The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.
Key Issues & Findings
Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:06 (107.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL
Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”
The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”
The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.
Case Overview
This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
18F-H1818053-REL
Petitioner
Travis Prall
Respondent
Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Initial Hearing
September 4, 2018
Initial Decision
September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)
Rehearing
January 11, 2019
Final Decision
January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)
Timeline of Key Events
• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.
• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.
• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.
• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.
• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.
Central Allegation and Dispute
The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.
Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)
The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.
• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.
• Inferences about Original Landscaping:
◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.
◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.
◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.
Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)
The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.
• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.
• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.
• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.
◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.
◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.
◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”
Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections
The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.
Section
Provision
Significance in the Case
The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“
This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”
“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…
This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.
“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…
This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.
Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.
Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)
• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”
• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”
• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.
Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)
• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”
• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”
• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”
• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818053-REL
Study Guide: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal decisions. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition?
3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing.
4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request?
5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent.
6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion?
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision?
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?
9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles? The Petitioner was Travis Prall, the homeowner who filed the dispute. The Respondent was the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association (HOA), which was defending against the Petitioner’s claims. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition? The Petitioner alleged a violation of Section 7.1.4 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). His central claim was that the HOA violated this section by neglecting its duty to perform yard maintenance in his backyard, which he argued was a “visible public yard.”
3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing. The exterior homes feature six to seven-foot-tall block wall fences enclosing their backyards. In contrast, the interior homes, including the Petitioner’s, have a shorter back wall consisting of a two-foot block wall topped with a two-foot aluminum fence, making the total height approximately four feet and more visible from a common walkway.
4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request? In 2018, the HOA had a “pony wall” in the Petitioner’s backyard repaired and was informed by the repair company, Sun King Fencing & Gates, that the wall had buckled due to tree roots. Consequently, the HOA issued a Courtesy Letter on May 3, 2018, requesting that the Petitioner “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent. The Respondent argued that a yard is considered a “Private Yard” if it is enclosed or shielded from view, meaning any enclosed yard qualified. The Petitioner argued that the definition should be read to mean a yard is private only if it is enclosed so that it is not generally visible from neighboring property, implying visibility was the key factor.
6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion? The Petitioner testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA had provided landscaping maintenance for his backyard. The Respondent denied this claim, stating that it had never provided any landscaping maintenance to any backyards in the community and raised liability concerns about entering residents’ enclosed yards.
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision? The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case? The judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to present evidence proving that the tree in his backyard was “originally installed by the Declarant” (the developer). According to Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs, the HOA’s maintenance responsibility only applied to landscaping and improvements installed by the original community developer.
9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter? Maureen Karpinski testified that none of the homes in the community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards and that they were “just dirt” at the time of purchase. Her testimony was considered credible because she was a real estate agent involved in the initial sales, had walked the community with many buyers during construction, and was herself an original buyer.
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019? In both the initial decision issued on September 24, 2018, and the final decision issued after the rehearing on January 31, 2019, the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated the CC&Rs.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style answers. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard” as defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found it unnecessary to rule on this specific issue to reach a decision.
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard shape the proceedings, and what specific types of evidence (or lack thereof) were most influential in the judge’s final decision?
3. Trace the timeline of the dispute over the tree in Travis Prall’s backyard, from the 2014 storm to the final legal decision in 2019. How did each key event contribute to the escalation of the conflict and the arguments presented at the hearings?
4. Compare the evidence presented by Travis Prall with the evidence presented by the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA at the rehearing. Why did the judge characterize Prall’s evidence as “suppositions and inferences” while deeming the HOA’s evidence “credible”?
5. Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs contains the phrase “as originally installed by Declarant.” Explain the critical importance of this phrase to the outcome of the case and how it became the dispositive legal issue, overshadowing all other arguments.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community.
Common Area
Areas within the community maintained by the HOA for the benefit of all residents. The HOA provides landscaping for these areas.
Courtesy Letter
A formal notice sent by the HOA to a homeowner regarding a potential violation or required action. In this case, it requested the removal of a tree causing damage.
Declarant
The original developer of the planned community who installed the initial infrastructure and landscaping.
HOA Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal hearing regarding an alleged violation by their HOA.
Improvements
A term used in the CC&Rs referring to any additions to a lot other than the main residential dwelling, including landscaping.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the homeowner Travis Prall.
Pony Wall
A term used to describe the short, two-foot-tall block wall in the backyards of the interior homes, which was buckling due to tree roots.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention “more probably true than not.”
Private Yard
As defined in the CC&Rs, a portion of a yard “which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property.” The interpretation of this definition was a point of contention.
Public Yard
As defined in the CC&Rs, the portion of a yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property,” regardless of its location on the lot. The HOA is responsible for maintaining landscaping originally installed by the Declarant in Public Yards.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the claims. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA.
Visible from Neighboring Property
A term defined in the CC&Rs to mean an object that would be visible to a six-foot-tall person standing on a neighboring property. It includes a specific exception for objects visible only through a wrought iron fence.
As defined in the CC&Rs, “the portion of the Lot devoted to Improvements other than the Residential Dwelling.”
Blog Post – 18F-H1818053-REL
⚖️
No emoji found
Loading
18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
2 sources
These documents are two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Travis Prall, the Petitioner, and the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, the Respondent. The first document outlines the initial decision, dated September 24, 2018, which dismissed Mr. Prall’s petition arguing the HOA violated their Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements (CC&Rs) by neglecting yard maintenance. The second document is the decision following a rehearing requested by the Petitioner, dated January 31, 2019, which reaffirmed the initial dismissal, concluding that Mr. Prall failed to prove that the landscaping in question was originally installed by the Declarant, a prerequisite for the HOA’s maintenance responsibility under the CC&Rs. Both decisions rely heavily on interpreting sections of the CC&Rs, particularly the definitions of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard,” to determine the HOA’s obligation. Ultimately, both rulings found that the Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Travis Prall(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Lydia Pierce Linsmeier(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Nicole Payne(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Maureen Karpinski(board member) Villas at Tierra Buena HOA President of the Board; testified
Frank Peake(property manager) Pride Community Management Owner of Pride Community Management; testified
Rebecca Stowers(community manager) Community Manager; testified at initial hearing
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party because Respondent established a technical violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested documents within the 10-day limit. However, the Administrative Law Judge found a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to provide requested association records within 10 business days
Petitioner requested sign-in sheets for the January 10, 2018, and February 15, 2018, CBS HOA meetings. Respondent acknowledged a technical violation of the statute by failing to provide the requested documents within the required 10-day timeframe, although they were ultimately provided prior to the hearing.
Orders: Respondent must comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future, and pay Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records request, failure to provide documents, condominium owners association, filing fee refund
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.A.C. R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 642888.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:22 (74.5 KB)
18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 655537.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:25 (83.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818033-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision from the administrative hearing case Annette Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association (No. 18F-H1818033-REL). The core of the dispute was the Homeowners Association’s (HOA) failure to provide requested documents—specifically, meeting sign-in sheets—to a member, Annette Cohen, within the ten-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1258.
At the hearing, the Respondent HOA acknowledged this “technical violation,” attributing the delay to operational difficulties arising from a recent change in management companies. The Petitioner, Ms. Cohen, argued the delay was intentional and warranted a civil penalty.
The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, found that the HOA did violate the statute. In the final order, the Judge declared Ms. Cohen the prevailing party and mandated future compliance by the HOA. While a civil penalty was deemed inappropriate under the circumstances, the Judge ordered the HOA to reimburse Ms. Cohen’s $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
Annette Cohen
Respondent
CBS 136 Homeowners Association (CBS)
Respondent’s Counsel
Brian Ditsch, Sacks Tierney P.A.
Respondent’s Mgmt. Co.
Key Witness
Susan Rubin (PRM)
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Case Number
18F-H1818033-REL
Hearing Date
June 6, 2018
Decision Date
June 26, 2018
Chronology of the Dispute
The dispute centered on two separate sets of document requests made by Petitioner Annette Cohen.
• Request 1 (January 10 Meeting):
◦ On or about Jan. 10, 2018: Ms. Cohen requested the sign-in sheets from the annual meeting held on this date.
◦ Jan. 2018: The management company PRM took over management of the CBS 136 HOA.
◦ Feb. 15, 2018: After more than a month, and after two scheduled review appointments were cancelled by the management company, the sign-in sheets were finally provided to Ms. Cohen by email.
• Request 2 (February 15 Meeting):
◦ Feb. 19, 2018: Ms. Cohen requested the sign-in sheets from the February 15, 2018 HOA meeting. Receipt of this request was acknowledged by PRM.
◦ Feb. 21, 26, 27 & March 5, 2018: Ms. Cohen made repeated follow-up requests for the same information.
• Formal Proceedings:
◦ March 9, 2018: Ms. Cohen filed a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
◦ April 10, 2018: The Respondent HOA filed an answer denying all allegations.
◦ June 6, 2018: An administrative hearing was held. The documents had been provided to Ms. Cohen at some point prior to this hearing.
◦ June 26, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision.
Core Allegation and Legal Framework
Petitioner’s Allegation
Annette Cohen alleged that the CBS 136 Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Section 33-1258 by failing to provide association records for review and copying within the statutorily required timeframe.
Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
The legal basis for the petition is Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1258(A), which governs a member’s right to access association records. The statute states, in relevant part:
“all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member… The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination. On request for purchase of copies of records by any member… the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records. An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.”
The petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence that “shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”
Arguments and Evidence Presented at Hearing
Once the Respondent acknowledged the delay, the hearing focused solely on determining the appropriate remedy.
Petitioner’s Position (Annette Cohen)
• Intentional Negligence: Ms. Cohen argued that the Respondent “intentionally ignored her request for the documents.”
• Request for Penalty: Based on the belief of intentional neglect, she asserted that a civil penalty was an appropriate remedy.
• Unreasonable Delay: She noted that the documents “could have easily been emailed to her within the 10 day deadline,” but that the HOA’s management company did not present this as an option until after the deadline had already passed.
Respondent’s Position (CBS 136 HOA)
• Acknowledged Violation: At the June 6, 2018 hearing, the Respondent “acknowledged that the requested documents were not provided within the 10 day timeframe set forth in statute.”
• Mitigating Circumstances: The defense centered on testimony from Susan Rubin of the management company, PRM. Ms. Rubin testified to the following:
◦ No requests are “ever purposefully ignored.”
◦ PRM had only taken over management of the HOA in January 2018.
◦ At the time of the requests, PRM was “still getting documents from the former management company.”
◦ The delay was not due to ignoring the request, but because it “took a little longer than expected to provide the documents.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order
Findings and Conclusions
• Violation Established: The Judge concluded there was “no dispute that Respondent failed to provide the requested documents within 10 days.” Therefore, the Petitioner “established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).”
• Rejection of Civil Penalty: Despite the Petitioner’s argument, the Administrative Law Judge did “not find such a penalty to be appropriate given the circumstances in this matter.”
Final Order
The Judge issued a three-part order binding on the parties:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Annette Cohen, is “deemed the prevailing party.”
2. Future Compliance: The Respondent, CBS 136 Homeowners Association, is ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future.”
3. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: The Respondent must pay the Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 directly to her within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818033-REL
Study Guide: Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Please answer the following ten questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 18F-H1818033-REL, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific documents did the Petitioner, Annette Cohen, request from the Respondent?
3. According to the petition, what was the core legal violation alleged by Ms. Cohen against the Homeowners Association?
4. What was the timeline for the Respondent’s failure to produce the sign-in sheets from the January 10, 2018 meeting?
5. How did the Respondent initially respond to the petition after it was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?
6. What admission did the Respondent make at the June 6, 2018 hearing?
7. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the delay in providing the requested documents to the Petitioner?
8. What remedy did the Petitioner argue was appropriate for the violation, and on what grounds?
9. What legal standard of proof was the Petitioner required to meet, and did the judge find that she met it?
10. What were the three components of the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Annette Cohen, who was the Petitioner, and the CBS 136 Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the party against whom the complaint was filed.
2. The Petitioner requested the sign-in sheets from two separate meetings. She requested the sign-in sheets from the January 10, 2018 annual meeting and the sign-in sheets from the February 15, 2018 CBS HOA meeting.
3. The core legal violation alleged by Ms. Cohen was that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Title 33, Chapter 16, Section 33-1258. This statute requires homeowner associations to provide requested records to members for examination or copying within a ten-business-day timeframe.
4. Ms. Cohen requested the January 10, 2018 sign-in sheets on or about that same date (January 10). She did not receive them via email until February 15, 2018, which is well beyond the ten-business-day limit stipulated by law.
5. On or about April 10, 2018, the Respondent filed an answer to the petition. In this official response, the Respondent denied all of the allegations made by the Petitioner.
6. At the June 6, 2018 hearing, the Respondent acknowledged its failure to comply with the law. The Respondent admitted that the requested documents were not provided within the 10-day timeframe set forth in the statute, constituting a technical violation.
7. The Respondent, through the testimony of Susan Rubin from its management company PRM, explained the delay was not intentional. Ms. Rubin stated that PRM had just taken over management of the HOA in January 2018 and was still in the process of getting documents from the former management company.
8. The Petitioner argued that a civil penalty was the appropriate remedy. She contended that the Respondent intentionally ignored her requests and could have easily emailed the documents within the deadline, but failed to do so until after the deadline had passed.
9. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The judge found that she successfully met this standard because there was no dispute that the Respondent failed to provide the documents within the required 10 days.
10. The three components of the final Order were: 1) The Petitioner, Annette Cohen, was deemed the prevailing party; 2) The Respondent was ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future; and 3) The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-format responses. Use the provided case documents to formulate a comprehensive analysis.
1. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the appropriate remedy for the acknowledged statutory violation. Evaluate the mitigating circumstances offered by the Respondent and discuss why the Administrative Law Judge may have found them persuasive enough to deny a civil penalty while still finding in favor of the Petitioner.
2. Discuss the legal framework governing disputes between property owners and condominium associations in Arizona as outlined in the case documents. Explain the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, and detail the specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).
3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the judge’s decision. Explain how the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof, particularly in light of the Respondent’s initial denial of all allegations versus its later admission at the hearing.
