Susan L Jarzabek v. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221008-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-11-19
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome Petitioner's complaint regarding the wrongful assessment of attorney's fees was dismissed because she failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the HOA violated its Policy regarding pre-attorney notification requirements.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Susan L Jarzabek Counsel
Respondent Hillcrest Improvement Association #2 Counsel Haidyn DiLorenzo, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 1, Section 10; Enforcement, Fines and Appeals Policy ("Policy")

Outcome Summary

Petitioner's complaint regarding the wrongful assessment of attorney's fees was dismissed because she failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the HOA violated its Policy regarding pre-attorney notification requirements.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof; the ALJ found the Policy does not require the two notices prior to attorney escalation, as Petitioner had alleged.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Policy concerning attorney's fees assessment and required pre-litigation notices.

Petitioner alleged the Association wrongfully assessed attorney's fees, arguing the Policy required providing the owner two warning notices and a certified letter before escalating a matter to attorney involvement.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: attorney fees, HOA policy enforcement, notice requirements, CC&Rs, due process
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221008-REL Decision – 926455.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:38:50 (93.9 KB)

22F-H2221008-REL Decision – 926455.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:40:13 (93.9 KB)

This summary pertains to the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Susan L Jarzabek (Petitioner) vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2 (Respondent), heard on November 5, 2021.

Key Facts and Main Issues

The Petitioner, Susan L. Jarzabek, filed a petition alleging that the Respondent Association violated CC&R Article 1, Section 10 and its Enforcement, Fines and Appeals Policy ("Policy") by wrongfully charging her attorney’s fees. The underlying dispute involved a neighbor's complaint regarding a tree on Ms. Jarzabek's property.

Ms. Jarzabek, the sole record owner, argued that the Association’s Policy requires the owner of record to be provided two warning notices and a certified letter before a matter can be escalated to attorney involvement, thus making the assessment of fees improper. She also contended she was denied due process because she did not receive proper notice of the allegations. Although the Association assessed fines and interest related to the violation, these charges were rescinded prior to the hearing.

The Association’s documents grant it the ability to recover enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees (CC&R Art. VIII, Section 1). Crucially, the Association’s Policy provides that if a matter is escalated to the attorney, the standard notice-procedure will no longer apply, and the owner is responsible for the associated fees and costs.

The facts showed that the Association sent a certified letter (January 15, 2019) regarding the tree violation, but it was addressed to Ms. Jarzabek’s husband, John Jarzabek, and was not claimed by either party. Furthermore, this January 15, 2019 letter did not meet all the required elements for a Notice of Violation under the Association’s policy. The Association engaged counsel (The Mulcahy Law Firm) on October 15, 2019, which subsequently sent Notices of Violation to Ms. Jarzabek.

Legal Analysis and Outcome

The matter was governed by the Department of Real Estate's authority concerning alleged violations of community documents. The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to show the alleged violation occurred by a preponderance of the evidence. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) considered the Policy a contract with which both parties must comply.

The ALJ concluded that Ms. Jarzabek did not meet her burden to prove the Association violated the Policy. The central legal finding was that the Policy, as written, does not require that an owner receive two notices before a matter is escalated to attorney involvement.

Final Decision

Based on this finding, the ALJ ordered that Susan L. Jarzabek’s petition be dismissed. The ALJ noted that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney’s fees levied against Ms. Jarzabek constituted a valid debt, offering no opinion on that specific debt issue.

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{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “22F-H2221008-REL”, “case_title”: “Susan L Jarzabek vs. Hillcrest Improvement Association #2”, “decision_date”: “2021-11-19”, “alj_name”: “Thomas Shedden”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “Can my HOA send a violation directly to their attorney without sending me warning letters first?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, if the community’s enforcement policy allows for immediate escalation to legal counsel.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this case, the ALJ ruled that the HOA did not violate its policy by involving a lawyer without prior notices, because the policy contained a provision stating that the standard notice procedure ceases to apply once a matter is escalated to an attorney.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy also provides in pertinent part that the Association may escalate a matter to its attorney for further action, if a matter is escalated to the attorney, the notice-procedure will no longer apply”, “legal_basis”: “HOA Enforcement Policy / Contract Law”, “topic_tags”: [ “enforcement process”, “attorney referral”, “notice requirements” ] }, { “question”: “If the HOA sends my violation to a lawyer, do I have to pay the attorney’s fees?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, generally, if the CC&Rs and enforcement policy state that the owner is responsible for enforcement costs.”, “detailed_answer”: “The decision notes that the governing documents (CC&Rs) specifically allow the Association to recover enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees, from the owner. Additionally, the specific policy noted that upon escalation, the owner becomes responsible for these costs.”, “alj_quote”: “CC&R Art. VIII, Section 1, Enforcement, provides that the Association may recover from an owner its enforcement costs, including attorney’s fees.”, “legal_basis”: “CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 1”, “topic_tags”: [ “attorney fees”, “fines and penalties”, “collection costs” ] }, { “question”: “Who has to prove that the HOA did something wrong in a hearing?”, “short_answer”: “The homeowner (petitioner) filing the complaint bears the burden of proof.”, “detailed_answer”: “When a homeowner petitions the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation by the HOA, it is up to the homeowner to provide sufficient evidence to prove that the violation occurred.”, “alj_quote”: “Ms. Jarzabek bears the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “burden of proof”, “legal procedure”, “hearing standards” ] }, { “question”: “Is an HOA’s enforcement policy legally considered a binding contract?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the policy is treated as part of the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Administrative Law Judge affirmed that community policies are part of the contractual agreement between the parties, meaning both the homeowner and the HOA are legally required to follow the terms written in that policy.”, “alj_quote”: “The Policy is part of contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”, “legal_basis”: “Contract Law; Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association”, “topic_tags”: [ “contract law”, “governing documents”, “policy enforcement” ] }, { “question”: “Can the Administrative Law Judge cancel the specific debt or fees I owe the HOA?”, “short_answer”: “Not necessarily; the tribunal’s jurisdiction may be limited to determining if a violation of documents occurred, not the validity of the debt itself.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ explicitly noted in a footnote that while they can determine if the HOA violated its policy, they did not have the jurisdiction to decide if the specific attorney’s fees charged constituted a valid debt.”, “alj_quote”: “it is not within this tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney’s fees levied against Ms. Jarzabek are a valid debt, and the tribunal offers no opinion on that issue.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)”, “topic_tags”: [ “jurisdiction”, “debt validity”, “tribunal limitations” ] }, { “question”: “What standard of evidence is used to make a decision in an HOA dispute?”, “short_answer”: “Preponderance of the evidence.”, “detailed_answer”: “The standard is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ which means the evidence must show it is more likely than not that the claim is true. It is described as the greater weight of the evidence.”, “alj_quote”: “The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.”, “legal_basis”: “ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal standards”, “evidence”, “administrative hearing” ] } ] }

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Susan L Jarzabek (petitioner, witness)

Respondent Side

  • Haidyn DiLorenzo (HOA attorney)
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Robert Cody (board president, witness)
    Hillcrest Improvement Association #2
  • Beth Mulcahy (HOA attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Recipient of transmission; firm engaged by Association

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Louis Dettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (via email)
  • Miranda Alvarez (OAH staff)
    Transmitter of Decision

Other Participants

  • John Jarzabek (spouse)
    Petitioner's husband, named on certified letter sent by Association

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-16
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura B Ganer Counsel
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners Association Counsel Mark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:39 (108.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

Parties:

Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.

3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

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1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

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2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

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3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

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Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020059-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-12
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 5.1; A.R.S. § 10-3842

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed after rehearing because Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner continually refused Respondent access to his locked back yard for landscaping maintenance, and the CC&Rs requiring landscaping do not mandate pool maintenance.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation due to refusal of access to the back yard and misinterpretation of CC&R obligations regarding pool maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain landscaping and acting in bad faith

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs by failing to maintain landscaping in 2020 and acting in bad faith, asserting that pool/hardscape maintenance was included in landscaping duties, and requesting the maximum fine. Respondent countered that they consistently maintained the front yard but were denied access to the locked backyard due to Petitioner's pool liability concerns.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was dismissed/denied as Petitioner failed to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. However, Respondent was ordered, going forward, to communicate the days and times they will be performing back yard landscaping so Petitioner can provide access.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-1122(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Duties, Landscaping, Pool Maintenance, CC&Rs, Access Refusal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-1122(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 855028.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-02T10:34:27 (139.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-02T10:34:33 (124.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 855028.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:32 (139.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:27:36 (124.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL Decision – 815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:21 (124.1 KB)

Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute centers on the scope of landscaping maintenance obligations as defined by the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Petitioner alleged the HOA failed its duties under CC&Rs § 5.1 by not maintaining his property’s unique landscaping, which he argued included replenishing rock, staining paths, and servicing his swimming pool and associated hardscape. He further claimed the HOA was acting in bad faith and failing to comply with a previous court ruling.

The Respondent countered that it had consistently performed standard landscaping on the Petitioner’s front yard since January 2020. However, it was repeatedly denied access to the backyard, a fact the Petitioner admitted, citing liability concerns due to his pool. The HOA provided evidence of multiple attempts to access the yard and testimony that its maintenance duties are uniform across the community and do not include “concierge” services or pool maintenance.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed the petition in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision rested on two key points: 1) The Petitioner failed to provide access to the area in question, preventing the HOA from performing its duties. 2) The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the term “landscaping” under the CC&Rs could be reasonably interpreted to include swimming pool maintenance. This conclusion was strongly supported by the separate licensing classifications for landscaping (R-21) and swimming pool service (R-6) issued by the Arizona Registrar of Contractors, which establishes them as distinct services under state regulation.

Case Overview

Parties and Key Personnel

Name/Entity

Affiliation / Title

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg

Homeowner, 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Yuma, AZ

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

Respondent Counsel

Nicole Payne, Esq.

Legal Representative

Respondent Witness

Diana Crites

Owner, Crites and Associates (Property Management Co.)

Respondent Witness

Rian Baas

Owner, Mowtown Landscape (HOA Landscaping Contractor)

Presiding Judge

Sondra J. Vanella

Administrative Law Judge

Case Details

Details

Initial Case No.

20F-H2020059-REL

Initial Hearing

August 3, 2020

Initial Decision

August 17, 2020

Rehearing Case No.

20F-H2020059-REL-RHG

Rehearing

February 2, 2021

Rehearing Decision

February 12, 2021

Core Dispute

The central conflict involved the interpretation of the HOA’s maintenance obligations under its governing documents. The Petitioner argued for an expansive definition of “landscaping” that encompassed his entire property exterior, including a swimming pool. The HOA maintained that its duties were limited to standard, uniform landscaping services and that pool maintenance was explicitly excluded. The dispute was compounded by the Petitioner’s refusal to grant the HOA’s landscaper access to his backyard.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition, filed on or about April 21, 2020, and subsequent arguments in two hearings, were based on the following claims:

Violation of CC&Rs: The HOA violated § 5.1 of its CC&Rs by failing “to do their job in 2020 with maintaining landscaping, and are acting in bad faith.”

Broad Interpretation of “Landscaping”: As the CC&Rs do not define “landscaping,” the Petitioner contended it should include all types of features outside of structures. His specific demands included:

◦ Maintenance of unique xeriscape with geometric patterns.

◦ Replenishment of thin or worn-out rock ground cover.

◦ Staining of walking paths.

◦ Full maintenance of his “water feature,” identified as a swimming pool. This included the pump, filter, chemicals, patio, and all related hardscape.

Refusal to Grant Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that the gate to his backyard was “always locked.” He stated this was for liability reasons due to the pool and refused access to the HOA’s landscapers. At the rehearing, he argued the HOA failed to communicate its schedule to allow him to provide temporary access.

Budgetary Failure: He asserted that the HOA did not properly budget for the costs associated with maintaining his unique landscaping.

Grounds for Rehearing: After the initial denial, the Petitioner requested a rehearing on multiple grounds, including irregularity in proceedings, errors in evidence admission, and claims of “Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) issues” related to hearing loss.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence

The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a defense centered on its consistent attempts to fulfill its obligations and the Petitioner’s own actions preventing them from doing so.

Consistent Front Yard Maintenance: Both the HOA property manager and its landscaping contractor testified that the Petitioner’s front yard had been continuously maintained since landscaping services began in January 2020.

Denial of Backyard Access: The HOA’s primary defense was that it was physically prevented from servicing the backyard. Evidence presented to support this included:

Testimony from Rian Baas (Mowtown Landscape): His crews were at the property weekly. Between January and March 2020, he or his crew knocked and left notes or business cards four to five times with no response.

Witness Testimony: In March 2020, a woman at the residence (presumably the Petitioner’s wife) explicitly instructed a landscaper that “she does not want anyone in the back yard because she had a pool and that is the reason for the lock on gate.”

Documentary Evidence: A text message dated March 24, 2020, from Mr. Baas to property manager Diana Crites memorialized this interaction. A photograph of the locked gate was also submitted.

Scope of Services: Ms. Crites testified that HOA landscape services are uniform throughout the community and include front yard maintenance, mowing and blowing in backyards (if access is granted), and sprinkler system upkeep. They do not provide “concierge” services such as maintaining potted plants, driveways, or pools (except for the community pool, which is serviced by a separate contractor).

Access as a Prerequisite: Ms. Crites explained that backyard maintenance is contingent on homeowners leaving their gates unlocked, and some owners choose not to grant access due to pets or other reasons.

Judicial Findings and Rulings

Initial Decision (August 17, 2020)

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s initial petition based on a clear set of facts.

Findings of Fact: The judge found the evidence presented by the Respondent to be credible. The Petitioner’s own admission that he refused to allow access to his backyard since January 2020 was a critical factor. The evidence established that the HOA had consistently maintained the front yard and made multiple, documented attempts to access the backyard.

Conclusions of Law: The judge concluded that while § 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs requires the HOA to maintain yards, “nothing therein requires Respondent to maintain an individual member’s pool.” Because the Petitioner denied access, he could not establish that the Respondent had violated any CC&R.

Rehearing and Final Decision (February 12, 2021)

After the Commissioner for the Department of Real Estate granted a rehearing, the judge again reviewed the case and ultimately dismissed the petition, providing a more detailed legal analysis of the term “landscaping.”

Burden of Proof: The judge reiterated that the Petitioner bore the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA was legally obligated to maintain his pool and hardscape. The Petitioner failed to offer any definition or legal authority to support his expansive interpretation.

Analysis of “Landscaping”: The judge found that the common definitions of “landscaping” from various dictionary and legal sources “cannot reasonably be read to include a swimming pool and the associated mechanical equipment.”

Arizona Registrar of Contractors (ROC) Licensing: The judge’s conclusion was decisively reinforced by the State of Arizona’s contractor licensing classifications:

◦ The R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems license (formerly Landscaping) is for installing garden walls, irrigation, and other landscape features. It specifically precludes the licensee from contracting for “swimming pools, pool deck coatings.”

◦ The R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair license is a separate classification required to service residential pools.

◦ The judge concluded: “The Registrar’s licensing scheme supports a conclusion that landscaping maintenance and pool maintenance are two separate and distinct services.”

Final Order: The petition was dismissed. The judge noted that because the Petitioner denied access, the Respondent was not in violation. However, the judge provided a forward-looking recommendation: “it is reasonable, going forward, for Respondent to communicate the days and times that it will be performing the landscaping of Petitioner’s back yard so that Petitioner can provide access for that service while maintaining safety precautions.”

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association. It covers the key arguments, evidence presented, and legal conclusions from two separate hearings. Use the following sections to test and deepen your understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent in the initial petition filed on April 21, 2020?

3. According to Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, what is the Association’s primary maintenance obligation regarding individual lots?

4. What specific and unique types of landscaping did the Petitioner claim required maintenance by the HOA?

5. What was the primary reason the Respondent’s landscaping contractor, Mowtown Landscape, was unable to perform maintenance in the Petitioner’s backyard?

6. What evidence did Diana Crites, the property manager, present to demonstrate the landscaper’s attempts to gain access to the backyard?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge initially deny the Petitioner’s petition in the decision dated August 17, 2020?

8. What reasons did the Petitioner give for his request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, how did the Administrative Law Judge legally define “landscaping” to determine the scope of the HOA’s duties?

10. What was the final order in the decision dated February 12, 2021, and what recommendation did the judge make for future interactions?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Michael J. Stoltenberg, the homeowner, who served as the Petitioner, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner brought the complaint alleging the HOA was not fulfilling its duties, while the Respondent defended its actions. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5.1 and Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842. Specifically, he claimed the HOA failed “to do their job in 2020 with maintaining landscaping, and are acting in bad faith.” He also referenced a refusal to follow a previous court ruling.

3. Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This clause formed the basis of the Petitioner’s argument that the HOA was responsible for all landscaping on his property.

4. The Petitioner testified that his landscaping was unique, including xeriscape with geometric patterns, “water features” (which was a pool), and walking paths that needed staining. He also contended that when the rock in his front yard wore thin, the Respondent should be responsible for replenishing it.

5. The landscaping contractor could not access the Petitioner’s backyard because the gate was always locked. The Petitioner acknowledged he kept it locked for liability reasons due to the presence of his pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.”

6. Diana Crites presented a text message from the landscaper, Rian Baas, dated March 24, 2020, detailing how a woman at the residence stated she did not want anyone in the backyard because of the pool. Ms. Crites also presented a photograph of the locked gate and read a letter from Mr. Baas explaining his crew had knocked and left business cards weekly for two months without response.

7. The judge denied the petition because the Petitioner’s own admission established that he had refused to allow the Respondent access to his backyard since January 2020. The decision noted that the HOA had made multiple attempts to access the yard and had consistently maintained the front yard landscaping.

8. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on multiple grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings by the judge, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the decision was not supported by evidence. He also asserted that there were Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) issues related to his hearing loss and privacy issues.

9. The judge referenced multiple online dictionaries (Oxford English Dictionary, Dictionary.com, etc.) and, most significantly, the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ license classifications. She noted that landscaping (R-21 license) and swimming pool service (R-6 license) are two separate and distinct services, supporting the conclusion that pool maintenance is not included under the term “landscaping.”

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s Petition was dismissed. However, the judge recommended that, going forward, it would be reasonable for the Respondent to communicate the days and times for landscaping so the Petitioner could provide access to his backyard while maintaining his safety precautions.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer as a short essay.

1. Analyze the role of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means according to the source text and discuss how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both hearings.

2. Discuss the conflict between the Petitioner’s right to secure his property (the locked gate) and the Respondent’s obligation to perform maintenance. How did the judge’s final recommendation attempt to resolve this practical conflict, even while legally siding with the Respondent?

3. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning in the rehearing for defining “landscaping.” Why was the reference to the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing scheme a particularly persuasive piece of evidence compared to dictionary definitions alone?

4. Trace the evolution of the Petitioner’s arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. How did his claims regarding the scope of “landscaping” and his introduction of issues like ADA accommodation and the HOA’s legitimacy reflect a shift in legal strategy?

5. Based on the evidence presented by the Respondent’s witnesses (Diana Crites and Rian Baas), assess the HOA’s efforts to fulfill its maintenance obligations. Were the HOA’s actions reasonable under the circumstances described in the proceedings?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 10-3842 (Code of Conduct for Board Members) and the proceedings operated under the authority of A.R.S. § 32-2199(B) and other related statutes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community. The central issue of this case was the interpretation of Section 5.1(a) of the Rancho Del Oro HOA’s CC&Rs regarding maintenance duties.

Concierge Landscape Services

A term used by witness Diana Crites to describe specialized, non-uniform services the HOA does not provide. Examples given included maintaining potted plants, driveways, or walls dividing properties, in contrast to the uniform mowing and blowing provided to all homeowners.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies. This office heard the dispute after it was referred by the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Xeriscape

A style of landscaping utilizing drought-tolerant plants and rock to minimize water use. The Petitioner mentioned his unique xeriscape with geometric patterns as part of the landscaping he expected the HOA to maintain.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association. It covers the key arguments, evidence presented, and legal conclusions from two separate hearings. Use the following sections to test and deepen your understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent in the initial petition filed on April 21, 2020?

3. According to Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, what is the Association’s primary maintenance obligation regarding individual lots?

4. What specific and unique types of landscaping did the Petitioner claim required maintenance by the HOA?

5. What was the primary reason the Respondent’s landscaping contractor, Mowtown Landscape, was unable to perform maintenance in the Petitioner’s backyard?

6. What evidence did Diana Crites, the property manager, present to demonstrate the landscaper’s attempts to gain access to the backyard?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge initially deny the Petitioner’s petition in the decision dated August 17, 2020?

8. What reasons did the Petitioner give for his request for a rehearing after the initial decision?

9. In the rehearing, how did the Administrative Law Judge legally define “landscaping” to determine the scope of the HOA’s duties?

10. What was the final order in the decision dated February 12, 2021, and what recommendation did the judge make for future interactions?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Michael J. Stoltenberg, the homeowner, who served as the Petitioner, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner brought the complaint alleging the HOA was not fulfilling its duties, while the Respondent defended its actions. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5.1 and Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842. Specifically, he claimed the HOA failed “to do their job in 2020 with maintaining landscaping, and are acting in bad faith.” He also referenced a refusal to follow a previous court ruling.

3. Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This clause formed the basis of the Petitioner’s argument that the HOA was responsible for all landscaping on his property.

4. The Petitioner testified that his landscaping was unique, including xeriscape with geometric patterns, “water features” (which was a pool), and walking paths that needed staining. He also contended that when the rock in his front yard wore thin, the Respondent should be responsible for replenishing it.

5. The landscaping contractor could not access the Petitioner’s backyard because the gate was always locked. The Petitioner acknowledged he kept it locked for liability reasons due to the presence of his pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.”

6. Diana Crites presented a text message from the landscaper, Rian Baas, dated March 24, 2020, detailing how a woman at the residence stated she did not want anyone in the backyard because of the pool. Ms. Crites also presented a photograph of the locked gate and read a letter from Mr. Baas explaining his crew had knocked and left business cards weekly for two months without response.

7. The judge denied the petition because the Petitioner’s own admission established that he had refused to allow the Respondent access to his backyard since January 2020. The decision noted that the HOA had made multiple attempts to access the yard and had consistently maintained the front yard landscaping.

8. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on multiple grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings by the judge, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the decision was not supported by evidence. He also asserted that there were Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) issues related to his hearing loss and privacy issues.

9. The judge referenced multiple online dictionaries (Oxford English Dictionary, Dictionary.com, etc.) and, most significantly, the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ license classifications. She noted that landscaping (R-21 license) and swimming pool service (R-6 license) are two separate and distinct services, supporting the conclusion that pool maintenance is not included under the term “landscaping.”

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s Petition was dismissed. However, the judge recommended that, going forward, it would be reasonable for the Respondent to communicate the days and times for landscaping so the Petitioner could provide access to his backyard while maintaining his safety precautions.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer as a short essay.

1. Analyze the role of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means according to the source text and discuss how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this burden led to the dismissal of his petition in both hearings.

2. Discuss the conflict between the Petitioner’s right to secure his property (the locked gate) and the Respondent’s obligation to perform maintenance. How did the judge’s final recommendation attempt to resolve this practical conflict, even while legally siding with the Respondent?

3. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning in the rehearing for defining “landscaping.” Why was the reference to the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing scheme a particularly persuasive piece of evidence compared to dictionary definitions alone?

4. Trace the evolution of the Petitioner’s arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. How did his claims regarding the scope of “landscaping” and his introduction of issues like ADA accommodation and the HOA’s legitimacy reflect a shift in legal strategy?

5. Based on the evidence presented by the Respondent’s witnesses (Diana Crites and Rian Baas), assess the HOA’s efforts to fulfill its maintenance obligations. Were the HOA’s actions reasonable under the circumstances described in the proceedings?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified laws of the state of Arizona. The Petitioner cited A.R.S. § 10-3842 (Code of Conduct for Board Members) and the proceedings operated under the authority of A.R.S. § 32-2199(B) and other related statutes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community. The central issue of this case was the interpretation of Section 5.1(a) of the Rancho Del Oro HOA’s CC&Rs regarding maintenance duties.

Concierge Landscape Services

A term used by witness Diana Crites to describe specialized, non-uniform services the HOA does not provide. Examples given included maintaining potted plants, driveways, or walls dividing properties, in contrast to the uniform mowing and blowing provided to all homeowners.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies. This office heard the dispute after it was referred by the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Xeriscape

A style of landscaping utilizing drought-tolerant plants and rock to minimize water use. The Petitioner mentioned his unique xeriscape with geometric patterns as part of the landscaping he expected the HOA to maintain.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Represented Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
  • Diana Crites (property manager)
    Crites and Associates
    Owner of Respondent’s property management company; appeared as witness
  • Rian Baas (witness)
    Mowtown Landscape
    Owner of landscaping company contracted by Respondent
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Listed as recipient of the decision
  • Luis (employee)
    Mowtown Landscape (Implied)
    Crew member mentioned in text message regarding attempted access to petitioner's yard
  • Jill (employee)
    Mowtown Landscape (Implied)
    Printed papers for Luis regarding access to petitioner's yard

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Jennie Bennett v. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-02-26
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The ALJ ordered the Petition dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited CC&R sections, as the malfunctioning backflow flap was located on the Petitioner's private property and was her responsibility.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jennie Bennett Counsel Maxwell Riddiough
Respondent Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ordered the Petition dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited CC&R sections, as the malfunctioning backflow flap was located on the Petitioner's private property and was her responsibility.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the backflow flap was a common element maintenance responsibility under CC&Rs Sections 12(c) or 12(h)(1).

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of community documents regarding maintenance responsibility for sewage backflow flap.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by refusing to pay for repairs related to a malfunctioning backflow flap that caused a sewage overflow, arguing the item was a common element maintenance responsibility.

Orders: Petitioner Jennie Bennett’s Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Section 12(c)
  • CC&Rs Section 12(h)(1)
  • CC&Rs Section 15

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Maintenance Responsibility, Plumbing, Sewage Overflow, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019002-REL-RHG Decision – 771959.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:01 (103.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Jennie Bennett vs. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings, arguments, and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG, concerning a dispute between homeowner Jennie Bennett (Petitioner) and the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association (Respondent).

The core of the dispute was the financial responsibility for repairing a malfunctioning sewage backflow valve that caused an overflow at the petitioner’s residence. The petitioner argued that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs), specifically Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1), by refusing to cover the repair costs. The petitioner’s claim was complicated by the fact that the HOA had, just two weeks prior to the incident, rescinded a “Sewer Maintenance Policy” that had previously addressed such issues. The petitioner stated she was not notified of this rescission.

The respondent contended that the backflow valve was located on the petitioner’s private property, not in a common area, making its maintenance the petitioner’s responsibility under Section 15 of the CC&Rs. The HOA asserted that the 2017 policy was rescinded precisely because legal guidance confirmed this distinction. The HOA also maintained that notice of the rescission was sent to all homeowners.

The ALJ ultimately ruled in favor of the respondent, dismissing the petitioner’s petition. The decision concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a preponderance of the evidence—to establish that the backflow valve was a common element covered by the cited CC&R sections. The evidence, including a plat map and photos, demonstrated the valve was on the petitioner’s private property. While the timing of the policy rescission was deemed “extremely unfortunate,” the ALJ found that once rescinded, the HOA was no longer obligated to share repair costs.

