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Lee & Kim Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120028-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lee & Kim Edwards Counsel Terry Foster, Esq.
Respondent Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association Counsel —

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or A.R.S. § 33-1255, ruling that the statute was inapplicable due to the specific provisions in the Declaration regarding the 1/26 assessment calculation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the ALJ determined A.R.S. § 33-1255 was superseded by the Declaration, which mandated assessments based on the undivided 1/26 interest in the common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

Assessment calculation based on undivided interest in common areas

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to change assessments from a historical square footage basis to a 1/26 interest calculation, arguing that this method violates A.R.S. § 33-1255 by charging for limited common elements (patios/parking).

Orders: The petition of Lee & Kim Edwards is dismissed; Respondent is deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • Declaration Article I, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 7
  • Declaration Article IV, Section 4
  • Declaration Article VI, Section 9

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, assessment, cc&r, statutory interpretation, common elements, limited common elements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 899379.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:32:11 (123.6 KB)

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 856603.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:32:19 (98.1 KB)

Assessment Methodology Dispute: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between homeowners Lee & Kim Edwards (Petitioners) and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association (Respondent) concerning a change in the methodology for calculating homeowner assessments. The core of the conflict was the Association’s decision to shift from a historical practice of assessments based on unit square footage to a uniform rate where each of the 26 units pays an equal 1/26 share of the common expenses.

The dispute was adjudicated by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in two separate hearings. In both instances, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing the petitions filed by the Edwards.

Key Takeaways:

• Change in Methodology: The Association’s Board, acting on legal advice received in January 2020, concluded that its 40-year practice of using a square-footage-based assessment violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Board subsequently implemented a 1/26 equal-share assessment method after a majority of homeowners selected this option.

• Initial Ruling on “Uniform Rate”: In the first hearing in February 2021, the Petitioners argued that the historical square footage method was a “uniform rate” and that the Association had waived its right to change the long-standing practice. The ALJ rejected this, finding that the new 1/26 rate complied with the CC&Rs’ requirement for a “uniform rate” (Article VI, Section 9) and aligned with each unit’s specified 1/26 undivided interest in the common elements (Article VI, Section 4(d)).

• Rehearing Ruling on State Statute: The Petitioners were granted a rehearing in July 2021, where they argued that the 1/26 method violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1255 by improperly charging all owners for “limited common elements” like patios and parking spaces. The ALJ again ruled against the Petitioners, concluding that the state statute did not apply. The ruling was based on a key provision in the statute: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” The judge found that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise by defining patios and parking as general common elements and explicitly mandating that costs be shared based on each unit’s 1/26 interest.

• Final Outcome: The petition was definitively dismissed after the rehearing, making the ALJ’s order binding. The Association’s adoption of the 1/26 assessment rate was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.

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Background of the Dispute

The legal conflict originated from a single-issue petition filed on November 20, 2020, by Lee and Kim Edwards, owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development. The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged that the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association had violated its CC&Rs, specifically Article VI, Section 9, and Article IV, Section 1.

The central issue was the Association Board’s decision to change the long-standing method of calculating homeowner assessments. For over 40 years, assessments had been based on the square footage of each unit. In 2020, the Board implemented a new system where the Association’s annual budget was divided equally among the 26 units, with each owner paying a 1/26 share. The Petitioners sought to enforce the historical calculation method unless and until the CC&Rs were properly amended.

Chronology of the Assessment Change

• Historical Practice: For more than four decades, the Association calculated and charged member assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit.

• Legal Consultation (January 2020): Two members of the Association’s Board consulted with an attorney regarding the legality of the historical assessment method.

• Attorney Recommendation (January 24, 2020): The attorney advised the Association that, to ensure compliance with the CC&Rs, it should calculate assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas. The attorney’s letter stated:

• Homeowner Consultation: Following the legal advice, the Board informed homeowners that the prior square-footage method violated the CC&Rs. The Board sought input on three potential assessment methods: the 1/26 rate, a variable blended rate, or continuing with the square footage rate. A majority of homeowners selected the 1/26 rate. The Board noted that any method other than the 1/26 rate would require a formal amendment to the CC&Rs.

• Implementation (September 26, 2020): The Board officially notified homeowners that it would begin charging assessments based on the 1/26 rate and that an amendment to the CC&Rs was not necessary to implement this change.

Initial Hearing and Decision (February 2021)

An evidentiary hearing was held on February 9, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

Arguments Presented

Petitioners (Edwards)

1. The historical square footage rate qualified as a “uniform rate” and was compliant with the CC&Rs.
2. By using the square footage rate for over 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different method like the 1/26 rate.

Respondent (Association)

1. The plain language of the CC&Rs requires that each homeowner pay an assessment based on the 1/26 rate.
2. It is not legally possible to waive a mandatory CC&R requirement through past practice.

On February 19, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the petition. The judge’s conclusions of law were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs:

• Uniform Rate Compliance: The ALJ determined that the “preponderance of the evidence” showed that the Association’s 1/26 rate was a uniform rate that complied with Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioners failed to meet their burden to prove that the Association had violated its governing documents.

• Outcome: The Association was deemed the prevailing party, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing and Final Decision (July 2021)

The Petitioners filed a request for a rehearing on March 30, 2021, which was granted. The rehearing was held on July 8, 2021. The Respondent did not appear at this hearing, as its counsel had withdrawn from representation without formally notifying the tribunal.

In the rehearing, the Petitioners introduced a new argument, alleging that the 1/26 assessment method violated Arizona state law, specifically A.R.S. § 33-1255.

• The core of this argument was that the 1/26 rate improperly included charges for “limited common elements,” such as patios and assigned parking spaces.

• The Petitioners contended that this forced all homeowners to pay for the maintenance of elements that were assigned to and benefited fewer than all units, in direct violation of the statute.

On July 28, 2021, the ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition. The ruling hinged on the precise wording of both the state statute and the Association’s Declaration.

• Applicability of A.R.S. § 33-1255: The judge found that the statute did not apply to this matter. The relevant section of the law, A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), begins with the critical phrase: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

• Supremacy of the Declaration: The ALJ concluded that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise. The CC&Rs explicitly:

◦ Define “Common Elements” broadly to include patios and parking areas (Article I, Section 3).

◦ Establish that each unit has an “undivided interest in the general common areas” of 1/26 (Article I, Section 5).

◦ Mandate that each unit’s share of costs for repair and maintenance of common areas is the “same as its undivided interest in the common elements” (Article IV, Section 4(d)).

• Final Outcome: Because the Declaration’s specific provisions overrode the general terms of the state statute, the Association was found to be in compliance. The petition was dismissed, and the order was deemed binding on the parties.

Key Legal Principles and Definitions

Concept

Definition / Application in Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioners were required to establish their claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The ALJ found the Petitioners failed to meet this standard in both hearings.

Restrictive Covenants

Arizona law requires that unambiguous restrictive covenants be enforced to give effect to the parties’ intent and be interpreted as a whole. The ALJ’s decisions were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs’ language.

Common Elements (per CC&Rs)

A broad definition including multifamily structures, land, roofs, ceilings, foundations, storage spaces, patios, parking areas, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and conduits.

Unit (per CC&Rs)

A freehold estate consisting of the interior space of an apartment. The definition explicitly states that common elements are not part of the unit.

Undivided Interest (per CC&Rs)

Article I, Section 5 clearly establishes that “The undivided interest in the general common areas… which shall be conveyed with each respective units shall be 1/26.” This provision was central to the final ruling.

Study Guide: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Lee & Kim Edwards and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association, based on the provided legal decisions. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a detailed glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central conflict between the Petitioners (Lee & Kim Edwards) and the Respondent (Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association)?

2. For over 40 years, how did the Association historically calculate assessments for homeowners?

3. What specific event in January 2020 prompted the Association’s Board to change the assessment method?

4. In the first hearing on February 9, 2021, what were the two main arguments presented by Mr. Edwards?

5. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the “uniform rate” requirement from CC&Rs Article VI, Section 9 in the initial decision?

6. Upon what new legal grounds did the Petitioners base their March 30, 2021, request for a re-hearing?

7. According to the CC&Rs, what is the defined undivided interest in the general common areas for each unit?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately conclude that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255 did not apply in this case?

9. What legal standard of proof did the Petitioners need to meet to successfully prove their case?

10. What was the final, binding outcome of the re-hearing held on July 8, 2021?

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Answer Key

1. The central conflict concerned the method for calculating homeowner assessments. The Petitioners argued for the historical method based on unit square footage, while the Respondent implemented a new method where each of the 26 units paid an equal share (1/26 rate) of the Association’s costs.

2. For over 40 years, the Association historically calculated assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit. This practice was changed by the Board in 2020.

3. In January 2020, two Board members met with an attorney who advised that to comply with the CC&Rs, the Association should charge assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas, not on square footage.

4. Mr. Edwards argued that the historical square footage rate was a “uniform rate” that complied with the CC&Rs. He also contended that by using this method for 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different assessment method like the 1/26 rate.

5. The Judge concluded that the Respondent’s assessment method, based on a uniform rate of 1/26 of the Association’s costs for each unit, did comply with Article VI, Section 9. Therefore, the Petitioners failed to prove the Association had violated the CC&Rs.

