Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-01-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Solera was in compliance with its governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, concluding that the Board is the 'sole judge' regarding appropriate maintenance of AREAS. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the Rehearing Petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation. The governing documents grant the Board 'the sole judge' authority over maintenance, and Petitioner did not provide legal support requiring the HOA to meet the homeowner maintenance standard.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times

Petitioner alleged that Solera failed to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times, arguing that the same strict maintenance standard applied to homeowners (CC&R 7.2) should apply to the HOA (CC&R 7.1). The issue was heard on rehearing after the initial decision dismissed the petition.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Solera was in compliance with its governing documents and was the prevailing party. Petitioner's appeal (Rehearing Petition) was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Violation, Maintenance Standard, Areas of Association Responsibility, Rehearing, Sole Judge
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 816310.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:18 (199.6 KB)

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 847175.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:21 (246.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision in the case of Debra K. Morin versus the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Solera), dated January 8, 2021. The central dispute involved a homeowner’s allegation that the association failed to maintain its common areas in good condition and repair.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petitioner’s case, finding conclusively in favor of the Solera HOA. The decision rested on a critical provision within the association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which designates the Solera Board as the “sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement” of all common areas. This clause grants the Board exclusive discretion, superseding an individual homeowner’s opinion on the timing or quality of maintenance.

Despite the petitioner presenting extensive photographic evidence documenting various maintenance issues, the ALJ concluded that this evidence failed to prove a violation of the governing documents. The petitioner did not meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board had acted outside its granted authority. The ruling affirms that the authority of the Board is explicitly elevated above that of an individual homeowner in matters of common area maintenance under the controlling legal documents.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Background and Procedural History

The case originates from a petition filed by Debra K. Morin, a four-year resident of the Solera community, against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. The matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (Tribunal).

A. Initial Petition

On March 12, 2020, Ms. Morin filed a two-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Solera, its Board of Directors, and its management company (Premier) had violated numerous governing documents, including the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, CC&Rs, and Rules & Regulations (R&Rs).

Issue #1: Alleged that Solera did not permit “direct communication from homeowners” and sought to have this “policy” rescinded.

Issue #2: Alleged that Solera was not providing oversight to the General Manager in maintaining the “Areas of Association Responsibility” (AREAS) in “good condition and repair at all times.” Specific complaints included uncontrolled weeds and poor maintenance of the Community Center and other common areas.

B. Procedural Developments

Motion to Dismiss: Solera filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the issues were outside the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction.

Withdrawal of Issue #1: At a May 20, 2020 hearing, the Tribunal noted its jurisdiction did not extend to non-governing documents like the Board’s Code of Ethics. Consequently, Ms. Morin withdrew Issue #1. The Tribunal denied the Motion to Dismiss for the remaining “bare-bones” maintenance allegation in Issue #2.

Initial Decision (August 19, 2020): Following the original hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Solera was the “sole judge” regarding maintenance of the AREAS and had not violated its governing documents. The petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Request (September 24, 2020): Ms. Morin filed a request for rehearing, citing irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and arguing the decision was arbitrary and capricious, particularly in its interpretation of CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

Rehearing Granted and Conducted: The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing, which was conducted telephonically on December 16, 2020.

——————————————————————————–

II. Core Arguments of the Parties

The fundamental conflict centered on the interpretation of the maintenance standards outlined in the community’s CC&Rs.

A. Petitioner’s Position (Debra K. Morin)

Ms. Morin’s case was built on the principle of equal application of maintenance standards.

Central Argument: The same maintenance standard requiring homeowners to keep their lots “in good condition and repair at all times” (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2) must be applied equally to Solera’s responsibility for the common AREAS (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1).

Core Belief: Because homeowners are given no discretion regarding delays in maintenance, Solera should not be able to take months to address reported issues.

Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted extensive documentation, including over 80 photographs (referenced in the rehearing as “310 pictures”), emails, and other documents. This evidence was intended to show persistent maintenance failures, including:

◦ Uncontrolled weeds in granite rock locations

◦ Poor exterior condition of the Community Center

◦ Deficiencies in street asphalt, storm drains, sidewalks, and curbing

◦ Water pooling and intrusion issues

◦ Exposed landscaping lights and irrigation lines

◦ Unremoved tree stumps

B. Respondent’s Position (Solera HOA)

Solera’s defense relied entirely on the specific authority granted to its Board by the governing documents.

Central Argument: The association met its responsibilities, and the petitioner’s subjective opinions about what, when, or how maintenance should be done are irrelevant.

Dispositive Legal Provision: Solera consistently cited CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states the Board “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].”

Interpretation: This provision grants the Board exclusive discretion and authority to determine the nature and timing of maintenance, insulating its decisions from a single homeowner’s critique.

——————————————————————————–

III. Analysis and Key Findings of the Administrative Law Judge

The Rehearing Decision provided a thorough review of the evidence and legal arguments, ultimately reinforcing the original ruling in favor of Solera.

A. The “Sole Judge” Clause and Board Authority

The ALJ’s conclusion hinged on the unambiguous language of the CC&Rs, which establishes a clear hierarchy of authority.

CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1: This article was identified as the dispositive text. It states, in pertinent part: “the Board ‘shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS], but all [AREAS], and the Improvements located thereon, shall be maintained in good condition and repair at all times.'” The ALJ found that the “sole judge” provision grants the Board exclusive authority to determine how the “good condition and repair” standard is met.

CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5: This section further strengthens the Board’s position by granting Solera the “exclusive right to construe and interpret the provisions of the [CC&Rs],” with its interpretation being “final, conclusive and binding.”

Conclusion on Authority: The ALJ concluded that these provisions clearly lift the Board’s authority above that of an individual homeowner in determining appropriate maintenance.

B. Rejection of the “Equal Standard” Argument

The petitioner’s primary argument for an equal, non-discretionary standard for both the HOA and homeowners was explicitly rejected.

• The ALJ found that the petitioner “failed to provide legal support for her argument that the same maintenance standard is required to be applied to the Board as it is applied to a homeowner.”

• The governing documents themselves create different levels of authority and obligation for the Board versus individual owners.

C. Evaluation of Evidence and Burden of Proof

Burden of Proof: The decision reiterates that the petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Photographic Evidence: The ALJ acknowledged reviewing all photographs from both hearings. The decision states that this evidence successfully documented “the existence, at those dates embedded in the photographs, of items that deal with maintenance and repairs in various locations of Solera AREAS.”

Failure to Prove a Violation: Crucially, while the photos proved maintenance issues existed, they did not prove a violation of the CC&Rs. Because the Board is the “sole judge,” the existence of a weed or a cracked curb does not automatically constitute a breach of its duties, as the Board retains discretion over the timeline and method of repair.

D. Jurisdictional Limitations

The decision affirmed the Tribunal’s limited jurisdiction, noting that many of the petitioner’s underlying frustrations were not legally actionable in this venue.

Not Actionable: A homeowner’s dissatisfaction with the Board, its management company, or the General Manager is “not within the purview of this process or the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”

Irrelevant Documents: Arguments based on City of Chandler standards, the landscaping contract with Integrated Landscape Management (ILM), or Premier’s General Manager job description were deemed irrelevant, as the Tribunal’s review is limited to the association’s governing documents and applicable state statutes.

——————————————————————————–

IV. Final Order and Conclusion

Based on an exhaustive review of the record from both the original hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

Final Finding: The petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The ALJ concluded that Solera is in compliance with its governing documents, including CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

Order:

IT IS ORDERED that Solera is the prevailing party with regard to the Rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

◦ The order was issued on January 8, 2021.

◦ As a decision issued after a rehearing, the order is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be filed with the Superior Court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative rehearing case No. 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG, between Petitioner Debra K. Morin and Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms derived from the case documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and who represented them at the telephonic hearing on December 16, 2020?

2. What were the two initial issues Petitioner Debra K. Morin raised in her petition filed on March 12, 2020?

3. Why did the Petitioner withdraw Issue #1 from her petition during the May 20, 2020 hearing?

4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the maintenance standard that Solera should be held to?

5. What type of evidence did the Petitioner primarily present to document the alleged maintenance failures in the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)?

6. What specific clause in the CC&Rs did Solera (the Respondent) rely on to defend its actions and decisions regarding maintenance?

7. What were the primary reasons the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?

8. How did the Administrative Law Judge rule on the relevance of non-governing documents, such as the City of Chandler ordinances and the Premier Management Company job description?

9. What is the legal standard of proof that a petitioner must meet in these proceedings, and how is it defined in the decision?

10. What was the final conclusion and order of the Administrative Law Judge in the Rehearing Decision issued on January 8, 2021?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Debra K. Morin, who represented herself, and the Respondent, Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association (Solera). Solera was represented by Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.

2. Issue #1 alleged that Solera did not allow direct communication from homeowners. Issue #2 alleged that Solera, its Board, and its management company were not providing proper oversight to maintain the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair.

3. The Petitioner withdrew Issue #1 after the Tribunal ruled that the statutory parameters of its jurisdiction did not include the interpretation or application of a non-governing document like the Board’s Code of Ethics. The allegations regarding ethics and mismanagement based on this code were therefore removed from consideration.

4. The Petitioner’s central argument was that the same maintenance standard must be applied to Solera as is applied to homeowners. She contended that just as homeowners are required by CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2 to maintain their lots in good condition at all times, Solera must be held to the same standard for common AREAS under CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

5. The Petitioner presented an “enormity” of photographic evidence to document the maintenance issues. The decision notes she presented over eighty photographs at the original hearing and an additional “310 pictures” were mentioned in the rehearing, showing weeds, debris, exposed wiring, and other issues at various dates.

6. Solera relied on CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states that the Solera Board of Directors “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].” Solera argued that the Petitioner’s subjective opinions on maintenance were therefore not relevant.

7. The rehearing was granted for reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request, which claimed: irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and that the original decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not supported by evidence, or contrary to law.

8. The Judge ruled that such documents were not relevant or justiciable. City standards were not under review, and the management company’s job description and landscape contract were not Solera governing documents, so they could not be used to prove a violation of the association’s governing documents.

9. The petitioner bears the burden of proving their case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, and it represents the greater weight of evidence.

10. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The Judge found Solera to be the prevailing party, in compliance with CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, and ordered that the Petitioner’s appeal be dismissed.

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Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the balance of power between a homeowner and an HOA as depicted in this case. Discuss how specific clauses in the CC&Rs, particularly Article 7 (Section 7.1) and Article 9 (Sections 9.5 and 9.9), grant authority to the Board and limit the recourse available to an individual owner within the association’s own framework.

2. Examine the role and limitations of evidence in this administrative hearing. Why was the Petitioner’s photographic evidence, despite its volume, ultimately insufficient to meet the burden of proof? Discuss the distinction made by the Tribunal between evidence of a maintenance issue and evidence of a violation of the governing documents.

3. The Petitioner argued for an equal application of the “maintenance standard” to both homeowners and the HOA, stating “[t]here must be equal consideration to have a valid contract.” Evaluate this argument in the context of the specific language found in the Solera CC&Rs. Is the concept of “equal consideration” legally applicable in the way the Petitioner suggests?

4. Discuss the jurisdiction of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (the Tribunal) in HOA disputes as described in the decision. Explain why the Tribunal could rule on the maintenance of common areas but had to dismiss claims related to the Solera Code of Ethics, City of Chandler ordinances, and Premier Management’s internal documents.

5. Based on the findings of fact, trace the procedural journey of this case from the initial petition to the final rehearing order. Identify the key turning points, such as the Motion to Dismiss and the Order Granting Rehearing, and explain their impact on the scope and outcome of the dispute.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact, issues decisions, and conducts rehearings.

Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)

The common areas within the Solera community that the homeowners’ association is responsible for managing and maintaining. This includes landscaping, the Community Center exterior, street conditions, storm drains, sidewalks, walls, and curbing.

Articles of Incorporation

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit A.

By-Laws

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit B.

CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A primary governing document for the Solera at Springfield Lakes community. It outlines the rights and responsibilities of both the homeowners and the association.

Maintenance Standard

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.30 as “the standard of maintenance of Improvements established from time to time by the Board and/or the Architectural Review Committee in the Design Guidelines, or in the absence of any such standards, the standards of maintenance of Improvements generally prevailing through the Project.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party (in this case, Solera) asking for a petition or case to be dismissed on the grounds that the issues are outside the Department’s jurisdiction or that the requested relief cannot be granted as a matter of law.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Debra K. Morin, a homeowner in the Solera community.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for a petitioner to win in these proceedings. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Premier Management Company (Premier)

The management company hired by the Solera Board of Directors to handle duties including the oversight of a General Manager.