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Jennie Bennett, Petitioner, vs. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number: 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Antara Nath Rivera

Hearing Date: February 7, 2020

Decision Date: February 26, 2020

Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated community documents, specifically Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the CC&Rs.

II. Central Dispute and Timeline of Events

The central issue was whether the HOA was responsible for the cost of repairing a malfunctioning sewage backflow flap on the petitioner’s property.

March 2017: The HOA adopts a “Sewer Maintenance Policy” to outline processes for sewage maintenance.

February 13, 2019: The HOA Board rescinds the Sewer Maintenance Policy.

March 3, 2019: Petitioner Jennie Bennett experiences a sewage overflow at her residence due to a malfunctioning backflow valve.

March – May 2019: The petitioner brings her concerns to the HOA board at multiple meetings but receives no response.

May 22, 2019: The HOA responds to the petitioner after receiving a letter from her attorney.

July 10, 2019: The petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

III. Petitioner’s Position and Arguments (Jennie Bennett)

The petitioner, a resident for 20 years, argued that the HOA was liable for the repair costs based on the following points:

CC&R Violation: The refusal to pay for the repair constituted a violation of Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the CC&Rs, which pertain to the HOA’s duty to maintain sewer lines and common elements.

Lack of Notice: The petitioner testified she was not notified of the policy rescission on February 13, 2019. The sewage overflow occurred just two weeks later, and upon reporting it, she was informed by a neighbor that the HOA had historically covered such issues.

Procedural Failure: The HOA failed to address her concerns at the March, April, or May board meetings, only engaging after her attorney intervened.

Community Support: The petitioner collected 97 signatures on a grassroots petition asking the HOA to cover the repair due to the short time frame between the policy rescission and the incident, and the lack of notice. The petition stated: “I am asking to be covered because of the 2 week time frame and no notice. I agree with being covered by the HOA for the flap.”

IV. Respondent’s Position and Arguments (Catalina Del Rey HOA)

The HOA, represented by community manager Vanessa Lubinsky of Cadden Community Management, presented a defense centered on the distinction between private and common property.

Private Property Responsibility: The HOA’s primary argument was that the backflow flap was located on the petitioner’s private property and was therefore her responsibility to maintain under Section 15 of the CC&Rs, which governs utilities like plumbing within a homeowner’s lot.

Evidence of Location: The respondent submitted a plat map and photographs as evidence. The photos illustrated that the backflow flap was located “next to Petitioner’s walk up to her front door,” well within her property lines and not on common elements.

Plumbing vs. Sewer Issue: Ms. Lubinsky characterized the problem as a “plumbing issue, not a sewer issue,” because of its location on private property.

Rationale for Policy Change: The 2017 Sewer Maintenance Policy was rescinded after the HOA received “additional legal guidance” confirming that backflow flaps were within homeowners’ units and thus their responsibility under Section 15.

Notice and Procedure: Ms. Lubinsky testified that notice of the rescission was issued to homeowners via both email and postal mail (postcards). She clarified that the rescission was a board decision that did not require a homeowner vote, as it was not an amendment to the CC&Rs.

V. Relevant Sections of the CC&Rs

The dispute hinged on the interpretation of the following sections of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Quoted Text from the Decision

Section 12(c)

“The Association shall maintain and landscape all front and side years open to the street, and shall maintain sewer lines, sidewalks, walkways, brick trim, streets and common recreation areas. …The words “repair or maintain” shall not be construed that the Association shall repair or maintain any individual lot owner’s roof or similar structure.”

Section 12(h)(1)

“Each such lot will be subject to assessments and the owner thereof shall pay to the Associations assessments as follows: Such lots pro rata share of the actual cost to the Association of all repair, maintenance, safety and control of common elements, including but not limited to maintenance of walkways, sidewalks, streets and sewers, care of lawns and landscaping in common areas and front and side yards of residences… .”

Section 15

(Described, not quoted) This section provides that the homeowner is responsible for the maintenance of utilities such as electricity and plumbing on their private property, similar to a single-family residence.

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling

The ALJ’s decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.

Burden of Proof: The petitioner was required to establish the HOA’s violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning proof that convinces the trier of fact the contention is more probably true than not.

Factual Determination: The judge found that the evidence, specifically the photos and plat map, demonstrated conclusively that the backflow flap was on the petitioner’s private property near her front door.

Conclusion on CC&Rs: Because the flap was determined not to be located within a common area, the petitioner failed to establish that it fell under the purview of Sections 12(c) or 12(h)(1). Therefore, she failed to prove the HOA had a responsibility to repair it under those sections.

Effect of Policy Rescission: The judge acknowledged, “It was extremely unfortunate that Petitioner experienced such a sewage overflow just after Respondent rescinded the Policy.” However, the ruling stated that once the policy was rescinded, the HOA “was not obligated to share the cost of repairs.”

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jennie Bennett’s Petition be dismissed.” The order is binding on the parties, with any appeal required to be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days of service.

Study Guide: Bennett v. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case text.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was the legal case number?

2. What specific sections of the community documents did Petitioner Jennie Bennett allege the Respondent had violated?

3. Describe the incident that prompted the dispute and the date on which it occurred.

4. What was the “Sewer Maintenance Policy,” when was it adopted, and when was it rescinded?

5. According to the Respondent’s manager, Vanessa Lubinsky, why was the repair Jennie Bennett’s financial responsibility?

6. What evidence did the Respondent present to prove the location of the malfunctioning backflow flap?

7. What steps did Jennie Bennett take to rally support from her neighbors after the Respondent did not address her concerns?

8. What is the legal standard for the burden of proof in this case, and which party does it fall on?

9. According to Section 12(c) of the CC&Rs, what specific areas is the Homeowners Association responsible for maintaining?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Jennie Bennett, represented by attorney Maxwell Riddiough. The Respondent was the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association, represented by attorney Nathan Tennyson. The case number was 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). This was noted as a single-issue petition.

3. On or about March 3, 2019, the Petitioner experienced a sewage overflow into her house. The overflow was caused by malfunctioning backflow valves.

4. The Sewer Maintenance Policy was a policy adopted in March 2017 to outline the process for sewage maintenance issues. It was rescinded by the HOA Board on February 13, 2019, shortly before the Petitioner’s incident.

5. Vanessa Lubinsky testified that the issue was the Petitioner’s responsibility because the malfunctioning backflow flap was located on her private property. Under Section 15 of the CC&Rs, homeowners are responsible for the maintenance of their own plumbing, electricity, and other utilities.

6. The Respondent presented a plat map, which specified all property lines, and photos. This evidence illustrated that the backflow flap was located inside the lines of the Petitioner’s private property, next to the walk-up to her front door, and not on common elements.

7. The Petitioner obtained 97 signatures on a “Grassroots petition.” The petition explained her situation and argued that she should be covered by the HOA for the repair due to the short time between the policy rescission and her incident, and because she had not received written notice.

8. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the proof must convince the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not. The burden of proof fell on the Petitioner, Jennie Bennett, to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations.

9. Section 12(c) states the Association is responsible for maintaining and landscaping front and side yards open to the street. It also specifies the Association’s duty to maintain sewer lines, sidewalks, walkways, brick trim, streets, and common recreation areas.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner Jennie Bennett’s Petition be dismissed. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated the CC&Rs.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, using specific evidence and arguments from the provided text to support your conclusions.

1. Analyze and contrast the core arguments presented by the Petitioner, Jennie Bennett, and the Respondent, Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association. How did each party use the CC&Rs and the Sewer Maintenance Policy to support their position?

2. Discuss the significance of the Sewer Maintenance Policy’s rescission. Evaluate the timing of the rescission relative to the Petitioner’s incident and the arguments made regarding notification to homeowners.

3. Explain the legal concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case document. How did Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera apply this standard to the evidence presented by both parties to reach a final decision?

4. Evaluate the role of physical evidence, specifically the plat map and photographs, in the outcome of this hearing. Why was determining the precise location of the backflow flap the central issue of the case?

5. From an ethical and community governance perspective, discuss the actions of the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association. Consider their decision to rescind the policy, the method of notification, and their initial responses (or lack thereof) to Ms. Bennett’s requests at the board meetings.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Antara Nath Rivera, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes legal decisions and orders.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Common Elements

Areas within the HOA community that are not part of an individual homeowner’s private property and are maintained by the Association. Examples from the text include walkways, sidewalks, streets, sewers, and recreation areas.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that outline the rules, obligations, and restrictions for a planned community. The Petitioner alleged a violation of Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of these documents.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The community organization, Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association, responsible for managing and maintaining the common elements of a planned community as defined by the CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Jennie Bennett.

Plat Map

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. In this case, it was used as evidence to specify all property lines, including the Petitioner’s.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Rescission

The act of canceling or revoking a policy or decision. The HOA Board rescinded its Sewer Maintenance Policy on February 13, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association.

A Homeowner’s Sewage Nightmare: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Losing Battle with an HOA

Introduction: The Dreaded HOA Letter

For many homeowners, the greatest fear isn’t a storm or a failing appliance; it’s a sudden, catastrophic repair bill. This anxiety is often magnified for those living in a planned community, where another layer of complexity—the Homeowners Association (HOA)—governs every aspect of property maintenance. A dispute with the HOA can turn a straightforward repair into a frustrating and expensive legal battle.

The case of Jennie Bennett, a resident in her home for 20 years, and the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association is a stark cautionary tale. After a sewage overflow caused by a malfunctioning backflow valve, Ms. Bennett found herself in a dispute with her HOA over who should pay for the repair, claiming the association had violated Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of its governing documents. The resulting legal decision reveals critical, and often surprising, insights into how HOA rules are interpreted and enforced. This article breaks down the five most impactful lessons from her losing battle.

1. Location is Everything: The Critical Line Between Private and Common Property

The single most important factor in the judge’s decision was the physical location of the broken part. The entire case hinged on a simple question: was the malfunctioning backflow flap on Jennie Bennett’s private property or in an HOA-maintained common area?

The HOA argued that the plat map and photos proved the flap was located “next to Petitioner’s walk up to her front door,” placing it squarely inside her private property line. While the homeowner claimed the HOA was responsible for “sewer lines” under Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), this argument failed. The HOA’s manager, Vanessa Lubinsky, perfectly synthesized the association’s legal position when she “opined that the backflow flap was a plumbing issue, not a sewer issue, because it was located on Petitioner’s private property.”

Because the backflow flap was deemed to be on private property, it fell under Section 15 of the CC&Rs. This clause stipulated that the homeowner was responsible for the maintenance of their own plumbing, electricity, and other utilities—much like the owner of a single-family residence. The specific location of the failure, not the general nature of the system it belonged to, determined financial responsibility.

2. An HOA ‘Policy’ Can Vanish Overnight

For nearly two years, from March 2017 to February 2019, the Catalina Del Rey HOA had a “Sewer Maintenance Policy” in place. This policy, which had been in effect for nearly two years, outlined a process for handling sewage maintenance; however, once rescinded, the HOA was no longer obligated to share in repair costs. The Board of Directors rescinded this policy on February 13, 2019. The petitioner’s sewage overflow occurred on March 3, 2019—less than three weeks later.

Crucially, the HOA’s action was not arbitrary. According to case testimony, the board rescinded the policy because, “After Respondent received additional legal guidance, it was determined that the backflow flaps were located within the homeowners’ units and on private property.” This reveals a critical insight: the HOA made a calculated, legally-informed decision to shift liability back to homeowners to align with the CC&Rs.

This also highlights the significant difference between a formal, recorded CC&R and a simple board policy. As the HOA manager clarified, rescinding the policy did not require a homeowner vote because it was not an amendment to the core CC&Rs. A board can unilaterally change a policy, altering the financial obligations of every resident without a community-wide vote.

3. The High Cost of “Extremely Unfortunate” Timing

The timing of the sewage backup, occurring just after the policy change, was a devastating coincidence for the homeowner. The administrative law judge acknowledged this directly in the final decision, stating:

It was extremely unfortunate that Petitioner experienced such a sewage overflow just after Respondent rescinded the Policy.

Compounding the issue was a dispute over communication. The petitioner claimed she “was not notified of the rescission.” In her efforts to be covered, she even gathered 97 signatures on a “Grassroots petition” from her neighbors. The petitioner claimed she received no substantive response from the board regarding her repair claim until her attorney sent a formal letter on May 22, 2019. The HOA countered this, stating that notice of the policy change had been sent to homeowners via both email and postcards.

This takeaway is impactful because it demonstrates how quickly a homeowner’s rights and financial obligations can change. A simple board decision, potentially missed in a stack of mail or an overlooked email, can result in thousands of dollars in unexpected costs.

4. The Burden of Proof Is on the Homeowner, Not the HOA

In any legal dispute, one side has the “burden of proof”—the responsibility to convince the judge that their claim is true. In this HOA case, that burden fell entirely on the petitioner, Jennie Bennett.

The legal standard required her to prove her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that is sufficient to persuade a judge that a claim is more likely true than not. The legal decision provides a clear definition:

“[t]he greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that the homeowner did not meet this standard. The final order states, “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the CC&Rs.” This underscores a critical point: when a homeowner challenges an HOA, it is their responsibility to build the winning case with convincing evidence.

Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Know Your Property Lines

The overarching lesson from Jennie Bennett’s experience is that in an HOA, the fine print matters immensely. The precise wording of the governing documents and, as this case proves, the exact location of property lines are paramount. A board policy you rely on today could be gone tomorrow, and a repair you assume is a community responsibility could be deemed yours based on a measurement of inches.