4. Deconstruct the final Order issued by Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer. What were the three distinct parts of the Order, and what legal and practical purpose did each part serve in resolving the dispute, compensating the Petitioner, and ensuring future compliance by the Respondent?
5. Trace the procedural history of this case, creating a timeline of key events from Ms. Cohen’s first document request to the issuance of the final Order. Discuss the significance of each step, including the multiple requests, the petition filing, the Respondent’s answer, the hearing, and the final decision.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge
The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.
A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
The specific section of Arizona Revised Statutes cited in the case. It mandates that a homeowners association must make records available for member examination within ten business days and may charge up to fifteen cents per page for copies.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to prove their assertions. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the statute.
CBS 136 Homeowners Association
The Respondent in the case; an association of condominium owners located in Sun City West, Arizona.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.
Findings of Fact
The section of the decision that outlines the factual history and evidence presented in the case, as determined by the judge.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The state office where the formal hearing on the petition was conducted.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Annette Cohen.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”
The management company that took over management of the CBS 136 Homeowners Association in January 2018.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the CBS 136 Homeowners Association.
Technical Violation
An acknowledged infringement of a rule or statute where the substance of the rule may not have been maliciously violated. The Respondent admitted to a technical violation of the 10-day timeframe for document production.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818033-REL
Select all sources
642888.pdf
655537.pdf
No emoji found
Loading
18F-H1818033-REL
2 sources
Both documents are identical excerpts from an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, concerning a dispute between Annette Cohen (Petitioner) and the CBS 136 Homeowners Association (Respondent). The case, No. 18F-H1818033-REL, addressed the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested association meeting sign-in sheets within the mandated ten-day period. Though the Respondent acknowledged a technical violation of the statute, the Administrative Law Judge determined that a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances, such as the change in management. Ultimately, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, and the Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute in the future and reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.
Based on 2 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Annette Cohen(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf
Respondent Side
Brian Ditsch(respondent attorney) Sacks Tierney P.A.
Susan Rubin(witness) PRM (management company) Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of decision notice
Other Participants
Felicia Del Sol(clerical staff) Transmitted the decision
Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party because Respondent established a technical violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested documents within the 10-day limit. However, the Administrative Law Judge found a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to provide requested association records within 10 business days
Petitioner requested sign-in sheets for the January 10, 2018, and February 15, 2018, CBS HOA meetings. Respondent acknowledged a technical violation of the statute by failing to provide the requested documents within the required 10-day timeframe, although they were ultimately provided prior to the hearing.
Orders: Respondent must comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future, and pay Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records request, failure to provide documents, condominium owners association, filing fee refund
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.A.C. R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 642888.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:41 (74.5 KB)
18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 655537.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:42 (83.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818033-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision from the administrative hearing case Annette Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association (No. 18F-H1818033-REL). The core of the dispute was the Homeowners Association’s (HOA) failure to provide requested documents—specifically, meeting sign-in sheets—to a member, Annette Cohen, within the ten-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1258.
At the hearing, the Respondent HOA acknowledged this “technical violation,” attributing the delay to operational difficulties arising from a recent change in management companies. The Petitioner, Ms. Cohen, argued the delay was intentional and warranted a civil penalty.
The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, found that the HOA did violate the statute. In the final order, the Judge declared Ms. Cohen the prevailing party and mandated future compliance by the HOA. While a civil penalty was deemed inappropriate under the circumstances, the Judge ordered the HOA to reimburse Ms. Cohen’s $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
Annette Cohen
Respondent
CBS 136 Homeowners Association (CBS)
Respondent’s Counsel
Brian Ditsch, Sacks Tierney P.A.
Respondent’s Mgmt. Co.
Key Witness
Susan Rubin (PRM)
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Case Number
18F-H1818033-REL
Hearing Date
June 6, 2018
Decision Date
June 26, 2018
Chronology of the Dispute
The dispute centered on two separate sets of document requests made by Petitioner Annette Cohen.
• Request 1 (January 10 Meeting):
◦ On or about Jan. 10, 2018: Ms. Cohen requested the sign-in sheets from the annual meeting held on this date.
◦ Jan. 2018: The management company PRM took over management of the CBS 136 HOA.
◦ Feb. 15, 2018: After more than a month, and after two scheduled review appointments were cancelled by the management company, the sign-in sheets were finally provided to Ms. Cohen by email.
• Request 2 (February 15 Meeting):
◦ Feb. 19, 2018: Ms. Cohen requested the sign-in sheets from the February 15, 2018 HOA meeting. Receipt of this request was acknowledged by PRM.
◦ Feb. 21, 26, 27 & March 5, 2018: Ms. Cohen made repeated follow-up requests for the same information.
• Formal Proceedings:
◦ March 9, 2018: Ms. Cohen filed a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
◦ April 10, 2018: The Respondent HOA filed an answer denying all allegations.
◦ June 6, 2018: An administrative hearing was held. The documents had been provided to Ms. Cohen at some point prior to this hearing.
◦ June 26, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision.
Core Allegation and Legal Framework
Petitioner’s Allegation
Annette Cohen alleged that the CBS 136 Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Section 33-1258 by failing to provide association records for review and copying within the statutorily required timeframe.
Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
The legal basis for the petition is Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1258(A), which governs a member’s right to access association records. The statute states, in relevant part:
“all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member… The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination. On request for purchase of copies of records by any member… the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records. An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.”
The petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence that “shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”
Arguments and Evidence Presented at Hearing
Once the Respondent acknowledged the delay, the hearing focused solely on determining the appropriate remedy.
Petitioner’s Position (Annette Cohen)
• Intentional Negligence: Ms. Cohen argued that the Respondent “intentionally ignored her request for the documents.”
• Request for Penalty: Based on the belief of intentional neglect, she asserted that a civil penalty was an appropriate remedy.
• Unreasonable Delay: She noted that the documents “could have easily been emailed to her within the 10 day deadline,” but that the HOA’s management company did not present this as an option until after the deadline had already passed.
Respondent’s Position (CBS 136 HOA)
• Acknowledged Violation: At the June 6, 2018 hearing, the Respondent “acknowledged that the requested documents were not provided within the 10 day timeframe set forth in statute.”
• Mitigating Circumstances: The defense centered on testimony from Susan Rubin of the management company, PRM. Ms. Rubin testified to the following:
◦ No requests are “ever purposefully ignored.”
◦ PRM had only taken over management of the HOA in January 2018.
◦ At the time of the requests, PRM was “still getting documents from the former management company.”
◦ The delay was not due to ignoring the request, but because it “took a little longer than expected to provide the documents.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order
Findings and Conclusions
• Violation Established: The Judge concluded there was “no dispute that Respondent failed to provide the requested documents within 10 days.” Therefore, the Petitioner “established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).”
• Rejection of Civil Penalty: Despite the Petitioner’s argument, the Administrative Law Judge did “not find such a penalty to be appropriate given the circumstances in this matter.”
Final Order
The Judge issued a three-part order binding on the parties:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Annette Cohen, is “deemed the prevailing party.”
2. Future Compliance: The Respondent, CBS 136 Homeowners Association, is ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future.”
3. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: The Respondent must pay the Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 directly to her within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818033-REL
Study Guide: Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Please answer the following ten questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 18F-H1818033-REL, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific documents did the Petitioner, Annette Cohen, request from the Respondent?
3. According to the petition, what was the core legal violation alleged by Ms. Cohen against the Homeowners Association?
4. What was the timeline for the Respondent’s failure to produce the sign-in sheets from the January 10, 2018 meeting?
5. How did the Respondent initially respond to the petition after it was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?
6. What admission did the Respondent make at the June 6, 2018 hearing?
7. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the delay in providing the requested documents to the Petitioner?
8. What remedy did the Petitioner argue was appropriate for the violation, and on what grounds?
9. What legal standard of proof was the Petitioner required to meet, and did the judge find that she met it?
10. What were the three components of the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Annette Cohen, who was the Petitioner, and the CBS 136 Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the party against whom the complaint was filed.
2. The Petitioner requested the sign-in sheets from two separate meetings. She requested the sign-in sheets from the January 10, 2018 annual meeting and the sign-in sheets from the February 15, 2018 CBS HOA meeting.
3. The core legal violation alleged by Ms. Cohen was that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Title 33, Chapter 16, Section 33-1258. This statute requires homeowner associations to provide requested records to members for examination or copying within a ten-business-day timeframe.
4. Ms. Cohen requested the January 10, 2018 sign-in sheets on or about that same date (January 10). She did not receive them via email until February 15, 2018, which is well beyond the ten-business-day limit stipulated by law.
5. On or about April 10, 2018, the Respondent filed an answer to the petition. In this official response, the Respondent denied all of the allegations made by the Petitioner.
6. At the June 6, 2018 hearing, the Respondent acknowledged its failure to comply with the law. The Respondent admitted that the requested documents were not provided within the 10-day timeframe set forth in the statute, constituting a technical violation.
7. The Respondent, through the testimony of Susan Rubin from its management company PRM, explained the delay was not intentional. Ms. Rubin stated that PRM had just taken over management of the HOA in January 2018 and was still in the process of getting documents from the former management company.
8. The Petitioner argued that a civil penalty was the appropriate remedy. She contended that the Respondent intentionally ignored her requests and could have easily emailed the documents within the deadline, but failed to do so until after the deadline had passed.
9. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The judge found that she successfully met this standard because there was no dispute that the Respondent failed to provide the documents within the required 10 days.
10. The three components of the final Order were: 1) The Petitioner, Annette Cohen, was deemed the prevailing party; 2) The Respondent was ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future; and 3) The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-format responses. Use the provided case documents to formulate a comprehensive analysis.
1. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the appropriate remedy for the acknowledged statutory violation. Evaluate the mitigating circumstances offered by the Respondent and discuss why the Administrative Law Judge may have found them persuasive enough to deny a civil penalty while still finding in favor of the Petitioner.
2. Discuss the legal framework governing disputes between property owners and condominium associations in Arizona as outlined in the case documents. Explain the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, and detail the specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).
3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the judge’s decision. Explain how the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof, particularly in light of the Respondent’s initial denial of all allegations versus its later admission at the hearing.
4. Deconstruct the final Order issued by Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer. What were the three distinct parts of the Order, and what legal and practical purpose did each part serve in resolving the dispute, compensating the Petitioner, and ensuring future compliance by the Respondent?
5. Trace the procedural history of this case, creating a timeline of key events from Ms. Cohen’s first document request to the issuance of the final Order. Discuss the significance of each step, including the multiple requests, the petition filing, the Respondent’s answer, the hearing, and the final decision.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge
The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.
A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
The specific section of Arizona Revised Statutes cited in the case. It mandates that a homeowners association must make records available for member examination within ten business days and may charge up to fifteen cents per page for copies.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to prove their assertions. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the statute.
CBS 136 Homeowners Association
The Respondent in the case; an association of condominium owners located in Sun City West, Arizona.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.
Findings of Fact
The section of the decision that outlines the factual history and evidence presented in the case, as determined by the judge.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The state office where the formal hearing on the petition was conducted.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Annette Cohen.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”
The management company that took over management of the CBS 136 Homeowners Association in January 2018.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the CBS 136 Homeowners Association.
Technical Violation
An acknowledged infringement of a rule or statute where the substance of the rule may not have been maliciously violated. The Respondent admitted to a technical violation of the 10-day timeframe for document production.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818033-REL
Select all sources
642888.pdf
655537.pdf
No emoji found
Loading
18F-H1818033-REL
2 sources
Both documents are identical excerpts from an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, concerning a dispute between Annette Cohen (Petitioner) and the CBS 136 Homeowners Association (Respondent). The case, No. 18F-H1818033-REL, addressed the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested association meeting sign-in sheets within the mandated ten-day period. Though the Respondent acknowledged a technical violation of the statute, the Administrative Law Judge determined that a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances, such as the change in management. Ultimately, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, and the Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute in the future and reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.
Based on 2 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Annette Cohen(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf
Respondent Side
Brian Ditsch(respondent attorney) Sacks Tierney P.A.
Susan Rubin(witness) PRM (management company) Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of decision notice
Other Participants
Felicia Del Sol(clerical staff) Transmitted the decision
Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. aka Bridgewood Townhomes
Counsel
Mark E. Lines and R. Patrick Whelan
Alleged Violations
CC&R § 5(G)
Outcome Summary
The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the HOA's denial was unreasonable or that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU block was inferior to the 8” x 8” x 16” CMU block she requested, and compliance with the HOA's reasonable specifications was required.
Key Issues & Findings
Unreasonable denial of architectural request to build a courtyard wall
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks, which did not comply with the HOA's Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.
Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner failed to establish that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request which did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.
Briefing Document: Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818028-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Debbie Westerman versus the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict involved the HOA’s denial of Ms. Westerman’s architectural request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) blocks, which deviated from the association’s established standard of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s architectural standards were reasonable and established to maintain the community’s original design integrity. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the HOA’s denial was unreasonable or that the specified building materials were in any significant way inferior. The HOA successfully argued that its “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” in place since 2005, were created to preserve the architectural continuity of the original “Al Beadle design” and have been consistently applied to numerous other homeowner projects.
1. Case Overview and Core Dispute
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Debbie Westerman, owner of condominium unit 31 in Bridgewood Townhomes.
◦ Respondent: Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (also known as Bridgewood Townhomes).
• Jurisdiction: The case was heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to build a courtyard wall with 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks. The HOA’s established specification required the use of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.
2. Chronology of the Dispute
The key events leading to the administrative hearing occurred between October 2017 and January 2018.
Oct 25, 2017
Michael Brubaker, the HOA Board President, emailed the petitioner with the association’s “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”
Oct 25, 2017
The petitioner submitted an Architectural Request to build a wall with 8″ x 8″ x 16″ CMU blocks, acknowledging the deviation from specifications.
Oct 25, 2017
Mr. Brubaker sent a follow-up email cautioning the petitioner not to pre-order non-conforming materials as her request was not yet approved.
Nov 29, 2017
Mr. Brubaker emailed the petitioner, acknowledging her request as “extraordinary” and stating the Board would need to meet to consider it.
Dec 28, 2017
The petitioner was formally notified of a Board meeting scheduled for January 2, 2018, to review her request.
Jan 2, 2018
The petitioner attended the Board meeting. The Board unanimously rejected her request because it was contrary to the established specifications and “the historical aspects of our compliance structure.” The Board noted its willingness to approve a compliant wall, but the petitioner “stated that she [was] unwilling to comply.”
Jan 8, 2018
The HOA’s attorney sent a letter to the petitioner summarizing the legal basis for the denial.
Jan 23, 2018
The petitioner filed her formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
3. Petitioner’s Arguments and Evidence (Debbie Westerman)
The petitioner’s case was built on three main arguments: the superiority of her proposed materials, the inconsistency of community standards, and the questionable validity of the HOA’s rules.
• Material Superiority: The petitioner claimed her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” blocks were stronger, less expensive, and visually identical to the required blocks.
◦ Evidence: She testified that three different contractors advised her that the larger blocks would be cheaper due to needing fewer units and less mortar.
◦ Evidence: Her subcontractor, Richard Ross, testified that using twice as many blocks (as required by the 4″ specification) “doubles the chance of the wall failing.”
• Inconsistent Community Standards: The petitioner argued that the HOA did not enforce a uniform aesthetic, negating the need for strict adherence to the block size specification.
◦ Evidence: She submitted photographs (Exhibits A5, A6) of walls at units 34 and 38, owned by Board President Michael Brubaker, which she claimed were built with larger blocks visible through stucco.
◦ Evidence: She submitted a photograph (Exhibit A11) showing courtyard walls of different heights, although wall height was not the subject of her dispute.
• Questionable Rule Authenticity: At the hearing, the petitioner challenged the validity of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” document itself.
◦ Argument: She argued the document was not authentic because the HOA did not produce the official Board meeting minutes from 2005 when the rules were allegedly adopted. This challenge was raised for the first time at the hearing.
4. Respondent’s Arguments and Evidence (Bridgewood HOA)
The HOA’s defense was centered on its legal authority, the reasonableness of its established architectural standards, and the consistent enforcement of its rules.
• Adherence to Established Architectural Standards: The HOA’s primary defense was that its denial was based on a reasonable and long-standing architectural rule.
◦ Authority: The HOA cited CC&R § 5(J), which grants the Board the authority to adopt reasonable rules concerning the use of common elements. Rule 7(a) requires Board approval for any exterior alterations.
◦ Evidence: The HOA submitted the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” (Exhibit 3), which Mr. Brubaker credibly testified was adopted by the Board on March 22, 2005.
◦ Purpose of the Rule: Mr. Brubaker stated the rule’s purpose was to ensure architectural continuity. An email to the petitioner (Exhibit 7) explained:
• Consistent Enforcement: The HOA demonstrated that the rule was not arbitrary but had been consistently applied.
◦ Evidence: Mr. Brubaker testified that since the program’s adoption, “twenty-nine homeowners have had applications approved and constructed courtyard walls to specification.” Four additional compliant applications were approved since the petitioner’s submission. A photograph of a recently completed, compliant wall (Ms. Warren’s) was submitted as Exhibit 16.
• Rebuttal of Petitioner’s Claims: The HOA directly countered the petitioner’s key arguments.
◦ On Inconsistency: Mr. Brubaker testified that the non-conforming walls at units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980 by the original developer, prior to the HOA assuming control of the property (Exhibit 14).
◦ On Structural Integrity: The HOA submitted two technical bulletins from the National Concrete Masonry Association (Exhibits 19 and 20). These documents stated that 4″ high (“half-high”) units can be considered “structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-in. (203-mm) high unit” as long as the cross-section is the same.
◦ On Cost: The HOA submitted a bid from J E Bowen Construction for $6,165.00 to build a compliant wall for the petitioner’s unit (Exhibit 17). It also noted that another homeowner’s recent compliant wall cost only $4,268.23 (Exhibit 15).
5. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found comprehensively in favor of the Respondent (HOA), denying the Petitioner’s petition.
• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the petitioner bore the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence” and failed to do so.
• Reasonableness of HOA Standards: The decision affirmed the HOA’s right to establish and enforce aesthetic standards.
• Validity of Specifications: The petitioner’s challenge to the authenticity of the HOA’s rules was dismissed. The ALJ found that she “did not establish that Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions was fraudulent or improperly adopted.”
• Materiality of Block Type: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her central claim that the larger blocks were superior.
• Aesthetic Impact: The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s proposed wall would violate the community’s aesthetic standards, noting that a wall using the larger blocks “would be noticeably different from walls that were constructed in compliance with the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions and other Al Beadle design elements.”
Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request to build a block wall around her patio that did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”
The order, issued on April 26, 2018, is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of service.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818028-REL
Study Guide: Westerman v. Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818028-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what was their relationship?
2. What specific action by the Respondent was the Petitioner challenging in her petition?
3. According to the Respondent, what was the primary purpose of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions”?
4. What were the three main arguments the Petitioner presented in favor of using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks instead of the specified size?
5. How did the Petitioner attempt to demonstrate that the Respondent’s enforcement of wall specifications was inconsistent?
6. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the non-conforming walls cited by the Petitioner?
7. What evidence did the Respondent present to counter the Petitioner’s claim that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were structurally inferior?
8. Which party bore the “burden of proof” in this case, and what did that require them to establish?
9. On what date did the Respondent’s Board of Directors originally adopt the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions?
10. What was the final ruling in this case, and what was the judge’s primary reason for the decision?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Debbie Westerman, the Petitioner, and the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc., the Respondent. Ms. Westerman owns condominium unit 31 in the Bridgewood Townhomes development and is therefore a member of the Respondent homeowners’ association.
2. The Petitioner was challenging the Respondent’s denial of her Architectural Request to build a wall around her patio. Specifically, she alleged that the Respondent had unreasonably denied her request to use 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) block, which violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
3. The “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” were developed to provide architectural continuity and standards for courtyard walls. They were intended to ensure that any new walls conformed to the original Al Beadle design represented by other structures on the property, such as the perimeter wall and pool enclosure.
4. The Petitioner argued that her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were stronger, less expensive (requiring fewer blocks and less mortar), and looked the same as the specified blocks. This information was based on advice she received from three different contractors.
5. The Petitioner submitted photographs of courtyard walls at unit nos. 34 and 38, which she testified had larger blocks visible through stucco. She used these examples to argue that walls within the community were not consistent.
6. The Respondent’s Board president, Michael Brubaker, testified that the walls for units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980. This was before the original developer turned the property over to the Respondent homeowners’ association, and therefore before the current specifications were in place.
7. The Respondent submitted two technical documents (TEK 5-15 and TEK 2-2B) from the National Concrete Masonry Association. These documents stated that 4-inch high (“half-high”) units are structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-inch high counterparts, provided the face shell and web thicknesses are the same.
8. The Petitioner, Ms. Westerman, bore the burden of proof. This required her to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request.
9. Michael Brubaker, the Respondent’s Board president, credibly testified that the Board adopted the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions on March 22, 2005.
10. The final ruling was that the Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent’s Board acted unreasonably in denying her request, as the Board’s decision to maintain architectural consistency with the original Al Beadle design was reasonable.
Suggested Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to test a deeper understanding of the case’s themes and legal principles. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the legal concept of a “restrictive covenant.” Using the CC&Rs from the Bridgewood Townhomes development as an example, explain how these covenants function to regulate property use and how they are interpreted and enforced in a legal dispute.
2. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the structural integrity and cost of the different CMU block sizes. Discuss the quality of the evidence (e.g., expert testimony, technical documents, contractor bids) and explain which side made a more compelling argument on this point.
3. Discuss the role and authority of a homeowners’ association Board of Directors as demonstrated in this case. How did the Board use its authority under the CC&Rs to create and enforce the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” and what does the judge’s decision say about the reasonableness of its actions?
4. The concept of “architectural continuity” and preserving the original “Al Beadle design” was central to the Respondent’s argument. Explain the significance of this argument and analyze why the Administrative Law Judge found it to be a reasonable basis for denying the Petitioner’s request.
5. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, from the Petitioner’s initial Architectural Request in October 2017 through the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision. What do the steps taken by both parties reveal about the formal processes for dispute resolution within this planned community?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition (as used in the source document)
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an agency separate from the Department of Real Estate.
Architectural Request
A formal application submitted by a homeowner to the homeowners’ association for approval of any alterations or additions to the exterior of a unit.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. A set of rules recorded with the county that governs the rights and obligations of property owners within a planned community or condominium development.
Concrete Masonry Unit. A standard-size rectangular block used in construction. In this case, the dispute centered on two sizes: 4” x 8” x 16” and 8” x 8” x 16”.
Common Area
Areas within the development owned by the Homeowners’ Association in trust for the benefit and use of all lot owners.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.
Homeowners’ Association (HOA)
An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.
Limited Common Elements
Areas, such as the patios or courtyards adjacent to individual units, that are part of the common area but are reserved for the exclusive use of a specific owner.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowner, Debbie Westerman.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this civil case. It is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the homeowners’ association, Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of the property. The judge notes that if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.
Subpoena Duces Tecum
A legal order requiring a person to appear and bring specified documents or evidence with them. The decision notes the Petitioner did not request one for the Board meeting minutes.
TEK 2-2B & TEK 5-15
Titles of technical publications from the National Concrete Masonry Association, submitted as evidence by the Respondent to demonstrate the structural equivalence of different-sized CMU blocks.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818028-REL
Why Your HOA Cares About Your Bricks: A Real-Life Legal Battle, Deconstructed
For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is a source of quiet frustration. It often involves rules that seem arbitrary, overly specific, or just plain unreasonable. You want to make a practical improvement to your property, but the HOA’s governing documents stand in the way, citing regulations you never knew existed. This friction between individual desire and community standards is common, but rarely does it escalate into a formal legal dispute.
When it does, however, the results can be surprisingly illuminating. Such is the case of Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA in Arizona. Their legal battle wasn’t over a major renovation or a loud party; it was about the specific size of concrete blocks for a new patio wall. On the surface, it seems like a minor disagreement. But a closer look at the administrative law judge’s decision reveals powerful, practical lessons for every homeowner about the hidden legal realities of community governance.
By deconstructing the judge’s final decision, we can uncover four critical lessons that reveal how HOAs wield power and how homeowners can protect themselves.
Takeaway 1: Aesthetic Vision Can Legally Outweigh Practicality
At the heart of the dispute was a simple disagreement over materials. The petitioner, Debbie Westerman, wanted to build her patio wall using 8″x8″x16″ concrete blocks. Her reasoning was entirely practical: a licensed contractor advised her that the larger blocks were “stronger, less expensive, and looks the same.” From a homeowner’s perspective, this seems like an open-and-shut case for approval.
The HOA, however, denied the request. Their position was based not on practicality, but on a specific design vision. The association’s rules, established back in 2005, explicitly required the use of 4″x8″x16″ blocks. The reason? To maintain “architectural continuity” with the property’s original “Al Beadle design.” This wasn’t a vague preference; it was a documented standard intended to conform new construction to the existing visual language of the community, as seen in the “property’s perimeter wall, the original block buildings, the pool area enclosure and buildings, the parking structures, and the walls around the parking areas.”
Ultimately, the judge sided with the HOA. The decision found that the association’s requirement was reasonable because it was aimed at keeping new construction consistent with “significant elements of Bridgewood Townhomes.” This is a crucial lesson: a homeowner’s logical arguments about cost, strength, and appearance can be legally superseded by a community’s well-documented commitment to a specific, even if less tangible, design aesthetic.
Takeaway 2: The Power is in the Paper Trail
The HOA’s entire case rested on the strength of a single key document: the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.” This document, which the board officially adopted on March 22, 2005, clearly outlined the requirement for the 4-inch blocks.
Crucially, the petitioner only challenged the authenticity of this document for the first time during the hearing itself, arguing the HOA had not produced the original meeting minutes that adopted it. The judge deemed this last-minute challenge inadmissible. Why? Crucially, the judge noted that the homeowner had failed to use the proper legal procedures to demand the HOA produce those records ahead of time, making her challenge too little, too late. The HOA, meanwhile, demonstrated a long history of consistent enforcement. Before Ms. Westerman’s request, the association had already approved 29 other courtyard walls, all built according to the 2005 specifications.
This highlights a critical lesson: an HOA’s power is codified in its paper trail. The governing documents—from the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) down to specific board-adopted rules—carry immense legal weight.
Pro Tip:Your HOA’s governing documents are more than just the CC&Rs you received at closing. Formally request and review all board-adopted rules, architectural guidelines, and meeting minutes related to your planned project hiring a contractor or submitting an application.
Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Is on the Homeowner
Many people might assume that in a dispute, the powerful organization (the HOA) has the responsibility to prove its rules are fair and justified. The legal reality is often the exact opposite.
The judge’s decision explicitly stated that the “burden of proof” was on Ms. Westerman to establish that the HOA had acted unreasonably. It was not the HOA’s job to prove their rule was perfect; it was the homeowner’s job to prove the denial was improper. To meet this high legal standard, defined as a “preponderance of the evidence,” you need convincing proof.
A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.
This case provides a masterclass in what constitutes convincing proof. Ms. Westerman’s evidence that the 8-inch blocks were superior came from the testimony of her contractor’s unlicensed subcontractor. In sharp contrast, the HOA submitted two technical documents from the National Concrete Masonry Association—a neutral, expert authority—which demonstrated that the required 4-inch blocks are “structurally equivalent” to their 8-inch counterparts. The homeowner brought an opinion to a legal fight; the HOA brought expert documentation.
Actionable Advice:If you choose to challenge an HOA decision, understand that personal testimony and contractor opinions are often insufficient. To meet the ‘burden of proof,’ you must be prepared to counter the HOA’s documented rules with equally strong evidence, such as independent engineering reports, surveys, or expert testimony.
Takeaway 4: An HOA Rule Can Be a “Win-Win Program”
While it’s easy to view HOA rules as purely restrictive, the association’s board president, Michael Brubaker, offered a completely different perspective. He framed the wall policy not as a limitation, but as a benefit designed to increase the value and security of the entire community.
In an email to the petitioner, he explained the board’s original thinking behind allowing the walls in the first place, calling it a “win win program.”
A courtyard wall allowed homeowners to expand their homes with an exclusive-use courtyard space, enhance privacy, and improve security, which resulted in an increased individual property value that subsequently raised all property values. Additionally, the Association reduced costs by reducing the common area to be maintained. This is a win win program.
This viewpoint is bolstered by another critical fact: the HOA assumes maintenance responsibility for the walls after they are built. This reinforces the logic behind the rule. Uniformity isn’t just about aesthetics; it’s about the long-term, collective cost and labor of maintaining these structures, making a consistent standard a practical and financial concern for the entire association.
Conclusion: Beyond the Bricks
The dispute between Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA was, on its face, about the size of concrete blocks. But the legal decision reveals a much deeper story about community living. It’s a story about how a shared aesthetic vision, when properly documented, can become legally enforceable. It’s a confirmation of the immense power of written rules and the critical importance of bringing credible evidence to a dispute. And it’s a reminder that the legal burden often falls on the individual to challenge the collective.
This case demonstrates that behind a seemingly petty disagreement lies a complex reality of legal precedent, established processes, and a community’s right to define and defend its character. The next time you encounter a seemingly arbitrary HOA rule, will you see it as a simple restriction, or will you look for the deeper story of community standards and legal precedent behind it?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Debbie Westerman(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf
Kelly Zernich(witness) Petitioner's realtor
Richard Ross(witness) Petitioner's contractor's subcontractor
Respondent Side
Mark E. Lines(attorney) Shaw & Lines, LLC
R. Patrick Whelan(attorney) Shaw & Lines, LLC
Michael Brubaker(board member/witness) Respondent's Board president
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Barb Warren(homeowner/applicant) Application approved by the Board (used for comparison)
Felicia Del Sol(unknown) Transmitted the decision electronically
Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. aka Bridgewood Townhomes
Counsel
Mark E. Lines and R. Patrick Whelan
Alleged Violations
CC&R § 5(G)
Outcome Summary
The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the HOA's denial was unreasonable or that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU block was inferior to the 8” x 8” x 16” CMU block she requested, and compliance with the HOA's reasonable specifications was required.
Key Issues & Findings
Unreasonable denial of architectural request to build a courtyard wall
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks, which did not comply with the HOA's Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.
Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner failed to establish that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request which did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.
Briefing Document: Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818028-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Debbie Westerman versus the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict involved the HOA’s denial of Ms. Westerman’s architectural request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) blocks, which deviated from the association’s established standard of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s architectural standards were reasonable and established to maintain the community’s original design integrity. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the HOA’s denial was unreasonable or that the specified building materials were in any significant way inferior. The HOA successfully argued that its “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” in place since 2005, were created to preserve the architectural continuity of the original “Al Beadle design” and have been consistently applied to numerous other homeowner projects.
1. Case Overview and Core Dispute
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Debbie Westerman, owner of condominium unit 31 in Bridgewood Townhomes.
◦ Respondent: Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (also known as Bridgewood Townhomes).
• Jurisdiction: The case was heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to build a courtyard wall with 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks. The HOA’s established specification required the use of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.
2. Chronology of the Dispute
The key events leading to the administrative hearing occurred between October 2017 and January 2018.
Oct 25, 2017
Michael Brubaker, the HOA Board President, emailed the petitioner with the association’s “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”
Oct 25, 2017
The petitioner submitted an Architectural Request to build a wall with 8″ x 8″ x 16″ CMU blocks, acknowledging the deviation from specifications.
Oct 25, 2017
Mr. Brubaker sent a follow-up email cautioning the petitioner not to pre-order non-conforming materials as her request was not yet approved.
Nov 29, 2017
Mr. Brubaker emailed the petitioner, acknowledging her request as “extraordinary” and stating the Board would need to meet to consider it.
Dec 28, 2017
The petitioner was formally notified of a Board meeting scheduled for January 2, 2018, to review her request.
Jan 2, 2018
The petitioner attended the Board meeting. The Board unanimously rejected her request because it was contrary to the established specifications and “the historical aspects of our compliance structure.” The Board noted its willingness to approve a compliant wall, but the petitioner “stated that she [was] unwilling to comply.”
Jan 8, 2018
The HOA’s attorney sent a letter to the petitioner summarizing the legal basis for the denial.
Jan 23, 2018
The petitioner filed her formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
3. Petitioner’s Arguments and Evidence (Debbie Westerman)
The petitioner’s case was built on three main arguments: the superiority of her proposed materials, the inconsistency of community standards, and the questionable validity of the HOA’s rules.
• Material Superiority: The petitioner claimed her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” blocks were stronger, less expensive, and visually identical to the required blocks.
◦ Evidence: She testified that three different contractors advised her that the larger blocks would be cheaper due to needing fewer units and less mortar.
◦ Evidence: Her subcontractor, Richard Ross, testified that using twice as many blocks (as required by the 4″ specification) “doubles the chance of the wall failing.”
• Inconsistent Community Standards: The petitioner argued that the HOA did not enforce a uniform aesthetic, negating the need for strict adherence to the block size specification.
◦ Evidence: She submitted photographs (Exhibits A5, A6) of walls at units 34 and 38, owned by Board President Michael Brubaker, which she claimed were built with larger blocks visible through stucco.
◦ Evidence: She submitted a photograph (Exhibit A11) showing courtyard walls of different heights, although wall height was not the subject of her dispute.
• Questionable Rule Authenticity: At the hearing, the petitioner challenged the validity of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” document itself.
◦ Argument: She argued the document was not authentic because the HOA did not produce the official Board meeting minutes from 2005 when the rules were allegedly adopted. This challenge was raised for the first time at the hearing.
4. Respondent’s Arguments and Evidence (Bridgewood HOA)
The HOA’s defense was centered on its legal authority, the reasonableness of its established architectural standards, and the consistent enforcement of its rules.
• Adherence to Established Architectural Standards: The HOA’s primary defense was that its denial was based on a reasonable and long-standing architectural rule.
◦ Authority: The HOA cited CC&R § 5(J), which grants the Board the authority to adopt reasonable rules concerning the use of common elements. Rule 7(a) requires Board approval for any exterior alterations.
◦ Evidence: The HOA submitted the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” (Exhibit 3), which Mr. Brubaker credibly testified was adopted by the Board on March 22, 2005.
◦ Purpose of the Rule: Mr. Brubaker stated the rule’s purpose was to ensure architectural continuity. An email to the petitioner (Exhibit 7) explained:
• Consistent Enforcement: The HOA demonstrated that the rule was not arbitrary but had been consistently applied.
◦ Evidence: Mr. Brubaker testified that since the program’s adoption, “twenty-nine homeowners have had applications approved and constructed courtyard walls to specification.” Four additional compliant applications were approved since the petitioner’s submission. A photograph of a recently completed, compliant wall (Ms. Warren’s) was submitted as Exhibit 16.
• Rebuttal of Petitioner’s Claims: The HOA directly countered the petitioner’s key arguments.
◦ On Inconsistency: Mr. Brubaker testified that the non-conforming walls at units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980 by the original developer, prior to the HOA assuming control of the property (Exhibit 14).
◦ On Structural Integrity: The HOA submitted two technical bulletins from the National Concrete Masonry Association (Exhibits 19 and 20). These documents stated that 4″ high (“half-high”) units can be considered “structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-in. (203-mm) high unit” as long as the cross-section is the same.
◦ On Cost: The HOA submitted a bid from J E Bowen Construction for $6,165.00 to build a compliant wall for the petitioner’s unit (Exhibit 17). It also noted that another homeowner’s recent compliant wall cost only $4,268.23 (Exhibit 15).
5. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found comprehensively in favor of the Respondent (HOA), denying the Petitioner’s petition.
• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the petitioner bore the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence” and failed to do so.
• Reasonableness of HOA Standards: The decision affirmed the HOA’s right to establish and enforce aesthetic standards.
• Validity of Specifications: The petitioner’s challenge to the authenticity of the HOA’s rules was dismissed. The ALJ found that she “did not establish that Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions was fraudulent or improperly adopted.”
• Materiality of Block Type: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her central claim that the larger blocks were superior.
• Aesthetic Impact: The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s proposed wall would violate the community’s aesthetic standards, noting that a wall using the larger blocks “would be noticeably different from walls that were constructed in compliance with the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions and other Al Beadle design elements.”
Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request to build a block wall around her patio that did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”
The order, issued on April 26, 2018, is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of service.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818028-REL
Study Guide: Westerman v. Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818028-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what was their relationship?
2. What specific action by the Respondent was the Petitioner challenging in her petition?
3. According to the Respondent, what was the primary purpose of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions”?
4. What were the three main arguments the Petitioner presented in favor of using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks instead of the specified size?
5. How did the Petitioner attempt to demonstrate that the Respondent’s enforcement of wall specifications was inconsistent?
6. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the non-conforming walls cited by the Petitioner?
7. What evidence did the Respondent present to counter the Petitioner’s claim that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were structurally inferior?
8. Which party bore the “burden of proof” in this case, and what did that require them to establish?
9. On what date did the Respondent’s Board of Directors originally adopt the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions?
10. What was the final ruling in this case, and what was the judge’s primary reason for the decision?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Debbie Westerman, the Petitioner, and the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc., the Respondent. Ms. Westerman owns condominium unit 31 in the Bridgewood Townhomes development and is therefore a member of the Respondent homeowners’ association.
2. The Petitioner was challenging the Respondent’s denial of her Architectural Request to build a wall around her patio. Specifically, she alleged that the Respondent had unreasonably denied her request to use 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) block, which violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
3. The “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” were developed to provide architectural continuity and standards for courtyard walls. They were intended to ensure that any new walls conformed to the original Al Beadle design represented by other structures on the property, such as the perimeter wall and pool enclosure.
4. The Petitioner argued that her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were stronger, less expensive (requiring fewer blocks and less mortar), and looked the same as the specified blocks. This information was based on advice she received from three different contractors.
5. The Petitioner submitted photographs of courtyard walls at unit nos. 34 and 38, which she testified had larger blocks visible through stucco. She used these examples to argue that walls within the community were not consistent.
6. The Respondent’s Board president, Michael Brubaker, testified that the walls for units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980. This was before the original developer turned the property over to the Respondent homeowners’ association, and therefore before the current specifications were in place.
7. The Respondent submitted two technical documents (TEK 5-15 and TEK 2-2B) from the National Concrete Masonry Association. These documents stated that 4-inch high (“half-high”) units are structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-inch high counterparts, provided the face shell and web thicknesses are the same.
8. The Petitioner, Ms. Westerman, bore the burden of proof. This required her to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request.
9. Michael Brubaker, the Respondent’s Board president, credibly testified that the Board adopted the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions on March 22, 2005.
10. The final ruling was that the Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent’s Board acted unreasonably in denying her request, as the Board’s decision to maintain architectural consistency with the original Al Beadle design was reasonable.
Suggested Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to test a deeper understanding of the case’s themes and legal principles. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the legal concept of a “restrictive covenant.” Using the CC&Rs from the Bridgewood Townhomes development as an example, explain how these covenants function to regulate property use and how they are interpreted and enforced in a legal dispute.
2. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the structural integrity and cost of the different CMU block sizes. Discuss the quality of the evidence (e.g., expert testimony, technical documents, contractor bids) and explain which side made a more compelling argument on this point.
3. Discuss the role and authority of a homeowners’ association Board of Directors as demonstrated in this case. How did the Board use its authority under the CC&Rs to create and enforce the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” and what does the judge’s decision say about the reasonableness of its actions?
4. The concept of “architectural continuity” and preserving the original “Al Beadle design” was central to the Respondent’s argument. Explain the significance of this argument and analyze why the Administrative Law Judge found it to be a reasonable basis for denying the Petitioner’s request.
5. Trace the procedural history of this dispute, from the Petitioner’s initial Architectural Request in October 2017 through the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision. What do the steps taken by both parties reveal about the formal processes for dispute resolution within this planned community?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition (as used in the source document)
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an agency separate from the Department of Real Estate.
Architectural Request
A formal application submitted by a homeowner to the homeowners’ association for approval of any alterations or additions to the exterior of a unit.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. A set of rules recorded with the county that governs the rights and obligations of property owners within a planned community or condominium development.
Concrete Masonry Unit. A standard-size rectangular block used in construction. In this case, the dispute centered on two sizes: 4” x 8” x 16” and 8” x 8” x 16”.
Common Area
Areas within the development owned by the Homeowners’ Association in trust for the benefit and use of all lot owners.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.
Homeowners’ Association (HOA)
An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.
Limited Common Elements
Areas, such as the patios or courtyards adjacent to individual units, that are part of the common area but are reserved for the exclusive use of a specific owner.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowner, Debbie Westerman.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this civil case. It is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the homeowners’ association, Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of the property. The judge notes that if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.
Subpoena Duces Tecum
A legal order requiring a person to appear and bring specified documents or evidence with them. The decision notes the Petitioner did not request one for the Board meeting minutes.
TEK 2-2B & TEK 5-15
Titles of technical publications from the National Concrete Masonry Association, submitted as evidence by the Respondent to demonstrate the structural equivalence of different-sized CMU blocks.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818028-REL
Why Your HOA Cares About Your Bricks: A Real-Life Legal Battle, Deconstructed
For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is a source of quiet frustration. It often involves rules that seem arbitrary, overly specific, or just plain unreasonable. You want to make a practical improvement to your property, but the HOA’s governing documents stand in the way, citing regulations you never knew existed. This friction between individual desire and community standards is common, but rarely does it escalate into a formal legal dispute.
When it does, however, the results can be surprisingly illuminating. Such is the case of Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA in Arizona. Their legal battle wasn’t over a major renovation or a loud party; it was about the specific size of concrete blocks for a new patio wall. On the surface, it seems like a minor disagreement. But a closer look at the administrative law judge’s decision reveals powerful, practical lessons for every homeowner about the hidden legal realities of community governance.
By deconstructing the judge’s final decision, we can uncover four critical lessons that reveal how HOAs wield power and how homeowners can protect themselves.
Takeaway 1: Aesthetic Vision Can Legally Outweigh Practicality
At the heart of the dispute was a simple disagreement over materials. The petitioner, Debbie Westerman, wanted to build her patio wall using 8″x8″x16″ concrete blocks. Her reasoning was entirely practical: a licensed contractor advised her that the larger blocks were “stronger, less expensive, and looks the same.” From a homeowner’s perspective, this seems like an open-and-shut case for approval.
The HOA, however, denied the request. Their position was based not on practicality, but on a specific design vision. The association’s rules, established back in 2005, explicitly required the use of 4″x8″x16″ blocks. The reason? To maintain “architectural continuity” with the property’s original “Al Beadle design.” This wasn’t a vague preference; it was a documented standard intended to conform new construction to the existing visual language of the community, as seen in the “property’s perimeter wall, the original block buildings, the pool area enclosure and buildings, the parking structures, and the walls around the parking areas.”
Ultimately, the judge sided with the HOA. The decision found that the association’s requirement was reasonable because it was aimed at keeping new construction consistent with “significant elements of Bridgewood Townhomes.” This is a crucial lesson: a homeowner’s logical arguments about cost, strength, and appearance can be legally superseded by a community’s well-documented commitment to a specific, even if less tangible, design aesthetic.
Takeaway 2: The Power is in the Paper Trail
The HOA’s entire case rested on the strength of a single key document: the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.” This document, which the board officially adopted on March 22, 2005, clearly outlined the requirement for the 4-inch blocks.
Crucially, the petitioner only challenged the authenticity of this document for the first time during the hearing itself, arguing the HOA had not produced the original meeting minutes that adopted it. The judge deemed this last-minute challenge inadmissible. Why? Crucially, the judge noted that the homeowner had failed to use the proper legal procedures to demand the HOA produce those records ahead of time, making her challenge too little, too late. The HOA, meanwhile, demonstrated a long history of consistent enforcement. Before Ms. Westerman’s request, the association had already approved 29 other courtyard walls, all built according to the 2005 specifications.
This highlights a critical lesson: an HOA’s power is codified in its paper trail. The governing documents—from the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) down to specific board-adopted rules—carry immense legal weight.
Pro Tip:Your HOA’s governing documents are more than just the CC&Rs you received at closing. Formally request and review all board-adopted rules, architectural guidelines, and meeting minutes related to your planned project hiring a contractor or submitting an application.
Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Is on the Homeowner
Many people might assume that in a dispute, the powerful organization (the HOA) has the responsibility to prove its rules are fair and justified. The legal reality is often the exact opposite.
The judge’s decision explicitly stated that the “burden of proof” was on Ms. Westerman to establish that the HOA had acted unreasonably. It was not the HOA’s job to prove their rule was perfect; it was the homeowner’s job to prove the denial was improper. To meet this high legal standard, defined as a “preponderance of the evidence,” you need convincing proof.
A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.
This case provides a masterclass in what constitutes convincing proof. Ms. Westerman’s evidence that the 8-inch blocks were superior came from the testimony of her contractor’s unlicensed subcontractor. In sharp contrast, the HOA submitted two technical documents from the National Concrete Masonry Association—a neutral, expert authority—which demonstrated that the required 4-inch blocks are “structurally equivalent” to their 8-inch counterparts. The homeowner brought an opinion to a legal fight; the HOA brought expert documentation.
Actionable Advice:If you choose to challenge an HOA decision, understand that personal testimony and contractor opinions are often insufficient. To meet the ‘burden of proof,’ you must be prepared to counter the HOA’s documented rules with equally strong evidence, such as independent engineering reports, surveys, or expert testimony.
Takeaway 4: An HOA Rule Can Be a “Win-Win Program”
While it’s easy to view HOA rules as purely restrictive, the association’s board president, Michael Brubaker, offered a completely different perspective. He framed the wall policy not as a limitation, but as a benefit designed to increase the value and security of the entire community.
In an email to the petitioner, he explained the board’s original thinking behind allowing the walls in the first place, calling it a “win win program.”
A courtyard wall allowed homeowners to expand their homes with an exclusive-use courtyard space, enhance privacy, and improve security, which resulted in an increased individual property value that subsequently raised all property values. Additionally, the Association reduced costs by reducing the common area to be maintained. This is a win win program.
This viewpoint is bolstered by another critical fact: the HOA assumes maintenance responsibility for the walls after they are built. This reinforces the logic behind the rule. Uniformity isn’t just about aesthetics; it’s about the long-term, collective cost and labor of maintaining these structures, making a consistent standard a practical and financial concern for the entire association.
Conclusion: Beyond the Bricks
The dispute between Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA was, on its face, about the size of concrete blocks. But the legal decision reveals a much deeper story about community living. It’s a story about how a shared aesthetic vision, when properly documented, can become legally enforceable. It’s a confirmation of the immense power of written rules and the critical importance of bringing credible evidence to a dispute. And it’s a reminder that the legal burden often falls on the individual to challenge the collective.
This case demonstrates that behind a seemingly petty disagreement lies a complex reality of legal precedent, established processes, and a community’s right to define and defend its character. The next time you encounter a seemingly arbitrary HOA rule, will you see it as a simple restriction, or will you look for the deeper story of community standards and legal precedent behind it?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Debbie Westerman(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf
Kelly Zernich(witness) Petitioner's realtor
Richard Ross(witness) Petitioner's contractor's subcontractor
Respondent Side
Mark E. Lines(attorney) Shaw & Lines, LLC
R. Patrick Whelan(attorney) Shaw & Lines, LLC
Michael Brubaker(board member/witness) Respondent's Board president
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Barb Warren(homeowner/applicant) Application approved by the Board (used for comparison)
Felicia Del Sol(unknown) Transmitted the decision electronically
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
James and Shawna Larson
Counsel
Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent
Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Counsel
Nathan Tennyson
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R sections 9 and 9(b)
Outcome Summary
The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.
Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party
Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson (Petitioners) and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (Respondent). The core conflict centered on the Respondent’s requirement that Petitioners remove their patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project. The case initially faced a jurisdictional challenge, with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommending dismissal due to the speculative nature of the Respondent’s threat to remove the cover. This recommendation was rejected by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, who found the matter ripe for adjudication and ordered a new hearing.
The final Administrative Law Judge Decision ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision found the HOA’s plan to remove the patio covers was reasonable, necessary for the safe and proper completion of the project, and authorized under the community’s CC&Rs. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona statute. Consequently, the financial responsibility for its removal and potential reinstallation rests solely with the Petitioners as the homeowners to whom the element is assigned. The Petitioners’ petition was dismissed, and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Procedural History
The case progressed through several distinct legal phases, beginning with a petition and culminating in a final administrative decision after a rehearing.
Outcome/Significance
June 15-16, 2017
Petition Filed
James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.
August 25, 2017
Order Recommending Dismissal
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil recommended dismissing the petition, finding no “justiciable controversy” because the Respondent had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the issue speculative.
August 31, 2017
Order Rejecting Recommendation
Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, rejected the ALJ’s recommendation. Citing a June 1, 2017 letter from the Respondent, the Commissioner determined the matter was “ripe for adjudication” and ordered the hearing to be rescheduled.
September 1, 2017
Notice of Re-Hearing Issued
The Arizona Department of Real Estate formally scheduled a new hearing in the matter.
November 20, 2017
Rehearing Conducted
A full hearing on the merits was conducted before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
December 11, 2017
Final Administrative Law Judge Decision
ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision, dismissing the Petitioners’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent.
Core Dispute Analysis
The conflict arose from a maintenance project initiated by the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which consists of 169 units. The project involved repairing and painting the exteriors of the community’s twenty-five two-story buildings.
Respondent’s (HOA’s) Mandate and Rationale
• Project Requirement: The HOA informed homeowners with patio covers that they were required to remove the covers at their own expense before repairs and painting could begin.
• Enforcement Threat: In a letter dated June 1, 2017, the HOA stated that if the Larsons’ patio cover was not removed within ten days, the HOA would remove it under the authority of CC&R section 10(a) and charge the homeowners for the cost.
• Legal Justification: The HOA asserted its authority based on:
◦ CC&R Section 9(b): Grants the Respondent responsibility for maintaining the building exteriors.
◦ CC&R Section 9: States, “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the … [building] exteriors … shall be taken by the [Respondent].”
• Practical Necessity: The HOA argued that removal was essential for the project’s proper and safe completion, a position supported by its project manager.
Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Objections and Counter-Arguments
• Initial Legal Position: In their brief, the Petitioners stated that “the true issues underlying this issue are not about whether Respondent’s current threatened actions are a violation of the CC&Rs. The true issues relate to Respondent Association’s actions and inactions that have lead up to the point where the Parties now find themselves addressing this administrative law panel.”
• Lack of Authority: In a May 19, 2017 letter, the Larsons’ counsel argued the HOA had no legal authority to support its request.
• Unreasonable Cost: The Petitioners asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation would be “thousands of dollars” and provided bids ranging from $3,980 to $5,975.
• Historical Precedent: The patio cover was in place when the Larsons purchased their unit in 1999, and they argued the HOA did not disclose any violation at that time.
• Proposed Alternatives:
1. The Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense, which the HOA rejected over concerns about project warranty and management.
2. During the November 20 hearing, after hearing testimony, the Larsons offered not to reinstall their patio cover if the Respondent would pay for its removal.
Key Evidence and Testimony
The final decision heavily relied on the testimony of Wayne King, the project manager hired by the HOA, and an analysis of competing cost estimates.
Testimony of Wayne King (Project Manager)
• Project Scope: King testified that the project involved not only painting but also repairing damaged siding, much of which was caused by improperly flashed patio covers. To “do the job right,” the process required sanding, power washing, and patching before painting.
• Contractor Requirements: All five contractors who bid on the project required the patio covers to be removed.
• Safety and Logistics: King explained why working around the covers was not viable:
◦ Scaffolding: “Regular” scaffolding would not fit, and commercial scaffolding would not provide access to the entire building.
◦ Lifts: Using a “reach” or forklift was not an option due to overhead powerlines creating a safety hazard.
◦ Worker Safety: Allowing painters to walk on homeowners’ patio covers was not a safe option. He noted that changes in safety laws since the buildings were last painted necessitated different methods.
• Warranty: King testified that the paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, like the Larsons, painted their own units.
Cost Estimates and Discrepancies
• Petitioners’ Estimates: The Larsons submitted two bids for their wooden patio cover:
◦ Bid 1: $1,250 to remove and dispose; $3,980 to remove and rebuild with new wood.
◦ Bid 2: $5,975 to remove and replace the structure.
• Respondent’s Estimates:
◦ The HOA’s initial letter offered a contractor who would remove aluminum covers for $150. The cost for the Larsons’ wood cover was stated as $225, though this was not a firm price.
◦ Wayne King testified that the Petitioners’ estimates were “very high” and opined that $1,000 should cover the cost of removing and rebuilding, assuming existing materials were reused. He acknowledged decking material would likely need replacement but estimated 80% of rafters could be reused.
Legal Findings and Final Decision
The Administrative Law Judge Decision of December 11, 2017, provided a comprehensive legal analysis that concluded in the Respondent’s favor.
Governing Authority and Reasonableness
• Deference to the HOA: Citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, the decision established that the tribunal must accord the HOA deference in its decisions regarding maintenance and repair, provided it acts reasonably.
• Finding of Reasonableness: Based on the credible testimony of Wayne King, the judge found that the Respondent’s proposed plan for repairing and painting was reasonable, as the buildings could not be “properly and safely painted without the patio covers being removed.”
• Authorization under CC&Rs: The judge concluded that CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”
“Limited Common Element” Doctrine and Cost Allocation
The central legal issue of financial responsibility was resolved by applying Arizona state statutes.
1. Classification: The Petitioners’ patio cover was classified as a limited common element within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).
2. Statutory Rule: The judge then applied ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), which states:
3. Conclusion on Cost: Based on a “reasonable reading” of this statute, the decision concluded that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, should they choose to do so, the cost of reinstalling it.
Final Ruling
• The evidence supported the conclusion that the Respondent had the authority to require the removal of the patio cover at the Petitioners’ expense.
• IT IS ORDERED that the petition filed by James and Shawna Larson is dismissed.
• The Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Key Parties and Representatives
Name(s)
Representation
Petitioners
James and Shawna Larson
Lisa M. Hanger, Esq.
Respondent
Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Nathan Tennyson, Esq. (Brown Alcott PLLC)
ALJ (Initial)
Suzanne Marwil
Office of Administrative Hearings
ALJ (Final)
Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings
Commissioner
Judy Lowe
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Study Guide – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Study Guide for Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, culminating in the Administrative Law Judge Decision of December 11, 2017. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was their relationship?
2. What was the initial reason given by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil for recommending the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition?
3. Why did Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate Judy Lowe reject the initial recommendation for dismissal?
4. What was the central issue adjudicated at the November 20, 2017 hearing before ALJ Thomas Shedden?
5. According to the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which specific sections of the CC&Rs granted it the authority to require the removal of patio covers?
6. Who was Wayne King, and what was the substance of his testimony during the hearing?
7. How did the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) classify the Petitioners’ patio cover, and why was this classification legally significant for the case’s outcome?
8. What safety and logistical reasons were provided to justify the necessity of removing the patio covers for the painting project?
9. What was the final decision issued by ALJ Thomas Shedden on December 11, 2017?
10. According to the final ruling, who is financially responsible for the removal and potential reinstallation of the Petitioners’ patio cover, and what was the legal basis for this conclusion?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners James and Shawna Larson, and the Respondent, their homeowner’s association, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation. The dispute arose from the Respondent’s requirement that the Petitioners remove a patio cover at their unit.
2. ALJ Suzanne Marwil recommended dismissal on August 25, 2017, for a lack of a “justiciable controversy.” She reasoned that the Respondent’s threat to take down the patio cover had not yet been undertaken, making the issue speculative and more appropriate for a declaratory judgment action in superior court.
3. Commissioner Judy Lowe rejected the recommendation on August 31, 2017, stating the matter was “ripe for adjudication.” Her decision was based on a letter from June 1, 2017, in which the Respondent alleged a violation of the governing documents, thus creating a tangible controversy for the administrative tribunal to rule upon.
4. The central issue was whether the Respondent had the authority to mandate the removal of the Petitioners’ patio cover to facilitate a large-scale building repair and painting project. A secondary issue was determining who was financially responsible for the cost of removal and reinstallation.
5. The Respondent cited CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) as the source of its authority. Section 9(b) makes the Respondent responsible for maintaining building exteriors, and section 9 grants it the power to take “any cooperative action necessary or appropriate” for that maintenance.
6. Wayne King was the project manager hired by the Respondent for the painting project. He provided expert testimony that removing the patio covers was necessary to properly and safely repair and paint the buildings, noting that all five bidding contractors required their removal and that alternative methods were not viable or safe.
7. The patio cover was classified as a “limited common element” under A.R.S. § 33-1212(4). This was significant because A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) states that common expenses associated with the maintenance or repair of a limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which it is assigned, placing the financial burden on the Petitioners.
8. Project manager Wayne King testified that removal was necessary to accommodate the 14-foot by 8-foot area required for scaffolding. He explained that using a forklift was unsafe due to overhead powerlines, and allowing painters to walk on the covers was also a safety hazard, especially given changes in safety laws since the last painting project.
9. ALJ Thomas Shedden dismissed the Petitioners’ petition and deemed the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, to be the prevailing party. The order found that the Respondent’s plan was reasonable and that it had the authority to require the patio cover’s removal.
10. The final ruling concluded that the Petitioners, James and Shawna Larson, were responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it if they chose to do so. The legal basis was A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), which assigns expenses related to a “limited common element” (the patio cover) exclusively to the unit owner it benefits.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing evidence from the provided source documents.
1. Trace the procedural history of case No. 17F-H1717038-REL from the initial petition to the final decision. Explain the reasoning behind each major procedural step, including the initial recommendation for dismissal, its rejection by the Commissioner, and the final order.
2. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioners (James and Shawna Larson) and the Respondent (Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation) at the November 20, 2017 hearing. Discuss the key pieces of evidence, including witness testimony, cost estimates, and CC&R provisions, that each side used to support its position.
3. Explain the concept of “justiciable controversy” as it was applied by ALJ Suzanne Marwil in her recommendation for dismissal. Contrast her interpretation with Commissioner Judy Lowe’s reasoning for why the matter was “ripe for adjudication.”
4. Discuss the legal significance of classifying the patio cover as a “limited common element.” How did this classification, in conjunction with Arizona Revised Statutes and the community’s CC&Rs, ultimately determine the outcome of the case regarding financial responsibility?
5. Evaluate the role of expert testimony in the final administrative hearing. How did the testimony of Wayne King influence ALJ Thomas Shedden’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the reasonableness and necessity of the Respondent’s actions?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The judge who presides over administrative hearings at a government agency, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Suzanne Marwil and Thomas Shedden served as ALJs.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The official compilation of the laws of the state of Arizona. Key statutes cited include A.R.S. § 32-2199, § 33-1212(4), and § 33-1255(C).
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)
The governing documents for a planned community or condominium association that outline the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the association. In this case, sections 9, 9(b), and 10(a) were specifically mentioned.
Declaratory Judgment Action
A legal action filed in superior court where a party asks the court to provide a binding ruling on the rights and obligations of the parties before an actual injury has occurred.
Justiciable Controversy
A real, substantial legal dispute that is appropriate for a court or tribunal to resolve. It cannot be a hypothetical, speculative, or advisory matter.
Limited Common Element
As defined in A.R.S. § 33-1212(4), a common element of a condominium assigned for the exclusive use of one or more units, but fewer than all of them. The Larsons’ patio cover was classified as such.
Petition
The formal written request filed by a party to initiate a case with an administrative body. The Larsons filed their petition with the Department of Real Estate on June 15/16, 2017.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, James and Shawna Larson were the Petitioners.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means the greater weight of the evidence is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation was the Respondent.
Tribunal
A body, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings, with the authority to judge, adjudicate on, or determine claims or disputes.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
They Fought the HOA Over a Patio and Lost: 3 Shocking Legal Lessons for Every HOA Member
It’s the letter every homeowner dreads. An official-looking envelope from the Homeowner’s Association (HOA) lands in your mailbox, and the message inside is not a friendly neighborhood greeting. It’s a demand.
This is exactly what happened to Arizona couple James and Shawna Larson. Their HOA, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was planning a large-scale project to repair and paint the building exteriors. To do the job properly, the HOA demanded that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover—at their own expense. The Larsons, believing this was an unreasonable overreach, refused. That refusal kicked off a legal battle that serves as a masterclass in the often-shocking realities of HOA power.
This post distills the most important lessons from their fight. These are the legal realities that every homeowner should understand before they find themselves on the receiving end of a similar notice.
You Can Win the First Round and Still Lose the Case
In the first stage of the dispute, the Administrative Law Judge actually recommended that the Larsons’ petition be dismissed. The judge’s reasoning was based on a crucial legal doctrine: ripeness. Because the HOA had only threatened to remove the patio cover and hadn’t physically done it yet, the judge found the issue “speculative.” In the court’s view, there was no “justiciable controversy” to rule on yet.
The initial ruling contained a powerful statement highlighting the confusion:
Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
But this initial victory was short-lived. In a surprising twist, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected the judge’s recommendation. The Commissioner found that the core question—whether the patio cover violated the association’s rules—was “ripe for adjudication” and ordered the case back to court for a full hearing. This highlights a key principle: administrative bodies often prefer to rule on the substance of a dispute rather than dismiss it on procedural grounds, ensuring that core community conflicts are actually resolved.
A case isn’t over until it’s over. An initial procedural win (or loss) can be overturned, shifting the entire battlefield. With the case now officially back on, the court turned to the central question of the dispute: who was financially responsible for the patio cover?
It’s Your Patio, So It’s Your Bill—Even When the HOA Forces the Work
The central conflict boiled down to one question: who should pay? The Larsons believed that since the HOA required the patio cover to be removed for its maintenance project, the HOA should bear the associated costs. This seems like common sense, but HOA law operates on a different logic.
The case was decided by a key legal concept: the patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element.” For most homeowners, this is where their jaw hits the floor. A limited common element is part of the common area (like exterior walls or roofs) but is assigned for the exclusive use of a single unit owner. The logic behind this law is that while the HOA maintains general common areas, elements that provide an exclusive benefit to one owner—like their personal patio, balcony, or assigned parking spot—carry an exclusive financial responsibility, even for HOA-mandated work.
This classification has a devastating financial consequence spelled out in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1255(C). The law states that common expenses associated with a limited common element are assessed against the unit it’s assigned to. The judge’s final conclusion was direct and absolute:
Because the patio cover is a limited common element, under a reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, if they choose to do so, the cost of reinstalling it.
Under the law, because the patio exclusively benefitted the Larsons, they were solely responsible for all costs associated with it, even when the work was demanded by the HOA for its own project.
Deference is Given to a Well-Prepared HOA
The HOA didn’t win just because of a legal statute; it won because it built a sound, well-documented case for its demand. They didn’t just issue an order; they presented extensive evidence that their plan was “reasonable.”
The testimony of their project manager, Wayne King, was particularly compelling. He laid out a series of facts that were difficult to dispute:
• The project involved necessary repairs to siding and flashing, not just cosmetic painting.
• All five painting contractors who bid on the project required the patio covers to be removed.
• Removal was essential to comply with modern safety laws for scaffolding and to allow for proper work, including sanding and power washing.
• Safety laws had changed since the buildings were last painted, making old methods unsafe and illegal.
• Allowing individual homeowners to paint their own sections would void the painter’s warranty for the entire project.
Faced with this mountain of meticulously documented evidence, the judge ruled that the HOA’s plan was “reasonable.” Because of this, the court was legally bound to “accord Respondent deference in decisions regarding maintenance and repair of the common areas.” In other words, when an HOA acts logically, documents its process, and prioritizes safety and proper procedure, courts will give it significant authority to enforce its decisions.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power in an HOA
The Larsons’ case is a stark reminder that in an HOA, what feels fair is irrelevant. The only things that matter are procedural correctness (even a ‘win’ can be temporary), the fine print of legal definitions (you can be forced to pay to remove your own property), and an HOA’s documented reasonableness (a well-prepared board is nearly unbeatable). These principles are found not in a sense of fairness, but in the specific, often surprising language of state law and a community’s own CC&Rs.
This case was about a patio cover, but the principles apply to fences, doors, and windows—do you truly know what you own and what you’re responsible for?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
James Larson(petitioner)
Shawna Larson(petitioner)
Lisa M. Hanger(petitioner attorney)
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(respondent attorney) Brown Alcott PLLC
Wayne King(witness) Project Manager for painting project hired by Respondent
Neutral Parties
Suzanne Marwil(ALJ) Issued initial Recommended Order of Dismissal (August 25, 2017)
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Issued Administrative Law Judge Decision (December 11, 2017)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Rejected initial recommendation of dismissal
Dan Gardner(HOA Coordinator) Transmitted Commissioner's order
CC&Rs § 3.1(a); Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA did not violate its CC&Rs by allowing play structures on properties that already contained a detached garage or shed, because play structures are not easily convertible into a second residence, which was the underlying concern of the relevant CC&R section.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated CC&R § 3.1. The ALJ determined that the HOA correctly clarified the status of play structures through an amendment to the Architectural Committee's regulations.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) regarding allowing play structures (swing sets, treehouses) when another detached structure (garage or shed) is present.
Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) by permitting members to construct play structures (swingsets, treehouses, etc.) on properties that already contained one detached structure (garage or shed), arguing that the rules allowed only one detached structure of any type.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied because he failed to establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances. All play structures that the Architectural Committee has previously approved are allowed to remain, and the Architectural Committee may consider and grant future Play Structure Approval Requests.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA governance, CC&R interpretation, detached structures, play structures, Architectural Committee regulations, burden of proof
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817006-REL Decision – 604710.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:47 (155.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817006-REL
Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between a homeowner, Charles Mandela (“Petitioner”), and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by permitting homeowners to install play structures (e.g., swing sets, treehouses) on lots that already contained another detached structure, such as a garage or shed.
The Petitioner argued that the HOA had historically enforced a strict “one detached structure” rule and that its recent allowance of play structures constituted a violation of CC&R § 3.1. In contrast, the Respondent contended that the underlying intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent secondary residential dwellings, not to prohibit recreational structures consistent with a family-oriented community. The HOA asserted it had properly amended its Architectural Committee regulations, not the CC&Rs, to clarify this distinction.
The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent HOA. The central finding was that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to maintain the single-family residential character of the community. Because play structures cannot be easily converted into secondary residences, they are not inconsistent with this intent. The ALJ concluded that the HOA was not required to amend the CC&Rs (which requires a 75% member vote) but acted within its authority to amend its rules and regulations via a simple board vote. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.
Case Overview
• Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Charles Mandela
◦ Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association
• Hearing Date: November 28, 2017
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D) by allowing members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on properties that already had another detached structure like a garage or shed.
Central Arguments and Presented Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)
The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.
• Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ Historical Enforcement: Testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA enforced this rule by removing nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo, a playhouse, an observation deck, and a zipline structure.
◦ 2006 Legal Opinion: Submitted a February 7, 2006, letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC, which opined on the ambiguity of CC&R § 3.1. The letter stated, “It still appears that only one structure (garage or shed) is permitted,” and supported the HOA’s ability to “enforce the ‘one detached structure’ requirement.” The letter did not specifically mention play structures.
◦ Invalid Approval Form: Presented a “Play Structure Approval Request” form he had drafted while on the board. This form incorrectly stated that the Board of Directors had voted on June 25, 2016, “to adopt changes to the CCR’s [sic], which will allow play structures.” Petitioner argued this was invalid because changing the CC&Rs requires a 75% vote of the membership, which was not obtained.
◦ Ancillary Documents: Submitted documents related to a housing discrimination claim filed by the HOA’s current president, Joseph Hancock, and a letter concerning another member. Petitioner testified these matters involved play structures, though the documents themselves did not mention CC&R § 3.1.
Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)
The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.
• Core Argument: The HOA did not violate the CC&Rs because the intent of the relevant articles is to prohibit secondary residential dwellings, not recreational structures suitable for a community intended to be a “uniquely planned recreation property.”
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ Community Status: There are currently 16 swingsets or play structures within the 193-lot development. The HOA president, Joseph Hancock, testified he has a swingset used by his children, grandchildren, and neighbors.
◦ Legal Counsel: The HOA retained the firm of Poli & Ball, PLC, which opined that because the community is for recreation and family use, “[p]lay structures are perfectly consistent with recreation and family use.” The firm advised that the Architectural Committee’s regulations could be changed to reflect this without amending the CC&Rs. Another law firm, Carpenter Hazlewood, generally agreed with this opinion.
◦ Correction of Clerical Error: Mr. Hancock testified that the form submitted by the Petitioner contained a typographical error. The board’s intent in its June 25, 2016, vote was to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations, not the CC&Rs.
◦ Board Meeting Minutes: The HOA submitted minutes from board meetings in December 2016 and October 2017. These minutes document the board’s discovery of the error on the website form and subsequent votes to formally clarify that the change was to the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs, thereby ratifying its decision.
◦ Amended Approval Form: Respondent submitted the corrected “Play Structure Approval Request” form, which states, “Per the modified Rules and Regulations dated April 6, 2016, this form must be submitted to Architectural Committee for approval of any Play Structure.”
Governing Rules and Covenants
The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.
Document / Section
Key Provision
CC&R § 3.1
“No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage… No garage or shed shall be built prior to the issuance of a Coconino County building permit for the construction of a Single Family Residence.”
Architectural Regulation 3(D)
“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”
CC&R § 4.2
“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”
CC&R § 12.2
Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale
The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.
• Intent of the Covenant: The Judge determined that CC&R Article III is fundamentally “concerned with keeping Respondent single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second residential dwelling on a lot.” This interpretation is supported by other rules in the article prohibiting mobile homes and clarifying that “If you can live/sleep in it, you cannot park it” in the development.
• Status of Play Structures: The decision concludes that a play structure “cannot be easily converted into a second residence.” Therefore, permitting a play structure in addition to a garage or shed is not inconsistent with the primary purpose of CC&R § 3.1.
• Board Authority vs. Member Vote: Because allowing play structures was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not required to amend the CC&Rs through a 75% member vote. Instead, the Board was empowered by CC&R § 4.2 to “amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to provide clarification on the status of play structures” through a majority vote of the Board.
• History of Enforcement: The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to establish a uniform history of enforcement against play structures. Rather, “it appears that the status of play structures, swingsets, and tree houses has been unsettled and the subject of some contention,” partly due to the Petitioner’s own advocacy.
• Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.
Final Order and Implications
• Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.
• Outcome for the Community:
1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.
2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.
3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817006-REL
Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision No. 18F-H1817006-REL
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties in case No. 18F-H1817006-REL, and what was their relationship?
2. What specific violation did the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, allege against the Respondent?
3. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bears the initial burden?
4. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the CC&Rs and amending the “Rules and Regulations”?
5. What was the Petitioner’s primary evidence to support his claim that the HOA historically enforced a “one detached structure” rule?
6. How did the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates HOA, legally justify its decision to permit play structures even on lots that already had a detached garage or shed?
7. How did the Respondent explain the document from its website which stated that the Board had voted to “adopt changes to the CCR’s”?
8. What did the law firm Poli & Ball conclude regarding the permissibility of play structures within the community?
9. What did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky determine was the primary intent of Article III of the CC&Rs?
10. What was the final Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
——————————————————————————–
Quiz Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, and the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association. Mr. Mandela is a homeowner within the Blue Ridge Estates development and a member of the homeowners’ association.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D). He claimed the HOA wrongly allowed members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on their properties when another detached structure, such as a garage or shed, already existed.
3. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must convince the judge that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Charles Mandela, bears the initial burden of proof to establish that a violation occurred.
4. To amend the CC&Rs (the Declaration), an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots is required. In contrast, the Board of Directors can adopt, amend, or repeal “Rules and Regulations” by a simple majority vote of the Board.
5. The Petitioner testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA removed nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo and a playhouse. He also submitted a 2006 letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, which opined that the HOA could enforce a “one detached structure” requirement.
6. The Respondent argued that the intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent second residential dwellings on a lot, not to prohibit recreational items consistent with a family community. Therefore, the Board acted within its authority under CC&R § 4.2 to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to clarify that play structures are permitted.
7. The Respondent’s president, Joseph Hancock, testified that the wording was a typographical error made by the previous Chair of the Architectural Committee (the Petitioner). Board meeting minutes from December 2016 and October 2017 were submitted as evidence to show the Board’s actual intent was to modify the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs.
8. The Poli & Ball law firm opined that play structures are “perfectly consistent with recreation and family use” in a community intended to be a planned recreation property. The firm concluded that the HOA could change the Architectural Committee’s regulations to allow them as long as the change was consistent with the CC&Rs.
9. The Judge concluded that the purpose of Article III is to keep the community single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second dwelling. Since a play structure cannot be easily converted into a second residence, allowing one did not violate the intent of the CC&Rs.
10. The Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge found that the Petitioner had not established that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances, and that the HOA had properly resolved the issue by amending its regulations.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon specific facts, arguments, and legal principles from the source document.
1. Discuss the critical distinction between amending the community’s CC&Rs and amending the Architectural Committee’s regulations. Explain how this distinction became the central pivot upon which the entire case turned.
2. Analyze the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s exhibits and testimony, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Respondent’s evidence more persuasive.
3. The “Conclusions of Law” section discusses the legal principle of interpreting restrictive covenants based on the “intent of the parties.” How did Judge Mihalsky apply this principle to CC&R § 3.1, and how did the community’s stated purpose as a “uniquely planned recreation property” influence this interpretation?
4. Charles Mandela, the Petitioner, was a former board member and president of the Architectural Committee who drafted one of the key documents in question. Discuss how his past involvement in HOA governance may have shaped his legal position and the evidence he presented.
5. Trace the timeline of the “play structure” controversy as detailed in the hearing evidence, from the 2015 discrimination claim to the “clarification vote” in October 2017. How does this sequence of events illustrate the challenges of community governance and rule interpretation within a homeowners’ association?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, the ALJ from the Office of Administrative Hearings heard the dispute between the homeowner and the HOA.
Architectural Committee
A committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for approving any construction, alteration, or improvement to the exterior of any property to ensure it complies with community standards.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this hearing, the Petitioner had the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
A legally binding document that governs a planned community or subdivision. It outlines the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.
Declaration
The formal legal document that creates the homeowners’ association and its CC&Rs. In this case, amending the Declaration required a 75% vote of the members.
Detached Structure
A building on a property that is separate from the main residence. The dispute centered on whether play structures counted as the “one detached structure” permitted by the CC&Rs.
Improvements
A broad term defined in the CC&Rs (§ 1.17) to include buildings, garages, fences, walls, landscaping, and all other structures of every type and kind on a property.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The judge noted that if Title 33 did not apply, the Office of Administrative Hearings would lack jurisdiction to hear the case.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, homeowner Charles Mandela.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a claim is more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or CC&Rs that limits the use of the property. The “one detached structure” rule is an example of a restrictive covenant.
Single Family Residential Use
The designated purpose of the properties in Blue Ridge Estates, meaning they are to be used exclusively as private homes for single families, not for commercial or multi-family dwelling purposes.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817006-REL
Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between a homeowner, Charles Mandela (“Petitioner”), and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by permitting homeowners to install play structures (e.g., swing sets, treehouses) on lots that already contained another detached structure, such as a garage or shed.
The Petitioner argued that the HOA had historically enforced a strict “one detached structure” rule and that its recent allowance of play structures constituted a violation of CC&R § 3.1. In contrast, the Respondent contended that the underlying intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent secondary residential dwellings, not to prohibit recreational structures consistent with a family-oriented community. The HOA asserted it had properly amended its Architectural Committee regulations, not the CC&Rs, to clarify this distinction.
The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent HOA. The central finding was that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to maintain the single-family residential character of the community. Because play structures cannot be easily converted into secondary residences, they are not inconsistent with this intent. The ALJ concluded that the HOA was not required to amend the CC&Rs (which requires a 75% member vote) but acted within its authority to amend its rules and regulations via a simple board vote. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.
Case Overview
• Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Charles Mandela
◦ Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association
• Hearing Date: November 28, 2017
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D) by allowing members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on properties that already had another detached structure like a garage or shed.
Central Arguments and Presented Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)
The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.
• Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ Historical Enforcement: Testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA enforced this rule by removing nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo, a playhouse, an observation deck, and a zipline structure.
◦ 2006 Legal Opinion: Submitted a February 7, 2006, letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC, which opined on the ambiguity of CC&R § 3.1. The letter stated, “It still appears that only one structure (garage or shed) is permitted,” and supported the HOA’s ability to “enforce the ‘one detached structure’ requirement.” The letter did not specifically mention play structures.
◦ Invalid Approval Form: Presented a “Play Structure Approval Request” form he had drafted while on the board. This form incorrectly stated that the Board of Directors had voted on June 25, 2016, “to adopt changes to the CCR’s [sic], which will allow play structures.” Petitioner argued this was invalid because changing the CC&Rs requires a 75% vote of the membership, which was not obtained.
◦ Ancillary Documents: Submitted documents related to a housing discrimination claim filed by the HOA’s current president, Joseph Hancock, and a letter concerning another member. Petitioner testified these matters involved play structures, though the documents themselves did not mention CC&R § 3.1.
Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)
The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.
• Core Argument: The HOA did not violate the CC&Rs because the intent of the relevant articles is to prohibit secondary residential dwellings, not recreational structures suitable for a community intended to be a “uniquely planned recreation property.”
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ Community Status: There are currently 16 swingsets or play structures within the 193-lot development. The HOA president, Joseph Hancock, testified he has a swingset used by his children, grandchildren, and neighbors.
◦ Legal Counsel: The HOA retained the firm of Poli & Ball, PLC, which opined that because the community is for recreation and family use, “[p]lay structures are perfectly consistent with recreation and family use.” The firm advised that the Architectural Committee’s regulations could be changed to reflect this without amending the CC&Rs. Another law firm, Carpenter Hazlewood, generally agreed with this opinion.
◦ Correction of Clerical Error: Mr. Hancock testified that the form submitted by the Petitioner contained a typographical error. The board’s intent in its June 25, 2016, vote was to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations, not the CC&Rs.
◦ Board Meeting Minutes: The HOA submitted minutes from board meetings in December 2016 and October 2017. These minutes document the board’s discovery of the error on the website form and subsequent votes to formally clarify that the change was to the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs, thereby ratifying its decision.
◦ Amended Approval Form: Respondent submitted the corrected “Play Structure Approval Request” form, which states, “Per the modified Rules and Regulations dated April 6, 2016, this form must be submitted to Architectural Committee for approval of any Play Structure.”
Governing Rules and Covenants
The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.
Document / Section
Key Provision
CC&R § 3.1
“No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage… No garage or shed shall be built prior to the issuance of a Coconino County building permit for the construction of a Single Family Residence.”
Architectural Regulation 3(D)
“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”
CC&R § 4.2
“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”
CC&R § 12.2
Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale
The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.
• Intent of the Covenant: The Judge determined that CC&R Article III is fundamentally “concerned with keeping Respondent single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second residential dwelling on a lot.” This interpretation is supported by other rules in the article prohibiting mobile homes and clarifying that “If you can live/sleep in it, you cannot park it” in the development.
• Status of Play Structures: The decision concludes that a play structure “cannot be easily converted into a second residence.” Therefore, permitting a play structure in addition to a garage or shed is not inconsistent with the primary purpose of CC&R § 3.1.
• Board Authority vs. Member Vote: Because allowing play structures was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not required to amend the CC&Rs through a 75% member vote. Instead, the Board was empowered by CC&R § 4.2 to “amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to provide clarification on the status of play structures” through a majority vote of the Board.
• History of Enforcement: The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to establish a uniform history of enforcement against play structures. Rather, “it appears that the status of play structures, swingsets, and tree houses has been unsettled and the subject of some contention,” partly due to the Petitioner’s own advocacy.
• Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.
Final Order and Implications
• Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.
• Outcome for the Community:
1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.
2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.
3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Charles Mandela(petitioner) Appeared and testified on his own behalf; previously served as president of the Architectural Committee.
Respondent Side
Brian C. Axt(attorney) Resnick & Louis, P.C. Represented Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.
Joseph Hancock(board member) Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association Board's president; presented testimony/witness for Respondent.
Jason Miller(counsel) Carpenter Hazlewood Provided an email opinion supporting the Respondent's position.
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
CC&Rs § 3.1(a); Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA did not violate its CC&Rs by allowing play structures on properties that already contained a detached garage or shed, because play structures are not easily convertible into a second residence, which was the underlying concern of the relevant CC&R section.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated CC&R § 3.1. The ALJ determined that the HOA correctly clarified the status of play structures through an amendment to the Architectural Committee's regulations.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) regarding allowing play structures (swing sets, treehouses) when another detached structure (garage or shed) is present.
Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) by permitting members to construct play structures (swingsets, treehouses, etc.) on properties that already contained one detached structure (garage or shed), arguing that the rules allowed only one detached structure of any type.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied because he failed to establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances. All play structures that the Architectural Committee has previously approved are allowed to remain, and the Architectural Committee may consider and grant future Play Structure Approval Requests.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA governance, CC&R interpretation, detached structures, play structures, Architectural Committee regulations, burden of proof
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817006-REL Decision – 604710.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:05 (155.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817006-REL
Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between a homeowner, Charles Mandela (“Petitioner”), and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by permitting homeowners to install play structures (e.g., swing sets, treehouses) on lots that already contained another detached structure, such as a garage or shed.
The Petitioner argued that the HOA had historically enforced a strict “one detached structure” rule and that its recent allowance of play structures constituted a violation of CC&R § 3.1. In contrast, the Respondent contended that the underlying intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent secondary residential dwellings, not to prohibit recreational structures consistent with a family-oriented community. The HOA asserted it had properly amended its Architectural Committee regulations, not the CC&Rs, to clarify this distinction.
The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent HOA. The central finding was that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to maintain the single-family residential character of the community. Because play structures cannot be easily converted into secondary residences, they are not inconsistent with this intent. The ALJ concluded that the HOA was not required to amend the CC&Rs (which requires a 75% member vote) but acted within its authority to amend its rules and regulations via a simple board vote. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.
Case Overview
• Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Charles Mandela
◦ Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association
• Hearing Date: November 28, 2017
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D) by allowing members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on properties that already had another detached structure like a garage or shed.
Central Arguments and Presented Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)
The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.
• Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ Historical Enforcement: Testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA enforced this rule by removing nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo, a playhouse, an observation deck, and a zipline structure.
◦ 2006 Legal Opinion: Submitted a February 7, 2006, letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC, which opined on the ambiguity of CC&R § 3.1. The letter stated, “It still appears that only one structure (garage or shed) is permitted,” and supported the HOA’s ability to “enforce the ‘one detached structure’ requirement.” The letter did not specifically mention play structures.
◦ Invalid Approval Form: Presented a “Play Structure Approval Request” form he had drafted while on the board. This form incorrectly stated that the Board of Directors had voted on June 25, 2016, “to adopt changes to the CCR’s [sic], which will allow play structures.” Petitioner argued this was invalid because changing the CC&Rs requires a 75% vote of the membership, which was not obtained.
◦ Ancillary Documents: Submitted documents related to a housing discrimination claim filed by the HOA’s current president, Joseph Hancock, and a letter concerning another member. Petitioner testified these matters involved play structures, though the documents themselves did not mention CC&R § 3.1.
Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)
The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.
• Core Argument: The HOA did not violate the CC&Rs because the intent of the relevant articles is to prohibit secondary residential dwellings, not recreational structures suitable for a community intended to be a “uniquely planned recreation property.”
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ Community Status: There are currently 16 swingsets or play structures within the 193-lot development. The HOA president, Joseph Hancock, testified he has a swingset used by his children, grandchildren, and neighbors.
◦ Legal Counsel: The HOA retained the firm of Poli & Ball, PLC, which opined that because the community is for recreation and family use, “[p]lay structures are perfectly consistent with recreation and family use.” The firm advised that the Architectural Committee’s regulations could be changed to reflect this without amending the CC&Rs. Another law firm, Carpenter Hazlewood, generally agreed with this opinion.
◦ Correction of Clerical Error: Mr. Hancock testified that the form submitted by the Petitioner contained a typographical error. The board’s intent in its June 25, 2016, vote was to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations, not the CC&Rs.
◦ Board Meeting Minutes: The HOA submitted minutes from board meetings in December 2016 and October 2017. These minutes document the board’s discovery of the error on the website form and subsequent votes to formally clarify that the change was to the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs, thereby ratifying its decision.
◦ Amended Approval Form: Respondent submitted the corrected “Play Structure Approval Request” form, which states, “Per the modified Rules and Regulations dated April 6, 2016, this form must be submitted to Architectural Committee for approval of any Play Structure.”
Governing Rules and Covenants
The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.
Document / Section
Key Provision
CC&R § 3.1
“No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage… No garage or shed shall be built prior to the issuance of a Coconino County building permit for the construction of a Single Family Residence.”
Architectural Regulation 3(D)
“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”
CC&R § 4.2
“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”
CC&R § 12.2
Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale
The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.
• Intent of the Covenant: The Judge determined that CC&R Article III is fundamentally “concerned with keeping Respondent single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second residential dwelling on a lot.” This interpretation is supported by other rules in the article prohibiting mobile homes and clarifying that “If you can live/sleep in it, you cannot park it” in the development.
• Status of Play Structures: The decision concludes that a play structure “cannot be easily converted into a second residence.” Therefore, permitting a play structure in addition to a garage or shed is not inconsistent with the primary purpose of CC&R § 3.1.
• Board Authority vs. Member Vote: Because allowing play structures was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not required to amend the CC&Rs through a 75% member vote. Instead, the Board was empowered by CC&R § 4.2 to “amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to provide clarification on the status of play structures” through a majority vote of the Board.
• History of Enforcement: The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to establish a uniform history of enforcement against play structures. Rather, “it appears that the status of play structures, swingsets, and tree houses has been unsettled and the subject of some contention,” partly due to the Petitioner’s own advocacy.
• Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.
Final Order and Implications
• Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.
• Outcome for the Community:
1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.
2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.
3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817006-REL
Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision No. 18F-H1817006-REL
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties in case No. 18F-H1817006-REL, and what was their relationship?
2. What specific violation did the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, allege against the Respondent?
3. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bears the initial burden?
4. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the CC&Rs and amending the “Rules and Regulations”?
5. What was the Petitioner’s primary evidence to support his claim that the HOA historically enforced a “one detached structure” rule?
6. How did the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates HOA, legally justify its decision to permit play structures even on lots that already had a detached garage or shed?
7. How did the Respondent explain the document from its website which stated that the Board had voted to “adopt changes to the CCR’s”?
8. What did the law firm Poli & Ball conclude regarding the permissibility of play structures within the community?
9. What did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky determine was the primary intent of Article III of the CC&Rs?
10. What was the final Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
——————————————————————————–
Quiz Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, and the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association. Mr. Mandela is a homeowner within the Blue Ridge Estates development and a member of the homeowners’ association.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D). He claimed the HOA wrongly allowed members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on their properties when another detached structure, such as a garage or shed, already existed.
3. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must convince the judge that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Charles Mandela, bears the initial burden of proof to establish that a violation occurred.
4. To amend the CC&Rs (the Declaration), an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots is required. In contrast, the Board of Directors can adopt, amend, or repeal “Rules and Regulations” by a simple majority vote of the Board.
5. The Petitioner testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA removed nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo and a playhouse. He also submitted a 2006 letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, which opined that the HOA could enforce a “one detached structure” requirement.
6. The Respondent argued that the intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent second residential dwellings on a lot, not to prohibit recreational items consistent with a family community. Therefore, the Board acted within its authority under CC&R § 4.2 to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to clarify that play structures are permitted.
7. The Respondent’s president, Joseph Hancock, testified that the wording was a typographical error made by the previous Chair of the Architectural Committee (the Petitioner). Board meeting minutes from December 2016 and October 2017 were submitted as evidence to show the Board’s actual intent was to modify the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs.
8. The Poli & Ball law firm opined that play structures are “perfectly consistent with recreation and family use” in a community intended to be a planned recreation property. The firm concluded that the HOA could change the Architectural Committee’s regulations to allow them as long as the change was consistent with the CC&Rs.
9. The Judge concluded that the purpose of Article III is to keep the community single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second dwelling. Since a play structure cannot be easily converted into a second residence, allowing one did not violate the intent of the CC&Rs.
10. The Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge found that the Petitioner had not established that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances, and that the HOA had properly resolved the issue by amending its regulations.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon specific facts, arguments, and legal principles from the source document.
1. Discuss the critical distinction between amending the community’s CC&Rs and amending the Architectural Committee’s regulations. Explain how this distinction became the central pivot upon which the entire case turned.
2. Analyze the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s exhibits and testimony, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Respondent’s evidence more persuasive.
3. The “Conclusions of Law” section discusses the legal principle of interpreting restrictive covenants based on the “intent of the parties.” How did Judge Mihalsky apply this principle to CC&R § 3.1, and how did the community’s stated purpose as a “uniquely planned recreation property” influence this interpretation?
4. Charles Mandela, the Petitioner, was a former board member and president of the Architectural Committee who drafted one of the key documents in question. Discuss how his past involvement in HOA governance may have shaped his legal position and the evidence he presented.
5. Trace the timeline of the “play structure” controversy as detailed in the hearing evidence, from the 2015 discrimination claim to the “clarification vote” in October 2017. How does this sequence of events illustrate the challenges of community governance and rule interpretation within a homeowners’ association?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, the ALJ from the Office of Administrative Hearings heard the dispute between the homeowner and the HOA.
Architectural Committee
A committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for approving any construction, alteration, or improvement to the exterior of any property to ensure it complies with community standards.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this hearing, the Petitioner had the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
A legally binding document that governs a planned community or subdivision. It outlines the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.
Declaration
The formal legal document that creates the homeowners’ association and its CC&Rs. In this case, amending the Declaration required a 75% vote of the members.
Detached Structure
A building on a property that is separate from the main residence. The dispute centered on whether play structures counted as the “one detached structure” permitted by the CC&Rs.
Improvements
A broad term defined in the CC&Rs (§ 1.17) to include buildings, garages, fences, walls, landscaping, and all other structures of every type and kind on a property.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The judge noted that if Title 33 did not apply, the Office of Administrative Hearings would lack jurisdiction to hear the case.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, homeowner Charles Mandela.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a claim is more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or CC&Rs that limits the use of the property. The “one detached structure” rule is an example of a restrictive covenant.
Single Family Residential Use
The designated purpose of the properties in Blue Ridge Estates, meaning they are to be used exclusively as private homes for single families, not for commercial or multi-family dwelling purposes.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817006-REL
Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between a homeowner, Charles Mandela (“Petitioner”), and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by permitting homeowners to install play structures (e.g., swing sets, treehouses) on lots that already contained another detached structure, such as a garage or shed.
The Petitioner argued that the HOA had historically enforced a strict “one detached structure” rule and that its recent allowance of play structures constituted a violation of CC&R § 3.1. In contrast, the Respondent contended that the underlying intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent secondary residential dwellings, not to prohibit recreational structures consistent with a family-oriented community. The HOA asserted it had properly amended its Architectural Committee regulations, not the CC&Rs, to clarify this distinction.
The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent HOA. The central finding was that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to maintain the single-family residential character of the community. Because play structures cannot be easily converted into secondary residences, they are not inconsistent with this intent. The ALJ concluded that the HOA was not required to amend the CC&Rs (which requires a 75% member vote) but acted within its authority to amend its rules and regulations via a simple board vote. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.
Case Overview
• Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Charles Mandela
◦ Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association
• Hearing Date: November 28, 2017
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D) by allowing members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on properties that already had another detached structure like a garage or shed.
Central Arguments and Presented Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)
The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.
• Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ Historical Enforcement: Testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA enforced this rule by removing nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo, a playhouse, an observation deck, and a zipline structure.
◦ 2006 Legal Opinion: Submitted a February 7, 2006, letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC, which opined on the ambiguity of CC&R § 3.1. The letter stated, “It still appears that only one structure (garage or shed) is permitted,” and supported the HOA’s ability to “enforce the ‘one detached structure’ requirement.” The letter did not specifically mention play structures.
◦ Invalid Approval Form: Presented a “Play Structure Approval Request” form he had drafted while on the board. This form incorrectly stated that the Board of Directors had voted on June 25, 2016, “to adopt changes to the CCR’s [sic], which will allow play structures.” Petitioner argued this was invalid because changing the CC&Rs requires a 75% vote of the membership, which was not obtained.
◦ Ancillary Documents: Submitted documents related to a housing discrimination claim filed by the HOA’s current president, Joseph Hancock, and a letter concerning another member. Petitioner testified these matters involved play structures, though the documents themselves did not mention CC&R § 3.1.
Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)
The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.
• Core Argument: The HOA did not violate the CC&Rs because the intent of the relevant articles is to prohibit secondary residential dwellings, not recreational structures suitable for a community intended to be a “uniquely planned recreation property.”
• Evidence and Testimony:
◦ Community Status: There are currently 16 swingsets or play structures within the 193-lot development. The HOA president, Joseph Hancock, testified he has a swingset used by his children, grandchildren, and neighbors.
◦ Legal Counsel: The HOA retained the firm of Poli & Ball, PLC, which opined that because the community is for recreation and family use, “[p]lay structures are perfectly consistent with recreation and family use.” The firm advised that the Architectural Committee’s regulations could be changed to reflect this without amending the CC&Rs. Another law firm, Carpenter Hazlewood, generally agreed with this opinion.
◦ Correction of Clerical Error: Mr. Hancock testified that the form submitted by the Petitioner contained a typographical error. The board’s intent in its June 25, 2016, vote was to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations, not the CC&Rs.
◦ Board Meeting Minutes: The HOA submitted minutes from board meetings in December 2016 and October 2017. These minutes document the board’s discovery of the error on the website form and subsequent votes to formally clarify that the change was to the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs, thereby ratifying its decision.
◦ Amended Approval Form: Respondent submitted the corrected “Play Structure Approval Request” form, which states, “Per the modified Rules and Regulations dated April 6, 2016, this form must be submitted to Architectural Committee for approval of any Play Structure.”
Governing Rules and Covenants
The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.
Document / Section
Key Provision
CC&R § 3.1
“No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage… No garage or shed shall be built prior to the issuance of a Coconino County building permit for the construction of a Single Family Residence.”
Architectural Regulation 3(D)
“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”
CC&R § 4.2
“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”
CC&R § 12.2
Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale
The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.
• Intent of the Covenant: The Judge determined that CC&R Article III is fundamentally “concerned with keeping Respondent single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second residential dwelling on a lot.” This interpretation is supported by other rules in the article prohibiting mobile homes and clarifying that “If you can live/sleep in it, you cannot park it” in the development.
• Status of Play Structures: The decision concludes that a play structure “cannot be easily converted into a second residence.” Therefore, permitting a play structure in addition to a garage or shed is not inconsistent with the primary purpose of CC&R § 3.1.
• Board Authority vs. Member Vote: Because allowing play structures was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not required to amend the CC&Rs through a 75% member vote. Instead, the Board was empowered by CC&R § 4.2 to “amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to provide clarification on the status of play structures” through a majority vote of the Board.
• History of Enforcement: The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to establish a uniform history of enforcement against play structures. Rather, “it appears that the status of play structures, swingsets, and tree houses has been unsettled and the subject of some contention,” partly due to the Petitioner’s own advocacy.
• Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.
Final Order and Implications
• Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.
• Outcome for the Community:
1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.
2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.
3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Charles Mandela(petitioner) Appeared and testified on his own behalf; previously served as president of the Architectural Committee.
Respondent Side
Brian C. Axt(attorney) Resnick & Louis, P.C. Represented Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.
Joseph Hancock(board member) Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association Board's president; presented testimony/witness for Respondent.
Jason Miller(counsel) Carpenter Hazlewood Provided an email opinion supporting the Respondent's position.
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.
Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 583987.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:14 (53.0 KB)
17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 585505.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:15 (385.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL
Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.
The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.
In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.
Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings
Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation
On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.
Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.
This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:
• Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”
• Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.
• Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.
• Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.
Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing
On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”
• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.
• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”
• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”
• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute
The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.
Respondent’s (HOA) Case
The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:
• Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”
• Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.
◦ Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).
◦ Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.
◦ Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.
◦ Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.
Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case
The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.
• Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.
• Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:
◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.
◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.
• Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.
• Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.
Final Administrative Law Judge Decision
On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.
Key Findings and Conclusions of Law
Finding/Conclusion
Details
Standard of Review
The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.
Reasonableness of HOA Action
Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.
HOA Authority
CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”
Patio Cover Classification
The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).
Cost Responsibility
The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”
Final Order
Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:
“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”
The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.
The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.
Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 583987.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:29 (53.0 KB)
17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 585505.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:30 (385.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL
Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.
The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.
In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.
Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings
Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation
On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.
Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.
This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:
• Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”
• Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.
• Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.
• Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.
Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing
On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”
• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.
• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”
• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”
• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute
The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.
Respondent’s (HOA) Case
The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:
• Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”
• Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.
◦ Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).
◦ Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.
◦ Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.
◦ Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.
Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case
The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.
• Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.
• Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:
◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.
◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.
• Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.
• Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.
Final Administrative Law Judge Decision
On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.
Key Findings and Conclusions of Law
Finding/Conclusion
Details
Standard of Review
The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.
Reasonableness of HOA Action
Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.
HOA Authority
CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”
Patio Cover Classification
The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).
Cost Responsibility
The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”
Final Order
Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:
“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”
The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.
