the custodian of those cards.

Alan Simpson (Vice President of Respondent’s Board) & Marc Kaplan (President of Respondent’s Board): Both testified that they did not have user names and passwords for the association’s Mutual of Omaha account. They believed, however, that the association’s treasurer may have had such credentials to access the account online.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 29, 2017, denied the Petitioner’s petition. The reasoning was based on a direct interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1258 and the evidence presented.

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent had violated the statute. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that “convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ determined that the “plain meaning” of A.R.S. § 33-1258 is to provide members with access to documents that allow them to “ascertain whether the association is prudently managing its members’ assessments.” The decision explicitly states that the numerous documents already provided by the Respondent fulfilled this purpose.

Custody and Control: A central finding was that the requested items were not “records of the association.” The signature cards were records held and maintained by a third party, Mutual of Omaha. The statute does not compel an association to produce records that are not in its possession or under its control.

Information vs. Documents: The decision drew a distinction between records and information, stating, “The user names and passwords are information, not a document.” Furthermore, it noted that these items “do not relate to Respondent’s actual expenditure of members’ assessments” but rather to the mechanisms for disbursing funds.

Scope of the Statute: The ALJ concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1258 does not require an association to “create, maintain, or provide this information or documentation to Petitioner, either to serve his convenience or to allow him to ascertain Respondent’s or Mutual of Omaha’s compliance with federal banking statutes that are not incorporated in the Uniform Condominium Act.”

Policy Arguments: The Petitioner’s contention that “paper access to the account information is inferior to electronic access” was dismissed as “a policy argument that should be addressed to the Legislature.” The statute only requires that records be made “reasonably available,” which the Respondent had done.

Procedural History and Final Outcome

c. Dec. 20, 2016

John Sellers files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Mar. 7, 2017

An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Diane Mihalsky. An order is issued holding the record open for the parties to submit legal memoranda regarding the scope of A.R.S. § 33-1258.

Mar. 21, 2017

The deadline for submitting legal memoranda passes, and the record on the matter is closed.

Mar. 29, 2017

ALJ Diane Mihalsky issues the “Administrative Law Judge Decision,” which includes Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Recommended Order to deny the Petitioner’s petition.

Mar. 30, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a “Final Order.” This order formally accepts and adopts the ALJ’s decision, and the petition is denied.

The Final Order, effective immediately upon service, represented the final administrative action in the matter. The order noted that parties could file a motion for rehearing within 30 days or appeal the final administrative decision through judicial review.

Study Guide:Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case John Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association, Case No. 17F-H1716021-REL. It covers the key parties, legal arguments, statutory interpretations, and the ultimate decision rendered by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner, John Sellers, against the Rancho Madera Condominium Association?

2. Identify the specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) that formed the basis of the legal dispute and summarize its primary requirement for homeowners’ associations.

3. What specific documents or information did John Sellers request that the association refused to provide?

4. In its defense, what was the association’s stated reason for not producing the requested items?

5. List the documents that the association did provide to the Petitioner prior to the hearing.

6. Who testified on behalf of the Respondent association at the March 7, 2017 hearing?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) distinguish between “information” and “documents” in her legal conclusions?

8. What is the “burden of proof” in this case, and which party was responsible for meeting it?

9. What was the final outcome of the petition as determined by the Administrative Law Judge and subsequently adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

10. According to the ALJ’s decision, what is the plain meaning and purpose of A.R.S. § 33-1258?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner, John Sellers, alleged that the Respondent, Rancho Madera Condominium Association, had violated A.R.S. § 33-1258. The specific violation was the association’s refusal to provide him with certain records related to its bank account at Mutual of Omaha.

2. The statute at the center of the dispute was A.R.S. § 33-1258, titled “Association financial and other records.” This statute generally requires that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association be made reasonably available for examination by any member within ten business days of a request.

3. John Sellers requested bank account signature cards for the association’s Mutual of Omaha account. He also requested read-only user names and passwords for online access to that same account.

4. The association denied the request because it asserted that the requested documents and information either did not exist or were not included in the association’s records. It was testified that the signature cards were held by the bank, Mutual of Omaha, as their custodian.

5. The association provided copies of all bank statements, account opening documentation, direct debit authorization forms, the Board’s resolution to open the account, agreements between its management company (Trestle) and the bank, its insurance certificate, and its management contract with Trestle.

6. Three witnesses testified for the Respondent: Alan Simpson (Vice President of the Board), Marc Kaplan (President of the Board), and Marc Vasquez (Vice President of Trestle Management Group).

7. The ALJ concluded that the requested user names and passwords constituted “information,” not a “document” as covered by the statute. She further reasoned that neither the signature cards nor the online credentials related to the actual expenditure of funds, but rather to the mechanisms for disbursement, and were maintained by the bank, not the association.

8. The burden of proof rested on the Petitioner, John Sellers, to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent had violated the statute. A preponderance of the evidence is proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

9. The Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order denying the Petitioner’s petition. This decision was then adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate in a Final Order, formally denying the petition and making the decision binding on the parties.

10. The ALJ determined the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1258 is that associations must provide members with access to documents that allow them to ascertain whether the association is prudently managing its members’ assessments. The judge noted that arguments for different types of access (e.g., electronic vs. paper) are policy arguments that should be addressed to the Legislature.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts, legal reasoning, and conclusions presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of “financial and other records” under A.R.S. § 33-1258. How did this interpretation, particularly the distinction between disbursement mechanisms and actual expenditures, lead to the denial of John Sellers’ petition?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail why the Petitioner, according to the ALJ’s findings, failed to meet this standard.

3. Trace the procedural timeline of the case from the initial petition filed around December 20, 2016, to the Final Order dated March 30, 2017. Identify the key legal bodies involved (Office of Administrative Hearings, Department of Real Estate) and their respective roles in the process.

4. Evaluate the Petitioner’s argument that federal banking statutes and regulations intended to fight terrorism necessitated the existence and disclosure of the requested records. Why was this argument ultimately unpersuasive to the court?