This case serves as a powerful reminder for all homeowners to be proactive. Read your CC&Rs, pay attention to all communications from your board, and understand the difference between binding covenants and changeable policies. It all comes down to one final, critical question: Do you know exactly where your maintenance responsibilities end and your HOA’s begin?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jennie Bennett (petitioner)
    Testified at hearing
  • Maxwell Riddiough (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (respondent attorney)
    Brown|Olcott, PLLC
  • Vanessa Lubinsky (property manager)
    Cadden Community Management
    Testified on behalf of Respondent
  • Daniel (staff)
    Cadden
    Informed Petitioner about policy rescission

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • JC Niles (witness)
    Mentioned in Petitioner's Grassroots petition

Joyce H Monsanto vs. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the HOA's architectural guideline limiting homeowners to one flagpole per lot, while permitting the display of both the U.S. flag and a military flag (Marine Corps flag) on that single pole, constitutes a reasonable rule under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B). The ALJ also found the Board complied with the 45-day requirement for a written appeal decision under CC&R § 7.9 by memorializing the denial in the draft meeting minutes posted by December 4, 2018,,.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joyce H Monsanto Counsel
Respondent Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808; CC&R § 7.9

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the HOA's architectural guideline limiting homeowners to one flagpole per lot, while permitting the display of both the U.S. flag and a military flag (Marine Corps flag) on that single pole, constitutes a reasonable rule under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B). The ALJ also found the Board complied with the 45-day requirement for a written appeal decision under CC&R § 7.9 by memorializing the denial in the draft meeting minutes posted by December 4, 2018,,.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on both statutory and CC&R violations,.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA's denial of application to install two flagpoles for US and military flags, and alleged failure to follow CC&R appeal process.

Petitioner challenged the HOA's denial of her request to install two flagpoles, arguing the restriction violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 (flag statute) and that the Board failed to provide a written decision on her appeal within 45 days as required by CC&R § 7.9, which she argued meant the request was deemed approved. The ALJ found the single flagpole restriction reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B) since both flags could be flown from one pole, and determined the Board satisfied the CC&R § 7.9 requirement by posting the decision in the meeting minutes within 45 days,.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied, as she failed to establish that the Respondent's Board should not have denied her application under A.R.S. § 33-1808 or CC&R § 7. The Board can properly find Petitioner in violation of Architectural Guidelines and order her to remove one of her two flagpoles.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag display, Architectural Guidelines, CC&Rs, Statutory compliance, Planned Communities Act, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R § 7

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919053-REL-RHG Decision – 749213.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:16 (163.6 KB)

19F-H1919053-REL-RHG Decision – 753595.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:19 (163.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal reasoning from the Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Joyce H. Monsanto versus the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (HOA). The central conflict revolves around the HOA’s denial of Ms. Monsanto’s request to install two separate flagpoles on her home to display the United States flag and the United States Marine Corps flag. The petitioner alleged this denial violated Arizona state law and the HOA’s own governing documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision established two critical points: first, that the HOA’s rule limiting homeowners to a single flagpole is a “reasonable” regulation on the “placement and manner of display” explicitly permitted under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1808(B), and does not constitute a prohibition of flag display. Second, the HOA was found to have complied with its own appeal process as outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The ALJ concluded that an oral denial at a board meeting, later documented in publicly posted meeting minutes, satisfied the CC&R’s requirement to “render its written decision” within a 45-day timeframe. The ruling affirms an HOA’s authority to enforce uniform aesthetic standards, provided they are reasonable and applied according to the association’s governing documents.

Case Background and Procedural History

The case was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) following a petition filed by homeowner Joyce H. Monsanto (“Petitioner”) against her HOA, Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (“Respondent”).

Initial Petition: On March 6, 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1803) and its CC&Rs (§ 7.9) by refusing to approve her request for two flagpoles.

First Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on May 30, 2019, after which the ALJ found that the Petitioner had not proven any violation by the HOA.

Rehearing: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing on August 22, 2019. This rehearing took place on October 21, 2019.

Amended Decision: On November 18, 2019, ALJ Diane Mihalsky issued an Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision, again denying the Petitioner’s petition and affirming the previous findings. The amendment was issued to correct a typographical error and clarify the parties’ appeal rights.

The Core Dispute: A Request for Two Flagpoles

The petitioner, whose husband and two sons have long careers in the U.S. Marines and Coast Guard, sought to display both the U.S. flag and the U.S. Marine Corps flag on her home.

The Application: On August 31, 2018, she submitted a Design Review Application to install two 6-foot-long flagpoles on the exterior wall of her house, flanking her front door.

The Rationale: The Petitioner stated her desire for two separate poles was for aesthetic reasons, believing the display would look better. She also expressed concern that a single, larger flagpole installed in her front yard would obstruct the view from her front window.

The Denial: On September 22, 2018, the HOA’s Architectural Committee issued a written Notice of Disapproval, citing the Architectural Guidelines which permit only one flagpole per lot.

The Appeal: On October 1, 2018, the Petitioner submitted a written appeal to the HOA Board, arguing the denial was unreasonable, that the guidelines were not uniformly enforced, and that the board could grant a waiver under CC&R § 7.6.

Governing Rules and Statutes

The case decision rested on the interpretation of Arizona state law and the HOA’s specific governing documents.

Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808

This statute governs the right of homeowners to display certain flags.

Protection of Display: Subsection A states that an association “shall not prohibit the outdoor… display” of the American flag or a military flag, among others.

Right to Regulate: Subsection B grants associations the authority to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations regarding the placement and manner of display.” It explicitly allows rules that “regulate the location and size of flagpoles,” “limit the member to displaying no more than two flags at once,” and limit flagpole height, while not prohibiting their installation.

HOA Architectural Guidelines

The community’s rules regarding flagpoles evolved but consistently maintained a key restriction.

Original Guideline (May 24, 2016): “Poles must not exceed 12’ in height, and only one flagpole is permitted per Lot.”

Amended Guideline (November 8, 2018): The board increased the maximum pole height to 20′ and added rules for nighttime illumination and inclement weather, but explicitly “did not change the limit of one flagpole per lot.”

HOA CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The procedural requirements for architectural review and appeals were central to the Petitioner’s claim.

Section 7.8 (Board Approval): Pertaining to initial applications, this section requires the Board to provide the owner with a “written response within sixty (60) days,” otherwise the request is deemed approved.

Section 7.9 (Appeal): Pertaining to appeals, this section requires the Board to consult with the Architectural Committee and “render its written decision” within 45 days. A failure by the Board to render a decision in this period “shall be deemed approval.” This section does not contain the same explicit language as § 7.8 requiring the response be provided to the owner.

Analysis of the Appeal Process and Conflicting Testimonies

A significant portion of the dispute centered on the events of the November 8, 2018, HOA Board meeting, where the Petitioner’s appeal was to be considered. The accounts of what transpired at this meeting were contradictory.

Petitioner’s Testimony (Joyce H. Monsanto)

Respondent’s Testimony (Anthony Nunziato, Board President)

Consultation

The board did not consult the Architectural Committee.

The board consulted with the Architectural Committee before the meeting.

Decision

The board did not consider or make any decision on her appeal.

The board considered the appeal and made a decision.

Notification

She was never told her appeal was denied at the meeting.

He was certain the board verbally informed the Petitioner that her appeal was denied at the meeting.

On December 4, 2018, draft minutes from the November 8 meeting were posted on the HOA’s website. The Petitioner acknowledged seeing them. These minutes included the following entry:

“[Petitioner’s] last request was for a waiver that would allow her to have two flagpoles on her property (one to fly the American flag and the other to fly the Marine flag). The Board rejected this request since our CC&Rs allow for the flying of both flags on a single flagpole.”

The Petitioner argued that these publicly posted draft minutes, which were not sent directly to her, did not constitute a valid written denial of her appeal under the CC&Rs.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s claims, relying on witness credibility, statutory interpretation, and contract construction principles.

Credibility Assessment

The ALJ made a clear determination on the conflicting testimonies regarding the November 8 meeting.

• Mr. Nunziato’s testimony that the board made a decision and informed the Petitioner was found to be “credible and supported by the minutes of the meeting.”

• The Petitioner’s testimony that the board made no decision on her appeal was deemed “incredible.”

Ruling on A.R.S. § 33-1808 (State Flag Law)

The ALJ concluded that the HOA’s one-flagpole rule did not violate state law.

• The rule was found to be a “reasonable rule or regulation under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B).”

• Because the Architectural Guidelines allow for flying two flags from a single flagpole up to 20′ long, the HOA was not prohibiting the display of flags, merely regulating the manner.

• The ALJ characterized the core issue as the “Petitioner’s petition is about her choice not to install a single flagpole for her own aesthetic reasons, not Respondent’s unreasonableness or lack of patriotism.”

Ruling on CC&R § 7.9 (Appeal Process)

The ALJ found that the HOA had followed the procedure required by its own CC&Rs.

Consultation: Based on Mr. Nunziato’s credible testimony, the board fulfilled its duty to consult with the Architectural Committee.

“Render a Decision”: The board “rendered a decision on her appeal at the November 8, 2018 board meeting” when it orally reached a decision.

“Written Decision”: The board created a “writing memorializing its decision” by documenting it in the meeting minutes. Because the Petitioner saw these minutes on December 4, 2018, this action occurred within the 45-day window following her October 1, 2018 appeal.

No Delivery Requirement: The ALJ applied the “negative implication cannon of contract construction.” By comparing CC&R § 7.9 (appeals) with § 7.8 (initial applications), the judge noted that § 7.9 lacks the explicit requirement to provide the written decision to the owner. Therefore, posting the minutes was sufficient, and the Petitioner’s request was not “deemed approved.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the ALJ issued a final, binding order.

IT IS ORDERED that the Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that the Respondent’s Board should not have denied her application to install two flagpoles on her property.

The decision concludes with a notice informing the parties that the order is binding and that any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA

This study guide provides a detailed review of the legal case Joyce H. Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG, as detailed in the Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision dated November 18, 2019. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, a corresponding answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What specific action did the Petitioner request from the Respondent that initiated this dispute?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent’s Architectural Committee initially deny the Petitioner’s request on September 22, 2018?

4. Identify the key Arizona statute cited in the case and explain its two main provisions regarding flag displays.

5. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument regarding the Respondent’s handling of her appeal under CC&R § 7.9?

6. According to the testimony of Board President Tony Nunziato, how did the Board address the Petitioner’s appeal at the November 8, 2018 meeting?

7. What documentary evidence did the Respondent use to support the claim that a decision on the appeal was made and written down within the required timeframe?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) find the Respondent’s one-flagpole rule to be legally permissible?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required for the Petitioner in this case, and did she meet it according to the ALJ?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case and its practical consequence for the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Joyce H. Monsanto, a homeowner. The Respondent is the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (HOA). Ms. Monsanto is a member of the Respondent HOA because she owns a house within its development in Sun City, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner submitted a Design Review Application to install two 6-foot-long flagpoles on the exterior wall of her house. She intended to fly the United States flag from one pole and the United States Marine Corps flag from the other.

3. The Architectural Committee denied the request because the community’s Architectural Guidelines only permitted one flagpole per lot. The written Notice of Disapproval explicitly stated this rule as the reason for the denial.

4. The key statute is A.R.S. § 33-1808. Its first provision, § 33-1808(A), prohibits an HOA from banning the display of the American flag and various military flags. The second provision, § 33-1808(B), allows an HOA to adopt reasonable rules regulating the placement, size, and number of flagpoles, explicitly permitting a limit of one flagpole per property.

5. The Petitioner argued that the Board violated CC&R § 7.9 because it failed to provide her with a formal written decision denying her appeal within the 45-day period. She contended that because she never received a dedicated letter, the request should have been “deemed approved” as stipulated in the CC&R for failure to render a timely decision.

6. Tony Nunziato testified that the Board did consult with the Architectural Committee regarding the appeal before the meeting. He stated with certainty that at the November 8, 2018 meeting, the Board considered the appeal and verbally informed Ms. Monsanto that her request for a waiver was denied.

7. The Respondent presented the draft minutes from the November 8, 2018 Board meeting, which were posted on the HOA’s website on December 4, 2018. These minutes explicitly stated that the Board rejected the Petitioner’s request for a waiver to have two flagpoles, fulfilling the requirement to have a written record of the decision within 45 days of her October 1 appeal.

8. The ALJ found the rule permissible because A.R.S. § 33-1808(B) explicitly grants HOAs the authority to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations” which may “regulate the location and size of flagpoles” and “shall not prohibit the installation of a flagpole.” Since the HOA’s guidelines allowed for one flagpole up to 20 feet long, capable of flying two flags, the judge concluded the rule was reasonable under the statute.

9. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that her contention was more probably true than not. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner did not meet this burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated any statute or its own CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied the Petitioner’s petition. The practical consequence is that the HOA’s denial of her application for two flagpoles was upheld, and the Board could therefore properly find her in violation of the Architectural Guidelines and order her to remove one of her two flagpoles.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1808(A), which protects a homeowner’s right to display military flags, and § 33-1808(B), which grants HOAs regulatory power. How did the Administrative Law Judge balance these two provisions to reach a conclusion in this case?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to the Petitioner. Detail the specific claims made by Joyce Monsanto and explain why, according to the legal decision, she failed to establish them by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

3. Examine the procedural dispute surrounding CC&R § 7.9. Contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of a “written decision” with the interpretation ultimately adopted by the Administrative Law Judge, referencing the role of the verbal notification and the meeting minutes.

4. Evaluate the role of testimony and credibility in this administrative hearing. Compare and contrast the testimony provided by Petitioner Joyce Monsanto and Respondent’s Board President Tony Nunziato regarding the events of the November 8, 2018 board meeting, and explain why the judge found Mr. Nunziato’s account more credible.