Project Documents

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.37 as the CC&Rs, any supplements to the CC&Rs, the By-Laws, the Rules and Regulations (R&Rs), and the Design Guidelines.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

R&Rs (Rules and Regulations)

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit D.

Tribunal

A term used to refer to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the body responsible for conducting administrative hearings for disputes referred by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

🧑‍⚖️

20F-H2020051-REL-RHG

1 source

This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision regarding a dispute between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent). The Petitioner initially filed a two-issue complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that the HOA had violated various governing documents, primarily concerning lack of direct homeowner communication and a failure to maintain Association Responsibility Areas (AREAS) in good condition. After the first issue was withdrawn due to jurisdictional limitations, the initial decision dismissed the petition, finding the HOA was the sole judge of appropriate maintenance under the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This rehearing decision, granted due to claims of procedural irregularities and arbitrary findings, ultimately reaffirms the original dismissal, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of the governing documents.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)
    Represented herself

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
  • Denise Frazier (general manager/witness)
    Premier Management Company / Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
    Solera's onsite general manager who testified

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for both original and rehearing decisions
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative)
    Transmitted the original August 19, 2020 Decision

Douglas J Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020041-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-05-21
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after establishing that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and the community documents by improperly recording Amended CC&Rs without proper owner consent. The Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. However, the ALJ could not grant the requested relief (rescission of the Amended CC&Rs) due to a lack of statutory authority.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Douglas J. Karolak Counsel
Respondent VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association Counsel David Fitzgibbons

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1); CC&Rs Part 10, Section 10.4

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after establishing that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and the community documents by improperly recording Amended CC&Rs without proper owner consent. The Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. However, the ALJ could not grant the requested relief (rescission of the Amended CC&Rs) due to a lack of statutory authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding the validity of Amended CC&Rs due to lack of required owner approval.

The Petitioner alleged that the Amended CC&Rs recorded by the Board were invalid because they were not approved by two-thirds (2/3) of the lot owners as required by the CC&Rs and statute. The ALJ agreed, finding the Board acted improperly and violated the documents and statute.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00. No civil penalty was assessed. The ALJ determined she lacked the statutory authority to order the rescission of the Amended CC&Rs requested by the Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • CC&Rs Part 10, Section 10.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Amendment, Board Authority, Filing Fee Refund, Partial Win
Additional Citations:

  • 20F-H2020041-REL
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • CC&Rs Part 10, Section 10.4

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020041-REL Decision – 792824.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T09:47:41 (102.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Douglas J. Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association (No. 20F-H2020041-REL). The central issue was whether the HOA Board had the authority to unilaterally amend and record changes to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) without the required homeowner vote.

The petitioner, Douglas J. Karolak, successfully argued that the HOA violated its own governing documents and Arizona state law by filing “Amended CC&Rs” on October 5, 2018, without securing the approval of two-thirds of the lot owners. The HOA contended its actions were a valid exercise of its authority to create “Association Rules.”

ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer ruled decisively in favor of the petitioner. The decision established a clear legal distinction between the Board’s power to adopt rules and the separate, more stringent process required to formally amend the CC&Rs. The judge found the Board acted improperly, declaring Karolak the prevailing party and ordering the HOA to reimburse his $500 filing fee. Notably, while the judge found the amended document was improperly recorded, she concluded she lacked the statutory authority to order its rescission, which was the remedy the petitioner had requested.

Case Overview

Case Name

Douglas J. Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

Case Number

20F-H2020041-REL

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

May 1, 2020

Decision Date

May 21, 2020

The Central Dispute

The core of the dispute revolved around the legitimacy of a document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates” (Amended CC&Rs), which the HOA Board recorded with the Pinal County Recorder on October 5, 2018.

Petitioner’s Position (Douglas J. Karolak): The Amended CC&Rs are invalid because they were not approved by “owners of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Lots,” a requirement explicitly stated in Section 10.4 of the original CC&Rs and supported by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1). Karolak argued that the Board’s action of recording an amendment is fundamentally different from its power to adopt internal “Association Rules.”

Respondent’s Position (VVE – Casa Grande HOA): The Board argued that its actions were a valid exercise of the authority granted to it under the CC&Rs. It claimed that because the only changes were to Part 7 (Use Restrictions), they fell under the Board’s power to “adopt, amend, or repeal such rules and regulations as it deems reasonable and appropriate” (Section 3.4) and to “modify or waive the foregoing restrictions… by reasonable rules and regulations” (Section 7.43). The Respondent’s counsel did, however, concede that “perhaps the Amended CC&Rs should not have been recorded.”

Factual Background and Chronology

• The VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association is a 56-lot community in Casa Grande, Arizona, with 19 lots remaining vacant at the time of the hearing.

April 30, 1999: The original “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for VVE” (CC&Rs) was recorded.

2014 and 2015: The HOA Board made unsuccessful attempts to amend the CC&Rs through membership votes.

2018: Following the failed votes, the Board determined it would make changes to the “rules section” of the CC&Rs under the authority it believed was granted by Section 3.4.

October 5, 2018: The Board recorded the Amended CC&Rs with the Pinal County Recorder. The HOA acknowledged that these amendments had not been approved by the required two-thirds of lot owners.

Legal Analysis and Key Provisions

The decision rested on the interpretation of specific sections of the community’s CC&Rs and Arizona state law. The judge concluded that the document’s structure clearly separates the process of rulemaking from the process of formal amendment.

Provision

Source

Summary of Stipulation

Amendment Process

CC&Rs Section 10.4

Requires an instrument “executed by the Owners of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Lots” and recorded to become effective.

Rulemaking Authority

CC&Rs Section 3.4

Empowers the Board to adopt, amend, or repeal “Association Rules” governing the use of the property. States rules have the “same force and effect as if they were set forth in” the CC&Rs.

Statutory Requirement

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

Provides that a declaration may be amended by the association via an affirmative vote or written consent of the number of owners specified in the declaration.

The judge’s rationale emphasized that the distinct sections for rulemaking (3.4) and amendments (10.4) demonstrate that the original drafters did not intend for the Board to have the power to unilaterally amend the CC&Rs. The judge stated, “The fact that the two topics are covered as separate topics in the CC&Rs leads to the conclusion that the original drafters of the CC&Rs did not contemplate that the Board had the authority to, on its own, amend the CC&Rs.”

The Court’s Decision and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the petitioner, Douglas J. Karolak, had successfully proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent HOA had acted improperly.

Key Findings:

• The HOA Board did not have the authority to amend the CC&Rs without the approval of two-thirds of the lot owners.

• The Board’s action of recording the Amended CC&Rs on October 5, 2018, was a violation of the community’s governing documents (Section 10.4) and Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)).

• The Board’s ability to create “Association Rules” is a separate and distinct process from the formal procedure required to amend the Declaration.

Final Order:

• The petitioner, Douglas J. Karolak, was deemed the prevailing party.

• The respondent HOA was ordered to pay the petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days of the order.

No civil penalty was found to be appropriate in the matter.

• Critically, the judge determined that under the applicable statute (A.R.S. § 32-2199.02), the Administrative Law Judge does not have the authority to order the Amended CC&Rs rescinded, despite this being the remedy requested by the petitioner.

The order is binding on both parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the decision.

Study Guide: Karolak v. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Douglas J. Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association (No. 20F-H2020041-REL).

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was the petitioner’s core allegation?

2. What specific statute and section of the community documents did the petitioner claim the respondent violated?

3. According to Section 10.4 of the original CC&Rs, what was the required procedure for amending the Declaration?

4. Under what authority did the VVE – Casa Grande HOA Board claim it could make changes to the community documents without a membership vote?

5. What key event occurred on or about October 5, 2018, that became the central point of the dispute?

6. What was the respondent’s primary argument for why their actions were valid?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence,” and which party bears the burden of proof to establish a violation?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Board’s authority to create “Association Rules” was a separate process from amending the CC&Rs?

9. What remedy did the petitioner request, and why was it not granted by the Administrative Law Judge?

10. What was the final order issued by the Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Douglas J. Karolak, a homeowner. The respondent was the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association. Karolak’s core allegation was that the HOA had improperly amended the community’s governing documents.

2. The petitioner alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1817(A)(1). He also claimed a violation of Part 10, Section 10.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

3. Section 10.4 of the CC&Rs stipulated that the Declaration could be amended by an instrument executed by the owners of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the lots. The amendment would not be effective until that instrument was officially recorded.

4. The HOA Board claimed it had the authority to make the changes under Section 3.4 of the CC&Rs. This section empowered the Board to adopt, amend, or repeal “Association Rules” as it deemed reasonable and appropriate.

5. On or about October 5, 2018, the Board recorded a document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates” (Amended CC&Rs) with the Pinal County Recorder. This was done without the required two-thirds vote from the lot owners.

6. The respondent argued that because the only changes made were to Part 7 (Use Restrictions), which fell under the type of rules the Board was authorized to adopt, the Amended CC&Rs were a valid exercise of the Board’s authority. Their counsel did acknowledge, however, that perhaps the document should not have been recorded.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the respondent committed the alleged violations by this standard.

8. The Judge concluded they were separate processes because the CC&Rs cover the topics in different sections. This separation led the Judge to believe the original drafters did not intend for the Board to have the authority to amend the CC&Rs on its own.

9. The petitioner requested that the improperly recorded Amended CC&Rs be rescinded. This remedy was not granted because the applicable statute, A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, does not give the Administrative Law Judge the specific authority to order a document rescinded.

10. The final order deemed the petitioner the prevailing party. It further ordered the respondent to repay the petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days, but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, using only the information presented in the legal decision.

1. Analyze the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between the Board’s authority to create “Association Rules” under Section 3.4 and the process for amending the Declaration under Section 10.4. Why was this distinction critical to the case’s outcome?

2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. How did the petitioner successfully meet this burden of proof to establish the respondent’s violation, and what specific facts supported this conclusion?

3. Examine the respondent’s (HOA’s) argument regarding its authority to amend the CC&Rs. What were the fundamental flaws in this argument, and how did their counsel’s acknowledgment about the recording of the Amended CC&Rs potentially weaken their position?

4. Explain the legal framework governing this dispute, citing the specific Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) mentioned in the decision. Detail the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Administrative Law Judge in resolving this type of HOA conflict.

5. Evaluate the final Order of the Administrative Law Judge. While the petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, why was their requested remedy (rescission of the Amended CC&Rs) denied? What does this reveal about the specific limits of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in such cases under A.R.S. § 32-2199.02?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Office of Administrative Hearings made the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

The specific Arizona Revised Statute cited by the petitioner. It states that a declaration may be amended by the association with an affirmative vote or written consent of the number of owners specified in the declaration.

Amended CC&Rs

The document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates,” which the HOA Board recorded on October 5, 2018, without the required two-thirds owner approval.

Association Rules

Rules and regulations that the HOA Board is empowered to adopt, amend, or repeal under Section 3.4 of the CC&Rs to govern the use of Common Areas and other parts of the Project. The Board argued their changes fell under this authority.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the respondent’s violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents for a planned community. The original “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for VVE” was recorded on April 30, 1999.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the petitioner filed his Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association, an association of 56 lot owners in Casa Grande, Arizona.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The office responsible for conducting hearings for disputes filed with state agencies like the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, homeowner Douglas J. Karolak.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association.

Your HOA Just Changed the Rules? Why This Homeowner’s $500 Victory is a Warning to Everyone

For millions of Americans, living in a planned community means living under the authority of a Homeowners Association (HOA). While intended to protect property values, these relationships can often feel one-sided, with boards issuing mandates and homeowners feeling powerless to push back. It’s a common frustration, but it’s rare to see a single homeowner challenge their board and force a legal reckoning.

A recent case from Arizona, Douglas J. Karolak versus the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association, provides a critical case study in board overreach and the surprising limits of legal victory. Karolak alleged his HOA board violated its own governing documents and state law by improperly changing the community’s core rules.

He took his case to an administrative law judge and, in a significant ruling, he won. But the outcome of this seemingly straightforward dispute was far from simple. The final decision reveals a shocking twist that holds critical lessons for every homeowner about the difference between being right on paper and getting the remedy you actually want.

There’s a Huge Difference Between a ‘Rule Change’ and a ‘Declaration Amendment’

The first lesson from this case is a critical one for every homeowner: understand the constitutional hierarchy of your community’s documents. The core of the dispute was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its foundational document, the CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions), without getting the required approval from the homeowners.

Here are the key facts of the case:

The Original Rule: The community’s CC&Rs explicitly stated in Section 10.4 that any amendment required a vote and execution by “at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Lots.” This is the highest level of authority in a planned community, akin to a constitution.

The Failed Attempts: The Board had tried to get this two-thirds vote in both 2014 and 2015, but was unsuccessful.