5. Examine the exceptions to disclosure outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1258(B). Although not the central issue in the final decision, explain how these exceptions frame the limits of a homeowner’s right to association records.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions or recommended orders. In this case, Diane Mihalsky served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 33-1258

The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the heart of the case, part of the Uniform Condominium Act. It governs a homeowner association’s duty to make its “financial and other records” available for examination by members.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Commissioner

The head of a government department. In this case, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, adopted the ALJ’s decision and issued the Final Order.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as documents and testimony) before a judge or hearing officer. The hearing in this case was held on March 7, 2017.

Final Order

A binding decision issued by an administrative agency that concludes a case. In this matter, the Final Order was issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on March 30, 2017, denying the petition.

Homeowners’ Association

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Rancho Madera Condominium Association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, John Sellers.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It means that the evidence presented is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, establishing that a claim is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Madera Condominium Association.

Trestle Management Group (“Trestle”)

The property management company for the Rancho Madera Condominium Association. The Vice President of Trestle, Marc Vasquez, testified at the hearing.

Uniform Condominium Act

The section of Arizona law (Chapter 9 of Title 33, Arizona Revised Statutes) that governs condominiums. A.R.S. § 33-1258 is part of this act.

These sources document the administrative legal proceedings of a dispute between John Sellers (Petitioner) and the Rancho Madera Condominium Association (Respondent) before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue of the case, No. 17F-H1716021-REL, was the Association’s alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258 by refusing to provide bank account signature cards and read-only user credentials for online access to their bank account. The initial order, dated March 7, 2017, held the record open to allow both parties to submit legal memoranda concerning the scope of corporate records required under the statute. The subsequent Administrative Law Judge Decision, dated March 29, 2017, denied the Petitioner’s petition, concluding that the requested items were not considered financial records the association was legally required to create, maintain, or disclose. Finally, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ Decision as a Final Order on March 30, 2017.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John Sellers (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Lydia Peirce Linsmeier (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
  • Alan Simpson (board member/witness)
    Rancho Madera Condominium Association
    Vice President of Respondent's board
  • Marc Kaplan (board member/witness)
    Rancho Madera Condominium Association
    President of Respondent's Board
  • Marc Vasquez (property manager/witness)
    Trestle Management Group
    Vice President of Trestle
  • Annette Graham (attorney staff)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Derived from email address (Annette.graham)

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Also listed as AHansen

Other Participants

  • M. Johnson (clerical staff)
    Signatory on document transmission
  • LDettorre (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Email recipient
  • djones (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Email recipient
  • jmarshall (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Email recipient
  • ncano (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Email recipient

Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Case Summary

Case ID17F-H1716019-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2017-03-14
Administrative Law JudgeSuzanne Marwil
OutcomeThe Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerJay JanicekCounsel
RespondentSycamore Vista No. 8 HOACounselEvan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

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17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

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Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

“Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.

Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (No. 17F-H1716019-REL). It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to aid in understanding the facts, arguments, and legal conclusions of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What was the central action taken by the Respondent’s Board that led to this legal dispute?

3. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument against the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”?

4. How did the Respondent justify its use of a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” instead of a full vote by lot owners?

5. Describe the conflict of interest alleged by the Petitioner against the Respondent’s Board.

6. How did the 2009 First Amendment alter Section 6.8 of the HOA’s 2005 Declaration?

7. What was the direct financial consequence for developed lot owners following the Board’s actions in 2016?

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final ruling regarding the validity of the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”?

9. Despite invalidating the Board’s action, what did the Judge decide regarding the increased assessment on developed lots?

10. What was the final order issued in the case, and what was the Respondent required to do?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Jay Janicek and Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA. Janicek, a lot owner, brought the petition against the Homeowner’s Association to challenge a decision made by its Board of Directors.

2. The Respondent’s Board, by a 3-2 vote, adopted a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” on August 3, 2016. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment to the HOA’s governing documents.

3. The Petitioner argued that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was not a simple correction but a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he contended it was an amendment that required approval by a vote of seventy-five percent of the lot owners, not just a Board vote.

4. The Respondent argued that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was merely intended to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of developed versus undeveloped lots, which was inadvertently deleted from the 2009 revision. The Board’s President, Steven Russo, testified that they acted on the recommendation of their legal counsel.

5. The Petitioner alleged a conflict of interest because three members of the Respondent’s Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owns the undeveloped lots. The Petitioner argued that these members stood to benefit from assessment changes that favored undeveloped lots.

6. The 2009 First Amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 and replaced it with new language. This new language explicitly allowed annual dues to be assessed at different uniform rates for “Completed Lots” and “Uncompleted Lots,” a distinction not present in the original uniform rate structure.

7. Following the adoption of the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error,” the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00. The assessment for undeveloped lots was left unchanged.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was an invalid amendment to the Declaration. The Judge found that it was a substantive change that required a vote of the lot owners as specified in A.R.S. §33-1817, and that calling it a correction of a clerical error after seven years “defies logic.”

9. The Judge ruled that the increased assessment on developed lots could stand. The ruling was based on the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment, which expressly permitted the HOA to assess different rates for completed and uncompleted lots, independent of the invalidated “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.”

10. The final order granted the Petitioner’s petition. The Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate a comprehensive response drawing upon the specific facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to invalidate the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” while simultaneously upholding the increased assessment on developed lots. Explain how both parts of this ruling were supported by different governing documents.

2. Discuss the conflict of interest allegation raised by Jay Janicek under A.R.S. § 33-1811. Why did the Tribunal ultimately reject this argument, and what does this rejection imply about the Board’s authority to set assessments under the Declaration?

3. Trace the evolution of Section 6.8 of the Declaration from the original 2005 version, through the 2009 First Amendment, to the attempted 2016 change. Explain the significance of the “Completed Lots” definition and how its omission and attempted reinsertion became the central point of the dispute.

4. Evaluate the Respondent’s argument that it was simply correcting an inadvertent clerical error. What evidence and reasoning did the Administrative Law Judge use to conclude that this was, in fact, an improper amendment?

5. Describe the legal requirements for amending an HOA declaration as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1817. Explain precisely how the actions of the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Board violated this statute.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge in the administrative hearing, in this case, Suzanne Marwil. The ALJ hears evidence and issues a decision based on the facts and applicable laws.

A.R.S. § 33-1811

An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case that addresses conflicts of interest for members of an HOA board of directors. The Tribunal found the Petitioner’s interpretation of this statute to be overbroad.