5. Based on the facts presented, construct an argument that the HOA’s actions, while legally permissible according to the judge, were inconsistent with the patriotic values of its community, which includes many retired military members. Conversely, construct an argument defending the Board’s decision as a necessary and fair application of rules essential for maintaining community standards.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition in Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues legal decisions. In this case, Diane Mihalsky served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. § 33-1808

An Arizona Revised Statute that governs the display of flags in planned communities. It forbids HOAs from prohibiting certain flags (like the U.S. and military flags) but permits them to establish reasonable rules regarding the number, size, and location of flagpoles.

Architectural Committee

A committee established by the HOA’s CC&Rs responsible for reviewing and approving or disapproving homeowners’ applications for external modifications to their property, such as installing flagpoles.

Architectural Guidelines

The specific rules adopted by the HOA that set forth requirements for property modifications. In this case, the guidelines limited each lot to one flagpole, with a maximum height of 20 feet.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. The Petitioner, Joyce Monsanto, bore the burden of proof to show the HOA had violated the law or its own rules.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that create the rules for a planned community. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9, which outlines the appeal process for disapproved architectural applications.

Declarant

The original developer of a planned community who establishes the initial CC&Rs. In this case, K. Hovnanian was the Declarant for Four Seasons at the Manor.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing organization in a planned community responsible for enforcing the CC&Rs and managing common areas. The Respondent, Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association, is an HOA.

Negative Implication

A principle of legal interpretation which holds that the explicit inclusion of one thing implies the intentional exclusion of another. The ALJ used this to argue that because CC&R § 7.9 (appeals) does not specify that a written decision must be sent to the owner, unlike CC&R § 7.8 (initial applications), that requirement should not be read into the appeal rule.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent Arizona state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, providing an impartial forum to resolve disputes.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Joyce H. Monsanto is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required in this civil case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact (the judge) that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association is the Respondent.

Restrictive Covenant

A legally enforceable rule within the CC&Rs that limits what a homeowner can do with their property. The rule limiting homes to one flagpole is an example of a restrictive covenant.

Waiver

The act of intentionally relinquishing a known right or claim. The Petitioner argued that the HOA board could, and should, have waived the one-flagpole rule for her under CC&R § 7.6.

HOA vs. Military Family: 4 Lessons from a Legal Battle Over a Flagpole

For Joyce Monsanto, a member of a dedicated military family, displaying her patriotism was a matter of pride. Her husband served 25 years in the Marines, and her two sons have spent decades in the Marines and the Coast Guard. Naturally, she wanted to fly both the flag of the United States and the flag of the U.S. Marine Corps at her Arizona home. But when she submitted her plan to her Homeowners Association (HOA), she was met with a firm “no.”

The conflict wasn’t about the flags themselves. The Four Seasons at the Manor HOA had no issue with her displaying both. The dispute centered on how she wanted to display them. It was a disagreement over her vision for a symmetrical, two-pole display versus the HOA’s “one flagpole per lot” rule. This architectural dispute escalated from a simple request into a formal administrative hearing.

Ms. Monsanto’s fight reveals several surprising truths about the power of HOA rules and the specific language written into state law. Her case ultimately failed on two fronts—a substantive challenge to the rule itself, and a procedural challenge to how the HOA handled her appeal. Here’s what every homeowner can learn from each.

1. Your Right to Fly the Flag Has Limits—And They’re Written into Law.

Many homeowners believe the right to fly the American flag is unconditional. However, the legal reality is more nuanced. While Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1808) prevents an HOA from outright prohibiting the display of U.S. or military flags, it explicitly allows the association to create “reasonable rules and regulations” for their placement and manner of display.

The statute is specific about what these rules can cover. An HOA can legally regulate the size and location of flagpoles and can limit a homeowner to displaying no more than two flags at once. In this case, the HOA’s architectural guidelines permitted two flags, but only on a single flagpole. The Administrative Law Judge found this “one flagpole per lot” rule was a “reasonable” regulation and therefore perfectly legal. To underscore that the HOA’s stance was not about a lack of patriotism, the judge noted testimony that the HOA president himself “placed 140 small flags on his property” for Memorial Day. The issue was about the uniform enforcement of an architectural rule, not the patriotic display itself.

2. Your Personal Taste Is No Match for the Community Rulebook.

During the hearing, Ms. Monsanto acknowledged that she could fly both of her flags from a single pole as the HOA rules allowed. Her reason for wanting two poles was a matter of personal preference. She testified that she “wanted to install two flagpoles for aesthetic reasons” and also felt that a single pole placed in the middle of her lot would block the view from her front window.

The judge was unmoved by this line of reasoning. In the final decision, the response was direct and unambiguous:

Petitioner’s petition is about her choice not to install a single flagpole for her own aesthetic reasons, not Respondent’s unreasonableness or lack of patriotism.

This is a foundational principle of community association law: homeowners trade a degree of personal autonomy for the perceived benefits of uniform standards and predictable property values. The judge’s decision simply reaffirms that bargain. In the world of planned communities, the established rulebook will almost always outweigh an individual’s personal taste.

3. In HOA Law, the Appeal Isn’t a Re-do—It’s a Different Process.

One of Ms. Monsanto’s key arguments was procedural. She believed her appeal should have been automatically approved because the HOA failed to provide a written decision within the 45-day deadline stipulated in its own rules (CC&R § 7.9). This is where the judge identified a subtle but crucial legal distinction buried in the HOA’s governing documents.

The HOA’s CC&Rs had two different sections for architectural requests:

CC&R § 7.8 (Initial Requests): This section explicitly required the Board to “inform the submitting party of the final decision” with a “written response.”

CC&R § 7.9 (Appeals): This section, however, only required the Board to “render its written decision” within 45 days.

That small difference in wording—”written response” versus “written decision”—was the linchpin of her procedural case. The judge ruled that for an appeal, the HOA was not required to send a personal letter or direct notice to Ms. Monsanto. It only had to create a written record of its decision within the timeframe.

4. A Post on an HOA Website Can Count as an Official “Written Decision.”

The final surprise came down to what constitutes a “written decision” and how the deadline was met. Ms. Monsanto was waiting for a formal letter informing her that her appeal had been denied. She never received one. Her appeal was filed on October 1, 2018, starting a 45-day clock.

The judge found the HOA satisfied its obligation in a two-step process:

1. The Decision: The Board verbally denied her appeal during its public meeting on November 8, 2018. This action, which occurred 38 days after her appeal, fulfilled the requirement to “render its decision” within the 45-day period.

2. The Writing: That decision was then recorded in the draft meeting minutes, which were posted on the Board’s website on December 4, 2018. Ms. Monsanto acknowledged seeing the posted minutes.

The judge ruled that these online minutes satisfied the separate legal requirement for a “writing memorializing its decision.” Even though they weren’t sent directly to her, the publicly posted minutes served as the official record of the timely denial of her appeal, closing the final door on her argument for automatic approval.

Conclusion: Before You Plant Your Flag, Read the Fine Print

Joyce Monsanto’s case is a cautionary tale on two levels. First, it shows that even cherished rights like displaying the flag are subject to reasonable, neutrally-applied community rules. Second, and more critically, it demonstrates that procedural arguments live and die by the most precise definitions in the governing documents. A single word can be the difference between winning an appeal and being ordered to take your flagpole down.

This case came down to the difference between a “written response” and a “written decision”—do you know what the fine print says about your rights in your community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joyce H Monsanto (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Anthony Nunziato (board member)
    Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association
    President of the Board of Directors; also referred to as 'Tony'
  • Annette McCraw (property manager)
    Community Manager/Trestle Management (implied)
    Sent Notice of Disapproval on behalf of Respondent
  • Marc Vasquez (HOA representative)
    Addressed Petitioner's claim regarding violation letters at the Board meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:21:58 (69.0 KB)

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 741807.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:22:08 (78.9 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

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I. Case Overview

Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

Decision Date: January 30, 2020

Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG). The guide includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information in the provided source text.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action taken by Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen initiated the dispute with the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association?

3. What was Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument for why the HOA’s Flag Display Rule was invalid?

4. On what authority did the Carter Ranch HOA claim it had the right to create and enforce its Flag Display Rule?

5. According to the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule,” which specific flags are homeowners permitted to fly?

6. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this hearing, and how is it defined in the decision?

7. What protection does Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1808(C) provide for “political signs”?

8. What were the two key failures of the petitioner’s case, as identified in the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law?

9. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

10. What are the next steps for a party wishing to challenge the Administrative Law Judge’s order?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Van Dan Elzen represented himself, while the HOA was represented by its attorney, Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

2. The dispute began on or about May 21, 2019, when the Carter Ranch HOA notified Mr. Van Dan Elzen that he had violated its rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag in his front yard. This notice of violation prompted Mr. Van Dan Elzen to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument was that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the community’s Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He contended that because CC&R section 3.14 only defines “SIGNS” and makes no reference to “Flags,” the HOA had no basis in the CC&Rs to regulate his flag.

4. The Carter Ranch HOA asserted its authority based on Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the HOA Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to the health, safety, or welfare of the owners and restrictions on the use of Lots.

5. The HOA’s Flag Display Rule prohibits flying any flag other than the American Flag, an official replica of a U.S. military flag (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), a POW/MIA flag, an Arizona Indian National flag, the Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

6. The petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

7. A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) prevents an HOA from prohibiting the display of political signs on a member’s property, although it allows for regulation. An HOA cannot prohibit political signs earlier than 71 days before an election or later than three days after, and its rules on size and number can be no more restrictive than applicable city or county ordinances.

8. The Judge concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the Flag Display Rule was improperly adopted or inconsistent with the CC&Rs. Furthermore, the Judge concluded that the petitioner had not actually alleged that Carter Ranch violated the specific statute he cited, A.R.S. § 33-1808.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by state statutes.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are designed to encourage a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument that the Flag Display Rule was invalid because the word “flag” does not appear in the CC&Rs. Why was this argument ultimately unconvincing to the Administrative Law Judge?

2. Explain the legal distinction between a “flag” and a “political sign” as presented in A.R.S. § 33-1808. How might the petitioner’s case have differed if he had argued his “Trump 2020” flag was a “political sign” instead of a flag?

3. Discuss the authority granted to the Carter Ranch HOA Board by Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. How did the HOA use this section to justify its Flag Display Rule, and why was this justification accepted by the court?

4. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the petitioner “has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” How can this be true when the petitioner’s initial filing explicitly cited this statute?

5. Based on the provided text of A.R.S. § 33-1808, under what specific circumstances could a homeowner in Carter Ranch successfully challenge the HOA’s rules on outdoor displays?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ in the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. The case centered on an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or subdivision. The Carter Ranch CC&Rs grant the HOA Board the authority to adopt rules and regulations.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.

Flag Display Rule

The specific rule created by the Carter Ranch HOA that prohibits flying any flag other than the American, military, POW/MIA, Arizona Indian National, Arizona State, and Gadsden flags.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Carter Ranch Homeowners Association is the Respondent in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, the petitioner is Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Political Sign

Defined by A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.” HOAs are restricted in their ability to prohibit the display of such signs.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it,” meaning the fact is more probable than not.

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent (Carter Ranch HOA) to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues. This case was decided as a result of a rehearing held on January 10, 2020.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the complaint. In this case, the respondent is the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

He Fought the HOA Over a Political Flag—And Lost. Here Are 3 Surprising Reasons Why.

Introduction: The Pride and the Problem

Imagine this: You want to display a flag on your own property to support a political candidate. It feels like a fundamental right, an expression of free speech on your home turf. But then, a letter arrives from your Homeowners Association (HOA) citing you for a violation. This exact scenario happened to Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who displayed a “Trump 2020” flag and promptly received a violation notice from the Carter Ranch HOA in Arizona.

Believing the HOA was overstepping its authority, Mr. Van Dan Elzen took them to court. He lost. The outcome might seem counter-intuitive, but the court’s decision reveals crucial lessons for any homeowner living under an HOA. Here are the three surprising legal reasons why the HOA won.

1. The Power of the Fine Print: Why a “Loophole” Wasn’t Enough

Mr. Van Dan Elzen built his case on a clever textual argument. He alleged that the HOA’s rule against his flag was invalid because the section of the master community documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—he believed it was based on only regulated “SIGNS” and made no mention of “FLAGS.” He argued that since the document didn’t explicitly prohibit flags, the rule against his was unenforceable.

This seemingly logical “loophole” argument failed. The HOA countered by pointing to a different, much broader clause in their CC&Rs. Article V, Section 5.3, gave the HOA board expansive power to create new rules.

The Board may, from time to time, adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to: … (iii) the health, safety or welfare of the owners, Lessees and Residence, or (iv) restrictions on the use of Lots…

This general power to create rules for the “welfare of the owners” was enough to give the HOA the legal authority to regulate flags, even if the word “flag” wasn’t in the specific section the homeowner cited. The broad power to govern trumped the narrow, semantic argument.

2. A Flag Is Not a Sign (At Least, Not According to the Law)

While the homeowner’s flag was political in nature, it did not receive the legal protections granted to “political signs” under Arizona law. This distinction proved fatal to his case.

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808, is highly specific about which flags an HOA is forbidden from prohibiting. The protected list includes: the American flag, official military branch flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, Arizona Indian nations flags, and the Gadsden flag. Critically, the Carter Ranch HOA’s own Flag Display Rule mirrored this state-approved list exactly, demonstrating they had aligned their regulations with the law. A political campaign flag, like “Trump 2020,” is not on this protected list.

The same law does protect political signs, but it defines them very precisely:

“political sign” means a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing the recall of a public officer or supporting or opposing the circulation of a petition for a ballot measure, question or proposition or the recall of a public officer.

The key takeaway is that the law treats a political flag differently from a political sign. Because the “Trump 2020” item was a flag and not on the state’s protected flag list, the HOA was well within its rights to restrict its display based on its own community rules.

3. A Critical Misstep: Arguing the Wrong Point

The most decisive reason for the loss was not a procedural error, but a substantive legal failure. Mr. Van Dan Elzen filed his petition with the state on the grounds that the HOA had violated a specific state law, A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and political signs.

However, his entire case was built on arguing that the HOA’s internal rules were inconsistent with its own CC&Rs—the “sign” versus “flag” argument. This was the wrong legal target. To win, he had to prove that the HOA had violated the state statute. But the statute explicitly allows an HOA to regulate any flag not on the protected list. By regulating his “Trump 2020” flag, the HOA was doing exactly what the state law permitted. His argument about internal documents, even if correct, did not add up to a violation of the state law he sued under.

The Administrative Law Judge recognized this fundamental flaw, concluding that the homeowner hadn’t actually made a case for a statutory violation at all.

Moreover, Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

This is a crucial lesson: it’s not enough to feel wronged. Your argument must directly prove that the specific law you cite in your complaint has actually been broken. The homeowner’s claim was dismissed because his central argument was irrelevant to the law he needed to prove was violated.

Conclusion: Know Your Rights, and Your Rules

The case of the “Trump 2020” flag is a powerful illustration for homeowners everywhere. It highlights three critical realities of living in an HOA: the broad rule-making power granted by community documents can override perceived loopholes; state laws make very specific and narrow distinctions between protected items like signs and flags; and a sound legal strategy is paramount.

This case is a stark reminder that in an HOA, your property rights are defined not by what you feel is right, but by what is written down. Before you make a stand, are you certain you’re fighting the right battle on the right legal ground?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Augustus H. Shaw IV (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines LLC
    Appeared for Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Dustin Snow (property manager)
    SNOW PROPERTY SERVICES
    Recipient of order transmission

David & Brenda Norman v. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919051-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner David and Brenda Norman Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Lago Community Association Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) / Common Project Guidelines § 3.11(D)(1)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by David and Brenda Norman against Rancho Del Lago Community Association, finding that the Department of Real Estate did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, as it was essentially a conflict between neighboring owners (Petitioners and Hendersons) regarding a wall.

Why this result: The Department lacked jurisdiction over the dispute among or between owners, per A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation by HOA approving a block wall built by neighbors (Hendersons)

Petitioners alleged that Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) by approving a block wall built by their next-door neighbors, the Hendersons, and requested the Department require the Hendersons to permit Petitioners to connect to the wall or require the Hendersons to tear the wall down.

Orders: The petition was dismissed because the Department lacked jurisdiction to hear a dispute primarily among or between owners to which the association is not a party, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, HOA Governance, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), Party Wall, Neighbor Dispute, CC&Rs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 737050.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:28 (40.9 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 710478.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:32 (150.0 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 711115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:36 (149.9 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 710478.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:06 (150.0 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 711115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:10 (149.9 KB)

Case Briefing: Norman v. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919051-REL, involving homeowners David and Brenda Norman (Petitioners) and the Rancho Del Lago Community Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute centers on the Petitioners’ allegation that the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) violated community guidelines by approving a wall built by the Petitioners’ neighbors, the Hendersons.

The Petitioners claimed the Henderson’s wall, constructed 6 inches inside the property line, created a situation where any wall they might build on their property would be a “closely parallel wall,” which is prohibited by the community’s Common Project Guidelines § 3.11(D)(1). They requested that the Respondent either force the Hendersons to allow the Petitioners to connect to their wall, effectively making it a shared “party wall,” or compel the Hendersons to demolish it.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition entirely. The primary legal basis for the dismissal was a lack of jurisdiction; under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1), the Arizona Department of Real Estate cannot hear disputes solely between homeowners in which the association is not a party. The judge concluded this was fundamentally a neighbor-versus-neighbor conflict. Furthermore, the judge characterized the wall the Petitioners sought to build as an “archetypical spite fence” and noted that the Petitioners had failed to prove the Respondent had violated any community documents.

Case Overview

Parties and Key Entities

Name/Entity

Description

Petitioners

David and Brenda Norman

Homeowners in the Rancho Del Lago Community.

Respondent

Rancho Del Lago Community Association

The homeowners’ association (HOA) for the community.

Neighbors

The Hendersons

The Petitioners’ next-door neighbors who built the disputed wall.

Management Co.

Management Solutions

The company managing the Respondent HOA.

Witness (Respondent)

Spencer Brod

Employee of Management Solutions overseeing the Respondent’s affairs.

Administrative Law Judge

Diane Mihalsky

Presiding judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Regulating Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

State agency authorized to hear certain HOA disputes.

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings

Independent state agency that conducted the evidentiary hearing.

Procedural Details

Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H1919051-REL

Petition Filed

On or about February 28, 2019

Hearing Date

May 8, 2019

Amended Decision Date

May 28, 2019

Timeline of Key Events

December 2003: The Respondent’s ARC adopts the Common Project Guidelines, which govern all exterior improvements.

March 8, 2017: The Hendersons submit an Architectural Variance Request (AVR) to extend the common wall between their property and the Petitioners’. Mrs. Norman signs the request, giving consent. The ARC approves this request.

April 27, 2017: The Hendersons submit a new AVR to build a wall extension 6 inches inside their property line, making it a private wall rather than a shared party wall. The record suggests Mrs. Norman may have rescinded her earlier approval for the common wall.

May 10, 2017: The ARC approves the Hendersons’ request to build the wall 6 inches inside their property line.

September 5, 2017: The Petitioners submit an AVR to build an 11-foot wide concrete driveway. The ARC denies the request.

Post-September 5, 2017: Despite the denial, the Petitioners construct the 11-foot wide driveway and are subsequently issued a Notice of Violation by the Respondent.

September 7, 2017: The Petitioners submit an AVR to build a wall extension on their property, positioned at least 3 feet away from the Hendersons’ wall.

October 13, 2017: The ARC approves the Petitioners’ wall extension request.

Post-October 13, 2017: The Petitioners decide not to build the approved wall, stating their contractor advised them against “giving up” the 3 feet of property that would lie between the two walls.

By November 2017: The Hendersons’ wall appears to have been constructed.

February 28, 2019: The Petitioners file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Respondent violated community rules.

March 27, 2019: The Petitioners file a new AVR to build a wall directly on the property line. This request did not include the Hendersons’ required consent and was still pending at the time of the hearing.

Governing Documents and Key Provisions

The dispute and subsequent legal decision referenced several specific articles from the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Common Project Guidelines.

Document

Provision

Description

Article I § (p)

Defines “Party Walls” built on a property line, establishing equal right of use, joint responsibility for maintenance and repair, and a process for the Board to resolve disputes over construction or cost-sharing.

Article II § 2(a)

Requires prior written approval from the ARC for any improvements that alter the exterior appearance of a property.

Article XII § 1

Establishes the ARC, noting that its decisions are “sole, absolute and final on all matters submitted to it.”

Common Project Guidelines

Section 3.11(D)(1)

States that “Closely parallel walls shall be disapproved.” The term “closely parallel” is not defined in the guidelines. This provision was the central focus of the Petitioners’ complaint.

Common Project Guidelines

Section 4.21

Grants the ARC the right “to waive, vary, or otherwise modify any of the standards or procedures set forth herein at its discretion, for good cause shown.”

Summary of Testimony and Evidence

Testimony of Brenda Norman (Petitioner)

Motivation for Wall: Stated that she and her husband are in law enforcement and want to enclose their side yard to protect utility meters from potential vandalism.

Reason for Not Building Approved Wall: Explained that their contractor advised them it was “crazy to give up the 3’ of property” that would be inaccessible between their proposed wall and the Hendersons’ wall.

Relationship with Neighbors: Acknowledged that the Petitioners “do not get along very well with the Hendersons” and therefore never asked for their consent for a wall on the property line.

Belief Regarding Parallel Walls: Believes that if she submitted a plan for a wall just inside her property line, it would be denied under the “close parallel wall” rule.

Requested Action: Opined that the Respondent should force the Hendersons to tear down their wall because it is not uniformly 6 inches from the property line.

Testimony of Spencer Brod (for Respondent)

HOA Policy: Testified that the HOA “never gets involved in disputes between neighbors” and that it is the homeowner’s responsibility to obtain neighbor consent for common wall projects.

Party vs. Private Walls: Explained that neighbor consent is required only for “party walls” on the property line due to shared maintenance liability. The Hendersons’ wall was approved because it was on their own property and therefore not a party wall.

Enforcement and Inspection: Admitted that the Hendersons’ wall may not be uniformly 6 inches from the line but stated the Respondent has no one to perform a “thorough inspection” and had not sent a violation letter.

“Closely Parallel Walls” Interpretation: Testified that while the term is undefined, the ARC’s approval of the Petitioners’ plan for a wall 3 feet away indicates that “closely parallel” means a distance of less than 3 feet.

Petitioners’ Unauthorized Construction: Confirmed that the Respondent sent the Petitioners a Notice of Violation for building a driveway that the ARC had explicitly denied.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The judge’s decision was based on a detailed analysis of the evidence, governing documents, and relevant state law.

1. Jurisdictional Failure: The primary reason for dismissal was a lack of jurisdiction. The judge cited A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1), which explicitly states, “The department does not have jurisdiction to hear [a]ny dispute among or between owners to which the association is not a party.” The judge determined this was a quintessential neighbor dispute, not a dispute with the HOA.

2. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated its own rules. The judge found they failed to do so.

3. Characterization as a “Spite Fence”: The decision describes the wall the Petitioners wish to build as an “archetypical spite fence between neighbors who cannot agree to mutually work for the improvement of their adjacent properties.”

4. HOA’s Limited Role: The judge affirmed that neither the CC&Rs nor the Common Project Guidelines compel the HOA to mediate or resolve disputes between neighbors by taking a side.

5. Distinction of Wall Types: The analysis distinguished between a party wall on a property line, which requires neighbor consent, and a private wall built entirely on one owner’s property, which does not. The Hendersons’ wall was approved as the latter.

6. Hypothetical Outcome: A concluding footnote in the decision states that even if the Department had jurisdiction, the Petitioners had not established that Guideline 3.11(D)(1) would authorize or require the Respondent to grant the relief they requested.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that the petition filed by David and Brenda Norman against the Respondent, Rancho Del Lago Community Association, is dismissed. The dismissal is based on the finding that the Arizona Department of Real Estate does not have jurisdiction to hear their dispute with the Hendersons.

Study Guide: Norman v. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

This guide is designed to review the administrative legal case between homeowners David and Brenda Norman and their homeowners’ association, the Rancho Del Lago Community Association, concerning a dispute over a neighbor’s wall.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing only from the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central violation of the homeowners’ association rules alleged by the Petitioners in their February 28, 2019, petition?

2. Identify the three main groups of individuals or entities involved in the dispute: the Petitioners, the Respondent, and the neighbors.

3. According to the Respondent’s CC&Rs, what is a “Party Wall” and what primary responsibility does it create for adjacent homeowners?

4. Describe the two separate wall-related Architectural Variance Requests (AVRs) submitted by the Hendersons in March and April of 2017.

5. Why did the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) initially deny the Petitioners’ request to build a new driveway, and what was the outcome of this denial?

6. What is the role of the “Declarant” within the Rancho Del Lago Community Association, and what influence do they hold over the board and the ARC?

7. The ARC approved a wall proposal for the Petitioners on October 13, 2017. Why did the Petitioners choose not to build this approved wall?

8. According to the CC&Rs, what is the ultimate authority of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) in rendering its decisions?

9. On what legal grounds did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss the Petitioners’ case?

10. Who bore the “burden of proof” in this hearing, and what does this legal standard require?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The Petitioners alleged that the Respondent (the homeowners’ association) violated Section 3.11(D)(1) of the Common Project Guidelines. This section states that “closely parallel walls shall be disapproved,” and the Petitioners argued that the association violated this rule by approving the wall built by their neighbors, the Hendersons.

2. The Petitioners were homeowners David and Brenda Norman. The Respondent was the Rancho Del Lago Community Association. The neighbors, who were central to the dispute but not a party to the case, were the Hendersons.

3. A “Party Wall” is a wall situated on the property line between two or more contiguous lots. It creates a shared right of use and a joint obligation for all adjoining owners to rebuild and repair the wall at their shared expense.

4. The Hendersons first submitted an AVR on March 8, 2017, to extend the existing common party wall, for which Mrs. Norman gave consent. On April 27, 2017, they submitted a different AVR to build a new wall located entirely on their property, 6 inches inside the property line, which did not require the Normans’ consent.

5. The ARC denied the Petitioners’ September 5, 2017, request for an 11-foot wide driveway because a driveway already existed on the opposite side of the house where the garage was located. Despite the denial, the Petitioners built the driveway anyway, which resulted in the Respondent issuing them a Notice of Violation.

6. The “Declarant” is the original developer that built the subdivision. At the time of the hearing, the Respondent association was still under the control of the Declarant, who appointed all three directors of the board and was also a member of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

7. The Petitioners did not build the approved wall because the plan required it to be built at least 3 feet inside their property line to avoid being a party wall. Their contractor advised them they would be “crazy to give up the 3’ of property” that would lie between their new wall and the Hendersons’ wall.

8. According to Article XII, § 1 of the CC&Rs, “the decision of the [ARC] shall be sole, absolute and final on all matters submitted to it pursuant to this Declaration and/or the Design Guidelines.”

9. The judge dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1), the Arizona Department of Real Estate does not have jurisdiction to hear disputes between owners to which the association is not a party. The judge framed the issue as a private dispute between the Normans and the Hendersons.

10. The Petitioners (the Normans) bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the community rules. This standard, known as a “preponderance of the evidence,” requires presenting evidence that is more convincing and more likely true than not.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts and rules from the case documents to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the concept of a “Party Wall” versus a privately-owned wall within the context of this case. How did the distinction between these two types of walls become the central point of contention and influence the decisions made by the Hendersons, the Normans, and the ARC?

