Arleen D Jouxson v. The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222030-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-08-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Arleen D. Jouxson Counsel Ellen B. Davis
Respondent The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association Counsel Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1243(B); Bylaws Article 3 §3.1; Declaration Article 6 §6.2
Bylaws Article 3 §3.9

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition. Petitioner withdrew the issue regarding the lack of quorum. Regarding the remaining issue, the ALJ found that the Association did not violate governing documents or statutes by seating board members pursuant to a settlement agreement that certified the results of the 2021 election.

Why this result: Petitioner withdrew one issue and failed to meet the burden of proof on the other, as the ALJ found the settlement agreement valid and the evidence of election irregularities insufficient.

Key Issues & Findings

Board Appointment via Settlement Agreement

Petitioner alleged the Association violated state statutes and governing documents by seating two board members pursuant to a settlement agreement from a prior lawsuit, rather than through a membership election.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1243(B)
  • Bylaws Article 3 §3.1
  • Declaration Article 6 §6.2

Quorum at Special Board Meeting

Petitioner alleged it was impermissible for the Board to conduct and transact business at a Special Board Meeting on June 25, 2021, without the required quorum.

Orders: Issue withdrawn by Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Bylaws Article 3 §3.9

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 959436.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 964645.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 964646.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 964678.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 973808.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 975982.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 978159.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – 989914.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_ElectronicNotice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_HearingScheduled.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Motion_Dismiss.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Notice_Appearance_Resp..pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Notice_Hearing.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Notice_Petition.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Payment.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_PetRequest_RespondToRespondent’s Response.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Petition&Narrative.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Response&CompletedForm.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22030_Response_NoForm.pdf

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22F-H2222030-REL Decision – HO22-22030_Packet_Hearing3of3/HO22-22033_ Expedited Request for Waiver of Conflict to Represent The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association.pdf

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Arleen D. Jouxson (petitioner)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association (Member)
    Unit owner of Unit 1369
  • Ellen B. Davis (petitioner attorney)
    Henze Cook Murphy, PLLC
  • Conrad Kampp (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing
  • Diane Potter (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing
  • Carol Lehan (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing
  • Barbara Kampp (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing
  • Dave Barren (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; appeared remotely
  • Lisa Le (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner
  • Carrie Y (witness)
    Listed as witness by Petitioner; present at hearing

Respondent Side

  • The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association (respondent)
    Entity
  • Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
  • Eloise Figueroa (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Board President; called as witness by Petitioner; Plaintiff in underlying Superior Court case
  • Linda Bahr (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Seated on board via settlement agreement
  • Tony Basuini (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Former Board President; signed settlement agreement
  • Joseph Orr (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Former board member
  • Tony Cancilla (board member)
    The Villages at Aviano Condominium Association
    Former board member
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (witness)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Attorney for Eloise Figueroa in Superior Court case; testified at OAH hearing
  • Natasha DeCoto (property manager)
    PMG Services
    Current community manager
  • Michael Sgro (property manager)
    Brown Community Management
    Former community manager
  • Marshall Chess (property manager)
    Brown Community Management
    Former community manager
  • Tim Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood
    Represented HOA in settlement negotiations
  • Curtis Ekmark (HOA attorney)
    Ekmark & Ekmark
    General Counsel for HOA at time of 2021 election

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Pamela Gates (judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court
    Presided over CV2021-006916
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Dan Gardner (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    HOA Coordinator

Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121040-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-03-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Marc Archer Counsel
Respondent PMPE Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nicholas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1817(B)(3)

Outcome Summary

The Association unreasonably withheld approval for Marc Archer's two-story garage addition, thereby violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3). The Association was ordered to grant preliminary approval for the design and refund the $500 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable withholding of architectural approval

The Association unreasonably withheld preliminary approval for the Petitioner's January 2020 two-story garage addition request. The ALJ determined that none of the three reasons provided by the Association for the denial were reasonable.

Orders: The Association must grant preliminary approval for the proposed design and must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • AR Section 1.1
  • AR Section 4.4
  • AR Section 4.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA architectural approval, unreasonable denial, two-story garage addition, filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • AR Section 1.1
  • AR Section 4.4
  • AR Section 4.2

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 928659.pdf

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21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 943581.pdf

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21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 953334.pdf

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21F-H2121040-REL Decision – 958716.pdf

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Study Guide – 21F-H2121040-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2121040-REL”, “case_title”: “Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.”, “decision_date”: “2022-03-30”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA unreasonably refuse to approve my architectural plans?”, “short_answer”: “No, state law prohibits the unreasonable withholding of approval for construction projects.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law explicitly states that an HOA cannot unreasonably withhold approval for architectural designs, plans, or amendments. If an HOA denies a request, the denial must be based on reasonable grounds supported by the community documents.”, “alj_quote”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1817(B)(3) provides that “Approval of a construction project’s architectural designs, plans and amendments shall not unreasonably be withheld.””, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “architectural review”, “homeowner rights”, “statutory compliance” ] }, { “question”: “Is the HOA required to give me a written reason if they deny my project?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, failing to provide a written reason for denial can be considered a violation of the statute.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this dispute, a prior decision established that the HOA violated the law by failing to provide the homeowner with a written explanation for denying preliminary approval. The homeowner must be informed of the specific basis for the decision.”, “alj_quote”: “In a Decision dated December 3, 2020, the ALJ in that matter determined that the Association had violated its CC&Rs and section 33-1817(B)(3) because it did not provide Mr. Archer with a written reason for denying preliminary approval.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “procedural requirements”, “due process”, “denial notices” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my request based on a rule that isn’t written down?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no. If the architectural rules do not explicitly prohibit a specific material or method, the HOA may be acting outside its authority to deny it.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that the HOA acted outside its authority by denying a request to paint roof tiles because the architectural rules (ARs) did not explicitly prohibit painting tiles, whereas other sections of the rules explicitly prohibited other specific materials (like vinyl siding).”, “alj_quote”: “Regarding the second basis for denial, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Association acted outside its scope of authority because the ARs do not include a prohibition on painting tiles.”, “legal_basis”: “Scope of Authority”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement authority”, “architectural rules”, “unwritten rules” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove the case if I file a petition against my HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the homeowner alleging the violation is responsible for providing evidence that supports their claim by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Archer bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred. The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “hearing procedures” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my project because they think it doesn’t ‘harmonize’ with the neighborhood?”, “short_answer”: “Only if they can prove it will ‘dominate or sharply contrast’ with the community.”, “detailed_answer”: “While rules often require harmony, this is interpreted to mean the project should not dominate or contrast sharply. If the evidence shows the project shares features (like roof pitch) with other homes, a denial based on lack of harmony may be unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “AR section 1.1 shows that improvements are to harmonize with the community, “rather than to dominate and/or contrast sharply with it.” … There was no substantial evidence adduced showing that Mr. Archer’s proposed addition will dominate or sharply contrast with the community.”, “legal_basis”: “Community Documents (AR Section 1.1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “aesthetics”, “harmony”, “architectural standards” ] }, { “question”: “Can I get my filing fee back if I win against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA can be ordered to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “State law allows the prevailing party in an HOA dispute to recover the filing fee. In this case, because the ALJ ordered the HOA to approve the design, the HOA was also ordered to pay the petitioner’s $500 fee.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association also must pay to Mr. Archer his $500 filing fee. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A).”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “penalties”, “reimbursement”, “filing fees” ] }, { “question”: “Does hiring an architect to review my plans help my case?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, professional opinions stating your plans comply with the rules can be strong evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner presented an affidavit from a registered architect who reviewed the plans and rules, concluding the design was compliant. This evidence helped refute the HOA’s claims that the design lacked architectural elements.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Bragg concluded that the proposal was in compliance with the ARs. He noted that the proposed second floor matched the existing architecture and that the “lowered roof height is stepped below the existing second floor roof line….””, “legal_basis”: “Evidence Weight”, “topic_tags”: [ “expert testimony”, “evidence”, “architectural review” ] }, { “question”: “What if the HOA’s denial letter is confusing or lists reasons as just ‘advisory’?”, “short_answer”: “The judge will look at the actual reasons for denial, even if the HOA categorizes them poorly.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the HOA listed some reasons for denial under a section labeled ‘advisory.’ The ALJ noted this was confusing but still analyzed whether those reasons were valid grounds for denial. The confusion did not prevent the judge from ruling the denial was unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association’s reasons for denial are arguably not clear because it included two of its three reasons in a portion of the denial notice that was advisory only. Nevertheless, Mr. Archer presented sufficient evidence to show that none of the three reasons is reasonable.”, “legal_basis”: “Reasonableness Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “denial notices”, “administrative review”, “confusion” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 21F-H2121040-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “21F-H2121040-REL”, “case_title”: “Marc Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.”, “decision_date”: “2022-03-30”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA unreasonably refuse to approve my architectural plans?”, “short_answer”: “No, state law prohibits the unreasonable withholding of approval for construction projects.”, “detailed_answer”: “Arizona law explicitly states that an HOA cannot unreasonably withhold approval for architectural designs, plans, or amendments. If an HOA denies a request, the denial must be based on reasonable grounds supported by the community documents.”, “alj_quote”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1817(B)(3) provides that “Approval of a construction project’s architectural designs, plans and amendments shall not unreasonably be withheld.””, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “architectural review”, “homeowner rights”, “statutory compliance” ] }, { “question”: “Is the HOA required to give me a written reason if they deny my project?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, failing to provide a written reason for denial can be considered a violation of the statute.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this dispute, a prior decision established that the HOA violated the law by failing to provide the homeowner with a written explanation for denying preliminary approval. The homeowner must be informed of the specific basis for the decision.”, “alj_quote”: “In a Decision dated December 3, 2020, the ALJ in that matter determined that the Association had violated its CC&Rs and section 33-1817(B)(3) because it did not provide Mr. Archer with a written reason for denying preliminary approval.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(3)”, “topic_tags”: [ “procedural requirements”, “due process”, “denial notices” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my request based on a rule that isn’t written down?”, “short_answer”: “Generally no. If the architectural rules do not explicitly prohibit a specific material or method, the HOA may be acting outside its authority to deny it.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ found that the HOA acted outside its authority by denying a request to paint roof tiles because the architectural rules (ARs) did not explicitly prohibit painting tiles, whereas other sections of the rules explicitly prohibited other specific materials (like vinyl siding).”, “alj_quote”: “Regarding the second basis for denial, the preponderance of the evidence shows that the Association acted outside its scope of authority because the ARs do not include a prohibition on painting tiles.”, “legal_basis”: “Scope of Authority”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement authority”, “architectural rules”, “unwritten rules” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove the case if I file a petition against my HOA?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the homeowner alleging the violation is responsible for providing evidence that supports their claim by a preponderance of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Archer bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred. The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “A.A.C. R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal standards”, “hearing procedures” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA deny my project because they think it doesn’t ‘harmonize’ with the neighborhood?”, “short_answer”: “Only if they can prove it will ‘dominate or sharply contrast’ with the community.”, “detailed_answer”: “While rules often require harmony, this is interpreted to mean the project should not dominate or contrast sharply. If the evidence shows the project shares features (like roof pitch) with other homes, a denial based on lack of harmony may be unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “AR section 1.1 shows that improvements are to harmonize with the community, “rather than to dominate and/or contrast sharply with it.” … There was no substantial evidence adduced showing that Mr. Archer’s proposed addition will dominate or sharply contrast with the community.”, “legal_basis”: “Community Documents (AR Section 1.1)”, “topic_tags”: [ “aesthetics”, “harmony”, “architectural standards” ] }, { “question”: “Can I get my filing fee back if I win against the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA can be ordered to reimburse the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “State law allows the prevailing party in an HOA dispute to recover the filing fee. In this case, because the ALJ ordered the HOA to approve the design, the HOA was also ordered to pay the petitioner’s $500 fee.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association also must pay to Mr. Archer his $500 filing fee. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A).”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)”, “topic_tags”: [ “penalties”, “reimbursement”, “filing fees” ] }, { “question”: “Does hiring an architect to review my plans help my case?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, professional opinions stating your plans comply with the rules can be strong evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The homeowner presented an affidavit from a registered architect who reviewed the plans and rules, concluding the design was compliant. This evidence helped refute the HOA’s claims that the design lacked architectural elements.”, “alj_quote”: “Mr. Bragg concluded that the proposal was in compliance with the ARs. He noted that the proposed second floor matched the existing architecture and that the “lowered roof height is stepped below the existing second floor roof line….””, “legal_basis”: “Evidence Weight”, “topic_tags”: [ “expert testimony”, “evidence”, “architectural review” ] }, { “question”: “What if the HOA’s denial letter is confusing or lists reasons as just ‘advisory’?”, “short_answer”: “The judge will look at the actual reasons for denial, even if the HOA categorizes them poorly.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the HOA listed some reasons for denial under a section labeled ‘advisory.’ The ALJ noted this was confusing but still analyzed whether those reasons were valid grounds for denial. The confusion did not prevent the judge from ruling the denial was unreasonable.”, “alj_quote”: “The Association’s reasons for denial are arguably not clear because it included two of its three reasons in a portion of the denial notice that was advisory only. Nevertheless, Mr. Archer presented sufficient evidence to show that none of the three reasons is reasonable.”, “legal_basis”: “Reasonableness Standard”, “topic_tags”: [ “denial notices”, “administrative review”, “confusion” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Marc Archer (petitioner)
  • Greg Hancock (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner, works in building industry
  • Dr. Victor Zach (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner, lives across the street from Petitioner
  • Dan Earlie (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner, experienced in homebuilding and HOA boards
  • Thomas Bragg (architect/witness)
    Registered architect hired by Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C. S. Nogami (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP
  • Keith Kauffman (board member/witness)
    PMPE Community Association, Inc.
    President and long-time board member of the Association
  • Gail Zigler (property manager/witness)
    Community manager for the Association
  • Mr. Sasser (committee member/neighbor)
    Mentioned as an opponent to the addition
  • Carlotta L. Turman (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Tammy L. Ikenberg (ALJ/Hearing Officer)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    ALJ in prior related proceedings (19F-H1919063-REL, 20F-H2020063-REL)
  • Claire Miller (Preserve Park Supervisor)
    City Parks and Recreation

Other Participants

  • AHansen (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • vnunez (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • tandert (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Miranda Alvarez (unknown)
    Clerical staff noted on transmission records (also Miranda A)
  • c. serrano (unknown)
    Clerical staff noted on transmission records
  • Dr. Smith (unknown)
    House used for a meeting location

Clifford (Norm) Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent

Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121051-REL-RHG Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:56 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL-RHG Decision – 935756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:01 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL-RHG Decision – ../21F-H2121051-REL/899423.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:05 (101.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.

Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes

Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.

Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.

Factual Background and Timeline

1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.

2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.

3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.

4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”

5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:

◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.

◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).

Procedural History

May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.

July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.

September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.

September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).

January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.

Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.

Petitioner’s Argument

ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion

1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.

2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.

Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.

3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.

Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.

4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.

Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.

5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”

Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.

6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.

Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.

Key Statutes and Legal Principles

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804 (Open Meetings Law):

◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”

◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”

◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):

◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”

◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.

◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”

Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):

◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

Conclusion and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.

The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”

The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.






Study Guide – 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?

2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?

3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?

4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?

5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?

6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?

7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?

9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?

10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.

2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.

3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.

5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.

6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.

7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.

8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.

10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.

2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?

3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.

4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Action without meeting

A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821

The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804

The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.

Clifford (Norm) Burnes

The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.

Unanimous Written Consent

The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.






Blog Post – 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG


Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It

1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality

For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.

But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”

The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.

This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.

Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict

Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.

In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.

This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence

Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).

The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.

Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.

5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency

While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.

This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:

1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.

2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford (Norm) Burnes (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Ms. Burnes (spouse of petitioner)
    Wife of Clifford (Norm) Burnes; raised issues with the Board

Respondent Side

  • John Crotty (HOA attorney)
    Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood
  • Esmerelda Sarina Martinez (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Board president and witness
  • Madill (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Referred to as 'Mr. Madill'
  • Jennifer Elias (HOA attorney)
    Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressee of original decision
  • Miranda Alvarez (clerk)
    Transmitted original decision and final rehearing decision (By Miranda Alvarez/Miranda A.)
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressee of documents relating to the rehearing
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Transmitted Order Concluding Matter

Other Participants

  • Jamie Argueta (researcher/staff)
    Conducted research regarding issues raised by Petitioner

James Iannuzo v. Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-12-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James Iannuzo Counsel
Respondent Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association Counsel Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243(H)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner prevailed by showing the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243. The Association was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. Petitioner's requests for voiding election results, assessing a civil penalty, and appointing an administrator were denied.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of statutory procedure for board member removal concerning ballot tabulation after deadline.

The Association violated the statute by tabulating ballots for a recall election at the August 19, 2021 meeting, as those ballots were only valid for the canceled June 30, 2021 special meeting.

Orders: Respondent must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order. Other requested remedies (voiding results, assessing civil penalty, appointing administrator) were denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250(C)(3)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA board recall, Ballot tabulation, Quorum dispute, Statutory violation, Filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Homeowners Ass'n
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221014-REL Decision – 935534.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:41:19 (128.9 KB)

22F-H2221014-REL Decision – 945764.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:41:24 (48.2 KB)

22F-H2221014-REL Decision – 949683.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:41:26 (49.4 KB)

Questions

Question

What is the deadline for an HOA to hold a special meeting after receiving a petition to recall board members?

Short Answer

The meeting must be held within 30 days of receiving the petition.

Detailed Answer

According to Arizona statute, once an HOA receives a petition for the removal of a board member, it is legally required to call, notice, and actually hold the special meeting within a 30-day timeframe.

Alj Quote

The special meeting shall be called, noticed and held within thirty days after receipt of the petition.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)

Topic Tags

  • recall election
  • deadlines
  • board removal

Question

Can an HOA count ballots collected for a specific meeting date at a later, rescheduled meeting?

Short Answer

No, ballots are only valid for the specific meeting they were issued for.

Detailed Answer

An HOA cannot use ballots collected for a canceled meeting at a subsequent meeting held on a different date. The decision clarified that counting such ballots violates the statute because the ballots are strictly limited to the meeting for which they were originally valid.

Alj Quote

The Association’s decision to count the ballots at the August 19th meeting does not comply with section 33-1243 because those ballots were valid only for the June 30th meeting as evidenced by the ballots, the Notice, and the voting instructions.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250(C)(3)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • ballots
  • meetings

Question

Can an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) void an HOA election or remove board members?

Short Answer

No, the ALJ does not have the authority to void election results or appoint administrators.

Detailed Answer

While an ALJ can determine if a violation occurred and levy penalties, they cannot order an election to be voided or appoint an independent administrator to oversee the HOA. These remedies are outside the tribunal's statutory scope.

Alj Quote

Mr. Iannuzo’s requests that the tribunal void the election results and that an oversight administrator be appointed have not been shown to be within the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal remedies
  • ALJ authority
  • elections

Question

Is an HOA allowed to determine a quorum based solely on mail-in ballots before the meeting starts?

Short Answer

Likely no; the quorum should be determined based on eligible voters present at the time of the meeting.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the statute calls for a quorum to be determined based on the number of eligible voters at the time of the meeting, implying that canceling a meeting beforehand based solely on returned ballots is not supported by persuasive legal argument.

Alj Quote

The Association presented no persuasive legal argument or authority showing that in determining whether a quorum existed it was appropriate for the Association to use only the ballots returned by June 29th, rather than using the ballots and the members present at the meeting on June 30th.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(d)

Topic Tags

  • quorum
  • meetings
  • voting

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my filing fee refunded?

Short Answer

Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA must be ordered to pay the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge determines that the homeowner has prevailed in proving a violation, the law mandates that the Judge order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.

Alj Quote

If the petitioner prevails, the administrative law judge shall order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • reimbursement

Question

Can an HOA fix a violation for missing the 30-day recall meeting deadline by holding the meeting later?

Short Answer

No, this specific violation cannot be cured after the fact.

Detailed Answer

Once the 30-day window for holding a recall meeting has passed, the violation is established and cannot be retroactively fixed by holding the meeting late.

Alj Quote

And although the Association did not conduct the required meeting within 30 days of receiving the recall petitions, this violation cannot be cured.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • compliance
  • deadlines

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221014-REL
Case Title
James Iannuzo vs. Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association
Decision Date
2021-12-30
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

What is the deadline for an HOA to hold a special meeting after receiving a petition to recall board members?

Short Answer

The meeting must be held within 30 days of receiving the petition.

Detailed Answer

According to Arizona statute, once an HOA receives a petition for the removal of a board member, it is legally required to call, notice, and actually hold the special meeting within a 30-day timeframe.

Alj Quote

The special meeting shall be called, noticed and held within thirty days after receipt of the petition.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)

Topic Tags

  • recall election
  • deadlines
  • board removal

Question

Can an HOA count ballots collected for a specific meeting date at a later, rescheduled meeting?

Short Answer

No, ballots are only valid for the specific meeting they were issued for.

Detailed Answer

An HOA cannot use ballots collected for a canceled meeting at a subsequent meeting held on a different date. The decision clarified that counting such ballots violates the statute because the ballots are strictly limited to the meeting for which they were originally valid.

Alj Quote

The Association’s decision to count the ballots at the August 19th meeting does not comply with section 33-1243 because those ballots were valid only for the June 30th meeting as evidenced by the ballots, the Notice, and the voting instructions.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250(C)(3)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • ballots
  • meetings

Question

Can an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) void an HOA election or remove board members?

Short Answer

No, the ALJ does not have the authority to void election results or appoint administrators.

Detailed Answer

While an ALJ can determine if a violation occurred and levy penalties, they cannot order an election to be voided or appoint an independent administrator to oversee the HOA. These remedies are outside the tribunal's statutory scope.

Alj Quote

Mr. Iannuzo’s requests that the tribunal void the election results and that an oversight administrator be appointed have not been shown to be within the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal remedies
  • ALJ authority
  • elections

Question

Is an HOA allowed to determine a quorum based solely on mail-in ballots before the meeting starts?

Short Answer

Likely no; the quorum should be determined based on eligible voters present at the time of the meeting.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the statute calls for a quorum to be determined based on the number of eligible voters at the time of the meeting, implying that canceling a meeting beforehand based solely on returned ballots is not supported by persuasive legal argument.

Alj Quote

The Association presented no persuasive legal argument or authority showing that in determining whether a quorum existed it was appropriate for the Association to use only the ballots returned by June 29th, rather than using the ballots and the members present at the meeting on June 30th.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(d)

Topic Tags

  • quorum
  • meetings
  • voting

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my filing fee refunded?

Short Answer

Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA must be ordered to pay the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge determines that the homeowner has prevailed in proving a violation, the law mandates that the Judge order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.

Alj Quote

If the petitioner prevails, the administrative law judge shall order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • reimbursement

Question

Can an HOA fix a violation for missing the 30-day recall meeting deadline by holding the meeting later?

Short Answer

No, this specific violation cannot be cured after the fact.

Detailed Answer

Once the 30-day window for holding a recall meeting has passed, the violation is established and cannot be retroactively fixed by holding the meeting late.

Alj Quote

And although the Association did not conduct the required meeting within 30 days of receiving the recall petitions, this violation cannot be cured.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • compliance
  • deadlines

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221014-REL
Case Title
James Iannuzo vs. Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association
Decision Date
2021-12-30
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • James Iannuzo (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    Smith & Wamsley, PLLC
    Counsel for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Miranda Alvarez (clerk)
    Transmitted Decision
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Transmitted Advisements
  • AHansen (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)
  • djones (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)
  • DGardner (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)
  • vnunez (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)

Susan L Jarzabek v. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-11-19
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susan L Jarzabek Counsel
Respondent Hillcrest Improvement Association #2 Counsel Haidyn DiLorenzo, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 1, Section 10; Enforcement, Fines and Appeals Policy ("Policy")

Outcome Summary

Petitioner's complaint regarding the wrongful assessment of attorney's fees was dismissed because she failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the HOA violated its Policy regarding pre-attorney notification requirements.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof; the ALJ found the Policy does not require the two notices prior to attorney escalation, as Petitioner had alleged.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Policy concerning attorney's fees assessment and required pre-litigation notices.

Petitioner alleged the Association wrongfully assessed attorney's fees, arguing the Policy required providing the owner two warning notices and a certified letter before escalating a matter to attorney involvement.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: attorney fees, HOA policy enforcement, notice requirements, CC&Rs, due process
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221008-REL Decision – 926455.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:40:13 (93.9 KB)





Study Guide – 22F-H2221008-REL


{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”,
“case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek, Petitioner, vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2, Respondent”,
“decision_date”: “November 19, 2021”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“individuals”: [
{
“name”: “Susan L Jarzabek”,
“role”: “petitioner, witness”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Haidyn DiLorenzo”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Counsel for Respondent”
},
{
“name”: “Thomas Shedden”,
“role”: “ALJ”,
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“affiliation”: null,
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},
{
“name”: “Robert Cody”,
“role”: “board president, witness”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “John Jarzabek”,
“role”: “spouse”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Petitioner’s husband, named on certified letter sent by Association”
},
{
“name”: “Louis Dettorre”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission”
},
{
“name”: “AHansen”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “djones”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “DGardner”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “vnunez”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “Beth Mulcahy”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Mulcahy Law Firm, PC”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission; firm engaged by Association”
},
{
“name”: “Miranda Alvarez”,
“role”: “OAH staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: null,
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}
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}

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”, “case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”, “decision_date”: “2021-11-19”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA send a violation directly to their attorney without sending me warning letters first?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the community’s enforcement policy allows for immediate escalation to legal counsel.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the ALJ ruled that the HOA did not violate its policy by involving a lawyer without prior notices, because the policy contained a provision stating that the standard notice procedure ceases to apply once a matter is escalated to an attorney.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy also provides in pertinent part that the Association may escalate a matter to its attorney for further action, if a matter is escalated to the attorney, the notice-procedure will no longer apply”, “legal_basis”: “HOA Enforcement Policy / Contract Law”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement process”, “attorney referral”, “notice requirements” ] }, { “question”: “If the HOA sends my violation to a lawyer, do I have to pay the attorney’s fees?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, generally, if the CC&Rs and enforcement policy state that the owner is responsible for enforcement costs.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision notes that the governing documents (CC&Rs) specifically allow the Association to recover enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees, from the owner. Additionally, the specific policy noted that upon escalation, the owner becomes responsible for these costs.”, “alj_quote”: “CC&R Art. VIII, Section 1, Enforcement, provides that the Association may recover from an owner its enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 1”, “topic_tags”: [ “attorney fees”, “fines and penalties”, “collection costs” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove that the HOA did something wrong in a hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (petitioner) filing the complaint bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “When a homeowner petitions the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation by the HOA, it is up to the homeowner to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the violation occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Jarzabek bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “hearing standards” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA’s enforcement policy legally considered a binding contract?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the policy is treated as part of the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge affirmed that community policies are part of the contractual agreement between the parties, meaning both the homeowner and the HOA are legally required to follow the terms written in that policy.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy is part of contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law; Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association”, “topic_tags”: [ “contract law”, “governing documents”, “policy enforcement” ] }, { “question”: “Can the Administrative Law Judge cancel the specific debt or fees I owe the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily; the tribunal’s jurisdiction may be limited to determining if a violation of documents occurred, not the validity of the debt itself.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ explicitly noted in a footnote that while they can determine if the HOA violated its policy, they did not have the jurisdiction to decide if the specific attorney’s fees charged constituted a valid debt.”, “alj_quote”: “it is not within this tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney’s fees levied against Ms. Jarzabek are a valid debt, and the tribunal offers no opinion on that issue.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “debt validity”, “tribunal limitations” ] }, { “question”: “What standard of evidence is used to make a decision in an HOA dispute?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means the evidence must show it is more likely than not that the claim is true. It is described as the greater weight of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “evidence”, “administrative hearing” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 22F-H2221008-REL


{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”,
“case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek, Petitioner, vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2, Respondent”,
“decision_date”: “November 19, 2021”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“individuals”: [
{
“name”: “Susan L Jarzabek”,
“role”: “petitioner, witness”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Haidyn DiLorenzo”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Counsel for Respondent”
},
{
“name”: “Thomas Shedden”,
“role”: “ALJ”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Robert Cody”,
“role”: “board president, witness”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “John Jarzabek”,
“role”: “spouse”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Petitioner’s husband, named on certified letter sent by Association”
},
{
“name”: “Louis Dettorre”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission”
},
{
“name”: “AHansen”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “djones”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “DGardner”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “vnunez”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission (via email)”
},
{
“name”: “Beth Mulcahy”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “Mulcahy Law Firm, PC”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmission; firm engaged by Association”
},
{
“name”: “Miranda Alvarez”,
“role”: “OAH staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitter of Decision”
}
]
}

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”, “case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”, “decision_date”: “2021-11-19”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA send a violation directly to their attorney without sending me warning letters first?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the community’s enforcement policy allows for immediate escalation to legal counsel.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the ALJ ruled that the HOA did not violate its policy by involving a lawyer without prior notices, because the policy contained a provision stating that the standard notice procedure ceases to apply once a matter is escalated to an attorney.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy also provides in pertinent part that the Association may escalate a matter to its attorney for further action, if a matter is escalated to the attorney, the notice-procedure will no longer apply”, “legal_basis”: “HOA Enforcement Policy / Contract Law”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement process”, “attorney referral”, “notice requirements” ] }, { “question”: “If the HOA sends my violation to a lawyer, do I have to pay the attorney’s fees?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, generally, if the CC&Rs and enforcement policy state that the owner is responsible for enforcement costs.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision notes that the governing documents (CC&Rs) specifically allow the Association to recover enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees, from the owner. Additionally, the specific policy noted that upon escalation, the owner becomes responsible for these costs.”, “alj_quote”: “CC&R Art. VIII, Section 1, Enforcement, provides that the Association may recover from an owner its enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 1”, “topic_tags”: [ “attorney fees”, “fines and penalties”, “collection costs” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove that the HOA did something wrong in a hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (petitioner) filing the complaint bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “When a homeowner petitions the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation by the HOA, it is up to the homeowner to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the violation occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Jarzabek bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “hearing standards” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA’s enforcement policy legally considered a binding contract?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the policy is treated as part of the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge affirmed that community policies are part of the contractual agreement between the parties, meaning both the homeowner and the HOA are legally required to follow the terms written in that policy.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy is part of contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law; Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association”, “topic_tags”: [ “contract law”, “governing documents”, “policy enforcement” ] }, { “question”: “Can the Administrative Law Judge cancel the specific debt or fees I owe the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily; the tribunal’s jurisdiction may be limited to determining if a violation of documents occurred, not the validity of the debt itself.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ explicitly noted in a footnote that while they can determine if the HOA violated its policy, they did not have the jurisdiction to decide if the specific attorney’s fees charged constituted a valid debt.”, “alj_quote”: “it is not within this tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney’s fees levied against Ms. Jarzabek are a valid debt, and the tribunal offers no opinion on that issue.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “debt validity”, “tribunal limitations” ] }, { “question”: “What standard of evidence is used to make a decision in an HOA dispute?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means the evidence must show it is more likely than not that the claim is true. It is described as the greater weight of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “evidence”, “administrative hearing” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susan L Jarzabek (petitioner, witness)

Respondent Side

  • Haidyn DiLorenzo (HOA attorney)
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Robert Cody (board president, witness)
    Hillcrest Improvement Association #2
  • Beth Mulcahy (HOA attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Recipient of transmission; firm engaged by Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • Miranda Alvarez (OAH staff)
    Transmitter of Decision

Other Participants

  • John Jarzabek (spouse)
    Petitioner's husband, named on certified letter sent by Association

Richard J. Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-11-15
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Richard J Jones Counsel
Respondent Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association Counsel Troy Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Design Guidelines; CC&Rs Section 4.1.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner Richard J. Jones failed to meet his burden of proof to show the Association violated its Design Guidelines or engaged in selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the Guidelines or engaged in selective enforcement. Evidence indicated that the Petitioner was in violation of the existing Guidelines by failing to obtain prior approval for his driveway extension and failing to meet the required setback.

Key Issues & Findings

Petitioner alleged the Association violated Design Guidelines regarding setback requirements for driveway extensions and engaged in selective enforcement.

Petitioner filed a single issue petition asserting that Design Guidelines did not require a twelve-inch setback for driveway extensions from the property line and that the Association was selectively enforcing its rules. The Petitioner had installed a concrete driveway extension without obtaining prior ARC approval, and approval was denied due to the lack of the twelve-inch setback.

Orders: Richard J. Jones’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 173, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Driveway Extension, Architectural Review Committee, Setback Requirements, Design Guidelines, Selective Enforcement, HOA Violation
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 173, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924982.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:52 (100.9 KB)

21F-H2121038-REL Decision – 924983.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:57 (94.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121038-REL


Briefing Document: Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge in the case of Richard J. Jones versus the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association (Case No. 21F-H2121038-REL). The dispute centered on a concrete driveway extension installed by Mr. Jones without the prior approval of the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC). Mr. Jones contested the Association’s denial of his post-installation application, alleging that the Design Guidelines were misinterpreted and selectively enforced.

The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed Mr. Jones’s petition. The decision rested on three key determinations:

1. Clear Violation: Mr. Jones was in direct violation of the Design Guidelines by failing to obtain prior approval for the modification and by not adhering to a mandatory 12-inch setback from the common block wall, a fact he acknowledged.

2. Reasonable Interpretation: The Association’s interpretation that the 12-inch setback requirement applied to the entire property line—not just the block wall—was deemed “not unreasonable,” particularly since the common wall is part of the property line.

3. Failure to Prove Selective Enforcement: Mr. Jones did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to prove his claim of selective enforcement. The Association provided credible evidence demonstrating consistent application of the setback rule to other homeowners.

The final order upholds the Association’s enforcement actions and dismisses the petitioner’s claims.

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdictional Details

Name / Entity

Representation

Petitioner

Richard J. Jones

On his own behalf

Respondent

Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

Troy Stratman, Esq.

Adjudicator

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge

Case No.

21F-H2121038-REL

Hearing Date

November 2, 2021

Decision Date

November 15, 2021

Core Dispute

The central conflict arose from a concrete driveway extension installed by Richard J. Jones on his property on May 11, 2020. The installation was performed without submitting a request for prior approval to the Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC), a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. Following the installation, the ARC denied Mr. Jones’s retroactive application, citing its failure to meet a required 12-inch setback from the property line. This led to a notice of non-compliance and a fine, prompting Mr. Jones to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Chronology of Events

April 2020: Mr. Jones contacted AAM, LLC, the Association’s property management company, to inquire about adding concrete strips. He was informed this was not allowed but that an employee could assist with an approval process for a paver driveway extension.

May 11, 2020: Having not received further guidance from the management company, Mr. Jones proceeded to have the concrete driveway extension installed.

Post-May 11, 2020: Mr. Jones submitted an application to the ARC for retroactive approval of the already-installed extension.

December 2, 2020: The ARC formally denied Mr. Jones’s application. The denial letter stated the extension did not meet the 12-inch setback requirement and advised him to reapply after cutting the driveway back from the property line.

January 12, 2021: The Association issued a Second Notice of Non-compliance/Fine.

February 12, 2021: Mr. Jones filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association was misinterpreting and selectively enforcing its Design Guidelines.

November 2, 2021: The administrative hearing was conducted.

November 15, 2021: The Administrative Law Judge issued a decision dismissing Mr. Jones’s petition.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Richard J. Jones)

Mr. Jones’s case was built on two primary arguments:

Interpretation of Design Guidelines: He contended that the Guidelines in effect at the time of installation required a 12-inch setback from the “common wall” but were silent regarding the “property line.” He argued that since the Guidelines explicitly mandated a property line setback for sidewalks, the absence of such language for driveway extensions meant the requirement did not apply.

Allegation of Selective Enforcement: He asserted that the Association was applying its Guidelines and Rules inconsistently among homeowners.

During testimony, Mr. Jones acknowledged that his driveway extension did not comply with the 12-inch setback from the common wall and expressed a willingness to correct that specific deficiency. He also testified that his neighbors did not object to the extension as installed.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association)

The Association, represented by counsel, presented a multi-faceted defense:

Procedural Failure: A core issue was Mr. Jones’s failure to obtain prior approval from the ARC before installation, as mandated by Section 4.1.1 of the CC&Rs.

Violation of Setback Rule: The Association maintained that the extension violated the required 12-inch setback. The property manager, Paul Favale, testified that this rule is intended to ensure water does not drain onto a neighbor’s property.

Evidence of Consistent Enforcement: To counter the claim of selective enforcement, the Association submitted an “Architectural Status Report” for the period of August 27, 2020, through April 21, 2021. This report demonstrated that other homeowners’ requests for driveway extensions had also been denied for failing to meet the 12-inch property line setback.

It was also noted that the Design Guidelines have since been modified to explicitly require a 12-inch setback from both the common wall and the property line.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Judge’s decision was based on a thorough analysis of the evidence presented and the applicable legal standards.

Key Findings of Fact

• Mr. Jones installed the driveway extension on May 11, 2020, without prior approval from the ARC.

• The extension does not have a 12-inch setback from the common block wall, which is part of the property line.

• The Design Guidelines at the time explicitly required a 12-inch setback from the block wall.

• Mr. Jones acknowledged his non-compliance with the block wall setback requirement.

Conclusions of Law

The Judge concluded that Mr. Jones failed to meet his burden of proof, which required demonstrating a violation by the Association by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

1. Petitioner’s Violation: Mr. Jones was found to be in violation of the Guidelines. His acknowledgment that the driveway did not comply with the 12-inch setback from the common wall was a critical factor.

2. Reasonableness of Association’s Interpretation: The Judge determined that the Association’s interpretation of the Guidelines—requiring a 12-inch setback along the entire property line—was “not unreasonable.” This conclusion was supported by two points: the common wall is physically part of the property line, and Mr. Jones had failed to follow the required prior approval process, where such ambiguities would have been clarified.

3. No Evidence of Selective Enforcement: The Association presented “credible evidence” via its Architectural Status Report showing that other members were subject to the same rule. Consequently, Mr. Jones “did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was selectively enforcing the Guidelines.”

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Judge ordered that Richard J. Jones’s petition be dismissed.

Legal Standing: The decision is binding on both parties.

Appeal Process: The order can only be challenged through a request for rehearing, which must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (November 15, 2021).






Study Guide – 21F-H2121038-REL


Study Guide: Jones v. Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 21F-H2121038-REL, involving Petitioner Richard J. Jones and Respondent Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final judgment.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their roles?

2. What specific modification did Richard J. Jones make to his property, and on what date did he complete it?

3. What critical step did Mr. Jones fail to take before installing the modification, as required by Section 4.1.1 of the CC&Rs?

4. According to the Design Guidelines in effect at the time of installation, what was the specific rule regarding the placement of driveway extensions that Mr. Jones’s project violated?

5. What was Mr. Jones’s main argument regarding the ambiguity of the Design Guidelines concerning the twelve-inch setback requirement?

6. What justification did the Association’s property manager, Paul Favale, provide for the setback requirement?

7. What were the two primary claims Mr. Jones made against the Association in his petition filed on February 12, 2021?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party carried the burden of meeting that standard?

9. How did the Association counter Mr. Jones’s claim that it was selectively enforcing its rules?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Richard J. Jones, a homeowner who appeared on his own behalf, and the Respondent, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association, which was represented by its counsel, Troy Stratman, Esq.

2. On May 11, 2020, Mr. Jones added a concrete driveway running from the street to a side gate on his property. This modification is referred to in the documents as a “driveway extension.”

3. Mr. Jones did not submit a request for prior approval to the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) before installing his driveway extension. This pre-approval is required for such modifications under the Association’s CC&Rs.

4. The driveway extension violated the rule requiring a twelve-inch setback from the common block wall. Mr. Jones acknowledged that his driveway did not comply with this specific requirement of the Design Guidelines.

5. Mr. Jones argued that since the Design Guidelines explicitly required a twelve-inch setback from the property line for sidewalks but did not explicitly state the same for driveway extensions, the requirement did not apply to his project along the full property line.

6. Mr. Favale testified that the purpose of the setback requirement is functional. It is designed to help ensure that water does not drain from one property onto a neighboring property.

7. Mr. Jones’s petition asserted that the Design Guidelines for driveway extensions did not require a setback from the property line (only the common wall). He also claimed that the Association was selectively enforcing its Guidelines and Rules against him.

8. The standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence. The Petitioner, Mr. Jones, bore the burden of proof to show that the Association had violated its own guidelines.

9. The Association submitted an Architectural Status Report covering August 27, 2020, to April 21, 2021. This report provided credible evidence that other Association members had also been denied requests for driveway extensions due to a failure to meet the twelve-inch setback requirement.

10. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, ordered that Richard J. Jones’s petition be dismissed. The judge concluded that Mr. Jones had not met his burden of proof to show the Association had violated its guidelines or enforced them selectively.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” and the “preponderance of the evidence” standard as they were applied in this case. Explain specifically how Mr. Jones failed to meet this burden for both of his primary claims.

2. Analyze the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to determine that the Association’s interpretation of its Design Guidelines was “not unreasonable.” Consider the judge’s reference to the common wall being part of the property line and Mr. Jones’s failure to obtain prior approval.

3. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Jones’s initial inquiry to AAM, LLC in April 2020 to the final order in November 2021. Discuss how Mr. Jones’s decision to proceed with construction without explicit approval ultimately weakened his legal position.

4. Evaluate the claim of “selective enforcement.” What kind of evidence would Mr. Jones have needed to present to successfully prove this claim, and why was the Association’s Architectural Status Report considered more compelling evidence by the court?

5. The “Conclusions of Law” section states that the Design Guidelines are part of a contract between the parties. Using the facts of this case, explain the legal and practical implications of this principle for a homeowner living within a master association.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

AAM, LLC

The property management company for the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judge who presides over administrative hearings and renders decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

The committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for reviewing and granting prior approval for modifications to properties, such as driveway extensions.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on the petitioner, Mr. Jones.

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community or homeowners’ association.

Design Guidelines

A set of rules that are part of the contract between homeowners and the association, detailing requirements for property modifications.

Driveway Extension

As defined by the parties, a concrete driveway running from the street to a gate at the side of a house.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Richard J. Jones.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as evidence that has “the most convincing force” and is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association.

Selective Enforcement

The legal claim that an association is not applying its rules and guidelines uniformly, instead penalizing some members while allowing others to violate the same rules.

Setback

A required distance that a structure must be located away from a property line or other feature, such as a common wall. In this case, the requirement was for a twelve-inch setback.






Blog Post – 21F-H2121038-REL


He Fought the HOA Over 12 Inches of Concrete—and Lost. Here Are 4 Surprising Lessons from His Case.

Navigating the rules of a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like walking through a minefield of regulations, where a small misstep can lead to notices, fines, and protracted disputes. For one homeowner, Richard J. Jones, a conflict with his HOA, the Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association, over a new driveway extension escalated all the way to a formal hearing. The official legal decision in his case reveals several counter-intuitive truths about how these disputes are won and lost, offering valuable lessons for any homeowner living under HOA governance.

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1. “Asking for Forgiveness” is a Losing Strategy.

The first major takeaway is that violating rules first and hoping for retroactive approval is an approach doomed to fail, even when the situation feels complex. The story here is more nuanced than simple defiance. In April 2020, before any work began, Mr. Jones contacted the HOA’s management company about his plans. After being told his initial idea for “two concrete strips” was not allowed, he was directed to another employee for help with an application for a different design. According to the case file, Mr. Jones “did not hear back from her and he had the driveway extension installed” on May 11, 2020.

While his frustration is relatable, this impatient miscalculation was his crucial error. Section 4.1.1 of the community’s CC&Rs requires prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). By proceeding without securing this written approval, Mr. Jones was in immediate violation. His subsequent application, submitted only after the work was done, was predictably denied on December 2, 2020. The lesson is stark: a breakdown in communication does not absolve a homeowner of their responsibility to follow procedure. The moment unapproved work begins, you are in breach of the community’s governing documents, and the merits of the project become secondary to the procedural failure.

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2. You Have to Prove the HOA is Wrong—Not the Other Way Around.

Many homeowners assume that in a dispute, the burden is on the HOA to prove the homeowner is wrong. The legal reality is the exact opposite. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision formally stated in Conclusion of Law #2 that Mr. Jones, as the petitioner who brought the case, bore the “burden of proof.”

To win, he had to demonstrate that the Association committed a violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision cites the formal definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, which essentially means the evidence presented must be convincing enough to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other. The reality for homeowners is surprising and crucial: in a formal dispute, the legal scales are not neutral. You must actively build a case and convincingly prove the HOA has violated its own rules. Mr. Jones failed to meet this standard.

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3. A Small Loophole Isn’t Enough to Win.

Mr. Jones’s central argument rested on a perceived loophole in the governing documents. He claimed the Design Guidelines required a 12-inch setback from the “common wall” but were silent about the “property line” as a whole, and therefore the rule didn’t apply to the entirety of his project. This highlights a key aspect of HOA governance: the purpose behind a rule matters. The property manager testified that the setback requirement exists to “ensure that water does not drain to the neighbor’s property,” transforming the rule from an arbitrary measurement into a practical and defensible standard.

Ultimately, the judge was unpersuaded by the loophole argument, and the reason is a masterclass in how these cases are decided. The judge’s decision, articulated in Conclusion of Law #7, pointed out that the common wall is fundamentally part of the property line. More importantly, the decision explicitly connected this conclusion to Mr. Jones’s prior actions: “…considering that Mr. Jones did not obtain prior approval from ARC before constructing his driveway extension, the Association’s interpretation…is not unreasonable.” This is the crucial insight: his procedural failure (Lesson #1) directly weakened his ability to argue about ambiguous wording. An HOA’s reasonable interpretation of its own rules is far more likely to be upheld when the homeowner has already disregarded clear procedural mandates. Tellingly, the Association later modified the guidelines to explicitly close this perceived loophole.

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4. Proving “Selective Enforcement” is Harder Than You Think.

A common defense from homeowners is that the HOA is engaging in “selective enforcement”—singling them out while letting others get away with similar violations. Mr. Jones made this exact claim, but the Association came prepared with meticulous documentation to defeat it.

As detailed in Finding of Fact #21, the HOA presented an “Architectural Status Report” covering August 27, 2020 through April 21, 2021. This document provided time-stamped evidence that other homeowners’ requests for similar driveway extensions had also been consistently denied for failing to meet the same 12-inch setback requirement. This report systematically dismantled the selective enforcement argument. For homeowners, this underscores a critical point: the feeling of being singled out is not evidence. To win a selective enforcement claim, you must provide clear proof that other members in the exact same situation were treated differently, a high bar that an HOA with good records can easily overcome.

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Conclusion: A Contract is a Contract

The overarching theme from this case is that HOA governing documents are not merely suggestions; they are legally binding. As stated in Conclusion of Law #5, the Design Guidelines are part of a contract between the homeowner and the association. While HOA rules can often feel arbitrary or frustrating, they carry the weight of a contract. The path to successfully challenging them is narrow and requires a clear, well-documented case that proves the HOA, not the homeowner, has breached its duties.

This case serves as a powerful reminder for all community members. How well do you really know the contract you’re living under?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Richard J Jones (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Paul Favale (property manager)
    Desert Oasis of Surprise Master Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Angela Pate (property manager employee)
    AAM, LLC
    Contacted by Petitioner regarding installation inquiry

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision (email alias listed)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision (email alias listed)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision (email alias listed)
  • Miranda Alvarez (Staff)
    Transmitted decision

Ronald Borruso v. Sunland Village East Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121062-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-09-21
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Ronald Borruso Counsel
Respondent Sunland Village East Association Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq. and Nikolas Eicher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Ronald Borruso, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) regarding the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 concerning meeting procedures and unauthorized board actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof to show that the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 occurred.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations regarding member speaking rights at May 27, 2021 meeting and unauthorized board meetings concerning Operations Manager job qualifications

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by restricting member speaking rights during deliberations at a special meeting on May 27, 2021, and by holding improperly noticed meetings to approve job qualifications for an Operations Manager.

Orders: Ronald Borruso’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Statute Violation, Burden of Proof, Dismissal, Filing Fee
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121062-REL Decision – 912276.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:53 (114.4 KB)

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Ronald Borruso (petitioner)
  • Thomas Huston (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Nikolas Eicher (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Mark Thurn (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Current Board President, testified for Respondent
  • Marvin Fretwell (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Joyce Haynie (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Former President, subject of recall petition
  • Kim Shallue (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Presided over May 27th meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission

Clifford (Norm) Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent

Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:06:54 (101.7 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:15 (46.9 KB)

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:15 (124.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121051-REL


Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.

Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes

Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.

Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.

Factual Background and Timeline

1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.

2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.

3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.

4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”

5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:

◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.

◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).

Procedural History

May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.

July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.

September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.

September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).

January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.

Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.

Petitioner’s Argument

ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion

1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.

2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.

Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.

3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.

Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.

4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.

Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.

5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”

Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.

6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.

Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.

Key Statutes and Legal Principles

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804 (Open Meetings Law):

◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”

◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”

◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):

◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”

◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.

◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”

Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):

◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

Conclusion and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.

The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”

The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.






Study Guide – 21F-H2121051-REL


Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?

2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?

3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?

4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?

5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?

6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?

7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?

9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?

10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.

2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.

3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.

5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.

6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.

7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.

8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.

10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.

2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?

3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.

4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Action without meeting

A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821

The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804

The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.

Clifford (Norm) Burnes

The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.

Unanimous Written Consent

The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.






Blog Post – 21F-H2121051-REL


Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It

1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality

For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.

But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”

The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.

This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.

Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict

Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.

In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.

This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence

Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).

The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.

Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.

5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency

While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.

This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:

1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.

2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford (Norm) Burnes (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf at the original hearing

Respondent Side

  • John Crotty (HOA attorney)
    Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood
    Attorney for Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Esmerelda Sarina Martinez (board president, witness)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as a witness for Respondent
  • Madill (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Referred to as Mr. Madill

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during original decision transmittal
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during rehearing transmittal
  • Miranda Alvarez (staff)
    Transmittal staff (also noted as Miranda A.)
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmittal staff

Other Participants

  • Jamie Argueta (staff)
    Conducted research; position and function apparently not in the record

Keith D Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120003-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-06-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keith D Smith Counsel
Respondent Sierra Foothills Condominium Association Counsel Stuart Rayburn

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 7.1(C)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) or ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. The rule limiting sign use was deemed reasonable.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on both issues.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged unreasonable discrimination in adopting rules regarding common elements (monument sign)

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&R 7.1(C) by adopting a rule limiting the use of the common element monument sign to only owners in Building B, arguing this was unreasonable discrimination against Building A owners.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • CC&R section 6.26(a)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217

Alleged open meeting law violation at the June 10, 2020 Board meeting

Petitioner alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by communicating via email and reaching a decision prior to the June 10, 2020 meeting, claiming the President called for a vote without discussion.

Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.

Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Condominium, Commercial HOA, Signage rules, Open meeting law, Discrimination
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
  • CC&R section 7.1(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120003-REL-RHG Decision – 885949.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:33 (143.3 KB)

21F-H2120003-REL-RHG Decision – ../21F-H2120003-REL/837073.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:35 (103.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120003-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing summarizes the administrative legal proceedings between Keith D. Smith (Petitioner) and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association (Respondent) regarding Case No. 21F-H2120003-REL and its subsequent rehearing. The dispute centered on two primary allegations: that the Association’s Board of Directors established an unreasonable and discriminatory rule regarding a common-element monument sign, and that the Board violated Arizona’s open meeting laws during the adoption of said rule.

Following an initial hearing on October 26, 2020, and a subsequent rehearing considered on June 3, 2021, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the petition in its entirety. The rulings established that the Association acted within its authority under the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) to create rules for common elements, provided those rules are reasonable. The ALJ found that limiting sign usage to specific buildings was a reasonable exercise of power based on the physical layout of the property. Furthermore, the Petitioner failed to provide substantial evidence to support claims of illegal pre-meeting communications by the Board.

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Core Dispute: Monument Sign Usage

The central conflict involved a monument sign located on the common elements of a commercial condominium consisting of two buildings, Building A and Building B.

The Challenged Rule

On June 10, 2020, the Association Board adopted a policy limiting the use of the monument sign exclusively to Unit owners in Building B. The monument sign contains only five advertising spaces.

Association Justification

The Association argued that the rule was necessary due to the physical limitations of the property:

Space Scarcity: The sign has a finite capacity (five spaces) that cannot accommodate all owners.

Building Frontage: Building A has direct street frontage, allowing its owners to hang signs directly on the building wall.

Lack of Frontage: Building B does not have street frontage, significantly limiting the utility and visibility of any signs hung on its walls.

Zoning Restrictions: Under the City of Phoenix Sign Code, businesses cannot post signs on buildings they do not occupy. Therefore, Building B owners are prohibited from hanging signs on Building A, making the monument sign their only viable external advertising option.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Mr. Smith, a Unit owner in Building A, challenged the rule based on the following:

Common Interest: He asserted that his deed grants him an undivided interest in common elements, meaning no owner should have exclusive use of the sign.

Disparate Treatment: He argued the rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a), which prohibits treating owners differently regarding occupancy and use restrictions.

Alternative Solutions: Mr. Smith proposed altering the sign to increase capacity or reducing existing sign sizes by half (which he offered to fund).

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Legal Analysis of CC&R Provisions

The ALJ’s decision hinged on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s governing documents.

CC&R Section 7.1(C): Board Authority

This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal Rules and Regulations to restrict and govern the use of any area.

Condition: Rules must not “unreasonably discriminate” and must be consistent with the Declaration and the Act.

Ruling: The ALJ concluded that discriminating among owners is permitted under 7.1(c) as long as it is not unreasonable. Given the lack of street frontage for Building B, the restriction was deemed a reasonable management of limited resources.

CC&R Section 6.26(a): Use Restrictions

The Petitioner argued that this section required all limitations to be applicable to all occupants equally.

Scope Limitation: The ALJ found that section 6.26(a) explicitly applies only to “occupancy and use restrictions contained in this Article 6.”

Ruling: Because the sign rule was promulgated under Article 7, the restrictive language of Article 6.26(a) did not apply.

Common Element Status and Partition

During the proceedings, the Association initially argued the sign was not a common element but later waived this argument. The Petitioner argued that common elements cannot be partitioned under A.R.S. § 33-1217. However, the ALJ found no evidence that the monument sign had been “partitioned” in a legal sense, merely that its use was regulated.

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Open Meeting Law Allegations

Mr. Smith alleged that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1248 regarding the conduct of the June 10, 2020, meeting.

Claims of Pre-Meeting Deliberation

The Petitioner asserted that Board members had “obviously” communicated via email and reached a decision before the meeting. His evidence for this was:

• The Board President called for a vote immediately without initiating discussion.

• The Board members appeared to have their minds made up.

Evidence and Testimony

The ALJ rejected these claims based on the following:

Lack of Proof: The Petitioner admitted he had no emails or physical evidence to support the claim of private deliberation.

Conflicting Testimony: Association witnesses provided “credible testimony” that a protracted discussion took place, lasting approximately 90 minutes. Mr. Smith himself spoke for 20 minutes during this period.

New Evidence Barred: During the rehearing, Mr. Smith claimed to possess an email supporting his position. The ALJ refused to consider it, citing Arizona Administrative Code § R2-19-115, which requires all evidence to be presented at the original hearing.

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Procedural Findings and Rehearing

The rehearing (Case No. 21F-H2120003-REL-RHG) addressed the Petitioner’s claims of administrative error and “arbitrary” findings.

ALJ Determination

Number of Issues

The hearing was limited to two issues because the Petitioner only paid the fee for a two-issue hearing. Claims of other meeting deficiencies were excluded.

Sufficiency of Evidence

The ALJ found that the original decision was supported by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence as required by A.R.S. § 41-1092.07.

Reasonableness of Rule

The ALJ reaffirmed that the unequal access to the monument sign was not “unreasonable discrimination” given the objective differences in building locations.

Sign Modification

The Association argued that modifying the sign would require rescinding previous approvals granted to other businesses, a position the ALJ did not find unreasonable.

Final Conclusion

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition in both the original hearing and the rehearing. The final order, dated June 3, 2021, is binding. The Association’s rule limiting monument sign access to Building B was upheld as a reasonable exercise of Board authority, and the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of Arizona’s open meeting laws.






Study Guide – 21F-H2120003-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Keith D. Smith vs. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association

This study guide examines the administrative proceedings and legal conclusions regarding the dispute between Keith D. Smith and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. The guide covers the original hearing (October 26, 2020) and the subsequent rehearing (March 21, 2021), focusing on the interpretation of CC&Rs, open meeting laws, and the standards of evidence in administrative hearings.

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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided source context.

1. What were the two primary issues the Petitioner was permitted to raise during the hearings?

2. Why did the Association Board decide to limit the use of the monument sign specifically to owners of units in Building B?

3. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding his “undivided interest” in the common elements of the condominium?

4. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) interpret the scope of CC&R section 6.26(a)?

5. What specific evidence did the Petitioner provide to support his allegation that Board members had communicated via email prior to the June 10, 2020, meeting?

6. How did the testimony of Stuart Rayburn and Harold Bordelon contradict the Petitioner’s claim regarding the lack of discussion at the June 10 meeting?

7. What were the two physical alterations to the monument sign suggested by the Petitioner to allow for more advertising space?

8. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider certain City of Phoenix zoning ordinance arguments and new email evidence during the rehearing?

9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” what is the definition of a “preponderance of the evidence”?

10. What is the final recourse for a party wishing to appeal the order issued following the rehearing?

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Part II: Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was limited to whether the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) regarding the Board’s authority to make rules for the monument sign and whether the Association violated open meeting laws under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. These limitations were enforced because the Petitioner only paid the required fees for a two-issue hearing.

2. The Board limited the sign to Building B because the monument sign has space for only five businesses, and unlike Building A, Building B does not have street frontage for advertising. Building A owners have the option to hang signs on their own building walls, a utility not available to Building B owners under city ordinances.

3. The Petitioner argued that his deed grants him an undivided interest in the common elements, which he interpreted to mean that no owner should have exclusive use of the monument sign. He contended that the Association’s common elements cannot be partitioned and that all owners should have access to the advertising space.

4. The ALJ ruled that section 6.26(a), which prohibits disparate treatment of owners, is expressly limited to the occupancy and use restrictions contained within Article 6. Because the rule in question was adopted under the authority of Article 7, the non-discrimination requirements of 6.26(a) did not apply.

5. The Petitioner admitted during the hearing that he had no emails or physical evidence to support his allegation of prior communication among Board members. He relied on the reasoning that because the President called for a vote immediately, they must have “obviously” reached a decision beforehand.

6. The Association’s witnesses provided credible testimony that a protracted discussion took place before the vote, lasting approximately 90 minutes. They noted that the Petitioner himself spoke for twenty minutes and that research on city ordinances and governing documents was presented before the board took action.

7. The Petitioner proposed either reducing the size of existing signs by one-half to create more slots—which he offered to pay for—or increasing the overall size of the monument sign. The Association resisted these plans, arguing they would require rescinding prior approvals and might not meet city codes.

8. The ALJ excluded this information because administrative findings must be based exclusively on evidence and issues raised in the original petition. New evidence or legal theories (such as ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217) not presented at the original hearing cannot be introduced during a rehearing.

9. A “preponderance of the evidence” is defined as the greater weight of the evidence that possesses the most convincing force. It is evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind toward one side of an issue rather than the other, even if it does not eliminate all reasonable doubt.

10. The order following a rehearing is binding; however, a party may seek judicial review as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6. This appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

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Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the provided documents to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts.

1. The Balance of Equity in Association Governance: Discuss how the Board justified a rule that seemingly treats Building A and Building B owners differently. In your answer, evaluate the ALJ’s conclusion that this “discrimination” was not unreasonable given the physical layout of the property.

2. Statutory Interpretation of CC&Rs: Analyze the conflict between reading the CC&Rs as a “continuous document” versus the ALJ’s strict adherence to the express terms of specific sections (Article 6 vs. Article 7). How does the wording “subject to the provisions of this Declaration” in section 7.1(c) impact this interpretation?

3. Procedural Rigidity in Administrative Hearings: Explain the impact of the Petitioner’s decision to only pay for two issues. How did this choice limit his ability to introduce alternative legal arguments, such as the non-partition of common elements or additional open meeting law violations?

4. The Role of Testimony vs. Allegation: Compare the Petitioner’s reliance on “rhetorical questions” and “obvious” conclusions with the Respondent’s use of witness testimony. How does this case demonstrate the burden of proof required to establish a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248?

5. Impact of Local Ordinances on Private Governance: Assess how the City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance (Section 705) and Sign Code influenced the Board’s policy and the ALJ’s final decision. Why was the distinction between “contiguous” signage and “flexible” placement critical to the reasonableness of the Association’s rule?

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues decisions on disputes involving state agency regulations or statutes.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248

The Arizona state statute governing open meeting laws for condominiums, requiring transparency in Board deliberations.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules and operations of a common interest development.

Common Elements

Portions of a condominium project other than the individual units, managed by the Association and intended for common use.

Monument Sign

A ground-level sign, typically located near a property entrance, used to identify the businesses or residents within a complex.

Partition

The act of dividing a property into separate parts or to sever the unity of possession; in this context, the Petitioner argued common elements cannot be partitioned.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The legal standard of proof in civil and administrative cases, meaning the evidence on one side is more convincing than the other.

Rehearing

A second consideration of a case, usually based on specific grounds such as an irregularity in the original proceeding or an error of law.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association.

Substantial Evidence

Evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; a requirement for the validity of an ALJ decision.

Undivided Interest

The legal right of each owner to use the whole of the common property, rather than a specific, physically divided portion.






Blog Post – 21F-H2120003-REL-RHG


The Monument Sign Mystery: 4 Surprising Lessons in HOA Power and “Reasonable” Fairness

1. Introduction: The Paradox of Undivided Interest

In the world of commercial real estate, few phrases carry as much weight—or cause as much confusion—as “undivided interest.” When Keith D. Smith purchased a unit in the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, his deed granted him an interest in the common elements. To many owners, this implies a fundamental right to equal use of every square inch of the property, including high-visibility signage.

However, a recent dispute between Mr. Smith and his Association highlights a complex legal paradox: an owner can have an undivided interest in a common element while being legally barred from using it. The conflict arose when the Board restricted a five-space monument sign to a specific subset of owners, sparking a claim of “unreasonable discrimination.”

Does fairness require a Board to grant every owner a “slice of the pie,” or can they prioritize certain owners for the functional benefit of the whole? The ruling in this case provides a masterclass in how administrative courts define “reasonableness” and “fairness” within a shared property.

2. Takeaway 1: When Equality Isn’t “Reasonable”

At first glance, the Association’s rule seemed blatantly unfair. The Board enacted a policy that limited the use of the monument sign exclusively to owners in Building B, completely barring Building A owners like Mr. Smith.

However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) looked beyond the surface-level exclusion to the “functional reality” of the property. Building A enjoys direct street frontage, allowing its owners to hang signs directly on their building. Building B, situated behind Building A, has no such visibility.

The “legal knot” that sealed the decision was a City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance. While Building A owners had their own signage options, the ordinance prohibited Building B owners from hanging signs on Building A—the only building visible from the street. Because Building B owners were effectively invisible without the monument sign, the Board’s “discrimination” was deemed a logical, functional necessity rather than an arbitrary act.

CC&R section 7.1(c) grants the Board broad authority to manage common areas:

The Board … subject to the provisions of this Declaration, may adopt, amend and repeal Rules and Regulations. The Rules and Regulations may … restrict and govern the use of any area by any Owner or Occupant…; provided however that the Rules and Regulations shall not unreasonably discriminate among Owners and Occupants.

Because the rule addressed a specific geographical disadvantage, the court found the Board’s decision was reasonable and consistent with its governing authority.

3. Takeaway 2: The “Fine Print” Trap of Article Silos

Mr. Smith argued that the sign rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a), which requires that use restrictions be “applicable to all Occupants.” It is a compelling argument for any property owner: if the rules say everyone must be treated the same, how can the Board pick favorites?

The legal reality, however, comes down to the structural logic of the CC&Rs—what we might call “Article Silos.” The ALJ pointed out that the “equality clause” Mr. Smith cited was explicitly limited to the confines of Article 6 (Occupancy and Use). The Board, however, enacted the sign rule under the powers granted in Article 7 (Association Powers).

In legal interpretation, the specific placement of a rule dictates its reach. The decision emphasized this “smoking gun” phrasing:

…although CC&R section 6.26 does prohibit disparate treatment of Owners, by its express terms, CC&R section 6.26 applies only to CC&R Article 6, and not Article 7.

This serves as a critical warning for property professionals: a protection in one article of a governing document does not necessarily limit the powers granted in another.

4. Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof and the “Pre-Meeting” Myth

Property owners often suspect that by the time a public meeting begins, the “real” decision has already been made in secret. Mr. Smith alleged that the Board violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1248) by reaching a consensus via email before the official vote on June 10, 2020.

His evidence was purely circumstantial; he posed a rhetorical question asking how the Board could call for a vote so quickly if they hadn’t already decided. The court, however, requires “substantial evidence” to overturn a Board action.

Testimony revealed that the meeting was far from a “rubber stamp” event. It involved a “protracted” discussion lasting an hour and a half, during which Mr. Smith himself was allowed to speak for 20 minutes. The ALJ applied the standard of the “Preponderance of the Evidence,” which favors the side with the most convincing weight of facts:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

5. Takeaway 4: The “Pay-to-Play” Reality of Administrative Hearings

The final lesson is a procedural one that every petitioner must understand: administrative law is a “one-shot” game governed by fees and strict paperwork.

When Mr. Smith filed his petition with the Department of Real Estate, he paid the fee for a two-issue hearing. Consequently, when he attempted to raise a new legal argument during his rehearing—citing A.R.S. § 33-1217 regarding the partition of common elements—the court flatly rejected it. Because the issue wasn’t in the original petition and he hadn’t paid for it to be heard, it simply didn’t exist in the eyes of the court.

The same “closed-door” policy applied to new evidence. During the rehearing, Mr. Smith claimed he finally had an email to prove the Board’s secret communications. The court refused to look at it, noting that because it wasn’t presented at the original hearing, it could not be considered later. In these proceedings, you must bring every issue and every piece of evidence to the table at the very beginning; there are no “add-ons” in the middle of the process.

6. Conclusion: A New Perspective on Common Ground

The dismissal of all claims against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association clarifies that “common elements” are not always equally shared in practice. Instead, they are managed for the functional benefit of the whole community. In this instance, providing visibility to the “hidden” units in Building B was a reasonable use of limited space, even if it meant Building A owners had to rely on their own street frontage.

This case leaves property owners with a challenging question: If your “undivided interest” doesn’t guarantee you a spot on the sign, what exactly are you entitled to? The answer is rarely found in the spirit of “fairness,” but rather in the specific, siloed mechanics of your Association’s CC&Rs.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Keith D Smith (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Sierra Foothills Condominium Association (respondent)
  • Stuart Rayburn (president)
    Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
    Appeared for Respondent
  • Harold Bordelon (witness)
    Testified for the Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • LDettorre (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Donald S Fern & Judith A. Hedges vs.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Donald S Fern & Judith A. Hedges Counsel Lance Leslie
Respondent San Ignacio Heights, Inc. Counsel Michael S. Shupe

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article VI(D)

Outcome Summary

Petitioners were the prevailing party because the Respondent acknowledged violating the CC&Rs by approving the pergola. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee, but the request for a civil penalty was denied.

Key Issues & Findings

View Obstruction by Pergola Approval

Petitioners alleged that Respondent, by granting approval in February 2018 for the construction of a pergola on lot 47, violated the CC&Rs requirement that an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains be maintained for owners of View Lots (Lot 46) and sought a civil penalty.

Orders: Respondent acknowledged the violation, rescinded the pergola approval prior to the Notice of Hearing, and was ordered to pay Petitioners the $500.00 filing fee. A civil penalty was sought but denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&R Violation, View Obstruction, Architectural Review Committee, Filing Fee Refund, Civil Penalty Denial
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120005-REL Decision – 838563.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:50 (90.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120005-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (No. 21F-H2120005-REL). The central conflict involved an allegation by Petitioners that the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving a pergola on an adjacent property that obstructed their mountain view.

The Respondent initially defended its approval but, after the Petitioners filed a formal complaint, reversed its position, admitted the approval was an error, and rescinded it. Despite this corrective action, the hearing proceeded. The ALJ’s final decision declared the Petitioners the “prevailing party,” as their legal action prompted the resolution. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioners’ $500 filing fee. However, the ALJ denied the Petitioners’ request for an additional civil penalty, stating they had not met the burden of proof for such an assessment. The decision effectively resolved the core dispute in the Petitioners’ favor while limiting the financial penalty on the Respondent.

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Case Overview

This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute over view obstruction within a planned community.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges, Petitioner, vs. San Ignacio Heights, Inc., Respondent.

Case Number

21F-H2120005-REL

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date

November 3, 2020

Decision Date

November 20, 2020

Core Allegation

Respondent violated its own CC&Rs, specifically Article VI (D) “View Obstructions,” which mandates that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”

Petitioners’ Property

Lot 46, located at 1546 West Acala Street in Green Valley, a designated “view lot.”

Disputed Structure

A pergola constructed on the neighboring Lot 47.

The hearing was conducted without testimony, with the decision based on the administrative record and closing arguments from both parties.

Chronology of Key Events

The dispute unfolded over a period of more than two years, marked by the Respondent’s significant change in position after formal legal action was initiated.

February 2018: The Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) grants approval to the owners of Lot 47 to construct a pergola.

On or Before July 30, 2018: Petitioners purchase Lot 46. They contend the pergola was built after the previous owners of their lot had moved but before their purchase was finalized.

December 2019: Petitioners attempt to resolve the issue directly with the owners of Lot 47 but are unsuccessful.

January 15, 2020: In a letter, the Respondent’s Board informs the Petitioners that it is standing by its February 2018 decision to approve the pergola.

July 24, 2020: Petitioners file a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

August 20, 2020: The Respondent’s Board holds a special executive session and determines that the approval of the pergola was “made in error.” The Board rescinds the approval.

August 25, 2020: The Respondent files its answer to the petition, stating the approval has been rescinded and requesting the Department dismiss the matter.

October 5, 2020: The Department does not dismiss the matter and issues a Notice of Hearing.

November 3, 2020: At the hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informs the tribunal that a contractor is scheduled to remove the pergola on the following day.

Central Arguments and Positions

Petitioners (Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges)

Violation: The pergola on Lot 47 constitutes a view obstruction in direct violation of CC&R Article VI(D).

Relief Sought: The Petitioners initially sought the removal of the structure. After the Respondent rescinded its approval, the Petitioners argued that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty for the violation.

Respondent (San Ignacio Heights, Inc.)

Initial Defense (Pre-Litigation): The Respondent offered two primary reasons for upholding its initial approval:

1. The previous owners of the Petitioners’ lot (Lot 46) were given notice of the pergola request and did not object at the time of its approval in February 2018.

2. The configuration of the nine lots on West Acala Street makes a “truly unobstructed view” impossible, and for the Petitioners, achieving such a view would require removing eight other houses.

Post-Petition Position: After the formal petition was filed, the Respondent’s position shifted entirely.

1. Admission of Error: The Respondent formally acknowledged that the approval of the pergola was a mistake and rescinded it.

2. Mootness: The Respondent argued that because it had provided the relief the Petitioners requested (rescission of approval), the matter was resolved and should be dismissed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision addressed the acknowledged violation, the status of the parties, and the appropriateness of financial penalties.

Findings on the Violation

• The Respondent explicitly acknowledged its violation of CC&R Article VI(D) by granting approval for the pergola.

• Because the Respondent had already rescinded its approval and the structure was scheduled for removal, the ALJ determined that an order compelling the Respondent to abide by the CC&Rs was unnecessary.

Prevailing Party Status

• Despite the Respondent’s admission of error and corrective actions occurring before the formal hearing, the ALJ designated the Petitioners as the prevailing party.

• The rationale is that the Petitioners’ legal action was the catalyst for the Respondent’s decision to rescind its approval and resolve the violation.

Financial Orders and Penalties

Filing Fee: Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), the ALJ is required to order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee if the petitioner prevails. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioners’ $500.00 filing fee.

Civil Penalty: The Petitioners argued for the assessment of a civil penalty against the Respondent. The ALJ denied this request, stating in the Conclusions of Law that “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.” The decision does not provide further detail on the reasoning for this conclusion.

Legal Framework

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate has authority over the matter under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11, as the case involves alleged violations of community documents.

Standard of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proof, which is a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119.

Final Order

The decision, issued on November 20, 2020, concluded with the following binding orders:

1. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges are the prevailing party in this matter.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent San Ignacio Heights Inc. must pay to Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of receipt of the Order.

The order is final unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 21F-H2120005-REL


Study Guide: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2120005-REL)

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges (Petitioners) and San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms.

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Short Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific rule from the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What physical structure caused the dispute, and where was it located relative to the Petitioners’ property?

4. What two arguments did the Respondent initially use to defend its decision to approve the structure?

5. At what point did the Respondent’s Board change its position, and what action did it take?

6. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party had the burden of meeting it?

7. Despite the Respondent admitting its error before the hearing, why were the Petitioners declared the “prevailing party”?

8. What specific financial penalty was ordered against the Respondent in the final decision?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decide not to levy a civil penalty against the Respondent?

10. What did the Respondent’s counsel state at the hearing regarding the future of the structure in question?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges, and the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc. The Petitioners filed a complaint against the homeowners’ association for allegedly violating community rules.

2. The dispute centered on Article VI (D) of the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” titled “View Obstructions.” This rule states that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”

3. The dispute was caused by a pergola that the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approved for construction on lot 47. This lot was adjacent to the Petitioners’ property, lot 46, which is designated as a “view lot” under the CC&Rs.

4. The Respondent initially argued that the approval was valid because (1) the previous owners of lot 46 were notified but did not object, and (2) the configuration of the lots meant a truly unobstructed view was impossible and would require removing eight other houses.

5. The Board changed its position on August 20, 2020, after the Petitioners had already filed their complaint. In a special executive session, the Board determined its February 2018 approval of the pergola was an error and officially rescinded that approval.

6. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

7. The Petitioners were declared the “prevailing party” because their legal action was the cause of the Respondent’s decision to rescind the erroneous approval. Under Arizona statute, a tribunal is required to order the respondent to pay the filing fee to the prevailing party.

8. The Judge ordered the Respondent, San Ignacio Heights Inc., to pay the Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00. The payment was to be made within thirty days of receipt of the order.

9. The Judge did not levy a civil penalty because the decision explicitly states, “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.”

10. At the November 3, 2020 hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informed the tribunal that the owners of lot 47 had a contractor scheduled to remove the pergola the very next day.

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Essay Questions for Further Study

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the timeline of events from the initial approval of the pergola in February 2018 to the final order in November 2020. How did the Respondent’s actions and communications contribute to the escalation of the dispute, and at what points could it have potentially been resolved before reaching a formal hearing?

2. Discuss the legal concept of the “prevailing party” as it applies to this case. Explain why the Petitioners were granted this status and what financial remedy it entitled them to, even though the Respondent had already conceded the central issue before the hearing.

3. Examine the two initial arguments made by the Respondent to justify its approval of the pergola. Based on the case outcome, why were these arguments ultimately insufficient to defend its position, leading the Board to rescind its approval?

4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the role and authority of the Administrative Law Judge in this type of dispute. What specific powers did the judge have according to Arizona statutes, and how were they applied or not applied in the final order?

5. The decision notes that no testimony was taken and the ruling was based on the administrative record. Discuss the potential advantages and disadvantages of this approach for both the Petitioners and the Respondent in this specific case.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders a binding legal decision and order.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

The section of Arizona’s administrative rules cited in the decision that establishes the “preponderance of the evidence” as the standard of proof for the matter.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

The Arizona state law that grants the ALJ the authority to order parties to abide by community documents, levy civil penalties, and order a losing respondent to pay the prevailing petitioner’s filing fee.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. In this case, it refers to the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” the official governing documents for the San Ignacio Heights community.

Civil Penalty

A monetary fine that an ALJ may levy for each violation of a statute or community document. A civil penalty was considered but not assessed in this case.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over disputes concerning alleged violations of a community’s CC&Rs.

Filing Fee

The fee ($500.00 in this case) required by Arizona statute to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate. The Judge ordered the Respondent to repay this fee to the Petitioners.

Petitioner

The party that initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party that wins a legal case. The Petitioners were declared the prevailing party, which legally entitled them to have their filing fee reimbursed by the Respondent.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc.

View Lot

A specific property designation defined in the CC&Rs, such as the Petitioners’ lot 46, which is guaranteed an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains.

View Obstructions

The title of Article VI (D) of the CC&Rs, the specific rule that the Petitioners alleged the Respondent violated by approving the construction of the pergola.






Blog Post – 21F-H2120005-REL


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