A.R.S. § 33-1817

An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case that outlines the legal requirements and procedures for amending an HOA’s declaration. The ALJ found the Respondent violated this statute.

Completed Lots

As defined in the original 2005 Declaration, this refers to any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy, including installed carpets, cabinets, plumbing, etc. This definition was central to the dispute.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration)

The primary governing legal document of the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, which outlines the rules, assessments, and rights of the property owners.

Declaration of Scrivener’s Error

The legal instrument adopted by the Respondent’s Board in a 3-2 vote on August 3, 2016. It was purported to correct a clerical error but was ruled to be an invalid substantive amendment to the Declaration.

First Amendment

The amendment to the 2005 Declaration adopted on December 4, 2008, after a vote of 75% of the lot owners. It changed Section 6.8 to allow for different assessment rates for completed and uncompleted lots but inadvertently omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot.”

NT Properties

A company with a financial interest in the undeveloped lots within the HOA. Three members of the Respondent’s Board also had a financial interest in this company, forming the basis of a conflict of interest allegation.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Jay Janicek.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA.

Tribunal

A term used within the decision to refer to the adjudicating body, specifically the Office of Administrative Hearings and the presiding Administrative Law Judge.

Uniform Rate of Assessment

A principle laid out in the 2005 Declaration requiring that annual and special assessments be fixed at a uniform rate for all lots. This was modified by the 2009 First Amendment.

He Sued His HOA and Won. Here’s Why He Still Had to Pay.

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath of Neighborhood Disputes

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant source of tension. It’s a world of rules, fees, and board decisions that can seem arbitrary or unfair. So when a single homeowner decides to take on their entire HOA in a legal battle, it feels like a classic David vs. Goliath story. This is one of those stories—about a homeowner who challenged an improper rule change and an unexpected fee increase. He took his HOA to court and, on paper, he won. But as he discovered, the outcome was far more surprising and nuanced than a simple victory.

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1. You Can’t Fix a Seven-Year-Old “Mistake” with a Simple Board Vote.

The core of the dispute began when the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA tried to amend its governing documents with a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” Their goal was to reinsert definitions of “Completed Lots” versus “Undeveloped Lots” that they claimed had been “inadvertently deleted” from a revision seven years prior.

Instead of seeking approval from the homeowners, the Board of Directors passed this “correction” on August 3, 2016, with a simple 3-2 vote. This procedural shortcut triggered the legal challenge.

The Administrative Law Judge unequivocally rejected the HOA’s move. The judge’s reasoning was sharp and logical: the seven-year gap since the original amendment was a critical factor. The sheer passage of time had transformed what the HOA called a clerical correction into what the law considered a substantive change. As such, it required a vote by 75% of the lot owners, not a simple board action.

The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful rebuke:

…after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.

This finding was a crucial victory for the homeowner. It affirmed that HOAs must follow the proper procedures outlined in their own governing documents and cannot use shortcuts to rewrite history, no matter how they frame their intentions.

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2. A Legal “Win” Doesn’t Always Mean You Get the Financial Outcome You Want.

Even though the judge invalidated the HOA’s “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error,” she made another, more surprising ruling: the $10.00 annual assessment increase on developed lots—the very fee that sparked the lawsuit—was valid and would stand.

The legal reasoning was buried in the fine print of the HOA’s own documents. A different amendment, one legally passed with a 75% homeowner vote on December 4, 2008, already gave the Board the explicit authority to set different assessment rates. The key language in that valid amendment stated, “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.”

This created the central irony of the case: the HOA took a legally improper path to arrive at a destination they already had a legal right to reach. Interestingly, the HOA board president testified they were acting on the advice of their counsel, suggesting this was less a malicious act and more of a costly legal misstep.

The petitioner, Jay Janicek, won his case on principle. The judge’s order granted his petition and even awarded him his $500.00 filing fee. But he lost on the practical financial issue that started the dispute. The $10 increase remained. It’s a stark illustration of how complex legal documents can be, where one legally sound clause can override a victory on another front.

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3. Proving a Conflict of Interest Is Harder Than It Looks.

The homeowner also accused the board of a conflict of interest. He pointed out that three members of the five-person board had a financial stake in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These were the very lots that benefited from the new assessment structure, as their fees remained unchanged while only the developed lots saw the $10 increase. On the surface, it appeared to be a clear-cut case of self-dealing.

However, the judge rejected this claim, ruling that the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict of interest statute was “overbroad.” The judge’s analysis provided a crucial distinction: the board members were not inventing a new power for their own benefit; they were exercising a power explicitly granted to the Board by the homeowners themselves in the 2009 Declaration. The ruling noted that the petitioner’s argument “disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

This takeaway is a sobering one for homeowners. It demonstrates that what might look like a glaring conflict of interest to a layperson may not meet the specific legal standard required to invalidate a board’s actions, especially when those actions fall within the powers already granted by the community’s governing documents.

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Conclusion: A Victory of Principle

In the end, the homeowner walked away with a strange and dual outcome. He successfully proved his HOA acted improperly by trying to amend its rules without a proper vote, yet he could not reverse the financial consequence that drove him to file the suit. The case stands as a powerful reminder for all homeowners: understanding both the procedural rules your HOA must follow and the precise wording hidden deep within its governing documents is absolutely critical. This ruling created a clear divide between procedural justice and financial reality.

This case was a victory of principle over practice—how much is a principle worth when the bottom line doesn’t change?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jay Janicek (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Evan Thomson (attorney)
    Represented Respondent
  • Steven Russo (board member)
    Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA
    President of Respondent; testified
  • Dane Dehler (attorney)
    Thompson Kron, P.L.C.
    Received copy of final order
  • Whitney Cunningham (HOA contact)
    Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA
    Received copy of final order c/o

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Recipient for rehearing request

John Sellers vs. Grayhawk Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID17F-H1716016-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2017-02-21
Administrative Law JudgeSuzanne Marwil
OutcomeThe Petitioner's petition was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof showing Respondent restricted electronic access to the bank account, and the issue was moot since the bank closed the account. Respondent complied with the statutory requirement to make records reasonably available.
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerJohn SellersCounsel
RespondentGrayhawk Community AssociationCounselCurtis Ekmark, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof showing Respondent restricted electronic access to the bank account, and the issue was moot since the bank closed the account. Respondent complied with the statutory requirement to make records reasonably available.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; lack of evidence that Respondent restricted access; issue was moot due to account closure; Respondent complied with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by offering paper copies of documents.

Key Issues & Findings

Wrongful denial of electronic access to the bank account's electronic information

Petitioner alleged Respondent unilaterally restricted his access to online, view-only bank account information and refused to restore access by November 25, 2016, in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Orders: Petition denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Access, HOA Records, Mootness, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • 32-2199.02
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716016-REL Decision – 546761.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:29 (61.1 KB)

17F-H1716016-REL Decision – 552261.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:34 (553.3 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Sellers vs. Grayhawk Community Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings in the administrative case of John Sellers (Petitioner) versus the Grayhawk Community Association (Respondent), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings and finalized by the Department of Real Estate. The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondent unlawfully restricted his electronic, view-only access to a bank account in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805(A).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The evidence showed the Respondent initially provided the requested electronic access, which the Petitioner successfully used before changing the password. The Petitioner offered no evidence that the Respondent subsequently interfered with or restricted this access. Furthermore, the issue was rendered moot when the bank in question closed the account. The ALJ affirmed that the Respondent’s offer to provide paper records satisfied the statutory requirement to make records “reasonably available.” This decision was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate.

Case Overview

Details

Case Name

John Sellers, Petitioner, vs. Grayhawk Community Association, Respondent.

Case Numbers

Docket No. 17F-H1716016-REL; Case No. HO 17-16/016

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

February 16, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

February 21, 2017

Final Order Date

March 3, 2017

Final Order Issued By

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Department of Real Estate

The Core Dispute

Petitioner’s Position

John Sellers alleged that after he requested and received view-only access to the Association’s Alliance Association Bank account, the Respondent unilaterally restricted that access. He claimed the Respondent’s failure to restore access by his deadline of the close of business on November 25, 2016, constituted a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), which governs a member’s right to examine association records. The petition, for which a $500 fee was paid, was specifically focused on this single issue.

Respondent’s Position

The Grayhawk Community Association argued that it had gone beyond its statutory obligations by arranging for the bank to create a new online password specifically for the Petitioner. They maintained that after providing this access, they did not interfere with or restrict it in any way. They contended that the Petitioner’s subsequent inability to access the account was due to unknown reasons. The Respondent noted that the bank closed the account on November 28, 2016, making any form of electronic access permanently unavailable and rendering the issue moot. They also offered to provide paper copies of the relevant bank records.

Chronology of Key Events

October 18, 2016: Petitioner John Sellers requests, among other items, an electronic, read-only password for the Respondent’s Alliance Association Bank account.

November 2, 2016: The Respondent notifies the Petitioner that such a password did not exist at the time of the request.

November 16, 2016: After requesting the bank create a password, the Respondent forwards the new login information to the Petitioner.

Post-November 16, 2016: The Petitioner successfully logs into the bank account using the provided information and changes the password.

Thanksgiving Day (November 24, 2016): The Petitioner attempts to log in again but “could not see anything.” Based on the assumption that the Respondent had restricted his access, he emails community manager Michael Fee.

Thanksgiving Day Demand: In his email, the Petitioner sets a deadline for the Respondent to restore his access by the end of the business day on Friday, November 25, 2016, threatening to file a petition if the deadline is not met. Mr. Fee replies that he will contact the bank.

November 28, 2016: Having not heard further from the Respondent, the Petitioner files the petition in this matter.

November 28, 2016: On the same day, the Respondent informs the Petitioner that they do not know the reason for the lack of access and denies that anyone affiliated with the association interfered. It is also on this date that Alliance Association Bank closes the account in question.

Analysis of the Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

The ALJ’s decision was based on a hearing held on February 16, 2017. The ruling systematically dismantled the Petitioner’s case based on the evidence presented.

Burden and Standard of Proof

• Pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner held the burden of proof.

• The required standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the Petitioner had to show it was more likely than not that his claim was true.

Key Findings of Fact

1. Access Was Provided: It was undisputed that the Respondent provided the Petitioner with login information and that this information initially worked, enabling him to access the account.

2. Petitioner Changed Password: After gaining access, the Petitioner changed the password.

3. No Evidence of Interference: The Petitioner offered “no evidence that Respondent took any action to deny Petitioner online access.” His belief that access was restricted was a “unilateral assumption.” The record did not establish why the new password failed to work on Thanksgiving Day.

4. Issue Rendered Moot: The undisputed closure of the bank account by the bank on November 28, 2016, made the request for electronic access moot, as such access was no longer available to anyone.

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof.” The record was “devoid of any evidence” that the Respondent denied the requested information or took any action to restrict access.

2. Compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): The statute requires that association records “be made reasonably available for examination.” The ALJ found that the Respondent complied with the statute by initially providing electronic access and later offering to “furnish the Petitioner paper copies of documents it possessed related to that bank account.”

3. Electronic vs. Paper Access: The Petitioner’s argument that paper access is inferior to electronic access was dismissed as a “policy argument that should be addressed to the Legislature.” The plain language of the existing statute does not mandate a specific format for record examination.

Final Order and Outcome

On March 3, 2017, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate issued a Final Order, which fully adopted the ALJ’s decision.

Petition Denied: The Commissioner accepted the ALJ’s decision that the petition be denied.

Future Compliance Directive: The order stated, “The Commissioner accepts the Recommended Order that Respondent shall comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes (‘A.R.S.’) § 33-1804 (A) in the future.”

Binding Decision: The order became a final administrative action, effective immediately and binding on the parties.

Rehearing and Appeal Process: Parties were notified that a motion for rehearing or review could be filed within 30 days. A request for rehearing should be addressed to Abby Hansen, 2910 N. 44th Street, Suite 100, Phoenix, Arizona, 85018. The order could also be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide: Sellers v. Grayhawk Community Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal case No. 17F-H1716016-REL, John Sellers v. Grayhawk Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision and the subsequent Final Order from the Department of Real Estate.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the primary parties involved in this case and state their respective roles.

2. What was the central accusation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent?

3. According to the Respondent’s argument, what actions did it take in response to the Petitioner’s initial request for electronic bank records?

4. What specific event occurred on Thanksgiving Day that directly prompted the Petitioner to file his petition?

5. What was the required standard of proof in this hearing, and which party was assigned the burden of meeting it?

6. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

7. Summarize the primary reason the Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof.

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge determine that the issue of electronic access had become moot?

9. What was the final decision issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and was it accepted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

10. How did the Administrative Law Judge address the Petitioner’s argument that paper records are an inferior substitute for electronic access?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were John Sellers, who served as the Petitioner, and the Grayhawk Community Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner, Mr. Sellers, brought the complaint, and the Respondent, Grayhawk Community Association, was the party accused of wrongdoing.

2. The Petitioner accused the Respondent of violating A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by unilaterally restricting his online, view-only access to a bank account. He claimed they wrongfully denied him this access and failed to restore it by his deadline of November 25, 2016.

3. The Respondent argued it went beyond its statutory obligation by requesting that Alliance Association Bank create an online, view-only password specifically for the Petitioner, as one did not previously exist. The Respondent then forwarded this new login information to the Petitioner on November 16, 2016.

4. On Thanksgiving Day, the Petitioner attempted to log on to the bank account but could not see anything. Based on the assumption that the Respondent had restricted his access, he emailed the community manager and set a deadline for the next business day, which ultimately led to him filing the petition when access was not restored.

5. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence.” Pursuant to A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner, John Sellers, had the burden of proof in this matter.

6. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). This statute requires that all financial and other records of an association be made reasonably available for examination by any member.

7. The Judge found that the Petitioner offered no proof that the Respondent took any action to restrict or interfere with his access to the bank account. The record showed the Respondent provided the initial access, and it was not established why the Petitioner’s new password later failed to work.

8. The issue of electronic access was deemed moot for two reasons. First, the bank closed the account in question on November 28, 2016, making electronic access impossible. Second, the Respondent had offered to furnish the Petitioner with paper copies of the documents it possessed related to that account.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted this recommended decision and issued a Final Order denying the petition.

10. The Judge characterized the Petitioner’s argument as a policy argument that should be addressed to the Legislature, not the court. The Judge stated that the plain language of the statute only requires records to be made “reasonably available,” and concluded the Respondent complied with the law by offering paper copies.

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Essay Questions

Construct detailed, essay-format responses to the following prompts. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the timeline of events from October 18, 2016, to November 28, 2016. How did the Petitioner’s actions, particularly his assumptions and deadlines, impact the outcome of the case as determined by the Administrative Law Judge?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain why the Petitioner, John Sellers, failed to meet the standard of “preponderance of the evidence” according to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). How does the judge’s distinction between “reasonably available” records and the specific format of access (electronic vs. paper) form the core of the legal conclusion?

4. The Respondent argued it went “beyond its statutory obligation.” Based on the facts presented in the decision, construct an argument either supporting or refuting this claim.

5. Explain the concept of “mootness” in the context of this legal dispute. How did the closure of the Alliance Association Bank account on November 28, 2016, render the central issue of the petition moot?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over hearings at an administrative agency. In this case, Suzanne Marwil presided for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.A.C.

An abbreviation for the Arizona Administrative Code, which is the official compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies.

A.R.S.

An abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which is the codified collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a proceeding to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner.

Conclusions of Law

The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a ruling.

Final Order

An official, binding decision issued by an administrative body that resolves a legal dispute. In this case, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate issued the Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Findings of Fact

The section of a legal decision that details the facts of the case as determined by the judge based on the evidence presented during the hearing.

A legal term describing an issue that is no longer in dispute or has become irrelevant due to changed circumstances, making a judicial decision unnecessary. The account’s closure made the access issue moot.

A formal, written direction from a judge or administrative body. The ALJ issued an Order denying the petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, John Sellers.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means that the evidence must demonstrate that a claim is more likely to be true than not true.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the claims. In this case, the Grayhawk Community Association.

How a Thanksgiving Day Login Failure Cost a Homeowner $500: Key Lessons from a Bizarre HOA Dispute

Almost everyone knows the modern frustration of a forgotten password or a website that simply won’t cooperate. But in a peculiar 2017 case, a homeowner’s inability to access a bank account online on Thanksgiving Day escalated from a simple tech issue into a formal legal petition against his Homeowners Association (HOA). The official court ruling offers a case study in failed conflict resolution, with surprising and critical lessons for any homeowner navigating the complex world of community association governance.

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1. An Unproven Assumption Can Be a Costly Mistake

The entire legal dispute was triggered by a critical strategic miscalculation based on an unverified assumption. The sequence of events began when petitioner John Sellers, after having previously changed the password himself, logged in to his HOA’s bank account on Thanksgiving Day and “could not see anything.”

Instead of exploring technical explanations, like a server issue over the holiday, he “unilaterally assumed” that the HOA (the Respondent, Grayhawk Community Association) had intentionally restricted his access. Acting immediately on this assumption, he emailed the community manager, Michael Fee, setting an aggressive deadline for the end of business the following day to have his access restored. When that deadline passed, he filed a formal petition. Crucially, the record notes the petitioner paid a $500.00 fee to file it.

However, the petitioner’s narrative omits a key fact: the community manager was not unresponsive. The case file shows that “Mr. Fee advised he would contact the bank.” This detail reveals the petitioner’s precipitous rush to litigation, bypassing any opportunity for simple clarification. The judge’s finding was decisive, underscoring this failure in de-escalation: the petitioner “offered no evidence that Respondent took any action to deny Petitioner online access to the account.” Acting on a costly assumption led directly to a lost case and a forfeited $500 fee.

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2. The Law Requires “Reasonable Access,” Not Your Preferred Method

The petitioner’s central legal argument was that he was wrongfully denied electronic access to the bank’s information. This complaint, however, was fundamentally misaligned with the plain language of the governing statute.

The relevant law, A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), states that “all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member.” The Administrative Law Judge found that the HOA had fully complied with this duty. When the login issue persisted and the account was later closed by the bank, the Respondent “offered to furnish the Petitioner paper copies of documents it possessed related to that bank account.” This distinction is legally significant; the law does not mandate a specific method of access—especially a preferred or more convenient one—only that the access provided be “reasonable.”

The judge’s decision explicitly rejected the petitioner’s policy argument:

Petitioner’s argument that paper access to the account information is inferior to electronic access constitutes a policy argument that should be addressed to the Legislature. The plain language of the statute requires only that records of Respondent be made reasonable available for Petitioner’s examination. Respondent complied with the statute.

This highlights an important takeaway for all homeowners: understanding the difference between what is legally required versus what is simply convenient can prevent unnecessary and unwinnable disputes.

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3. Even “Going the Extra Mile” Can Lead to a Lawsuit

One of the most ironic details of the case is that the HOA was never obligated to provide online access in the first place. According to the case file, when the petitioner first requested electronic access on October 18, 2016, “such a password did not exist.”

In its defense, the HOA argued—and the facts seem to support—that it went “beyond its statutory obligation” by requesting that its bank create a special view-only password specifically for the petitioner. This was a proactive accommodation, not a statutory duty.

This situation reveals a paradox often seen in community management, where proactive efforts to accommodate a resident can inadvertently create new avenues for conflict. The very courtesy the HOA extended—creating an online access portal that wasn’t legally required—became the foundation of the legal petition filed against them, illustrating the complex and often thankless nature of community governance.

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4. The Burden of Proof Is on the Accuser

In any formal legal dispute, the question of who must prove their case is critical. According to the case file, the “Petitioner has the burden of proof in this matter.” The legal standard he had to meet was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is the standard of proof required in most civil, non-criminal matters.

In simple terms, this means John Sellers had the responsibility to prove that it was more likely than not that the Grayhawk Community Association actively and intentionally restricted his access. He failed to provide any such proof.

The judge’s conclusion on this point was unambiguous: “Petitioner offered no proof that the Respondent restricted his access to the account in any way.” His case failed because it was built entirely on an assumption, with no evidence to support the accusation. This serves as a fundamental lesson in legal disputes: an accusation alone is not enough; it must be backed by credible evidence to prevail.

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Conclusion: A Final Thought Before You Escalate

A simple holiday login error became a failed legal petition due to a cascade of unverified assumptions and a fundamental misunderstanding of statutory requirements. This strange case serves as a potent reminder for homeowners and board members alike about the risks of escalating a grievance without first establishing the facts and understanding the law.

Before launching a formal, and potentially costly, complaint, it’s worth asking two simple questions: What does the law actually require, and what can I definitively prove?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John Sellers (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Curtis Ekmark (HOA attorney)
    Grayhawk Community Association
  • Michael Fee (community manager)
    Grayhawk Community Association

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)

Richard A. DeBoer vs. Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID17F-H1616006-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2017-01-09
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party, finding that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) by conducting votes via email. The HOA was ordered to comply with the statute, reimburse the Petitioner $500.00 for the filing fee, and pay a civil penalty of $1,000.00 to the Department of Real Estate.
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$1,000.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerRichard A. DeBoerCounsel
RespondentTurtle Rock III Homeowners AssociationCounsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party, finding that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) by conducting votes via email. The HOA was ordered to comply with the statute, reimburse the Petitioner $500.00 for the filing fee, and pay a civil penalty of $1,000.00 to the Department of Real Estate.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Open Meeting Requirements

Petitioner alleged that the HOA board violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by using email communications to vote on substantive issues (common area lighting installation and removal). The Tribunal concluded that the Board’s practice of taking action via email consensus violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which requires meetings of the board of directors to be open to all members.

Orders: Respondent must comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) in the future. Respondent must pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00. Respondent must pay a civil penalty of $1,000.00 to the Department of Real Estate.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $1,000.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, Email Voting, HOA Governance
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1616006-REL Decision – 538360.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T20:59:50 (72.5 KB)

17F-H1616006-REL Decision – 539992.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T21:00:03 (678.7 KB)

Briefing Document: DeBoer vs. Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the findings and outcome of the legal dispute between homeowner Richard A. DeBoer and the Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association (HOA). The central issue was the HOA Board of Directors’ practice of conducting votes on non-emergency matters via email, which the petitioner alleged violated Arizona’s open meeting laws.

An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the State of Arizona concluded that the HOA Board did violate state law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by using email to approve the purchase of new street lights and the removal of existing fixtures, thereby circumventing requirements for open meetings accessible to all members. The Board’s defense, that it had relied on poor advice from its management company, was not sufficient to overcome the violation.

Consequently, Mr. DeBoer was declared the prevailing party. The HOA was ordered to cease this practice, pay a $1,000 civil penalty to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, and reimburse Mr. DeBoer for his $500 filing fee. The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, making it a final administrative order.

Case Background

Case Name: Richard A. DeBoer vs. Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association

Case Numbers: 17F-H1616006-REL (Office of Administrative Hearings), HO17-16/006 (Department of Real Estate)

Jurisdiction: The dispute was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioner: Richard A. DeBoer, a homeowner.

Respondent: Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association, located in Phoenix, Arizona.

Key Dates

August 23, 2016

Petition filed by Richard A. DeBoer.

December 19, 2016

Hearing held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

January 9, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Decision issued.

January 12, 2017

Final Order issued by the Department of Real Estate Commissioner.

January 13, 2017

Compliance letter sent to the HOA by the Department of Real Estate.

February 11, 2017

Deadline for HOA to show proof of payment for petitioner’s filing fee.

March 13, 2017

Deadline for HOA to pay the civil penalty.

Petitioner’s Allegations

Richard A. DeBoer’s petition, filed on August 23, 2016, alleged that the Turtle Rock III HOA Board of Directors had a “common practice” of conducting unnoticed email meetings to vote on non-emergency matters. This practice was alleged to be in violation of both Arizona state law and the HOA’s own bylaws.

March 2016: The Board conducted an email vote to approve the purchase and installation of four high-mast street lights in the common area.

April 2016: The Board conducted an email vote to approve the removal and sale or disposal of fourteen large, iconic, architectural light fixtures from the common areas.

• The email meetings were not open to all association members.

• Members were denied the opportunity to attend and speak before the Board took formal action.

• The subject matter did not meet the criteria for a closed meeting.

• The Board failed to provide members with at least 48 hours’ advance notice.

• The meetings did not qualify as emergency meetings.

• Proper notices and agendas containing information “reasonably necessary to inform the members” were not provided.

• The petitioner alleged the actions were contrary to Turtle Rock III Bylaws, Division VI, Item 2.i, which incorporates Robert’s Rules of Order.

• Specifically, the email meetings were conducted without authorization in the bylaws and failed to provide for “a single official gathering in one room or area.”

• The format lacked the required “conditions of opportunity for simultaneous aural communication among participating members.”

Respondent’s Defense and Testimony

The Turtle Rock III HOA initially filed an answer denying all allegations made in the petition.

During the hearing on December 19, 2016, the following testimony was provided on behalf of the HOA:

Verl Curtiss (Board President) and Steve Pilcher (Board Treasurer) both acknowledged that the email votes regarding the lighting had occurred.

• Their defense centered on the claim that they had been advised by their management company and manager that their actions were not in violation of Arizona statutes or the HOA’s bylaws.

• Mr. Pilcher testified that they believed they had received “good advice.”

Legal Findings and Conclusion

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Tammy L. Eigenheer, determined that the petitioner bore the burden of proving the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

The decision focused on A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association… and all members or designated representatives so desiring shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

Based on the evidence and testimony, including the Board’s admission that email votes took place, the ALJ issued a clear conclusion:

“This Tribunal concludes that the Board’s prior practice of taking action in the absence of a meeting by obtaining unanimous written consent of the Board’s members via email violated the charged provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).”

Final Order and Penalties

The ALJ’s Recommended Order was officially accepted and adopted as a Final Order by Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, on January 12, 2017. The HOA was ordered to undertake the following actions:

1. Cease and Desist: The Respondent must comply with all applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) in the future.

2. Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent must pay the Petitioner, Richard A. DeBoer, his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the Order.

3. Civil Penalty: The Respondent must pay a civil penalty of $1,000.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order.

The Final Order constituted a final administrative action, subject to appeal or a motion for rehearing within 30 days.

Key Parties and Officials

Name/Entity

Richard A. DeBoer

Petitioner / Homeowner

Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association

Respondent

Verl Curtiss

President, Respondent’s Board of Directors

Steve Pilcher

Treasurer, Respondent’s Board of Directors

Goodman Law Group

Respondent’s Representative

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Administrative Law Judge

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Agency / Jurisdiction for HOA Disputes

Judy Lowe

Commissioner, Department of Real Estate

Abby Hansen

HOA Dispute Coordinator, Department of Real Estate

Study Guide: DeBoer v. Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Richard A. DeBoer v. Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association, case number 17F-H1616006-REL. It covers the key facts, legal arguments, judicial findings, and final orders as detailed in the provided legal documents.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific actions taken by the Turtle Rock III HOA Board of Directors in March and April 2016 were at the center of the dispute?

3. What key Arizona statute did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated, and what is the primary requirement of that law?

4. In addition to the state statute, what internal governing document and procedural rules did the Petitioner claim the HOA’s actions violated?

5. What was the defense offered by the HOA’s representatives, Verl Curtiss and Steve Pilcher, during the hearing?

6. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is it defined in the case documents?

7. What was the ultimate conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge regarding the HOA’s practice of conducting votes via email?

8. What two distinct financial penalties were imposed on the Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association in the final order?

9. Which state agency has jurisdiction over disputes between homeowners and condominium associations in Arizona and formally adopted the Judge’s decision?

10. What specific, non-financial order was given to the Respondent to ensure future adherence to the law?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Richard A. DeBoer, a homeowner who filed the complaint. The Respondent was the Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association (HOA), the governing body of the community, which was accused of violating state law and its own bylaws.

2. In March 2016, the Board conducted an e-mail vote to purchase and install four high-mast street lights. In April 2016, the board held another e-mail vote to remove and sell or give away fourteen large, architectural light fixtures from the common areas.

3. The Petitioner alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. This statute’s primary requirement is that all meetings of an HOA’s board of directors must be open to all members of the association, who must be permitted to attend and speak.

4. The Petitioner claimed the e-mail votes also violated the Turtle Rock III Bylaws, specifically Division VI, Item 2.i. This section references Robert’s Rules of Order (RONR), which requires a “single official gathering” and “simultaneous aural communication” for meetings.

5. Verl Curtiss (President) and Steve Pilcher (Treasurer) testified that their management company and manager had advised them that they were not in violation of any statutes or bylaws. They did not deny that the e-mail votes had occurred.

6. The Petitioner had the burden of proving the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence of greater weight or more convincing than opposing evidence, showing the fact is more probable than not.

7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Board’s practice of taking action through unanimous written consent via email, in the absence of a meeting, violated the open meeting provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

8. The HOA was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 directly to him. Additionally, the HOA was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $1,000.00 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) has jurisdiction to hear these disputes. The Commissioner of the ADRE formally accepted and adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, making it a Final Order.

10. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) in the future. This directive mandates that the HOA cease its practice of holding votes outside of open meetings.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed response for each question, drawing evidence and examples from the source documents.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s complaint, detailing both the statutory violations (A.R.S. § 33-1804) and the alleged bylaw infractions (Robert’s Rules of Order). Explain how these two lines of argument reinforced each other.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain how the testimony of the HOA’s own representatives, Verl Curtiss and Steve Pilcher, helped the Petitioner meet this burden of proof, despite their intentions.

3. Examine the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge and adopted by the Commissioner. Detail the specific remedies imposed and explain the purpose of each component (compliance, restitution, and civil penalty).

4. Based on the arguments presented, evaluate the significance of Arizona’s open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804) for homeowners in a planned community. Why is it critical for board decisions, such as those concerning common area fixtures, to be made in an open forum?

5. Trace the timeline of the case from the initial filing of the petition on August 23, 2016, to the issuance of the compliance letter from the Department of Real Estate on January 13, 2017. Identify the key milestones and explain the function of each step in the administrative hearing process.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and recommendations.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case that mandates all HOA board meetings be open to all association members, allowing them to attend and speak.

Bylaws

The internal rules governing the operation of an organization. In this case, the Turtle Rock III Bylaws (Division VI, Item 2.i) were cited as being violated.

Civil Penalty

A monetary fine levied by a government agency for a violation of law, distinct from criminal punishment. The HOA was ordered to pay a $1,000.00 civil penalty.

Common Area

Property within a planned community owned and maintained by the homeowners association for the use and benefit of all members. The light fixtures in the case were located in the common areas.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Arizona Department of Real Estate had jurisdiction to hear the dispute under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state agency that conducts formal hearings for disputes involving other state agencies, providing an impartial forum for adjudication.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Richard A. DeBoer.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Prevailing Party

The party in a legal dispute who is found to have won the case. Richard A. DeBoer was deemed the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Respondent was the Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association.

Robert’s Rules of Order (RONR)

A manual of parliamentary procedure that governs most meetings of deliberative assemblies. The Petitioner argued that the HOA’s e-mail votes violated RONR’s requirement for simultaneous aural communication.

Your HOA Board’s Emails Might Be Illegal Meetings: How One Homeowner Fought Back and Won

Introduction: The Hidden Risks of HOA Board Emails

Do you ever wonder how your Homeowners Association (HOA) board really makes its decisions? For many residents, board operations can feel like a black box. While official meetings are announced, it’s easy to assume that much of the groundwork happens behind the scenes. But what if those seemingly harmless email chains among board members are more than just casual discussions? What if they are, in fact, illegal meetings?

A powerful legal case from Arizona, involving a homeowner named Richard A. DeBoer and the Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association, provides a powerful lesson for HOA members nationwide. This post breaks down the four most impactful takeaways from that case, showing how one homeowner successfully held his board accountable for its lack of transparency.

Takeaway 1: “Convenient” Email Votes Can Be Illegal Secret Meetings

An Email Vote Isn’t Just an Email—It’s a Meeting.

In 2016, the Turtle Rock III HOA board made two significant decisions affecting community property. In March, they conducted an email vote to purchase and install four high-mast street lights. In April, they conducted another email vote to remove and sell, or give away, fourteen “large, iconic, architectural, light-fixtures” from the common areas.

The petitioner, Richard A. DeBoer, argued that this practice was a direct violation of Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs, which states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association or any person designated by a member in writing as the member’s representative and all members or designated representatives so desiring shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings. . .” — A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

The Administrative Law Judge agreed with the homeowner, concluding that the board’s practice of taking action via email “violated the charged provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).” The case record reveals the board’s actions failed on multiple fronts. Specifically, their email votes violated the law because they were conducted in a way that:

Were not open to all members: The decisions were made in a private digital space, excluding the very residents they affected.

Denied members the right to attend and speak: Homeowners were given no opportunity to hear the deliberations or provide input before the board took formal action.

Failed to provide 48-hour notice: Members were not given the legally required advance notice of the “meetings” where votes were cast.

Lacked proper agendas: No agendas were provided to inform members of the matters to be discussed or decided.

Did not qualify as emergency meetings: The subject matter did not meet the stringent requirements for an emergency session that might bypass standard notice rules.

This ruling affirms a crucial principle: transparency laws apply to modern forms of communication. Boards cannot use technology to circumvent their legal obligation to conduct business in the open.

Takeaway 2: “Bad Advice” Is Not a Valid Legal Defense

“But Our Manager Said It Was OK” Won’t Hold Up in Court.

During the hearing, the HOA board did not deny that the email votes took place. Instead, they offered a defense: they were just following advice.

Board President Verl Curtiss and Treasurer Steve Pilcher both testified that their management company and its manager had told them they were not in violation of the law. Mr. Pilcher stated that they believed they had received “good advice.”

Despite this testimony, the judge ruled against the HOA. This outcome is a stark reminder that reliance on bad advice is not a legal shield. Board members have a fiduciary duty to the community they serve, and a core part of that duty is understanding and adhering to the laws governing their association. This responsibility cannot be outsourced to a management company. Ultimately, the board—not its vendors—is accountable for upholding the principles of open governance.

Takeaway 3: A Single Homeowner Can Force an Entire Board to Comply

One Determined Homeowner Can Win Against the Whole Association.

Perhaps the most empowering aspect of this case is who brought it forward. The petition was not filed by a large group of angry residents or a high-powered law firm. It was initiated by a single person: Richard A. DeBoer.

Mr. DeBoer filed the petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on August 23, 2016. When the hearing took place on December 19, 2016, he “appeared on his own behalf.”

In the end, the court’s order officially deemed Mr. DeBoer the “prevailing party.” This victory demonstrates that the legal framework provides a viable path for individual homeowners to hold their boards accountable. It shows that one person with a clear understanding of the law and the determination to see it enforced can successfully challenge an entire association and win.

Takeaway 4: Cutting Corners on Transparency Carries a Financial Cost

Ignoring the Law Comes With a Price Tag.

Violating open meeting laws isn’t just a procedural error; it has direct financial consequences. As a result of the ruling, the Turtle Rock III HOA was ordered to pay for its actions. The financial penalties included:

• The HOA was ordered to pay back the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA was ordered to pay a $1,000.00 civil penalty to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

The board’s decision to cut corners on transparency cost their neighbors—the very people they were elected to serve—a total of $1,500. This money, which came directly from the association’s funds, could have gone toward community maintenance or improvements. Instead, it was spent paying for a legal and procedural failure. This case proves that when a board fails to follow the law, the entire community pays the price.

Conclusion: Transparency Is Not Optional

The case of DeBoer v. Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association delivers a clear and powerful message: HOA boards must conduct business in the open, and homeowners have both the right and the ability to enforce those transparency laws. Email votes and other back-channel communications that exclude members from the decision-making process are not just bad practice—they can be illegal.

This case was decided in Arizona, but the principle of transparency is universal. Does your HOA board’s communication meet the standard of the law, and what would you do if you discovered it didn’t?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Richard A. DeBoer (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Verl Curtiss (board member)
    Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association
    President; Appeared on behalf of Respondent; witness
  • Steven Pilcher (board member)
    Turtle Rock III Homeowners Association
    Treasurer; Appeared on behalf of Respondent; witness

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Business Services Division (ADRE)