2. Discuss the powers and limitations of the Rancho Del Lago Community Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) as outlined in the CC&Rs and Common Project Guidelines. How did the ARC’s discretionary authority, particularly under Section 4.21 of the guidelines, impact the events of this dispute?

3. Trace the timeline of Architectural Variance Requests (AVRs) submitted by both the Normans and the Hendersons. Evaluate how the sequence of approvals, denials, and unbuilt projects contributed to the escalation of the dispute and ultimately led to the legal hearing.

4. Explain the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision. Why was the concept of “jurisdiction” more critical to the outcome than the merits of the Normans’ claim regarding “closely parallel walls”? Refer to the specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) cited in the decision.

5. The judge described the potential wall the Petitioners wish to build as an “archetypical spite fence.” Based on the testimony and evidence presented in the case, argue for or against this characterization.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders decisions on disputes involving state agencies.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee established by the Declarant and governed by the CC&Rs, responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any proposed improvements that alter the exterior appearance of properties within the community. Its decisions are described as “sole, absolute and final.”

Architectural Variance Request (AVR)

The formal application submitted by a homeowner to the ARC to request approval for an exterior improvement or modification to their property.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (the Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations regarding violations of community documents.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The legal documents that establish the rules, regulations, and obligations for homeowners within a planned community like Rancho Del Lago.

Closely Parallel Walls

A term from Section 3.11(D)(1) of the Common Project Guidelines that are to be disapproved. The term is not explicitly defined, but testimony suggests a wall 3 feet from another would be approved, making the threshold for “close” less than that.

Common Project Guidelines

A set of rules adopted by the ARC in December 2003 that govern all exterior improvements and provide standards for the Design Review Process. These guidelines supplement the CC&Rs.

Declarant

The original developer that built the subdivision. In this case, the Declarant still controlled the association’s Board of Directors and the ARC.

Jurisdiction

The legal authority of a court or agency to hear and decide a case. The petition was dismissed because the Department was found to lack jurisdiction over disputes solely between homeowners.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted by an Administrative Law Judge.

Party Wall

As defined in the CC&Rs, a wall on the property line between contiguous lots. Owners have equal rights to use it and share joint financial responsibility for its repair and maintenance.

Petitioners

The party that initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, homeowners David and Brenda Norman.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this civil administrative hearing. It means the evidence presented must be sufficient to convince the judge that a claim is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Lago Community Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document (like a CC&R) that limits the use of the property. Arizona law holds that unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

The Six-Inch Wall That Ignited a Legal Battle: 4 Shocking Lessons from a Brutal HOA War

1.0 Introduction: The Neighbor Next Door

Living next to someone is a universal experience, and it’s remarkable how quickly a small disagreement over a fence or a property line can spiral into a full-blown conflict. For two families in an Arizona HOA, what started as a plan for a backyard wall ended in a formal administrative law hearing, providing a stark case study in property law, association rules, and human nature.

This dispute, involving homeowners David and Brenda Norman and their neighbors, the Hendersons, dissects four critical lessons that challenge common assumptions about homeowner rights and association duties. Their story is a powerful cautionary tale about property lines, HOA authority, and the high cost of a neighborhood war.

2.0 Takeaway 1: The Six-Inch Difference That Changes Everything

1. A Wall on the Property Line Isn’t the Same as a Wall Near It

In property law, inches are everything. The community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) defined a “Party Wall” as a structure sitting directly on the property line between two lots. By this definition, these walls are a shared responsibility, requiring mutual consent from both homeowners for construction and shared costs for maintenance.

This distinction became the pivot on which the entire case turned. Initially, the Hendersons submitted plans to build a shared Party Wall, and the Normans gave their required consent. But then the plan changed. The Hendersons withdrew that request and submitted a new one: to build a wall located just six inches inside their own property line. The record doesn’t state definitively why the Hendersons changed their plan, though testimony suggested the Normans may have rescinded their initial consent.

This was a masterstroke of procedural navigation; by sacrificing a mere six inches of their yard, the Hendersons effectively bought the legal right to build without their neighbors’ consent, turning a potential year-long dispute into a matter of a simple ARC approval. By moving the structure entirely onto their own lot, it was no longer a “Party Wall” but their private property. While the Hendersons had successfully navigated the HOA’s rules, the Normans’ next step was to try and force the HOA to intervene directly—a move that would expose a common misunderstanding about the limits of an association’s power.

3.0 Takeaway 2: Your HOA Isn’t the Neighborhood Referee

2. The HOA’s Power to Intervene Has Surprising Limits

A common assumption among homeowners is that the HOA must mediate any and all disputes between residents. This case proves that assumption is fundamentally incorrect.

When the conflict escalated, the HOA’s position was unwavering. Spencer Brod, an employee of the association’s management company, testified that the association “never gets involved in disputes between neighbors.” Its role is to enforce community rules as they relate to the association, not to take sides in personal conflicts between homeowners.

The Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case reinforced this legal reality, citing Arizona law to clarify the limits of both the HOA’s and the state’s jurisdiction. The judge’s finding was unequivocal:

Neither the CC&Rs nor the Common Project Guidelines require Respondent [the HOA] to mediate or resolve a dispute between neighbors by taking one side or the other. A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1) provides that ‘[t]he department does not have jurisdiction to hear [a]ny dispute among or between owners to which the association is not a party.’

This finding is a crucial lesson: while an HOA enforces its governing documents, it is not a neighborhood court and cannot be compelled to referee personal disagreements.

4.0 Takeaway 3: You Can’t Demand a Neighbor Play by the Rules If You Don’t

3. Coming to the Table with Clean Hands Matters

The case contained a powerful element of irony that proved fatal to the Normans’ petition. The judge’s official Findings of Fact reveal that while demanding the HOA enforce its rules against the Hendersons, the Normans had a significant compliance issue of their own.

In September 2017, the Normans submitted a request to build an 11-foot wide concrete driveway “to provide a solid walking surface because Mrs. Norman was disabled and had difficulty walking.” While the motivation was sympathetic, the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) denied the request. Despite the denial, the Normans built the driveway anyway and were subsequently issued a Notice of Violation by the HOA.

Critically, the Normans’ own rule-breaking occurred after the Hendersons’ wall was approved. In the very midst of their dispute, while formulating a case against their neighbors, they chose to defy the ARC themselves. This is a classic illustration of the “unclean hands” doctrine. In any legal or administrative forum, one’s credibility is paramount. The Normans were asking the HOA to be a strict enforcer of rules they themselves had flagrantly violated, a position that is almost always untenable.

5.0 Takeaway 4: When a Judge Calls It a “Spite Fence”

4. The Court May Look Past the Rules and See Your Intent

Even in a hearing focused on the technicalities of CC&Rs, the underlying human motivations of the conflict did not go unnoticed. The HOA’s ARC had previously approved a plan for the Normans to build their own wall, provided it was located three feet inside their property line. They refused. Brenda Norman testified that their contractor told them they were “crazy to give up the 3’ of property.” Mrs. Norman also argued that a wall on her property would be denied as a prohibited “closely parallel wall,” but this claim was directly contradicted by the ARC’s own actions—they had already approved her wall at the three-foot distance.

The judge’s “spite fence” comment wasn’t just an observation; it was the legal culmination of the Normans’ entire pattern of behavior. Their refusal to accept an approved wall on their own property (losing 3 feet) while demanding their neighbor tear down a wall built on theirs (losing 0 feet) painted a clear picture of animosity, not a genuine need for property protection. The judge saw through the legal arguments to the core of the issue:

The wall that Petitioners testified that they must build to protect their property appears to be an archetypical spite fence between neighbors who cannot agree to mutually work for the improvement of their adjacent properties.

A “spite fence” is a legal term for a structure erected with malicious intent, where the primary purpose is not to improve one’s own property but to annoy, inconvenience, or harm a neighbor. The judge’s use of this term was a powerful signal that, in the court’s view, the dispute was no longer about property rights, but about personal animus.

6.0 Conclusion: A Wall Is a Wall, But a Neighbor Is Forever

This case is a cautionary tale written in concrete and legal filings. It shows how a dispute over six inches of soil can metastasize, fueled by a misunderstanding of HOA rules and an unwillingness to compromise, ultimately costing both parties time, money, and peace of mind. From the critical importance of a few inches of land to the defined limits of an HOA’s authority, the details matter.

Ultimately, the story of the Normans and the Hendersons serves as a powerful reminder that navigating HOA living requires a clear-eyed understanding of the actual rules, not just a sense of what seems “fair.” It leaves us with a critical question to consider.

When it comes to our homes and neighbors, is it more important to be right, or to find a way to live in peace?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • David Norman (petitioner)
    Appeared telephonically on own behalf
  • Brenda Norman (petitioner)
    Testified on Petitioners' behalf

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Represented Rancho Del Lago Community Association
  • Spencer Brod (property manager/witness)
    Management Solutions
    Employee of Respondent's management company; testified

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Other Participants

  • Anthony Henderson (homeowner/neighbor)
    Next-door neighbor who built the wall in dispute
  • Mabel Gummere (property manager predecessor)
    Predecessor to Spencer Brod

Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/19F-H1919044-REL-RHG/733509.pdf

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19F-H1919044-REL Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/19F-H1919044-REL/706518.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-17T05:44:08 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – /home/jeremy/azhoa/repos/azoah_decisions/portal_documents/19F-H1919044-REL/706560.pdf

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19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

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19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

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Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

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Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

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Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions

Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

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Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.

Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.

4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. vs.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918027-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-29
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the HOA Board had the authority under the CC&Rs and related documents to remove non-Board ARC members and appoint itself to perform the functions of the ARC, thus validating its approval of the homeowner's detached garage application.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. Counsel
Respondent Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association Counsel Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs §§ 3.2 and 7.7

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the HOA Board had the authority under the CC&Rs and related documents to remove non-Board ARC members and appoint itself to perform the functions of the ARC, thus validating its approval of the homeowner's detached garage application.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated CC&Rs §§ 3.2 or 7.7. The Board, having assumed the developer's rights, was authorized to remove and appoint ARC members.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs regarding ARC dissolution and architectural approval authority.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA Board violated CC&Rs §§ 3.2 and 7.7 by dissolving the ARC and then acting as the ARC to approve a modification (detached garage) for a homeowner.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied because he failed to establish that CC&Rs §§ 3.2 or 7.7 prohibited the Respondent HOA from replacing non-Board ARC members, appointing its own members to act as the ARC, or approving the detached garage application.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(D)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, ARC, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Architectural Review
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(D)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918027-REL Decision – 685758.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:17:21 (194.8 KB)

19F-H1918027-REL Decision – 685758.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:25 (194.8 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Dwight vs. Whisper Mountain HOA

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 19F-H1918027-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. (“Petitioner”) and the Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The Petitioner alleged that the HOA Board violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by suspending the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and subsequently approving a homeowner’s construction application.

The ALJ denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the HOA Board acted within its authority. The decision established that upon the departure of the original developer (the “Declarant”), the Board inherited the Declarant’s full rights and responsibilities, including the power to both appoint and remove members of the ARC. The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s argument that ARC members held lifetime appointments, deeming such an interpretation contrary to the democratic principles of HOA governance. Consequently, the Board’s decision to remove the non-Board ARC members and appoint itself to serve as the ARC was ruled a valid exercise of its powers, and its subsequent approval of the construction application was not a violation of the CC&Rs.

Case Overview

Entity

Petitioner

N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. (Homeowner and former ARC member)

Respondent

Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (HOA)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

Case Number

19F-H1918027-REL

Hearing Date

January 14, 2019

Decision Date

January 29, 2019

Core Allegation

The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent’s Board violated two sections of the CC&Rs:

1. § 7.7 (Improvements and Alterations): By approving a homeowner’s application to build a detached garage on September 19, 2018, without the approval of a properly constituted ARC.

2. § 3.2 (Appeal): By creating a situation where the body making an architectural decision (the Board acting as the ARC) is the same body that would hear an appeal of that decision, rendering the appeal process meaningless.

This was based on the Petitioner’s central claim that the Board’s action on August 6, 2018, to “dissolve” or “suspend” the ARC was a violation of the governing documents.

Key Factual Background & Timeline

Prior to 2015: The developer, VIP Homes (“Declarant”), establishes the ARC as required by the CC&Rs.

2015: The Declarant turns over control of the HOA to the resident-elected Board of Directors.

March 15, 2016: The Board adopts an ARC Charter, which explicitly states: “The right to appoint and remove all appointed [ARC] members at any time is hereby vested solely in the Board.” The Petitioner is appointed as one of three non-Board members to the ARC.

2017 or 2018: A proposed amendment to the CC&Rs to formally replace references to “Declarant” with “Board” or “Association” is not adopted by the general membership.

July 17, 2018: The ARC meets to consider a detached garage application from homeowners Mark and Connie Wells. The meeting is contentious, with the Petitioner expressing doubts about the ARC’s authority to grant a variance from city setback requirements. The meeting adjourns abruptly after the applicant allegedly “verbally threatened the committee.”

August 6, 2018: The HOA Board meets and passes a motion “to suspend the ARC committee for 60 days until guidelines/expectations are clarified.” The motion states that in the interim, the Board will review and approve all ARC submissions.

August 24, 2018: The Board sends a letter to the non-Board ARC members, including the Petitioner, informing them of the 60-day suspension.

September 17, 2018: The Board meets and approves a revised application from the Wells, which now aligns with City of Mesa code.

September 19, 2018: The Board, formally acting as the ARC, reviews and approves the Wells’ revised application.

October 22, 2018: The Petitioner files his complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 19, 2018: The Board adopts a “Resolution Regarding the ARC” to clarify its position. The resolution states the Board had “(i) temporarily removed the current members of the [ARC] (via a suspension) and (ii) chose to act and serve as the current [ARC].” It also formally ratifies the approval of the Wells’ garage.