The Workaround: In 2018, the Board decided to bypass the homeowners. It used a separate power granted in Section 3.4 of the CC&Rs—the authority to create day-to-day “Association Rules”—to make what it called changes to the “‘rules section’ of the CC&Rs, specifically targeting the Use Restrictions in Part 7.”

The judge’s conclusion was crystal clear: The CC&Rs were drafted to treat the power to create “rules” and the power to “amend” the declaration as two entirely separate processes. This separation acts as a crucial check on the board’s power, preventing a small group from unilaterally changing the fundamental property rights of all owners. As the judge noted, “the original drafters of the CC&Rs did not contemplate that the Board had the authority to, on its own, amend the CC&Rs.”

Recording a Document Doesn’t Magically Make It Valid

To make their changes appear official, the HOA Board took a significant step. On October 5, 2018, they filed a document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates (Amended CC&Rs)” with the Pinal County Recorder.

For the average homeowner, a formally recorded document filed with the county looks final, official, and legally binding. It’s an intimidating piece of paper that suggests any challenge would be futile.

However, the judge’s ruling highlights a critical legal truth: procedural legitimacy is paramount. An official-looking document, even one filed with the county, is invalid if the legal process required to create it was ignored. The judge found that because the Board did not follow the correct internal procedure—securing the two-thirds vote from homeowners—the very act of recording the document was improper. Even the HOA’s own lawyer seemed to concede this point during the hearing, acknowledging that “perhaps the Amended CC&Rs should not have been recorded.”

The Winner’s Paradox: You Can Be Right and Still Not Get Your Desired Fix

The final order from the Administrative Law Judge was unambiguous: Douglas Karolak, the petitioner, was officially deemed the “prevailing party.” The judge concluded that the HOA had acted in violation of its own community documents and Arizona state law. This was a clear-cut victory for the homeowner.

But here is the shocking twist. Karolak’s requested remedy was for the illegally filed “Amended CC&Rs” to be rescinded—in other words, to have them officially nullified and removed. This seems like the logical and necessary fix to the problem.

The judge, however, was bound by the limits of her authority. The final decision states plainly: “The Administrative Law Judge does not have the authority under the applicable statute to order the Amended CC&Rs rescinded.” This highlights a critical jurisdictional gap. The Administrative Law Judge’s role in this venue is to determine if a violation occurred and assign limited penalties, not to perform the function of a higher court, which might have the power to void a recorded document.

So, what was the actual remedy for this clear violation? The judge ordered the HOA to repay Karolak his $500 filing fee. No other civil penalty was issued. The homeowner won the argument but did not get the one thing he asked for to correct the board’s improper action.

A Victory on Paper, A Question in Practice

The case of Douglas J. Karolak is a powerful real-world lesson. It proves that a single homeowner, armed with a thorough understanding of their community’s governing documents, can successfully challenge an overreaching HOA board and win. It confirms that procedural shortcuts, even when filed and recorded, do not make an illegal action legal.

But it also reveals the frustrating limitations that can exist within the legal process. The homeowner was proven right, but the improperly filed document remains on the books, unable to be rescinded in this specific venue. It raises a crucial question for homeowners everywhere: How do you ensure your victory has real teeth?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Douglas J. Karolak (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • David A. Fitzgibbons III (HOA attorney)
    Fitzgibbons Law Offices PLC
    Represented VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • CV Mathai (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • John Kelsey (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Kristi Kelsey (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • William Findley (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Kay Niemi (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Mark Korte (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Felicia Del Sol (property manager rep)
    Norris Management

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Donna M Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-03-30
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The Petition was upheld on all issues asserted by the Petitioner. The Respondent was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) (failure to provide election documents), A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) (failure to hold an annual meeting in 2019), and Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws (improperly prohibiting write-in ballots). Respondent was ordered to supply Petitioner with relevant documents and refund the Petitioner's filing fee of $1,500.00. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Donna M Bischoff Counsel
Respondent Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)
Bylaws Article 3, Section 2

Outcome Summary

The Petition was upheld on all issues asserted by the Petitioner. The Respondent was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) (failure to provide election documents), A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) (failure to hold an annual meeting in 2019), and Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws (improperly prohibiting write-in ballots). Respondent was ordered to supply Petitioner with relevant documents and refund the Petitioner's filing fee of $1,500.00. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Voting; proxies; absentee ballots; applicability; definition

Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with the required election materials and documentation from the October 2018 elections, violating statutory requirements for retention and availability of these materials for owner inspection.

Orders: Respondent ordered to supply Petitioner with the relevant documents, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C), within ten (10) days of the Order.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Open meetings; exceptions

Respondent postponed its required yearly 2019 meeting until January 2020, resulting in a failure to hold a unit owners' association meeting in 2019 as required by statute.

Orders: Petition upheld on this issue.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)

Selection

Respondent's board of directors declared write-in ballots invalid for the November 20, 2019, election. Since the Bylaws were silent on prohibiting write-in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.

Orders: Petition upheld on this issue.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Condominium Association, Election Procedures, Annual Meeting, Statutory Violation, Bylaw Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Bylaws Article 3, Section 2
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Related election workflow tool

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019033-REL Decision – 778923.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:24:42 (108.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Donna M. Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019033-REL), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge found entirely in favor of the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, concluding that the Respondent, Country Hills West Condominium Association (“the Association”), committed multiple violations of Arizona state statutes and its own governing documents.

The core violations upheld by the court are:

1. Failure to Hold a Required Annual Meeting: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold its required annual meeting within the 2019 calendar year, repeatedly postponing it until January 2020.

2. Failure to Provide Election Records: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with complete election materials for inspection, including ballots, envelopes, and sign-in sheets from the October 2018 election.

3. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots: The Association violated Article 3, Section 2 of its Bylaws by unilaterally prohibiting write-in ballots for the 2019 election, despite its governing documents being silent on the issue.

As a result, the Association was ordered to provide the requested documents to the Petitioner within ten days and to reimburse her $1,500 filing fee within thirty days. The decision underscores the legal obligation of homeowners’ associations to adhere strictly to statutory requirements for meetings, elections, and record transparency.

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I. Case Overview

The dispute was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by homeowner Donna M. Bischoff with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on December 11, 2019.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Donna M Bischoff, Petitioner, v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2019033-REL

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera

Hearing Date

March 10, 2020

Decision Date

March 30, 2020

Petitioner Representative

Donna M. Bischoff (on her own behalf)

Respondent Representative

Doug Meyer, President and Director

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, asserted that the Country Hills West Condominium Association committed violations of state law and its own governing documents. The specific allegations were:

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B): Failure to hold the mandatory annual unit owners’ association meeting within the 2019 calendar year.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C): Failure to make election materials, including ballots and related items, available for inspection by a unit owner.

Violation of Bylaws Article 3, Section 2: Improperly invalidating election ballots by prohibiting write-in candidates without any authority from the governing documents.

The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish these violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

III. Core Issues and Factual Findings

The hearing established several key facts that formed the basis of the Judge’s decision. The testimony from both Ms. Bischoff and the Association’s President, Doug Meyer, was central to these findings.

A. Failure to Hold the 2019 Annual Meeting

Timeline of Events: The Association’s required annual meeting for 2019 was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019. It was subsequently postponed three times: first to December 19, 2019; then to December 30, 2019; and ultimately held on January 24, 2020.

Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer testified that the postponements were necessary because write-in candidates appeared on the ballot, which the board had prohibited. He stated that the board “needed time to reprint the ballot and mail them out.”

Conclusion of Law: The evidence was undisputed that no annual meeting took place during the 2019 calendar year. The Judge concluded that by postponing the meeting into the following year, the Association was in direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B), which mandates that “A meeting of the unit owners’ association shall be held at least once each year.”

B. Denial of Access to Election Records

Petitioner’s Request: In October 2018, Ms. Bischoff requested to see the election results from the October 2018 meeting, specifically seeking to know which units had voted.

Respondent’s Response: The Association initially did not provide the results. A few weeks prior to the March 2020 hearing, it supplied Ms. Bischoff with vote tallies and a list of unit members who voted. However, it failed to provide the full scope of required materials.

Missing Documentation: The Association did not provide the “ballots, envelopes, related materials, and sign-in sheets” as mandated by statute for inspection.

Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer argued that no election actually occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting because there was no quorum. He further made the admission that the Association had not achieved a quorum for any meeting in the preceding 20 years. He claimed that without an election, there was no obligation to publish ballots.

Conclusion of Law: The Judge found that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C). The statute requires that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… and made available for unit owner inspection for at least one year.” The partial and delayed provision of records was insufficient to meet this legal requirement.

C. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots

The Dispute: The November 20, 2019, meeting was cancelled because some ballots contained write-in candidates. The board of directors informed members that write-in ballots were prohibited and would be “thrown out.”

Petitioner’s Argument: Ms. Bischoff argued that the board could not “choose how to interpret a silent document.” She pointed out that the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation do not prohibit write-in ballots and that the same board had allowed them in a 2017 election.

Respondent’s Position: Mr. Meyer acknowledged that the Bylaws were silent on the issue but stated the Association needed to “figure out how to handle” them. A membership meeting to discuss the issue was held on December 30, 2019, but failed to achieve a quorum.

Conclusion of Law: The Judge determined that the Association violated its own Bylaws. The decision states, “absent any clear language in the A.R.S. or the Bylaws prohibiting write in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.” The board’s unilateral prohibition was therefore found to be improper.

IV. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge upheld the petition on all issues, finding that the Petitioner had successfully proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Final Order:

Based on the foregoing conclusions, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Petition filed by Donna M. Bischoff is upheld on all issues.

2. The Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

3. The Respondent must supply the Petitioner with the relevant election documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) within ten (10) days of the Order.

4. The Respondent must pay the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within thirty (30) days of the Order.

5. No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.

The Order is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Study Guide: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2019033-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and a condominium association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the source document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties in the legal dispute, and what were their roles?

2. What specific violations did the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, allege against the Respondent?

3. Why was the 2019 yearly meeting for the Country Hills West Condominium Association repeatedly rescheduled?

4. What was the Respondent’s position on the validity of write-in ballots for the November 20, 2019, election?

5. What information did the Petitioner request from the October 2018 election, and what was the initial response?

6. What is the definition of “quorum” according to the association’s Bylaws, and why was it significant in this case?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet in this hearing?

8. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) regarding association meetings?

9. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) regarding election materials?

10. What were the key components of the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and the Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner is the homeowner who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the homeowners association accused of violations.

2. The Petitioner alleged violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1250(C) and § 33-1248(B), as well as Article 3, Section 2 of the association’s Bylaws. These allegations related to the handling of yearly meetings and elections.

3. The 2019 yearly meeting was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019, but was rescheduled three times, ultimately taking place in January 2020. The first cancellation was because some ballots contained write-in candidates, which the board deemed prohibited.

4. The Respondent’s representative, Doug Meyer, testified that members were informed that write-in ballots were not valid for the November 20, 2019, election. He stated that any ballots with write-in candidates would have been thrown out.

5. The Petitioner requested to see the election results from the October 2018 election, specifically wanting to know which units voted. While she was eventually given the voting tallies, the Respondent did not initially provide the requested results.

6. Quorum is defined in Article 4, Section 3 of the Bylaws. It was significant because the Respondent’s president, Mr. Meyer, acknowledged that the association had not achieved a quorum for its meetings in the last 20 years, and thus no election occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting.

7. The Petitioner had the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

8. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold a required yearly meeting within the calendar year of 2019. The evidence showed that the meeting scheduled for 2019 was postponed until January 2020.

9. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with all required election materials from the 2018 election. While vote tallies were eventually provided, the statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related materials be retained and made available for inspection for at least one year.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s Order upheld the Petition on all issues, deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party, and required the Respondent to supply the relevant documents within 10 days. The Order also mandated that the Respondent reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 within 30 days.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the information presented in the source document to construct a comprehensive argument for each prompt.

1. Analyze the Respondent’s handling of the write-in ballot issue for the 2019 election. Discuss the legal basis (or lack thereof) for their actions as presented in the hearing, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled that their prohibition of these ballots was a violation of the Bylaws.

2. Explain the concept of “quorum” as it relates to this case. How did the association’s failure to achieve a quorum for 20 years impact its governance, specifically regarding the 2018 meeting and the Respondent’s obligation to produce election records?

3. Describe in detail the specific violations of the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that the Country Hills West Condominium Association was found to have committed. For each statute (A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) and A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)), detail the legal requirement and explain how the Respondent’s actions failed to meet that standard.

4. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Using testimony and evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explain how the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof for her allegations.

5. Outline the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge. Beyond the simple outcome, explain the significance of each component of the order, including the validation of the petition, the designation of a “prevailing party,” the directive to supply documents, and the financial remedy awarded.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Antara Nath Rivera.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which a homeowner or planned community organization can file a petition for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The specific statutes cited were A.R.S. §§ 33-1250(C) and 33-1248(B).

Bylaws

The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, the Bylaws of Country Hills West Association, Inc. were a key document.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state agency where petitions filed with the Department of Real Estate are heard before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Donna M. Bischoff.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is met when the evidence presented is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid. The Respondent had not achieved quorum for 20 years.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or a legal action is brought. In this case, Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.

Select all sources
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20F-H2019033-REL

1 source

This source is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The document details the hearing held on March 10, 2020, where the Petitioner alleged the Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the association’s Bylaws. Specifically, the Petitioner claimed violations related to the failure to hold a required yearly meeting in 2019, the failure to provide election materials for inspection, and the improper prohibition of write-in ballots where the Bylaws were silent. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately upheld the Petition on all issues, finding the Respondent in violation, and ordered the Association to provide the requested documents and pay the Petitioner’s $1,500.00 filing fee.

1 source

What were the specific legal violations found against the Condominium Association regarding meetings and documents?
How did the lack of clarity in the Bylaws regarding write-in ballots impact the association’s actions?
What was the ultimate outcome of this administrative hearing, including the ordered remedies for the petitioner?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Donna M Bischoff (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Doug Meyer (president, director, witness)
    Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.
    Appeared and testified on behalf of Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted electronically to Commissioner

Dennis J Gregory v. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919069-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-24
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of the HOA's CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1803 was denied because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The HOA had acknowledged its error regarding the palm trees, issued an apology, and expunged the record, thereby resolving the substantive dispute and making the remaining allegations moot.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dennis J Gregory Counsel
Respondent Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association Counsel Marc Vasquez

Alleged Violations

8.1.7 of CC&Rs; A.R.S. § 33-1803

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of the HOA's CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1803 was denied because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The HOA had acknowledged its error regarding the palm trees, issued an apology, and expunged the record, thereby resolving the substantive dispute and making the remaining allegations moot.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent violated governing documents or statute when the Respondent had already resolved the underlying issue by apology and expungement, and no financial penalties were assessed.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Governing Documents and Planned Community Statute

Petitioner filed a two-issue petition alleging Respondent violated CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1803 by fraudulently sending a courtesy notice regarding unapproved palm trees and subsequently deceiving Petitioner, despite the underlying tree issue being resolved and expunged.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Title 33, Chapter 16.1
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA dispute, Planned Community Statute, CC&Rs violation, Expungement of record, Mootness
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • Title 33, Chapter 16.1
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919069-REL Decision – 740332.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:21:33 (85.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Gregory v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA (Case No. 19F-H1919069-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in Case No. 19F-H1919069-REL, concerning a petition filed by homeowner Dennis Gregory against the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (HOA). The petition was ultimately denied.

The dispute originated from an incorrect violation notice sent by the HOA on July 13, 2018, regarding palm trees on the Petitioner’s property. The HOA subsequently discovered its error, recognizing the trees were on its “Recommended Plant List.” Consequently, the HOA issued a formal apology to the Petitioner on August 16, 2018, and expunged the violation notice from all records. No fines or penalties were ever imposed.

Despite the resolution, the Petitioner filed a formal dispute petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on May 24, 2019. He alleged the initial notice was fraudulent and that an employee of the HOA’s management company had lied and threatened him. The Administrative Law Judge, Antara Nath Rivera, concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The Judge determined that the HOA’s prompt corrective actions—issuing an apology, retracting the notice, and imposing no fines—rendered the issue moot.

Case Overview

The hearing addressed a petition filed by Dennis Gregory alleging that the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Arizona state law.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H1919069-REL

Petitioner

Dennis J Gregory

Respondent

Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Antara Nath Rivera, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

September 4, 2019

Decision Date

September 24, 2019

Chronology of Events

July 13, 2018: The HOA sends a courtesy notice to Dennis Gregory requesting the removal of palm trees, citing a violation of the CC&Rs.

Post-July 13, 2018: Gregory disputes the violation. Upon review, the HOA discovers the palm trees are on its “Recommended Plant List” and therefore permissible.

August 16, 2018: The HOA sends Gregory a letter of apology via both email and postal mail, deeming the violation notice invalid.

May 24, 2019: Gregory files a two-issue Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

June 28, 2019: The HOA files its formal answer to the petition.

September 4, 2019: An administrative hearing is conducted, with testimony from Gregory and Marc Vasquez, Vice President of the HOA’s management company.

September 24, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge issues a decision denying the petition.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Testimony

Dennis Gregory filed the petition after the palm tree issue was resolved because he was upset with the HOA’s handling of the matter. His testimony and allegations included:

Primary Motivation: He believed the HOA “fraudulently sent the courtesy letter.”

Allegations of Deception:

◦ The HOA lied about the Board members discussing the palm tree issue prior to sending the notice.

◦ Annette McCraw of Trestle Management Group lied to him about speaking with the board.

◦ The HOA deceptively changed the CC&Rs regarding the names of permitted trees.

◦ The HOA failed to disclose the identity of the individual who falsely claimed his palm trees were poisonous.

Allegations of Misconduct: He stated that Annette McCraw had threatened him with a lawyer.

Legal Claim: He opined that these actions constituted a violation of the community’s CC&Rs (specifically 8.1.7) and Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1803.

Acknowledged Facts: During his testimony, Gregory confirmed that the HOA never imposed any fines and that he received the apology letter issued on August 16, 2018.

Respondent’s Position and Actions

The HOA, represented by Marc Vasquez of Trestle Management Group, maintained that it had taken all necessary steps to rectify its initial error.

Admission of Error: The Respondent acknowledged that the initial violation notice was sent in error.

Corrective Measures:

◦ It issued a formal apology letter once the mistake was identified.

◦ The courtesy letter was “removed and expunged” from both the Respondent’s and Petitioner’s records to preserve the Petitioner’s good standing.

◦ Marc Vasquez personally apologized to Gregory at a board meeting.

No Penalties: The Respondent confirmed that no fines or sanctions were ever imposed on the Petitioner.

Personnel Status: Vasquez testified that Annette McCraw, the employee accused of misconduct by the Petitioner, was no longer employed by Trestle Management Group.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Order

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Reasoning

1. Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving that the HOA violated its CC&Rs and state statutes. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to convince a trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

2. Failure to Meet Burden: The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet this standard. This conclusion was based on several key facts established during the hearing:

◦ The Petitioner himself acknowledged that he was never financially penalized.

◦ The Petitioner acknowledged receipt of the HOA’s apology letter.

◦ Evidence showed the palm trees were, in fact, compliant with HOA rules.

◦ The violation notice was officially “removed and expunged” from all records.

3. Mootness of the Issue: The decision states, “the preponderance of the evidence showed Respondent did not violate any rules or regulations that would facilitate any orders or sanctions once it issued the apology letter, thus making the issue moot.” The HOA’s corrective actions effectively nullified the original dispute before it escalated to the point of requiring legal sanctions.

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision also included a notice that the order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.

Study Guide: Gregory v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1919069-REL, concerning Dennis J Gregory and the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association. It includes short-answer questions with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information found in the case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their roles?

2. What was the initial action by the Homeowners Association that triggered the dispute with the Petitioner?

3. What specific violations did the Petitioner, Dennis Gregory, allege in his Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition?

4. How did the Respondent discover its error regarding the Petitioner’s palm trees?

5. What two specific actions did the Respondent take to rectify its error before the hearing took place?

6. Why did the Petitioner proceed with the hearing even after the Respondent retracted the violation notice and apologized?

7. Who was Annette McCraw, and what specific actions did the Petitioner accuse her of taking?

8. What is the “preponderance of the evidence,” and what was its significance in the judge’s decision?

9. According to the judge’s findings, why was the central issue of the dispute considered moot?

10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Dennis J Gregory, the homeowner, who served as the Petitioner, and the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. Marc Vasquez, vice president of Trestle Management Group, appeared on behalf of the Respondent.

2. The dispute was triggered when the Respondent, on July 13, 2018, sent the Petitioner a courtesy notice requesting the removal of palm trees from his front yard. The notice claimed the trees were a violation of the association’s CC&Rs.

3. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated section 8.1.7 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1803.

4. After the Petitioner disputed the violation, the Respondent conducted a further review. Through this review, the Respondent discovered that the palm trees on the Petitioner’s property were actually listed on the “Recommended Plant List” and were therefore acceptable.

5. First, the Respondent issued a courtesy letter to the Petitioner on August 16, 2018, apologizing for the misunderstanding. Second, the Respondent deemed the original violation notice invalid and had it “removed and expunged” from both its own and the Petitioner’s records to preserve his good standing.

6. The Petitioner proceeded with the hearing because he was upset and believed the Respondent had acted fraudulently. He alleged the Respondent lied about discussing the issue with board members, deceptively changed the CC&Rs, and failed to disclose who made the initial complaint.

7. Annette McCraw was an employee of Trestle Management Group, the Respondent’s management company. The Petitioner accused her of lying about speaking with board members regarding the palm tree issue and threatening him with a lawyer.

8. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof required, defined as evidence convincing the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. Its significance is that the Petitioner bore this burden of proof and ultimately failed to meet it, leading to the denial of his petition.

9. The issue was considered moot because the Respondent had already issued an apology letter and rescinded the violation notice before the hearing occurred. Since the Petitioner was never fined, the palm trees were deemed acceptable, and the notice was expunged, there was no longer an active controversy for the court to resolve.

10. The final Order, issued on September 24, 2019, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. The Order was binding unless a rehearing was requested within 30 days.

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Essay Questions

Construct detailed responses to the following prompts, drawing evidence and arguments exclusively from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the concept of a “moot” issue as it applies to this case. How did the Respondent’s actions before the hearing render the Petitioner’s primary complaint moot in the eyes of the law, despite the Petitioner’s ongoing grievances?

2. Discuss the burden of proof in this administrative hearing. Explain the “preponderance of the evidence” standard as defined in the document and detail the specific reasons why the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Dennis Gregory failed to meet this burden.

3. Examine the roles and conduct of the management company, Trestle Management Group, and its employee, Annette McCraw. Based on the testimony presented, what specific actions escalated the conflict even after the initial landscaping error was identified and corrected?

4. Trace the timeline of events from the initial “courtesy notice” of July 13, 2018, to the final Order of September 24, 2019. Identify the key turning points and decisions made by both the Petitioner and the Respondent that influenced the outcome of the case.

5. Although the Petitioner lost the case, he raised several allegations beyond the palm trees, including fraud, deception, and threats. Using only the evidence presented in the decision, construct the argument that Dennis Gregory was attempting to make regarding why these subsequent actions constituted a violation of the planned community statute, even if the original tree issue was resolved.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing and issues a decision. In this case, the ALJ was Antara Nath Rivera.

Answer

The Respondent’s formal written response to the Petition, filed in this case on June 28, 2019.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of laws for the state of Arizona. The decision cites A.R.S. § 33-1803, which authorizes HOAs to enforce CC&Rs, and statutes governing the hearing and rehearing process.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party to establish its claims by a required degree of evidence. In this hearing, the Petitioner had the burden of proof.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents that establish the rules for a planned community. The Petitioner alleged a violation of section 8.1.7 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with which the Petition was filed and which has jurisdiction over such disputes.

Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition (Petition)

The formal document filed by a homeowner to initiate a hearing with the Department concerning alleged violations by their homeowners association.

A legal term for a situation where the underlying issue has been resolved, making any ruling on the matter unnecessary. The judge found the case moot because the Respondent had already issued an apology and rescinded the violation notice.

The final and binding decision issued by the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to deny the Petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or hearing. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Dennis J Gregory.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond. In this case, the Respondent was the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association.

Trestle Management Group, LLC

The management company employed by the Respondent HOA to handle its operations.

An HOA Admitted It Was Wrong. The Homeowner Sued Anyway—And Lost. Here Are the Surprising Reasons Why.

Introduction: The Familiar Dread of an HOA Letter

For many homeowners, few things cause a spike of anxiety quite like a formal notice from their Homeowners Association (HOA). That crisp envelope often contains a violation notice, sparking a frustrating process of proving compliance or making unwanted changes. But what happens when you prove the HOA was completely wrong, they admit their mistake, and issue a full apology? For most, that’s the end of the story—a clear victory.

This, however, is the story of a homeowner who achieved that victory and then decided to take the HOA to a formal hearing anyway. He had been proven right, the violation was erased, and no fines were ever issued. Yet, he pursued the case and ultimately lost.

How could someone who was proven right end up losing their case? The answer reveals a critical distinction between winning an argument and winning in a court of law.

