Arthur Fisenko & Viktoriya Tkach-Fisenko v. Bellvue Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121046-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-09-20
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition, finding that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof that the Association violated state statute or community documents. The Association's Architectural Review Committee (ARC) refusal to approve the wall modification request was deemed reasonable because Petitioners failed to provide the supplemental information requested by the ARC.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Arthur Fisenko & Viktoriya Tkach-Fisenko Counsel Laurence Stevens, Esq.
Respondent Bellvue Homeowners Association Counsel Jamie B. Palfai, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3) and CC&Rs Article VII, Section 2

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition, finding that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof that the Association violated state statute or community documents. The Association's Architectural Review Committee (ARC) refusal to approve the wall modification request was deemed reasonable because Petitioners failed to provide the supplemental information requested by the ARC.

Why this result: The record did not establish violation(s) of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3) or CC&Rs Article VII, Section 2 by a preponderance of the evidence. Petitioners did not provide sufficient and/or requisite information necessary for the ARC to make a reasonably objective determination, nor did they attempt to cure the deficient application.

Key Issues & Findings

Arbitrary and capricious denial of architectural request to move garage-side yard block wall and install a double-wide gate.

Petitioners alleged the Association (ARC) arbitrarily and capriciously rejected their request to move their garage-side yard wall eight (8) feet forward on their property, using the same materials as the existing wall, except replacing the single-wide gate with a double-wide gate previously approved by Respondent.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Architectural Request, Block Wall, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), A.R.S. 33-1817
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3)
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 2
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121046-REL Decision – 912007.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:35:00 (138.0 KB)

This is a summary of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in *Arthur Fisenko & Viktoriya Tkach-Fisenko vs. Bellvue Homeowners Association* (No. 21F-H2121046-REL), heard on August 30, 2021.

Key Facts and Proceedings

The dispute involved Arthur Fisenko and Viktoriya Tkach-Fisenko (Petitioners), property owners in the Bellvue subdivision, and the Bellvue Homeowners Association (Respondent). The case was heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) pursuant to Arizona statutes governing disputes between owners and planned community associations.

Petitioners initially filed a two-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that the Association's Architectural Review Committee (ARC) arbitrarily and capriciously rejected landscaping modification requests. By July 30, 2021, the issue concerning the installation of pavers and artificial grass became moot when the Respondent reversed its initial denial.

The main issue for the hearing was whether the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3) and/or CC&Rs Article VII, Section 2, by denying Petitioners’ request to move their garage-side yard wall eight (8) feet forward on their property. The proposal included using the same materials and replacing an existing single-wide gate with a previously approved double-wide gate.

Key Arguments

  1. Petitioners’ Argument: Petitioners asserted that the Association's denial was arbitrary and capricious, noting that the ARC had approved the paver/artificial grass portion of their request without requiring supplemental information. They argued that their initial Architectural Request Form, filled out without counsel, should have been approved despite any technical omissions.
  2. Respondent’s Argument: The Association contended that the Petitioners' Architectural Request Form was deficient and incomplete because crucial and relevant information was missing. Specifically, after the initial denial in February 2021 (citing concerns over length and neighbor impact), Petitioners were instructed in March 2021 to submit a complete form, a plot plan, elevation plans, and specifications. Respondent argued that because Petitioners failed to provide this specific supplemental information, the ARC was unable to make a reasonably objective determination necessary for approval.

Legal Points and Outcome

The Petitioners bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1817(B)(3) (which mandates that architectural approval "shall not unreasonably be withheld") or CC&Rs Article VII, Section 2.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof. The decision rested on the finding that the Petitioners did not provide sufficient and/or requisite information necessary for the ARC to reasonably evaluate the wall modification request. Furthermore, the record established that Petitioners were specifically advised what supplemental information was required but failed to cure their application deficiencies.

The final decision held that the Respondent’s refusal to grant the Architectural Request was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Therefore, the Petitioners’ petition was denied.

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21F-H2121046-REL

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This administrative law decision outlines a legal dispute between homeowners Arthur and Viktoriya Fisenko and the Bellvue Homeowners Association regarding property modifications. The petitioners alleged that the association’s Architectural Committee unfairly rejected their request to extend a boundary wall and install a double-wide gate. While the parties resolved disagreements over landscaping materials like artificial grass and pavers before the hearing, the conflict regarding the wall remained. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Homeowners Association, finding that the residents failed to provide the specific plans and technical data required for approval. Consequently, the court determined the association did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its refusal, leading to the formal denial of the petition.

What was the core legal dispute between the Fisenkos and the HOA?
Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule against the homeowners?
How do Arizona statutes regulate the architectural approval process for HOAs?

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21F-H2121046-REL

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This administrative law decision outlines a legal dispute between homeowners Arthur and Viktoriya Fisenko and the Bellvue Homeowners Association regarding property modifications. The petitioners alleged that the association’s Architectural Committee unfairly rejected their request to extend a boundary wall and install a double-wide gate. While the parties resolved disagreements over landscaping materials like artificial grass and pavers before the hearing, the conflict regarding the wall remained. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Homeowners Association, finding that the residents failed to provide the specific plans and technical data required for approval. Consequently, the court determined the association did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its refusal, leading to the formal denial of the petition.

What was the core legal dispute between the Fisenkos and the HOA?
Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule against the homeowners?
How do Arizona statutes regulate the architectural approval process for HOAs?

Thursday, February 12

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Today • 11:01 AM

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Arthur Fisenko (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of Petitioners
  • Viktoriya Tkach-Fisenko (petitioner)
  • Laurence Stevens (petitioner attorney)
    Stevens & Van Cott, PLLC

Respondent Side

  • Jamie Palfai (HOA attorney)
    O’Hagan Meyer LLC
  • Samuel Truett (witness)
    Bellvue Homeowners Association
    Witness for Bellvue Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Clifford (Norm) Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent

Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

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21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

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21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf

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21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf

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21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf

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21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf

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Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.

Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes

Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.

Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.

Factual Background and Timeline

1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.

2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.

3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.

4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”

5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:

◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.

◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).

Procedural History

May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.

July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.

September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.

September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).

January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.

Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing

In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.

Petitioner’s Argument

ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion

1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.

2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.

Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.

3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.

Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.

4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.

Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.

5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”

Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.

6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.

Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.

Key Statutes and Legal Principles

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804 (Open Meetings Law):

◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”

◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”

◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):

◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”

◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.

◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”

Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):

◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

Conclusion and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.

The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”

The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.

Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?

2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?

3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?

4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?

5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?

6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?

7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?

8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?

9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?

10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.

2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.

3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.

4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.

5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.

6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.

7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.

8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.

9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.

10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.

2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?

3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.

4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Action without meeting

A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821

The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804

The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.

Clifford (Norm) Burnes

The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.

Unanimous Written Consent

The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.

Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It

1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality

For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.

But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.

2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”

The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.

This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.

Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”

3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict

Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.

In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.

This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.

4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence

Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).

The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.

Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.

5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency

While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.

This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:

1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.

2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford (Norm) Burnes (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf at the original hearing

Respondent Side

  • John Crotty (HOA attorney)
    Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood
    Attorney for Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Esmerelda Sarina Martinez (board president, witness)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as a witness for Respondent
  • Madill (board member)
    Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Referred to as Mr. Madill

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during original decision transmittal
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner during rehearing transmittal
  • Miranda Alvarez (staff)
    Transmittal staff (also noted as Miranda A.)
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmittal staff

Other Participants

  • Jamie Argueta (staff)
    Conducted research; position and function apparently not in the record

Gregory L Smith v. Mountain Bridge Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121037-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-06-11
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Petitioner prevailed on the claim of violating CC&R Article 11.3.2 (failure to negotiate in good faith) but was denied relief on the claim of violating A.R.S. § 33-1811 (conflict of interest). Petitioner was ordered reimbursed $500.00 for the filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gregory L. Smith Counsel
Respondent Mountain Bridge Community Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1811
CC&R Article 11.3.2

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner prevailed on the claim of violating CC&R Article 11.3.2 (failure to negotiate in good faith) but was denied relief on the claim of violating A.R.S. § 33-1811 (conflict of interest). Petitioner was ordered reimbursed $500.00 for the filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the A.R.S. § 33-1811 violation because the statute was interpreted by the Tribunal to require the action to involve compensation.

Key Issues & Findings

Conflict of Interest Disclosure

Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1811 because the HOA President failed to disclose a conflict of interest during the approval of his own flagpole. The Tribunal found the statute requires the decision to involve compensation, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Orders: Petition denied as to a violation of A.R.S. 33-1811. Tribunal declined to award a civil penalty.

Filing fee: $1,000.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1811

Failure to Negotiate Claim Resolution in Good Faith

Petitioner claimed Mountain Bridge failed to negotiate a resolution in good faith after he filed a claim notice. Mountain Bridge failed to communicate until approximately 35 days after the claim was noticed. The Tribunal found Respondent failed to negotiate in good faith.

Orders: Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party as to his claim of an Article 11 violation. Respondent must reimburse the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days. Tribunal declined to award a civil penalty.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&R Article 11.3.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Conflict of Interest, Failure to Negotiate, Flagpole, Filing Fee
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121037-REL Decision – 887461.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:33:55 (121.4 KB)

This is a summary of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of *Gregory L. Smith v. Mountain Bridge Community Association*.

Key Facts and Proceedings

Petitioner Gregory L. Smith, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Bridge Community Association (HOA/Respondent), filed a petition alleging the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&R’s) and Arizona statute. The core dispute centered on the HOA’s failure to take enforcement action against Smith’s backyard neighbor—who was also the HOA President (Mr. Riggs)—for installing a flagpole that impacted Smith’s property view. Smith believed the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) had an obligation to consider the view from his property when approving the flagpole. The hearings occurred on April 22, 2021, and June 2, 2021.

Main Issues and Arguments

The Tribunal focused on two primary issues after addressing a moot point regarding attorney’s fees:

  1. Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1811 (Conflict of Interest): Smith argued that the HOA violated the statute because the Board President failed to make proper disclosures regarding the flagpole approval, as it was a board decision.
  2. Violation of CC&R Article 11.3.2 (Good Faith Negotiation): Smith argued that the HOA violated the requirement to negotiate in good faith after he filed a formal claim notice on September 8, 2020. The credible evidence showed the HOA or its attorneys failed to communicate with Smith until October 13, 2020, approximately 35 days after the claim notice.

Legal Conclusions and Outcome

The Administrative Law Judge rendered a decision based on whether Smith met his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

  1. A.R.S. § 33-1811 Claim Denied: The Tribunal found that A.R.S. § 33-1811, concerning board conflicts of interest, applies only when the "contract, decision or other action" involves compensation. Since the decision regarding the flagpole was not found to involve compensation, the Tribunal held that Smith had not sustained his burden of proof regarding the statutory violation.
  2. CC&R Article 11.3.2 Claim Upheld: The Tribunal found that Mountain Bridge failed to negotiate in good faith and violated Article 11.3.2 of the CC&R’s. Although the dispute occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, the lack of any communication until 35 days post-notice, thereby exceeding the negotiation period, constituted a violation.

Final Decision

The Petitioner’s request regarding the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1811 was denied. Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party solely on the claim that Mountain Bridge violated CC&R Article 11 (failure to negotiate in good faith). As the prevailing party, the Petitioner is entitled to the reimbursement of his $500.00 filing fee from the Respondent within 30 days. The Tribunal declined to award a civil penalty.

Questions

Question

Does a board member violate conflict of interest laws by voting on their own architectural request if no money is exchanged?

Short Answer

Likely not. The ALJ ruled that the conflict of interest statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) applies specifically to decisions involving compensation.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ interpreted A.R.S. § 33-1811 narrowly. While acknowledging that abstaining from voting on one's own request is 'best practice,' the Judge determined that the phrase 'contract, decision or other action for compensation' implies that the decision must involve compensation to trigger the statutory violation. Since the architectural approval was not for compensation, the statute was not violated.

Alj Quote

However, the word “other” would indicate that the contract or decision would involve compensation. … Therefore, the Tribunal finds that Mr. Smith has not sustained his burden in demonstrating that Mountain Bridge violated A.R.S. § 33-1811.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • Conflict of Interest
  • Board Conduct
  • Architectural Review

Question

If the CC&Rs require the HOA to negotiate a dispute within a certain time, can they simply ignore it?

Short Answer

No. Ignoring a request for negotiation beyond the mandated timeframe can be considered a violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the CC&Rs required the parties to make a reasonable effort to meet and confer. The HOA failed to communicate with the homeowner until 35 days after the claim was noticed (past the 30-day negotiation period). The ALJ found this lack of communication to be a violation of the specific CC&R article requiring good faith negotiation.

Alj Quote

The credible evidence presented demonstrated that Mountain Bridge, or its attorneys, did not communicate with Mr. Smith until October 13, 2020, approximately 35 days after the claim was noticed. … Therefore, the Tribunal finds that Mountain Bridge failed to negotiate in good faith and violated Article 11.3.2 of the CC&R’s.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article 11.3.2

Topic Tags

  • Dispute Resolution
  • Good Faith
  • HOA Obligations

Question

Can the HOA use the COVID-19 pandemic as a valid excuse for failing to communicate with me?

Short Answer

Not if they fail to send any updates. The HOA must at least inform the homeowner of potential delays.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ rejected the HOA's implicit defense that the pandemic justified the delay in communication. The ruling stated that even if the pandemic caused issues, the HOA had an obligation to at least inform the homeowner that delays were occurring. Total silence was not justified.

Alj Quote

While this dispute occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, certainly communications could have been sent to Mr. Smith informing him there may be some delays in communication. However, there were none, and thus no valid justification for the Board not entering into negotiations with the Smiths.

Legal Basis

Administrative Discretion / Good Faith

Topic Tags

  • Communication
  • Delays
  • Good Faith

Question

Who is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the rules during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred. The HOA does not have to disprove the claim initially; the burden starts with the homeowner.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated CC&R § 3.1 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I claim the HOA violated a definition in the CC&Rs, such as 'Visible from Neighboring Property'?

Short Answer

No. You cannot violate a definition; you can only violate the rules that use the definition.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner argued the HOA violated the definition of 'Visible from Neighboring Property.' The ALJ ruled that a definition is descriptive and cannot be violated in and of itself. Violations must be tied to specific covenants or restrictions.

Alj Quote

Further, because “Visible from Neighboring Property” as mentioned in Article 1 is a definition, it is impossible for Mountain Bridge to violate the same.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Interpretation
  • Definitions
  • Legal Standards

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, will I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, if you prevail on a claim, the ALJ can order the HOA to reimburse your filing fee.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ deemed the homeowner the prevailing party regarding the 'failure to negotiate' claim (even though other claims were denied) and ordered the HOA to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Alj Quote

Thus, Petitioner is entitled to his filing fee of $500.00 and Respondent must reimburse the same with 30 days.

Legal Basis

Administrative Remedy

Topic Tags

  • Remedies
  • Fees
  • Reimbursement

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121037-REL
Case Title
Gregory L. Smith vs. Mountain Bridge Community Association
Decision Date
2021-06-11
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Does a board member violate conflict of interest laws by voting on their own architectural request if no money is exchanged?

Short Answer

Likely not. The ALJ ruled that the conflict of interest statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) applies specifically to decisions involving compensation.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ interpreted A.R.S. § 33-1811 narrowly. While acknowledging that abstaining from voting on one's own request is 'best practice,' the Judge determined that the phrase 'contract, decision or other action for compensation' implies that the decision must involve compensation to trigger the statutory violation. Since the architectural approval was not for compensation, the statute was not violated.

Alj Quote

However, the word “other” would indicate that the contract or decision would involve compensation. … Therefore, the Tribunal finds that Mr. Smith has not sustained his burden in demonstrating that Mountain Bridge violated A.R.S. § 33-1811.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • Conflict of Interest
  • Board Conduct
  • Architectural Review

Question

If the CC&Rs require the HOA to negotiate a dispute within a certain time, can they simply ignore it?

Short Answer

No. Ignoring a request for negotiation beyond the mandated timeframe can be considered a violation of the duty to negotiate in good faith.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the CC&Rs required the parties to make a reasonable effort to meet and confer. The HOA failed to communicate with the homeowner until 35 days after the claim was noticed (past the 30-day negotiation period). The ALJ found this lack of communication to be a violation of the specific CC&R article requiring good faith negotiation.

Alj Quote

The credible evidence presented demonstrated that Mountain Bridge, or its attorneys, did not communicate with Mr. Smith until October 13, 2020, approximately 35 days after the claim was noticed. … Therefore, the Tribunal finds that Mountain Bridge failed to negotiate in good faith and violated Article 11.3.2 of the CC&R’s.

Legal Basis

CC&R Article 11.3.2

Topic Tags

  • Dispute Resolution
  • Good Faith
  • HOA Obligations

Question

Can the HOA use the COVID-19 pandemic as a valid excuse for failing to communicate with me?

Short Answer

Not if they fail to send any updates. The HOA must at least inform the homeowner of potential delays.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ rejected the HOA's implicit defense that the pandemic justified the delay in communication. The ruling stated that even if the pandemic caused issues, the HOA had an obligation to at least inform the homeowner that delays were occurring. Total silence was not justified.

Alj Quote

While this dispute occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, certainly communications could have been sent to Mr. Smith informing him there may be some delays in communication. However, there were none, and thus no valid justification for the Board not entering into negotiations with the Smiths.

Legal Basis

Administrative Discretion / Good Faith

Topic Tags

  • Communication
  • Delays
  • Good Faith

Question

Who is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the rules during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred. The HOA does not have to disprove the claim initially; the burden starts with the homeowner.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated CC&R § 3.1 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I claim the HOA violated a definition in the CC&Rs, such as 'Visible from Neighboring Property'?

Short Answer

No. You cannot violate a definition; you can only violate the rules that use the definition.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner argued the HOA violated the definition of 'Visible from Neighboring Property.' The ALJ ruled that a definition is descriptive and cannot be violated in and of itself. Violations must be tied to specific covenants or restrictions.

Alj Quote

Further, because “Visible from Neighboring Property” as mentioned in Article 1 is a definition, it is impossible for Mountain Bridge to violate the same.

Legal Basis

Contract Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • CC&R Interpretation
  • Definitions
  • Legal Standards

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, will I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, if you prevail on a claim, the ALJ can order the HOA to reimburse your filing fee.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ deemed the homeowner the prevailing party regarding the 'failure to negotiate' claim (even though other claims were denied) and ordered the HOA to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Alj Quote

Thus, Petitioner is entitled to his filing fee of $500.00 and Respondent must reimburse the same with 30 days.

Legal Basis

Administrative Remedy

Topic Tags

  • Remedies
  • Fees
  • Reimbursement

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121037-REL
Case Title
Gregory L. Smith vs. Mountain Bridge Community Association
Decision Date
2021-06-11
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gregory L. Smith (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Christa Smith (witness)
    Called by Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Amber Martin (community manager)
    Mountain Bridge Community Association
    Also testified as a witness
  • Jim Rayment (ARC Chair)
    Mountain Bridge Community Association
    Approved the flagpole; also testified as a witness
  • Mr. Riggs (HOA President)
    Mountain Bridge Community Association
    Petitioner's backyard neighbor

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission

Charles P Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020042-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-04-27
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge, following a rehearing, affirmed the original decision, concluding that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R Article X regarding the denial of an architectural modification request for a patio shade. The Respondent was found to have acted in compliance with the community documents, and the appeal was dismissed.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P Mandela Counsel
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners' Association Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article X; CC&R Section 10.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge, following a rehearing, affirmed the original decision, concluding that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R Article X regarding the denial of an architectural modification request for a patio shade. The Respondent was found to have acted in compliance with the community documents, and the appeal was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of the CC&R's and failed to follow the procedural requirements necessary to appeal a deemed disapproval under CC&R Section 10.3.

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of request for patio shade structure and alleged violation of response timeline

Petitioner challenged the HOA's denial of his application for a patio shade, arguing the denial was improper because the shade would be attached (not a separate structure) and that the HOA missed the 30-day response deadline. The ALJ determined that the HOA's denial based on the 'only one structure other than the residence' rule (since a shed already existed) complied with the non-exhaustive Architectural Committee Standards (Article X, 10.2). Regarding the delayed response, the ALJ noted that Section 10.3 mandated that a late response results in the request being 'deemed disapproved,' and the Petitioner failed to subsequently request the required appeal meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Respondent violated Article X of the CC&R’s. The Respondent was declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner's appeal (rehearing) was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • CC&R Article X
  • CC&R Section 10.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Review, Denial, Rehearing, Burden of Proof, Deemed Disapproved
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020042-REL-RHG Decision – 876009.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:30 (118.9 KB)

20F-H2020042-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2020042-REL/850032.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:33 (113.4 KB)

Briefing on Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association (“Blue Ridge”). The core issue was Blue Ridge’s denial of Mr. Mandela’s request to build a patio shade structure.

In the initial hearing on January 13, 2021, Mr. Mandela argued the denial was erroneous because the shade would be attached to his house, not a separate structure, and that similar structures existed in the community. Blue Ridge defended its decision based on Article X of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which limits properties to one structure besides the main residence. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, finding that Blue Ridge acted within the authority granted by its CC&Rs, as its architectural standards were not exhaustive and it provided a reasonably detailed written reason for the denial.

Following this decision, Mr. Mandela was granted a rehearing, which took place on April 16, 2021. During this second hearing, he introduced a new argument that Blue Ridge had violated Article 10.3 of the CC&Rs by failing to respond to his request within the stipulated 30-day timeframe. However, the ALJ found that the same article specifies that a failure to respond results in the request being “deemed disapproved.” The ALJ concluded that Mr. Mandela had failed to follow the subsequent appeal procedures outlined in the CC&Rs and again failed to meet his burden of proof. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and Blue Ridge was declared the prevailing party. Notably, during the rehearing, Mr. Mandela testified that his request for the patio shade had since been approved by the Blue Ridge board.

Initial Hearing and Decision (Case No. 20F-H2020042-REL)

The first evidentiary hearing was held on January 13, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone to address Mr. Mandela’s petition alleging Blue Ridge violated its CC&Rs.

The Core Dispute

Petitioner’s Request: On August 28, 2019, Charles P. Mandela submitted a request to build a “patio shade less than 200 sq. feet,” described as a four-post structure he intended to attach to the east wall of his residence.

Respondent’s Denial: On October 25, 2019, Blue Ridge denied the request, stating: “Only one structure other than the residence may be placed on the property. The site plan that was given for review shows the residence and also a shed on property already existing, this would be the allowable limit per the Architectural Standards.”

Arguments Presented

Petitioner (Charles P. Mandela):

◦ Argued passionately that the denial was erroneous because the patio shade was to be attached to the house, not a separate, stand-alone structure.

◦ Presented photographs of other properties within Blue Ridge Estates that had multiple structures and stand-alone patio shades similar to his proposal.

Respondent (Blue Ridge Estates HOA):

◦ Contended it properly followed Article X of the CC&Rs in its denial.

◦ At the hearing, Blue Ridge pointed to Article III of the CC&Rs as justification, classifying the proposed shade as an additional structure on the property.

Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, concluding he had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that Blue Ridge violated Article X of the CC&Rs.

Interpretation of CC&R Section 10.2: The judge found that the architectural standards listed in this section were explicitly not exhaustive. The text states standards “may include, without limitation, provisions regarding” aspects like size, design, and placement. This allowed the architectural committee to deny the request based on the “one additional structure” rule, even if not explicitly listed.

Compliance with CC&R Section 10.3: This section requires the committee to provide “reasonably detailed written reasons for such disapproval.” The judge found that the denial email of October 25, 2019, fulfilled this requirement. The email did not need to cite a specific CC&R section, only to provide an explanation.

On Precedent and Fairness: The ALJ acknowledged Mr. Mandela’s evidence of similar structures on other properties. However, the decision noted: “While those properties may have had their shades approved by different members of the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee that does not follow that Mr. Mandela’s request was improperly denied under Article X.”

Final Ruling: The petition was denied in a decision dated January 29, 2021.

Rehearing and Final Decision (Case No. 20F-H2020042-REL-RHG)

Mr. Mandela filed for a rehearing on February 5, 2021, on the grounds that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by evidence. The Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner granted the request, and a new hearing was held on April 16, 2021.

New Testimony and Arguments

Petitioner (Charles P. Mandela):

Subsequent Approval: Testified that since the January 29, 2021 decision, his request for the patio shade had been approved by the Blue Ridge board.

Procedural Violation: Argued that Blue Ridge violated CC&R Section 10.3 by failing to respond to his August 28, 2019, request within the required 30-day period, as the denial was not issued until October 25, 2019.

History of Denials: Stated he had made several previous requests in 2018 and 2019 that were either denied or ignored.

Discrimination: Claimed he had been discriminated against due to the previous denials.

Respondent (Blue Ridge Estates HOA):

Interpretation of Section 10.3: Argued that while the section may be “confusingly drafted,” it stipulates that if the committee fails to respond within 30 days, the request is “deemed disapproved.” Therefore, the board acted within its authority.

Failure to Appeal: Contended that Mr. Mandela failed to follow the proper appeal procedure outlined in the CC&Rs, as he never specifically requested a meeting to discuss the denial.

Judge’s Final Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ affirmed the original decision, finding for the Respondent as the prevailing party and dismissing Mr. Mandela’s appeal.

Scope of Rehearing: The judge determined that the rehearing was limited to the August 28, 2019, request and its subsequent denial, as that was the sole focus of the original petition. Mr. Mandela’s arguments about prior denials were not considered new evidence relevant to the specific violation alleged.

Interpretation of the 30-Day Rule: The ALJ sided with the HOA’s interpretation of Section 10.3. While acknowledging that Blue Ridge took more than thirty days to issue a written denial, the judge ruled that the CC&R’s provision for a “deemed disapproved” status meant the request was properly denied under the rules.

Petitioner’s Failure to Follow Procedure: The judge noted that Mr. Mandela admitted he did not formally request a meeting with the Architectural Committee after the denial, which was the required next step in the appeal process under Section 10.3.

Final Ruling: The final decision, dated April 27, 2021, concluded that Mr. Mandela failed to sustain his burden of proof. The HOA was found to have acted in compliance with the CC&Rs, and the appeal was dismissed. This order was declared binding on the parties.

Timeline of Key Events

August 28, 2019

Charles Mandela submits his request to build a patio shade.

October 25, 2019

Blue Ridge HOA denies the request via email, citing the one-additional-structure limit.

January 13, 2020

Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

January 13, 2021

The first evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

January 29, 2021

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues a decision denying Mandela’s petition.

February 5, 2021

Mandela files a request for a rehearing.

March 15, 2021

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

April 16, 2021

The rehearing is conducted.

April 27, 2021

The ALJ issues a final decision, finding for the HOA and dismissing Mandela’s appeal.

Central CC&R Provision: Article X, Section 10.3

The most heavily debated provision was Section 10.3 of the Blue Ridge Estates CC&Rs, which outlines the procedure for architectural requests. Its language was central to the outcome of the rehearing.

Key text from Section 10.3:

“The Architectural Committee shall have thirty (30) days after receipt of such plans, specifications, and elevations to approve or disapprove of the proposed construction… In the event the Architectural Committee fails either to approve or disapprove the proposed construction… within said thirty (30) day period, such proposed construction… shall be deemed disapproved and the Owner can then request a meeting with the Architectural Committee to discuss the reasons for such disapproval…”

This clause was interpreted by the ALJ to mean that the HOA’s failure to provide a written response within 30 days automatically constituted a denial, shifting the burden to the homeowner to request a follow-up meeting, a step Mr. Mandela did not take.

Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from January 29, 2021, and April 27, 2021. The case centers on the denial of an architectural request and the interpretation of the association’s governing documents (CC&Rs).

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Quiz: Key Facts and Arguments

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided legal decisions.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific structure did Charles P. Mandela request approval to build on August 28, 2019?

3. What was the initial reason given by the Blue Ridge Estates HOA for denying Mr. Mandela’s request on October 25, 2019?

4. What was Mr. Mandela’s central argument during the first hearing on January 13, 2021?

5. According to the decision from the first hearing, why did the Administrative Law Judge rule that the HOA’s denial was in compliance with Section 10.2 of the CC&Rs?

6. On what grounds did Mr. Mandela file his Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request on February 5, 2021?

7. During the rehearing, what new argument did Mr. Mandela raise concerning the timeline of the HOA’s denial of his August 28, 2019 request?

8. How did the HOA’s legal counsel counter Mr. Mandela’s argument regarding the 30-day response time outlined in Section 10.3?

9. What procedural step, outlined in Section 10.3, did Mr. Mandela admit he failed to take after his request was deemed denied?

10. What was the final outcome of the rehearing on April 16, 2021, and what was the judge’s conclusion regarding the HOA’s actions?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Charles P. Mandela, a homeowner, and Respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association of Coconino County. Mr. Mandela filed the petition against the HOA after it denied his request to build a patio shade.

2. On August 28, 2019, Mr. Mandela requested approval to build a “patio shade less than 200 sq. feet.” The structure was a four-post shade that he intended to attach to the east side wall of his residence.

3. The HOA denied the request based on Architectural Committee Standards Article X. The denial stated that only one structure other than the residence may be placed on the property, and Mr. Mandela already had a residence and a shed.

4. Mr. Mandela’s central argument was that the denial was erroneous because the patio shade was not a separate stand-alone structure. He planned to attach it to his house, and he presented photographs of other properties with similar structures.

5. The judge ruled the denial complied with Section 10.2 because the list of standards the Architectural Committee could enforce was “not an exhaustive one.” This meant the committee could properly deny the request based on the one-structure limit, even if it wasn’t explicitly enumerated.

6. Mr. Mandela requested a rehearing on the grounds that the findings of fact were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. He also claimed the decision was not supported by the evidence or was contrary to law.

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Mandela argued that the Board violated Section 10.3 of the CC&Rs. He contended that since he made his request on August 28, 2019, and the Board did not respond until October 25, 2019, it had failed to provide a written response within the required 30-day period.

8. The HOA’s counsel argued that while Section 10.3 may be “confusingly drafted,” it specifies that if the committee fails to approve or disapprove within the 30-day period, the request is “deemed disapproved.” Therefore, the Board was within its authority.

9. Mr. Mandela admitted that he did not formally request a meeting with the Architectural Committee to discuss the reasons for the disapproval. This is the procedural step required by Section 10.3 after a request is deemed denied.

10. The final outcome was that the petition was dismissed, and the Respondent (HOA) was declared the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the HOA had not violated the CC&Rs and had acted in compliance with its governing documents.

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Essay Questions for Further Study

The following questions are designed to promote a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, citing specific details from the legal decisions.

1. Analyze the interpretation of CC&R Section 10.3, specifically the “deemed disapproved” clause. Discuss how this clause functioned as a key legal defense for the HOA and ultimately shaped the outcome of the rehearing.

2. The legal standard in this case was “a preponderance of the evidence.” Define this standard as described in the legal text and evaluate the evidence Mr. Mandela presented in both hearings. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that Mr. Mandela failed to meet his burden of proof?

3. Compare and contrast the arguments presented by the Petitioner and Respondent in the initial hearing (January 13, 2021) versus the rehearing (April 16, 2021). How did the focus of the legal arguments shift between the two proceedings?

4. Examine the authority and jurisdiction of the Architectural Committee as outlined in CC&R Section 10.2. Discuss the significance of the phrase “Such standards and procedures may include, without limitation, provisions regarding…” in the judge’s initial decision.

5. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Mandela’s initial request in August 2019 to the final order in April 2021. Identify at least four key procedural milestones and explain their significance to the case’s progression and ultimate resolution.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge, in this case Adam D. Stone, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on petitions concerning disputes regulated by state agencies.

Architectural Committee

A body within the Blue Ridge Estates HOA established by Article X of the CC&Rs, with jurisdiction over all original construction and any modifications, additions, or alterations to the exterior of homes or properties.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations and the associations themselves in Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to produce evidence that proves the facts it claims are true. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Mandela) bore the burden of proof.

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community like Blue Ridge Estates. This case centered on the interpretation of Article X of the Blue Ridge CC&Rs.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing organization for a planned community. In this case, the Respondent was the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County.

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a lawsuit or petition to be dismissed. The Blue Ridge HOA filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was denied on October 7, 2020, allowing the case to proceed.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where petitions related to disputes with HOAs are sent for an evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to review a legal decision. Mr. Mandela was granted a rehearing after the initial decision, based on his claim that the findings were arbitrary, capricious, or not supported by evidence.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners’ Association was the Respondent.

Tribunal

A term used in the documents to refer to the judicial body hearing the case, specifically the Office of Administrative Hearings and the presiding Administrative Law Judge.

He Fought the HOA Over a Patio and Lost. Here Are 5 Shocking Lessons Every Homeowner Needs to Learn.

Introduction: The Perils of a Simple Home Improvement Project

For any homeowner, the excitement of a new project—a deck, a fence, or a simple patio shade—can quickly turn to frustration when it collides with the dense rulebook of a Homeowners’ Association (HOA). What seems like a straightforward improvement can become a complex battle of bylaws and procedures.

This was the reality for Charles P. Mandela, a homeowner in the Blue Ridge Estates community. His plan to build a simple patio shade was denied by his HOA, sparking a legal challenge that went before an Administrative Law Judge. While Mr. Mandela ultimately lost his case on its legal merits, the details of his fight offer a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive world of HOA governance. This article distills the most shocking lessons from his case, providing critical insights for any homeowner living under an HOA.

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1. The “Deemed Disapproved” Clause: How an HOA’s Silence Becomes a Legal “No”

Mr. Mandela submitted his request to build a patio shade on August 28, 2019. He argued that the HOA, Blue Ridge Estates, violated its own rules, which required a response within 30 days. The HOA didn’t send its formal denial until October 25, 2019, well past the deadline. On the surface, it seemed like a clear procedural violation by the HOA.

However, a bizarre and “unartfully drafted” clause hidden in the HOA’s governing documents (CC&Rs) turned this logic on its head. The rule stated:

In the event the Architectural Committee fails either to approve or disapprove the proposed construction… within said thirty (30) day period, such proposed construction… shall be deemed disapproved…

Contrary to common sense, the rule meant that the HOA’s failure to respond on time resulted in an automatic denial, not a pending approval. The Administrative Law Judge was bound by this text, concluding that because the 30-day period had passed without a formal approval, the request was “properly deemed denied.”

2. The “My Neighbor Has One” Argument Is Weaker Than You Think

To support his case, Mr. Mandela presented photographs showing that “similar shades exist on other properties with additional structures.” He argued that the HOA was engaging in selective enforcement by denying his project while having approved others like it. This is one of the most frequent arguments homeowners make when they feel singled out by their HOA board.

The judge’s conclusion was a stunning reality check. The legal decision stated:

While those properties may have had their shades approved by different members of the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee that does not follow that Mr. Mandela’s request was improperly denied under Article X.

The legal reasoning here is crucial for homeowners to understand. Architectural committees are not static; members change, and so can their interpretation of aesthetic standards. Each application is legally considered a distinct request, evaluated under the rules in place at that moment. A previous committee’s approval—which may have even been a mistake or a variance granted under different circumstances—does not create a binding legal precedent that forces the current committee to repeat it.

3. Procedure is Everything: A Missed Step Can Cost You the Case

The HOA’s rules contained a specific process for appealing a denial. After a project is “deemed disapproved” because the 30-day clock ran out, the homeowner must then formally request a meeting with the committee to discuss the denial.

The judge found that Mr. Mandela had failed to take this critical next step. This procedural misstep, however small it might seem, became a key factor in the case against him. The decision hinged on this procedural failure, stating:

Further, Petitioner admitted that in his several email responses that he did not formally request a meeting with the Architectural Committee, thus he failed to follow the procedures in Section 10.3.

This highlights a crucial lesson: meticulously follow every single procedural step outlined in your HOA’s documents. Failure to do so, such as not using the correct language to request a meeting, can be used to dismiss your claim, regardless of its other merits.

4. “Unartfully Drafted” Rules Can Still Be Legally Binding

Even the Administrative Law Judge acknowledged the poor quality of the HOA’s rulebook. In the decision, the judge offered a candid assessment of the rule regarding the 30-day response time, stating, “Admittedly this section is unartfully drafted…”

Despite this observation, the rule was enforced exactly as written. The judge was bound by the text, however confusing, and concluded that “from the evidence presented, the request was properly deemed denied.”

This is perhaps the most sobering lesson. Homeowners often assume that a rule that is confusing or seems illogical won’t hold up under scrutiny. This case proves that the literal text of the governing documents possesses immense power. What a rule literally says is far more important than what one might assume it should mean.

5. The Final Twist: He Lost the Case But Got His Patio Anyway

After the initial decision was made against him, Mr. Mandela requested a rehearing. During this second hearing, a surprising fact emerged. Mr. Mandela testified that “since the decision on January 29, 2021, his request for the patio shade had been approved by the Board.”

This outcome highlights a crucial dynamic: while Mr. Mandela lost the legal argument based on procedural history, his persistent engagement in the process—including filing a formal appeal—likely created enough administrative and community pressure to compel the Board to find a practical, non-legal solution. It’s a powerful reminder that a legal loss on a technicality does not always foreclose a real-world victory.

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Conclusion: Do You Really Know Your HOA’s Rules?

The case of Charles Mandela serves as a powerful cautionary tale. It reveals that HOA disputes are rarely won on appeals to fairness or common sense. Instead, they are won or lost in the fine print of the governing documents—documents that can contain counter-intuitive clauses, procedural traps, and “unartfully drafted” rules that are nonetheless legally binding.

A homeowner’s best defense is not passion or conviction, but a deep and thorough understanding of the specific rules and procedures they agreed to live by. This case forces every homeowner to ask: Are you prepared to navigate the literal text of your community’s rules, where silence can mean “no” and a neighbor’s precedent is no precedent at all?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P Mandela (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Susan E Abbass v. 10000 North Central Homeowners Assocciation

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020057-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-17
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susan E Abbass Counsel
Respondent 10000 North Central Homeowners Association Counsel Blake Johnson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R's Article XII, Section 6 & Article XIII, Section 1(d) & 4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's single-issue petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish that the Respondent HOA violated the governing CC&R provisions.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violations; specifically, the HOA was found to have the right to enter property for certain conditions (including emergencies or maintenance) but was under no obligation to do so, and the situation was not determined to be a true emergency by the ALJ.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether 10000 North Central Homeowners Association violated the CC&R's Article XII, Section 6 & Article XIII, Section 1(d) & 4.

Petitioner claimed the Association violated specified CC&R sections by refusing to grant access to the neighboring property to determine and resolve the source of a water leak. Petitioner requested an ORDER requiring the Association to allow access. The ALJ found that the CC&Rs grant the HOA the right to enter, but not the obligation, and Petitioner failed to prove an emergency situation or a violation of the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner's petition in this matter was denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et al.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article XII Section 6
  • CC&R Article XIII Section 1(d)
  • CC&R Article XIII Section 4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Easement, Maintenance, Drainage, Property Access, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et al.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 33, Chapter 16, Article 1
  • CC&R Article XII Section 6
  • CC&R Article XIII Section 1(d)
  • CC&R Article XIII Section 4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020057-REL Decision – 839845.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:59 (108.6 KB)

20F-H2020057-REL Decision – ../20F-H2020057-REL/815490.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:02 (135.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Abbass vs. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and final order from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in case number 20F-H2020057-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Susan E. Abbass (Petitioner) and the 10000 North Central Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s request for the HOA to compel an inspection of a neighboring property, believed to be the source of a recurring water leak into her home.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the Petitioner’s case, ruling in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a critical distinction within the community’s governing documents (CCR’s): while the HOA possesses the right to enter a property under certain conditions, it does not have an explicit obligation to do so. The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the HOA had violated the CCR’s. The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted reasonably by contacting the neighbor and reviewing the provided information, and that forcing access without more definitive proof could expose the HOA to legal risk. The decision suggests the Petitioner may be pursuing relief in an incorrect venue or against the incorrect party.

Case Overview

Case Name

Susan E Abbass vs. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

Case Number

20F-H2020057-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

In the Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

Administrative Law Judge

Adam D. Stone

Petitioner

Susan E. Abbass

Respondent

10000 North Central Homeowners Association (represented by Blake Johnson, Esq.)

Hearing Date

November 24, 2020 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

December 1, 2020

Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Central Claim

The Petitioner, Susan E. Abbass, alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s) by failing to authorize an inspection on a neighboring property. The Petitioner’s home was experiencing water intrusion every time it rained, and she believed the leak originated from the adjacent lot.

Alleged Violations: The petition cited violations of the CCR’s Article XII, Section 6 and Article XIII, Sections 1(d) and 4.

Argument: The Petitioner contended that the recurring water leak constituted an “emergency” situation, obligating the HOA to act.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Financial Responsibility: The Petitioner stated she was “ready, willing and able to be financially responsible for the cost of any inspections/surveys which needed to be performed on the neighboring property.”

Due Diligence: Inspections and surveys conducted on her own property determined that the leak was not originating from there.

Frustration: The Petitioner noted that over a year had passed since the leaking first occurred with no resolution from the HOA or the neighbor.

Key Concession: During the rehearing, the Petitioner “agreed that Respondent does not have an obligation to enter the property, only the right.”

Respondent’s Defense and Actions

Respondent’s Position

The HOA argued that it did not have sufficient evidence to justify compelling access to the neighboring property. The property manager, Robert Kersten, testified for the Respondent.

Lack of Proof: The HOA determined that the information provided by the Petitioner did not meet the criteria for forcing entry onto the neighbor’s property.

Legal Risk: The Respondent expressed concern that if it “overstepped its authority, it could open itself up to other causes of action.”

Actions Taken by the HOA

Despite denying the Petitioner’s request to force an inspection, the HOA took the following steps:

• It reached out to the neighboring property owner to request access.

• It sent a warning letter to the neighbor regarding “improper vegetation” on the property.

• It contacted the neighbor, who, upon information and belief, had her insurance company inspect the water flow. The insurance company reportedly determined the neighbor was not at fault.

• At the rehearing, the Respondent submitted photographic evidence (Exhibits K, L, and M) purportedly showing a fixed pipe and drainage moving away from the Petitioner’s property.

Procedural History and Rehearing

1. Petition Filed (May 5, 2020): Petitioner filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Initial Hearing (July 28, 2020): The first hearing was conducted.

3. Initial Decision (August 17, 2020): The ALJ issued a decision concluding the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof, as the HOA only had the right to enter the property, not an obligation.

4. Rehearing Request (August 31, 2020): Petitioner requested a rehearing, claiming the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” and “not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.”

5. Rehearing Granted (October 14, 2020): The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing request.

6. Rehearing Conducted (November 24, 2020): The ALJ conducted a new hearing to reconsider the evidence.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

Burden of Proof

The ALJ reiterated that the Petitioner bears the burden to prove the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Conclusion on Evidence: The ALJ found that on rehearing, the “Petitioner failed to provide new evidence or witness testimony demonstrating that Respondent violated Article XII and Article XIII of the CCR’s.”

Key Judicial Determinations

Right vs. Obligation: The central legal conclusion is that the HOA’s authority is discretionary. The CCR’s grant a right to enter property but do not impose an obligation to do so upon a homeowner’s request.

HOA’s Conduct: The judge determined that the HOA had acted appropriately and in compliance with the CCR’s. The decision notes, “Respondent was receptive to the information provided by Petitioner and requested the neighboring property owners cooperation. While the neighboring owner may not have fully cooperated to the liking of Petitioner, Respondent still followed the CCR’s to the best of its ability at this point.”

Statutory Limitations on ALJ: The ALJ is bound by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), which limits the judge’s authority to ordering a party to “abide by the statutes, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue.” The ALJ concluded, “it too cannot force the neighbor or the Respondent to grant access to the property.”

Incorrect Venue: The decision strongly suggests the Petitioner is pursuing the wrong legal remedy: “While the possibility of future leaking is certainly frustrating, it appears that Petitioner has or the incorrect venue and possibly party to grant the relief for which it seeks.”

Final Order and Implications

Ruling: The ALJ ordered that “the Respondent is the prevailing party with regard to the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: As a result of a rehearing, the administrative law judge order is binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Abbass v. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020057-REL-RHG, involving Petitioner Susan E. Abbass and Respondent 10000 North Central Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What specific articles of the community documents did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

3. What was the outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on July 28, 2020?

4. On what legal grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing of the case?

5. What was the Respondent’s main argument for not forcing an inspection of the neighboring property?

6. What key point regarding the Respondent’s authority did the Petitioner concede during the rehearing?

7. According to the decision, who bears the burden of proof, and what is the evidentiary standard required to meet it?

8. What evidence did the Respondent introduce during the rehearing on November 24, 2020?

9. What was the final ruling of the Administrative Law Judge, and what did the order state?

10. What specific limitation on the Administrative Law Judge’s power is cited in the Conclusions of Law?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Susan E. Abbass, and the Respondent, 10000 North Central Homeowners Association. The central dispute was the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondent failed to fulfill its duty by not allowing an inspection on a neighboring property to find the source of a water leak affecting the Petitioner’s home.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Article XII, Section 6 and Article XIII, Sections 1(d) and 4 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s).

3. Following the July 28, 2020 hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision on August 17, 2020, concluding that the Petitioner had failed to meet her burden of proof. The judge found that the Respondent only had the right to enter the neighboring property, not an obligation to do so.

4. The Petitioner’s request for rehearing was granted based on her claims that the initial findings of fact were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” and that the decision was “not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.”

5. The Respondent argued that the Petitioner had not provided sufficient proof of the neighbor’s fault to justify forcing access. The Respondent was also concerned that overstepping its authority could expose the association to other legal actions.

6. During the rehearing, the Petitioner agreed with the Respondent’s position that the association does not have an obligation to enter the neighboring property, only the right to do so.

7. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof. The evidentiary standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

8. At the rehearing, the Respondent introduced Exhibits K, L, and M. These were photographs that purportedly showed where a pipe was fixed and how drainage moves away from the Petitioner’s property.

9. The final ruling concluded that the Respondent had not violated the CCR’s and was the prevailing party. The order dismissed the Petitioner’s appeal.

10. The decision cites A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), which states that an Administrative Law Judge may only order a party to abide by the statutes, community documents, or contract provisions at issue. The judge cannot force the Respondent or the neighbor to grant access to the property.

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Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-format response. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal distinction between a “right” and an “obligation” as it pertains to the Homeowners Association’s authority under the CCR’s in this case. How was this distinction central to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decision. Detail the evidence and arguments presented by both the Petitioner and Respondent, and explain why the judge ultimately concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this standard.

3. Trace the complete procedural history of this case, from the filing of the initial petition to the final order. Identify the key dates, actions taken by each party, and the rulings made at each stage of the administrative process.

4. Evaluate the actions taken by the Respondent (10000 North Central Homeowners Association) in response to the Petitioner’s complaint. Based on the Findings of Fact, did the association act reasonably and in compliance with the CCR’s?

5. Explain the jurisdiction and statutory limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings in resolving disputes between homeowners and their associations, as outlined in the decision. What remedies were available to the Petitioner through this venue, and why was the specific relief she sought beyond the judge’s power to grant?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, considers evidence, and issues a legal decision. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings involving homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner.

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The government office where administrative law judges hear disputes concerning state agencies.

Order Granting Rehearing

A formal order issued by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate that approved the Petitioner’s request for a second hearing.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Susan E. Abbass.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is met when the evidence presented is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal case or dispute. In the final decision, the Respondent was named the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the 10000 North Central Homeowners Association.

Tribunal

A body established to settle certain types of disputes. In this context, it refers to the Office of Administrative Hearings where the case was heard.

Briefing Document: Abbass vs. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and final order from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in case number 20F-H2020057-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Susan E. Abbass (Petitioner) and the 10000 North Central Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s request for the HOA to compel an inspection of a neighboring property, believed to be the source of a recurring water leak into her home.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the Petitioner’s case, ruling in favor of the Respondent. The decision hinged on a critical distinction within the community’s governing documents (CCR’s): while the HOA possesses the right to enter a property under certain conditions, it does not have an explicit obligation to do so. The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove the HOA had violated the CCR’s. The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted reasonably by contacting the neighbor and reviewing the provided information, and that forcing access without more definitive proof could expose the HOA to legal risk. The decision suggests the Petitioner may be pursuing relief in an incorrect venue or against the incorrect party.

Case Overview

Case Name

Susan E Abbass vs. 10000 North Central Homeowners Association

Case Number

20F-H2020057-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

In the Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

Administrative Law Judge

Adam D. Stone

Petitioner

Susan E. Abbass

Respondent

10000 North Central Homeowners Association (represented by Blake Johnson, Esq.)

Hearing Date

November 24, 2020 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

December 1, 2020

Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Central Claim

The Petitioner, Susan E. Abbass, alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s) by failing to authorize an inspection on a neighboring property. The Petitioner’s home was experiencing water intrusion every time it rained, and she believed the leak originated from the adjacent lot.

Alleged Violations: The petition cited violations of the CCR’s Article XII, Section 6 and Article XIII, Sections 1(d) and 4.

Argument: The Petitioner contended that the recurring water leak constituted an “emergency” situation, obligating the HOA to act.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

Financial Responsibility: The Petitioner stated she was “ready, willing and able to be financially responsible for the cost of any inspections/surveys which needed to be performed on the neighboring property.”

Due Diligence: Inspections and surveys conducted on her own property determined that the leak was not originating from there.

Frustration: The Petitioner noted that over a year had passed since the leaking first occurred with no resolution from the HOA or the neighbor.

Key Concession: During the rehearing, the Petitioner “agreed that Respondent does not have an obligation to enter the property, only the right.”

Respondent’s Defense and Actions

Respondent’s Position

The HOA argued that it did not have sufficient evidence to justify compelling access to the neighboring property. The property manager, Robert Kersten, testified for the Respondent.

Lack of Proof: The HOA determined that the information provided by the Petitioner did not meet the criteria for forcing entry onto the neighbor’s property.

Legal Risk: The Respondent expressed concern that if it “overstepped its authority, it could open itself up to other causes of action.”

Actions Taken by the HOA

Despite denying the Petitioner’s request to force an inspection, the HOA took the following steps:

• It reached out to the neighboring property owner to request access.

• It sent a warning letter to the neighbor regarding “improper vegetation” on the property.

• It contacted the neighbor, who, upon information and belief, had her insurance company inspect the water flow. The insurance company reportedly determined the neighbor was not at fault.

• At the rehearing, the Respondent submitted photographic evidence (Exhibits K, L, and M) purportedly showing a fixed pipe and drainage moving away from the Petitioner’s property.

Procedural History and Rehearing

1. Petition Filed (May 5, 2020): Petitioner filed a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Initial Hearing (July 28, 2020): The first hearing was conducted.

3. Initial Decision (August 17, 2020): The ALJ issued a decision concluding the Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof, as the HOA only had the right to enter the property, not an obligation.

4. Rehearing Request (August 31, 2020): Petitioner requested a rehearing, claiming the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” and “not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.”

5. Rehearing Granted (October 14, 2020): The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing request.

6. Rehearing Conducted (November 24, 2020): The ALJ conducted a new hearing to reconsider the evidence.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

Burden of Proof

The ALJ reiterated that the Petitioner bears the burden to prove the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Conclusion on Evidence: The ALJ found that on rehearing, the “Petitioner failed to provide new evidence or witness testimony demonstrating that Respondent violated Article XII and Article XIII of the CCR’s.”

Key Judicial Determinations

Right vs. Obligation: The central legal conclusion is that the HOA’s authority is discretionary. The CCR’s grant a right to enter property but do not impose an obligation to do so upon a homeowner’s request.

HOA’s Conduct: The judge determined that the HOA had acted appropriately and in compliance with the CCR’s. The decision notes, “Respondent was receptive to the information provided by Petitioner and requested the neighboring property owners cooperation. While the neighboring owner may not have fully cooperated to the liking of Petitioner, Respondent still followed the CCR’s to the best of its ability at this point.”

Statutory Limitations on ALJ: The ALJ is bound by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), which limits the judge’s authority to ordering a party to “abide by the statutes, condominium documents, community documents or contract provision at issue.” The ALJ concluded, “it too cannot force the neighbor or the Respondent to grant access to the property.”

Incorrect Venue: The decision strongly suggests the Petitioner is pursuing the wrong legal remedy: “While the possibility of future leaking is certainly frustrating, it appears that Petitioner has or the incorrect venue and possibly party to grant the relief for which it seeks.”

Final Order and Implications

Ruling: The ALJ ordered that “the Respondent is the prevailing party with regard to the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: As a result of a rehearing, the administrative law judge order is binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susan E Abbass (petitioner)
  • Ronald Pick (witness)
    Witness for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Blake Johnson (attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Robert Kersten (property manager)
    Property manager, appeared as a witness for Respondent
  • Kelly Oetinger (attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Electronic transmission sender

John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – 814023.pdf

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20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772795.pdf

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Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Case Background and Procedural History

Parties Involved

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

John R. Ashley

Respondent

Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Attorney for Respondent

Wendy Erlich, Esq.

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Oversight Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation

The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.

Procedural Timeline

c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.

February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.

March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.

March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.

August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.

Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation

The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.

Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)

Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.

“Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.

Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.

Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)

Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.

Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.

Controlling Bylaw Provisions

Article

Pertinent Text / Description

Article III, Section 4

Meetings of Members; Quorum

“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”

Article VI, Section 3

Meetings of Directors; Quorum

Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.

Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)

In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:

• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.

• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”

• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.

Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)

The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:

Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.

Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.

Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:

◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.

◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”

Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?

2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?

3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?

4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?

6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?

8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.

3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.

4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.

5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.

6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.

8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.

9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.

10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.

1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.

2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?

3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?

4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?

5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association

Introduction: The Rules We All Live By

If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.

But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.

A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.

The Takeaways

Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.

The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:

and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.

A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.

Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”

A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.

In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.

However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.

Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.

During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.

The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print

The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.

When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (respondent attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission

Other Participants

  • A. Leverette (clerical staff)
    Signed document transmission in initial order

Jennie Bennett v. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-02-26
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The ALJ ordered the Petition dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited CC&R sections, as the malfunctioning backflow flap was located on the Petitioner's private property and was her responsibility.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jennie Bennett Counsel Maxwell Riddiough
Respondent Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ordered the Petition dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited CC&R sections, as the malfunctioning backflow flap was located on the Petitioner's private property and was her responsibility.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the backflow flap was a common element maintenance responsibility under CC&Rs Sections 12(c) or 12(h)(1).

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of community documents regarding maintenance responsibility for sewage backflow flap.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by refusing to pay for repairs related to a malfunctioning backflow flap that caused a sewage overflow, arguing the item was a common element maintenance responsibility.

Orders: Petitioner Jennie Bennett’s Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Section 12(c)
  • CC&Rs Section 12(h)(1)
  • CC&Rs Section 15

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Maintenance Responsibility, Plumbing, Sewage Overflow, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019002-REL-RHG Decision – 771959.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:01 (103.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Jennie Bennett vs. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings, arguments, and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG, concerning a dispute between homeowner Jennie Bennett (Petitioner) and the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association (Respondent).

The core of the dispute was the financial responsibility for repairing a malfunctioning sewage backflow valve that caused an overflow at the petitioner’s residence. The petitioner argued that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs), specifically Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1), by refusing to cover the repair costs. The petitioner’s claim was complicated by the fact that the HOA had, just two weeks prior to the incident, rescinded a “Sewer Maintenance Policy” that had previously addressed such issues. The petitioner stated she was not notified of this rescission.

The respondent contended that the backflow valve was located on the petitioner’s private property, not in a common area, making its maintenance the petitioner’s responsibility under Section 15 of the CC&Rs. The HOA asserted that the 2017 policy was rescinded precisely because legal guidance confirmed this distinction. The HOA also maintained that notice of the rescission was sent to all homeowners.

The ALJ ultimately ruled in favor of the respondent, dismissing the petitioner’s petition. The decision concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a preponderance of the evidence—to establish that the backflow valve was a common element covered by the cited CC&R sections. The evidence, including a plat map and photos, demonstrated the valve was on the petitioner’s private property. While the timing of the policy rescission was deemed “extremely unfortunate,” the ALJ found that once rescinded, the HOA was no longer obligated to share repair costs.

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Jennie Bennett, Petitioner, vs. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number: 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Antara Nath Rivera

Hearing Date: February 7, 2020

Decision Date: February 26, 2020

Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated community documents, specifically Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the CC&Rs.

II. Central Dispute and Timeline of Events

The central issue was whether the HOA was responsible for the cost of repairing a malfunctioning sewage backflow flap on the petitioner’s property.

March 2017: The HOA adopts a “Sewer Maintenance Policy” to outline processes for sewage maintenance.

February 13, 2019: The HOA Board rescinds the Sewer Maintenance Policy.

March 3, 2019: Petitioner Jennie Bennett experiences a sewage overflow at her residence due to a malfunctioning backflow valve.

March – May 2019: The petitioner brings her concerns to the HOA board at multiple meetings but receives no response.

May 22, 2019: The HOA responds to the petitioner after receiving a letter from her attorney.

July 10, 2019: The petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

III. Petitioner’s Position and Arguments (Jennie Bennett)

The petitioner, a resident for 20 years, argued that the HOA was liable for the repair costs based on the following points:

CC&R Violation: The refusal to pay for the repair constituted a violation of Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the CC&Rs, which pertain to the HOA’s duty to maintain sewer lines and common elements.

Lack of Notice: The petitioner testified she was not notified of the policy rescission on February 13, 2019. The sewage overflow occurred just two weeks later, and upon reporting it, she was informed by a neighbor that the HOA had historically covered such issues.

Procedural Failure: The HOA failed to address her concerns at the March, April, or May board meetings, only engaging after her attorney intervened.

Community Support: The petitioner collected 97 signatures on a grassroots petition asking the HOA to cover the repair due to the short time frame between the policy rescission and the incident, and the lack of notice. The petition stated: “I am asking to be covered because of the 2 week time frame and no notice. I agree with being covered by the HOA for the flap.”

IV. Respondent’s Position and Arguments (Catalina Del Rey HOA)

The HOA, represented by community manager Vanessa Lubinsky of Cadden Community Management, presented a defense centered on the distinction between private and common property.

Private Property Responsibility: The HOA’s primary argument was that the backflow flap was located on the petitioner’s private property and was therefore her responsibility to maintain under Section 15 of the CC&Rs, which governs utilities like plumbing within a homeowner’s lot.

Evidence of Location: The respondent submitted a plat map and photographs as evidence. The photos illustrated that the backflow flap was located “next to Petitioner’s walk up to her front door,” well within her property lines and not on common elements.

Plumbing vs. Sewer Issue: Ms. Lubinsky characterized the problem as a “plumbing issue, not a sewer issue,” because of its location on private property.

Rationale for Policy Change: The 2017 Sewer Maintenance Policy was rescinded after the HOA received “additional legal guidance” confirming that backflow flaps were within homeowners’ units and thus their responsibility under Section 15.

Notice and Procedure: Ms. Lubinsky testified that notice of the rescission was issued to homeowners via both email and postal mail (postcards). She clarified that the rescission was a board decision that did not require a homeowner vote, as it was not an amendment to the CC&Rs.

V. Relevant Sections of the CC&Rs

The dispute hinged on the interpretation of the following sections of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Quoted Text from the Decision

Section 12(c)

“The Association shall maintain and landscape all front and side years open to the street, and shall maintain sewer lines, sidewalks, walkways, brick trim, streets and common recreation areas. …The words “repair or maintain” shall not be construed that the Association shall repair or maintain any individual lot owner’s roof or similar structure.”

Section 12(h)(1)

“Each such lot will be subject to assessments and the owner thereof shall pay to the Associations assessments as follows: Such lots pro rata share of the actual cost to the Association of all repair, maintenance, safety and control of common elements, including but not limited to maintenance of walkways, sidewalks, streets and sewers, care of lawns and landscaping in common areas and front and side yards of residences… .”

Section 15

(Described, not quoted) This section provides that the homeowner is responsible for the maintenance of utilities such as electricity and plumbing on their private property, similar to a single-family residence.

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling

The ALJ’s decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.

Burden of Proof: The petitioner was required to establish the HOA’s violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning proof that convinces the trier of fact the contention is more probably true than not.

Factual Determination: The judge found that the evidence, specifically the photos and plat map, demonstrated conclusively that the backflow flap was on the petitioner’s private property near her front door.

Conclusion on CC&Rs: Because the flap was determined not to be located within a common area, the petitioner failed to establish that it fell under the purview of Sections 12(c) or 12(h)(1). Therefore, she failed to prove the HOA had a responsibility to repair it under those sections.

Effect of Policy Rescission: The judge acknowledged, “It was extremely unfortunate that Petitioner experienced such a sewage overflow just after Respondent rescinded the Policy.” However, the ruling stated that once the policy was rescinded, the HOA “was not obligated to share the cost of repairs.”

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jennie Bennett’s Petition be dismissed.” The order is binding on the parties, with any appeal required to be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days of service.

Study Guide: Bennett v. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case text.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was the legal case number?

2. What specific sections of the community documents did Petitioner Jennie Bennett allege the Respondent had violated?

3. Describe the incident that prompted the dispute and the date on which it occurred.

4. What was the “Sewer Maintenance Policy,” when was it adopted, and when was it rescinded?

5. According to the Respondent’s manager, Vanessa Lubinsky, why was the repair Jennie Bennett’s financial responsibility?

6. What evidence did the Respondent present to prove the location of the malfunctioning backflow flap?

7. What steps did Jennie Bennett take to rally support from her neighbors after the Respondent did not address her concerns?

8. What is the legal standard for the burden of proof in this case, and which party does it fall on?

9. According to Section 12(c) of the CC&Rs, what specific areas is the Homeowners Association responsible for maintaining?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Jennie Bennett, represented by attorney Maxwell Riddiough. The Respondent was the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association, represented by attorney Nathan Tennyson. The case number was 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). This was noted as a single-issue petition.

3. On or about March 3, 2019, the Petitioner experienced a sewage overflow into her house. The overflow was caused by malfunctioning backflow valves.

4. The Sewer Maintenance Policy was a policy adopted in March 2017 to outline the process for sewage maintenance issues. It was rescinded by the HOA Board on February 13, 2019, shortly before the Petitioner’s incident.

5. Vanessa Lubinsky testified that the issue was the Petitioner’s responsibility because the malfunctioning backflow flap was located on her private property. Under Section 15 of the CC&Rs, homeowners are responsible for the maintenance of their own plumbing, electricity, and other utilities.

6. The Respondent presented a plat map, which specified all property lines, and photos. This evidence illustrated that the backflow flap was located inside the lines of the Petitioner’s private property, next to the walk-up to her front door, and not on common elements.

7. The Petitioner obtained 97 signatures on a “Grassroots petition.” The petition explained her situation and argued that she should be covered by the HOA for the repair due to the short time between the policy rescission and her incident, and because she had not received written notice.

8. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the proof must convince the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not. The burden of proof fell on the Petitioner, Jennie Bennett, to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations.

9. Section 12(c) states the Association is responsible for maintaining and landscaping front and side yards open to the street. It also specifies the Association’s duty to maintain sewer lines, sidewalks, walkways, brick trim, streets, and common recreation areas.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner Jennie Bennett’s Petition be dismissed. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated the CC&Rs.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, using specific evidence and arguments from the provided text to support your conclusions.

1. Analyze and contrast the core arguments presented by the Petitioner, Jennie Bennett, and the Respondent, Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association. How did each party use the CC&Rs and the Sewer Maintenance Policy to support their position?

2. Discuss the significance of the Sewer Maintenance Policy’s rescission. Evaluate the timing of the rescission relative to the Petitioner’s incident and the arguments made regarding notification to homeowners.

3. Explain the legal concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case document. How did Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera apply this standard to the evidence presented by both parties to reach a final decision?

4. Evaluate the role of physical evidence, specifically the plat map and photographs, in the outcome of this hearing. Why was determining the precise location of the backflow flap the central issue of the case?

5. From an ethical and community governance perspective, discuss the actions of the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association. Consider their decision to rescind the policy, the method of notification, and their initial responses (or lack thereof) to Ms. Bennett’s requests at the board meetings.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Antara Nath Rivera, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes legal decisions and orders.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Common Elements

Areas within the HOA community that are not part of an individual homeowner’s private property and are maintained by the Association. Examples from the text include walkways, sidewalks, streets, sewers, and recreation areas.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that outline the rules, obligations, and restrictions for a planned community. The Petitioner alleged a violation of Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of these documents.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The community organization, Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association, responsible for managing and maintaining the common elements of a planned community as defined by the CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Jennie Bennett.

Plat Map

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. In this case, it was used as evidence to specify all property lines, including the Petitioner’s.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Rescission

The act of canceling or revoking a policy or decision. The HOA Board rescinded its Sewer Maintenance Policy on February 13, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association.

A Homeowner’s Sewage Nightmare: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Losing Battle with an HOA

Introduction: The Dreaded HOA Letter

For many homeowners, the greatest fear isn’t a storm or a failing appliance; it’s a sudden, catastrophic repair bill. This anxiety is often magnified for those living in a planned community, where another layer of complexity—the Homeowners Association (HOA)—governs every aspect of property maintenance. A dispute with the HOA can turn a straightforward repair into a frustrating and expensive legal battle.

The case of Jennie Bennett, a resident in her home for 20 years, and the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association is a stark cautionary tale. After a sewage overflow caused by a malfunctioning backflow valve, Ms. Bennett found herself in a dispute with her HOA over who should pay for the repair, claiming the association had violated Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of its governing documents. The resulting legal decision reveals critical, and often surprising, insights into how HOA rules are interpreted and enforced. This article breaks down the five most impactful lessons from her losing battle.

1. Location is Everything: The Critical Line Between Private and Common Property

The single most important factor in the judge’s decision was the physical location of the broken part. The entire case hinged on a simple question: was the malfunctioning backflow flap on Jennie Bennett’s private property or in an HOA-maintained common area?

The HOA argued that the plat map and photos proved the flap was located “next to Petitioner’s walk up to her front door,” placing it squarely inside her private property line. While the homeowner claimed the HOA was responsible for “sewer lines” under Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), this argument failed. The HOA’s manager, Vanessa Lubinsky, perfectly synthesized the association’s legal position when she “opined that the backflow flap was a plumbing issue, not a sewer issue, because it was located on Petitioner’s private property.”

Because the backflow flap was deemed to be on private property, it fell under Section 15 of the CC&Rs. This clause stipulated that the homeowner was responsible for the maintenance of their own plumbing, electricity, and other utilities—much like the owner of a single-family residence. The specific location of the failure, not the general nature of the system it belonged to, determined financial responsibility.

2. An HOA ‘Policy’ Can Vanish Overnight

For nearly two years, from March 2017 to February 2019, the Catalina Del Rey HOA had a “Sewer Maintenance Policy” in place. This policy, which had been in effect for nearly two years, outlined a process for handling sewage maintenance; however, once rescinded, the HOA was no longer obligated to share in repair costs. The Board of Directors rescinded this policy on February 13, 2019. The petitioner’s sewage overflow occurred on March 3, 2019—less than three weeks later.

Crucially, the HOA’s action was not arbitrary. According to case testimony, the board rescinded the policy because, “After Respondent received additional legal guidance, it was determined that the backflow flaps were located within the homeowners’ units and on private property.” This reveals a critical insight: the HOA made a calculated, legally-informed decision to shift liability back to homeowners to align with the CC&Rs.

This also highlights the significant difference between a formal, recorded CC&R and a simple board policy. As the HOA manager clarified, rescinding the policy did not require a homeowner vote because it was not an amendment to the core CC&Rs. A board can unilaterally change a policy, altering the financial obligations of every resident without a community-wide vote.

3. The High Cost of “Extremely Unfortunate” Timing

The timing of the sewage backup, occurring just after the policy change, was a devastating coincidence for the homeowner. The administrative law judge acknowledged this directly in the final decision, stating:

It was extremely unfortunate that Petitioner experienced such a sewage overflow just after Respondent rescinded the Policy.

Compounding the issue was a dispute over communication. The petitioner claimed she “was not notified of the rescission.” In her efforts to be covered, she even gathered 97 signatures on a “Grassroots petition” from her neighbors. The petitioner claimed she received no substantive response from the board regarding her repair claim until her attorney sent a formal letter on May 22, 2019. The HOA countered this, stating that notice of the policy change had been sent to homeowners via both email and postcards.

This takeaway is impactful because it demonstrates how quickly a homeowner’s rights and financial obligations can change. A simple board decision, potentially missed in a stack of mail or an overlooked email, can result in thousands of dollars in unexpected costs.

4. The Burden of Proof Is on the Homeowner, Not the HOA

In any legal dispute, one side has the “burden of proof”—the responsibility to convince the judge that their claim is true. In this HOA case, that burden fell entirely on the petitioner, Jennie Bennett.

The legal standard required her to prove her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that is sufficient to persuade a judge that a claim is more likely true than not. The legal decision provides a clear definition:

“[t]he greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that the homeowner did not meet this standard. The final order states, “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the CC&Rs.” This underscores a critical point: when a homeowner challenges an HOA, it is their responsibility to build the winning case with convincing evidence.

Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Know Your Property Lines

The overarching lesson from Jennie Bennett’s experience is that in an HOA, the fine print matters immensely. The precise wording of the governing documents and, as this case proves, the exact location of property lines are paramount. A board policy you rely on today could be gone tomorrow, and a repair you assume is a community responsibility could be deemed yours based on a measurement of inches.

This case serves as a powerful reminder for all homeowners to be proactive. Read your CC&Rs, pay attention to all communications from your board, and understand the difference between binding covenants and changeable policies. It all comes down to one final, critical question: Do you know exactly where your maintenance responsibilities end and your HOA’s begin?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jennie Bennett (petitioner)
    Testified at hearing
  • Maxwell Riddiough (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (respondent attorney)
    Brown|Olcott, PLLC
  • Vanessa Lubinsky (property manager)
    Cadden Community Management
    Testified on behalf of Respondent
  • Daniel (staff)
    Cadden
    Informed Petitioner about policy rescission

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • JC Niles (witness)
    Mentioned in Petitioner's Grassroots petition

Rick & Lisa Holly v. La Barranca II Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-02-14
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1811, or 33-1817, or any of the cited CC&R provisions concerning intentional construction delay, conflict of interest, or retaliatory fines.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rick and Lisa Holly Counsel Kevin P. Nelson, Esq.
Respondent La Barranca II Homeowners Association Counsel Edward D. O’Brien, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B); CC&R Article 11.2.5
A.R.S. § 33-1811; CC&R Article 4.7
A.R.S. § 33-1803; CC&Rs Articles 11.3 and 12

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1811, or 33-1817, or any of the cited CC&R provisions concerning intentional construction delay, conflict of interest, or retaliatory fines.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on all three issues alleged in the petition.

Key Issues & Findings

Intentional delay of construction

Petitioners alleged that Respondent intentionally delayed the approval and construction of their new home for over eleven months.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)
  • CC&R Article 11.2.5

Conflict of interest

Petitioners alleged that a Board Vice President and Secretary (who owned lots adjacent to Petitioners') were blocking approval of the home due to a conflict of interest.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • CC&R Article 4.7

Retaliatory fines

Petitioners alleged fear of prospective retaliatory imposition of fines.

Orders: Petition dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • CC&R Article 11.3
  • CC&R Article 12

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Planned Communities Act, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), Construction Delay, Conflict of Interest, Retaliatory Fines
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 4.7
  • CC&R Article 11.2.5
  • CC&R Article 11.3
  • CC&R Article 12

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019020-REL Decision – 769746.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:42 (191.2 KB)

This decision by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) addresses a three-issue petition filed by Rick and Lisa Holly (Petitioners), who are members and lot owners in the La Barranca II development, against the La Barranca II Homeowners Association (Respondent). The hearing proceedings took place on February 5 and February 7, 2020.

Key Facts and Background

The dispute centered on the Petitioners' attempt to gain Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approval for the construction of a new home on their property (Lot 50). The approval process had spanned over eleven months. Petitioners alleged that the Respondent violated Arizona statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1811, and 33-1817) and certain Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Main Issues and Legal Arguments

Petitioners presented three specific claims:

  1. Intentional Delay of Construction: Petitioners asserted that Respondent unreasonably delayed the construction of their home. The Petitioners' timeline expectations were based on their contractor's (Brilar) estimates, not statutes or association documents. The OAH found that Petitioners did not establish any undue delay attributable to the Respondent. Evidence showed that the contractor's initial plans failed to meet the Architectural Guidelines and that delays were more likely due to the contractor's "imperfect understanding of the Guidelines’ requirements". The ARC and its consultant provided guidance and conditional preliminary approval, requiring revisions based on valid considerations. Furthermore, final construction approval in September 2019 was withheld because the required $20,000 refundable construction deposit had not been paid and the site markers (surveyor pins) were missing.
  2. Conflict of Interest: Petitioners alleged a conflict of interest because the Board's vice president, William Bohan, and secretary, Nancy Williams, jointly owned a vacant lot (Lot 49) bordering Lot 50. Petitioners offered only suppositions that Mr. Bohan and Ms. Williams were "blocking approval" due to personal negative opinions. The OAH ruled that Petitioners did not establish that Mr. Bohan had an undeclared conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811, acknowledging that in a small development, volunteers on the board and ARC will naturally be regulating their neighbors.
  3. Retaliatory Fines: Petitioners feared retaliatory imposition of fines based on the Respondent previously fining other owners for "petty offenses". The OAH concluded that this claim, which implicated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) concerning monetary penalties, failed because the Respondent had not assessed any fines or penalties against the Petitioners. The claim was based entirely on speculation.

Outcome and Final Decision

Petitioners bore the burden of proving violations by a preponderance of the evidence. Since Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated any statute or CC&R, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky issued a Recommended Order that the petition be dismissed. The Order became binding unless a rehearing was granted.

Questions

Question

Does a board member have a conflict of interest just because they own a lot next to mine?

Short Answer

No. Owning a neighboring lot does not automatically create a conflict of interest or imply bias.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ reasoned that in planned communities, especially smaller ones, board and committee members will inevitably have to regulate their neighbors. Without evidence of actual animus or discriminatory intent, simply owning a contiguous lot is not a conflict of interest that prevents a member from voting on architectural plans.

Alj Quote

In any homeowners’ association, but especially In a small development having only 71 lots, the persons who volunteer to serve on homeowners’ associations’ boards and ARCs will necessarily be regulating their neighbors.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • Conflict of Interest
  • Board of Directors
  • Neighbors

Question

Is the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) required to help me design my home to meet the guidelines?

Short Answer

No. The ARC's role is to review submitted plans for compliance, not to assist in the design process.

Detailed Answer

While an ARC might offer guidance, the decision clarifies that their official duty is strictly to review plans against the governing documents. They are not obligated to help owners or builders design compliant structures.

Alj Quote

It is not ARC’s job to help an owner design a home that complies with Respondent’s Guidelines, only to review plans that are submitted for compliance.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 11

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Design Guidelines
  • HOA Obligations

Question

Can I file a complaint against my HOA because I am afraid they might fine me in the future?

Short Answer

No. You cannot base a legal complaint on the speculation of future retaliatory fines.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that a petition cannot rely on fear of potential future actions. Unless the HOA has actually assessed a fine or penalty, a claim regarding retaliatory fines is considered speculative and will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

Any prospective prohibition on fines would be based on nothing but speculation. . . . Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) or Articles 11.3 or 12 by assessing retaliatory fines or penalties against Petitioners.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Topic Tags

  • Fines
  • Retaliation
  • Dispute Resolution

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the rules in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA violated the statutes or CC&Rs. The standard of proof is a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Is the HOA responsible for delays if my builder doesn't understand the design guidelines?

Short Answer

No. The HOA is not liable for delays caused by a builder's failure to submit compliant plans.

Detailed Answer

If an HOA's architectural committee is reasonably responsive to submissions, they are not at fault for construction delays resulting from a contractor's misunderstanding of the design rules or failure to meet requirements.

Alj Quote

On this record, it appears that Hoamco and the ARC were reasonably responsive . . . and that any delay in construction appears more likely based on Brilar principal’s imperfect understanding of the Guidelines’ requirements.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Construction Delays
  • Vendor Issues

Question

Can I rely on my contractor's timeline estimates for when the HOA will approve my plans?

Short Answer

No. You should rely on the timelines specified in the CC&Rs and statutes, not third-party estimates.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that a homeowner's expectations based on their builder's estimates are not binding on the HOA. The official governing documents determine the procedural timeline, and reliance on outside estimates does not constitute a violation by the HOA.

Alj Quote

Mrs. Holly candidly testified that Petiitoners’ expectations about how long it would take to build their house was based on Brilar’s principles’ estimates, not anything in statutes or Respondent’s CC&Rs . . .

Legal Basis

N/A

Topic Tags

  • Timelines
  • Construction
  • Expectations

Question

Can the HOA charge a fee for reviewing architectural plans?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs allow for it.

Detailed Answer

The decision affirms that CC&Rs can grant the Architectural Review Committee the power to assess reasonable fees in connection with the review of plans.

Alj Quote

Article 11.3 of Respondent’s CC&Rs concerns general provisions for the ARC, including that it may assess reasonable fees in connection with its review of plans . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 11.3

Topic Tags

  • Fees
  • Architectural Review
  • CC&Rs

Case

Docket No
20F-H2019020-REL
Case Title
Rick and Lisa Holly vs. La Barranca II Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-02-14
Alj Name
Diane Mihalsky
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Does a board member have a conflict of interest just because they own a lot next to mine?

Short Answer

No. Owning a neighboring lot does not automatically create a conflict of interest or imply bias.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ reasoned that in planned communities, especially smaller ones, board and committee members will inevitably have to regulate their neighbors. Without evidence of actual animus or discriminatory intent, simply owning a contiguous lot is not a conflict of interest that prevents a member from voting on architectural plans.

Alj Quote

In any homeowners’ association, but especially In a small development having only 71 lots, the persons who volunteer to serve on homeowners’ associations’ boards and ARCs will necessarily be regulating their neighbors.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1811

Topic Tags

  • Conflict of Interest
  • Board of Directors
  • Neighbors

Question

Is the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) required to help me design my home to meet the guidelines?

Short Answer

No. The ARC's role is to review submitted plans for compliance, not to assist in the design process.

Detailed Answer

While an ARC might offer guidance, the decision clarifies that their official duty is strictly to review plans against the governing documents. They are not obligated to help owners or builders design compliant structures.

Alj Quote

It is not ARC’s job to help an owner design a home that complies with Respondent’s Guidelines, only to review plans that are submitted for compliance.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 11

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Design Guidelines
  • HOA Obligations

Question

Can I file a complaint against my HOA because I am afraid they might fine me in the future?

Short Answer

No. You cannot base a legal complaint on the speculation of future retaliatory fines.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that a petition cannot rely on fear of potential future actions. Unless the HOA has actually assessed a fine or penalty, a claim regarding retaliatory fines is considered speculative and will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

Any prospective prohibition on fines would be based on nothing but speculation. . . . Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) or Articles 11.3 or 12 by assessing retaliatory fines or penalties against Petitioners.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Topic Tags

  • Fines
  • Retaliation
  • Dispute Resolution

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the rules in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA violated the statutes or CC&Rs. The standard of proof is a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Is the HOA responsible for delays if my builder doesn't understand the design guidelines?

Short Answer

No. The HOA is not liable for delays caused by a builder's failure to submit compliant plans.

Detailed Answer

If an HOA's architectural committee is reasonably responsive to submissions, they are not at fault for construction delays resulting from a contractor's misunderstanding of the design rules or failure to meet requirements.

Alj Quote

On this record, it appears that Hoamco and the ARC were reasonably responsive . . . and that any delay in construction appears more likely based on Brilar principal’s imperfect understanding of the Guidelines’ requirements.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Construction Delays
  • Vendor Issues

Question

Can I rely on my contractor's timeline estimates for when the HOA will approve my plans?

Short Answer

No. You should rely on the timelines specified in the CC&Rs and statutes, not third-party estimates.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that a homeowner's expectations based on their builder's estimates are not binding on the HOA. The official governing documents determine the procedural timeline, and reliance on outside estimates does not constitute a violation by the HOA.

Alj Quote

Mrs. Holly candidly testified that Petiitoners’ expectations about how long it would take to build their house was based on Brilar’s principles’ estimates, not anything in statutes or Respondent’s CC&Rs . . .

Legal Basis

N/A

Topic Tags

  • Timelines
  • Construction
  • Expectations

Question

Can the HOA charge a fee for reviewing architectural plans?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs allow for it.

Detailed Answer

The decision affirms that CC&Rs can grant the Architectural Review Committee the power to assess reasonable fees in connection with the review of plans.

Alj Quote

Article 11.3 of Respondent’s CC&Rs concerns general provisions for the ARC, including that it may assess reasonable fees in connection with its review of plans . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 11.3

Topic Tags

  • Fees
  • Architectural Review
  • CC&Rs

Case

Docket No
20F-H2019020-REL
Case Title
Rick and Lisa Holly vs. La Barranca II Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-02-14
Alj Name
Diane Mihalsky
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rick Holly (petitioner)
    La Barranca II Homeowners Association Member
  • Lisa Holly (petitioner)
    La Barranca II Homeowners Association Member
    Also referred to as Mrs. Holly
  • Kevin P. Nelson (petitioner attorney)
    Tiffany & Bosco
  • Brian Bracken (witness/contractor's principal)
    Brilar Homes, LLC
    Petitioners' general contractor
  • Larry E. Smith (witness/contractor's principal)
    Brilar Homes, LLC
    Petitioners' general contractor

Respondent Side

  • La Barranca II Homeowners Association (respondent)
    HOA party
  • Edward D. O’Brien (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Alexia Firehawk (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • William Bohan (HOA board member/ARC member/witness)
    La Barranca II Homeowners Association
    Board Vice President
  • Nancy Williams (HOA board member/ARC member)
    La Barranca II Homeowners Association
    Board Secretary
  • Luke Hyde (property manager staff)
    Hoamco
    Architectural Department Manager
  • Josh Hall (property manager staff)
    Hoamco
    Architectural Department Staff
  • Neil True (architect consultant)
    Hoamco/ARC Consultant
    Consultant architect reviewing plans

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    OAH
  • John Davis (fire marshall)
    Sedona District Fire Marshall
    Consulted by HOA regarding dumpster placement
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Mary J Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Mary J Bartle Counsel
Respondent Saguaro West Owner's Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions

The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.

Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919059-REL-RHG Decision – 767041.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:24 (94.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association (Case No. 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Mary J. Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association. The final order, issued on January 30, 2020, dismissed the petition brought by Ms. Bartle. The core of the case revolved around a financial transaction where $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018, and redeposited on November 30, 2018.

The petitioner, Ms. Bartle, alleged this transaction violated a specific provision of the Association’s bylaws—Article VIII, section 8(d)—which outlines the duties of the Treasurer. Despite two hearings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently concluded that Ms. Bartle failed to meet her burden of proof. The central finding was that while evidence suggested the transaction “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper,” the petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, how this transaction specifically violated any of the enumerated duties of the Treasurer as set forth in the cited bylaw. The decision underscores a critical legal distinction between a potentially improper act and a proven violation of the specific bylaw under which the complaint was filed.

Case Overview

Case Name

Mary J. Bartle, Petitioner, vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association, Respondent

Case Number

19F-H1919059-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Petitioner

Mary J. Bartle (representing herself)

Respondent

Saguaro West Owner’s Association (represented by Nicole Payne, Esq.)

Rehearing Date

January 14, 2020

Final Decision Date

January 30, 2020

Procedural History and Core Allegation

The case proceeded through an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, following a specific timeline of events:

April 22, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed the initial petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

August 29, 2019: The first hearing was held. At the outset, a discussion was held to narrow the scope of the hearing. Ms. Bartle agreed to limit her petition to a single issue.

The Single Issue: Whether the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) through a withdrawal of $49,000.50 on October 22, 2018, and a redeposit of the same amount on November 30, 2018.

September 18, 2019: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing Ms. Bartle’s petition.

October 23, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed a request for a rehearing, asserting an error in the admission of evidence.

November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.

January 14, 2020: The rehearing was convened. Ms. Bartle testified, while the Respondent presented no witnesses.

January 30, 2020: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, reaffirming the dismissal of the petition.

At the rehearing, Ms. Bartle testified “to the effect that laws must have been violated by the withdrawal and redepositing of the $49,000.50 without the Association’s members being provided any notice of these transactions.”

Analysis of Bylaw and Judicial Findings

Bylaw Article VIII, Section 8(d): The Treasurer’s Duties

The entirety of the petitioner’s case rested on proving a violation of the specific duties outlined for the Treasurer in the Association’s bylaws. The text of the bylaw is as follows:

The Treasurer shall receive and deposit in the Association’s bank accounts all monies received by the Association and shall disburse such funds as directed by resolution [of] the Board of Directors; shall properly prepare and sign all checks before presenting them to be co-signed; keep proper books of account; cause an annual audit of the Association’s books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year; and shall prepare an annual budget to be presented to the membership at the annual meeting; to cause all Federal and State reports to be prepared; and shall prepare all monthly statements of finance for the Board of Directors.

Key Judicial Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the petitioner’s failure to connect the disputed financial transaction to a specific violation of the duties listed above. The judge made a clear distinction between the potential impropriety of the transaction and the narrow scope of the legal claim.

Initial Hearing Conclusion: The decision from the first hearing, which the judge took notice of in the rehearing, established the core finding:

Rehearing Conclusion: The final decision after the rehearing reinforced this exact point, stating:

Ultimately, the case was dismissed because Ms. Bartle did not meet the legal standard required to prove her specific claim.

Legal Framework and Final Order

Applicable Legal Standards

The decision was grounded in several key legal principles cited by the Administrative Law Judge:

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate possesses authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Burden of Proof: Ms. Bartle, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof on all issues.

Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Contractual Nature of Bylaws: Citing McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., the decision notes that “The Bylaws are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”

Final Order and Implications

Based on the failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with the following key points:

1. Dismissal: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed.

2. Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

3. Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served, as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 12-904(A) and Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6.

Study Guide: Bartle v. Saguaro West Owner’s Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the legal matter.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific financial transaction was the central subject of the petitioner’s complaint?

3. Which specific article and section of the Association’s Bylaws did the petitioner claim was violated?

4. What was the legal standard of proof that the petitioner was required to meet, and who had the burden of proof?

5. On what grounds did Ms. Bartle file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

6. According to the judge’s decision, what was the key failure in the petitioner’s argument regarding the financial transaction?

7. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on January 30, 2020?

8. Although the judge dismissed the petition, what did the decision state about the nature of the financial transactions?

9. Which government department granted the request for a rehearing and has authority over this type of matter?

10. What options does a party have if they wish to appeal the final administrative law judge order?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Mary J. Bartle, and the Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association. Ms. Bartle brought the petition against the Association, alleging a violation of its bylaws.

2. The central subject was the withdrawal of $49,000.50 from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018. The same amount was subsequently redeposited into the account on November 30, 2018.

3. The petitioner claimed the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). This section outlines the specific duties and responsibilities of the Association’s Treasurer.

4. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioner, Ms. Bartle, to demonstrate that the Association had violated the bylaw.

5. Ms. Bartle filed her Rehearing Request on the grounds that there was an error in the admission of evidence. She specifically referenced documents dated July 5, August 6, and September 13, 2019, in her request.

6. The key failure was that Ms. Bartle did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the withdrawal and redeposit specifically violated any of the treasurer’s duties as explicitly listed in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Her claim was too narrow for the evidence she presented.

7. The final order was that Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, was deemed to be the prevailing party in the matter.

8. The decision stated that there was evidence to suggest that the withdrawal and redeposit of the $49,000.50 “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper.” However, this was not sufficient to prove a violation of the specific bylaw in question.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing on November 18, 2019. This department has authority over the matter as established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information provided in the source document.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain why Mary J. Bartle failed to meet this standard, despite the judge’s acknowledgment that the transaction may have been “improper” or in “violation of the law.”

2. Discuss the procedural significance of limiting the hearing to the single issue of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). How might the case’s outcome have differed if the scope of the hearing had been broader?

3. Trace the complete timeline of the case from the initial petition filing in April 2019 to the final order in January 2020. What do the key events and dates reveal about the process of administrative hearings and rehearings?

4. Based on the full text of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d), what specific types of evidence would the petitioner have needed to present to successfully prove that the treasurer’s duties were violated by the $49,000.50 transaction?

5. Evaluate the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between a transaction that is potentially illegal or improper and a transaction that specifically violates the duties enumerated in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Why is this distinction critical to the final order of dismissal?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues decisions on matters under the jurisdiction of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona’s state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited to establish jurisdiction and the appeals process.

Bylaws

A set of rules established by an organization, such as a homeowners’ association, to regulate itself. In this case, the bylaws are treated as a binding contract between the parties.

Conclusion of Law

The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case.

Finding of Fact

The section of a legal decision that lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented during the hearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a court of law reviews the decision of a lower court or an administrative agency to determine if the decision was legally sound.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

A state agency that provides a neutral forum for conducting administrative hearings for other state agencies. The hearings in this matter were held at the OAH.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the petitioner was Mary J. Bartle.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is met when the evidence presented has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Prevailing Party

The party in a legal dispute who is successful and in whose favor the judgment is rendered. In this case, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to consider new evidence or to argue against the original decision on the basis of an error. Ms. Bartle’s request for a rehearing was granted.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Saguaro West Owner’s Association.

A Homeowner Found a Mysterious $49,000 Transaction in Her HOA’s Books. The Reason She Lost in Court Is a Lesson for Everyone.

Introduction: The David-vs-Goliath Fight That Didn’t Go as Planned

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant battle for transparency and fairness. It’s a common story: a resident raises concerns about financial decisions made behind closed doors, only to be met with resistance or silence. But what happens when a homeowner pushes back and takes that fight to an administrative hearing?

After an initial hearing and a persistent request for a rehearing, the final decision in Mary J. Bartle’s case against the Saguaro West Owner’s Association seemed, on the surface, like a clear-cut quest for accountability. The dispute centered on a single, alarming event: the withdrawal and subsequent redeposit of $49,000.50 from the association’s operating account without any notice to the members. It appeared to be a straightforward case of a concerned resident demanding answers.

However, the ruling from the administrative hearing offers a surprising and crucial lesson in how the legal system operates. The outcome reveals that suspicion, no matter how justified, is not enough to win. This article breaks down the top counter-intuitive takeaways from the judge’s decision and what they mean for any homeowner considering a legal challenge against their HOA.

Takeaway 1: A “Suspicious” Act Isn’t a Guaranteed Win

Feeling Something Is Wrong Isn’t the Same as Proving It.

The core facts of the case were not in dispute. On October 22, 2018, $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Saguaro West Owner’s Association’s operating account. On November 30, 2018, the exact same amount was redeposited. Members were not notified of these transactions. To any reasonable observer, this activity raises immediate questions.

Even the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case acknowledged the questionable nature of the transaction. In his final decision, he validated Ms. Bartle’s initial concerns with a striking statement:

The evidence shows that $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s account in October 2018 and the same amount was deposited in November 2018, and there is evidence to suggest that the transactions may have been in violation of the law.

This is the most stunning part of the case: the judge agreed that the transaction looked suspicious and might have broken the law, yet Ms. Bartle still lost. This reveals a critical distinction in legal proceedings. A judge is not an arbiter of general fairness but an interpreter of specific laws and rules. The judge’s comment shows he understood the spirit of Ms. Bartle’s complaint, but his hands were tied by the letter of her petition. The legal system requires more than a gut feeling; it demands specific proof that a specific rule was violated, which leads directly to the next critical lesson.

Takeaway 2: You Must Prove theExactRule Was Broken

Specificity Is Your Only Weapon.

Ms. Bartle’s case was ultimately narrowed to a single, highly specific issue: whether the $49,000.50 transaction violated Article VIII, section 8(d) of the association’s bylaws. This is a crucial detail because courts and administrative bodies require this rigid specificity to ensure fairness, prevent “moving goalposts,” and keep proceedings focused on the actual claims filed, not a general feeling of grievance.

Her entire case hinged on proving a violation of that specific section and no other. The rule in question outlines the treasurer’s duties, which include the power to: “receive and deposit…all monies,” “disburse such funds as directed,” “sign all checks,” and “keep proper books of account.”

The judge’s conclusion was brutally precise. He found that Ms. Bartle had “not shown by a preponderance of the evidence” that the transaction violated any of those specific, listed duties. She couldn’t prove the treasurer failed to deposit money or keep proper books; she could only prove a strange transaction occurred that wasn’t explicitly forbidden by the rule she cited. This is a critical lesson: it doesn’t matter if an HOA’s action feels wrong; what matters is whether you can prove it violated the precise rule you cited in your petition.

Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Rests Entirely on the Accuser

It’s Your Job to Build the Case, Not Theirs to Disprove It.

In a civil administrative hearing like this, the petitioner—Ms. Bartle—carries the “burden of proof.” The standard she had to meet was the “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal definition for this is:

“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

In simple terms, she had to present enough convincing evidence to make the judge believe that her version of events was more likely true than not. The judge’s decision explicitly states that Ms. Bartle bore this burden and ultimately failed to meet it.

One of the most powerful details from the case file illustrates this point perfectly: the Saguaro West Owner’s Association, though represented by legal counsel, “presented no witnesses.” They didn’t have to. They didn’t need to explain the transaction or justify their actions because Ms. Bartle failed to build a strong enough case to prove her specific claim. The onus was completely on her to prove her argument, and when it fell short, the case was dismissed.

Conclusion: A Sobering Reminder for Homeowners

The case of Mary Bartle is a sobering reminder that winning a legal fight against a well-resourced entity like an HOA is less about moral rightness and more about meticulous legal strategy and precision.

While the judge acknowledged that Ms. Bartle’s concerns about the $49,000.50 transaction were potentially valid, her petition was dismissed not on a simple technicality, but because of a core principle of law: the failure to prove that the specific rule cited had actually been broken. Her case highlights the immense challenge for individual homeowners seeking transparency. It leaves us asking, if the legal bar is this specific, what practical recourse do residents have when they feel something is fundamentally wrong?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Mary J Bartle (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf and testified

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
  • Edith Rudder (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Jason West vs. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919065-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-10-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Petitioner's request for a hearing was denied and the petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove the Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) or its Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the meeting agenda or ballot.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jason West Counsel
Respondent Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's request for a hearing was denied and the petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove the Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) or its Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the meeting agenda or ballot.

Why this result: The relevant statute and HOA bylaws do not mandate that the Board add a member-proposed amendment to the agenda; the member has the independent recourse of gathering member support (25% or 1/4 of votes) to call a special meeting, a route the Petitioner was aware of but did not pursue.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual meeting

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment (Bylaw 3.13, concerning banning directors whose actions resulted in a paid claim) on the agenda or ballot for the annual meeting.

Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner did not establish that Respondent violated the cited statute or bylaw by declining to add the proposed amendment to the agenda or ballot.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
  • Bylaw 1.5
  • Bylaw 2.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaw Amendment, Meeting Agenda, Director liability, Statute interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Respondent’s Bylaw 1.5
  • Respondent’s Bylaw 2.2

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919065-REL Decision – 742075.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:21:02 (159.4 KB)

Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Jason West (Petitioner) versus the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL. The petition, filed on May 20, 2019, was ultimately denied in a decision issued on October 1, 2019.

The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and its own Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to add his proposed bylaw amendment to the agenda for the annual members’ meeting. The proposed amendment sought to ban directors from serving for five years if their actions resulted in a paid claim against the Association.

The ALJ’s ruling was decisive: the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The decision rested on a strict interpretation of the relevant statute and bylaws. The ALJ concluded that neither A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) nor the Association’s bylaws compel the Board to place a member-initiated proposal on the agenda of a Board-scheduled meeting. Critically, the bylaws provide a distinct and available remedy for members: Bylaw 2.2 allows members to force a special meeting for any purpose, including bylaw amendments, by gathering the support of 25% of the voting membership. The record showed the Petitioner was aware of this option but did not attempt to use it. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was also denied, as the presiding body (the Office of Administrative Hearings) lacks the statutory authority to award them in such proceedings.

1. Case Overview

Case Name

Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1919065-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

Hearing Date

September 26, 2019

Decision Date

October 1, 2019

Petitioner

Jason West, appearing on his own behalf

Respondent

Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, represented by Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent’s Board violated state law and its governing documents by refusing to include his proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda and ballot for the annual meeting held in June 2019.

2. The Proposed Bylaw Amendment (Bylaw 3.13)

The Petitioner submitted a proposal to add a new Bylaw 3.13 to the Association’s governing documents. The full text of the proposed amendment is as follows:

Directors whose actions result in a paid claim

In an effort to reduce liability to the Association, any current or former director whose actions have resulted in a paid claim by the Association or its insurance carrier, is banned from serving as a director for a period of five years from the date of the final payment. This five year directorship ban also applies to any other individual co-owning an Association lot with the director. This Amendment is retroactive.

The stated purpose of the amendment was to reduce the Association’s liability. The decision notes that some of the current Board members may have been serving when the Association’s insurance carrier paid legal fees and other costs associated with a previous petition filed by the Petitioner.

3. Chronology of the Dispute

December 23, 2018: The Petitioner first sent his proposed Bylaw 3.13 amendment to Joanelize Morales, the Association’s property manager.

January 3 & 4, 2019: The Petitioner emailed Mickey Latz, owner of the management company, demanding the proposal be added to the next meeting’s agenda and ballot. In this correspondence, the Petitioner explicitly stated his awareness of the alternative process, writing, “I can also force the Board to call a Special Meeting of the Members at any time with 10 signatures from members of our Association. This is Article 2.2 of our Bylaws.”

January – June 2019: Mr. Latz repeatedly informed the Petitioner that the Board, based on legal advice, had decided not to add the proposal to the agenda of a Board-scheduled meeting.

April 17, 2019: Notice was sent to members for the annual meeting scheduled for June 4, 2019. The agenda was limited to (1) Election of Directors and (2) Approval of 2018 Annual Meeting Minutes. On the same day, the Petitioner re-sent his proposed amendment.

May 14, 2019: The Petitioner attended a Board meeting and threatened to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate if his amendment was not placed on the agenda.

May 20, 2019: The Petitioner filed the formal petition that led to this hearing.

June 3, 2019: A notice was sent rescheduling the meeting to June 20, 2019, with the agenda unchanged.

June 20, 2019: At the annual meeting, the Petitioner, whose name was on the ballot, was not elected to the Board of Directors.

4. Governing Authorities and Bylaws

The ALJ’s decision centered on the interpretation of one state statute and two specific Association bylaws.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B): This Arizona statute governs homeowners’ association meetings. It requires annual meetings and specifies notice requirements. It explicitly provides a mechanism for members to call special meetings: “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president, by a majority of the board of directors or by members having at least twenty-five percent, or any lower percentage specified in the bylaws, of the votes in the association.”

Bylaw 1.5 (Amendment Process): This bylaw states that amendments can be made “at a regular or special meeting of the Members, by a vote of the Members having a majority (more than 50%) of the votes.” The ALJ found that this bylaw is permissive, allowing for votes on amendments, but does not obligate the Board to place any specific proposal on an agenda.

Bylaw 2.2 (Special Meetings): This bylaw mirrors the state statute, allowing members to compel a meeting. It states: “Special meetings of the Members may be called at any time … upon written request signed by Members having at least one-fourth (1/4) of the authorized votes… which request shall be delivered to the President or Secretary.”

5. Summary of Key Testimony

The hearing included testimony from the Petitioner and six witnesses he subpoenaed, including property managers and the three current Board members.

Board Members (Bryan Selna, David Epstein, Linda Seidler): All testified that they consulted with the Association’s attorneys and property management company. Based on the advice received, they collectively decided not to add the Petitioner’s proposal to the agenda.

Mickey Latz (Property Management Co. Owner): Testified that the Board as a whole, not the secretary, determines the meeting agenda. He affirmed that counsel had advised the Board it was not obligated to add member-requested items. Mr. Latz testified that he explicitly pointed the Petitioner to the process outlined in Bylaw 2.2, which allows members to call their own meetings directly.

Joanelize Morales (Property Manager): Confirmed that she prepares meeting agendas based on the Board’s instructions. She also testified that the Petitioner never attempted to use the Bylaw 2.2 process to gather the support of his neighbors to schedule a meeting to consider his proposed amendment.

6. Historical Context and Prior Litigation

The decision provides context regarding the Petitioner’s previous interactions with the Association.

Prior Petition (OAH Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL): In April 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition concerning the Board’s failure to fill vacant positions. On June 28, 2017, an ALJ dismissed that petition, concluding that the Board had done all it could and that vacancies were due in part to the Petitioner’s “obstructionist tactics.”

Successful Amendment (Bylaw 3.12): In April 2017, the Petitioner proposed a different amendment regarding director resignations. The Board at that time agreed to submit it to a vote, and it was passed by the membership in May 2017.

7. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions of law methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s claims, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent had violated the statute and bylaw.

Statutory and Bylaw Interpretation: The ALJ applied a plain-language reading to the governing authorities.

◦ The court found that nothing in the language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) requires an HOA board to add an item to an agenda at a member’s request. Instead, it provides the remedy for members to call a meeting themselves.

◦ Similarly, the court concluded that Bylaw 1.5 allows for bylaw amendments to be considered at meetings but does not compel the Board to include such proposals on the agenda of a meeting it has noticed.

◦ The ALJ found that Bylaw 2.2 provides the explicit and proper procedure for a member to bring an issue to a vote when the Board declines to do so: gather support from 25% of the members to call a special meeting.

Final Ruling: Because the Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any cited statute or bylaw, the petition was ordered to be denied.

Attorney’s Fees: The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The decision cited legal precedent establishing that administrative bodies like the Department of Real Estate and the OAH are not empowered by the legislature to award attorney’s fees in these types of disputes.

Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the provided administrative law judge decision.

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What specific action did the Petitioner, Jason West, allege the Respondent took that violated Arizona statute and the association’s bylaws?

3. Describe the substance of the proposed Bylaw 3.13 that the Petitioner wanted to add to the agenda.

4. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not adding the proposed bylaw amendment to the annual meeting’s agenda or ballot?

5. According to Bylaw 2.2, what procedural option did the Petitioner have to bring his proposed amendment to a vote without the Board’s approval?

6. What was the outcome of the Petitioner’s previous case against the Respondent in 2017 (OAH Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL)?

7. What two specific authorities did the Petitioner claim the Respondent’s Board violated?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation, does A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) require an HOA board to add an item to an agenda at a single member’s request?

9. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge in this case (No. 19F-H1919065-REL)?

10. What was the judge’s ruling regarding the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees, and what was the reason for this ruling?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Jason West, who owns a house in the Desert Sage Two development. The Respondent is the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, of which the Petitioner is a member.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and its own Bylaw 1.5. The specific violation was the Board’s failure to place a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner on the agenda of the association’s annual meeting.

3. The proposed Bylaw 3.13 sought to ban any current or former director from serving on the board for five years if their actions resulted in a paid claim by the association or its insurance carrier. This ban would be retroactive and also apply to any individual co-owning a lot with the director.

4. The Respondent’s Board, after consulting with its attorneys and property management company, argued that neither state law nor its bylaws obliged them to add items to an agenda at a single member’s request. They contended that the Petitioner had the option to call a special meeting himself by gathering support from other members.

5. Bylaw 2.2 allows for a special meeting of the members to be called upon a written request signed by members who hold at least one-fourth (25%) of the authorized votes. The Petitioner was aware of this option but had not attempted to use it.

6. In the previous case, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. The judge concluded that the Board had done all it could to fill vacant positions and that the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics” were part of the reason no eligible members were willing to serve.

7. The Petitioner claimed the Respondent’s Board violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(B) and the association’s Bylaw 1.5.

8. No, the judge concluded that nothing in the language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) requires a homeowners’ association board to add an item to an agenda or ballot at the request of a single member. The statute only provides that members with at least 25% of the votes can independently call a meeting.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge found that the Petitioner had not established that the Respondent’s Board violated either A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) or Bylaw 1.5.

10. The judge ruled that attorney’s fees could not be awarded to the Respondent. The reason given is that the legislature has not empowered the Department of Real Estate or the Office of Administrative Hearings to award attorney’s fees in this type of administrative proceeding.

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Essay Questions

Construct a detailed essay response for each of the following prompts, using only evidence and reasoning found within the case document.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory construction and interpretation of restrictive covenants. How did the judge apply these principles to A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5 to reach a conclusion?

2. Discuss the balance of power between an individual HOA member and the Board of Directors as illustrated in this case. What rights and recourses are available to a member who disagrees with a Board decision, according to the Respondent’s Bylaws?

3. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the standard required, and why was the Petitioner unable to meet this standard?

4. Examine the history between the Petitioner and the Respondent as detailed in the “Findings of Fact.” How might this prior history, including the 2017 legal case and a previously successful bylaw amendment, have influenced the actions of both parties in the current dispute?

5. Based on the testimony of Michael David (“Mickey”) Latz and the text of the bylaws, contrast the process for placing an item on the agenda of a Board-scheduled meeting versus the process for calling a member-initiated special meeting. What are the key differences in initiative, requirements, and control?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent official (Diane Mihalsky) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presides over evidentiary hearings and issues decisions on petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)

An Arizona statute cited by the Petitioner. It stipulates that an HOA members’ meeting must be held at least annually and that special meetings can be called by the president, a board majority, or members with at least 25% of the votes.

Bylaw 1.5

A bylaw of the Desert Sage Two HOA that states the Bylaws may be amended at a regular or special meeting by a majority vote of members present in person or by proxy.

Bylaw 2.2

A bylaw of the Desert Sage Two HOA that allows for special meetings of the members to be called by the president, the Board, or upon written request from members holding at least one-fourth (25%) of the votes.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state body authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Homeowners’ Association

An organization whose members own property and/or residences in a specific development (in this case, Desert Sage Two in Scottsdale, Arizona).

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department refers petitions for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner

Jason West, the member of the homeowners’ association who filed the petition alleging a violation by the association’s Board.

Petition

A formal complaint filed with the Department of Real Estate by an HOA member or the HOA itself concerning alleged violations.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof standard required in the hearing. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Respondent

The Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, the entity against which the petition was filed.

Restrictive Covenant

A rule or provision within community documents, like bylaws, that is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties if it is unambiguous.

Select all sources
742075.pdf

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19F-H1919065-REL

1 source

This text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) concerning a dispute between a homeowner, Jason West (Petitioner), and his association, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)) and an association bylaw by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual meeting. The proposed amendment sought to ban directors whose actions resulted in a paid insurance claim from serving for five years, but the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that neither the statute nor the association’s bylaws required the Board to add a member-proposed item to a scheduled agenda or ballot. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation and denied the petition.

1 source

What was the specific legal and procedural context of this homeowners association dispute?
How did the Petitioner’s proposed bylaw amendment attempt to alter Board member liability?
What statutory and bylaw provisions guided the final Administrative Law Judge decision?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jason West (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Bradley R. Jardine (HOA attorney)
    Jardine, Baker, Hickman, & Houston, PLLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Edward A. Padilla (property manager)
    Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association
    Property manager in May 2017; testified for Petitioner; also referred to as 'Eddie'
  • Joanelize Morales (property manager)
    Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association
    Property manager since August 2018; testified for Petitioner
  • Bryan Robert Selna (board member)
    Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association
    Current Vice President of Respondent's Board; testified for Petitioner
  • David Epstein (board member)
    Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association
    Current President of Respondent's Board; testified for Petitioner
  • Linda Maria Seidler (board member)
    Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association
    Current Secretary of Respondent's Board; testified for Petitioner
  • Michael David Latz (property manager)
    Golden Valley Property Management
    Owner of Golden Valley Property Management; testified for Petitioner; also referred to as 'Mickey'

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate