ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B); Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4; Association Bylaws Article VIII, Section 1
Outcome Summary
The ALJ granted the petition, concluding that the HOA Board’s unilateral amendment of the Bylaws on November 20, 2017, was an invalid action taken without the required vote of the Association members and without statutory notice, violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and the Association’s governing documents. The amendment was invalidated, and the Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's filing fee and pay a $250.00 civil penalty.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4 and Article VIII, Section 1 in an action taken by the board on November 20, 2017.
The Board of Directors attempted a third amendment to the Bylaws on November 20, 2017, specifically changing the requirements for the Association's financial review (audit, review, or compilation). The ALJ concluded that this action was invalid because it was taken in the absence of a quorum of Association members voting in favor of the amendment, violating both the Bylaws and statutory notice requirements.
Orders: The petition was granted. The third amendment to the Association Bylaws taken on November 20, 2017, was invalidated. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 and pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.
Topics: HOA Governance, Bylaws Amendment, Open Meeting Law, ARS 33-1804, Membership Vote, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373 (Ariz. 2006)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 661797.pdf
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19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf
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Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918001-REL
Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Jay A. Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG). The central issue was the validity of a bylaw amendment enacted by the Association’s Board of Directors on November 20, 2017, without a vote of the general homeowner membership.
The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Petitioner, Jay Janicek, finding that the Board’s action was invalid. The decision hinged on a critical interpretation of the Association’s governing documents, concluding that the term “members” in the context of bylaw amendments unambiguously refers to the homeowner membership, not the Board of Directors. The ruling established that the Board does not have the authority to amend bylaws where that power is reserved for the membership.
Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that the Board’s action violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by failing to provide the required notice to homeowners for a meeting concerning a proposed bylaw amendment. As a result, the amendment was invalidated, and the Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.
Case Background and Procedural History
Parties and Jurisdiction
• Petitioner: Jay A. Janicek, a property owner within the Sycamore Vista subdivision and a member of the Respondent Association.
• Respondent: Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (“the Association”), a homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, governed by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and overseen by a Board of Directors.
• Adjudicating Body: The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), an independent state agency, which received the case on referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
The Central Dispute
The core of the dispute was an action taken by the Association’s Board of Directors during a regular meeting on November 20, 2017. At this meeting, the Board, with three of five directors present, voted to approve a third amendment to the Association’s Bylaws. The amendment altered Article VIII Section 6(d), changing the requirement for an annual financial check from:
“cause an annual audit of the Association books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year”
“cause an annual audit, review, or compilation of the Associations financial records to be made by a public accountant within 180 days after the end of the HOA’s fiscal year.”
The Petitioner contended this action was invalid because it was undertaken without a vote of the general Association membership, as he believed the governing documents required.
Timeline of Adjudication
1. July 25, 2018: Petitioner files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
2. September 05, 2018: An initial evidentiary hearing is held before the OAH.
3. September 25, 2018: The OAH issues an ALJ Decision in the Petitioner’s favor.
4. October 23, 2018: The Respondent submits a Request for Rehearing.
5. November 07, 2018: The Department grants the rehearing request and refers the matter back to the OAH.
6. March 05, 2019: A rehearing is conducted, based on legal briefs and closing arguments without new evidence.
7. March 25, 2019: The final ALJ Decision is issued, reaffirming the initial ruling in favor of the Petitioner.
Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes
The case decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state statutes.
Key Bylaw Provisions
Article
Section
Description
Article IV
Section 1
States that the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board of not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) directors.”
Article VI
Section 1
Establishes that regular meetings of the Board of Directors shall be held monthly without notice.
Article VI
Section 2
Governs special meetings of the Board, requiring not less than three days’ notice to each Director.
Article VI
Section 3
Defines a quorum for Board meetings as “a majority of the number of Directors.”
Article VII
Section 1
Outlines the Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. This section does not explicitly grant the Board the power to amend the Bylaws.
Article XIII
Section 1
(The central provision in the dispute) States: “These Bylaws may be amended at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Association by a vote of a majority of a quorum of members present in person or by proxy.”
Relevant Arizona Statutes
• A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law): This statute was central to the Petitioner’s argument and the ALJ’s final decision.
◦ Subsection (A): Requires that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors be open to all members of the association.
◦ Subsection (B): Mandates specific notice requirements for any meeting of the members, stating that notice “shall also state the purpose for which the meeting is called, including the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws.”
◦ Subsection (F): The ALJ noted that this section codifies the legislative intent of the statute, which, as cited from a Governor’s message, is to “promote transparency and participation for all residents in homeowners’ association governance.”
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Position (Jay Janicek)
The Petitioner’s case was built on a textual interpretation of the Bylaws and adherence to state law.
• Interpretation of “Members”: The Petitioner argued that the word “members” in Article XIII, Section 1 refers to the general homeowner membership of the Association, not the members of the Board of Directors.
• Textual Differentiation: The drafters of the Bylaws intentionally used the words “members” and “directors” distinctly throughout the document. Where the intent was to refer to the Board, the word “Director” was specifically used (e.g., Article VI).
• Proxy Voting: The inclusion of the term “proxy” in Article XIII supports the argument that the vote is for the general membership, as Board members are not permitted to vote by proxy.
• Lack of Explicit Power: Article VII, which details the Board’s powers, does not grant the authority to amend the Bylaws, implying such power is reserved for the membership.
• Statutory Violation: The Board’s action violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 because the required notice for a meeting concerning a bylaw amendment was not provided to the general membership.
• Legal Precedent: The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn, an Arizona Supreme Court case holding that restrictive covenants (which he argued include the Bylaws) should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties as determined from the entire document.
Respondent’s Position (Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA)
The Association argued that its actions were a valid exercise of the Board’s authority.
• Broad Authority: The Respondent cited Article IV, which states the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board,” to assert its general authority.
• Valid Board Meeting: The amendment occurred at a regular monthly Board meeting as allowed by Article VI. The meeting had three directors present, which constituted a valid quorum for transacting business.
• Interpretation of Article XIII: The Respondent argued that the phrase “at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors” in Article XIII indicates that the Board is the body empowered to make the amendment, and the word “members” in that context refers to the members of the Board.
• No Open Meeting Law Violation: The Respondent contended its conduct was not a violation because the action occurred during a regular Board meeting with a proper quorum of directors.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s conclusions were unequivocal, fully adopting the Petitioner’s interpretation of the governing documents and state law.
Conclusions of Law
• Burden of Proof: The ALJ found that the Petitioner successfully sustained his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804.
• Interpretation of “Members” vs. “Directors”: The decision states that the governing documents are clear: “‘members’ refers to the body of owners who make up the membership of the Association, and ‘directors’ refers to the few who are elected to the membership’s Board.” The ALJ found the differentiation to be intentional by the drafters.
• Avoiding Absurdity: The decision holds that construing the Bylaws to allow the Board to amend them would create an absurdity. The ALJ wrote, “The voices of few cannot speak for all, unless all have bestowed those few with the power and authority to speak on their behalf.”
• Violation of Statute and Bylaws: The ALJ concluded that the Board’s action on November 20, 2017, violated both A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) due to a lack of notice and Article III of the Association Bylaws.
• Rejection of Respondent’s Argument: The decision explicitly states, “The Tribunal is not swayed by Respondent’s closing arguments.”
Final Order
Based on the findings and conclusions, the ALJ issued the following binding order:
1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was officially granted.
2. Amendment Invalidated: The third amendment to the Association Bylaws, as enacted on November 20, 2017, was invalidated.
3. Fees and Penalties: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918001-REL
Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association
Short-Answer Quiz
1. Who were the primary parties in the case No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific action taken by the Respondent on November 20, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint?
3. According to the Petitioner, what was the crucial difference in meaning between the terms “members” and “directors” as used in the Association’s Bylaws?
4. What was the Respondent’s central argument for why the Board of Directors had the authority to amend the Bylaws at its regular meeting?
5. What is Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, and how did the Petitioner argue that the Respondent violated it?
6. What was the financial concern that the Petitioner argued could potentially impact him as a homeowner due to the Board’s amendment?
7. Describe the procedural history of this case after the initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision on September 25, 2018.
8. What case did the Petitioner cite regarding the interpretation of restrictive covenants, and what principle did it establish?
9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this proceeding, and how is it defined in the document?
10. What was the final outcome of the case, including the specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Jay A. Janicek, the Petitioner, and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner is a property owner and member of the Association who brought the legal action, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association governed by a Board of Directors.
2. On November 20, 2017, the Respondent’s Board of Directors held a regular meeting where they voted to approve a third amendment to the Association’s Bylaws. This amendment changed the requirement for an “annual audit…by a public accountant” to an “annual audit, review, or compilation” of financial records.
3. The Petitioner argued that the term “members” in Article XIII of the Bylaws refers to the entire body of property owners in the Association, not the Board of Directors. He contended that if the drafter had intended to give amendment power to the Board, the specific word “directors” would have been used, as it was in other sections of the Bylaws.
4. The Respondent argued that its actions were proper because the Bylaws empower the Board to manage the Association’s affairs at regular monthly meetings. They contended that since a quorum of three directors was present at the November 20, 2017 meeting, the Board was empowered to transact business, which they interpreted to include amending the bylaws as described in Article XIII.
5. Arizona’s Open Meeting Law is ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, which requires meetings of a homeowners’ association’s board and members to be open to all members. The Petitioner argued the Respondent violated this by amending a bylaw without proper notice to the full membership, which is required for any proposed bylaw amendment, thus undermining the law’s legislative intent of transparency.
6. The Petitioner was concerned that the amendment weakened the financial oversight of the Association. It modified a requirement for a third-party audit to a less stringent “review, or compilation,” creating a risk that the Association could perform its own financial checks, and as a homeowner, he had an interest in ensuring the Association’s financials were correct.
7. After the initial decision in the Petitioner’s favor on September 25, 2018, the Respondent submitted a Request for Rehearing on October 23, 2018. The Department of Real Estate granted this request on November 7, 2018, and the matter was referred back to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing, which ultimately took place on March 5, 2019.
8. The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn. This case established the principle that restrictive covenants should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties, as determined from the language of the entire document and the purpose for which the covenants were created.
9. The legal standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The document defines this as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with the most “convincing force” that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.
10. The final outcome was a ruling in favor of the Petitioner. The ALJ granted the petition, invalidated the third amendment to the Bylaws that was passed on November 20, 2017, and ordered the Respondent to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.00.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning in differentiating between the terms “members” and “directors.” How did the principle of avoiding absurdity and considering the drafter’s intent, as seen throughout the Bylaws, contribute to the final decision?
2. Discuss the interplay between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) and state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804). Explain which authority took precedence in this case and why the Board’s actions were found to violate both.
3. Evaluate the legal strategy employed by the Petitioner, Jay A. Janicek. Consider his use of specific Bylaw articles, the citation of Powell v. Washburn, and his argument regarding the legislative intent of the Open Meeting Law.
4. Examine the arguments presented by the Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association. Why did the Judge find their interpretation of the Bylaws unconvincing, despite their claims that the Board was empowered to transact business with a quorum present?
5. Based on the text, discuss the broader implications of this ruling for homeowners’ associations in Arizona. How does this decision reinforce the principles of transparency and the limitations of a Board’s power relative to the association’s general membership?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
A section of the Arizona Revised Statutes, also known as Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, which mandates that meetings of an HOA’s members and board of directors must be open to all members and requires specific notice for meetings where bylaw amendments will be considered.
Bylaws
A set of rules that govern the internal operations of the homeowners’ association. In this case, key articles discussed include Article VI (Meeting of Directors), Article VII (Powers of the Board), and Article XIII (Amendments).
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are governing documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.
Member
As defined in the Association’s documents, a person entitled to membership by virtue of being a property owner within the Sycamore Vista subdivision. The Judge concluded this term refers to the body of owners, not the Board of Directors.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona, unaffiliated with the parties, responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings and making legal decisions in disputes like this one.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Jay A. Janicek, a homeowner in the Association.
Preponderance of the evidence
The burden of proof in this case. It is defined as evidence that is more likely true than not and has the most convincing force, sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue.
The authority to represent someone else, especially in voting. The document notes that the term “proxy” applies to votes of the members, as members of the Board are not permitted to vote by proxy.
Quorum
The minimum number of members of a deliberative assembly necessary to conduct the business of that group. For the Respondent’s Board of Directors, a quorum is defined as a majority of the number of Directors.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association.
Restrictive Covenants
Legal obligations imposed in a deed to real property to do or not do something. The Petitioner argued this term included the CC&Rs, Bylaws, and rules of the Association.
Tribunal
A body established to settle certain types of dispute. In this document, it refers to the Administrative Law Judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918001-REL
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19F-H1918001-REL-RHG
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Jay A. Janicek (Petitioner) and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core issue of the case, designated No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, revolves around whether the Homeowners Association violated its Bylaws and Arizona state statute (§ 33-1804) when its Board of Directors unilaterally amended the Bylaws on November 20, 2017. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board’s action was invalid because the power to amend the Bylaws was delegated to the Association’s general membership, not the Board of Directors, and the Board failed to provide the required notice for such an amendment. Consequently, the Petitioner’s request was granted, the amendment was invalidated, and the Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty.
What central conflict drove the administrative hearing and subsequent rehearing process?
How did governing documents and Arizona statutes shape the final legal decision?
What ultimate implications does this ruling have for homeowners association governance and member rights?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jay A. Janicek(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf at initial hearing; Observed rehearing
Jake Kubert(petitioner attorney) Dessaules Law Group Appeared at rehearing
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Thomas P. Satterlee
Counsel
—
Respondent
Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association
Counsel
James A. Robles
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Outcome Summary
The petition was dismissed with prejudice due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Respondent Property Owner's Association was not found to be a 'planned community' under the applicable Arizona statute.
Why this result: The ALJ determined that the Respondent HOA did not meet the definition of a 'planned community' because its maintenance of landscaping did not constitute maintaining 'roadways' as required by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
Key Issues & Findings
Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status
The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing it was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because it did not maintain 'roadways'. Petitioner argued that maintaining landscaping around the entrance sign satisfied the 'covenant to maintain roadways' requirement by defining 'roadway' as the entire 'right-of-way'. The ALJ found that 'roadway' means the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, HOA Dispute
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf
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Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA
Executive Summary
This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.
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Case Overview and Procedural History
The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.
• January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
• March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.
• April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.
• September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.
• September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Central Jurisdictional Question
The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.
The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.
Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:
“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”
A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.
Arguments of the Parties
The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.
Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)
The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.
• Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
• “Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.
• Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”
• Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:
◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.
◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).
◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.
◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”
◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.
Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)
The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.
• Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”
• Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.
• Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision
The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.
The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.
To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”
Source
Definition of “Roadway”
English Oxford Living Dict.
“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”
Merriam-Webster
“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”
Dictionary.com
“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”
Cambridge Dictionary
“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”
American Heritage Dictionary
“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”
Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries
“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”
The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:
“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”
The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”
• Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”
• Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).
• Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”
These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.
• Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.
• Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.
• Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.
• Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association
This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.
1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?
2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?
3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?
4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?
5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?
7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?
8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?
9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?
10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?
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Answer Key
1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.
2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.
3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.
4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.
5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.
6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.
8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”
9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.
10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
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Essay Questions
Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.
2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?
3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.
4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?
5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.
Complete Streets
An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.
Covenant
A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.
Petitioner
The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.
Planned Community
As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.
Right-of-Way
The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”
Roadway
Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
This Homeowner’s Case Collapsed Over One Word — Here’s Why It Matters
Dealing with a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) can sometimes feel like navigating a maze of rules and regulations. But what happens when a dispute isn’t about a rule, but about the definition of a single, common word? In the Arizona case of Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association, a major legal conflict hinged on one seemingly simple question: What, exactly, is a “roadway”?
The answer would determine whether a state agency had the power to hear the case at all. The judge’s decision provides a masterclass in how the law interprets language, revealing practical lessons about why a single word can make or break an entire legal argument.
1. A Legal Battle Can Hinge on a Dictionary Definition
The core issue of the case was jurisdiction—whether the Arizona Department of Real Estate had the authority to hear the dispute. For the department to have jurisdiction, the HOA had to qualify as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). A key part of that definition required the HOA to have a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
This is where the entire case pivoted.
The Homeowner’s Argument: The petitioner, Mr. Satterlee, argued that the HOA’s responsibility to maintain the walls, sign, and surrounding landscaping at the community entrance fulfilled this requirement. He contended that “roadway” should be interpreted broadly as a “roadway system,” which would include the entire right-of-way, landscaping and all.
The HOA’s Argument: The respondent HOA argued for a much narrower definition. They stated that a “roadway” is only the part of the road used for vehicle traffic. Since maintaining walls and landscaping is not maintaining a roadway, they argued they were not a “planned community” under the law, and therefore the state had no jurisdiction.
The entire legal question of whether the case could even proceed came down to the plain meaning of this one word.
2. Judges Don’t Guess — They Have a Method for Meaning
When a legal dispute depends on the meaning of a word in a law, judges don’t simply pick the definition they prefer. Legal interpretation follows a clear principle: start with the “plain meaning” of the words the legislature chose to use. This wasn’t just a casual search; it was a methodical application of the “plain meaning rule,” a cornerstone of statutory interpretation where judges prioritize the common, ordinary meaning of words over specialized or re-imagined definitions.
To determine the plain meaning of “roadway,” the Administrative Law Judge in this case conducted a thorough review of its common definition by consulting numerous dictionaries:
• English Oxford Living Dictionaries
• Merriam-Webster
• Dictionary.com
• Cambridge Dictionary
• American Heritage Dictionary
• Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries
The collective conclusion was overwhelming. The dictionaries consistently defined a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicles, explicitly contrasting it with sidewalks, shoulders, or adjacent landscaping. This methodical approach demonstrated that the common, established meaning of the word supported the HOA’s narrow interpretation, not the homeowner’s broad one.
3. Your Own Evidence Can Be Used Against You
In a classic case of legal irony, the very evidence the homeowner presented to support his case became the primary tool the judge used to dismantle it. The homeowner submitted several official documents from Pima County, but these exhibits ended up undermining his own argument.
The judge pointed to several instances where the homeowner’s own evidence made a clear distinction between a “roadway” and the surrounding area:
• A Pima County ordinance referred to the “right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway,” treating the two as separate things. The judge noted that the petitioner tried to argue that the “shoulder of an existing roadway” referred not to the paved edge for vehicles, but to the landscaped areas beyond it—an interpretation that defies common understanding and the county’s own official language.
• County planning documents used different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’), showing they are considered distinct components.
• Another county rule stated that the “installation of landscaping” must begin after the formal completion of the “roadway project.”
The judge concluded that these documents demonstrated that in official use, “roadway” and “right-of-way” are treated as different concepts. The very evidence intended to support the homeowner’s case ended up directly contradicting it.
4. Modern Concepts Don’t Automatically Change Old Laws
The homeowner’s central supporting idea was the “Complete Streets” approach—a modern civil engineering concept that views streets as integrated systems for all users, including cars, bicyclists, and pedestrians. He argued this modern understanding should apply to the word “roadway.”
The judge rejected this argument based on a crucial point of legal reasoning: legislative intent.
The judge noted that the “Complete Streets” concept was already well-known in 2014 when the Arizona legislature amended the statute in question. The legislature could have used broader terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets” but deliberately chose not to. Instead, they specifically chose the narrower, more traditional term “roadway.” The judge inferred that this was a deliberate choice, and the court’s job was to interpret the word the legislature actually used, not one it could have used.
The judge even noted that the sheer volume of evidence the homeowner presented to redefine “roadway” was itself proof that his interpretation was not the “plain meaning”—if it were, such extensive explanation wouldn’t be necessary.
To illustrate the point with a simple, real-world example of plain meaning, the judge wrote:
One would be hard pressed to interpret that phrase [“don’t play in the street”] as a warning not to play on the sidewalk or landscaping area bordering a paved thoroughfare.
Conclusion: In Law, Precision Is Everything
The overarching lesson from this case is that in legal interpretation, every word matters. Whether it’s the dictionary definition of “roadway,” the precise language in county ordinances, or the specific terms chosen by lawmakers, the plain, established meaning of words carries immense weight.
Ultimately, the homeowner’s petition was dismissed. Because the HOA’s duty to maintain landscaping did not qualify as a “covenant to maintain roadways,” it was not a “planned community” under the statute. As a result, the state agency lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
This case shows how the specific words chosen by lawmakers years ago can have major consequences today. What common words might we be using every day that have a completely different and critical meaning in a legal context?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Thomas P. Satterlee(petitioner)
Respondent Side
James A. Robles(attorney) Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del sol(staff) Clerk/Distribution staff
Other Participants
Ana M. Olivares(Director) Pima County Transportation Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Thomas P. Satterlee
Counsel
—
Respondent
Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association
Counsel
James A. Robles
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Outcome Summary
The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.
Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.
Key Issues & Findings
Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status
This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:02 (130.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA
Executive Summary
This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.
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Case Overview and Procedural History
The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.
• January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
• March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.
• April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.
• September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.
• September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Central Jurisdictional Question
The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.
The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.
Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:
“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”
A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.
Arguments of the Parties
The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.
Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)
The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.
• Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
• “Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.
• Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”
• Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:
◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.
◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).
◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.
◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”
◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.
Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)
The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.
• Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”
• Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.
• Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision
The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.
The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.
To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”
Source
Definition of “Roadway”
English Oxford Living Dict.
“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”
Merriam-Webster
“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”
Dictionary.com
“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”
Cambridge Dictionary
“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”
American Heritage Dictionary
“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”
Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries
“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”
The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:
“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”
The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”
• Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”
• Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).
• Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”
These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.
• Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.
• Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.
• Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.
• Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association
This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.
1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?
2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?
3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?
4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?
5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?
7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?
8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?
9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?
10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?
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Answer Key
1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.
2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.
3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.
4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.
5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.
6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.
8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”
9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.
10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
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Essay Questions
Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.
2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?
3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.
4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?
5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.
Complete Streets
An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.
Covenant
A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.
Petitioner
The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.
Planned Community
As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.
Right-of-Way
The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”
Roadway
Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.
don't play in the street
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Thomas P. Satterlee(petitioner)
Respondent Side
James A. Robles(attorney) Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del sol(staff) Clerk/Distribution staff
Other Participants
Ana M. Olivares(Director) Pima County Transportation Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.
Key Issues & Findings
Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:06 (107.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL
Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”
The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”
The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.
Case Overview
This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
18F-H1818053-REL
Petitioner
Travis Prall
Respondent
Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Initial Hearing
September 4, 2018
Initial Decision
September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)
Rehearing
January 11, 2019
Final Decision
January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)
Timeline of Key Events
• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.
• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.
• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.
• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.
• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.
Central Allegation and Dispute
The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.
Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)
The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.
• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.
• Inferences about Original Landscaping:
◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.
◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.
◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.
Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)
The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.
• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.
• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.
• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.
◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.
◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.
◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”
Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections
The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.
Section
Provision
Significance in the Case
The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“
This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”
“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…
This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.
“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…
This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.
Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.
Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)
• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”
• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”
• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.
Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)
• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”
• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”
• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”
• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818053-REL
Study Guide: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal decisions. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition?
3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing.
4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request?
5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent.
6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion?
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision?
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?
9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019?
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Answer Key
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles? The Petitioner was Travis Prall, the homeowner who filed the dispute. The Respondent was the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association (HOA), which was defending against the Petitioner’s claims. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition? The Petitioner alleged a violation of Section 7.1.4 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). His central claim was that the HOA violated this section by neglecting its duty to perform yard maintenance in his backyard, which he argued was a “visible public yard.”
3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing. The exterior homes feature six to seven-foot-tall block wall fences enclosing their backyards. In contrast, the interior homes, including the Petitioner’s, have a shorter back wall consisting of a two-foot block wall topped with a two-foot aluminum fence, making the total height approximately four feet and more visible from a common walkway.
4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request? In 2018, the HOA had a “pony wall” in the Petitioner’s backyard repaired and was informed by the repair company, Sun King Fencing & Gates, that the wall had buckled due to tree roots. Consequently, the HOA issued a Courtesy Letter on May 3, 2018, requesting that the Petitioner “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent. The Respondent argued that a yard is considered a “Private Yard” if it is enclosed or shielded from view, meaning any enclosed yard qualified. The Petitioner argued that the definition should be read to mean a yard is private only if it is enclosed so that it is not generally visible from neighboring property, implying visibility was the key factor.
6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion? The Petitioner testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA had provided landscaping maintenance for his backyard. The Respondent denied this claim, stating that it had never provided any landscaping maintenance to any backyards in the community and raised liability concerns about entering residents’ enclosed yards.
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision? The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case? The judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to present evidence proving that the tree in his backyard was “originally installed by the Declarant” (the developer). According to Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs, the HOA’s maintenance responsibility only applied to landscaping and improvements installed by the original community developer.
9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter? Maureen Karpinski testified that none of the homes in the community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards and that they were “just dirt” at the time of purchase. Her testimony was considered credible because she was a real estate agent involved in the initial sales, had walked the community with many buyers during construction, and was herself an original buyer.
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019? In both the initial decision issued on September 24, 2018, and the final decision issued after the rehearing on January 31, 2019, the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated the CC&Rs.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style answers. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard” as defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found it unnecessary to rule on this specific issue to reach a decision.
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard shape the proceedings, and what specific types of evidence (or lack thereof) were most influential in the judge’s final decision?
3. Trace the timeline of the dispute over the tree in Travis Prall’s backyard, from the 2014 storm to the final legal decision in 2019. How did each key event contribute to the escalation of the conflict and the arguments presented at the hearings?
4. Compare the evidence presented by Travis Prall with the evidence presented by the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA at the rehearing. Why did the judge characterize Prall’s evidence as “suppositions and inferences” while deeming the HOA’s evidence “credible”?
5. Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs contains the phrase “as originally installed by Declarant.” Explain the critical importance of this phrase to the outcome of the case and how it became the dispositive legal issue, overshadowing all other arguments.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community.
Common Area
Areas within the community maintained by the HOA for the benefit of all residents. The HOA provides landscaping for these areas.
Courtesy Letter
A formal notice sent by the HOA to a homeowner regarding a potential violation or required action. In this case, it requested the removal of a tree causing damage.
Declarant
The original developer of the planned community who installed the initial infrastructure and landscaping.
HOA Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal hearing regarding an alleged violation by their HOA.
Improvements
A term used in the CC&Rs referring to any additions to a lot other than the main residential dwelling, including landscaping.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the homeowner Travis Prall.
Pony Wall
A term used to describe the short, two-foot-tall block wall in the backyards of the interior homes, which was buckling due to tree roots.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention “more probably true than not.”
Private Yard
As defined in the CC&Rs, a portion of a yard “which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property.” The interpretation of this definition was a point of contention.
Public Yard
As defined in the CC&Rs, the portion of a yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property,” regardless of its location on the lot. The HOA is responsible for maintaining landscaping originally installed by the Declarant in Public Yards.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the claims. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA.
Visible from Neighboring Property
A term defined in the CC&Rs to mean an object that would be visible to a six-foot-tall person standing on a neighboring property. It includes a specific exception for objects visible only through a wrought iron fence.
As defined in the CC&Rs, “the portion of the Lot devoted to Improvements other than the Residential Dwelling.”
Blog Post – 18F-H1818053-REL
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18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
2 sources
These documents are two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Travis Prall, the Petitioner, and the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, the Respondent. The first document outlines the initial decision, dated September 24, 2018, which dismissed Mr. Prall’s petition arguing the HOA violated their Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements (CC&Rs) by neglecting yard maintenance. The second document is the decision following a rehearing requested by the Petitioner, dated January 31, 2019, which reaffirmed the initial dismissal, concluding that Mr. Prall failed to prove that the landscaping in question was originally installed by the Declarant, a prerequisite for the HOA’s maintenance responsibility under the CC&Rs. Both decisions rely heavily on interpreting sections of the CC&Rs, particularly the definitions of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard,” to determine the HOA’s obligation. Ultimately, both rulings found that the Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Travis Prall(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Lydia Pierce Linsmeier(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Nicole Payne(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Maureen Karpinski(board member) Villas at Tierra Buena HOA President of the Board; testified
Frank Peake(property manager) Pride Community Management Owner of Pride Community Management; testified
Rebecca Stowers(community manager) Community Manager; testified at initial hearing
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.
Key Issues & Findings
Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:14 (107.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL
Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”
The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”
The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.
Case Overview
This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
18F-H1818053-REL
Petitioner
Travis Prall
Respondent
Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Initial Hearing
September 4, 2018
Initial Decision
September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)
Rehearing
January 11, 2019
Final Decision
January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)
Timeline of Key Events
• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.
• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.
• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.
• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.
• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.
Central Allegation and Dispute
The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.
Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)
The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.
• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.
• Inferences about Original Landscaping:
◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.
◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.
◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.
Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)
The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.
• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.
• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.
• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.
◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.
◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.
◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”
Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections
The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.
Section
Provision
Significance in the Case
The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“
This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”
“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…
This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.
“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…
This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.
Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.
Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)
• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”
• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”
• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.
Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)
• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”
• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”
• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”
• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.
Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association
Counsel
James A. Robles
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Outcome Summary
The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.
Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.
Key Issues & Findings
Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status
This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Decision Documents
18F-H1817022-REL Decision – 661827.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:16:14 (130.3 KB)
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Thomas P. Satterlee(petitioner)
Respondent Side
James A. Robles(HOA attorney) Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del sol(staff/clerk) Staff responsible for decision distribution
Other Participants
Ana M. Olivares(Director) Pima County Transportation Authored May 18, 2018 letter presented as documentation by Petitioner
The ALJ granted the petition, finding that the HOA Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and the Association Bylaws by amending the Bylaws on November 20, 2017, without a quorum of Association members voting in favor and without proper notice. The amendment was invalidated, and the HOA was fined $250.00 and ordered to refund the Petitioner's filing fee.
Why this result: The Board lacked the authority to amend the Bylaws without the vote of the Association membership, and failed to provide required notice for the proposed amendment, violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and the Association Bylaws.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association violated Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4 and Article VIII, Section 1 in an action taken by the board on November 20, 2017.
The Respondent HOA Board amended Association Bylaws on November 20, 2017, without proper notice to the members and without a vote by a majority of Association members, which violated the statutory notice requirement and the Bylaws. The Board action was consequently invalidated.
Orders: The Petitioner's petition was granted. The Respondent's third amendment to the Association Bylaws, dated November 20, 2017, was invalidated. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner's filing fee and pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Mail Boxes v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 181 Ariz. 119, 122, 888 P.2d 777, 780 (1995)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 661797.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:04:41 (143.2 KB)
19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:14 (169.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918001-REL
Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Jay A. Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG). The central issue was the validity of a bylaw amendment enacted by the Association’s Board of Directors on November 20, 2017, without a vote of the general homeowner membership.
The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Petitioner, Jay Janicek, finding that the Board’s action was invalid. The decision hinged on a critical interpretation of the Association’s governing documents, concluding that the term “members” in the context of bylaw amendments unambiguously refers to the homeowner membership, not the Board of Directors. The ruling established that the Board does not have the authority to amend bylaws where that power is reserved for the membership.
Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that the Board’s action violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by failing to provide the required notice to homeowners for a meeting concerning a proposed bylaw amendment. As a result, the amendment was invalidated, and the Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.
Case Background and Procedural History
Parties and Jurisdiction
• Petitioner: Jay A. Janicek, a property owner within the Sycamore Vista subdivision and a member of the Respondent Association.
• Respondent: Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (“the Association”), a homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, governed by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and overseen by a Board of Directors.
• Adjudicating Body: The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), an independent state agency, which received the case on referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
The Central Dispute
The core of the dispute was an action taken by the Association’s Board of Directors during a regular meeting on November 20, 2017. At this meeting, the Board, with three of five directors present, voted to approve a third amendment to the Association’s Bylaws. The amendment altered Article VIII Section 6(d), changing the requirement for an annual financial check from:
“cause an annual audit of the Association books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year”
“cause an annual audit, review, or compilation of the Associations financial records to be made by a public accountant within 180 days after the end of the HOA’s fiscal year.”
The Petitioner contended this action was invalid because it was undertaken without a vote of the general Association membership, as he believed the governing documents required.
Timeline of Adjudication
1. July 25, 2018: Petitioner files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
2. September 05, 2018: An initial evidentiary hearing is held before the OAH.
3. September 25, 2018: The OAH issues an ALJ Decision in the Petitioner’s favor.
4. October 23, 2018: The Respondent submits a Request for Rehearing.
5. November 07, 2018: The Department grants the rehearing request and refers the matter back to the OAH.
6. March 05, 2019: A rehearing is conducted, based on legal briefs and closing arguments without new evidence.
7. March 25, 2019: The final ALJ Decision is issued, reaffirming the initial ruling in favor of the Petitioner.
Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes
The case decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state statutes.
Key Bylaw Provisions
Article
Section
Description
Article IV
Section 1
States that the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board of not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) directors.”
Article VI
Section 1
Establishes that regular meetings of the Board of Directors shall be held monthly without notice.
Article VI
Section 2
Governs special meetings of the Board, requiring not less than three days’ notice to each Director.
Article VI
Section 3
Defines a quorum for Board meetings as “a majority of the number of Directors.”
Article VII
Section 1
Outlines the Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. This section does not explicitly grant the Board the power to amend the Bylaws.
Article XIII
Section 1
(The central provision in the dispute) States: “These Bylaws may be amended at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Association by a vote of a majority of a quorum of members present in person or by proxy.”
Relevant Arizona Statutes
• A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law): This statute was central to the Petitioner’s argument and the ALJ’s final decision.
◦ Subsection (A): Requires that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors be open to all members of the association.
◦ Subsection (B): Mandates specific notice requirements for any meeting of the members, stating that notice “shall also state the purpose for which the meeting is called, including the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws.”
◦ Subsection (F): The ALJ noted that this section codifies the legislative intent of the statute, which, as cited from a Governor’s message, is to “promote transparency and participation for all residents in homeowners’ association governance.”
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Position (Jay Janicek)
The Petitioner’s case was built on a textual interpretation of the Bylaws and adherence to state law.
• Interpretation of “Members”: The Petitioner argued that the word “members” in Article XIII, Section 1 refers to the general homeowner membership of the Association, not the members of the Board of Directors.
• Textual Differentiation: The drafters of the Bylaws intentionally used the words “members” and “directors” distinctly throughout the document. Where the intent was to refer to the Board, the word “Director” was specifically used (e.g., Article VI).
• Proxy Voting: The inclusion of the term “proxy” in Article XIII supports the argument that the vote is for the general membership, as Board members are not permitted to vote by proxy.
• Lack of Explicit Power: Article VII, which details the Board’s powers, does not grant the authority to amend the Bylaws, implying such power is reserved for the membership.
• Statutory Violation: The Board’s action violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 because the required notice for a meeting concerning a bylaw amendment was not provided to the general membership.
• Legal Precedent: The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn, an Arizona Supreme Court case holding that restrictive covenants (which he argued include the Bylaws) should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties as determined from the entire document.
Respondent’s Position (Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA)
The Association argued that its actions were a valid exercise of the Board’s authority.
• Broad Authority: The Respondent cited Article IV, which states the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board,” to assert its general authority.
• Valid Board Meeting: The amendment occurred at a regular monthly Board meeting as allowed by Article VI. The meeting had three directors present, which constituted a valid quorum for transacting business.
• Interpretation of Article XIII: The Respondent argued that the phrase “at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors” in Article XIII indicates that the Board is the body empowered to make the amendment, and the word “members” in that context refers to the members of the Board.
• No Open Meeting Law Violation: The Respondent contended its conduct was not a violation because the action occurred during a regular Board meeting with a proper quorum of directors.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s conclusions were unequivocal, fully adopting the Petitioner’s interpretation of the governing documents and state law.
Conclusions of Law
• Burden of Proof: The ALJ found that the Petitioner successfully sustained his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804.
• Interpretation of “Members” vs. “Directors”: The decision states that the governing documents are clear: “‘members’ refers to the body of owners who make up the membership of the Association, and ‘directors’ refers to the few who are elected to the membership’s Board.” The ALJ found the differentiation to be intentional by the drafters.
• Avoiding Absurdity: The decision holds that construing the Bylaws to allow the Board to amend them would create an absurdity. The ALJ wrote, “The voices of few cannot speak for all, unless all have bestowed those few with the power and authority to speak on their behalf.”
• Violation of Statute and Bylaws: The ALJ concluded that the Board’s action on November 20, 2017, violated both A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) due to a lack of notice and Article III of the Association Bylaws.
• Rejection of Respondent’s Argument: The decision explicitly states, “The Tribunal is not swayed by Respondent’s closing arguments.”
Final Order
Based on the findings and conclusions, the ALJ issued the following binding order:
1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was officially granted.
2. Amendment Invalidated: The third amendment to the Association Bylaws, as enacted on November 20, 2017, was invalidated.
3. Fees and Penalties: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918001-REL
Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association
Short-Answer Quiz
1. Who were the primary parties in the case No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific action taken by the Respondent on November 20, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint?
3. According to the Petitioner, what was the crucial difference in meaning between the terms “members” and “directors” as used in the Association’s Bylaws?
4. What was the Respondent’s central argument for why the Board of Directors had the authority to amend the Bylaws at its regular meeting?
5. What is Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, and how did the Petitioner argue that the Respondent violated it?
6. What was the financial concern that the Petitioner argued could potentially impact him as a homeowner due to the Board’s amendment?
7. Describe the procedural history of this case after the initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision on September 25, 2018.
8. What case did the Petitioner cite regarding the interpretation of restrictive covenants, and what principle did it establish?
9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this proceeding, and how is it defined in the document?
10. What was the final outcome of the case, including the specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Jay A. Janicek, the Petitioner, and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner is a property owner and member of the Association who brought the legal action, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association governed by a Board of Directors.
2. On November 20, 2017, the Respondent’s Board of Directors held a regular meeting where they voted to approve a third amendment to the Association’s Bylaws. This amendment changed the requirement for an “annual audit…by a public accountant” to an “annual audit, review, or compilation” of financial records.
3. The Petitioner argued that the term “members” in Article XIII of the Bylaws refers to the entire body of property owners in the Association, not the Board of Directors. He contended that if the drafter had intended to give amendment power to the Board, the specific word “directors” would have been used, as it was in other sections of the Bylaws.
4. The Respondent argued that its actions were proper because the Bylaws empower the Board to manage the Association’s affairs at regular monthly meetings. They contended that since a quorum of three directors was present at the November 20, 2017 meeting, the Board was empowered to transact business, which they interpreted to include amending the bylaws as described in Article XIII.
5. Arizona’s Open Meeting Law is ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, which requires meetings of a homeowners’ association’s board and members to be open to all members. The Petitioner argued the Respondent violated this by amending a bylaw without proper notice to the full membership, which is required for any proposed bylaw amendment, thus undermining the law’s legislative intent of transparency.
6. The Petitioner was concerned that the amendment weakened the financial oversight of the Association. It modified a requirement for a third-party audit to a less stringent “review, or compilation,” creating a risk that the Association could perform its own financial checks, and as a homeowner, he had an interest in ensuring the Association’s financials were correct.
7. After the initial decision in the Petitioner’s favor on September 25, 2018, the Respondent submitted a Request for Rehearing on October 23, 2018. The Department of Real Estate granted this request on November 7, 2018, and the matter was referred back to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing, which ultimately took place on March 5, 2019.
8. The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn. This case established the principle that restrictive covenants should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties, as determined from the language of the entire document and the purpose for which the covenants were created.
9. The legal standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The document defines this as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with the most “convincing force” that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.
10. The final outcome was a ruling in favor of the Petitioner. The ALJ granted the petition, invalidated the third amendment to the Bylaws that was passed on November 20, 2017, and ordered the Respondent to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.00.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning in differentiating between the terms “members” and “directors.” How did the principle of avoiding absurdity and considering the drafter’s intent, as seen throughout the Bylaws, contribute to the final decision?
2. Discuss the interplay between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) and state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804). Explain which authority took precedence in this case and why the Board’s actions were found to violate both.
3. Evaluate the legal strategy employed by the Petitioner, Jay A. Janicek. Consider his use of specific Bylaw articles, the citation of Powell v. Washburn, and his argument regarding the legislative intent of the Open Meeting Law.
4. Examine the arguments presented by the Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association. Why did the Judge find their interpretation of the Bylaws unconvincing, despite their claims that the Board was empowered to transact business with a quorum present?
5. Based on the text, discuss the broader implications of this ruling for homeowners’ associations in Arizona. How does this decision reinforce the principles of transparency and the limitations of a Board’s power relative to the association’s general membership?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
A section of the Arizona Revised Statutes, also known as Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, which mandates that meetings of an HOA’s members and board of directors must be open to all members and requires specific notice for meetings where bylaw amendments will be considered.
Bylaws
A set of rules that govern the internal operations of the homeowners’ association. In this case, key articles discussed include Article VI (Meeting of Directors), Article VII (Powers of the Board), and Article XIII (Amendments).
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are governing documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.
Member
As defined in the Association’s documents, a person entitled to membership by virtue of being a property owner within the Sycamore Vista subdivision. The Judge concluded this term refers to the body of owners, not the Board of Directors.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona, unaffiliated with the parties, responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings and making legal decisions in disputes like this one.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Jay A. Janicek, a homeowner in the Association.
Preponderance of the evidence
The burden of proof in this case. It is defined as evidence that is more likely true than not and has the most convincing force, sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue.
The authority to represent someone else, especially in voting. The document notes that the term “proxy” applies to votes of the members, as members of the Board are not permitted to vote by proxy.
Quorum
The minimum number of members of a deliberative assembly necessary to conduct the business of that group. For the Respondent’s Board of Directors, a quorum is defined as a majority of the number of Directors.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association.
Restrictive Covenants
Legal obligations imposed in a deed to real property to do or not do something. The Petitioner argued this term included the CC&Rs, Bylaws, and rules of the Association.
Tribunal
A body established to settle certain types of dispute. In this document, it refers to the Administrative Law Judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918001-REL
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19F-H1918001-REL-RHG
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Jay A. Janicek (Petitioner) and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core issue of the case, designated No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, revolves around whether the Homeowners Association violated its Bylaws and Arizona state statute (§ 33-1804) when its Board of Directors unilaterally amended the Bylaws on November 20, 2017. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board’s action was invalid because the power to amend the Bylaws was delegated to the Association’s general membership, not the Board of Directors, and the Board failed to provide the required notice for such an amendment. Consequently, the Petitioner’s request was granted, the amendment was invalidated, and the Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty.
What central conflict drove the administrative hearing and subsequent rehearing process?
How did governing documents and Arizona statutes shape the final legal decision?
What ultimate implications does this ruling have for homeowners association governance and member rights?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jay A. Janicek(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf at initial hearing; Observed rehearing
Jake Kubert(petitioner attorney) Dessaules Law Group Appeared at rehearing
Patricia Davies-Brown, Individually and as Trustee of the Trust; BART A. BROWN, JR.; SCOTT R. DAVIES
Counsel
—
Respondent
Starwood Estates Homeowners Association
Counsel
Daniel Campbell & Kristopher L. Smith
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs; Bylaws; Architectural Guidelines
Outcome Summary
The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.
Why this result: Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Exterior Appearance and Colors provisions regarding copper-colored metal roof approval
Petitioners alleged that the HOA improperly approved a copper-colored metal roof because it constituted a reflective surface and did not blend with the natural surroundings, violating the community documents. The ALJ denied the petition, finding Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its documents, noting the reflective surfaces ban applied to windows and doors, not roofs, and the roof's appearance was acceptable.
Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Briefing Document: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the administrative hearing and decision in case No. 18F-H1818039-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowners Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies (the “Petitioners”) and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the HOA Board of Directors’ 2013 approval of a copper-colored metal roof for homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin.
The Petitioners alleged this approval violated the community’s CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Architectural Guidelines. Their primary arguments were that the roof was an impermissible “reflective surface,” that it did not “blend with the natural surrounding and landscape,” and that the Board lacked the authority to approve it without prior review by the Architectural Committee (ACC) and without viewing a physical sample.
The Respondent defended the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board possessed the authority to grant such approvals. They contended the prohibition on reflective surfaces in the community guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not roofing. Furthermore, they asserted that the roof was aesthetically compliant and that other reflective metal roofs exist within the community.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision, issued on September 14, 2018, denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof. The ALJ found that the Board had the authority to approve the roof, the ban on reflective surfaces did not apply to roofing, and the Petitioners did not establish that the roof failed to blend with its natural surroundings.
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Case Overview
• Case Name: Patricia Davies-Brown, et al. vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association
• Case Number: 18F-H1818039-REL
• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Presiding Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge
• Hearing Dates: July 10, 2018, and August 13, 2018
• Final Decision Date: September 14, 2018
Key Parties and Representatives
Name(s)
Representation / Contact
Petitioners
Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., Scott R. Davies
Appeared on behalf of themselves 9777 E Dreyfus Ave., Scottsdale, AZ 85260 [email protected]
Respondent
Starwood Estates Homeowners Association
Kristopher L. Smith, Esq. O’Connor & Campbell, P.C. 7955 S Priest Dr., Tempe, AZ 85284 [email protected]
Homeowners
Jeff and Karen Martin
Owners of the property with the disputed roof at 8500 Skywood Drive, Pinetop, Arizona (Lot 40 of Starwood Estates).
Core Dispute: The Martin Residence Roof
The central conflict originated in the summer of 2013 when the Starwood Estates Board of Directors approved a request from Jeff and Karen Martin to install a copper-colored metal roof on their home. The approval was passed by a 5-1 vote. Petitioner Scott R. Davies was the sole board member who voted against the approval at that time.
The Board reviewed a brochure containing the roof’s color before granting approval but did not observe a physical sample. However, one Board member, Pat Knight, was reportedly familiar with the appearance of such roofs from a previous home she owned nearby. The petition challenging this 2013 decision was filed on or about March 26, 2018.
Petitioners’ Allegations and Arguments
The Petitioners filed their petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the HOA violated community governing documents. Their case was built on three central questions:
1. Does the exterior appearance of the Martins’ aluminum copper-colored metal roof blend with the “natural surrounding and landscape” of Starwood Estates?
2. Does such roof constitute a “reflective surface”?
3. If the answer to (1) above is no and/or the answer to (2) above is yes, did the ACC and the Board of Starwood Estates erroneously violate the provisions of the CC&R’s and GUIDELINES in permitting the Martins to install such aluminum copper-colored metal roof…?
During the hearing, the Petitioners expanded on these points, arguing:
• Reflective Surface: The copper-colored roof was a prohibited reflective surface under the Architectural Guidelines.
• Aesthetic Incompatibility: The roof did not blend with the natural surroundings as required.
• Procedural Violations:
◦ The Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample of the material.
◦ The approval was invalid because it should have first been granted by the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) appointed by the Board.
Respondent’s Defense and Arguments
The Starwood Estates HOA maintained that its approval of the Martin roof was proper and compliant with all governing documents. Their key arguments were:
• Board Authority: The HOA asserted that either the Board of Directors or the Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the roof.
• Interpretation of “Reflective Surfaces”: The Respondent argued that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” within the Architectural Guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not to roofing, which is addressed in a separate section of the guidelines.
• Aesthetic Compliance: They contended the roof, while having a “shine,” was not a barred reflective surface and did blend in with the natural surroundings.
• Precedent: The HOA noted that several other metal roofs that are reflective had been previously approved in Starwood Estates. They submitted images of reflective green and red roofs in the Pinetop Country Club area as evidence.
Referenced Governing Documents
The decision cited specific sections from the HOA’s governing documents to adjudicate the dispute.
• Section 3.1.4: Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any work that alters the exterior appearance of a Lot.
• Section 5.2: States that approvals or actions to be taken by the Association “shall be valid if given or taken by the Board.”
• Article VII, Section A(2): Grants the Board authority to exercise all powers and duties vested in the Association unless reserved to the membership.
• Article VII, Section B: Empowers the Board to “Review and approve any architectural plan for the building of any improvements on any Lots.”
• Exterior Appearance and Colors: Mandates that exterior appearance “shall blend with the natural surroundings and landscape.” It also states, “Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.” A note requires the owner to submit samples of materials for ACC approval.
• Roofs, Materials, and Pitches: Stipulates that “Metal roofs are permitted only with ACC approval” and that all pitched roof materials “shall promote a continuity of texture and color.”
Evidence Presented
• Petitioner’s Exhibit 13: A photograph of the Martins’ copper-colored roof. The ALJ’s decision noted that while the image showed a reflection, the photograph itself was “blurred.”
• Respondent’s Exhibit 26: The brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof that the Board reviewed before its 2013 approval.
• Respondent’s Exhibit 7: Images of other reflective green and red metal roofs located in the Pinetop Country Club area, which were previously approved.
• Testimony: Board member Pat Knight’s familiarity with the appearance of copper-colored roofs was noted.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The petition was denied. The ALJ found that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.
Conclusions of Law
1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not. They failed to meet this standard.
2. Board Authority: The ALJ concluded that the governing documents allowed for the roof to be approved by either the Architectural Committee or the Board of Directors. The Board’s action was therefore valid.
3. Interpretation of Reflective Surfaces: The evidence established that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines applies to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines. The existence of other approved shiny metal roofs further supported this interpretation.
4. Aesthetic Compliance: The Petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the copper-colored roof failed to blend in with the natural surroundings.
Final Order
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated the Community Bylaws, Community CC&Rs, and the Community Architectural Guidelines when Respondent approved the Martins’ request to install the copper-colored roof.
The order was made binding unless a rehearing was requested within 30 days of service.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818039-REL
Study Guide: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing case between Patricia Davies-Brown, et al., and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the context of the provided legal documents.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information presented in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL?
2. What specific architectural feature was the central point of the dispute?
3. What were the three main questions the Petitioners raised in their petition filed on March 26, 2018?
4. How did the Respondent (Starwood Estates HOA) justify the approval of other reflective metal roofs in the community?
5. According to the Petitioners, which two procedural errors did the Board of Directors commit when approving the Martins’ roof?
6. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the prohibition of “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines?
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioners were required to meet, and did they succeed?
8. Which governing documents grant the Board of Directors the authority to approve architectural plans?
9. When was the disputed roof originally approved by the Board, and what was the vote count?
10. What evidence did the Board review before its initial approval, and what evidence was not reviewed at that time?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioners were Patricia Davies-Brown (Individually and as Trustee of the Trust), Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies. The Respondent was the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association.
2. The central dispute was an aluminum, “copper-colored metal roof” installed by homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin on their property at Lot 40 of Starwood Estates. The Petitioners challenged the HOA Board’s approval of this roof.
3. The Petitioners’ petition questioned whether the roof blended with the “natural surrounding and landscape,” whether it constituted a “reflective surface,” and if so, whether the Board and ACC violated the CC&Rs and Guidelines by permitting it.
4. The Respondent submitted evidence of other reflective green and red metal roofs within the Pinetop Country Club area that had been previously approved by the Board. This was used to argue that roofs with a shine were not explicitly barred.
5. The Petitioners contended the Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample. They also argued that the roof required approval from the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) and could not be approved by the Board alone.
6. The Judge concluded that the bar on reflective surfaces, as written in the Architectural Guidelines, applies specifically to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines that does not contain the same prohibition.
7. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means showing their contention is more probably true than not. The Judge ruled that they failed to meet this standard.
8. Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs states that actions taken by the Board are valid, and Article VII of the Starwood Bylaws grants the Board the power to exercise Association authority and to review and approve architectural plans. The Judge found this authority allowed the Board to approve the roof.
9. The roof was approved by the Board of Directors in the summer of 2013. The approval passed with a 5-1 vote, with Petitioner Scott R. Davies being the sole board member who voted against it.
10. Before approving the roof, the Board reviewed a brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof. However, the Board did not observe a physical sample of the actual roofing material.
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Essay Questions for Further Study
The following questions are designed for deeper, analytical consideration of the case. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the conflict between CC&Rs Section 3.1.4 (requiring ACC approval) and other governing documents (like CC&Rs Section 5.2 and Bylaws Article VII) that grant broad authority to the Board. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent contradiction in the final decision?
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail why the Petitioners failed to meet this standard with respect to their claims about the roof’s reflective nature and its harmony with the natural surroundings.
3. Examine the interpretation of the Architectural Guidelines regarding “reflective surfaces.” How did the Respondent and the Administrative Law Judge construe this rule, and what evidence and reasoning supported their interpretation over the Petitioners’ broader application?
4. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioners and the Respondent. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s evidence (e.g., the blurred photograph vs. the brochure and photos of other roofs) and explain how this likely influenced the outcome of the case.
5. Based on the issues raised in this case, what specific changes or clarifications could be made to the community’s CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines to prevent similar disputes in the future?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition in Context
ACC (Architectural Committee)
A committee, as referenced in the CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines, responsible for approving exterior alterations and ensuring all building materials and colors conform to community standards.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The presiding official (Velva Moses-Thompson) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducts hearings, evaluates evidence, and issues a binding decision on the matter.
Architectural Guidelines
A set of community documents establishing goals and specific rules for exterior appearance, colors, materials, and site development to retain the character of Starwood Estates.
Board of Directors (Board)
The governing body of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which is empowered by the CC&Rs and Bylaws to conduct the affairs of the Association and approve architectural plans.
Bylaws
The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, including the powers and duties of the Board of Directors.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in the Starwood Estates community that govern what homeowners may or may not do with their property.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the ALJ’s decision that applies legal principles, statutes, and case law to the established facts of the case to reach a final judgment.
Findings of Fact
The section of the ALJ’s decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.
Petitioner
The party that initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies, who brought the complaint against the HOA.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has a greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, persuading the fact-finder that a contention is more likely true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which had to defend its decision to approve the roof.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or community document (like a CC&R) that limits the use of the property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818039-REL
This Copper Roof Caused a Legal Battle: 3 Surprising Lessons Every Homeowner Should Learn
Introduction: The Neighborhood Dispute That Went to Court
The relationship between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a delicate balance. Architectural rules, designed to maintain a community’s aesthetic, often become a source of friction. But what happens when a disagreement over design choices escalates?
In the case of Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, a dispute over Jeff and Karen Martin’s new copper-colored metal roof didn’t just cause whispers over the fence—it went all the way to a formal administrative hearing. When the HOA board approved the roof in a 5-1 vote, the lone dissenting board member, Scott R. Davies, joined two other homeowners to formally challenge the decision.
This seemingly simple disagreement over a roofing material reveals several powerful, and often counter-intuitive, lessons for anyone living in a planned community. From the structural placement of a single sentence to the evidentiary power of a blurry photograph, this case offers a masterclass in HOA law. Here are three surprising lessons every homeowner should learn.
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1. The Devil in the Document: How a Single Sentence Can Decide Everything
The first major lesson from this case is that the hyper-specific wording and structure of your community guidelines are paramount. The location and context of a rule can be just as important as the rule itself.
The petitioners’ core argument was that the copper-colored roof violated the Architectural Guidelines because it was a “reflective surface,” which they believed was forbidden. On the surface, this seems like a straightforward complaint.
However, the HOA mounted a successful counter-argument based on document structure. The Administrative Law Judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation. The rules for roofs were addressed in a distinct section titled “Roofs, Materials, and Pitches.” The ban on “reflective surfaces,” meanwhile, was located in an entirely separate section, “Exterior Appearance and Colors,” which also contained rules for windows and doors. This seemingly minor structural detail was the deciding factor on this point.
The exact rule the petitioners cited, found in the “Exterior Appearance and Colors” section, illustrates the point perfectly:
Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.
Because this prohibition was not located in the roofing section, the judge concluded it applied only to windows, doors, and general exterior surfaces—not roofs. This case highlights that homeowners must read their community documents with extreme care. A prohibition you think is universal might, in fact, be limited to a very specific context by its placement in the text.
2. The Power of Precedent: What Your Neighbors Did Years Ago Matters Today
The second key takeaway is that an HOA board’s decisions can be heavily influenced by the character of the surrounding area, not just by what has been approved inside the development’s gates.
During the hearing, the HOA presented evidence of other reflective metal roofs, including green and red ones, that existed in the broader Pinetop Country Club area. Starwood Estates is part of this larger community, and the judge’s official findings noted this evidence, which significantly supported the HOA’s position to approve the Martins’ copper-colored roof.
This reveals a nuanced lesson: an HOA doesn’t exist in a vacuum. Once a certain style or material becomes common in the surrounding region, it can establish a de facto community standard. This makes it significantly more difficult for other homeowners to argue against a similar request, as the board can point to the broader neighborhood aesthetic to justify its decision. Before you challenge a project, it’s crucial to look not only at what has been approved within your HOA, but also at the character of the community at large.
3. The Burden of Proof: Your Complaint Is Only as Good as Your Evidence
The third critical lesson is that in any formal dispute, the quality of your evidence is non-negotiable. A subjective feeling or personal opinion holds little weight without objective proof.
The petitioners attempted to prove the roof was overly reflective by submitting a photograph as evidence. However, the judge’s official findings delivered a devastating blow, noting with precise and revealing language: “Although the image showed a reflective the image, the photograph was blurred.”
This detail underscores a vital point: in a legal or formal setting, a complaint must be backed by clear, objective proof. Weak or poor-quality evidence, like a blurred photo, can completely undermine an otherwise valid concern. Even though the image hinted at the issue, its poor quality rendered it useless. If you are going to make a claim, the burden is on you to prove it with convincing, high-quality evidence. Without it, your case is likely to be dismissed.
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Conclusion: Before You Build or Battle, Do Your Homework
The Starwood Estates case serves as a powerful reminder that navigating HOA rules requires diligence. From this single dispute over a copper roof, we learn to read the fine print—and the structure—of governing documents, understand the power of aesthetic standards in the broader community, and ensure any complaint is backed by strong, clear evidence.
The next time you plan a home project or question a neighbor’s, ask yourself: have you really done your homework on the rules, the history, and the facts?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Patricia Davies-Brown(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of petitioners
Bart A. Brown, Jr.(petitioner)
Scott R. Davies(petitioner, board member) Starwood Estates HOA Board Voted against the roof approval
Respondent Side
Kristopher L. Smith(HOA attorney) O'Connor & Campbell, P.C. Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Daniel Campbell(HOA attorney) O'Connor & Campbell, P.C.
Pat Knight(board member) Starwood Estates HOA Board
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
L Dettorre(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
A Hansen(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
D Jones(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
D Gardner(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
N Cano(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
C Serrano(OAH Staff) Office of Administrative Hearings Transmitted the order
Other Participants
Jeff Martin(Starwood Estates resident) Starwood Estates Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute
Karen Martin(Starwood Estates resident) Starwood Estates Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute
Patricia Davies-Brown, Individually and as Trustee of the Trust; BART A. BROWN, JR.; SCOTT R. DAVIES
Counsel
—
Respondent
Starwood Estates Homeowners Association
Counsel
Daniel Campbell & Kristopher L. Smith
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs; Bylaws; Architectural Guidelines
Outcome Summary
The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.
Why this result: Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Exterior Appearance and Colors provisions regarding copper-colored metal roof approval
Petitioners alleged that the HOA improperly approved a copper-colored metal roof because it constituted a reflective surface and did not blend with the natural surroundings, violating the community documents. The ALJ denied the petition, finding Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its documents, noting the reflective surfaces ban applied to windows and doors, not roofs, and the roof's appearance was acceptable.
Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Briefing Document: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the administrative hearing and decision in case No. 18F-H1818039-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowners Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies (the “Petitioners”) and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the HOA Board of Directors’ 2013 approval of a copper-colored metal roof for homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin.
The Petitioners alleged this approval violated the community’s CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Architectural Guidelines. Their primary arguments were that the roof was an impermissible “reflective surface,” that it did not “blend with the natural surrounding and landscape,” and that the Board lacked the authority to approve it without prior review by the Architectural Committee (ACC) and without viewing a physical sample.
The Respondent defended the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board possessed the authority to grant such approvals. They contended the prohibition on reflective surfaces in the community guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not roofing. Furthermore, they asserted that the roof was aesthetically compliant and that other reflective metal roofs exist within the community.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision, issued on September 14, 2018, denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof. The ALJ found that the Board had the authority to approve the roof, the ban on reflective surfaces did not apply to roofing, and the Petitioners did not establish that the roof failed to blend with its natural surroundings.
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Case Overview
• Case Name: Patricia Davies-Brown, et al. vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association
• Case Number: 18F-H1818039-REL
• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Presiding Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge
• Hearing Dates: July 10, 2018, and August 13, 2018
• Final Decision Date: September 14, 2018
Key Parties and Representatives
Name(s)
Representation / Contact
Petitioners
Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., Scott R. Davies
Appeared on behalf of themselves 9777 E Dreyfus Ave., Scottsdale, AZ 85260 [email protected]
Respondent
Starwood Estates Homeowners Association
Kristopher L. Smith, Esq. O’Connor & Campbell, P.C. 7955 S Priest Dr., Tempe, AZ 85284 [email protected]
Homeowners
Jeff and Karen Martin
Owners of the property with the disputed roof at 8500 Skywood Drive, Pinetop, Arizona (Lot 40 of Starwood Estates).
Core Dispute: The Martin Residence Roof
The central conflict originated in the summer of 2013 when the Starwood Estates Board of Directors approved a request from Jeff and Karen Martin to install a copper-colored metal roof on their home. The approval was passed by a 5-1 vote. Petitioner Scott R. Davies was the sole board member who voted against the approval at that time.
The Board reviewed a brochure containing the roof’s color before granting approval but did not observe a physical sample. However, one Board member, Pat Knight, was reportedly familiar with the appearance of such roofs from a previous home she owned nearby. The petition challenging this 2013 decision was filed on or about March 26, 2018.
Petitioners’ Allegations and Arguments
The Petitioners filed their petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the HOA violated community governing documents. Their case was built on three central questions:
1. Does the exterior appearance of the Martins’ aluminum copper-colored metal roof blend with the “natural surrounding and landscape” of Starwood Estates?
2. Does such roof constitute a “reflective surface”?
3. If the answer to (1) above is no and/or the answer to (2) above is yes, did the ACC and the Board of Starwood Estates erroneously violate the provisions of the CC&R’s and GUIDELINES in permitting the Martins to install such aluminum copper-colored metal roof…?
During the hearing, the Petitioners expanded on these points, arguing:
• Reflective Surface: The copper-colored roof was a prohibited reflective surface under the Architectural Guidelines.
• Aesthetic Incompatibility: The roof did not blend with the natural surroundings as required.
• Procedural Violations:
◦ The Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample of the material.
◦ The approval was invalid because it should have first been granted by the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) appointed by the Board.
Respondent’s Defense and Arguments
The Starwood Estates HOA maintained that its approval of the Martin roof was proper and compliant with all governing documents. Their key arguments were:
• Board Authority: The HOA asserted that either the Board of Directors or the Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the roof.
• Interpretation of “Reflective Surfaces”: The Respondent argued that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” within the Architectural Guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not to roofing, which is addressed in a separate section of the guidelines.
• Aesthetic Compliance: They contended the roof, while having a “shine,” was not a barred reflective surface and did blend in with the natural surroundings.
• Precedent: The HOA noted that several other metal roofs that are reflective had been previously approved in Starwood Estates. They submitted images of reflective green and red roofs in the Pinetop Country Club area as evidence.
Referenced Governing Documents
The decision cited specific sections from the HOA’s governing documents to adjudicate the dispute.
• Section 3.1.4: Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any work that alters the exterior appearance of a Lot.
• Section 5.2: States that approvals or actions to be taken by the Association “shall be valid if given or taken by the Board.”
• Article VII, Section A(2): Grants the Board authority to exercise all powers and duties vested in the Association unless reserved to the membership.
• Article VII, Section B: Empowers the Board to “Review and approve any architectural plan for the building of any improvements on any Lots.”
• Exterior Appearance and Colors: Mandates that exterior appearance “shall blend with the natural surroundings and landscape.” It also states, “Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.” A note requires the owner to submit samples of materials for ACC approval.
• Roofs, Materials, and Pitches: Stipulates that “Metal roofs are permitted only with ACC approval” and that all pitched roof materials “shall promote a continuity of texture and color.”
Evidence Presented
• Petitioner’s Exhibit 13: A photograph of the Martins’ copper-colored roof. The ALJ’s decision noted that while the image showed a reflection, the photograph itself was “blurred.”
• Respondent’s Exhibit 26: The brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof that the Board reviewed before its 2013 approval.
• Respondent’s Exhibit 7: Images of other reflective green and red metal roofs located in the Pinetop Country Club area, which were previously approved.
• Testimony: Board member Pat Knight’s familiarity with the appearance of copper-colored roofs was noted.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The petition was denied. The ALJ found that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.
Conclusions of Law
1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not. They failed to meet this standard.
2. Board Authority: The ALJ concluded that the governing documents allowed for the roof to be approved by either the Architectural Committee or the Board of Directors. The Board’s action was therefore valid.
3. Interpretation of Reflective Surfaces: The evidence established that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines applies to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines. The existence of other approved shiny metal roofs further supported this interpretation.
4. Aesthetic Compliance: The Petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the copper-colored roof failed to blend in with the natural surroundings.
Final Order
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated the Community Bylaws, Community CC&Rs, and the Community Architectural Guidelines when Respondent approved the Martins’ request to install the copper-colored roof.
The order was made binding unless a rehearing was requested within 30 days of service.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818039-REL
Study Guide: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing case between Patricia Davies-Brown, et al., and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the context of the provided legal documents.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information presented in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL?
2. What specific architectural feature was the central point of the dispute?
3. What were the three main questions the Petitioners raised in their petition filed on March 26, 2018?
4. How did the Respondent (Starwood Estates HOA) justify the approval of other reflective metal roofs in the community?
5. According to the Petitioners, which two procedural errors did the Board of Directors commit when approving the Martins’ roof?
6. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the prohibition of “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines?
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioners were required to meet, and did they succeed?
8. Which governing documents grant the Board of Directors the authority to approve architectural plans?
9. When was the disputed roof originally approved by the Board, and what was the vote count?
10. What evidence did the Board review before its initial approval, and what evidence was not reviewed at that time?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioners were Patricia Davies-Brown (Individually and as Trustee of the Trust), Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies. The Respondent was the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association.
2. The central dispute was an aluminum, “copper-colored metal roof” installed by homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin on their property at Lot 40 of Starwood Estates. The Petitioners challenged the HOA Board’s approval of this roof.
3. The Petitioners’ petition questioned whether the roof blended with the “natural surrounding and landscape,” whether it constituted a “reflective surface,” and if so, whether the Board and ACC violated the CC&Rs and Guidelines by permitting it.
4. The Respondent submitted evidence of other reflective green and red metal roofs within the Pinetop Country Club area that had been previously approved by the Board. This was used to argue that roofs with a shine were not explicitly barred.
5. The Petitioners contended the Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample. They also argued that the roof required approval from the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) and could not be approved by the Board alone.
6. The Judge concluded that the bar on reflective surfaces, as written in the Architectural Guidelines, applies specifically to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines that does not contain the same prohibition.
7. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means showing their contention is more probably true than not. The Judge ruled that they failed to meet this standard.
8. Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs states that actions taken by the Board are valid, and Article VII of the Starwood Bylaws grants the Board the power to exercise Association authority and to review and approve architectural plans. The Judge found this authority allowed the Board to approve the roof.
9. The roof was approved by the Board of Directors in the summer of 2013. The approval passed with a 5-1 vote, with Petitioner Scott R. Davies being the sole board member who voted against it.
10. Before approving the roof, the Board reviewed a brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof. However, the Board did not observe a physical sample of the actual roofing material.
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Essay Questions for Further Study
The following questions are designed for deeper, analytical consideration of the case. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the conflict between CC&Rs Section 3.1.4 (requiring ACC approval) and other governing documents (like CC&Rs Section 5.2 and Bylaws Article VII) that grant broad authority to the Board. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent contradiction in the final decision?
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail why the Petitioners failed to meet this standard with respect to their claims about the roof’s reflective nature and its harmony with the natural surroundings.
3. Examine the interpretation of the Architectural Guidelines regarding “reflective surfaces.” How did the Respondent and the Administrative Law Judge construe this rule, and what evidence and reasoning supported their interpretation over the Petitioners’ broader application?
4. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioners and the Respondent. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s evidence (e.g., the blurred photograph vs. the brochure and photos of other roofs) and explain how this likely influenced the outcome of the case.
5. Based on the issues raised in this case, what specific changes or clarifications could be made to the community’s CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines to prevent similar disputes in the future?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition in Context
ACC (Architectural Committee)
A committee, as referenced in the CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines, responsible for approving exterior alterations and ensuring all building materials and colors conform to community standards.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The presiding official (Velva Moses-Thompson) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducts hearings, evaluates evidence, and issues a binding decision on the matter.
Architectural Guidelines
A set of community documents establishing goals and specific rules for exterior appearance, colors, materials, and site development to retain the character of Starwood Estates.
Board of Directors (Board)
The governing body of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which is empowered by the CC&Rs and Bylaws to conduct the affairs of the Association and approve architectural plans.
Bylaws
The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, including the powers and duties of the Board of Directors.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in the Starwood Estates community that govern what homeowners may or may not do with their property.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the ALJ’s decision that applies legal principles, statutes, and case law to the established facts of the case to reach a final judgment.
Findings of Fact
The section of the ALJ’s decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.
Petitioner
The party that initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies, who brought the complaint against the HOA.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has a greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, persuading the fact-finder that a contention is more likely true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which had to defend its decision to approve the roof.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or community document (like a CC&R) that limits the use of the property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818039-REL
This Copper Roof Caused a Legal Battle: 3 Surprising Lessons Every Homeowner Should Learn
Introduction: The Neighborhood Dispute That Went to Court
The relationship between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a delicate balance. Architectural rules, designed to maintain a community’s aesthetic, often become a source of friction. But what happens when a disagreement over design choices escalates?
In the case of Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, a dispute over Jeff and Karen Martin’s new copper-colored metal roof didn’t just cause whispers over the fence—it went all the way to a formal administrative hearing. When the HOA board approved the roof in a 5-1 vote, the lone dissenting board member, Scott R. Davies, joined two other homeowners to formally challenge the decision.
This seemingly simple disagreement over a roofing material reveals several powerful, and often counter-intuitive, lessons for anyone living in a planned community. From the structural placement of a single sentence to the evidentiary power of a blurry photograph, this case offers a masterclass in HOA law. Here are three surprising lessons every homeowner should learn.
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1. The Devil in the Document: How a Single Sentence Can Decide Everything
The first major lesson from this case is that the hyper-specific wording and structure of your community guidelines are paramount. The location and context of a rule can be just as important as the rule itself.
The petitioners’ core argument was that the copper-colored roof violated the Architectural Guidelines because it was a “reflective surface,” which they believed was forbidden. On the surface, this seems like a straightforward complaint.
However, the HOA mounted a successful counter-argument based on document structure. The Administrative Law Judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation. The rules for roofs were addressed in a distinct section titled “Roofs, Materials, and Pitches.” The ban on “reflective surfaces,” meanwhile, was located in an entirely separate section, “Exterior Appearance and Colors,” which also contained rules for windows and doors. This seemingly minor structural detail was the deciding factor on this point.
The exact rule the petitioners cited, found in the “Exterior Appearance and Colors” section, illustrates the point perfectly:
Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.
Because this prohibition was not located in the roofing section, the judge concluded it applied only to windows, doors, and general exterior surfaces—not roofs. This case highlights that homeowners must read their community documents with extreme care. A prohibition you think is universal might, in fact, be limited to a very specific context by its placement in the text.
2. The Power of Precedent: What Your Neighbors Did Years Ago Matters Today
The second key takeaway is that an HOA board’s decisions can be heavily influenced by the character of the surrounding area, not just by what has been approved inside the development’s gates.
During the hearing, the HOA presented evidence of other reflective metal roofs, including green and red ones, that existed in the broader Pinetop Country Club area. Starwood Estates is part of this larger community, and the judge’s official findings noted this evidence, which significantly supported the HOA’s position to approve the Martins’ copper-colored roof.
This reveals a nuanced lesson: an HOA doesn’t exist in a vacuum. Once a certain style or material becomes common in the surrounding region, it can establish a de facto community standard. This makes it significantly more difficult for other homeowners to argue against a similar request, as the board can point to the broader neighborhood aesthetic to justify its decision. Before you challenge a project, it’s crucial to look not only at what has been approved within your HOA, but also at the character of the community at large.
3. The Burden of Proof: Your Complaint Is Only as Good as Your Evidence
The third critical lesson is that in any formal dispute, the quality of your evidence is non-negotiable. A subjective feeling or personal opinion holds little weight without objective proof.
The petitioners attempted to prove the roof was overly reflective by submitting a photograph as evidence. However, the judge’s official findings delivered a devastating blow, noting with precise and revealing language: “Although the image showed a reflective the image, the photograph was blurred.”
This detail underscores a vital point: in a legal or formal setting, a complaint must be backed by clear, objective proof. Weak or poor-quality evidence, like a blurred photo, can completely undermine an otherwise valid concern. Even though the image hinted at the issue, its poor quality rendered it useless. If you are going to make a claim, the burden is on you to prove it with convincing, high-quality evidence. Without it, your case is likely to be dismissed.
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Conclusion: Before You Build or Battle, Do Your Homework
The Starwood Estates case serves as a powerful reminder that navigating HOA rules requires diligence. From this single dispute over a copper roof, we learn to read the fine print—and the structure—of governing documents, understand the power of aesthetic standards in the broader community, and ensure any complaint is backed by strong, clear evidence.
The next time you plan a home project or question a neighbor’s, ask yourself: have you really done your homework on the rules, the history, and the facts?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Patricia Davies-Brown(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of petitioners
Bart A. Brown, Jr.(petitioner)
Scott R. Davies(petitioner, board member) Starwood Estates HOA Board Voted against the roof approval
Respondent Side
Kristopher L. Smith(HOA attorney) O'Connor & Campbell, P.C. Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Daniel Campbell(HOA attorney) O'Connor & Campbell, P.C.
Pat Knight(board member) Starwood Estates HOA Board
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
L Dettorre(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
A Hansen(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
D Jones(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
D Gardner(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
N Cano(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
C Serrano(OAH Staff) Office of Administrative Hearings Transmitted the order
Other Participants
Jeff Martin(Starwood Estates resident) Starwood Estates Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute
Karen Martin(Starwood Estates resident) Starwood Estates Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes
Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.
Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 660026.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:02 (91.5 KB)
18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 720468.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:02 (103.5 KB)
This is a concise summary of the administrative law proceedings concerning Lawrence M. Stewart's petition against the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., drawing from the original hearing (September 6, 2018) and the subsequent rehearing (January 2, 2019).
Summary of Administrative Law Case: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
Key Facts
The Petitioner, Lawrence M. Stewart, an owner and former Board member, made changes to the common or limited common area around his unit without prior permission, violating section 5.1 of the CC&Rs. After being informed of the violation, Mr. Stewart requested a variance from the Association Board while he was still a member. At a Board meeting on February 18, 2018, Mr. Stewart resigned, and the two remaining Board members (Sandra Fernandez and David Larson) voted to deny his variance request, requiring him to restore the areas to their original condition.
Main Issues and Petitioner's Arguments
Mr. Stewart filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Association violated Bylaws section 5.4. His central argument was that the Board did not act in good faith when denying the variance request. He asserted that Board member David Larson was biased against him and that the denial was unfair because other units were also non-conforming with the CC&Rs. Mr. Stewart cited Bylaws Section 5.4 because he testified it was the only section referring to a “good faith” requirement in the governing documents.
Key Legal Points and Analysis
Burden of Proof: Mr. Stewart bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws are considered a contract, and the Respondent (Association) is required to act reasonably in exercising its authority.
Applicability of Section 5.4: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Bylaws Article V, Section 5.4 (Liability/Indemnification) does not impose any duty on the Board members; rather, it merely shields them from liability if they act in good faith. Mr. Stewart eventually acknowledged that the Association had not technically violated Section 5.4.
Reasonableness of Board Action: The Board's stated reason for denying the variance was fear of "open[ing] a Pandora’s Box" where other unit owners would request variances. The ALJ found this concern to be a not unreasonable position for a condominium association board.
Lack of Evidence for Bias/Unfairness: The ALJ found that Mr. Stewart did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board lacked good faith, was biased against him, or treated him unfairly. Regarding the assertion of other non-conforming units, there was no evidence that those owners had requested variances, making that testimony not probative of the issue at hand.
Outcome
The Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. Stewart failed to meet his burden of proof. Consequently, Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition was dismissed in both the initial decision (September 14, 2018) and the binding order issued after the rehearing (January 17, 2019). The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818052-REL
Study Guide: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case Lawrence M. Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818052-REL). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the initial hearing and subsequent rehearing as detailed in the decisions issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be approximately two to three sentences long.
1. What initial action taken by Lawrence M. Stewart prompted the Canyon Gate Condominium Association to contact him with a notice of violation?
2. What specific section of the Association Bylaws did Mr. Stewart allege was violated in his petition to the Department of Real Estate?
3. What was Mr. Stewart’s position within the Association at the time he requested a variance for the changes he had made?
4. According to Mr. Stewart, what was the Board’s primary reason for denying his variance request?
5. Why did Mr. Stewart ultimately resign from the Association’s Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting?
6. In the initial hearing, what three pieces of evidence did Mr. Stewart present to support his allegation that Board member David Larson was biased against him?
7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bears the burden of meeting that standard?
8. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the function of Bylaws Section 5.4, characterizing it as either a “shield” or a “sword”?
9. During the rehearing, what new piece of evidence did Mr. Stewart introduce to support his claim of bias from Mr. Larson?
10. What was the final ruling in both the initial hearing (September 14, 2018) and the rehearing (January 17, 2019)?
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Quiz Answer Key
1. Mr. Stewart made changes to the common area and/or limited common area around his condominium unit without first getting permission from the Association. This action was a violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, leading the Association’s counsel to send him a letter on November 15, 2017.
2. Mr. Stewart’s petition alleged that the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4. He later clarified that he cited this specific section because it was the only one in the governing documents that included a “good faith” requirement, which he believed the Board had failed to meet.
3. At the time he requested a variance to approve the changes he had made, Mr. Stewart was an active member of the Association’s Board of Directors. The other two members were Sandra Fernandez and David Larson.
4. The Board denied his request because they feared it would “open a Pandora’s Box,” leading other unit owners to request variances for changes to the common area. The judge found this was not an unreasonable position for a condominium association board to take.
5. Mr. Stewart resigned from the Board because he got the sense “right away” that the other two board members, Ms. Fernandez and Mr. Larson, had already made up their minds to deny his request and would not approve it.
6. To support his bias claim, Mr. Stewart relied on: (1) a biography of Mr. Larson prepared by the property manager, (2) statements Mr. Larson made in notes from a November 28, 2017 Board meeting, and (3) his belief that the other members had already decided the matter without his input.
7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof to meet this standard rests entirely on the Petitioner, Mr. Stewart.
8. The judge concluded that Section 5.4 acts as a “shield” to protect Board members from liability when they act in good faith. It does not impose a duty on them and cannot be used as a “sword” by an owner to force a particular action from the Board.
9. At the rehearing, Mr. Stewart entered into evidence an October 3, 2018 letter written by Mr. Larson to the Association’s members. In the letter, Mr. Larson urged the members not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.
10. In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stewart’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that Bylaws Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s claim. How did Mr. Stewart’s interpretation of the section as a “sword” versus a “shield” contribute to this outcome?
2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Evaluate the evidence Mr. Stewart presented to prove bias and unfair treatment, and explain why the judge found it insufficient to meet this standard.
3. Examine the Board’s justification for denying the variance request (the “Pandora’s Box” argument). Based on the court’s conclusions, discuss why this was considered a “reasonable position” for a condominium association board, even without a detailed inspection of Mr. Stewart’s specific changes.
4. Trace the evolution of Mr. Stewart’s arguments and evidence from the initial hearing on September 6, 2018, to the rehearing on January 2, 2019. What new evidence was introduced, and did it fundamentally change the core issues or the final outcome of the case?
5. Explore the principle established in the “Conclusions of Law” that Association Bylaws function as a contract between the parties. How does this principle require both homeowners and the Association Board to act, and how did it influence the judge’s final decision in this matter?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition in the Context of the Case
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, Thomas Shedden, who presided over the hearings, reviewed the evidence, and issued the final decisions in this matter.
Bylaws
A contract between the Association and its members. The parties are required to comply with its terms, and the Association must act reasonably in exercising its authority under them. Mr. Stewart alleged a violation of Bylaws Section 5.4.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Mr. Stewart was found to be in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes to a common area.
Common Area
An area around a condominium unit that is not privately owned. Mr. Stewart made unauthorized changes to the common and/or limited common area around his unit.
Good Faith
A standard of conduct mentioned in Bylaws Section 5.4, which shields Board members from liability if they act accordingly. Mr. Stewart’s core argument was that the Board did not act in good faith when denying his variance request.
Indemnification
The subject of Article V of the Bylaws. Section 5.4, titled “Liability,” falls under this article and serves to protect, or indemnify, the Board from liability.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Lawrence M. Stewart.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Recuse
To formally withdraw from a decision-making process due to a conflict of interest. The Association’s attorney incorrectly stated in a letter that Mr. Stewart had recused himself from voting on his own variance request.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
Variance
A formal request for an exception to the established rules (the CC&Rs). Mr. Stewart requested a variance to gain approval for the changes he had already made to the common area.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818052-REL
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660026.pdf
683622.pdf
694095.pdf
720468.pdf
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18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
4 sources
These documents consist of Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, detailing a dispute between Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart and the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. The core issue revolves around Mr. Stewart making unauthorized changes to the common area of his unit and his subsequent failed attempt to obtain a variance from the Association’s Board. The sources include an initial decision (dated September 14, 2018) and two decisions stemming from a rehearing (both dated January 17, 2019, though one is more detailed), all concluding that Mr. Stewart’s petition must be dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. Stewart failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association acted in bad faith or was biased against him when it denied his request, despite his reliance on a Bylaws section regarding indemnity which the court found acted as a “shield” for the Board rather than a source of duty.
Based on 4 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Lawrence M. Stewart(petitioner) Was also a board member during the variance request period, but resigned prior to the vote to deny his request
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(Respondent Attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Nicolas C. S. Nogami(Respondent Attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Also appears as 'Nichols C. S. Nogami'
Sandra Fernandez(board member) Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request
David Larson(board member) Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request; Petitioner alleged bias against him
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
F. Del Sol(Administrative Staff) Transmitted copies of the decision