1. You Can Win the Argument, But Still Lose the Case

The initial dispute was straightforward. The homeowner, Dennis Gregory, received a courtesy notice from his HOA requesting the removal of palm trees from his front yard, which were alleged to be in violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Mr. Gregory disputed the violation. In response, the HOA conducted a further review and made a critical discovery: the palm trees on the property were, in fact, listed on the HOA’s own “Recommended Plant List” and were perfectly acceptable. The HOA had made a mistake. Here, however, the story takes a surprising turn. Mr. Gregory filed his formal petition for a hearing after the HOA had already admitted its error, apologized, and confirmed the issue was resolved.

This sequence of events is the crucial detail of the case. The legal dispute wasn’t about the palm trees—that argument was already won. The case was about the actions taken after the HOA’s error was acknowledged and corrected.

2. A Proactive Apology Can Be a Powerful Legal Shield

Once the HOA realized its mistake, it took several decisive steps to remedy the situation. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, the HOA and its management company:

• Sent a formal apology letter to the homeowner.

• Confirmed the original courtesy notice was “deemed invalid.”

• “Removed and expunged” the violation from the homeowner’s records to preserve his good standing.

• Never issued any fines or financial penalties.

• Took action regarding personnel, as the employee who the homeowner accused of making threats was no longer with the management company by the time of the hearing.

These corrective actions had a profound legal impact. The judge found that because the HOA had already reversed its initial notice, apologized, cleared the homeowner’s record, and addressed the personnel issue, there was no longer an active dispute to rule on. The issue was considered “moot.”

This conclusion was emphasized in the judge’s final decision:

Furthermore, the preponderance of the evidence showed Respondent did not violate any rules or regulations that would facilitate any orders or sanctions once it issued the apology letter, thus making the issue moot.

3. The Law Requires Proof, Not Just Principle

The homeowner’s petition wasn’t just about the palm trees. He testified that he proceeded with the case because he felt he had been wronged by an HOA management employee during the dispute. His petition alleged the HOA had “fraudulently sent the courtesy letter,” lied about discussing the issue with board members, and even “threatened him with a lawyer.” He wasn’t just seeking to correct the record on his landscaping; he was fighting on a matter of principle.

To win his case, however, the homeowner had to meet a specific legal standard: proving his claims by “a preponderance of the evidence.” In simple terms, this means showing that his version of events was more likely to be true than not.

Ultimately, the judge concluded that the homeowner “failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent violated the CC&Rs.” This outcome highlights a crucial legal reality: tangible, documented evidence—such as a formal apology letter and an expunged record—often carries more evidentiary weight than a homeowner’s testimony about verbal statements, which can be viewed as a ‘he said, she said’ dispute without additional proof. While the homeowner may have genuinely felt wronged, his feelings could not overcome the HOA’s documented resolution.

Conclusion: A Cautionary Tale for Homeowners and HOAs

The outcome of this dispute offers a powerful lesson for both homeowners and association boards. It demonstrates three core takeaways: a dispute isn’t over until it’s legally resolved, a swift and comprehensive apology can be an effective legal defense, and a deeply felt principle must still be backed by sufficient evidence to prevail in a formal hearing.

This case serves as a fascinating reminder of the complexities of community disputes, leaving us with a final question: At what point does the fight for principle risk overshadowing a practical victory?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Dennis J Gregory (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Marc Vasquez (attorney)
    Trestle Management Group
    Appeared for Respondent; testified as vice president of Trestle
  • Annette McCraw (property manager)
    Trestle Management Group, LLC
    Issued letter on behalf of Respondent; no longer with Trestle
  • James A. Baska (management representative)
    Trestle Management Group
    Recipient of decision transmission

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmission of decision

George E Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918013-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner George E Lord Counsel
Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association Counsel Maria Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, and CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any statute or covenant alleged. The core findings supported the HOA's position that the lessee was engaging in prohibited business activity and subletting, and that the charged attorney fees were permissible.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations concerning notice procedures, leasing restrictions, prohibited business use, and excessive fees.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to include proper citations in violation notices, violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 and CC&Rs by imposing illegal restrictions on occupancy dates and prohibiting tenant guests, and violated fee limits under A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) by charging $250 in attorney fees.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, HOA dispute, leasing restrictions, short-term rental, business use, notice procedure, attorney fees
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:51 (115.9 KB)

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:54 (47.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918013-REL, involving Petitioner George E. Lord and Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association. The judge ultimately dismissed all claims brought by the Petitioner, ruling that the Association acted within the bounds of Arizona statutes and its governing documents.

The core of the dispute centered on Mr. Lord’s leasing of three condominium units to an individual, Barrie Shepley, who used the properties to house participants for his commercial fitness training camps. The Association contended this arrangement constituted a prohibited short-term sublease and an improper business use of the units, leading them to suspend amenity access for the occupants.

The judge’s decision affirmed the Association’s position on all counts. Key takeaways include:

Substance Over Form: The judge concluded that despite the absence of a formal sublease agreement, the nature of the arrangement—specifically a camp pricing structure that varied based on the number of occupants per condo—was effectively a sublet designed to house an “itinerant population,” contrary to the “spirit and purpose” of the community’s rules.

Business Use Violation: The operation was found to be a business activity that violated the CC&Rs by requiring persons (camp participants) to come to the residential units.

Procedural Compliance: The Association’s violation notices were deemed compliant with Arizona law. The judge noted that the statute only requires a detailed citation of the violated rule after the owner responds to the initial notice, which the Petitioner failed to do.

Legality of Fees: A $250 charge levied by the Association’s counsel was determined to be a permissible charge for attorney’s fees related to potential collection, not an illegal penalty for leasing information as the Petitioner alleged.

As a result of these findings, the Petitioner’s request for relief was denied, and the petition was dismissed in its entirety.

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: George E. Lord (unit owner)

Respondent: The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Number: 19F-H1918013-REL

Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: November 26, 2018

Decision Date: December 17, 2018

Final Disposition: The petition filed by George E. Lord was dismissed.

II. Factual Background and Timeline of Events

1. Lease Agreements: On or about December 4, 2017, Petitioner George Lord, through his management company, leased two units at The Boulders to Barrie Shepley for a term from March 7, 2018, to April 30, 2018. A third unit was subsequently leased to Mr. Shepley on or about January 15, 2018.

2. Commercial Use: Mr. Shepley operated a Canadian fitness business, “Personal Best,” which offered training camps in Tucson. Accommodations at The Boulders were included in the camp packages. The price for a camp varied based on occupancy:

◦ $950.00 each for four campers in a condo

◦ $1075.00 each for three campers in a condo

◦ $1299.00 each for two campers in a condo

3. Occupancy Begins: On March 7, 2018, guests of Mr. Shepley (camp participants) began arriving to occupy the three leased units.

4. Association Intervention: On March 9, 2018, Community Manager Danielle Morris emailed Mr. Lord, stating the Association’s belief that he was in violation of the CC&Rs by allowing subleasing for periods less than the 30-day minimum. Ms. Morris informed him that amenity access cards for the three units were deactivated.

5. Dispute Escalation: Mr. Lord contended that the occupants were merely “guests” of Mr. Shepley, not subletters. Ms. Morris countered that the Association required the names of all occupants and the duration of their stays, and that each occupant must stay for a minimum of 30 days.

6. Information Provided: On March 13, 2018, Mr. Lord provided the names of the occupants and their dates of occupancy, requesting that amenities be restored.

7. Violation Reiterated: On March 16, 2018, Ms. Morris stated the violation was ongoing, as occupants staying from March 7 to March 31 did not meet the 30-day minimum stay requirement.

8. Formal Notice of Violation: On March 18, 2018, Mr. Lord received formal Notices of Violations for the three units. The notices stated that amenity access was suspended because the HOA was not provided with the names of adult occupants and their timeframes. The notice warned that a $300 fine could be applied. Mr. Lord did not respond to these notices.

9. Attorney Involvement: On March 22, 2018, Mr. Lord received a letter from the Association’s legal counsel outlining its legal position and noting an amount due of $250 for attorney’s fees already incurred.

10. Lease Cancellation & Financial Loss: On April 2, 2018, Mr. Shepley cancelled the remainder of the leases due to the lack of amenities for his guests. Mr. Lord asserted a resulting financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018.

11. Petition Filing: On August 31, 2018, Mr. Lord filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association violated state statutes and its own CC&Rs.

III. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Lord’s petition was based on three primary allegations against the Association:

Allegation 1: Defective Violation Notice (A.R.S. § 33-1242): The Petitioner argued that the Notices of Violations were legally deficient because they failed to cite the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

Allegation 2: Unlawful Occupancy Requirements (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 & CC&Rs): The Petitioner asserted that the Association overstepped its authority by demanding that each occupant, whom he characterized as a “guest” of the primary lessee, must stay for a minimum of 30 days. He argued the 30-day minimum lease term applied only to the primary lease with Mr. Shepley, not to the occupants.

Allegation 3: Improper Fees (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)): The Petitioner claimed that the $250 charge from the Association’s attorney constituted an illegal fee, penalty, or charge related to providing leasing information, which he argued was prohibited by statute.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for any of his allegations and dismissed the petition. The judge’s reasoning is detailed below.

Finding 1: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Violation Notice)

The judge determined that the Association’s initial Notices of Violations were legally sufficient.

Legal Reasoning: A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) requires an association to cite the specific provision of the condominium documents that has been violated. However, this obligation is only triggered after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail.

Factual Basis: The Petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the formal Notices of Violations he received.

Conclusion: Because the Petitioner did not take the legally required step to trigger the Association’s duty to provide a specific citation, the Association did not violate the statute.

Finding 2: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 or CC&Rs (Leasing Rules)

The judge concluded that the Association was justified in its actions regarding the occupancy of the units.

The Arrangement was a “Form” of Subletting: The judge ruled against the Petitioner’s argument that the occupants were merely “guests.” The fact that the price of the fitness camp changed based on how many people shared a unit was seen as evidence that Mr. Shepley was, in effect, subletting the units for his business.

Prohibited Business Activity: The judge found that Mr. Shepley was operating a business from the units in a manner prohibited by Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs, which disallows business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.”

Spirit of the Law: The decision acknowledged that the specific facts of the case “falls between the cracks of the specific language of the statutes and the regulations.” However, the judge emphasized that the Association’s actions were consistent with the broader intent of its rules, stating, “given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.”

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association violated leasing statutes or its own CC&Rs.

Finding 3: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) (Fees)

The judge found that the $250 charge was not an illegal penalty.

Nature of the Charge: The evidence showed that no fines for the lease policy violation had actually been assessed. The $250 charge was explicitly for attorney’s fees related to the potential collection of assessments.

Legal Reasoning: The judge stated, “Nothing in the cited statute or the CC&Rs prohibits such a charge being implemented.” The fee was not a penalty for “incomplete or late information” as covered by the statute, but a charge for legal costs incurred by the Association.

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish a violation regarding the assessed fees.

V. Referenced Statutes and Governing Documents

Reference

Provision Summary

Relevance to Case

A.R.S. § 33-1242(B)&(C)

Outlines the process for a unit owner to respond to a violation notice and the association’s subsequent duty to provide specific details of the violation.

The judge found no violation because the Petitioner did not follow the procedure to trigger the association’s duty.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(C)

Limits the information an association can require about a tenant to names, contact info for adults, lease period, and vehicle information.

The Petitioner’s case rested on interpreting this statute; the judge found the Association’s inquiries justified by the unique circumstances.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)

Prohibits an association from imposing fees greater than $15 for incomplete or late leasing information.

The Petitioner argued the $250 attorney fee violated this, but the judge found it was a permissible charge for legal costs, not a penalty.

CC&R Section 7.21

Requires leases to be in writing, for a term of not less than 30 days, and requires owners to provide lessee names and lease dates.

The Association argued the arrangement violated the 30-day minimum stay rule for occupants, which the judge upheld in spirit.

CC&R Section 7.3

Prohibits business activities within a unit that involve persons coming to the unit.

The judge found Mr. Shepley’s fitness camp, which housed participants in the units, was a clear violation of this provision.

Leasing Policy

States a $300 fine may be imposed for violations of the 30-day minimum lease policy.

The Notice of Violation referenced this potential fine, though it was never actually assessed.

VI. Final Order and Procedural Notes

Order: Based on the above findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be dismissed.

Binding Nature: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Related Filings: On the same day the decision was issued, December 17, 2018, the court also issued a separate “Order Vacating Hearing,” likely a procedural filing to cancel a future hearing that was rendered unnecessary by the dismissal of the case.

Study Guide: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918013-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The case involves a dispute between a condominium unit owner, George E. Lord, and his condominium association, The Boulders at La Reserve, concerning leasing policies, occupant regulations, and alleged statutory violations.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. Describe the business arrangement that Barrie Shepley, the petitioner’s lessee, was operating from the leased condominium units.

3. What was the first official action the Condominium Association’s management took in response to the arrival of Barrie Shepley’s guests, and what was their stated reason?

4. According to the Association, what two specific provisions of the governing documents were being violated by the petitioner and his lessee?

5. What was the petitioner’s central argument for why the occupants of the units were not in violation of the Association’s 30-day minimum stay requirement?

6. On what procedural grounds did the petitioner, George Lord, claim that the Association’s “Notice of Violations” was itself a violation of Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242)?

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1242?

8. How did the judge interpret the fact that the price for Barrie Shepley’s fitness camps varied based on the number of people sharing a condo?

9. What financial loss did the petitioner claim to have suffered, and what was the direct cause of this loss?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were George E. Lord, the petitioner and owner of multiple condominium units, and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association, the respondent and governing body for the community. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. Barrie Shepley operated a fitness business called “Personal Best” that offered training camps in the Tucson area. The price for these camps included accommodations at The Boulders, with the cost per person varying based on how many campers shared a condominium unit.

3. The Association’s first action was to deactivate the amenity access cards for the three units leased by Shepley. Danielle Morris, the Community Manager, stated this was due to a belief that the petitioner’s lessee was subleasing the units for periods of less than the 30-day minimum in violation of the CC&Rs.

4. The Association alleged violations of the CC&Rs related to subleasing for less than the 30-day minimum timeframe. The formal Notices of Violations also cited the failure to provide the names of all adult occupants and the timeframes of their stays to the HOA.

5. The petitioner argued that because his lessee, Mr. Shepley, was not charging a specific rental fee to the occupants, they were merely “guests” and not sub-lessees. Therefore, the 30-day minimum stay requirement applicable to leases did not apply to them.

6. The petitioner alleged that the Association’s failure to include a citation to the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated in the initial Notice of Violations was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242.

7. The judge ruled against the petitioner because A.R.S. § 33-1242 only requires an association to provide the specific provision violated after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail. The petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the Notices of Violations.

8. The judge found that the tiered pricing structure supported the conclusion that Mr. Shepley was, “in a form, subletting the units.” The fact that the camp price decreased as more people shared a unit indicated that the occupants were paying for their accommodations, not simply staying as guests.

9. The petitioner asserted a financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018. This loss was directly caused by Barrie Shepley canceling the remainder of his leases due to the lack of amenities for his occupants.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s final order was that the Petition filed by George E. Lord be dismissed. This decision was binding unless a rehearing was granted.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts, arguments, and legal interpretations from the case file.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Barrie Shepley was “in a form, subletting” the units. Discuss the evidence cited and the concept of the “spirit and purpose” of the rules versus their literal interpretation.

2. Examine the procedural misstep made by the petitioner, George Lord, after receiving the Notices of Violations. How did this action directly impact the judge’s ruling on his claim regarding A.R.S. § 33-1242?

3. Discuss the conflict between a unit owner’s right to lease their property and a condominium association’s right to enforce its governing documents, using the specific provisions of the CC&Rs (Sections 7.21 and 7.3) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01) as examples from the case.

4. Explain the distinction the judge made between the $300 potential fine mentioned in the Notice of Violations and the $250 attorney’s fee charged to the petitioner. How did this distinction relate to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E), and why was the Association’s action deemed permissible?

5. Evaluate the concept of an “itinerant population” as mentioned by the judge. How did Barrie Shepley’s business model contribute to this concern for the Association, and how did it ultimately weigh into the judge’s decision to dismiss the petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Name

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings on disputes involving government agencies. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified body of laws for the state of Arizona. The petitioner alleged violations of specific statutes within this code, namely A.R.S. § 33-1242 and § 33-1260.01.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

A state law governing the process for notifying a unit owner of a violation of condominium documents and the procedures for the owner to respond and contest the notice.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01

A state law that places limitations on what information an association can require from a unit owner regarding a tenant and caps certain fees or penalties for incomplete information at $15.

Amenity

A feature or facility of a property that provides comfort, convenience, or pleasure. In this case, access to amenities was controlled by key cards, which the Association deactivated.

Barrie Shepley

The individual who leased three condominium units from the petitioner. He operated a fitness business, “Personal Best,” and used the units to house clients attending his training camps.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Association alleged Shepley’s use of the units violated Sections 7.21 (leasing limitations) and 7.3 (business use limitations).

George E. Lord

The Petitioner in the case. He was the owner of multiple condominium units at The Boulders at La Reserve and filed the petition against the Association.

Itinerant population

A term used by the judge to describe a population of short-term, transient occupants. The judge concluded that the purpose of the Association’s rules was, in part, to prevent this type of occupancy.

Notice of Violations

A formal written document sent by the Association to the petitioner informing him of alleged violations of the governing documents and outlining potential consequences, such as fines.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, George E. Lord.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means that the petitioner had the burden of showing that the facts they sought to prove were “more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association.

Subletting

The practice of a tenant leasing a rented property to a third party. The Association contended Shepley was subletting the units to his campers, while the petitioner argued they were merely guests.

The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case. The homeowners’ association (HOA) responsible for governing the condominium community in Oro Valley, Arizona.

The $6,900 ‘Guest’ Mistake: 3 Hard Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit

A $6,900 loss in rental income and a losing legal battle with his HOA—all because of a dispute over the definition of a “guest.” This case between owner George Lord and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association is a masterclass in how quickly and completely an owner can lose when they misinterpret the rules and underestimate an association’s power.

For any homeowner or landlord, this dispute provides three crucial lessons distilled from the administrative court’s decision. Understanding these precedents is essential before you ever find yourself at odds with your own HOA.

Lesson 1: The “Spirit of the Rule” Can Outweigh Your Clever Workaround

The dispute began when the property owner, Mr. Lord, leased three condos to Barrie Shepley, who ran fitness training camps. Mr. Shepley then used the condos to house his camp attendees, often for periods shorter than the HOA’s 30-day minimum lease term.

The owner argued his arrangement complied with the rules. He claimed his tenant, Mr. Shepley, was not subleasing the units; the attendees were merely “guests,” and therefore not subject to the 30-day minimum. It was a clever workaround, but it fell apart under scrutiny for two distinct reasons.

First, the judge looked past the “guest” label to the financial substance of the arrangement. A key piece of evidence was the camp’s pricing: the cost changed based on how many campers shared a condo ($950 each for four campers vs. $1299 each for two). The judge saw this as clear proof that housing was being paid for, making it a form of subletting.

Second, the judge found that the arrangement constituted a prohibited business activity. The association’s CC&Rs (Section 7.3) explicitly forbade any business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.” Since the fitness camp required attendees to come to the condos for lodging, it was a direct violation. The judge’s decision was therefore not just based on a subjective interpretation, but was also grounded in a concrete rule violation.

The court looked at the “totality of the circumstances” to make its ruling, a point powerfully summarized in the final decision:

However, given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.

Pro Tip: Before implementing a workaround, ask yourself: “Does this honor the community’s stated goal?” If the answer is no, you’re on thin ice, even if you think you’ve found a loophole.

Lesson 2: You Must Follow Procedure to the Letter, Or You Forfeit Your Rights

Confident in his “guest” interpretation, the homeowner made his next critical error by underestimating the importance of legal procedure. He argued that the HOA’s initial “Notice of Violations” was invalid because it failed to cite the specific CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

This argument was swiftly dismissed due to a simple but fatal mistake: the owner never sent a formal written response to the notice by certified mail.

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242), an owner’s formal written response via certified mail triggers the HOA’s obligation to provide the specific provision that was violated. Without that trigger, the HOA’s duty to explain further is never activated. The homeowner failed to pull the trigger. Because he did not follow this exact procedure, his claim was thrown out, and the HOA had no further legal obligation to detail its case.

Analyst’s Takeaway: In a legal dispute, communication that isn’t sent via the officially mandated channel (like certified mail) is legally equivalent to communication that never happened.

Lesson 3: The HOA’s Legal Fees Can Hit Your Wallet Sooner Than You Think

Early in the dispute, the owner received a letter from the HOA’s legal counsel. The letter outlined the association’s position and included a charge for $250.00. This was not a fine for the violation. It was a fee for the lawyer’s time, as explained in the letter:

“As you know, the Association is entitled to recover its costs and attorneys’ fees from you, including $250.00 already incurred for the preparation of this letter.”

Many governing documents contain clauses that allow an HOA to recover its “costs of enforcement.” This letter was an enforcement action, and the legal fee was the cost. The judge found that nothing in the law or CC&Rs prohibited the HOA from immediately passing this expense to the owner.

This initial charge was a precursor to a much larger financial blow. As an enforcement tool for the violations discussed in Lesson 1, the HOA suspended the tenants’ access to community amenities. This pressure tactic worked perfectly. The tenant, Mr. Shepley, cancelled his leases due to the lack of amenity access, leading to the owner’s stated loss of $6,900 in rental fees.

Pro Tip: Assume your HOA’s first legal letter starts a running tab. Budget for legal costs from day one of a formal dispute, not just for potential fines.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense

The case of Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve establishes three clear precedents for owners: a rule’s intent can supersede its literal interpretation, procedural shortcuts void your rights, and the financial clock starts ticking the moment an HOA retains counsel.

This case is a firm reminder of an HOA’s power to enforce its rules, but it also highlights the owner’s responsibility to understand them. It begs the question: In our own communities, are we fully aware of the rules we’ve agreed to live by?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • George E. Lord (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Maria Kupillas (respondent attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
  • Danielle Morris (community manager)
    The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barrie Shepley (renter/key individual)

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, Rehearing, HOA Dispute, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:02 (130.3 KB)

Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

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Case Overview and Procedural History

The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.

January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Central Jurisdictional Question

The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.

The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:

“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”

A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

Arguments of the Parties

The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.

Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)

The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.

Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

“Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.

Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”

Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:

◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.

◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).

◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.

◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”

◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.

Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)

The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.

Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”

Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.

Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.

The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.

To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”

Source

Definition of “Roadway”

English Oxford Living Dict.

“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”

Merriam-Webster

“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”

Dictionary.com

“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”

Cambridge Dictionary

“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

American Heritage Dictionary

“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”

Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”

The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”

Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”

Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).

Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”

These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.

Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.

Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.

1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?

2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?

3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?

4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?

5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?

7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?

9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?

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Answer Key

1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.

2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.

3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.

4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.

5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.

6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.

8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”

9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.

2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?

3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?

5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Complete Streets

An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.

Covenant

A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.

Petitioner

The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.

Right-of-Way

The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”

Roadway

Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.

  • don't play in the street

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del sol (staff)
    Clerk/Distribution staff

Other Participants

  • Ana M. Olivares (Director)
    Pima County Transportation
    Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance

Dina R. Galassini vs. Plaza Waterfront Condominiums Owners

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dina R. Galassini Counsel
Respondent Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner’s petition for rehearing, concluding that the OAH has the authority, pursuant to statute and precedent, to resolve disputes involving the interpretation of condominium documents and related regulating statutes, rejecting Petitioner's constitutional claims regarding separation of powers. Respondent's request for attorney's fees was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's argument that the original ALJ decision was contrary to law due to separation of powers violation was dismissed, as the OAH confirmed its statutory authority (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) to interpret condominium documents and regulating statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent Association correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget

Petitioner sought rehearing arguing the ALJ lacked constitutional authority (separation of powers) to interpret condominium documents (contracts) and statutory definitions of common/limited common elements (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202) related to the posting of the 2018 parking lot budget assessment.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Assessment, Jurisdiction, ALJ Authority, Condominium Documents, Separation of Powers
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. CONST. Art. 3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 655375.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:00 (65.7 KB)

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 636950.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:08 (128.6 KB)

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 655375.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:36 (65.7 KB)

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 636950.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:39 (128.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG, which dismissed a petition filed by Dina R. Galassini against the Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The central conflict revolved around the jurisdictional authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Petitioner, Ms. Galassini, argued that the OAH, as part of the executive branch, violated the constitutional separation of powers by interpreting private condominium documents, a power she claimed was reserved exclusively for the judicial branch.

The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, rejected this argument and dismissed the petition as a matter of law. The decision affirms that the OAH is statutorily empowered by Arizona Revised Statutes to hear disputes concerning alleged violations of condominium documents. The ALJ’s rationale rests on established legal precedent, citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov to confirm that condominium documents are a contract and Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. to support an agency’s authority to take actions reasonably implied by its governing statutes. Consequently, the Petitioner’s core constitutional challenge was deemed “unfounded,” leading to the dismissal of her petition. While the petition was dismissed, the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied.

1. Case Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute between a condominium owner and a condominium association, brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Parties:

Petitioner: Dina R. Galassini

Respondent: Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Presiding Judge: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Decision Date: August 22, 2018

The matter arrived before Judge Shedden following a series of procedural steps initiated after an original ALJ decision.