Central Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (N. Wayne Dwight, Jr.)

Limited Board Authority: The CC&Rs (§ 3.4) grant the Declarant the “sole right to appoint and remove” ARC members. After the Declarant’s departure, this section states that members “shall be appointed by the Board.” The Petitioner argued this only conferred the power to appoint, not to remove.

Failed Amendment: The failure of the membership to amend the CC&Rs to explicitly grant the Board the Declarant’s powers proves that the Board does not possess the power of removal.

Lifetime Appointments: The Petitioner argued that once appointed, ARC members could only be removed for specific cause (e.g., moving out of the community, incapacitation) and were otherwise entitled to serve for life.

Improper ARC Suspension: The Board’s action to suspend the committee was a violation of the CC&Rs, as the Board lacked the authority to do so.

Invalid Approval: Because the ARC was improperly suspended, the Board’s subsequent approval of the Wells’ application violated § 7.7, which requires ARC approval for all alterations.

Meaningless Appeals: If the Board can act as the ARC, the appeal process outlined in § 3.2, which allows a homeowner to appeal an ARC decision to the Board, becomes an “exercise in futility.”

Respondent’s Position (Whisper Mountain HOA)

Inherited Powers: Upon the Declarant’s departure, the Board assumed all of its rights and responsibilities under the CC&Rs, including the power to both appoint and remove ARC members.

Authority from ARC Charter: The ARC Charter, adopted in 2016, explicitly grants the Board the sole right to remove ARC members at any time.

Intent of the Board: The Board’s intent was not to abolish the ARC, but to address concerns about the committee’s conduct, including its “way of questioning applicants” and a need for more civility, fairness, and consistency.

Clarification of “Suspension”: The use of the word “suspend” in communications by the management company (Mariposa Group) was “unfortunate and inaccurate.” The Board’s true action, clarified in its November 19 resolution, was to remove the non-Board members and appoint its own members to serve as the ARC.

Valid Approval: The Board was legitimately acting as the ARC when it approved the Wells’ application; therefore, § 7.7 was not violated.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Conclusions

Interpretation of Governing Documents

The ALJ concluded that restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted to give effect to the intent of the parties. The Judge found the Petitioner’s interpretation of the CC&Rs to be unpersuasive and ultimately harmful to the community.

• The Judge stated that the Petitioner’s interpretation “elevates non-elected members of ARC above elected Board members, abrogates any community control over ARC, and does not serve the underlying purposes of the CC&Rs.”

• This “unelected lifetime appointment” concept was found to be contrary to the “democratic principles underlying HOA law in Arizona.”

On the Board’s Authority

The ALJ affirmed the HOA’s authority to manage the ARC as it did.

Assumption of Powers: The decision concludes that “When Declarant turned Respondent HOA over to its Board, the Board assumed all of Declarant’s rights and responsibilities under the CC&Rs and related documents.” This included the power to remove ARC members.

ARC Charter: The Judge noted that the ARC Charter also “expressly provided that the Board had the power to remove as well as to appoint members of the ARC.”

Legitimacy of Actions: The Board was found to have acted within its authority in August 2018 when it “removed the three non-Board members of the ARC and appointed itself to perform the functions of the ARC.”

On the Alleged Violations

Based on the finding that the Board acted within its authority, the ALJ concluded that no violations occurred.

Conclusion on CC&R § 7.7 (ARC Approval): The petition failed on this point because the Board was legitimately acting as the ARC when it approved the Wells’ application in September 2018.

Conclusion on CC&R § 3.2 (Appeals): The petition failed on this point because the CC&Rs do not prohibit Board members from acting as the ARC. While acknowledging that appealing a decision to the same body “may be an exercise in futility,” the Judge noted that under the CC&Rs, the Board is not required to hear appeals in any event.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The petition filed by N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. was denied. The Judge found he had not established that the HOA violated CC&Rs §§ 3.2 or 7.7.

Implications: This decision establishes a strong precedent for interpreting HOA governing documents in a manner that favors functional, democratic governance over literal interpretations that could lead to impractical or absurd outcomes. It affirms that an HOA Board generally inherits the full operational powers of the original developer unless explicitly restricted, and that a Board can act to reform or reconstitute committees to ensure they serve the community’s best interests.

Study Guide: Dwight v. Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. vs. Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918027-REL). It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the context of the legal document.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the provided source document.

1. What were the two specific allegations made by the Petitioner, N. Wayne Dwight, Jr., in his petition filed on October 22, 2018?

2. Identify the key parties in this case and describe their respective roles or relationships to the dispute.

3. What was the purpose and outcome of the ARC meeting held on July 17, 2018, regarding the Wells’ property?

4. Explain the actions taken by the Respondent’s Board of Directors during its meeting on August 6, 2018, regarding the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

5. What was the Petitioner’s interpretation of CC&R § 3.4 regarding the removal of ARC members, and what was the potential consequence of this interpretation as noted by the Administrative Law Judge?

6. According to the Respondent’s Board president, Greg Robert Wingert, what were the primary reasons for removing the non-Board members of the ARC?

7. Describe the role of the Mariposa Group LLC in this case and explain how its communications created confusion.

8. How did the Board clarify its actions and ratify its decisions in the November 19, 2018 Resolution?

9. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is it defined in the case documents?

10. What was the final ruling of the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core reasoning behind the decision regarding CC&Rs §§ 3.2 and 7.7?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent’s Board violated Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) §§ 3.2 and 7.7. The specific violations cited were the dissolution or suspension of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) on August 6, 2018, and the subsequent approval of an application from two members to build a detached garage on September 19, 2018.

2. The key parties are N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. (the “Petitioner”), a property owner and former ARC member, and the Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The case also involves Greg Robert Wingert, the President of the Respondent’s Board, and Mark and Connie Wells, the homeowners who applied to build a detached garage. The dispute centers on the Respondent’s authority over the ARC, of which the Petitioner was a member.

3. The purpose of the July 17, 2018, meeting was for the ARC, including the Petitioner, to consider Mark and Connie Wells’ application for a detached garage. The meeting was abruptly adjourned after the applicant allegedly threatened the committee, and no formal vote was conducted at that time. However, a letter dated July 30, 2018, later informed the Wells that the ARC had approved their request.

4. At the August 6, 2018, meeting, the Board of Directors discussed the need for more consistency and guidelines for the ARC. Citing these reasons and safety concerns from a prior meeting, the Board passed a motion to “suspend the ARC committee for 60 days” and announced that in the interim, the Board itself would review and approve all ARC submissions.

5. The Petitioner argued that CC&R § 3.4 only allowed the Board to appoint, not remove, ARC members. He contended that once appointed, members could only be removed for cause and were otherwise entitled to serve for life. The Judge noted this interpretation would elevate unelected ARC members above the elected Board and abrogate community control.

6. Greg Robert Wingert testified that the Board removed the non-Board ARC members due to concerns about the “manner in which questioning was done in a public forum.” The Board’s intent was not to eliminate the ARC, but to continue the review process while making it more civil, fair, consistent, and transparent.

7. The Mariposa Group LLC was the Respondent’s management company. Its employees, such as Ed Ericksen, were responsible for drafting official communications like minutes and letters. These communications used inaccurate words like “suspend” and “dissolve” to describe the Board’s actions regarding the ARC, which Mr. Wingert testified was an “unfortunate and inaccurate” choice of words that did not reflect the Board’s true intent.

8. The November 19, 2018, Resolution clarified that the Board had removed the existing ARC members and appointed itself to act and serve as the ARC, as was its right under CC&R § 3.4. The resolution explicitly stated that the Board members were the current members of the ARC and ratified all prior architectural decisions made by the Board while serving in this capacity, including the approval of the garage on Lot 18.

9. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not, representing the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it removed the non-Board ARC members and appointed itself to perform ARC functions, meaning it did not violate CC&R § 7.7 by approving the Wells’ application. The Judge also found no violation of CC&R § 3.2, noting that the CC&Rs do not prohibit Board members from acting as the ARC.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the facts and legal interpretations presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the CC&Rs, particularly § 3.4. How does this interpretation address the transfer of power from the “Declarant” to the Board, and how does it counter the Petitioner’s argument for lifetime appointments?

2. Discuss the concept of an “appeal” as outlined in CC&R § 3.2. Evaluate the potential conflict of interest and the issue of futility raised when the Board of Directors also serves as the Architectural Review Committee.

3. Trace the timeline of events surrounding the Wells’ application for a detached garage. How did this specific application serve as the catalyst for the broader conflict between the Petitioner and the Respondent’s Board?

4. Examine the role of communication and language in this dispute. How did the specific wording used by the management company in official documents (e.g., “suspend”) differ from the Board’s stated intent, and how did this discrepancy fuel the conflict?

5. Based on the evidence presented, evaluate the argument that the Board’s actions were a necessary measure to ensure a “civil, fair, consistent, and transparent” architectural review process versus the argument that the Board overstepped its authority as defined by the CC&Rs.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition within the Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judicial officer (Diane Mihalsky) from the Office of Administrative Hearings tasked with conducting an evidentiary hearing and rendering a decision on the petition.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee established to review and approve or deny any improvements, alterations, or other work that alters the exterior appearance of a property. Per the CC&Rs, its decisions are final unless appealed to the Board.

ARC Charter

A document adopted by the Respondent’s Board on March 15, 2016, which provided that the ARC would consist of up to four members appointed by the Board and that the Board vested itself with the sole right to appoint and remove all appointed ARC members at any time.

Board of Directors (Board)

The elected body that conducts the affairs of the Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association. The document presumes they are elected by members to specific terms.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents for the Whisper Mountain planned community, recorded on September 7, 2016. They outline the rules for property use, the structure of the HOA, and the functions of bodies like the ARC.

Declarant

The original developer who built the planned community, identified as VIP Homes. The Declarant initially held the sole right to appoint and remove ARC members, a right that transferred to the Board after the developer was no longer involved.

Mariposa Group LLC

The management company employed by the Respondent HOA. Its employees, such as Douglas Egan and Ed Ericksen, were responsible for drafting official communications like meeting minutes and approval letters.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate referred the petition for an evidentiary hearing.

Petitioner

N. Wayne Dwight, Jr., a property owner in the Whisper Mountain development and a former member of the ARC. He filed the petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (“HOA”), the governing body for the development. The Respondent was represented by its Board and legal counsel.

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19F-H1918027-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between a homeowner, N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. (Petitioner), and the Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged that the HOA’s Board violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by dissolving or suspending the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and subsequently approving an application for a detached garage. The decision details the background, evidence presented at the hearing, and the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) findings and conclusions of law. Ultimately, the ALJ denied the petition, finding that the Board acted within its authority under the governing documents to remove non-Board ARC members and appoint itself to fulfill the ARC’s functions. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated the specified CC&Rs.

1 source

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • N. Wayne Dwight, Jr. (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; former ARC member; testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Troy B. Stratman (attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC
    Represented Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association
  • Greg Robert Wingert (board member/witness)
    Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association
    Board President; Chairman of the ARC; testified for Respondent
  • Pam Cohen (board member)
    Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association
    Seconded motions; identified as 'Pam' in meeting minutes
  • Ronna (board member)
    Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association
    Made motion to suspend ARC
  • Gary (board member)
    Whisper Mountain Homeowners Association
  • Douglas Egan (property manager)
    Mariposa Group LLC
    Sent approval letter for garage application
  • Ed Ericksen (property manager)
    Mariposa
    Community Manager; sent approval/clarification letters regarding Wells' request

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Mark Wells (owner/applicant)
    Whisper Mountain development
    Submitted application for detached garage (Lot 18)
  • Connie Wells (owner/applicant)
    Whisper Mountain development
    Submitted application for detached garage (Lot 18)
  • Phil Hoyt (owner/member)
    Whisper Mountain development (Lot 16)
  • Andy Horn (owner/member)
    Whisper Mountain development (Lot 1)
  • Jason Komorowski (owner/member)
    Whisper Mountain development (Lot 51)
  • Connie Harrison (neighbor)
    Whisper Mountain development
    Mentioned regarding Lot 18 variance condition
  • Don Berry (owner/member)
    Whisper Mountain development (Lot 45)

William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

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Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Case Overview

This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Roles

Party/Role

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

William P. Lee

A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.

Legal Counsel

Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.

Timeline of Key Events

June 16, 1986

Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.

July 2, 1999

Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.

July 6, 2018

Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.

September 12, 2018

William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 13, 2018

The original hearing on the petition was conducted.

February 11, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.

April 1, 2019

The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

April 22, 2019

The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.

The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations

The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.

Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).

Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.

Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.

Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.

Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.

Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.

Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.

No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.

Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.

Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.

Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”

Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.

• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

The Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:

1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.

2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.

3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.

5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.

1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?

2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?

4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?

5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?

6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?

8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?

9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.

2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.

4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.

5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”

6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.

8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.

9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.

10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?

3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?

5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.

Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.

Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.

Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.

Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.

Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.

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19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

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This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between William P. Lee, a homeowner, and Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two, his Homeowners Association. The central issue revolved around the Greenlaw HOA’s implementation of a comprehensive ban on street parking and its contracting with a towing company to enforce the rule, which Mr. Lee contended violated the association’s governing documents, specifically amendments to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the proper notification procedures for revised rules. The findings of fact detail the history of the parking rules, the homeowner’s receipt of the electronic notification of the revised rules, and Mr. Lee’s arguments that the association failed to use the required postal mail or personal delivery methods for notice. The Conclusions of Law determined that the controlling rules were the revised July 2018 Rules and Regulations and that Mr. Lee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated either the CC&Rs or relevant Arizona statutes. Consequently, the Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.

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Based on 1 source

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association member
    Testified on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Contended by Lee to be the reason for the parking ban

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate