R.L. Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H056-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-11-19
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $167.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner R.L. Whitmer Counsel
Respondent Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners Counsel Emily Mann, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner's petition was granted in part, finding Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(A) by failing to afford Petitioner an opportunity to speak before the vote ratification during the special meeting. The tribunal found no violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(E)(1), 33-1248(E)(4), or Art. 23, sec. 23.9. Petitioner was awarded a civil penalty of $167.00, but reimbursement of the filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner lost claims regarding the lack of meeting agenda (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(E)(1)) because the statute applies to board meetings, not special member meetings; regarding the unnoticed Town Hall (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(E)(4)) because the gathering was not considered an informal meeting to discuss Association business; and the claim regarding Art. 23, sec. 23.9 was abandoned/plead in error.

Key Issues & Findings

Member right to speak during noticed meeting

Petitioner alleged violation by refusing to permit him to speak during a noticed meeting. The Tribunal found Respondent in violation because Petitioner unequivocally indicated he wished to be heard ('waiting for the public comment') prior to vote ratification, but was not afforded a clear opportunity to do so.

Orders: Respondent shall tender $167.00 to the Department, in certified funds, as a civil penalty for its violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(A) within thirty (30) days of this Order. Respondent shall not violate this statutory provision henceforth.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $167.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Condominium, Open Meeting Law, Right to Speak, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(E)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(E)(4)
  • Art. 23, sec. 23.9

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H056-REL Decision – 1335493.pdf

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25F-H056-REL Decision – 1335502.pdf

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25F-H056-REL Decision – 1335656.pdf

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25F-H056-REL Decision – 1352057.pdf

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25F-H056-REL Decision – 1352067.pdf

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25F-H056-REL Decision – 1353232.pdf

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25F-H056-REL Decision – 1357681.pdf

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25F-H056-REL Decision – 1360270.pdf

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25F-H056-REL Decision – 1369834.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 25F-H056-REL


Briefing Document: Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowner R.L. Whitmer (Petitioner) and the Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners (Respondent), culminating in a decision by an Arizona Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The case, docket number 25F-H056-REL, centered on allegations that the Homeowners Association (HOA) violated Arizona’s open meeting laws during and after a special meeting of the members on April 7, 2025.

The Petitioner alleged three primary statutory violations of A.R.S. § 33-1248: (1) failure to provide a meeting agenda, (2) denial of the opportunity to speak, and (3) holding an unnoticed informal meeting with a quorum of the board present. The Respondent countered that the meeting was a special meeting of the members, not a board meeting, that the petitioner never explicitly requested to speak, and that the post-meeting gathering was an informal discussion among neighbors, not an official meeting.

The ALJ’s final decision, issued on November 19, 2025, resulted in a partial victory for the Petitioner. The judge found the HOA in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(A) for failing to provide an opportunity for the Petitioner to speak, deeming the HOA’s argument that he did not make an explicit request “disingenuous.” The other two allegations were dismissed. Consequently, a civil penalty of $167.00 was imposed on the Respondent, but the Petitioner’s request for reimbursement of his $500.00 filing fee was denied.

I. Case Overview

Case Name

In the Matter of R.L. Whitmer, Petitioner, v. Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners, Respondent

Docket Number

25F-H056-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Jenna Clark

Referring Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Petitioner

R.L. Whitmer (appearing on his own behalf)

Respondent

Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners

Respondent’s Counsel

Emily Mann, Esq. (Phillips Maceyko & Battock, PLLC)

Respondent’s Witness

Robert Westbrook (HOA President)

Date of Incident

April 7, 2025

Petition Filed

April 9, 2025

Hearing Date

November 3, 2025

ALJ Decision Date

November 19, 2025

II. Petitioner’s Allegations and Requested Relief

On April 9, 2025, R.L. Whitmer filed a Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition with the ADRE, alleging violations stemming from a “special meeting” presided over by HOA President Bob Westbrook on April 7, 2025.

Core Allegations:

Failure to Provide an Agenda (A.R.S. § 33-1248(E)(1)): The Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to provide an agenda for the meeting. The petition states, “When asked for the agenda…Mr. Westbrook stated there was no agenda.”

Denial of Opportunity to Speak (A.R.S. § 33-1248(A)): The Petitioner claimed he was denied the opportunity to speak during the noticed session. The petition reads, “When asked for the opportunity to speak during the noticed session, Mr. Westbrook stated there would not be such an opportunity.”

Unnoticed Meeting (A.R.S. § 33-1248(E)(4)): The Petitioner alleged that after the special meeting was adjourned, the board “unlawfully proceeded to hold an unnoticed meeting with a quorum of the board present.”

Violation of Association Declaration: The petition initially cited a violation of “Article 23 § 23.9 of the Declaration of Horizontal Property Regime for Hilton Casitas.” During the hearing, the Petitioner acknowledged this was included in error and abandoned the claim.

Requested Relief:

1. An order directing the Respondent to abide by the Arizona statutes specified in the complaint.

2. The imposition of a civil penalty against the Respondent for the alleged violations.

III. Respondent’s Position and Defense

The Hilton Casitas HOA, represented by counsel, denied all allegations and argued for the petition’s complete dismissal.

Core Defense Arguments:

Agenda Not Required for Member Meeting: The Respondent contended that the April 7, 2025 meeting was a “special meeting of the members” for the sole purpose of ratifying a revised budget, not a “meeting of the board of directors.” Therefore, the specific agenda requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1248(E)(1) did not apply.

Ballot Packet Served as Agenda: Even if an agenda were required, the absentee ballot packet—which included a letter explaining the budget, the revised budget itself, and the ballot—sufficiently notified the membership of the meeting’s sole purpose.

Petitioner Never Explicitly Requested to Speak: The Respondent argued that the Petitioner never made a formal request to speak. Citing the hearing transcript, they noted that in response to being asked if he cared to vote, the Petitioner stated, “I’m waiting for the public comment.” The defense argued this statement was not a direct request to speak.

“Town Hall” Was Not a Board Meeting: The HOA characterized the gathering after the formal meeting as an “informal town hall discussion” where President Westbrook invited neighbors to stay at his home for a “neighborly conversation.” They asserted that no association business was conducted and that the mere presence of a quorum of board members did not transform the gathering into a formal, unnoticed board meeting, which would lead to the “absurd result” of directors being prohibited from attending member events.

IV. Procedural History and Hearing Chronology

April 9, 2025: Petition filed by R.L. Whitmer.

April 30, 2025: Petitioner pays the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

June 6, 2025: Respondent files its answer, denying all complaint items.

June 24, 2025: ADRE issues a Notice of Hearing, scheduling it for August 1, 2025.

August 1, 2025: Petitioner moves to continue the hearing to amend his petition.

August 11, 2025: Petitioner submits an Amended HOA Dispute Petition.

September-October 2025: A series of motions are filed, including a Motion for Summary Judgment by the Petitioner and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment by the Respondent.

October 8, 2025: The OAH issues an order denying the Petitioner’s motion and dismissing his Amended Petition with prejudice, but allowing the original petition to proceed.

November 3, 2025: The continued hearing is held remotely before ALJ Jenna Clark. R.L. Whitmer testifies on his own behalf, and Robert Westbrook testifies for the Respondent.

November 19, 2025: ALJ Clark issues the final Administrative Law Judge Decision.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Final Decision and Rationale

The ALJ granted the petition in part and denied it in part, finding the Respondent in violation of one of the three alleged statutory provisions.

The ALJ found that the Respondent violated the Petitioner’s right to speak. The decision concluded that although the Petitioner did not make an explicit request, his statement, “I’m waiting for the public comment,” was a clear and unequivocal indication of his desire to be heard.

Rationale: The judge found the Respondent’s counterargument to be “disingenuous,” stating, “It cannot be faithfully argued that the HOA President was unaware Petitioner was desirous of speaking. Animosity notwithstanding, Petitioner should have been afforded a reasonable amount of time to be heard prior to adjournment.”

The ALJ ruled that the Respondent did not violate the statute regarding meeting agendas.

Rationale: The decision affirms the Respondent’s position, stating, “the record clearly reflects that the April 07, 2025, special meeting was not a meeting of the board of directors, and did have an agenda issued to members in advance – as evidenced by the ballot and memorandum which provided objectively reasonable detail regarding the purpose and scope of the meeting.”

The ALJ determined that the post-meeting gathering did not constitute an illegal unnoticed meeting.

Rationale: The judge concluded that “the existence of a quorum, intentional or otherwise, absent open discussion of Association business does not a meeting make.” The decision further supported the Respondent’s argument that holding otherwise “would unintentionally result in absurdity.”

VI. Final Order and Sanctions

Based on the findings, the final order established the following:

1. Petition Status: The petition was granted in part (for the A.R.S. § 33-1248(A) violation) and denied and dismissed for all other allegations.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $167.00 to the ADRE within thirty days for the violation.

3. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Petitioner’s request to be reimbursed for the $500.00 filing fee was denied.

4. Future Compliance: The Respondent was ordered to not violate A.R.S. § 33-1248(A) henceforth.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rial Lamar Whitmer (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Emily Mann (respondent attorney)
    Phillips Maceyko & Battock, PLLC
  • Robert Westbrook (HOA president/board member/witness)
    Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners
  • John Brooke (board member)
    Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners
    Director
  • Curt Richard Roberts (board member)
    Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners
    Secretary
  • Jay Panzer (board member)
    Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners
    Director
  • James Cox (board member)
    Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners
    Treasurer

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Liz Recchia (Division Manager/ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • V. Nunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on distribution list
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on distribution list
  • L. Abril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on distribution list
  • M. Neat (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on distribution list
  • G. Osborn (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on distribution list

Other Participants

  • Eli (homeowner/witness)
    Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners
    Attendee at special meeting
  • Mike Benson (former board member/homeowner)
    Hilton Casitas Council of Homeowners
    Attendee at Town Hall
  • Katie Hobbs (Governor)

Robert E. Wolfe v. Warner Ranch Association

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H062-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-11-11
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Robert E. Wolfe Counsel
Respondent Warner Ranch Association Counsel Chandler W. Travis

Alleged Violations

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1804(D)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the March 28, 2025, 'Kick Start' meeting was not an official HOA Board meeting because no HOA business was transacted and it was arranged prior to the new management company being fully contracted. Therefore, the 48-hour advance notice requirement under A.R.S. § 33-1804(D) was not required.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(D), as the meeting was concluded to be informal and not subject to the statutory notice requirements for official Board meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA Board Meeting Notice Requirement

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(D) by holding a 'kick start' meeting on March 28, 2025, after notice was sent on March 26, 2025, failing to meet the 48-hour advance notice requirement for a Board meeting. The ALJ concluded the meeting was an informal 'meet and greet' arranged by the incoming management company and was not an official HOA Board meeting where business was transacted; thus, the statute did not apply.

Orders: Petitioner's petition in 25F-H062-REL is dismissed, and Petitioner bears the $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1804(D)
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2102
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.05
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199(2)
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.02
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Board Meeting Notice, Open Meeting Law, Planned Communities Statute, Management Company Transition
Additional Citations:

  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 33-1804(D)
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2102
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.05
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199(2)
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.02
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H062-REL Decision – 1341648.pdf

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25F-H062-REL Decision – 1341651.pdf

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25F-H062-REL Decision – 1347681.pdf

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25F-H062-REL Decision – 1355633.pdf

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25F-H062-REL Decision – 1367124.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 25F-H062-REL


Briefing Document: Wolfe v. Warner Ranch Association (Case No. 25F-H062-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key proceedings, arguments, and final judgment in the administrative case of Robert E. Wolfe v. Warner Ranch Association, Case No. 25F-H062-REL, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Robert E. Wolfe, alleged that the Warner Ranch Association (HOA) violated Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804(D)) by failing to provide the requisite 48-hour advance notice for a “kickstart meeting” held on March 28, 2025.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition. The central finding of the decision was that the event in question was not a formal HOA Board meeting at which official business was transacted. Instead, it was characterized as an informal “meet and greet” arranged by the incoming management company, Spectrum, prior to its official contract start date. Consequently, the 48-hour notice requirement for Board meetings was deemed not applicable. The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and he was ordered to bear the $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Robert E. Wolfe, a resident and member of the Warner Ranch Association.

Respondent: Warner Ranch Association (HOA), represented by board members and its management company, Spectrum Association Management.

Case Number: 25F-H062-REL

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Presiding Judge: Kay A. Abramsohn, Administrative Law Judge.

Core Dispute: Whether the “kickstart meeting” held on March 28, 2025, constituted an official Board of Directors meeting subject to the 48-hour advance notice requirement under A.R.S. § 33-1804(D).

Procedural History

The case involved several procedural adjustments regarding the hearing format and date, primarily initiated by the petitioner. Notably, several of the petitioner’s requests were made without copying the respondent, a point of order noted by the ALJ.

Action

Outcome

Aug 11, 2025

Petitioner requests a continuance, citing unavailability.

Aug 21, 2025

An order is issued continuing the hearing to October 7, 2025, to be held virtually.

Aug 27, 2025

Petitioner agrees to the date but requests the hearing be conducted in-person.

Sep 7, 2025

An order is issued confirming the October 7 date and changing the format to in-person.

Sep 30, 2025

Respondent’s counsel requests a virtual option for an unavailable witness.

Sep 30, 2025

A final order is issued establishing a hybrid hearing format (in-person and virtual) for October 7, 2025.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments (Robert E. Wolfe)

The petitioner’s case was singularly focused on the alleged violation of the 48-hour notice rule for Board meetings.

Core Claim: The HOA held a Board meeting on Friday, March 28, 2025, at 1:00 PM but provided notice less than 48 hours in advance, in direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(D).

Evidence of Insufficient Notice:

◦ Email notifications for the meeting were sent on Wednesday, March 26, 2025.

◦ Documentary evidence showed computer-generated receipt times ranging from 1:36 PM to 1:45 PM on March 26, which is less than 48 hours before the 1:00 PM meeting on March 28.

◦ The petitioner himself did not receive the initial email notice and was forwarded a copy by the HOA President, Melanie Zimmer.

Evidence the Event was a Board Meeting:

◦ The petitioner argued the event’s structure and attendance qualified it as a formal Board meeting. The meeting notification included a formal agenda with items such as “Call to Order,” “Establishment of a Quorum,” and “Adjournment.”

◦ He contended that the meeting minutes listed Board members as present, indicating a quorum was established.

◦ In his testimony, the petitioner stated, “when you have a quorum of board of directors, it requires notice of open meeting.”

◦ He summarized his position with an analogy:

Requested Relief:

1. Reimbursement of the $500 filing fee.

2. An order requiring that a copy of the open meeting law be given to each board member.

Respondent’s Position and Testimony (Warner Ranch Association & Spectrum)

The respondent’s defense centered on the informal nature and purpose of the meeting, arguing it did not constitute official Board business.

Characterization of the Meeting: The event was consistently described as an “informal kickstart meeting” and a “meet and greet,” not a formal Board meeting.

Purpose of the Meeting:

◦ The meeting was arranged by the incoming management company, Spectrum, to introduce its team to the Board and homeowners.

◦ This was deemed necessary due to severe operational issues with the previous management company, which was described as “very, very delinquent.”

Absence of Official Business:

◦ Testimony from multiple representatives, including HOA President Melanie Zimmer and Spectrum’s Brenda Steel, asserted that no official Board business, decision-making, motions, or votes were conducted.

◦ The meeting minutes reflected discussions about the management transition, roles, and expectations, but contained no record of official Board actions.

Context of Management Transition:

◦ The contract with Spectrum was signed prior to the “kickstart” meeting.

◦ However, Spectrum’s official management duties were not set to begin until April 1, 2025. The March 28 meeting occurred before Spectrum formally took over management.

Acknowledgement of Procedural Issues:

◦ A Spectrum representative testified that the meeting “could have been noticed differently” and that they did not have a complete list of homeowner email addresses from the prior company.

◦ HOA Treasurer Bonnie S. acknowledged receiving her own notice late (36 minutes after the 48-hour mark) and offered an apology:

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s final decision, issued on November 11, 2025, sided with the respondent and dismissed the petition.

Final Order:

◦ The petitioner’s petition in case 25F-H062-REL was ordered dismissed.

◦ The petitioner, Robert E. Wolfe, was ordered to bear the $500.00 filing fee.

Key Finding: The ALJ concluded that the March 28, 2025 “Kick Start” meeting was not an official HOA Board meeting where business was transacted.

Legal Rationale: Because the event was not a Board meeting as defined by statute, the 48-hour advance notice requirement stipulated in A.R.S. § 33-1804(D) did not apply.

Evidentiary Basis for Decision:

◦ The finding was supported by testimony from the HOA and Spectrum characterizing the event as an informal “meet and greet.”

◦ A review of the meeting minutes confirmed that they “do not reflect any motions, votes, or actions taken by the Board at the meeting on behalf of the HOA.”

◦ The decision noted that Spectrum had also mailed a postcard regarding the meeting to each of the 803 HOA members.

Conclusion on Burden of Proof: The petitioner bore the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The ALJ ruled that this burden was not met.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert E. Wolfe (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Melanie Zimmer (board president)
    Warner Ranch Association
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Bonnie Strike (board member)
    Warner Ranch Association
    Treasurer
  • Brenda Steel (community manager/witness)
    Spectrum Association Management
    HOA Community Manager
  • Elizabeth Wicks (legal services manager/witness)
    Spectrum Association Management
  • Diana Treantos (division president/witness)
    Spectrum Association Management
  • Chandler W. Travis (HOA attorney)
    The Travis Law Firm PLC
    Counsel for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • mneat (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • lrecchia (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • gosborn (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • dmorehouse (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission

Other Participants

  • Renee Malcolm (HOA member/recipient)
    Warner Ranch Association
    Referenced in testimony regarding notice delivery timing
  • Bill Carlson (HOA member/recipient)
    Warner Ranch Association
    Referenced in testimony regarding notice delivery timing (one of the Carlsons)

Marilyn J Fogelsong vs Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, INC

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H050-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-08-05
Administrative Law Judge Nicole Robinson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marilyn J. Fogelsong Counsel
Respondent Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, INC. Counsel

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1811
Paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (A) and (F)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner's petition was DENIED because Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed the alleged violations, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to enforce the alleged violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830(A).

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on all four issues. Issues 1, 2, and 3 lacked sufficient evidentiary support or statutory violation proof. Issue 4 was dismissed due to lack of OAH jurisdiction over ARS § 10-830.

Key Issues & Findings

The HOA failed to disclose conflicts-of-interest when hiring an HOA property manager to manage the HOA which is a violation of ARS 33-1811.

Petitioner alleged that the hiring of TRT (Tucson Realty & Trust Company, Management Services, LLC) as the HOA manager constituted an undisclosed conflict of interest because TRT also managed individual townhouses within the community.

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1811

The HOA has violated paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs by directing an HOA property manager to pursue an unsanctioned project for individual townhouses which is beyond the scope of HOA management for common areas.

The HOA manager solicited bids to paint the exteriors of all townhouses. Petitioner argued the HOA lacked authority to manage improvements for individual units, as Paragraph 19 limits HOA authority to common areas.

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs

The board has violated the open meeting laws of ARS 33-1804 (A) and (F) by holding a private board meeting without notice; failing to provide material information, minutes, financial statements, and a budget upon request; and by failing to communicate via the designated representative.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by failing to provide proper notice for meetings and failing to provide requested documentation (minutes, financial statements, etc.).

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

The board has violated ARS 10-830(A) by failing to act in good faith with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would act by failing to perform their duties.

Petitioner alleged the board failed to perform required duties in a timely or prudent manner, including failing to elect officers, manage the bank account, check the post office box, and schedule a backflow test.

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Management, Conflict of Interest, Open Meeting Law, Jurisdiction, Planned Community, CC&Rs, Director Duty, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1811
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Park Association

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1336348.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:23:33 (157.7 KB)

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1348020.pdf

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25F-H050-REL Decision – 1380164.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:23:41 (51.8 KB)

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1384549.pdf

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25F-H050-REL Decision – 1384804.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:23:50 (7.5 KB)

25F-H050-REL Decision – 1393862.pdf

Uploaded 2026-02-12T19:19:32 (59.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 25F-H050-REL


Briefing Document: Fogelsong vs. Park Townhouses Homeowners Association (Docket No. 25F-H050-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the proceedings and outcome of the legal dispute between Marilyn J. Fogelsong (“Petitioner”) and the Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The case was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

The Petitioner, a co-owner of a unit in the eight-unit Park Townhouses community, filed a petition on or about March 31, 2025, alleging four distinct violations by the HOA board. These allegations included failure to disclose a conflict of interest in hiring an HOA manager, violating the community’s CC&Rs by pursuing projects for individual units, violating state open meeting laws, and failing to act in good faith as fiduciaries.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted on July 16, 2025, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Nicole Robinson. The Respondent did not appear at the hearing, and the Petitioner provided sole testimony.

On August 5, 2025, the ALJ issued a decision denying the Petitioner’s petition in its entirety. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence for three of the four issues. The fourth issue was dismissed on the grounds that the OAH lacked the jurisdiction to enforce the specific statute cited (A.R.S. § 10-830). A subsequent request for a rehearing filed by the Petitioner was rejected by the OAH as it was submitted to the incorrect office after the OAH’s jurisdiction had ended.

Case Overview

Case Number

25F-H050-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Nicole Robinson

Petitioner

Marilyn J. Fogelsong

Respondent

Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, Inc.

Subject Property

Park Townhouses, an 8-unit planned community in Tucson, AZ

Petition Filed

On or about March 31, 2025

Hearing Date

July 16, 2025

Decision Issued

August 5, 2025

Final Outcome

Petition DENIED

The Parties and Property

Petitioner Marilyn J. Fogelsong: A partial owner of unit 2467 East 1st Street since April 2021, co-owning with her 39-year-old son who resides in the unit. Fogelsong previously served as the HOA board president for three years, with her last term ending in September 2024.

Respondent Park Townhouses HOA: A planned community association for an eight-unit townhouse development in Tucson, Arizona. Each unit owner is responsible for their own structure and lot.

The Property: The community consists of two buildings, each with four townhouses facing each other across a 20-foot wide common driveway.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Testimony

During the July 16, 2025 hearing, Ms. Fogelsong, representing herself, presented testimony on the four issues outlined in her petition. The HOA did not appear.

Issue #1: Conflict of Interest (A.R.S. § 33-1811)

The Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to disclose conflicts of interest when hiring Tucson Realty & Trust Company (TRT) as the HOA property manager, rendering the contract void.

Core Allegation: On February 17, 2025, the HOA board presented only one proposal—from TRT—and asked homeowners to approve the hire without disclosing pertinent conflicts.

Identified Conflicts:

◦ TRT’s property management division manages two units within the community (2463 and 2467) owned by then-current board members Mark Schlang (Treasurer) and Gerald Schwarzenb[erger] (Secretary).

◦ Both the property management and HOA management divisions of TRT operate under the same broker, Deborah Garcia.

History of Misconduct by TRT: The Petitioner testified to a history of issues with TRT that she believed constituted conflicts of interest:

◦ TRT collected parking violation fines from a tenant but failed to remit them to the HOA.

◦ TRT failed to provide tenant contact information to the HOA upon request, which is a violation of Arizona law.

◦ TRT’s attorney, BL Edmonson, sent a “cease and desist” letter to Fogelsong and then invoiced the HOA for the legal fees, which Fogelsong, as president at the time, rejected. The invoice was resubmitted to the HOA 18 months later.

Issue #2: CC&R Violation (Paragraph 19)

The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Paragraph 19 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by directing the HOA manager to pursue an “unsanctioned project for individual townhouses.”

Core Allegation: The HOA manager (TRT) met with a painting company on March 31, 2025, to solicit bids for painting the exteriors of all townhouses. The Petitioner argued this action is beyond the scope of the HOA’s authority, which is limited to maintaining common areas.

Supporting Evidence:

◦ The Petitioner cited a legal opinion she obtained from an HOA attorney, Jason Smith, which concluded that the HOA does not have the right to conduct repairs on individual units.

◦ She referenced a past incident where another homeowner, David Zinfeld, paid an assessment for awning wood repair “under protest” because the funds were being used for an individual unit, not a common area.

Issue #3: Open Meeting Law Violations (A.R.S. § 33-1804)

The Petitioner claimed the board violated Arizona’s open meeting laws through multiple actions.

Secret Meeting: The board held a private meeting to approve TRT as the manager before the February 17, 2025, homeowners meeting where the vote occurred. No notice of this prior board meeting was given to homeowners.

Failure to Provide Information: The Petitioner made multiple requests for documents that were ignored. She requested management proposals on February 4, 2025, and later requested minutes, financial statements, and property management agreements, none of which were provided.

Disregarded Standing: In its written response to the petition, the HOA claimed the Petitioner lacked “sufficient standing” due to her “limited ownership stake,” a position the Petitioner refutes based on her recorded deed.

Issue #4: Failure to Act in Good Faith (A.R.S. § 10-830A)

The Petitioner alleged the board failed to perform its duties with the care an “ordinarily prudent person” would exercise.

Dereliction of Duties:

◦ The board, elected in September 2024, waited 10 weeks to meet and elect officers.

◦ The board failed to take control of the HOA bank account until March 2025, approximately six months into its one-year term.

◦ It failed to schedule a required annual backflow test for the irrigation system, resulting in the water being shut off.

◦ It failed to replace a dead tree that was on the agenda for replacement in fall 2024.

◦ It failed to check the HOA’s post office box, leading to the return of dues checks from homeowners.

◦ It did not abate new graffiti for six weeks, at which point the Petitioner did so herself after receiving permission.

Respondent’s Position

Although the HOA was not present at the hearing, its positions were articulated in a five-page written response submitted to the Department of Real Estate on May 8, 2025, and were referenced during the hearing.

Denial of Claims: The Respondent denied all of the Petitioner’s claims.

Challenge to Standing: The HOA’s formal position was that Ms. Fogelsong lacked sufficient standing due to her “limited ownership stake.”

Allegation of Ulterior Motive: The Respondent accused the Petitioner of a “calculated and systematic attempt to devalue the property and agitate the owners to possibly sell their respective units to Miss Fogong [sic] and her son at a below market value.” They claimed several owners could testify to her “repeated suggestions and solicitations to sell.”

Claim of Non-cooperation: The HOA stated that the Petitioner had “not been fully cooperative in the transition process” regarding missing documentation after her term as president ended.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision

On August 5, 2025, ALJ Nicole Robinson issued a decision denying the petition. The core finding was that the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving the violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Findings on Each Issue

Issue #1 (Conflict of Interest): No Violation Found. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove the hiring of TRT constituted a conflict of interest as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1811. The evidence showed that a prior management company (McElwain) also managed individual units while serving as the HOA manager, suggesting this was an established practice. The statute specifically addresses benefits to board members or their families, which was not sufficiently established by the evidence presented.

Issue #2 (CC&R Violation): No Violation Found. The decision stated that the Petitioner failed to submit the entirety of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, providing only “snippets.” Without the complete governing documents, the tribunal could not definitively determine the scope of the HOA’s authority regarding projects on individual units. Furthermore, the evidence only showed that a bid was solicited for painting; there was no evidence that work was actually performed.

Issue #3 (Open Meeting Law): No Violation Found. The ALJ found that the February 17, 2025, meeting was properly noticed via email. Regarding a March 5, 2025, email the Petitioner did not receive, the evidence showed her co-owner son did receive it, meaning the unit was properly notified. A December 2024 meeting was deemed emergent, for which the statute does not require prior notice.

Issue #4 (Failure to Act in Good Faith): No Jurisdiction. The ALJ concluded that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacks jurisdiction to enforce A.R.S. § 10-830. The OAH’s authority is limited by statute to adjudicating violations of Title 33 (Planned Communities and Condominiums) and community documents, not Title 10 (Corporations and Associations).

Post-Decision Events

• On August 26, 2025, the Petitioner filed a request for a rehearing.

• On September 8, 2025, the OAH issued a Minute Entry stating that the request would not be considered because it was “inappropriately sent to the Office of Administrative Hearings.”

• The OAH’s jurisdiction over the matter had concluded with the August 5 decision. The Petitioner was advised to address any further requests to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Marilyn J. Fogelsong (petitioner)
    Park Townhouses HOA
    Represented herself; former HOA President/Treasurer
  • Levi Benjamin Lazarus (co-owner/son of petitioner)
    Park Townhouses HOA
    Co-owner of petitioner's unit
  • Jason Smith (HOA attorney)
    Consulted by petitioner regarding CC&R interpretation for unit repairs

Respondent Side

  • Gerald Schwarzenb (board member/Secretary)
    Park Townhouses HOA
    Current HOA board member; his unit managed by TRT
  • Mark Schlang (board member/Treasurer/architect)
    Park Townhouses HOA
    Current HOA board member; his unit managed by TRT
  • Deborah Garcia (broker/HOA manager)
    TRT Property Management
    Broker of TRT; homeowners voted to accept her as HOA manager
  • Andrew Viscara (HOA property manager)
    TRT Property Management
    TRT representative designated for Park Townhouses HOA management
  • Mary Lord Lr (property manager)
    TRT Property Management
    Property manager for unit 2465
  • B.L. Edmonson (attorney)
    TRT Property Management
    Wrote cease and desist letter to petitioner; billed HOA

Neutral Parties

  • Nicole Robinson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • David Zinfeld (homeowner/former Treasurer)
    Park Townhouses HOA
    Property owner; prior treasurer during self-managed period; paid assessment under protest
  • Ray Floyd (former board member)
    Park Townhouses HOA
    Served on board with petitioner during self-managed period
  • Sasha Flores (bank account signer)
    Park Townhouses HOA
    Wife of Rick Flores; co-signer on HOA bank account
  • Rick Flores (homeowner/delegate)
    Park Townhouses HOA
    Delegated authority to wife Sasha Flores for bank account deeds

Marilyn J Fogelsong

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H050-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-08-05
Administrative Law Judge Nicole Robinson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marilyn J. Fogelsong Counsel
Respondent Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, INC. Counsel

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1811
Paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (A) and (F)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner's petition was DENIED because Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed the alleged violations, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to enforce the alleged violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830(A).

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on all four issues. Issues 1, 2, and 3 lacked sufficient evidentiary support or statutory violation proof. Issue 4 was dismissed due to lack of OAH jurisdiction over ARS § 10-830.

Key Issues & Findings

The HOA failed to disclose conflicts-of-interest when hiring an HOA property manager to manage the HOA which is a violation of ARS 33-1811.

Petitioner alleged that the hiring of TRT (Tucson Realty & Trust Company, Management Services, LLC) as the HOA manager constituted an undisclosed conflict of interest because TRT also managed individual townhouses within the community.

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1811

The HOA has violated paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs by directing an HOA property manager to pursue an unsanctioned project for individual townhouses which is beyond the scope of HOA management for common areas.

The HOA manager solicited bids to paint the exteriors of all townhouses. Petitioner argued the HOA lacked authority to manage improvements for individual units, as Paragraph 19 limits HOA authority to common areas.

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs

The board has violated the open meeting laws of ARS 33-1804 (A) and (F) by holding a private board meeting without notice; failing to provide material information, minutes, financial statements, and a budget upon request; and by failing to communicate via the designated representative.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by failing to provide proper notice for meetings and failing to provide requested documentation (minutes, financial statements, etc.).

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

The board has violated ARS 10-830(A) by failing to act in good faith with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would act by failing to perform their duties.

Petitioner alleged the board failed to perform required duties in a timely or prudent manner, including failing to elect officers, manage the bank account, check the post office box, and schedule a backflow test.

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Management, Conflict of Interest, Open Meeting Law, Jurisdiction, Planned Community, CC&Rs, Director Duty, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1811
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Park Association

Marilyn J Fogelsong vs Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, INC.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H050-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-08-05
Administrative Law Judge Nicole Robinson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marilyn J. Fogelsong Counsel
Respondent Park Townhouses Homeowners Association, INC. Counsel

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1811
Paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (A) and (F)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner's petition was DENIED because Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed the alleged violations, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to enforce the alleged violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830(A).

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on all four issues. Issues 1, 2, and 3 lacked sufficient evidentiary support or statutory violation proof. Issue 4 was dismissed due to lack of OAH jurisdiction over ARS § 10-830.

Key Issues & Findings

The HOA failed to disclose conflicts-of-interest when hiring an HOA property manager to manage the HOA which is a violation of ARS 33-1811.

Petitioner alleged that the hiring of TRT (Tucson Realty & Trust Company, Management Services, LLC) as the HOA manager constituted an undisclosed conflict of interest because TRT also managed individual townhouses within the community.

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1811

The HOA has violated paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs by directing an HOA property manager to pursue an unsanctioned project for individual townhouses which is beyond the scope of HOA management for common areas.

The HOA manager solicited bids to paint the exteriors of all townhouses. Petitioner argued the HOA lacked authority to manage improvements for individual units, as Paragraph 19 limits HOA authority to common areas.

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Paragraph 19 of the CC&Rs

The board has violated the open meeting laws of ARS 33-1804 (A) and (F) by holding a private board meeting without notice; failing to provide material information, minutes, financial statements, and a budget upon request; and by failing to communicate via the designated representative.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by failing to provide proper notice for meetings and failing to provide requested documentation (minutes, financial statements, etc.).

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

The board has violated ARS 10-830(A) by failing to act in good faith with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would act by failing to perform their duties.

Petitioner alleged the board failed to perform required duties in a timely or prudent manner, including failing to elect officers, manage the bank account, check the post office box, and schedule a backflow test.

Orders: N/A

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Management, Conflict of Interest, Open Meeting Law, Jurisdiction, Planned Community, CC&Rs, Director Duty, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1811
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-830
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Park Association

Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H030-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-06-02
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Sharon Maiden Counsel
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Josh Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Association’s Bylaws
Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition is denied, as she failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law) or selectively enforced Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws regarding term limits.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on both issues. The closed board meeting was authorized for discussing legal advice, and the HOA's interpretation of the term limit provision aligned with the amendment's purpose to prevent Board members from serving long terms.

Key Issues & Findings

Selective enforcement of Bylaws regarding term limits.

Petitioner alleged Respondent selectively enforced the 2021 Bylaws amendment concerning term limits by retroactively applying the two-term limit to disqualify her 2024 candidacy.

Orders: Petition denied. Petitioner failed to establish a violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Failure to hold an open meeting to decide candidacy disqualification.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated open meeting laws by holding a closed executive session vote on October 11, 2024, to disqualify her candidacy.

Orders: Petition denied. Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Term Limits, Open Meeting Law, Selective Enforcement, ADR
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1272425.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1272426.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1282372.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:17:12 (60.5 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1282375.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:17:15 (9.1 KB)

25F-H030-REL Decision – 1284492.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1288176.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1288177.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1293820.pdf

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25F-H030-REL Decision – 1313134.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 25F-H030-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing:Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative hearing case Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 25F-H030-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Sharon Maiden, a former board member, alleged that the association selectively enforced its bylaws to disqualify her from running for the board and violated Arizona’s open meeting laws by making this decision in a closed executive session.

The central conflict revolved around the interpretation of a 2021 bylaw amendment that shortened board member term limits. The petitioner argued for a prospective application, which would reset the term-limit clock for sitting board members, while the respondent association argued for an interpretation that counted prior service.

On June 2, 2025, Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issued a decision denying the petition in its entirety. The judge concluded that the association’s board acted within the bounds of Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)) by holding a closed session to consider legal advice. Furthermore, the judge found that the petitioner failed to prove a bylaw violation, reasoning that the association’s interpretation was consistent with the membership’s clear intent to shorten, not lengthen, the potential tenure of board members.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Name

Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Case Number

25F-H030-REL

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Petitioner

Sharon M. Maiden

Respondent

Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Josh Bolen, Esq. (CHDB Law LLP)

Presiding Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petition Allegations

The petition, filed by Sharon Maiden on December 15, 2024, asserted two primary violations by the Val Vista Lakes Community Association:

1. Selective Enforcement of Bylaws: An alleged violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Association’s Bylaws, stemming from the board’s decision to disqualify the petitioner from running for a board position in 2024 based on its interpretation of term limits.

2. Open Meeting Law Violation: An alleged violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A), contending that the board failed to hold an open meeting when it made the binding decision to disqualify her candidacy.

Initially filed as a single-issue petition for which a $500 fee was paid, the OAH ordered on March 12, 2025, that the petitioner must either pay an additional $500 to pursue both issues or select one to proceed with at the hearing.

——————————————————————————–

Procedural History

January 27, 2025: The Arizona Department of Real Estate refers the petition to the OAH for an administrative hearing.

February 4, 2025: Respondent files a Motion to Strike the Petition, arguing the petitioner improperly disclosed attorney-client privileged communications.

February 11, 2025: Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn denies the Motion to Strike. The hearing is continued to March 26, 2025.

March 26, 2025: The first day of the evidentiary hearing is conducted.

April 11, 2025: A further hearing is conducted. At its conclusion, the record is held open to allow for post-hearing briefing.

May 13, 2025: The post-hearing briefing period concludes, and the record is closed.

June 2, 2025: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues the final decision, denying the petition.

Central Dispute: Interpretation of Bylaw Term Limits

The core of the dispute was the interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 of the association’s bylaws, which was amended in 2021. The amendment’s purpose, as testified by multiple witnesses, was to shorten the length of time directors could serve on the board.

Evolution of the Bylaw

2012 Bylaws: Introduced term limits for the first time, establishing a maximum of three consecutive two-year terms (six years total), followed by a required one-year break.

2021 Bylaws: The membership approved a rewrite that reduced term limits to two consecutive elected two-year terms (four years total), followed by a required two-year break.

Both versions of the bylaw contained the following critical sentence: “Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits as follows.” The meaning of this sentence became the primary point of contention.

Competing Interpretations

Position

Argument Summary

Key Evidence and Testimony

Petitioner’s Position (Prospective Application)

The “Commencing with…” language resets the clock. Terms served before the 2021 amendment should not count toward the new, shorter limits. The association’s sudden shift to a retroactive interpretation was selective and targeted.

William Sutell (Former President): Testified the intent was to “reset the clock for everybody.” His 2022 newsletter stating his “term limit of four years is up” was “ineloquent” and meant to express he was tired of serving.
Douglas Keats (Former Board Member): Stated the intent of the rewrite was to “Go forward.”
Historical Precedent: The association, based on a 2016 legal opinion from Goodman Law Group, had allowed Director Cheryl McCoy to serve nine consecutive years despite the 2012 bylaw’s six-year limit.
Legal Opinions: An opinion from Krupnik & Speas in November 2023 stated the 2021 bylaws were prospective, not retroactive.

Respondent’s Position (Prior Service Counts)

The clear intent of the membership and the bylaw committee was to shorten terms. The petitioner’s interpretation creates a loophole allowing sitting board members to serve for 8 or more years, directly contradicting the amendment’s purpose.

Jill Brown (Bylaw Committee Chair): Testified the committee’s intent was to apply the new limits to sitting directors and there was no discussion of “grandfathering” anyone.
Bryan Patterson (Current President): Testified that the membership voted for two two-year terms “and that’s it.”
Sutell’s 2022 Newsletter: Presented as a direct admission from the former president that the four-year limit applied to him based on his service from 2018-2022.
Drafting Logic: The “Commencing with…” clause is a standard legal provision to prevent a new rule from invalidating a board member’s current term, not to erase their entire service history.

Central Dispute: Alleged Open Meeting Law Violation

The second major issue concerned the board’s decision-making process. On October 11, 2024, the board held a closed executive session where it voted 5-4 to accept the legal opinion of its counsel (CHDB Law) and disqualify Ms. Maiden from the ballot.

Competing Arguments

Position

Argument Summary

Key Evidence and Testimony

Petitioner’s Argument (Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A))

The vote to disqualify a candidate was a final, binding decision that must be made in an open meeting. The closed session was not justified under the narrow exceptions of the statute.

Improper Notice: The meeting notice cited the incorrect statute (for condominiums, not planned communities) and was not properly distributed to all board members.
Lack of Statutory Justification: No attorney was present at the meeting, and there was no pending litigation at that specific moment. The agenda item was to “accept opinion,” not simply “receive advice.”

Respondent’s Argument (Compliance with Law)

The executive session was permissible under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1), which allows closed meetings for the “consideration of… Legal advice from an attorney for the board or the association” and matters concerning “pending or contemplated litigation.”

Contemplated Litigation: Testimony indicated that Ms. Maiden had threatened to file an ADR complaint or lawsuit.
Consideration of Legal Advice: The board was reviewing three separate legal opinions regarding Ms. Maiden’s eligibility.
Petitioner’s Participation: Ms. Maiden was present at the meeting, participated in the vote, and did not object to the session being held in private at that time.

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Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ denied Ms. Maiden’s petition on both counts, finding that she failed to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Ruling on the Open Meeting Law

The ALJ concluded that the board did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

Key Rationale: The evidence demonstrated that the board met in executive session “to consider a legal opinion regarding the 2021 Amendment.” This action falls squarely within the statutory exception outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1).

On Disclosure: The statute permits, but does not require, the board to disclose information from such a session after a “final resolution.” As the matter was still being litigated, no final resolution had been reached.

Ruling on the Bylaw Violation

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the respondent violated Article IV of its bylaws.

Key Rationale: The judge focused on the underlying purpose of the 2021 amendment, which testimony from both sides confirmed was to “prevent Board members from serving for long periods of time.”

Rejection of Petitioner’s Interpretation: The decision noted that the petitioner, along with her witnesses, admitted that their interpretation “would have allowed the then-sitting Board Members the right to serve 6, 8, and potentially 10-year term limits.” The ALJ found this outcome would be contrary to the amendment’s purpose.

Jurisdictional Note: The decision explicitly stated that the “issue of selective enforcement is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” The ruling was based on the interpretation of the bylaw’s text and intent, not on whether it was applied unevenly.

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that Respondent’s Board violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 or Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws.”






Study Guide – 25F-H030-REL


Administrative Hearing Study Guide: Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source context.

1. What were the two primary legal issues Sharon Maiden raised in her petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association?

2. What was the key phrase in the 2021 bylaws that became the central point of interpretive conflict regarding term limits?

3. According to the hearing testimony, what were the main purposes of the 2021 bylaw committee’s rewrite of the association’s bylaws?

4. Explain the Respondent’s justification for holding a closed executive session on October 11, 2024, to decide on Sharon Maiden’s eligibility.

5. How did the legal opinions from the Goodman Law Group (Ashley Turner) and Krupnik & Spees (Adrien Speed) support the Petitioner’s case?

6. Describe the key piece of evidence the Respondent used involving former board president William (Bill) Sutell to argue against a prospective interpretation of the term limits.

7. What decision did the Board of Directors make during the October 11, 2024, executive session, and what was the final vote count?

8. What procedural issue did Petitioner Douglas Keats identify with the notice for the October 11, 2024, executive session?

9. According to witness Jill Brown, what was the general intent of the bylaw committee and community members regarding the length of board service?

10. What were the final conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge in the June 2, 2025, decision?

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Answer Key

1. Petitioner Sharon Maiden alleged that the Respondent (1) selectively enforced the Bylaws in violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3, and (2) failed to hold an open meeting when it decided to disqualify her from running for the Board, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A).

2. The central point of conflict was the phrase in Article IV, Section 2: “Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits…” The Petitioner argued this indicated a prospective “reset,” while the Respondent argued it did not erase prior service.

3. Testimony from witnesses like Douglas Keats and William Sutell indicated the rewrite was intended to address multiple issues, not just term limits. Key purposes included establishing secret ballots, eliminating the nominating committee which was seen as counter to the CCNRs, and creating a formal procedure for replacing board members based on vote counts rather than board appointments.

4. The Respondent justified the closed session under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1), which allows for closed meetings to consider legal advice from an attorney. The board was discussing three separate legal opinions regarding Ms. Maiden’s eligibility and also noted that Ms. Maiden had contemplated legal action against the association.

5. The Petitioner argued that these opinions demonstrated a consistent historical interpretation by the association’s own general counsels. Both opinions stated that the term limit language in the 2012 and 2021 bylaws should be interpreted prospectively, meaning terms served prior to the adoption of the new bylaws did not count toward the new limits.

6. The Respondent heavily relied on a November 2022 newsletter message from then-president Bill Sutell. In it, Mr. Sutell stated, “This will be my last president’s message to the community as my term limit of four years is up,” which the Respondent argued was an admission that the term limits were not reset by the 2021 bylaw amendment.

7. The Board of Directors voted to accept the opinion of CHDB Law LLP regarding term limits, which effectively disqualified Sharon Maiden from running in the 2024 election. The motion passed with a vote of 5 to 4.

8. Douglas Keats testified that the email notice for the executive session was not sent to him or two other board members (Christine Rucker and Curtis Weile) at their correct addresses, while it was sent to a former board member. He also noted the notice cited an incorrect statute (A.R.S. § 33-1248 for condominiums) instead of the one for planned communities.

9. Jill Brown, who chaired the bylaw committee, testified that the general consensus of the committee and community members was that they did not want directors serving for long periods. The intent was to shorten the available terms to encourage turnover and prevent directors from serving for “excessive amounts of time.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied Sharon Maiden’s petition. The Judge concluded that the Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) because the closed meeting to consider legal advice was permissible. Furthermore, the Judge found Maiden failed to prove a violation of the bylaws, stating the purpose of the 2021 amendment was to prevent long service periods, and deemed the issue of selective enforcement to be outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

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Essay Questions

Construct detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from across the source documents. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioner and Respondent regarding the proper interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law). Discuss the specific actions taken by the board and how each party framed those actions in the context of the statute’s exceptions for closed sessions.

2. Compare and contrast the testimonies of William Sutell and Douglas Keats with that of Jill Brown. How did their recollections and interpretations of the bylaw committee’s intent differ, particularly concerning whether the new term limits should apply prospectively or retroactively to sitting board members?

3. Trace the evolution of the Val Vista Lakes Community Association’s bylaws regarding term limits from 2012 to 2021. Evaluate the arguments concerning “long-standing practice” and “selective enforcement,” referencing the specific cases of board members Cheryl McCoy, William Sutell, and Sharon Maiden.

4. Examine the role of conflicting legal advice in this dispute. Discuss the different opinions offered by the Goodman Law Group, Krupnik & Spees, and CHDB Law LLP, and analyze how the Board of Directors chose to navigate these contradictory recommendations.

5. The Administrative Law Judge’s final decision states that the “issue of selective enforcement is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” Based on the testimony and arguments presented, construct an argument that Sharon Maiden might have made regarding selective enforcement, and explain why the Respondent would have refuted it.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Kay A. Abramsohn and Velva Moses-Thompson served as ALJs.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from members of homeowners’ associations. It referred this case to the OAH.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. Key statutes in this case include § 33-1804(A) and § 32-2199.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

The Arizona statute concerning open meeting laws for planned community associations. It mandates that meetings be open to members but provides specific, limited exceptions for closed (executive) sessions, such as to discuss legal advice.

Bolen, Josh

An attorney with CHDB Law LLP who served as counsel for the Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Brown, Jill

A witness for the Respondent. She served as the chair of the 2021 bylaw committee and was a current board member at the time of the hearing.

Bylaw Committee

A committee established by the board in 2021 to review and recommend changes to the association’s bylaws. Its members included Jill Brown, William Sutell, and Douglas Keats.

Carpenter Hazelwood (CHDB LAW LLP)

The law firm that represented the Respondent. The Petitioner filed an unsuccessful motion to disqualify the firm.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing documents for the community. The 2021 bylaw committee sought to address bylaw provisions that were counter to the CCNRs, such as the nominating committee.

Commencing with…

The key phrase in Article IV, Section 2 of the bylaws that was central to the dispute. The Petitioner argued it signaled a prospective application of term limits, while the Respondent disagreed.

Executive Session

A closed meeting of the Board of Directors, permitted under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) for specific purposes, such as discussing legal advice or pending litigation.

Keats, Douglas

A witness for the Petitioner. He was a former board member who served as secretary of the 2021 bylaw committee.

Maiden, Sharon M.

The Petitioner in the case, a homeowner in Val Vista Lakes and a former member of its Board of Directors who was disqualified from running for a third consecutive term.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH / Tribunal)

The independent state agency that conducted the administrative hearing for this case after referral from the Department of Real Estate.

Patterson, Bryan

A witness for the Respondent. He was the HOA President at the time of the hearing and was Vice President when the vote to disqualify the Petitioner occurred.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Sharon M. Maiden.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this administrative hearing, defined as evidence that is more likely true than not. The ALJ found the Petitioner failed to meet this burden.

Prospective Interpretation

The argument that a new rule or law applies only “going forward” from its effective date and does not consider service or actions that occurred prior to that date. This was the Petitioner’s central argument.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Retroactive Interpretation

The argument that a new rule or law applies to past events, meaning prior service on the board would count against the newly established term limits. This was the Respondent’s position.

Sutell, William (Bill)

A witness for the Petitioner. He is an attorney, a former board president, and served on the 2021 bylaw committee.

Val Vista Lakes Community Association

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners’ association (HOA) in Gilbert, Arizona.






Blog Post – 25F-H030-REL


5 Surprising Lessons from an HOA War Over a Single Sentence

Introduction: The Butterfly Effect of Bylaws

For many homeowners, the rules set by their homeowners’ association (HOA) can feel arbitrary, buried in dense legal documents. But the precise wording of those governing documents has massive, unforeseen consequences—a legal butterfly effect where a minor change creates a major storm. This dynamic was on full display in the case of Sharon Maiden vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, where one seemingly simple sentence sparked a complex, year-long legal dispute.

The case offers a masterclass in the tension between the technical reading of a text versus its clear, underlying intent. It provides surprising insights into law, community governance, and human nature. Here are five key lessons from this HOA war over a single sentence.

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1. One Sentence, Two Meanings, and a Mountain of Legal Bills

A 2021 bylaw amendment, designed to reduce board member term limits, lit the fuse for the central conflict. The entire dispute hinged on the interpretation of one introductory phrase, demonstrating just how much can ride on a few words.

The critical sentence from Article IV, Section 2 of the 2021 Bylaws reads:

“Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits as follows.”

This single sentence gave rise to two completely opposite interpretations:

The “Reset” Theory (Petitioner’s view): Proponents argued this language meant the term limit clock reset for all sitting board members. Under this view, their prior years of service didn’t count toward the new, shorter limit. This interpretation seemed solid, even supported by a formal legal opinion from the association’s previous general counsel, attorney Adrien Spees.

The “Look-Back” Theory (Respondent’s view): The association argued the phrase was merely a legal formality to prevent sitting members from being disqualified mid-term. They contended that a board member’s prior service absolutely still counted toward the new limit.

The fact that this ambiguity was enough to fuel a formal administrative hearing shows the high stakes of precise legal drafting. What’s truly surprising is how a standard legal phrase like “Commencing with…” could be interpreted so diametrically as to potentially erase years of board service from the term-limit calculation.

2. The Architect of the Rule Became Its Most Complicated Case

One of the most fascinating aspects of the case involved the testimony of Bill Sutell, the former Board President. Mr. Sutell was in charge when the 2021 bylaw changes were drafted and approved, and he testified in support of the “reset” theory, which would have allowed him and other members to serve longer.

However, the strongest piece of evidence used against his position came from his own hand. In a 2022 newsletter to the community, Mr. Sutell had written:

“This will be my last president’s message to the community as my term limit of four years is up.”

When questioned, he explained the statement was “ineloquent.” He testified he was tired and had a “self-imposed term limit” because he “didn’t want to be a career board member.” This created a paradox where the rule’s architect argued for one interpretation in court while his own public statement seemed to support the opposing view. As community governance analysts, we see a crucial lesson here: for HOA volunteers, informal communications like a newsletter can be scrutinized with the same intensity as a legal document—a trap many well-meaning leaders are unprepared for.

3. Why a “Correct” Interpretation Can Still Be Wrong

The petitioner’s side came to the hearing with what seemed like very strong evidence. They had testimony about the bylaw committee’s intent and presented a formal legal opinion from attorney Adrien Spees that appeared to settle the matter:

“This amendment is prospective not retroactive. The Term limits only apply to directors elected beginning the first annual meeting following November 9th, 2021. Thus, a director who has served for several years before November 9th, 2021 will still be eligible to serve two consecutive terms after November 9th, 2021.”

This seems clear-cut. However, the argument that ultimately won focused not on what the words said, but on what they would do. The fatal blow to the “reset” theory came not from the respondent’s lawyers, but from the petitioner’s own key witnesses. During testimony, both Sutell and another witness, Douglas Keats, admitted that their interpretation would create a massive loophole, allowing sitting board members “the right to serve 6, 8, and potentially 10-year term limits.” This admission was critical. The Administrative Law Judge rejected an interpretation—even one supported by a legal opinion—because it led to an “absurd result” that directly contradicted the stated purpose of the rule, which was to shorten term limits, not accidentally lengthen them for a select few.

4. The Peril of a Closed-Door Meeting

The second major issue was the claim that the board violated Arizona’s open meeting laws. The vote to disqualify Sharon Maiden from the 2024 ballot was not taken in public. Instead, it happened during a closed executive session while she, a sitting board member, was present.

The board justified the closed-door meeting by stating they were discussing legal advice and contemplated litigation, a valid exception under A.R.S. § 33-1804. However, the ALJ’s final decision highlighted a crucial detail:

“Petitioner was a member of the Board at the time of the meeting and did not object to the Board voting on whether Article IV, Section 2 of Respondent’s Bylaws permitted Petitioner to run for the board…”

This offers a stark lesson. A person’s failure to object to a process in the moment can significantly weaken their ability to challenge it later. It’s easy to see why someone might stay silent: they may be intimidated, unsure of the rules, or simply not realize the procedural gravity of their silence. This surprising takeaway underscores that understanding the rules of order as they are happening is critical, because silence can be interpreted as consent.

5. The “Why” Trumped the “What”

The story concluded when the Administrative Law Judge denied the petitioner’s case on both counts. In the face of ambiguous text and competing legal opinions, the judge focused on the fundamental purpose of the 2021 bylaw amendment. The final decision stated:

“…the preponderance of the evidence presented at hearing shows that the purpose of the 2021 amendment was to prevent Board members for serving on the Board for long periods of time.”

In this legal gray area, the underlying intent—the “why” behind the rule—proved more powerful than the technical arguments about the “what.” The judge determined that an interpretation creating 10-year term limits could not possibly align with the members’ vote to prevent people from serving for long periods. The surprising lesson is that even when the text is debatable, the spirit of a rule can become the most decisive factor in its application.

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Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What Your Rules Mean?

The Val Vista Lakes case is a powerful reminder that the words in bylaws are not just suggestions; they have real-world power to shape communities, define rights, and launch costly legal battles. Bylaws are “living documents” in the sense that they have a daily impact, but they are dangerously “dead documents” if members don’t understand them. The consequences are not just financial. At the hearing, former president Bill Sutell gave a poignant final statement explaining his departure from the community he had worked so hard to serve: “I sold my home that this was more than I needed in my retirement.”

This case is a cautionary tale about the human cost of ambiguity. It leaves every HOA member with a final, thought-provoking challenge: When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and are you willing to actively question ambiguity and push for clarity before a conflict arises?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sharon M. Maiden (petitioner)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Former board member/candidate
  • William Sutel (witness)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Former board president; bylaw committee member
  • Douglas Keats (witness)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Board member; bylaw committee member; requested subpoena for him
  • Jeremy Whitaker (petitioner)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Filed ADR complaint

Respondent Side

  • Josh Bolen (HOA attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Counsel for Val Vista Lakes Community Association; requested subpoena for him
  • Jill Brown (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Bylaw committee chair; respondent witness
  • Bryan Patterson (board president)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Respondent witness; Also listed as subpoenaed witness
  • Chuck Oldham (HOA attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
  • Mel McDonald (board president)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Requested subpoena; board member
  • Vicki Goslin (attorney staff)
    CHDB Law LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Ashley Turner (attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Wrote 2016 legal opinion; Also listed as subpoenaed witness
  • Jessica Misto (attorney)
    Provided legal review/opinion
  • Adrienne Speed (attorney)
    Cartik and Speed
    General counsel who wrote 2023 opinion

Other Participants

  • Diana Ebertshauser (witness)
    Requested subpoena; candidate
  • Brodie Hurtado (witness)
    Requested subpoena; candidate
  • Timothy Hedrick (witness)
    Requested subpoena
  • Christine Rucker (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Requested subpoena
  • Curtis Weile (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Requested subpoena
  • Cheryl McCoy (former board president)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Brian Solomon (former board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Dustin Snow (former director)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Wendy Rhodess (bylaw committee member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Jonathan Everhouser (attorney)
    CHDB Law LLP
    Bylaw committee member
  • Laura Henry (property manager)
    First Service Residential
    General Manager
  • Leslie Johnson (former director)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • John Walls (former board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Community member

Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2024-09-20
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lisa Marx Counsel
Respondent Tara Condominium Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1248 (A), (D), (E), and (F); and Tara CC&Rs Section 9(E)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner prevailed on the 'Records' issue (A.R.S. § 33-1258), resulting in a $500.00 filing fee reimbursement. Respondent prevailed on the 'Example 13' issue (A.R.S. § 33-1248 and CC&Rs § 9(E)).

Why this result: The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner failed to sustain her burden regarding the Open Meeting Law allegations, finding that TARA conducted meetings in compliance and the specific volunteer work referenced was not statutorily or contractually required to be placed on an agenda for formal action.

Key Issues & Findings

Records Access Violation

TARA failed to timely provide access to TARA HOA records it possessed, violating the ten business day fulfillment requirement for examination requests.

Orders: TARA was ordered to reimburse Petitioner $500.00.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

Open Meeting Law Violation (Example 13)

Petitioner alleged open meeting violations concerning volunteer work and projects not placed on agendas or formally voted upon by the board (Example 13).

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was dismissed as to alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1248(A), (D), (E), and (F) and/or Tara CC&Rs Section 9(E).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(D)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(E)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(F)
  • Tara CC&Rs Section 9(E)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records, Open Meeting Law, Partial Victory, Filing Fee Reimbursement, Condominium Association
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Tara CC&Rs Section 9(E)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H054-REL Decision – 1212274.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:11:34 (70.4 KB)

24F-H054-REL Decision – 1212281.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:11:41 (12.4 KB)

24F-H054-REL Decision – 1216809.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:11:49 (50.9 KB)

24F-H054-REL Decision – 1225818.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:11:58 (168.1 KB)

24F-H054-REL Decision – 1226250.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:12:08 (41.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 24F-H054-REL


Briefing Document: Marx v. Tara Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative case Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominium Association (No. 24F-H054-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on two primary allegations brought by homeowner and former board member Lisa Marx against the Tara Condominium Association (TARA): (1) violations of Arizona state law regarding access to association records, and (2) violations of the state’s Open Meeting Law.

The case culminated in a split decision by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). TARA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 by failing to provide timely access to its financial and other records as requested by the petitioner. However, the petitioner failed to prove her second claim that TARA violated the open meeting provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1248 when board members and volunteers performed maintenance and repair projects on common areas without formal agenda items and board votes.

Consequently, the ALJ sustained the petition on the records violation and dismissed it on the open meeting violation. TARA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Marx $500, representing the filing fee for the single issue on which she prevailed. A subsequent request for rehearing filed by Ms. Marx was procedurally rejected for being submitted to the incorrect agency.

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties and Context

Petitioner: Lisa Marx, a homeowner in the Tara Condominium Association and a former board member who served in various capacities, including Secretary, Chairperson, and Vice-Chairperson, from 2021 until her resignation in January 2024.

Respondent: Tara Condominium Association (TARA), a 50-unit nonprofit management association, represented at the hearing by its Chairman, Mark Gottmann.

The dispute arose following a change in board leadership in early 2024, with Ms. Marx alleging the new board was operating without transparency and in violation of state statutes and the association’s governing documents.

Chronology of Key Events

Jan 2024

Lisa Marx resigns from the TARA board two weeks after being elected for a fourth term.

Feb 1, 2024

Mark Gottmann assumes the role of Chairman of the Board.

Feb–Apr 2024

Marx makes a series of five requests for association records, which are either partially or fully denied by the TARA board.

May 29, 2024

Marx files an HOA Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging two categories of violations and paying a 1,000filingfee(500 per issue).

Aug 8, 2024

TARA files an Amended Response, admitting to several of the alleged violations, offering to reimburse Marx’s $1,000 filing fee, and requesting that the hearing be vacated.

Aug 8, 2024

Marx files a reply rejecting the offer, stating that the “numerous” issues required “a ruling that is binding and definite” to “hopefully prevent further violations.”

Aug 16, 2024

The ALJ issues an order requiring Marx to narrow her petition to two specific issues, categorizing the five records-request instances as one “records” issue and requiring her to select one of the thirteen alleged open-meeting violations.

Aug 19, 2024

Marx selects “Example 13” from her petition as her second issue.

Aug 29, 2024

An administrative hearing is held before ALJ Kay A. Abramsohn.

Sep 20, 2024

The ALJ issues a final decision.

Sep 23, 2024

The ALJ issues a Minute Entry rejecting a request for rehearing filed by Marx, as it was sent to the Office of Administrative Hearings instead of the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Analysis of Disputed Issues and Testimony

The hearing focused on two central issues as narrowed by the ALJ’s order.

Issue 1: Access to Association Records (A.R.S. § 33-1258)

This issue consolidated five instances across multiple dates where Marx alleged she was improperly denied access to or provision of TARA’s records.

Petitioner’s Position (Lisa Marx):

• Marx testified that she made multiple written requests for documents including vouchers, contracts, financial reports (General Ledger, AP Distribution), architectural change forms, and violation letters.

• The board’s responses were statutorily invalid. For example, a February 22, 2024 response stated: “A member of the Association is entitled to see reasonable financial information only. A member does not have a right to see contracts entered into by the Board nor information concerning specific members. We respectfully refuse your request…” Another denial was based on her being “no longer a board member.”

• Marx argued this refusal to provide records blocks transparency, creates distrust, and prevents homeowners from ensuring the governing documents are being enforced impartially. She asserted that all requested documents, such as financial records and contracts related to common areas, are records homeowners are entitled to examine.

Respondent’s Position (Tara Condominium Association):

• Mark Gottmann testified that the board was new and that any mistakes were made out of “enthusiasm” and a desire to better the community, not malicious intent.

• He stated the board acted on advice from outside sources, including a trade association, which led them to believe they were “over-providing” documents compared to their CC&Rs, which only mandate semi-annual financial statements.

• TARA experienced delays in receiving financial reports from its management company, Colby, after it was acquired by another entity, which in turn delayed distribution to homeowners.

• Gottmann argued that some requested documents did not exist (e.g., contracts for volunteer work), while others were justifiably withheld because they contained private information about individual homeowners (e.g., violation letters, architectural change forms).

Issue 2: Open Meeting Law Violations (A.R.S. § 33-1248)

This issue centered on “Example 13” of the petition, which alleged the board undertook several projects without adhering to open meeting requirements.

Petitioner’s Position (Lisa Marx):

• Marx alleged that several projects were performed on common property without being included on a meeting agenda and without a formal vote by the board in an open meeting. These projects included:

◦ Board members spraying weeds.

◦ Board members digging up grass around trees and laying mulch.

◦ A board member refinishing wood shutters.

• She argued these actions violated A.R.S. § 33-1248 and TARA’s own CC&Rs (Section 9(E)), which states, “A majority vote of the Managers shall entitle the Board to carry out action on behalf of the owners of the units.”

• The failure to discuss these items in an open meeting denied members the right to provide input before the board took action on community property.

Respondent’s Position (Tara Condominium Association):

• Gottmann characterized the projects as ongoing operational responsibilities and good-faith efforts by volunteers to save the association money.

• The weed spraying was described as an “experiment” at no cost to TARA. The mulching was done with donated materials in response to a homeowner’s suggestion. The shutter repair was done by volunteers for a nominal cost of less than $150 for materials, which was within the monthly maintenance budget.

• He argued these were not formal actions requiring a board vote but were undertaken with an “enthusiasm and desire to make our community a better place.” TARA’s CC&Rs (Section 12, Part D) grant the board the power “to use and expend the assessments collected to maintain, care for, and preserve the common elements.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ’s decision, issued on September 20, 2024, delivered a split verdict, finding for each party on one of the two core issues.

Finding on Records Violation (A.R.S. § 33-1258):

Verdict: TARA violated the statute.

Reasoning: The ALJ concluded that TARA failed to provide access to records it possessed within the statutorily required ten-day timeframe. While TARA had a potential defense for delays related to its management company and a valid reason to withhold records containing personal information of other members, the overall evidence demonstrated a failure to comply with the law.

Outcome: The petitioner was deemed the prevailing party on this issue.

Finding on Open Meeting Violation (A.R.S. § 33-1248):

Verdict: TARA did not violate the statute.

Reasoning: The ALJ found that the petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof. The evidence showed that TARA conducted its formal meetings in compliance with open meeting laws, providing notice and agendas. The ALJ concluded there was “no evidence in the hearing record that… those work circumstances… were required by statute or the CC&Rs to be placed on a TARA agenda for discussion and/or for ‘formal action’ by the Board.”

Outcome: The respondent was deemed the prevailing party on this issue.

Final Order

Based on the findings, the ALJ issued the following orders:

1. Petitioner’s Petition is sustained as to the TARA violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258 (Records).

2. Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed as to the alleged violations by TARA of A.R.S. § 33-1248 (Open Meetings).

3. TARA is ordered to reimburse Petitioner in the amount of $500.00, representing the filing fee for the single successful claim.






Study Guide – 24F-H054-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “24F-H054-REL”, “case_title”: “Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominium Association”, “decision_date”: “2024-09-20”, “alj_name”: “Kay A. Abramsohn”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA refuse to provide financial records because they are waiting to receive them from their third-party management company?”, “short_answer”: “No. The HOA is responsible for providing access to records within the statutory 10-day timeframe, regardless of management company delays.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ ruled that waiting for a management company to provide monthly reports does not excuse the association from its statutory obligation to make records reasonably available within 10 business days. Even if the HOA acts in good faith while waiting for a vendor, failure to provide existing records violates the statute.”, “alj_quote”: “TARA has a defense, although unsupported, regarding the time frame only as to the financial documents for which TARA was waiting from its management company. … Overall, as to A.R.S. § 33-1258, there is no evidence that, within the ten day time frame, TARA provided access to the TARA HOA records it did have and which were required to have been provided to Petitioner; therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that TARA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258”, “topic_tags”: [ “records request”, “financial records”, “management company” ] }, { “question”: “Does a group of board members or volunteers doing unpaid maintenance work require an open meeting and a formal vote?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. If the work is volunteer-based and doesn’t require a specific contract or expenditure necessitating a vote under the CC&Rs or statutes, it may not trigger open meeting requirements.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ determined that volunteer work performed by board members (like weeding or painting) to save money did not constitute ‘formal action’ that required placement on an agenda or a formal vote in an open meeting, provided no statute or governing document specifically required it.”, “alj_quote”: “There is no evidence in the hearing record that, prior to the volunteer work described in Example 13, that those work circumstances, or any projected volunteer work circumstances, were required by statute or the CC&Rs to be placed on a TARA agenda for discussion and/or for ‘formal action’ by the Board at the TARA monthly meetings.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1248”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meetings”, “volunteer work”, “board authority” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA withhold violation letters or architectural change forms concerning other homeowners?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if those documents contain personal information about specific members.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision affirms that HOAs can refuse to provide records related to specific units, such as violation notices or contracts containing personal data, under the statutory exception for personal, health, or financial records of individual members.”, “alj_quote”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4) provides an exception to the requirement to provide records for ‘personal, health or financial records of an individual member’ … In this case, because some of the requested ‘repair’ contract information for repairs at certain addresses may have contained personal information of another member, TARA was likely within its statutory authority to refuse to provide that particular information.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4)”, “topic_tags”: [ “privacy”, “violation letters”, “records request” ] }, { “question”: “Can the board deny my records request because I am no longer a board member?”, “short_answer”: “No. The right to examine records belongs to all members of the association.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found the HOA in violation when it declined to provide information on the grounds that the requester was ‘no longer a Board member.’ The statute requires records be made available to ‘any member.'”, “alj_quote”: “TARA declined to provide such, stating that Petitioner was no longer a Board member. … TARA failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1258 regarding provision of access to TARA HOA records.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “homeowner rights”, “records access”, “board membership” ] }, { “question”: “If I file a petition with two issues and only win one, do I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “You may receive a partial reimbursement. The tribunal may order the HOA to reimburse the portion of the fee related to the successful claim.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the petitioner paid 1,000fortwoissues(500 per issue). Since the petitioner prevailed on the records issue but failed on the open meeting issue, the ALJ ordered the HOA to reimburse only $500.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS ORDERED that TARA reimburse Petitioner in the amount of $500.00. … The Administrative Law Judge concludes TARA is the prevailing party regarding the ‘Example 13’ issue and Petitioner bears the filing fee on this issue.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “filing fees”, “dispute resolution”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “Does being a ‘new board’ or ‘learning the ropes’ excuse the HOA from following state laws?”, “short_answer”: “No. Ignorance of the law or being a new board is not a valid defense for violating statutes.”, “detailed_answer”: “The HOA argued they were a new board acting in the best interest of the community and learning better governing practices. The ALJ acknowledged this explanation but still ruled that the failure to provide records was a violation of state statute.”, “alj_quote”: “TARA explained that the Board was a new Board and, believing it was acting in the Board’s best interest, was in the process of learning the procedures for better governing practices. … the Administrative Law Judge concludes that TARA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258”, “topic_tags”: [ “board duties”, “legal compliance”, “defenses” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 24F-H054-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “24F-H054-REL”, “case_title”: “Lisa Marx v. Tara Condominium Association”, “decision_date”: “2024-09-20”, “alj_name”: “Kay A. Abramsohn”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA refuse to provide financial records because they are waiting to receive them from their third-party management company?”, “short_answer”: “No. The HOA is responsible for providing access to records within the statutory 10-day timeframe, regardless of management company delays.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ ruled that waiting for a management company to provide monthly reports does not excuse the association from its statutory obligation to make records reasonably available within 10 business days. Even if the HOA acts in good faith while waiting for a vendor, failure to provide existing records violates the statute.”, “alj_quote”: “TARA has a defense, although unsupported, regarding the time frame only as to the financial documents for which TARA was waiting from its management company. … Overall, as to A.R.S. § 33-1258, there is no evidence that, within the ten day time frame, TARA provided access to the TARA HOA records it did have and which were required to have been provided to Petitioner; therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that TARA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258”, “topic_tags”: [ “records request”, “financial records”, “management company” ] }, { “question”: “Does a group of board members or volunteers doing unpaid maintenance work require an open meeting and a formal vote?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. If the work is volunteer-based and doesn’t require a specific contract or expenditure necessitating a vote under the CC&Rs or statutes, it may not trigger open meeting requirements.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ determined that volunteer work performed by board members (like weeding or painting) to save money did not constitute ‘formal action’ that required placement on an agenda or a formal vote in an open meeting, provided no statute or governing document specifically required it.”, “alj_quote”: “There is no evidence in the hearing record that, prior to the volunteer work described in Example 13, that those work circumstances, or any projected volunteer work circumstances, were required by statute or the CC&Rs to be placed on a TARA agenda for discussion and/or for ‘formal action’ by the Board at the TARA monthly meetings.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1248”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meetings”, “volunteer work”, “board authority” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA withhold violation letters or architectural change forms concerning other homeowners?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if those documents contain personal information about specific members.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision affirms that HOAs can refuse to provide records related to specific units, such as violation notices or contracts containing personal data, under the statutory exception for personal, health, or financial records of individual members.”, “alj_quote”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4) provides an exception to the requirement to provide records for ‘personal, health or financial records of an individual member’ … In this case, because some of the requested ‘repair’ contract information for repairs at certain addresses may have contained personal information of another member, TARA was likely within its statutory authority to refuse to provide that particular information.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(B)(4)”, “topic_tags”: [ “privacy”, “violation letters”, “records request” ] }, { “question”: “Can the board deny my records request because I am no longer a board member?”, “short_answer”: “No. The right to examine records belongs to all members of the association.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found the HOA in violation when it declined to provide information on the grounds that the requester was ‘no longer a Board member.’ The statute requires records be made available to ‘any member.'”, “alj_quote”: “TARA declined to provide such, stating that Petitioner was no longer a Board member. … TARA failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1258 regarding provision of access to TARA HOA records.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “homeowner rights”, “records access”, “board membership” ] }, { “question”: “If I file a petition with two issues and only win one, do I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “You may receive a partial reimbursement. The tribunal may order the HOA to reimburse the portion of the fee related to the successful claim.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the petitioner paid 1,000fortwoissues(500 per issue). Since the petitioner prevailed on the records issue but failed on the open meeting issue, the ALJ ordered the HOA to reimburse only $500.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS ORDERED that TARA reimburse Petitioner in the amount of $500.00. … The Administrative Law Judge concludes TARA is the prevailing party regarding the ‘Example 13’ issue and Petitioner bears the filing fee on this issue.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.01”, “topic_tags”: [ “filing fees”, “dispute resolution”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “Does being a ‘new board’ or ‘learning the ropes’ excuse the HOA from following state laws?”, “short_answer”: “No. Ignorance of the law or being a new board is not a valid defense for violating statutes.”, “detailed_answer”: “The HOA argued they were a new board acting in the best interest of the community and learning better governing practices. The ALJ acknowledged this explanation but still ruled that the failure to provide records was a violation of state statute.”, “alj_quote”: “TARA explained that the Board was a new Board and, believing it was acting in the Board’s best interest, was in the process of learning the procedures for better governing practices. … the Administrative Law Judge concludes that TARA violated A.R.S. § 33-1258.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1258”, “topic_tags”: [ “board duties”, “legal compliance”, “defenses” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lisa Marx (petitioner)
    Tara Condominium Association (Homeowner)
    Also former HOA Secretary, Vice-Chairperson, and Chairperson.
  • Brenda Spielder (observer)
    Tara Condominium Association (Member)
    Attended hearing with Petitioner.
  • Cynthia Poland (observer)
    Tara Condominium Association (Member)
    Attended hearing with Petitioner.

Respondent Side

  • Mark Gottmann (board member)
    Tara Condominium Association
    Chairman of the Board; represented Tara at the hearing.
  • Chandler W. Travis (HOA attorney)
    Travis Law Firm PLC
    Counsel for Tara Condominium Association until August 27, 2024.
  • Stephanie Bushart (board member)
    Tara Condominium Association
  • Tina Marie Shepherd (board member)
    Tara Condominium Association
    Resigned as Chairperson on January 31, 2024.
  • Dennis Anderson (board member)
    Tara Condominium Association
    Involved in volunteer work (weed spraying, trench digging, shutter refinishing).
  • Judy Rice (board member)
    Tara Condominium Association
    Treasurer and CPA.
  • Ted (board member)
    Tara Condominium Association
    Involved in volunteer trench work.
  • Nikki (volunteer)
    Tara Condominium Association
    Involved in volunteer shutter repair.

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Renee Snow (volunteer)
    Tara Condominium Association
    Volunteered for landscaping committee.

Wanda Swartling v. Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H057-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-08-01
Administrative Law Judge Brian Del Vecchio
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Wanda Swartling Counsel
Respondent Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa Counsel Chad Gallacher

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner’s petition because the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1804 by failing to hold a properly noticed open board meeting prior to the March 2, 2023, special assessment vote. Evidence suggested issues were discussed in prior committee and board meetings, and Petitioner did not prove informal discussions constituted a violation requiring a finding against the Respondent.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent's conduct violated ARS § 33-1804.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to hold open board meeting prior to special assessment meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting law (ARS § 33-1804) by failing to hold an open board meeting prior to the March 2, 2023, special meeting where members voted on a special assessment, arguing that preliminary discussions and decisions were made unilaterally in supposed closed-door meetings or through email/informal discussions.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Petitioner's request to levy a civil penalty against Respondent is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meeting Law, Special Assessment, Board Meetings, HOA Governance, Committee Meeting
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071114.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:11 (5884.7 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:14 (7935.6 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071120.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:19 (1989.0 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071121.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:23 (4055.1 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071122.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:27 (676.0 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071126.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:31 (3343.5 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071127.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:36 (3328.5 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1071503.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:39 (49.2 KB)

23F-H057-REL Decision – 1079574.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:58:42 (114.8 KB)

Questions

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner alleging a violation against their HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a "preponderance of the evidence."

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the burden is on the homeowner to prove their case. The standard used is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner must show that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Do informal discussions or emails between board members automatically violate open meeting laws?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. To constitute a violation, there must be proof that a quorum was present and that board business was actually conducted.

Detailed Answer

While informal discussions or emails might technically constitute a meeting, the homeowner must provide sufficient evidence that a quorum of board members was involved and that they were conducting actual board business to prove a violation of the open meeting statute.

Alj Quote

The informal discussions and emails between board members may have constituted board meetings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, however, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence the number of board members meeting constituted a quorum which would thereby require notice to homeowners.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • open meetings
  • emails
  • board communication

Question

What evidence is required to prove the board held a 'secret' meeting?

Short Answer

The homeowner must provide sufficient evidence that a quorum met and that specific board business was conducted.

Detailed Answer

Allegations of closed-door meetings fail if the homeowner cannot prove that enough board members were present to form a quorum and that they engaged in board business during that time.

Alj Quote

Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence the number of board members meeting constituted a quorum which would thereby require notice to homeowners. Furthermore, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence board business was conducted during these putative board meetings.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • secret meetings
  • quorum

Question

Can a special assessment vote be based on recommendations from a committee meeting held months earlier?

Short Answer

Yes, if the committee meeting was valid, its recommendations can serve as the basis for a later vote.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the ALJ found that a special assessment vote in March 2023 was validly based on maintenance recommendations generated during an architectural committee meeting held the previous August.

Alj Quote

The special assessment which was voted on during the March 2, 2023, special meeting were maintenance recommendations from the architectural committee meeting on August 18, 2022.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • special assessments
  • committees
  • voting

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA hearing?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue, even if it doesn't remove all reasonable doubt.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5 (1960)

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Question

Which HOA meetings are required by law to be open to all members?

Short Answer

Meetings of the members, the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings must be open.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute explicitly requires that meetings of the members' association, the board of directors, and regularly scheduled committee meetings be open to all association members, notwithstanding contrary bylaws.

Alj Quote

Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • open meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • statutes

Case

Docket No
23F-H057-REL
Case Title
Wanda Swartling v Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa
Decision Date
2023-08-01
Alj Name
Brian Del Vecchio
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner alleging a violation against their HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a "preponderance of the evidence."

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the burden is on the homeowner to prove their case. The standard used is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner must show that their claim is more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Do informal discussions or emails between board members automatically violate open meeting laws?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. To constitute a violation, there must be proof that a quorum was present and that board business was actually conducted.

Detailed Answer

While informal discussions or emails might technically constitute a meeting, the homeowner must provide sufficient evidence that a quorum of board members was involved and that they were conducting actual board business to prove a violation of the open meeting statute.

Alj Quote

The informal discussions and emails between board members may have constituted board meetings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, however, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence the number of board members meeting constituted a quorum which would thereby require notice to homeowners.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • open meetings
  • emails
  • board communication

Question

What evidence is required to prove the board held a 'secret' meeting?

Short Answer

The homeowner must provide sufficient evidence that a quorum met and that specific board business was conducted.

Detailed Answer

Allegations of closed-door meetings fail if the homeowner cannot prove that enough board members were present to form a quorum and that they engaged in board business during that time.

Alj Quote

Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence the number of board members meeting constituted a quorum which would thereby require notice to homeowners. Furthermore, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence board business was conducted during these putative board meetings.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • secret meetings
  • quorum

Question

Can a special assessment vote be based on recommendations from a committee meeting held months earlier?

Short Answer

Yes, if the committee meeting was valid, its recommendations can serve as the basis for a later vote.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the ALJ found that a special assessment vote in March 2023 was validly based on maintenance recommendations generated during an architectural committee meeting held the previous August.

Alj Quote

The special assessment which was voted on during the March 2, 2023, special meeting were maintenance recommendations from the architectural committee meeting on August 18, 2022.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Topic Tags

  • special assessments
  • committees
  • voting

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA hearing?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue, even if it doesn't remove all reasonable doubt.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 5 (1960)

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Question

Which HOA meetings are required by law to be open to all members?

Short Answer

Meetings of the members, the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings must be open.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute explicitly requires that meetings of the members' association, the board of directors, and regularly scheduled committee meetings be open to all association members, notwithstanding contrary bylaws.

Alj Quote

Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • open meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • statutes

Case

Docket No
23F-H057-REL
Case Title
Wanda Swartling v Val Vista Park Townhome Association of Mesa
Decision Date
2023-08-01
Alj Name
Brian Del Vecchio
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wanda Swartling (petitioner)
    Val Vista Park Townhome Association
    Homeowner, VVP Unit 82

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Steve Cheff (property manager / witness)
    Heywood Community Management
    Also community manager
  • Patti Locks (board member)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Also listed as candidate/incumbent
  • Stephanie Hamrock (board member / witness)
    Val Vista Park HOA
  • Troy Goudeau (board member)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Elected director
  • Paul Wilcox (board member)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Elected director
  • Bettie Smiley (board member)
    Val Vista Park HOA
  • Carlee Collins (administrative assistant)
    Heywood Community Management
  • Alli (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Associate attorney

Neutral Parties

  • Brian Del Vecchio (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (ADRE Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • A. Hansen (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • V. Nunez (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
  • L. Abril (ADRE staff)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • Shelley Dusek (candidate)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Candidate for Board of Directors
  • Lori Solomon (candidate)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Candidate for Board of Directors
  • Tanya (committee attendee)
    Val Vista Park HOA
    Attended Building Architectural Committee meeting
  • David Clem Sr (homeowner)
    Val Vista Park Townhomes
    Email recipient

Jill P. Eden-Burns v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H015-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-05-18
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jill P. Eden-Burns Counsel
Respondent Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Daniel S. Francom

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), (C), (E); CC&R 4.32

Outcome Summary

The petition was granted because the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law) by holding an informal quorum discussion prior to a meeting, and violated CC&R 4.32 by improperly charging the homeowner $1750.00 for septic maintenance and repair costs that should have been covered by annual common assessments.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Open Meeting Laws and unequal application of CC&R 4.32 regarding septic system costs.

The Board violated open meeting laws by holding an informal quorum discussion about septic policy prior to a formal meeting. Additionally, the Association improperly charged Petitioner $1750.00 for septic maintenance and repair, violating CC&R 4.32, which mandates such costs be included as part of Assessments allocated equally among all Lots.

Orders: Petition granted. Respondent must reimburse the $1,000.00 filing fee and henceforth comply with A.R.S. § 33-33-1804 and CC&R 4.32.

Filing fee: $1,000.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)
  • CC&R 4.32

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meeting Law, HOA Governing Documents, Assessment Dispute, Septic System Maintenance, Informal Meeting
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)
  • CC&R 4.32
  • CC&R 8.1
  • CC&R 8.2
  • CC&R 11.2
  • CC&R 15.1

Video Overview

Audio Overview

https://open.spotify.com/episode/3kec7arsCl2MroOtIDp5eO

Decision Documents

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1015027.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:28 (52.0 KB)

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1017891.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:32 (53.2 KB)

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1024720.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:35 (59.5 KB)

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1033722.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:38 (47.5 KB)

23F-H015-REL Decision – 1057466.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:51:42 (168.6 KB)





Study Guide – 23F-H015-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H015-REL”, “case_title”: “Jill P. Eden-Burns v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association”, “decision_date”: “2023-05-18”, “alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can the HOA board meet informally (e.g., on Zoom) before an open meeting to discuss business without notifying homeowners?”, “short_answer”: “No. Any gathering of a quorum of the board to discuss association business, even informally, must be open to members.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law requires that whenever a quorum of the board meets to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to members. This applies even if the meeting is informal and no official votes or actions are taken during that time. Discussions about how to handle agenda items or agreeing on policies effectively constitute a meeting.”, “alj_quote”: “The plain language of the statute provides that when a quorum of a board of directors meets, even informally, to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to the members of the association, even if they do not vote or take any action during the informal meeting.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), (C), and (E)”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meeting law”, “board procedures”, “informal meetings” ] }, { “question”: “Does the board have to take a formal vote for a private discussion to be considered a violation of open meeting laws?”, “short_answer”: “No. Merely discussing business is sufficient to trigger open meeting requirements.”, “detailed_answer”: “It is a violation of open meeting laws for a quorum of the board to discuss association business in private, even if they do not take a formal vote or action. If the board members discuss a policy and agree on how to proceed (e.g., agreeing to ‘just nod our heads’ later), they are conducting business that must be done in the open.”, “alj_quote”: “The plain language of the statute provides that when a quorum of a board of directors meets, even informally, to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to the members of the association, even if they do not vote or take any action during the informal meeting.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meeting law”, “voting”, “quorum” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA charge me individually for maintenance on my lot if the CC&Rs say costs are part of ‘Assessments’?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. It depends on how ‘Assessments’ is defined in your CC&Rs.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the CC&Rs define ‘Assessments’ as charges levied against each membership equally (like annual dues), the HOA cannot interpret a provision saying costs are ‘part of the Assessments’ as authorization to bill a single owner individually. Unless there is a specific provision allowing individual charges (like for owner negligence), maintenance costs defined as ‘Assessments’ must generally be paid from the common funds.”, “alj_quote”: “Nothing in Article 8 provides a mechanism by which a single owner may be charged for fees associated with their lot. Rather, that type of charge is located in Section 11 of the CC&Rs, which is not referenced in the definition of ‘Assessments.'”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Interpretation”, “topic_tags”: [ “assessments”, “maintenance costs”, “CC&R interpretation” ] }, { “question”: “Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) filing the complaint has the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner must prove their case by a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means they must show that their claims are more probably true than not.”, “alj_quote”: “In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-33-1804(A), (C) and (E) and the CC&Rs.”, “legal_basis”: “Administrative Law Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the petitioner prevails in the hearing, the ALJ has the authority to order the Respondent (the HOA) to reimburse the filing fee paid to the Department of Real Estate.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,000.00 in certified funds.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.”, “topic_tags”: [ “filing fees”, “remedies”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “How are ambiguous terms in CC&Rs interpreted?”, “short_answer”: “Words are given their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning, and definitions within the document are prioritized.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting CC&Rs, the tribunal looks at the defined terms within the document. If a term like ‘Assessment’ is specifically defined as a general charge allocated equally, that definition controls over an interpretation that would allow individual billing, unless another section specifically authorizes it.”, “alj_quote”: “Unless defined by the legislature, words in statutes are given their ordinary meanings… Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence of a statute or rule must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”, “legal_basis”: “Principles of Statutory/Contract Construction”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “definitions” ] }, { “question”: “Does the HOA have to maintain systems on my lot if the CC&Rs state they ‘shall assume responsibility’?”, “short_answer”: “Yes. If the CC&Rs state the HOA assumes responsibility for monitoring, maintenance, and repair, they must perform and pay for it.”, “detailed_answer”: “When the governing documents explicitly state the Association ‘shall assume responsibility’ for maintenance, and the costs are to be included in the general Assessments, the HOA cannot shift that financial burden back to the individual owner improperly.”, “alj_quote”: “Accordingly, the terms of the CC&Rs requires that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the septic systems in the Association and that the maintenance is to be paid for from the annual assessments collected by Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law / CC&R Enforcement”, “topic_tags”: [ “HOA obligations”, “maintenance”, “repairs” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 23F-H015-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “23F-H015-REL”, “case_title”: “Jill P. Eden-Burns v. Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association”, “decision_date”: “2023-05-18”, “alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can the HOA board meet informally (e.g., on Zoom) before an open meeting to discuss business without notifying homeowners?”, “short_answer”: “No. Any gathering of a quorum of the board to discuss association business, even informally, must be open to members.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law requires that whenever a quorum of the board meets to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to members. This applies even if the meeting is informal and no official votes or actions are taken during that time. Discussions about how to handle agenda items or agreeing on policies effectively constitute a meeting.”, “alj_quote”: “The plain language of the statute provides that when a quorum of a board of directors meets, even informally, to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to the members of the association, even if they do not vote or take any action during the informal meeting.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), (C), and (E)”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meeting law”, “board procedures”, “informal meetings” ] }, { “question”: “Does the board have to take a formal vote for a private discussion to be considered a violation of open meeting laws?”, “short_answer”: “No. Merely discussing business is sufficient to trigger open meeting requirements.”, “detailed_answer”: “It is a violation of open meeting laws for a quorum of the board to discuss association business in private, even if they do not take a formal vote or action. If the board members discuss a policy and agree on how to proceed (e.g., agreeing to ‘just nod our heads’ later), they are conducting business that must be done in the open.”, “alj_quote”: “The plain language of the statute provides that when a quorum of a board of directors meets, even informally, to discuss association business, the meeting must be open to the members of the association, even if they do not vote or take any action during the informal meeting.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)”, “topic_tags”: [ “open meeting law”, “voting”, “quorum” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA charge me individually for maintenance on my lot if the CC&Rs say costs are part of ‘Assessments’?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily. It depends on how ‘Assessments’ is defined in your CC&Rs.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the CC&Rs define ‘Assessments’ as charges levied against each membership equally (like annual dues), the HOA cannot interpret a provision saying costs are ‘part of the Assessments’ as authorization to bill a single owner individually. Unless there is a specific provision allowing individual charges (like for owner negligence), maintenance costs defined as ‘Assessments’ must generally be paid from the common funds.”, “alj_quote”: “Nothing in Article 8 provides a mechanism by which a single owner may be charged for fees associated with their lot. Rather, that type of charge is located in Section 11 of the CC&Rs, which is not referenced in the definition of ‘Assessments.'”, “legal_basis”: “CC&R Interpretation”, “topic_tags”: [ “assessments”, “maintenance costs”, “CC&R interpretation” ] }, { “question”: “Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing against an HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) filing the complaint has the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner must prove their case by a ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means they must show that their claims are more probably true than not.”, “alj_quote”: “In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-33-1804(A), (C) and (E) and the CC&Rs.”, “legal_basis”: “Administrative Law Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “evidence” ] }, { “question”: “If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “If the petitioner prevails in the hearing, the ALJ has the authority to order the Respondent (the HOA) to reimburse the filing fee paid to the Department of Real Estate.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,000.00 in certified funds.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.”, “topic_tags”: [ “filing fees”, “remedies”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “How are ambiguous terms in CC&Rs interpreted?”, “short_answer”: “Words are given their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning, and definitions within the document are prioritized.”, “detailed_answer”: “When interpreting CC&Rs, the tribunal looks at the defined terms within the document. If a term like ‘Assessment’ is specifically defined as a general charge allocated equally, that definition controls over an interpretation that would allow individual billing, unless another section specifically authorizes it.”, “alj_quote”: “Unless defined by the legislature, words in statutes are given their ordinary meanings… Each word, phrase, clause, and sentence of a statute or rule must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”, “legal_basis”: “Principles of Statutory/Contract Construction”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal interpretation”, “CC&Rs”, “definitions” ] }, { “question”: “Does the HOA have to maintain systems on my lot if the CC&Rs state they ‘shall assume responsibility’?”, “short_answer”: “Yes. If the CC&Rs state the HOA assumes responsibility for monitoring, maintenance, and repair, they must perform and pay for it.”, “detailed_answer”: “When the governing documents explicitly state the Association ‘shall assume responsibility’ for maintenance, and the costs are to be included in the general Assessments, the HOA cannot shift that financial burden back to the individual owner improperly.”, “alj_quote”: “Accordingly, the terms of the CC&Rs requires that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the septic systems in the Association and that the maintenance is to be paid for from the annual assessments collected by Respondent.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law / CC&R Enforcement”, “topic_tags”: [ “HOA obligations”, “maintenance”, “repairs” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jill P. Eden-Burns (petitioner)
  • Kathryn Kendall (witness)
    Former Board Member; also referred to as Catherine Temple
  • John Krahn (witness)
    Former Board Member/Secretary; also referred to as John Cran
  • Michael Holland (witness)
    Former Board President

Respondent Side

  • Tonto Forest Estates Homeowners Association (respondent)
  • Daniel S. Francom (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Also referred to as Dan Frank
  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
  • Kurt Meister (board president)
    Witness for Respondent
  • Jeanne Ackerley (board member)
    Witness for Respondent; also referred to as Jean Aly
  • Kerry Chou (board member)
    Witness for Respondent; also referred to as Carrie Shu
  • Jeremy Sykes (board member)
    Secretary; also referred to as Jeremy Sikes
  • Steve Gauer (board member)
  • Charles Kiehl (witness)
    Lot owner; testified for Respondent
  • Melissa Jordan (property manager/witness)
    Aud
  • Len Meyer (former board member)

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Also referred to as Tammy Igener
  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • James Knupp (ADRE Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Acting Commissioner
  • Susan Nicolson (ADRE Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • c. serrano (OAH staff)
    OAH
    Transmitting Staff
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission

Other Participants

  • Rich Orcutt (property manager)
    Focus/Ogden
    Community Manager
  • Rebecca (property manager)
    Former HOA Manager (Focus)
  • Jason Buck (former board president)

Clifford (Norm) Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent

Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121051-REL-RHG Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:56 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL-RHG Decision – 935756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:01 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL-RHG Decision – ../21F-H2121051-REL/899423.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:05 (101.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.

Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes

Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.

Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.

Factual Background and Timeline

1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.

2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.

3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.

4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”

5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:

◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.

◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).

Procedural History

May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.

July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.

September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.

September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).

January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.

Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.

Petitioner’s Argument

ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion

1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.

2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.

Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.

3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.

Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.

4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.

Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.

5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”

Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.

6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.

Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.

Key Statutes and Legal Principles

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804 (Open Meetings Law):

◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”

◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”

◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):

◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”

◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.

◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”

Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):

◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

Conclusion and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.

The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”

The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.






Study Guide – 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?

2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?

3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?

4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?

5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?

6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?

7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?

9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?

10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.

2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.

3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.

5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.

6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.

7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.

8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.

10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.

2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?

3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.

4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Action without meeting

A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821

The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804

The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.

Clifford (Norm) Burnes

The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.

Unanimous Written Consent

The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.






Blog Post – 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG


Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It

1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality

For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.

But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”

The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.

This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.

Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict

Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.

In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.

This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence

Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).

The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.

Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.

5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency

While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.

This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:

1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.

2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford (Norm) Burnes (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Ms. Burnes (spouse of petitioner)
    Wife of Clifford (Norm) Burnes; raised issues with the Board

Respondent Side

  • John Crotty (HOA attorney)
    Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood
  • Esmerelda Sarina Martinez (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Board president and witness
  • Madill (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Referred to as 'Mr. Madill'
  • Jennifer Elias (HOA attorney)
    Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressee of original decision
  • Miranda Alvarez (clerk)
    Transmitted original decision and final rehearing decision (By Miranda Alvarez/Miranda A.)
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressee of documents relating to the rehearing
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Transmitted Order Concluding Matter

Other Participants

  • Jamie Argueta (researcher/staff)
    Conducted research regarding issues raised by Petitioner