June 26, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

July 20, 2018: The Department of Real Estate issued an Order Granting Rehearing, based on the reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request.

August 15, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate Rehearing, arguing the case could be resolved as a matter of law.

August 21, 2018: The Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Respondent’s motion.

2. Core Dispute: Petitioner’s Jurisdictional Challenge

The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing was founded on a direct constitutional challenge to the authority of the Administrative Law Judge. The underlying substantive issue concerned the association’s handling of “owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget,” which turned on the interpretation of “common element” versus “limited common element.”

Petitioner’s Arguments

Violation of Separation of Powers: The Petitioner contended that the original ALJ decision was “contrary to law” because it involved the interpretation of private contracts (the condominium documents). She argued this function is reserved exclusively for the judicial branch under Arizona’s Constitution, Article 3 (Separation of Powers).

Due Process Violation: By interpreting the contract, the ALJ allegedly committed a “due process violation.” The Petitioner stated, “For the ALJ to definitively interpret actual contracts between two private parties is a due process violation (separation of powers).”

Improper Delegation of Power: The Petitioner claimed the ALJ’s action “redistributed interpreted power from the Judiciary to the Executive and this is a congressional encroachment on my rights.”

3. The Administrative Law Judge’s Legal Rationale and Decision

The ALJ agreed with the Respondent that the case could be resolved as a matter of law, focusing entirely on the jurisdictional question raised by the Petitioner. The decision systematically refutes the Petitioner’s separation of powers argument by outlining the OAH’s legal authority.

Statutory Authority

The decision establishes the OAH’s jurisdiction through Arizona state law:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11: This statute describes the administrative process for referring disputes between owners and condominium associations to the OAH.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A): This section specifically grants the OAH authority to conduct hearings for alleged “violations of condominium documents … or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums….”

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202: The decision notes that analyzing the Petitioner’s claim inherently requires interpreting definitions found in the statutes that regulate condominiums, such as this section defining “common element” and “limited common element.”

Precedent from Case Law

The ALJ grounded the OAH’s interpretive authority in two key Arizona appellate court decisions:

1. Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007): This case is cited to establish the legal principle that “the condominium documents are a contract between the parties.” By defining the documents as a contract, the decision links the dispute directly to the type of documents the OAH is empowered to review.

2. Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 392 P.3d 506 (App. 2017): This case is cited to support the broader principle of administrative authority. The ruling states, “[I]t is the law of this state that an agency may” take such action “which may be reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole.’” This supports the conclusion that the OAH’s authority to hear disputes over condominium documents implies the authority to interpret them.

Conclusion of the Court

Based on the cited statutes and case law, the ALJ concluded that the OAH possesses the necessary authority to interpret both the condominium documents and the relevant state statutes. Therefore, the Petitioner’s central argument that the original decision was “contrary to law” was declared “unfounded,” and dismissing the matter was deemed appropriate.

4. Final Orders and Directives

The Administrative Law Judge issued the following final orders on August 22, 2018:

Outcome

Petitioner’s Petition

Dismissed

Respondent’s Request for Attorney’s Fees

Denied

The decision also included the following legally mandated notices for the parties:

Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as a result of the rehearing, per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B).

Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five (35) days from the date the order was served. The appeal process is prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. title 12, chapter 7, article 6 and § 12-904(A).

Study Guide: Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG, issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It is designed to assess comprehension of the case’s key arguments, legal precedents, and procedural history.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source document.

1. Identify the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case and state the official case number.

2. What was the Petitioner’s core legal argument for requesting a rehearing, as detailed in her filing on June 26, 2018?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent file a Motion to Vacate Rehearing on August 15, 2018?

4. According to the Petitioner’s Response, what was the specific issue that the Department’s Commissioner had ordered the rehearing to address?

5. Which Arizona Revised Statute section is cited as describing the process for hearings on disputes between owners and condominium associations?

6. To resolve the Petitioner’s claim, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) needed to interpret the definitions of what two key terms from the Arizona Revised Statutes?

7. What legal precedent was cited in the decision to establish that condominium documents are considered a contract between the parties?

8. What was the final decision issued by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden on August 22, 2018, regarding the Petitioner’s petition and the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees?

9. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B), what is the legal status of an administrative law judge order that has been issued as the result of a rehearing?

10. What specific steps must a party take to appeal this order, including the timeframe and the court where the appeal must be filed?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Dina R. Galassini, and the Respondent is Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The official case number is 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG.

2. The Petitioner argued that the original Administrative Law Judge’s decision was contrary to law because it violated the principle of separation of powers. She claimed that by interpreting contracts between private parties, the ALJ, part of the Executive branch, encroached upon the power of the Judiciary, resulting in a due process violation.

3. The Respondent argued that the matter could be resolved as a matter of law. This argument was based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01, which governs administrative hearings for condominium disputes.

4. The Petitioner asserted in her Response that the Department’s Commissioner had ordered a rehearing specifically on the issue of whether the Respondent Association had correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget.

5. ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11, specifically section 32-2199.01(A), is cited as governing the process. It states that hearings are conducted for alleged “violations of condominium documents … or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums.”

6. To analyze the Petitioner’s claim, the ALJ needed to interpret the definitions of “common element” and “limited common element.” These definitions are found in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1202.

7. The case Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007) was cited to support the legal principle that condominium documents (like CC&Rs) constitute a contract between the parties involved.

8. Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. He further ordered that the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees be denied.

9. According to the statute, an administrative law judge order issued as a result of a rehearing is binding on the parties.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. title 12, chapter 7, article 6. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s “separation of powers” argument. Explain why she believed the ALJ’s decision constituted a due process violation and a congressional encroachment on her rights, and discuss how the final decision legally refuted this claim.

2. Detail the legal basis and precedents cited by the Administrative Law Judge to establish the authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Explain how ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A) and the cases Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov and Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. were used to justify the OAH’s jurisdiction in this matter.

3. Trace the procedural history of this case from the Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Include key dates, motions filed by both parties, and the reasoning behind the Department of Real Estate’s initial decision to grant a rehearing.

4. Discuss the relationship between condominium documents and state statutes as presented in this decision. How does the ruling define condominium documents, and what authority does it grant the OAH in interpreting both these documents and the statutes that regulate condominiums?

5. Based on the final decision and the provided notice, explain the legal options available to the Petitioner following the dismissal of her petition. What specific steps must be taken to pursue an appeal, and what legal standard is established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B) regarding the finality of the ALJ’s order?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Thomas Shedden of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Common Element

A term defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1202. The interpretation of this term was central to the Petitioner’s original dispute.

Condominium Documents

The governing documents of a condominium association (e.g., CC&Rs). The decision establishes these as a contract between the parties, citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov.

Department of Real Estate

The state agency that issued the Order Granting Rehearing in this matter on July 20, 2018.

Due Process Violation

An alleged infringement of legal rights. The Petitioner claimed this occurred when the ALJ interpreted a contract between private parties.

Judicial Review

The legal process by which a party can appeal an administrative order to a court. The decision specifies this must be done by filing with the superior court within 35 days.

Limited Common Element

A term defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1202. The interpretation of this term was central to the Petitioner’s original dispute.

Motion to Vacate Rehearing

A formal request filed by the Respondent on August 15, 2018, arguing that the case could be resolved as a matter of law.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where disputes between owners and condominium associations are referred for hearings, as per ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Petitioner

The party initiating a legal petition. In this case, Dina R. Galassini.

Request for Rehearing

A formal request filed by the Petitioner on June 26, 2018, after an initial decision, which was granted by the Department of Real Estate.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

Separation of Powers

A constitutional principle cited by the Petitioner. She argued that only the judicial branch, not the executive branch (where the OAH resides), can make decisions that legally bind private parties.

4 Surprising Legal Lessons from a Condo Parking Lot Dispute

Introduction: The Anatomy of a Neighborhood Fight

Disputes with a Condominium or Homeowner’s Association are a common, and often frustrating, part of modern life. But what happens when a seemingly minor conflict over assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget escalates into a direct challenge to the power of the state?

The case of Dina R. Galassini vs. the Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. did just that. This neighborhood fight quickly grew to question fundamental legal principles, revealing some counter-intuitive truths about the power and jurisdiction of administrative agencies. The final court decision provides a masterclass in administrative law, a powerful, court-like system designed for efficiency that operates with more flexibility and authority than most people realize. Here are the top surprising takeaways from the final ruling.

Takeaway 1: Administrative Agencies Can Act Like Courts

At the heart of her appeal, Ms. Galassini made a powerful constitutional argument: she believed that only a judge in the judicial branch—not an administrator in the executive branch—had the authority to interpret a private contract like her condominium documents.

In her “Request for Rehearing,” she argued forcefully:

The decision by the administrative law judge (ALJ) is contrary to law, and the decision that was handed down to me only belongs in the judicial branch. Regarding what is a common element or a limited common element (see Exhibit C) should only be decided upon by a judge. For the ALJ to definitively interpret actual contracts between two private parties is a due process violation (separation of powers). In doing so the ALJ redistributed interpreted power from the Judiciary to the Executive and this is a congressional encroachment on my rights. According to Arizona’s Constitution Article 3, Separation of Powers—only the judicial branch can make decisions that make decisions that bind private parties as law.

The surprising outcome was that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument entirely. The judge found that the Office of Administrative Hearings was specifically empowered by Arizona statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A)) to handle disputes involving “violations of condominium documents.” Creating specialized administrative bodies like this is a common legislative strategy. It provides expert, efficient resolution for specific types of disputes, preventing the judicial courts from being overwhelmed.

Takeaway 2: Your Condo Agreement is a Legally Binding Contract

The ALJ’s authority to reject such a powerful constitutional claim hinged on a foundational question: what exactly are a condo’s governing documents in the eyes of the law? The answer is what gives administrative bodies their power in these disputes.

The decision affirms that these documents are not just community guidelines, but a formal, legally binding contract between the unit owner and the association. To support this, the judge referenced the legal precedent set in Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, which established that “the condominium documents are a contract between the parties.”

This is a critical takeaway because by defining these governing documents as a contract, it provides the legal foundation for an administrative body, like the Office of Administrative Hearings, to step in and resolve disputes using principles of contract law.

Takeaway 3: An Agency’s Power Can Be “Reasonably Implied”

Another surprising lesson from the decision is that a government agency’s authority doesn’t always have to be spelled out word-for-word for every possible action it might take.

To make a broader point about administrative law, the judge cited a separate case, Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. The principle from that case is that an agency can take actions that “may be reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole.’”

This concept is crucial for government to function. Legislatures cannot possibly foresee and explicitly write laws for every conceivable scenario an agency might face. This doctrine of “implied power” allows agencies the flexibility to adapt and act effectively within the spirit of the law, fulfilling their duties based on the overall purpose of the statutes they enforce.

Takeaway 4: Winning a Rehearing Isn’t Winning the War

The case’s procedure offers a fascinating lesson in legal strategy. The Department of Real Estate initially granted the petitioner’s request for a rehearing, a decision made, crucially, “for the reasons outlined in Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing.” This shows the Department initially found her legal argument about separation of powers compelling enough to warrant a second look.

However, the outcome was deeply ironic. Instead of re-arguing the facts, the respondent (the Condo Association) “filed a Motion to Vacate Rehearing, arguing that… this matter can be resolved as a matter of law” (meaning no facts were in dispute, only the interpretation of the statutes and contracts).

The ALJ agreed. The petitioner, by winning the rehearing, had inadvertently given the respondent a perfect platform to argue the case on purely legal grounds—the respondent’s strength. The rehearing forced the core jurisdictional issue to the forefront, leading directly to the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. It’s a stark reminder that a procedural victory doesn’t guarantee a final win.

Conclusion: The Law in Your Daily Life

Born from a dispute over a parking lot, this single case reveals the hidden legal machinery designed to resolve specific conflicts efficiently, without overburdening the traditional court system. It demonstrates how everyday disagreements can touch upon complex principles of constitutional power, contract law, and implied statutory authority. From a simple assessment, we see a system where administrative bodies act with court-like power, a power built upon the contractual nature of community rules and the flexibility of implied authority. It’s a powerful reminder of the intricate legal frameworks operating just beneath the surface of our daily lives.

What hidden legal complexities might be shaping the rules and agreements in your own life?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Dina R. Galassini (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Jim Flood (board member)
  • Roger Isaacs (witness)
  • Gary Pedersen (witness, statutory agent)

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)

Other Participants

  • Peter Saiia (observer)
  • Suzanne Isaacs (observer)
  • Paul Blessing (observer)
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Paul Herbert vs. Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-01-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome neutral
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian C. Herbert Counsel Jeffrey D. Harris
Respondent Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association Counsel Stewart F. Salwin

Alleged Violations

A.A.C. R2-19-111(3)

Outcome Summary

The case was resolved by settlement between the parties before adjudication, leading to the vacation of the scheduled hearing and remand to the ADRE.

Key Issues & Findings

Resolution by Settlement

The parties reached a settlement, resulting in a motion to vacate the hearing on the merits.

Orders: ORDER VACATING HEARING; matter remanded to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for further action.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: settlement

Cited:

  • A.A.C. R2-19-111(3)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Settlement, Vacated Hearing, HOA Dispute
Additional Citations:

  • A.A.C. R2-19-111(3)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817002-REL Decision – 609956.pdf

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Briefing on Case No. 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG: Herbert v. Blackstone at Vistancia

Executive Summary

This briefing details the resolution of case number 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG, a dispute between Petitioner Brian C. Herbert and Respondent Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association. The central development is that the parties reached a settlement, leading their attorneys to jointly file a motion to vacate the scheduled hearing. On January 3, 2018, Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings granted this motion. The hearing scheduled for January 5, 2018, was officially vacated, and the case was remanded to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for subsequent action.

Case Overview

Case Number: 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG

Forum: The Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Petitioner: Brian C. Herbert

Respondent: Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association

Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Key Development: Settlement and Hearing Vacation

The primary catalyst for the case’s disposition was a mutual agreement between the parties.

Settlement Reached: The document explicitly states that the parties “have reached a settlement.”

Joint Motion: Following the settlement, the attorneys for both the Petitioner and the Respondent filed a joint motion to vacate the hearing on the merits of the case.

Hearing Canceled: The order formally vacates the “continued hearing that had been scheduled on January 5, 2018, at 8:30 a.m.”

Judicial Orders and Disposition

On January 3, 2018, Judge Diane Mihalsky issued two definitive orders that concluded the proceedings at the Office of Administrative Hearings:

1. Order to Vacate: The first order vacates the hearing scheduled for January 5, 2018. The document states: “IT IS ORDERED vacating the continued hearing that had been scheduled on January 5, 2018, at 8:30 a.m.”

2. Order to Remand: The second order remands, or sends back, the matter to a different state body for final processing. It specifies: “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter under A.A.C. R2-19-111(3) to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for further action.”

Parties and Legal Representation

The following table details the key individuals and firms involved in the legal matter.

Name/Entity

Legal Counsel

Law Firm

Contact Information

Petitioner

Brian C. Herbert

Jeffrey D. Harris, Esq.

Titus Brueckner & Levine, PLC

[email protected]
8355 East Hartford Drive, Suite 200, Scottsdale, AZ 85255

Respondent

Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association

Stewart F. Salwin, Esq.
Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier, Esq.

Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC

[email protected]
[email protected]
1400 E. Southern Ave., Suite 400, Tempe, AZ 85282

Administrative Details

Order Date: The order was issued on January 3, 2018.

Transmission: The document was transmitted on January 3, 2018, by “M.Aguirre” via mail, email, or facsimile.

Recipients of the Order:

Arizona Department of Real Estate:

▪ Judy Lowe, Commissioner

▪ Additional staff: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Legal Counsel: All attorneys listed in the table above.

Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG

This guide is designed to review the key facts, entities, and procedures detailed in the legal document concerning the case of Brian C. Herbert v. Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association.

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Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information found in the provided source document.

1. Who were the two primary parties involved in case number 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG?

2. What was the specific legal action taken by the Administrative Law Judge on January 3, 2018?

3. What was the stated reason for vacating the hearing?

4. On what date and at what time was the original hearing scheduled to take place before it was canceled?

5. Identify the Administrative Law Judge who signed the order and the administrative body she represents.

6. Following the order to vacate the hearing, to which government agency was the matter sent for further action?

7. Which attorney and law firm represented the Petitioner in this case?

8. Identify the attorneys and the law firm that represented the Respondent.

9. What is the full title of the legal document, and what is its case number?

10. Besides the legal representatives for the Petitioner and Respondent, to which organization were copies of the order transmitted?

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Answer Key

1. The two primary parties were the Petitioner, Brian C. Herbert, and the Respondent, Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association.

2. The Administrative Law Judge issued an order vacating the continued hearing that had been scheduled. The order also remanded the matter to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for further action.

3. The hearing was vacated because the attorneys for both the Petitioner and the Respondent filed a motion to vacate, indicating that the two parties had reached a settlement.

4. The canceled hearing had been scheduled to take place on January 5, 2018, at 8:30 a.m.

5. The order was signed by Diane Mihalsky, an Administrative Law Judge. She represents the Office of Administrative Hearings, located at 1400 West Washington, Suite 101, Phoenix, Arizona.

6. The matter was remanded to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The order was transmitted to the department’s Commissioner, Judy Lowe, and several other individuals within the department.

7. The Petitioner, Brian C. Herbert, was represented by Jeffrey D. Harris, Esq. of the law firm Titus Brueckner & Levine, PLC.

8. The Respondent, Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association, was represented by Stewart F. Salwin, Esq. and Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier, Esq. from the law firm Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC.

9. The full title of the document is “ORDER VACATING HEARING.” The case number is No. 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG.

10. Copies of the order were transmitted to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. Specifically, they were sent to Commissioner Judy Lowe and six other email addresses associated with the department.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the information in the document. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt.

1. Describe the procedural history of this case as presented in the order. Detail the sequence of events that led to the issuance of this order and explain the mandated next step for the case.

2. Analyze the roles and relationships of all named individuals and entities in the document. Discuss the functions of the Petitioner, Respondent, their respective legal counsel, the Administrative Law Judge, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate within the context of this legal matter.

3. Explain the legal significance of a “settlement” in the context of this case. How did the settlement between Brian C. Herbert and the Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association directly influence the actions taken by the Office of Administrative Hearings?

4. Detail the formal communication process for this legal order. Identify who issued the order, the date of issuance, the methods of transmission, and the complete list of recipients, including their professional titles and affiliations where provided.

5. Based on the order’s text, discuss the legal authority under which the case was remanded. What does the citation of A.A.C. R2-19-111(3) and the subsequent remand to the Department of Real Estate suggest about the jurisdiction and procedural relationship between the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.A.C.

An abbreviation for the Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this document, it is cited as A.A.C. R2-19-111(3) as the legal basis for remanding the case.

Administrative Law Judge

An official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal rulings.

Attorney

A legal professional representing a client. The document lists Stewart F. Salwin, Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier, and Jeffrey D. Harris as attorneys for the parties.

An abbreviation for “Esquire,” a courtesy title commonly used for practicing attorneys in the United States.

Hearing

A formal proceeding before a judge or administrative body to resolve a legal dispute. In this case, the hearing scheduled for January 5, 2018, was vacated.

Matter

A legal case or issue being considered by a court or administrative body.

Motion

A formal request made by a party to a judge or administrative body for an order or ruling. Here, the parties filed a “motion to vacate the hearing.”

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state agency in Phoenix, Arizona, responsible for conducting hearings for other state agencies. It is the body that issued this order.

A formal written direction from a judge or administrative body. This document is titled an “ORDER VACATING HEARING.”

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Petitioner is Brian C. Herbert.

Remand

To send a case back to a lower court or another body for further action. This matter was remanded to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who responds to the legal action. In this case, the Respondent is the Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association.

Settlement

An agreement reached between opposing parties in a legal dispute, resolving the issue without a full hearing or trial. The parties in this case reached a settlement, leading to the motion to vacate.

Vacate

To cancel or make void a scheduled legal proceeding. The order explicitly vacates the hearing that was scheduled for January 5, 2018.

What a Single Page of Legalese Reveals About How ConflictsReallyEnd

We’ve all seen it on screen: the dramatic courtroom showdown. A lawyer points an accusatory finger, a witness breaks down on the stand, and a judge slams a gavel to seal a dramatic verdict. It’s compelling television, but it bears little resemblance to how most conflicts in our society actually end. The real story is often much quieter, hidden in plain sight within documents that most of us would dismiss as bureaucratic fine print.

This single page, an “Order Vacating Hearing” filed away in a public record, is more than just paper. This seemingly inert document upends the Hollywood version of justice and reveals three powerful truths about how our society actually functions. It’s a window into the hidden world of negotiation, procedure, and resolution that keeps our civil society from grinding to a halt.

By closely examining this order, we can uncover a story not of courtroom battles, but of quiet compromise and the powerful machinery of resolution.

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1. The Real Drama Happens Off-Screen

The most pivotal moment in this legal dispute wasn’t a climactic courtroom argument; it was an event that happened entirely behind the scenes, just before the curtain was set to rise.

An order signed by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky shows that a formal hearing was scheduled for January 5, 2018. But the order canceling that hearing was issued on January 3, 2018—a mere two days before the parties were due in court. This two-day window is where the real lawyering happens. Imagine the flurry of phone calls, the redlined settlement drafts exchanged via email, and the strategic calculations of risk versus reward that led both sides to step back from the brink. This underscores a fundamental reality of the legal system: the primary goal is often resolution, not a zero-sum victory, in order to avoid the high cost of litigation, the uncertainty of a judge’s ruling, and the immense investment of time and emotional energy.

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2. Every Dispute is a Cog in a Larger Machine

While this case involved a dispute between an individual and a community association, the document reveals a surprisingly large cast of characters. Resolving the matter required the involvement of a complex network of official entities and professionals.

A quick scan of the order shows just how many parties are plugged into this single conflict:

The Petitioner: Brian C. Herbert

The Respondent: Blackstone at Vistancia Community Association

The Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings

The Law Firms: Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC, and Titus Brueckner & Levine, PLC

The Regulatory Body: The Arizona Department of Real Estate

But the story doesn’t end with a simple settlement between two parties. The order states the matter is being “remanded… to the Director of the Arizona Department of Real Estate for further action.” From a procedural standpoint, this is significant. Remanding means sending the case back to the original agency that handled it. What this signals is that a private agreement doesn’t necessarily end the state’s interest. The regulatory body still has a role to play, ensuring the settlement aligns with public rules or addressing any remaining compliance issues.

The document’s final page reinforces this, showing it was formally transmitted not just to the lawyers, but to a list of at least six different officials at the Arizona Department of Real Estate, ensuring the entire regulatory apparatus was kept in the loop. This machinery, while complex, ensures that even a local conflict is handled within a structured, accountable system of oversight.

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3. The Most Powerful Words Aren’t in the Verdict

We often search for resolution in a judge’s lengthy, detailed ruling, full of complex legal reasoning and citations. But in this case, the single phrase that resolves the entire matter is disarmingly simple. It’s a quiet declaration of fact, not a thundering judgment.

The order states that the hearing is being vacated for one direct reason:

…because they have reached a settlement.

This short clause is far more than procedural boilerplate; it represents a fundamental shift in power. A verdict is an imposed resolution, where a third party dictates the ending. A settlement, however, is an act of agency and control. It signifies that the parties have chosen to take the outcome out of a judge’s hands and write their own ending. These six words represent the power of negotiated resolution over imposed confrontation—a conclusion built by the parties themselves, who chose compromise to avoid the risks and costs of continued conflict.

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Conclusion: The Story in the Silence

A single, seemingly mundane administrative order tells a profound story about how our society manages conflict. It reveals that the real work often happens not in a noisy courtroom, but in a quiet agreement. It shows that even small disputes are handled by a vast, interconnected system designed to ensure fairness and order. And it reminds us that the most powerful outcome is often the one achieved through mutual consent.

This perceived lack of drama is not a bug in the system; it is the core feature of a stable civil society. The quiet, predictable processes and behind-the-scenes compromises are what we value over chaotic and uncertain public battles. The next time you encounter a piece of official jargon or a formal notice, what hidden story of conflict and resolution might be waiting to be discovered?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul Herbert (petitioner)
    Original petitioner in the related docket (18F-H1817002-REL); conceded he is the beneficiary, not the owner/trustee.
  • Brian C. Herbert (petitioner)
    Petitioner in docket 18F-H1817002-REL-RHG; identified as the trustee of the trust that owns the property.

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge who issued the Recommended Order of Dismissal.
  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    OAH
    Administrative Law Judge who issued the Order Vacating Hearing due to settlement.
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • M. Aguirre (staff)
    Listed in electronic transmission.
  • LDettorre (staff)
    ADRE
    Electronic transmission recipient.
  • AHansen (staff)
    ADRE
    Electronic transmission recipient.
  • djones (staff)
    ADRE
    Electronic transmission recipient.
  • DGardner (staff)
    ADRE
    Electronic transmission recipient.
  • ncano (staff)
    ADRE
    Electronic transmission recipient.

Other Participants

  • Stewart F. Salwin (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
  • Jeffrey D. Harris (attorney)
    Titus Brueckner & Levine, PLC