6. The Petitioners based their request for a re-hearing on the new allegation that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255. They argued the 1/26 rate improperly required members to pay for limited common elements, such as patios and parking spaces, not assigned to them.

7. According to Article I, Section 5 of the Declaration (CC&Rs), the undivided interest in the general common areas established and conveyed with each respective unit is 1/26.

8. The Judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1255 did not apply because the statute itself contains an exception: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” In this case, the Association’s Declaration explicitly required that each member be charged an assessment equivalent to their 1/26 interest in the total costs, which included patios and parking areas.

9. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

10. Following the re-hearing, the Administrative Law Judge again ordered that the petition of Lee & Kim Edwards be dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party, and the order was declared binding on the parties.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Answers are not provided.

1. Trace the evolution of the Petitioners’ legal strategy from the initial petition filed on November 20, 2020, to the arguments made during the re-hearing on July 8, 2021. How did their core arguments change, and what new evidence or legal statutes were introduced?

2. Analyze the concept of a “uniform rate” as required by Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs. Discuss how both the Petitioners and the Respondent interpreted this phrase to support their respective assessment methods (square footage vs. 1/26 rate).

3. Explain in detail the role of A.R.S. § 33-1255 in the re-hearing. Why did the Petitioners believe it supported their case, and what specific language in both the statute and the Association’s Declaration led the Administrative Law Judge to rule that it did not apply?

4. Evaluate the actions taken by the Association’s Board of Directors in 2020. Consider their consultation with an attorney, their communication with homeowners, and their final decision to implement the 1/26 rate. Discuss whether these actions were consistent with the powers and obligations outlined in the CC&Rs.

5. Discuss the legal argument of “waiver” raised by Mr. Edwards in the first hearing. Explain what he meant by this and why the Association’s 40-year history of using a square-footage-based assessment was central to this claim. Why did this argument ultimately fail?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

1/26 Rate

The assessment method where the Association’s annual budget is divided 26 ways, with each unit responsible for paying an equal portion. This is based on each unit’s 1/26 undivided interest in the common areas as specified in the CC&Rs.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The independent judicial officer who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)

The Arizona Revised Statute that permits a condominium unit owner to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing regarding alleged violations of the Condominium Act.

A.R.S. § 33-1255

The Arizona Revised Statute concerning common expenses. It states that unless the declaration provides otherwise, expenses for a limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which it is assigned, and expenses benefitting fewer than all units shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of condominium associations in Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to establish its claims by a required standard of evidence. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. Also referred to as the “Declaration” in the provided documents.

Common Area / Common Elements

As defined in Article I, Section 3 of the CC&Rs, this includes the multifamily structure (except for the units), land, air space, bearing walls, roofs, storage spaces, patios, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and other premises designed for common use.

Declaration

Another term for the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Lee & Kim Edwards

The Petitioners in the case and owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for evidentiary hearings.

Petitioners

The party that initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Lee & Kim Edwards.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to be met by the Petitioners. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association.

Restricted Common Area

As defined in Article I, Section 3(b) of the CC&Rs, this refers to a separately designed and exclusive parking area for each unit as assigned by the Board of Directors.

Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case; the condominium unit owners’ association for the development.

Square Footage Rate

The historical method of calculating assessments for over 40 years, where each unit’s assessment was based on its square footage.

Uniform Rate

A requirement from Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs that states both regular and special assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units. The interpretation of this term was central to the dispute.

As defined in Article I, Section 4 of the CC&Rs, a separately designated freehold estate consisting of the space bounded by the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows, and floors of each apartment. It does not include common elements.

Waiver

A legal argument made by the Petitioners that because the Association had charged assessments based on square footage for 40 years, it had relinquished or “waived” its right to enforce a different method.

4 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Could Upend How You See Your Fees

Introduction: The 40-Year Mistake

If you live in a condominium or a community governed by a Homeowners Association (HOA), you likely operate under a simple assumption: the way things have always been done is the correct and legal way. Monthly fees, maintenance schedules, and community rules that have been in place for decades feel permanent and unassailable. But what if they aren’t?

This was the central question in the case of Lee & Kim Edwards versus the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association. For over 40 years, the Association calculated homeowner fees based on the square footage of each unit—a practice that seemed fair and logical, and one that was never questioned by residents.

Then came the twist. In January 2020, after consulting with an attorney, the HOA board announced a shocking revelation: their 40-year-old assessment method was a direct violation of the community’s own governing documents. The board presented the legal findings to the community and sought their input on how to proceed. After being given the choice between the old method, a blended rate, or a new flat-rate fee that complied with the rules, most homeowners voted for the compliant flat-rate system for every single unit, regardless of its size.

Homeowners sued to keep the old method, sparking a legal battle that went all the way to an administrative court. The resulting decisions offer surprising and crucial lessons for every homeowner paying HOA dues. Here are the four most impactful takeaways from the case that could change how you view your own community’s rules.

1. “Past Practice” Means Nothing if It Violates the Rules

The primary argument made by the petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Edwards, was that the Association had “waived its right” to change the assessment method. After all, by using the square-footage calculation for four decades, hadn’t they established an unbreakable precedent? It seemed like a common-sense argument rooted in history and consistency.

The court, however, completely rejected this line of reasoning. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was not based on historical practice but on the clear, written rules found in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association argued that it’s “not possible to waive the CC&R requirement,” and the court agreed.

The Lesson: This case powerfully demonstrates that tradition or “how things have always been done” cannot override the explicit language of an HOA’s governing documents. The CC&Rs are a contract. The lesson is clear: if your HOA’s practice contradicts its documents, the practice is invalid. The board has a fiduciary duty to follow the written rules, not a 40-year-old mistake.

2. Your CC&Rs Are a Binding Contract—Read Them

Throughout the legal proceedings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently referred back to the specific text of the CC&Rs to make a final decision. The entire case ultimately hinged on the interpretation of a few key sentences written decades ago.

The most critical passage, which decided the outcome, was from Article VI, Section 4(d) of the community’s governing documents:

“Each unit’s share shall be the same as its undivided interest in the common elements of the total amount determined under the subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.” —Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association CC&Rs, Article VI, Section 4(d)

This single sentence was the linchpin. It explicitly linked each unit’s assessment share to its “undivided interest in the common elements.” Another section of the document, Article I, Section 5, had already established that interest as an equal 1/26 for all 26 units.

The Lesson: This is a classic example of legal cross-referencing in a contract. Section 4(d) provided the instruction (base fees on “undivided interest”), while Article I, Section 5 provided the specific value (1/26). With both parts present and unambiguous, the court had no choice but to enforce them exactly as written, leaving no room for interpretations based on fairness or history. The contract was the contract.

3. A “Uniform Rate” Might Not Mean What You Think

One of the central points of contention was the term “uniform rate.” Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs required that all assessments “must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units.”

The homeowners argued that the square footage rate was, in fact, a “uniform rate”—a consistent price per square foot applied to every unit. It’s an interpretation many of us might find reasonable.

However, the HOA Board and the court had a different interpretation. The judge found that the flat 1/26 rate was the correct interpretation of a “uniform rate” because it was uniformly applied to every unit’s established 1/26 interest in the common areas. In the court’s view, the “rate” being applied uniformly was the 1/26 fraction of the total budget. The fact that this resulted in different dollar amounts for square-footage fees was irrelevant; the legal share was what had to be uniform.

The Lesson: Common-sense terms like “uniform” can have very specific legal meanings within the context of your governing documents. The true definition is found not in a dictionary, but in how the term is defined and applied by the rest of the document’s provisions.

4. Your HOA’s Rules Can Sometimes Override State Law

In a final attempt to overturn the decision, the petitioners filed for a re-hearing. This time, they cited a specific Arizona state law, A.R.S. 33-1255. This statute says that expenses for “limited common elements”—things like assigned patios or parking spaces that only benefit specific units—should be assessed only against those units that benefit from them. The homeowners argued that the new 1/26 flat fee unfairly forced them to pay for their neighbors’ patios and parking spots, a direct violation of state law.

Surprisingly, this argument also failed. The reason is found in the crucial introductory clause of the state law itself: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

Because the Scottsdale Embassy’s Declaration did provide otherwise—by explicitly rolling all general and restricted common area costs into the total budget before calculating each unit’s 1/26 share—the community’s own rules legally superseded the default state statute. The judge concluded that the state law “does not apply to this matter because the Declaration requires” a different method.

The Lesson: This is perhaps the most counter-intuitive lesson of all. This demonstrates a key principle of contract law and planned community governance: state statutes often provide a “default” rule for situations a community’s documents don’t address. However, they also grant communities the power to create their own specific rules, which, if legally permissible, will take precedence. Homeowners cannot assume that a state law automatically protects them if their community’s own governing documents have a more specific rule in place.

Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What You Agreed To?

The central message from the Scottsdale Embassy case is undeniable: in an HOA, the written word is law. The CC&Rs and other governing documents are a binding contract that dictates the rules, regardless of 40 years of history, common-sense assumptions, or even some default state laws. What you believe is fair or standard practice is irrelevant if the document you agreed to upon purchase says otherwise.

This case was decided by a few sentences written decades ago. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from cover to cover?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lee Edwards (petitioner, witness)
  • Kim Edwards (petitioner)
  • Teresa H. Foster (petitioner attorney)
    Ellis & Baker, P.C.
    Also referred to as Terri Foster and Terry Foster

Respondent Side

  • Lauren Vie (respondent attorney)
    Appeared for initial hearing; later noted as withdrawn
  • Caleb Koch (board president, witness)
    Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
  • Mary Edinburgh (board member, witness)
    Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
  • Beth Mulcahy (respondent attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Recipient of transmission; noted as withdrawn counsel prior to rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient

Other Participants

  • Miranda Alvarez (unknown)
    Associated with transmission for petitioner's attorney

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-16
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura B Ganer Counsel —
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners Association Counsel Mark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:39 (108.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

◦ Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

• Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

• Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

• Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

• Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

• Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

• Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

• Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

• Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

• Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

• Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

• No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

• Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.

3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

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1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

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2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

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3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

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Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.

Wendy Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020043-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-08
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth Counsel Brian Hatch
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners' Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1

Outcome Summary

The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that VHA violated CC&R section 10.11.1 by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment requested by the Petitioner regarding VHA's waiver of its enforcement rights.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 regarding parking enforcement and waiver

Petitioner alleged VHA waived its right to enforce CC&R 10.11.1 (parking prohibition) because violations had been frequent since inception. The tribunal found Petitioner failed to establish VHA violated section 10.11.1, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction regarding the requested declaratory judgment on waiver of enforcement.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Parking, Waiver, Jurisdiction
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:22 (95.4 KB)

20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:39 (95.4 KB)

Briefing: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Wendy Ellsworth versus the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). The case centered on Ms. Ellsworth’s petition alleging that the VHA had waived its right to enforce a specific parking restriction outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition in its entirety.

The dismissal was based on two fundamental conclusions. First, the petitioner, Ms. Ellsworth, failed to meet her burden of proof. Her petition did not allege, nor did she provide evidence, that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. Instead, her claim focused on the VHA’s alleged failure to enforce the rule against others. Second, and more decisively, the judge determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment. Ms. Ellsworth was effectively asking the tribunal to declare that the VHA had waived its enforcement rights, a legal determination beyond the OAH’s statutory authority. The VHA successfully argued that the OAH’s jurisdiction is limited to hearing alleged violations committed by the association, not to adjudicating the association’s future enforcement capabilities.

Case Background

• Petitioner: Wendy Ellsworth, a property owner within the Vincenz community.

• Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

• Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

• Filing Date: Ms. Ellsworth filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about January 15, 2020.

• Hearing Date: An evidentiary hearing was held on August 19, 2020.

• Decision Date: The final decision was issued on September 8, 2020.

The matter was referred to the OAH to determine whether VHA was in violation of its community documents as alleged by the petitioner.

Central Dispute: CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1

The entire dispute revolved around the enforcement of a specific vehicle parking rule within the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

Article 10 § 10.11.1 provides:

Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

This provision explicitly restricts the parking of personal vehicles to approved locations: garages, private driveways, or other areas specifically designated by the VHA Board.

Positions of the Parties

Petitioner’s Position (Wendy Ellsworth)

Ms. Ellsworth’s central argument was not that the VHA had violated the parking rule, but that it had lost the ability to enforce it through inaction.

• Core Allegation: The petition claimed VHA had waived its ability to enforce Article 10, Section 10.11.1.

• Stated Rationale: Ms. Ellsworth intended to prove that “violations of the street parking prohibition have been ‘frequent’ since Vincenz’s inception” and that the community’s CC&Rs “do not contain a relevant non-waiver provision.”

• Testimony: At the August 19, 2020 hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, under cross-examination, she later conceded that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz Homeowners’ Association)

The VHA argued for a complete dismissal of the petition, primarily on procedural and jurisdictional grounds.

• Core Argument: The petition failed to state a valid claim because it did not contend that VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

• Jurisdictional Challenge: VHA contended that the OAH’s jurisdiction, granted under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), is strictly limited to hearing petitions about alleged violations of community documents or state statutes by the association.

• Declaratory Judgment: The VHA characterized Ms. Ellsworth’s request as one for a “declaratory judgment”—a ruling on the VHA’s legal right to enforce the rule—which it argued the OAH has no legal authority to issue.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided entirely with the Respondent, concluding that the petition must be dismissed. The decision was based on a failure of proof by the petitioner and a critical lack of jurisdiction by the tribunal.

Legal Standards Applied

Standard

Description

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner bears the burden to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Covenant Interpretation

In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be interpreted as a whole.

Conclusion 1: Failure to Establish a Violation

The ALJ found that Ms. Ellsworth failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision notes:

• Ms. Ellsworth “did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

• Because no violation by the VHA was alleged or proven, the core requirement for a successful petition was absent.

Conclusion 2: Lack of Jurisdiction

The most significant finding was that the tribunal lacked the authority to grant the relief Ms. Ellsworth sought.

• The ALJ explicitly stated: “To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

• This conclusion affirmed the VHA’s central argument that the OAH is not the proper forum for determining an association’s prospective enforcement rights.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings, the final order was unambiguous:

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision document includes a notice outlining the next steps available to the parties. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the order is binding unless a party files a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (Case No. 20F-H2020043-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and the final ruling of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

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Review Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific rule, or covenant, was at the center of the dispute?

3. What was the core allegation made by the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, in her initial petition?

4. What was the primary legal argument made by the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association, for why the petition should be dismissed?

5. What change occurred in Ms. Ellsworth’s testimony during the hearing?

6. According to the decision, what is the legal standard for the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing?

7. How does Arizona law interpret “restrictive covenants” when their language is unambiguous?

8. What two key reasons did the Administrative Law Judge give for dismissing the petition?

9. Which government body has jurisdiction to hear petitions from homeowners concerning violations of planned community documents?

10. What action could the parties take after the order was issued, and within what timeframe?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth, a homeowner, and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). Ms. Ellsworth initiated the legal action by filing a petition against the VHA.

2. The rule at the center of the dispute was Article 10, Section 10.11.1 of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section prohibits the parking of private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks on the property or adjacent roadways, except in garages, private driveways, or other Board-designated areas.

3. Ms. Ellsworth’s core allegation was that the VHA had waived its ability to enforce the street parking prohibition (CC&R 10.11.1). She claimed that violations had been “frequent” since the community’s inception and that the VHA’s CC&Rs lacked a relevant non-waiver provision.

4. The VHA argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ellsworth never alleged that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. The VHA contended that the OAH only has jurisdiction over alleged violations by the association, not over a homeowner’s request for a declaratory judgment on the right to enforce a rule.

5. During the hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, upon cross-examination, she admitted that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.

6. The legal standard for the burden of proof is “a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires the petitioner to provide proof that convinces the trier of fact that their contention is more probably true than not.

7. In Arizona, if a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes.

8. The judge dismissed the petition for two main reasons. First, Ms. Ellsworth failed to establish that the VHA itself had violated section 10.11.1. Second, the tribunal (the OAH) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the VHA has waived its right to enforce the covenant.

9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate is the government body that receives petitions for hearings concerning violations of planned community documents. These hearings are then referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

10. After the order was issued on September 8, 2020, either party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. This request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the facts and legal principles from the case to construct your arguments. No answer key is provided.

1. Explain the concept of “waiver” as argued by the petitioner. Why was this argument ultimately ineffective before the Office of Administrative Hearings in this specific case?

2. Analyze the jurisdictional limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) as demonstrated in this decision. Discuss the difference between adjudicating a violation of community documents and issuing a declaratory judgment.

3. Describe the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and explain how the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, failed to meet this burden of proof. Consider both her initial claim and her testimony during the hearing.

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s legal strategy. What was the central flaw in her petition that prevented the Administrative Law Judge from ruling on the merits of her non-enforcement claim?

5. Based on the legal precedent cited (Powell v. Washburn), discuss the principles Arizona courts use to interpret CC&Rs. How did the judge apply this principle to the specific language of Article 10, Section 10.11.1?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (like the OAH) and issues decisions.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts other than those alleged by the petitioner which, if proven by the respondent, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the respondent’s otherwise unlawful conduct.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the VHA violated its CC&Rs.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision.

Declaratory Judgment

A binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in a matter before any actual harm has occurred. The OAH determined it lacked jurisdiction to issue such a judgment in this case.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The OAH’s jurisdiction was limited to hearing alleged violations of community documents, not requests for declaratory judgments.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held. It conducts hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition to start a legal action. In this case, Wendy Ellsworth.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning that the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than not. It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or a set of CC&Rs that limits the use of the property and prohibits certain uses.

Waiver

The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. The petitioner argued that the VHA, through its inaction, had waived its right to enforce the parking rule.

Why This Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA Was Doomed From the Start: 3 Critical Lessons

The frustration is real. You see your neighbors breaking the rules—parking on the street, letting their lawn go—and it feels like your Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is doing nothing about it. This sense of inconsistent enforcement is one of the most common complaints homeowners have. For Wendy Ellsworth, this frustration led her to file a legal petition against the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).

Her case, however, was dismissed. It wasn’t lost on a minor technicality or a surprise piece of evidence. It was doomed from the start because of fundamental strategic errors. By examining where she went wrong, we can uncover three powerful lessons for any homeowner considering a similar fight.

Lesson 1: You Must Accuse the Right Party of the Right Violation

Ms. Ellsworth’s core grievance was that the VHA was not enforcing its own on-street parking rules against other residents. Her formal petition, however, made a critical mistake: it accused the HOA itself of violating the community’s parking rule, CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1.

This was a fatal flaw. That specific rule governs the actions of homeowners—prohibiting them from parking automobiles or trucks on roadways except in designated areas. It places no duty on the HOA. In her legal filing, Ms. Ellsworth failed to point to any specific rule that the HOA, as an entity, had actually broken. Her petition essentially accused the HOA of illegally parking a car, which was not her complaint at all. The judge noted this fundamental disconnect:

“Ms. Ellsworth did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”

A viable petition would have needed to identify a completely different rule—one that placed a specific duty on the HOA Board to enforce the community documents—and then allege that the Board had violated that duty. This fundamental error of misidentifying the violation was compounded by the fact that she was asking the tribunal for a remedy it had no power to grant. Accusing the wrong party of breaking the wrong rule can cause an entire case to be dismissed before its merits are even considered.

Lesson 2: The “Burden of Proof” is More Than Just a Legal Phrase

In any legal action, the person making the claim (the “petitioner”) has the “burden of proof.” This means it is their responsibility to present evidence that convinces the judge their claim is true. Ms. Ellsworth, as the petitioner, was responsible for proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

The court defined this standard as:

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Making an accusation is easy; proving it is hard. Ms. Ellsworth’s own testimony failed to meet this standard. At the hearing, she initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, when questioned further during cross-examination, she admitted that she was “unsure” whether the HOA had ever enforced it. This admission transformed her claim from an assertion of fact into mere speculation. In court, “I’m unsure” is the equivalent of having no evidence at all on that point, making it impossible for the judge to conclude her version of events was “more probably true than not.”

The lesson here is that winning requires more than just a belief you are right. You must present evidence that is solid, consistent, and more convincing than the other side’s. Weak or self-contradictory testimony undermines your own credibility and makes it nearly impossible to meet the burden of proof.

Lesson 3: You Have to Knock on the Right Legal Door

The legal system is highly specialized, and different courts and tribunals have the authority—or “jurisdiction”—to hear different types of cases. A major part of Ms. Ellsworth’s petition was the request for a “declaratory judgment,” essentially asking the judge to declare that the VHA had waived its right to enforce the parking rule in the future because of its alleged past non-enforcement.

The problem was that she brought this request to the wrong venue. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is designed to answer a simple question: “Did the HOA violate an existing rule?” Ms. Ellsworth was asking a far more complex question: “Based on past behavior, should the court declare that this rule is no longer enforceable in the future?” That forward-looking request for a “declaratory judgment” belongs in a court of general jurisdiction (like a state Superior Court), which has broader powers to interpret contracts and establish future rights, not in a specialized administrative tribunal.

The Administrative Law Judge made this point unequivocally:

“To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”

Even if her argument about waiver had merit, it was brought before a body that was legally powerless to grant her request. This serves as a crucial reminder: filing a case in the wrong court is an automatic loss. Understanding the specific jurisdiction of the court or tribunal you are petitioning is a non-negotiable step in legal strategy.

Conclusion: Thinking Like a Lawyer, Not Just a Homeowner

Ms. Ellsworth’s case failed not because of three separate errors, but because of a single, comprehensive breakdown in legal strategy. The “what” (the specific accusation), the “how” (the burden of proof), and the “where” (the legal venue) were all fundamentally misaligned with her ultimate goal. This misalignment created a case that was legally impossible to win, regardless of how valid her underlying frustration may have been.

While a homeowner’s anger may be entirely justified, this case demonstrates that passion alone doesn’t win lawsuits. A sound legal strategy is essential. Before you challenge your HOA, have you moved past the frustration to build a case that can actually win?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Wendy Ellsworth (petitioner)
    Testified at hearing
  • Brian Hatch (petitioner attorney)
    Brian A. Hatch PLLC

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel —
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:21:58 (69.0 KB)

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 741807.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:22:08 (78.9 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

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I. Case Overview

• Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

• Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

• Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

• Decision Date: January 30, 2020

• Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

• May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

• June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

• January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

• Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

• Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

• Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

• The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

• Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

• Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
• Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
• Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

• Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

• Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

• Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

• Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG). The guide includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information in the provided source text.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action taken by Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen initiated the dispute with the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association?

3. What was Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument for why the HOA’s Flag Display Rule was invalid?

4. On what authority did the Carter Ranch HOA claim it had the right to create and enforce its Flag Display Rule?

5. According to the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule,” which specific flags are homeowners permitted to fly?

6. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this hearing, and how is it defined in the decision?

7. What protection does Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1808(C) provide for “political signs”?

8. What were the two key failures of the petitioner’s case, as identified in the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law?

9. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

10. What are the next steps for a party wishing to challenge the Administrative Law Judge’s order?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Van Dan Elzen represented himself, while the HOA was represented by its attorney, Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

2. The dispute began on or about May 21, 2019, when the Carter Ranch HOA notified Mr. Van Dan Elzen that he had violated its rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag in his front yard. This notice of violation prompted Mr. Van Dan Elzen to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument was that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the community’s Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He contended that because CC&R section 3.14 only defines “SIGNS” and makes no reference to “Flags,” the HOA had no basis in the CC&Rs to regulate his flag.

4. The Carter Ranch HOA asserted its authority based on Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the HOA Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to the health, safety, or welfare of the owners and restrictions on the use of Lots.

5. The HOA’s Flag Display Rule prohibits flying any flag other than the American Flag, an official replica of a U.S. military flag (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), a POW/MIA flag, an Arizona Indian National flag, the Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

6. The petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

7. A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) prevents an HOA from prohibiting the display of political signs on a member’s property, although it allows for regulation. An HOA cannot prohibit political signs earlier than 71 days before an election or later than three days after, and its rules on size and number can be no more restrictive than applicable city or county ordinances.

8. The Judge concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the Flag Display Rule was improperly adopted or inconsistent with the CC&Rs. Furthermore, the Judge concluded that the petitioner had not actually alleged that Carter Ranch violated the specific statute he cited, A.R.S. § 33-1808.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by state statutes.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are designed to encourage a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument that the Flag Display Rule was invalid because the word “flag” does not appear in the CC&Rs. Why was this argument ultimately unconvincing to the Administrative Law Judge?

2. Explain the legal distinction between a “flag” and a “political sign” as presented in A.R.S. § 33-1808. How might the petitioner’s case have differed if he had argued his “Trump 2020” flag was a “political sign” instead of a flag?

3. Discuss the authority granted to the Carter Ranch HOA Board by Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. How did the HOA use this section to justify its Flag Display Rule, and why was this justification accepted by the court?

4. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the petitioner “has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” How can this be true when the petitioner’s initial filing explicitly cited this statute?

5. Based on the provided text of A.R.S. § 33-1808, under what specific circumstances could a homeowner in Carter Ranch successfully challenge the HOA’s rules on outdoor displays?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ in the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. The case centered on an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or subdivision. The Carter Ranch CC&Rs grant the HOA Board the authority to adopt rules and regulations.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.

Flag Display Rule

The specific rule created by the Carter Ranch HOA that prohibits flying any flag other than the American, military, POW/MIA, Arizona Indian National, Arizona State, and Gadsden flags.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Carter Ranch Homeowners Association is the Respondent in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, the petitioner is Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Political Sign

Defined by A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.” HOAs are restricted in their ability to prohibit the display of such signs.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it,” meaning the fact is more probable than not.

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent (Carter Ranch HOA) to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues. This case was decided as a result of a rehearing held on January 10, 2020.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the complaint. In this case, the respondent is the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

He Fought the HOA Over a Political Flag—And Lost. Here Are 3 Surprising Reasons Why.

Introduction: The Pride and the Problem

Imagine this: You want to display a flag on your own property to support a political candidate. It feels like a fundamental right, an expression of free speech on your home turf. But then, a letter arrives from your Homeowners Association (HOA) citing you for a violation. This exact scenario happened to Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who displayed a “Trump 2020” flag and promptly received a violation notice from the Carter Ranch HOA in Arizona.

Believing the HOA was overstepping its authority, Mr. Van Dan Elzen took them to court. He lost. The outcome might seem counter-intuitive, but the court’s decision reveals crucial lessons for any homeowner living under an HOA. Here are the three surprising legal reasons why the HOA won.

1. The Power of the Fine Print: Why a “Loophole” Wasn’t Enough

Mr. Van Dan Elzen built his case on a clever textual argument. He alleged that the HOA’s rule against his flag was invalid because the section of the master community documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—he believed it was based on only regulated “SIGNS” and made no mention of “FLAGS.” He argued that since the document didn’t explicitly prohibit flags, the rule against his was unenforceable.

This seemingly logical “loophole” argument failed. The HOA countered by pointing to a different, much broader clause in their CC&Rs. Article V, Section 5.3, gave the HOA board expansive power to create new rules.

The Board may, from time to time, adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to: … (iii) the health, safety or welfare of the owners, Lessees and Residence, or (iv) restrictions on the use of Lots…

This general power to create rules for the “welfare of the owners” was enough to give the HOA the legal authority to regulate flags, even if the word “flag” wasn’t in the specific section the homeowner cited. The broad power to govern trumped the narrow, semantic argument.

2. A Flag Is Not a Sign (At Least, Not According to the Law)

While the homeowner’s flag was political in nature, it did not receive the legal protections granted to “political signs” under Arizona law. This distinction proved fatal to his case.

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808, is highly specific about which flags an HOA is forbidden from prohibiting. The protected list includes: the American flag, official military branch flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, Arizona Indian nations flags, and the Gadsden flag. Critically, the Carter Ranch HOA’s own Flag Display Rule mirrored this state-approved list exactly, demonstrating they had aligned their regulations with the law. A political campaign flag, like “Trump 2020,” is not on this protected list.

The same law does protect political signs, but it defines them very precisely:

“political sign” means a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing the recall of a public officer or supporting or opposing the circulation of a petition for a ballot measure, question or proposition or the recall of a public officer.

The key takeaway is that the law treats a political flag differently from a political sign. Because the “Trump 2020” item was a flag and not on the state’s protected flag list, the HOA was well within its rights to restrict its display based on its own community rules.

3. A Critical Misstep: Arguing the Wrong Point

The most decisive reason for the loss was not a procedural error, but a substantive legal failure. Mr. Van Dan Elzen filed his petition with the state on the grounds that the HOA had violated a specific state law, A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and political signs.

However, his entire case was built on arguing that the HOA’s internal rules were inconsistent with its own CC&Rs—the “sign” versus “flag” argument. This was the wrong legal target. To win, he had to prove that the HOA had violated the state statute. But the statute explicitly allows an HOA to regulate any flag not on the protected list. By regulating his “Trump 2020” flag, the HOA was doing exactly what the state law permitted. His argument about internal documents, even if correct, did not add up to a violation of the state law he sued under.

The Administrative Law Judge recognized this fundamental flaw, concluding that the homeowner hadn’t actually made a case for a statutory violation at all.

Moreover, Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

This is a crucial lesson: it’s not enough to feel wronged. Your argument must directly prove that the specific law you cite in your complaint has actually been broken. The homeowner’s claim was dismissed because his central argument was irrelevant to the law he needed to prove was violated.

Conclusion: Know Your Rights, and Your Rules

The case of the “Trump 2020” flag is a powerful illustration for homeowners everywhere. It highlights three critical realities of living in an HOA: the broad rule-making power granted by community documents can override perceived loopholes; state laws make very specific and narrow distinctions between protected items like signs and flags; and a sound legal strategy is paramount.

This case is a stark reminder that in an HOA, your property rights are defined not by what you feel is right, but by what is written down. Before you make a stand, are you certain you’re fighting the right battle on the right legal ground?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Augustus H. Shaw IV (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines LLC
    Appeared for Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Dustin Snow (property manager)
    SNOW PROPERTY SERVICES
    Recipient of order transmission

William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

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Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Case Overview

This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Roles

Party/Role

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

William P. Lee

A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.

Legal Counsel

Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.

Timeline of Key Events

June 16, 1986

Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.

July 2, 1999

Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.

July 6, 2018

Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.

September 12, 2018

William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 13, 2018

The original hearing on the petition was conducted.

February 11, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.

April 1, 2019

The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

April 22, 2019

The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.

The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations

The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).

• Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.

• Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.

• Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.

• Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.

• Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.

• No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.

• Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

• No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

• Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.

• Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.

• Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

• Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”

• Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.

• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

The Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:

1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.

2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.

3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.

5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.

1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?

2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?

4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?

5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?

6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?

8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?

9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.

2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.

4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.

5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”

6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.

8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.

9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.

10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?

3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?

5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.

• Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.

• Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.

• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.

• Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.

• Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.

• Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.

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19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

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This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between William P. Lee, a homeowner, and Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two, his Homeowners Association. The central issue revolved around the Greenlaw HOA’s implementation of a comprehensive ban on street parking and its contracting with a towing company to enforce the rule, which Mr. Lee contended violated the association’s governing documents, specifically amendments to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the proper notification procedures for revised rules. The findings of fact detail the history of the parking rules, the homeowner’s receipt of the electronic notification of the revised rules, and Mr. Lee’s arguments that the association failed to use the required postal mail or personal delivery methods for notice. The Conclusions of Law determined that the controlling rules were the revised July 2018 Rules and Regulations and that Mr. Lee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated either the CC&Rs or relevant Arizona statutes. Consequently, the Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association member
    Testified on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Contended by Lee to be the reason for the parking ban

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel —
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Notice Violation, A.R.S. 33-1242, Statutory Construction, Homeowner Petition Dismissed
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
  • Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T09:58:56 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T09:59:03 (85.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:40 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:44 (85.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the case is Mr. Garcia’s allegation that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 by failing to follow specific procedures after issuing notices for a violation of its short-term rental policy.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The central finding was that Mr. Garcia failed to meet a critical prerequisite outlined in the statute: he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period. This failure meant that the HOA’s corresponding statutory obligations—such as providing the name of the person who observed the violation—were never triggered.

Furthermore, the judge determined that the HOA was not required to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to an administrative hearing because the violation notices themselves included instructions on the HOA’s internal process for contesting the matter. Mr. Garcia’s argument that the HOA’s rapid issuance of fines and subsequent notices prevented him from responding was found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The decisions underscore a strict interpretation of the statute, placing the initial burden of response on the unit owner.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings after a petition was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involved an initial hearing and a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

Rogelio A. Garcia

Respondent

Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”)

Respondent’s Counsel

Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Case Number (Initial)

19F-H1918009-REL

Case Number (Rehearing)

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG

Core Allegation

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 by the Respondent.

II. Chronology of Events

• March 8, 2018: Villagio mails the first letter to Mr. Garcia, alleging a violation of short-term lease provisions in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The letter instructs him to file an appeal with the Board of Directors within 10 days of receipt.

• March 22, 2018: Villagio mails a second notice for the same violation, informing Mr. Garcia that a $1,000 fine has been posted to his account. This notice also contains instructions for contesting the violation.

• April 5, 2018: Villagio mails a third notice, informing Mr. Garcia that a $2,000 fine has been posted to his account for the continuing violation.

• Response from Garcia: Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-calendar-day period specified by statute. He did, at some point, file an appeal directly with Villagio, which held a hearing but did not change its position.

• August 17, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Garcia files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally initiating the administrative hearing process.

• October 30, 2018: The first evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

• November 19, 2018: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

• January 3, 2019 (approx.): The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues an order setting a rehearing for the matter, following a request from Mr. Garcia.

• February 12, 2019: The rehearing is held. Mr. Garcia testifies on his own behalf, and Villagio presents testimony from Community Manager Tom Gordon.

• March 4, 2019: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

III. Central Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1242

The entire dispute centered on the procedural requirements laid out in A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs how an HOA must handle notices of violation to a unit owner. The key provisions are:

• Unit Owner’s Responsibility (Subsection B): A unit owner who receives a written notice of violation may provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.

• Association’s Obligations upon Response (Subsection C): Within ten business days after receiving the certified mail response, the association must provide a written explanation that includes:

1. The specific provision of the condominium documents allegedly violated.

2. The date the violation occurred or was observed.

3. The first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

4. The process the unit owner must follow to contest the notice.

• Association’s Obligation Regarding Administrative Hearings (Subsection D): An association must provide written notice of the owner’s option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department unless the information required in Subsection C, paragraph 4 (the contest process) is provided in the initial notice of violation.

IV. Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Mr. Garcia’s arguments, presented across both hearings, focused on three primary claims of statutory violation by Villagio:

1. Failure to Provide Required Information: Villagio violated the statute by not providing him with the first and last name of the person who observed the violation.

2. Failure to Notify of Hearing Rights: Villagio did not inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

3. Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from responding via certified mail within the 21-day statutory period. He argued that the notices’ demand for compliance within 10 days, combined with the issuance of a second notice and a fine just 14 days after the first, led him to believe he only had 10 days to act before incurring another violation.

Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio presented a defense based on a direct reading of the statute and Mr. Garcia’s inaction:

1. Statutory Obligations Not Triggered: Villagio’s central argument was that its obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C)—including the duty to name the observer—are only triggered after a unit owner submits a written response by certified mail within 21 days. Since Mr. Garcia never sent such a response, these obligations never came into effect.

2. Internal Contest Process Satisfied Statute: Per A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), the duty to notify an owner of their right to an administrative hearing only applies if the HOA fails to provide its own contest process. Villagio argued that because all three notices explicitly stated the process for appealing to the Board of Directors, it had fulfilled its statutory duty.

3. No Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia was never legally or physically prevented from sending a certified letter. During cross-examination, he admitted he was not under any court order prohibiting him from responding.

4. Statute Inapplicability (Argument from Rehearing): Villagio further contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies specifically to violations concerning the “condition of the property,” not the “use” of the property. Since short-term renting is a use, Villagio argued the statute did not apply to this situation at all.

Key Testimony from Rehearing

During the February 12, 2019 rehearing, Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified.

• On direct examination, Mr. Gordon stated that Villagio does not restrict homeowners from responding to violation notices within the 21-day period.

• On cross-examination, when asked by Mr. Garcia if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” had he responded in 21 days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.” He explained this by stating that homeowners are given 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio pursuant to its own short-term rental policy.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decisions and Rationale

The judge’s findings were consistent across both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, leading to the same conclusion in each instance.

Initial Decision (November 19, 2018)

• Finding of Fact: It was undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the March 8, March 22, or April 5, 2018 notices within 21 calendar days.

• Conclusion 1: Because Mr. Garcia did not respond within the 21-day period, Villagio was not required to provide him with the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

• Conclusion 2: Because Villagio notified Mr. Garcia of the process for contesting the notice, it was not required under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) to provide him with notice of the right to petition for an administrative hearing.

• Outcome: Mr. Garcia failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (March 4, 2019)

The judge reaffirmed the initial findings and addressed Mr. Garcia’s argument that he was prevented from responding.

• Finding on “Prevention”: The judge found no evidence that Villagio informed Mr. Garcia he could not respond within 21 days or otherwise prevented him from doing so. The issuance of a second notice 14 days after the first was not deemed a preventative act that nullified Mr. Garcia’s statutory window to respond to the first notice.

• Statutory Construction: The decision invoked the legal principle that “what the Legislature means, it will say,” indicating a strict, literal interpretation of the statute’s requirements.

• Reaffirmed Conclusions: The judge again concluded that because Mr. Garcia failed to submit a written response by certified mail, Villagio’s obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) were not triggered, and its inclusion of an internal appeal process satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242(D).

• Outcome: Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed for a second time, with Villagio deemed the prevailing party.

VI. Final Disposition

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Garcia’s petition be dismissed. The decision issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the administrative case between Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, as detailed in case number 19F-H1918009-REL.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source context.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association initially accuse Mr. Garcia of committing?

3. What was the core of Mr. Garcia’s legal complaint against the Homeowners Association?

4. According to the court’s findings, what crucial step did Mr. Garcia fail to take after receiving the violation notices?

5. What was Villagio’s main argument for why it was not obligated to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?

6. Under what circumstance did Villagio argue it was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with notice of his right to petition for an administrative hearing?

7. What new fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia in the notices dated March 22, 2018, and April 5, 2018?

8. At the rehearing, what was Mr. Garcia’s explanation for why he was unable to respond to the notices within the statutory 21-day period?

9. What argument did Villagio introduce at the rehearing concerning the distinction between a property’s “condition” and its “use”?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Rogelio A. Garcia, the Petitioner who brought the complaint, and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, the Respondent defending against the complaint. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

2. Villagio accused Mr. Garcia of violating the short-term lease provisions located in the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The association alleged that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of its short-term rental policy.

3. Mr. Garcia alleged that Villagio violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. He claimed Villagio failed to provide him the opportunity to respond by certified mail within 21 days, did not inform him of his right to an administrative hearing, and did not provide the name of the person who observed the violation.

4. The court found that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the violation notices sent on March 8, March 22, and April 5, 2018. Specifically, he failed to provide the association with a written response by sending it via certified mail within 21 calendar days after the date of the notices.

5. Villagio argued that its obligation to provide the observer’s name under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) is only triggered if the unit owner first submits a written response by certified mail within the 21-day period. Because Mr. Garcia did not do so, Villagio was not required to provide that information.

6. Villagio argued it was not required to provide notice of the right to petition for a hearing because it had already fulfilled its legal obligation under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D). The violation notices it sent to Mr. Garcia contained instructions on the process for contesting the notice with the Board of Directors.

7. The notice dated March 22, 2018, informed Mr. Garcia that a fine of $1,000 had been posted to his account. The subsequent notice on April 5, 2018, stated that an additional $2,000 fine had been posted for the same violation.

8. Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio prevented him from responding because it did not wait 21 days before issuing subsequent notices and fines. He believed he only had 10 days to comply based on language in the notices, which created confusion and pressure.

9. At the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition of the property.” Villagio asserted its notices concerned the “use” of Mr. Garcia’s property (short-term renting), not its physical condition.

10. In both the initial hearing decision issued on November 19, 2018, and the rehearing decision issued on March 4, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove Villagio had violated the statute. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to provoke deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing evidence and reasoning exclusively from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson to dismiss Mr. Garcia’s petition. How did the judge interpret and apply the specific subsections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242 to the facts presented in the initial hearing and the rehearing?

2. Trace the progression of arguments made by both Rogelio A. Garcia and Villagio from the initial petition through the rehearing. How did their claims and defenses evolve, and what new evidence or legal theories were introduced in the second hearing?

3. Discuss the significance of the “burden of proof” in this case, which rested upon Mr. Garcia. Explain the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decision and detail why the judge concluded Mr. Garcia failed to meet this standard.

4. Evaluate the strength and potential implications of Villagio’s argument, introduced at the rehearing, that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge did not base the final decision on this point, discuss how this interpretation could affect future disputes between homeowners and associations.

5. Based on the dates and actions described in the two decisions, construct a detailed procedural timeline of this case. Begin with the first violation letter from Villagio and conclude with the notice of the right to appeal the rehearing decision, including all key notices, filings, hearings, and fines.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The central statute in this case was A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this matter, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof to show that Villagio committed the alleged violation.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents that dictate how a condominium or planned community must be operated and maintained, and which contain the rules that unit owners must follow. Mr. Garcia was accused of violating the short-term lease provisions of Villagio’s CC&Rs.

Certified Mail

A type of mail service that provides the sender with a mailing receipt and electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made. A.R.S. § 33-1242(B) specifies this method for a unit owner’s written response to a violation notice.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding, similar to a trial, where parties present evidence (such as testimony and documents) to a neutral decision-maker. Hearings were held in this case on October 30, 2018, and February 12, 2019.

Office of Administrative Hearings

A state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies, boards, and commissions. This office was responsible for conducting the hearings in this case.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the original decision, often granted to review the evidence or arguments. Mr. Garcia requested and was granted a rehearing after the initial decision was issued.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association was the Respondent.

Unit Owner

A person who owns a unit within a condominium or planned community and is subject to the association’s governing documents. Mr. Garcia is a unit owner in the Villagio at Tempe community.

Select all sources
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19F-H1918009-REL-RHG

2 sources

These sources consist of two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The first document records the initial decision from October 2018, which dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition alleging the HOA violated Arizona statute § 33-1242 by not providing required information following a notice of violation for short-term leasing. The second document details the rehearing decision from February 2019, which again found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove the HOA violated the statute because he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the mandatory 21-day period to trigger the HOA’s legal obligations. Both rulings concluded that since the HOA provided him with the process for contesting the notices, they were not required to provide written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing. Consequently, both decisions dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition and designated the HOA as the prevailing party.

2 sources

What are the legal requirements concerning notice and response for HOA violations?
How did the unit owner’s failure to respond impact their statutory rights?
What legal interpretation was key to dismissing the homeowner’s administrative petition?

Based on 2 sources

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00:00

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rogelio A. Garcia (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association,
  • Tom Gordon (Community Manager/witness)
    AAM LLC
    Community Manager for Villagio; testified on behalf of Villagio

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of the decision,

Other Participants

  • Amanda Shaw (Representative/Contact)
    AAM LLC
    Listed as c/o for service of process for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Charles P Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel —
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:26 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL Decision – 669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:30 (91.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the dispute was Blue Ridge’s repeated denial of Mr. Mandela’s requests to construct a 150-square-foot cedar patio structure on his property.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied Mr. Mandela’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation of the association’s governing documents. The ALJ’s decisions affirmed that Blue Ridge acted within its authority and correctly applied its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and architectural regulations.

Key takeaways from the rulings include:

• Violation of Detached Structure Limit: Mr. Mandela’s request for a detached patio was denied because he already had a tool shed, and the HOA rules explicitly permit only one detached structure per property.

• Improper “Play Structure” Request: An initial request framing the patio as a “play structure” was correctly denied as its proposed 150 sq. ft. size exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit for certain play structures.

• Insufficient Plans for Attached Structure: A separate request to attach the structure to his home was denied due to Mr. Mandela’s failure to provide the required detailed architectural plans and construction drawings, which the HOA deemed necessary for approval.

• Arguments Found Lacking: Mr. Mandela’s arguments—including claims of selective enforcement, discrimination against homeowners without children, and misinterpretation of the term “temporary structure”—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded the structure would be a prohibited temporary structure as the proposed concrete pavers do not constitute a permanent foundation under the HOA’s definition.

Case Overview

Parties Involved

Description

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

A homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

The governing homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Timeline of Key Events

c. Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request for a 150 sq. ft. patio, using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form. Blue Ridge denies it for exceeding the size limit.

c. Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits a second request, this time to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans and materials.

c. Mar 8, 2018

Blue Ridge denies the request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information,” instructing Mr. Mandela to provide formal drawings as per CC&R guidelines.

c. Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an internal appeal with Blue Ridge, which is subsequently denied for the same reason of incomplete construction information.

Post-Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits a third request for a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. Blue Ridge denies it because he already has a detached tool shed.

c. Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a) by denying his request while allowing another member a Tuff Shed.

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues the initial decision, denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Arizona Department of Real Estate orders a rehearing of the matter.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held before the same ALJ.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues the final decision, again finding in favor of Blue Ridge and denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Analysis of Construction Requests and Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure, each of which was denied for different reasons based on the HOA’s governing documents.

Request 1: Detached “Play Structure”

Mr. Mandela’s initial application on February 1, 2018, was submitted using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form.

• HOA Rule: The form, based on modified Rules and Regulations from April 6, 2016, states: “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”

• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied the request because the proposed 150 sq. ft. size of the structure exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit specified for this type of structure.

Request 2: Attached Cedar Patio Shade

On March 2, 2018, Mr. Mandela submitted a new request to attach the structure to his home.

• HOA Action: The committee chairman, John Hart, requested documents showing the structure would not be free-standing, such as plans and material specifications.

• Mandela’s Response: In a March 3 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof.” He asserted that photos of other attached structures were sufficient.

• Denial Rationale: The request was denied on March 8 due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter explicitly instructed Mr. Mandela to submit all required documents, including drawings that “match exactly what you are going to build,” per CC&R Section 10.3. His subsequent appeal was also denied, with Blue Ridge noting that a manufacturer’s representative stated they would not warranty the product if the design was altered and reiterating the need for detailed elevation drawings.

Request 3: Detached Cedar Patio Structure

Following the denial of his appeal, Mr. Mandela submitted a third request for a detached version of the patio.

• HOA Rule: According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D), “One detached structure may… be constructed on a property.”

• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied this request because Mr. Mandela already had one detached structure—a tool shed—on his property. The rules permit only one such structure.

Key Arguments and Rulings from Administrative Hearings

At the initial hearing and subsequent rehearing, both parties presented arguments regarding the application of the HOA’s rules. The ALJ systematically addressed and ruled on each point, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Petitioner’s Core Arguments (Charles P. Mandela)

• Definition of “Detached Structure”: He argued that his proposed patio was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, based on his misinterpretation of a prior administrative ruling, a detached structure is one that can be easily converted into a second residence.

• Selective Enforcement: He alleged that Blue Ridge approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member and was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. play structure size limit against other homeowners, thus discriminating against him.

• Discriminatory Rules: He contended that the rule allowing a second detached structure if it is a “play structure” violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people without children. He stated he wanted the patio for his mother.

• Definition of “Temporary Structure”: He asserted the structure was not a prohibited temporary structure because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he claimed constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules, and the materials had a 5-year warranty.

Respondent’s Core Arguments (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)

• One Detached Structure Rule: The rules unambiguously limit homeowners to one detached structure, and Mr. Mandela already had one.

• Incomplete Submissions: The request for an attached structure lacked the necessary architectural details to ensure it was properly and safely constructed, as required by the CC&Rs. Joseph Hancock, Vice President of Blue Ridge and a former contractor, testified that Mr. Mandela failed to consider critical factors like height and width differentials.

• Temporary Structure Violation: Mr. Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.” Therefore, the proposed structure would be a prohibited temporary structure under the CC&Rs.

• No Selective Enforcement: Mr. Hancock refuted Mr. Mandela’s claims of selective enforcement, testifying that the lots Mr. Mandela cited either had structures built before 2003 (predating certain rules) or had no detached structures at all.

Administrative Law Judge’s Final Conclusions

The ALJ found that Mr. Mandela failed to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The final order denied his petition based on the following conclusions of law:

• Burden of Proof: The petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that Blue Ridge violated CC&R Article III, Section 3.1(a).

• Second Detached Structure: It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela had a shed on his property. The proposed 150 sq. ft. patio therefore constituted a barred second detached structure.

• Prior Rulings Not Precedent: The ALJ noted that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior administrative decision he cited and, furthermore, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.”

• Temporary Structure: The preponderance of the evidence showed the proposed structure is a temporary structure under the CC&Rs because “concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

• Denial of Attached Structure: The denial of the request to attach the structure was proper, as the “Petitioner failed to provide sufficient details to illustrate how he would attach the cedar patio structure to his home.”

• No Evidence of Discrimination: The petitioner failed to establish that Blue Ridge approved other oversized play structures or that the denial of his requests was discriminatory. The ALJ also noted the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over potential constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Relevant HOA Governing Documents

Document/Section

Key Provision / Definition

CC&R § 3.1

Permitted Uses and Restrictions – Single Family: “No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage…”

Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Detached Structures: “One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property.”

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Standard

Temporary Structures: Prohibits temporary structures. A temporary structure is defined as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

Modified Rules and Regulations (April 6, 2016)

Play Structures: Allows up to two play structures but specifies they “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”

CC&R § 3.24

Architectural Approval: “No building, fence, wall, screen, residence or other structure shall be commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered… without the prior written approval of the… Architectural Committee.”

CC&R § 10.3

Architectural Submission Guidelines: Specifies the format and information required for submittals to the architectural committee.

CC&R § 12.2

Declaration Amendments: Requires an affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least 75% of all lots to amend the Declaration.

Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. The case revolves around Mr. Mandela’s multiple attempts to gain approval for a patio structure on his property and the subsequent legal proceedings. The material is drawn from two Administrative Law Judge Decisions, dated November 6, 2018, and February 28, 2019.

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Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing your information directly from the provided case documents.

1. What were the three distinct requests Mr. Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA, and what was the outcome of each?

2. Explain the HOA’s rule regarding detached structures and why Mr. Mandela’s third request for a detached patio was denied under this rule.

3. On what grounds did the HOA deny Mr. Mandela’s second request to attach a cedar patio shade to his home?

4. What was Mr. Mandela’s primary allegation in his initial petition filed with the Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

5. How do the Blue Ridge rules define a “temporary structure,” and why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude Mr. Mandela’s proposed patio fell into this category?

6. Describe Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s policy on play structures.

7. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this case, and what does this standard mean?

8. Mr. Mandela cited a prior administrative law judge decision to support his case. What was his interpretation of that decision, and how did the presiding judge respond to this line of argument?

9. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key pieces of testimony did he provide on behalf of the HOA during the rehearing?

10. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the Declaration (the CC&Rs themselves) versus adopting new “Rules and Regulations”?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot size limit for such structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied due to incomplete information and a lack of adequate plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio structure, which was denied because he already had another detached structure on his property.

2. According to CC&Rs § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), a property is permitted to have only one detached structure. Mr. Mandela’s third request was denied because it was undisputed that he already had a tool shed on his property. The proposed detached patio would have constituted a prohibited second detached structure.

3. The HOA denied the request to attach the patio shade because Mr. Mandela submitted incomplete information and failed to provide sufficient plans. The HOA requested detailed elevation drawings showing construction methods, dimensions, foundation details, and attachment methods, which Mr. Mandela did not provide.

4. In his petition of July 31, 2018, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a). His specific claim was that the HOA discriminated against him by denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

5. The Architectural Committee rules define a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” The judge concluded the proposed patio was a temporary structure because Mr. Mandela planned to use concrete pavers, which, according to the credible testimony of Joseph Hancock, are not the equivalent of a permanent cement or block foundation.

6. Mr. Mandela argued that the modified rule allowing a second detached play structure (up to 80 sq ft) violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people who do not have children. He asserted the policy was unfair because he wanted to build the structure for his mother to rest outside, not for children’s play.

7. The petitioner, Mr. Mandela, had the burden of proof to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.

8. Mr. Mandela argued that a prior administrative law judge decision had found that a “detached structure” under Blue Ridge CC&Rs is a structure that can be easily converted into a second residence, which his patio could not. The presiding judge dismissed this by stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future decisions.

9. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of the Blue Ridge HOA and a former general, electrical, and HVAC contractor. He testified that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or block foundation, that Mr. Mandela’s plans for attaching the structure were insufficient, and that he had investigated lots Mr. Mandela cited for alleged violations and found none.

10. According to the CC&Rs, adopting, amending, or repealing “Rules and Regulations” can be done by a majority vote of the Board (§ 4.2). In contrast, amending the Declaration of CC&Rs themselves is a much more stringent process, requiring the affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all lots (§ 12.2).

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate your answers in a standard essay format, using specific evidence from the source documents to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the progression of Mr. Mandela’s three distinct requests to the HOA. How did the denial of his first request (as a “Play Structure”) appear to influence his subsequent applications and legal arguments?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies in this case. Explain why Mr. Mandela ultimately failed to convince the Administrative Law Judge that the HOA violated its own rules, citing specific examples of his failed arguments (e.g., the temporary structure definition, claims of selective enforcement, and the adequacy of his submitted plans).

3. Examine the distinction made in the Blue Ridge Estates governing documents between the core CC&Rs and the “Rules and Regulations” adopted by the Board. How did this distinction allow the HOA to have a rule permitting a second “play structure” while the main CC&Rs seem to limit properties to a single residence and one other detached structure (a garage)?

4. The HOA denied Mr. Mandela’s request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information.” Based on the evidence presented in the decisions, evaluate the reasonableness of the HOA’s request for detailed plans versus Mr. Mandela’s assertion that he had provided sufficient information for approval.

5. Trace Mr. Mandela’s various claims of unfair treatment, including selective enforcement (the Tuff Shed), discrimination (the play structure rule), and his interpretation of key terms like “detached structure.” For each claim, explain the HOA’s counter-position or the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings for state agencies, such as the one between Mr. Mandela and the HOA. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the HOA granted authority by CC&R § 10.2 to approve or deny proposed construction and promulgate regulations aligned with the CC&Rs. It denied all of Mr. Mandela’s requests.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Mandela) bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the primary governing documents for the Blue Ridge Estates community, outlining land use, permitted structures, and rules members must follow.

Detached Structure

A building or structure on a property that is separate from the main single-family residence. According to Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one such structure is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela is the petitioner.

Play Structure

A structure defined by the HOA’s modified rules to include items like Swing Sets, Jungle Gyms, Tree Houses, and Ground Placed Play Houses/Forts. Play Houses/Forts and Tree Houses are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association is the respondent.

Rules and Regulations

Rules that can be adopted, amended, or repealed by a majority vote of the HOA Board, as distinct from the CC&Rs which require a 75% vote of all lot owners to amend. The “Play Structure” rules are an example.

Temporary Structure

As defined by the Architectural Committee regulations, a structure “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” Such structures are prohibited by CC&R § 3.6.

Select all sources
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19F-H1918006-REL-RHG

2 sources

These sources document two decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association (HOA). The first document presents the initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision which denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, finding he failed to prove the HOA violated its governing documents by denying his request to build a patio structure. The second document is the ALJ Decision following a rehearing, which reaffirms the initial denial, concluding that Mr. Mandela’s proposed structure was either a prohibited second detached structure or a temporary structure lacking a proper foundation, and that he failed to provide sufficient plans for an attached structure. Both sources establish that Mr. Mandela did not meet his burden of proof to show the HOA discriminated against him or otherwise violated the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

2 sources

What were the specific reasons the HOA denied Charles Mandela’s requests?
How did the HOA Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions govern detached structures?
What was the ultimate outcome of Charles Mandela’s petition and subsequent rehearing?

Based on 2 sources

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NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Paul Frame (HOA attorney)
    FRAME LAW PLLC
  • John Hart (HOA Chairman)
    Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association
    Reviewed petitioner's requests
  • Joseph Hancock (HOA Vice President, witness)
    Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association
    Presented testimony

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Patricia Davies-Brown vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818039-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Davies-Brown, Individually and as Trustee of the Trust; BART A. BROWN, JR.; SCOTT R. DAVIES Counsel —
Respondent Starwood Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Daniel Campbell & Kristopher L. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs; Bylaws; Architectural Guidelines

Outcome Summary

The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Exterior Appearance and Colors provisions regarding copper-colored metal roof approval

Petitioners alleged that the HOA improperly approved a copper-colored metal roof because it constituted a reflective surface and did not blend with the natural surroundings, violating the community documents. The ALJ denied the petition, finding Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its documents, noting the reflective surfaces ban applied to windows and doors, not roofs, and the roof's appearance was acceptable.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: architectural control, CC&Rs enforcement, metal roof approval, reflective surfaces, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 653217.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:12:08 (41.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 659968.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:12:20 (104.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 653217.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:55 (41.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 659968.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:00 (104.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and decision in case No. 18F-H1818039-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowners Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies (the “Petitioners”) and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the HOA Board of Directors’ 2013 approval of a copper-colored metal roof for homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin.

The Petitioners alleged this approval violated the community’s CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Architectural Guidelines. Their primary arguments were that the roof was an impermissible “reflective surface,” that it did not “blend with the natural surrounding and landscape,” and that the Board lacked the authority to approve it without prior review by the Architectural Committee (ACC) and without viewing a physical sample.

The Respondent defended the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board possessed the authority to grant such approvals. They contended the prohibition on reflective surfaces in the community guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not roofing. Furthermore, they asserted that the roof was aesthetically compliant and that other reflective metal roofs exist within the community.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision, issued on September 14, 2018, denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof. The ALJ found that the Board had the authority to approve the roof, the ban on reflective surfaces did not apply to roofing, and the Petitioners did not establish that the roof failed to blend with its natural surroundings.

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Case Overview

• Case Name: Patricia Davies-Brown, et al. vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

• Case Number: 18F-H1818039-REL

• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Dates: July 10, 2018, and August 13, 2018

• Final Decision Date: September 14, 2018

Key Parties and Representatives

Name(s)

Representation / Contact

Petitioners

Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., Scott R. Davies

Appeared on behalf of themselves
9777 E Dreyfus Ave., Scottsdale, AZ 85260
[email protected]

Respondent

Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Kristopher L. Smith, Esq.
O’Connor & Campbell, P.C.
7955 S Priest Dr., Tempe, AZ 85284
[email protected]

Homeowners

Jeff and Karen Martin

Owners of the property with the disputed roof at 8500 Skywood Drive, Pinetop, Arizona (Lot 40 of Starwood Estates).

Core Dispute: The Martin Residence Roof

The central conflict originated in the summer of 2013 when the Starwood Estates Board of Directors approved a request from Jeff and Karen Martin to install a copper-colored metal roof on their home. The approval was passed by a 5-1 vote. Petitioner Scott R. Davies was the sole board member who voted against the approval at that time.

The Board reviewed a brochure containing the roof’s color before granting approval but did not observe a physical sample. However, one Board member, Pat Knight, was reportedly familiar with the appearance of such roofs from a previous home she owned nearby. The petition challenging this 2013 decision was filed on or about March 26, 2018.

Petitioners’ Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioners filed their petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the HOA violated community governing documents. Their case was built on three central questions:

1. Does the exterior appearance of the Martins’ aluminum copper-colored metal roof blend with the “natural surrounding and landscape” of Starwood Estates?

2. Does such roof constitute a “reflective surface”?

3. If the answer to (1) above is no and/or the answer to (2) above is yes, did the ACC and the Board of Starwood Estates erroneously violate the provisions of the CC&R’s and GUIDELINES in permitting the Martins to install such aluminum copper-colored metal roof…?

During the hearing, the Petitioners expanded on these points, arguing:

• Reflective Surface: The copper-colored roof was a prohibited reflective surface under the Architectural Guidelines.

• Aesthetic Incompatibility: The roof did not blend with the natural surroundings as required.

• Procedural Violations:

◦ The Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample of the material.

◦ The approval was invalid because it should have first been granted by the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) appointed by the Board.

Respondent’s Defense and Arguments

The Starwood Estates HOA maintained that its approval of the Martin roof was proper and compliant with all governing documents. Their key arguments were:

• Board Authority: The HOA asserted that either the Board of Directors or the Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the roof.

• Interpretation of “Reflective Surfaces”: The Respondent argued that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” within the Architectural Guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not to roofing, which is addressed in a separate section of the guidelines.

• Aesthetic Compliance: They contended the roof, while having a “shine,” was not a barred reflective surface and did blend in with the natural surroundings.

• Precedent: The HOA noted that several other metal roofs that are reflective had been previously approved in Starwood Estates. They submitted images of reflective green and red roofs in the Pinetop Country Club area as evidence.

Referenced Governing Documents

The decision cited specific sections from the HOA’s governing documents to adjudicate the dispute.

• Section 3.1.4: Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any work that alters the exterior appearance of a Lot.

• Section 5.2: States that approvals or actions to be taken by the Association “shall be valid if given or taken by the Board.”

• Article VII, Section A(2): Grants the Board authority to exercise all powers and duties vested in the Association unless reserved to the membership.

• Article VII, Section B: Empowers the Board to “Review and approve any architectural plan for the building of any improvements on any Lots.”

• Exterior Appearance and Colors: Mandates that exterior appearance “shall blend with the natural surroundings and landscape.” It also states, “Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.” A note requires the owner to submit samples of materials for ACC approval.

• Roofs, Materials, and Pitches: Stipulates that “Metal roofs are permitted only with ACC approval” and that all pitched roof materials “shall promote a continuity of texture and color.”

Evidence Presented

• Petitioner’s Exhibit 13: A photograph of the Martins’ copper-colored roof. The ALJ’s decision noted that while the image showed a reflection, the photograph itself was “blurred.”

• Respondent’s Exhibit 26: The brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof that the Board reviewed before its 2013 approval.

• Respondent’s Exhibit 7: Images of other reflective green and red metal roofs located in the Pinetop Country Club area, which were previously approved.

• Testimony: Board member Pat Knight’s familiarity with the appearance of copper-colored roofs was noted.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The petition was denied. The ALJ found that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Conclusions of Law

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not. They failed to meet this standard.

2. Board Authority: The ALJ concluded that the governing documents allowed for the roof to be approved by either the Architectural Committee or the Board of Directors. The Board’s action was therefore valid.

3. Interpretation of Reflective Surfaces: The evidence established that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines applies to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines. The existence of other approved shiny metal roofs further supported this interpretation.

4. Aesthetic Compliance: The Petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the copper-colored roof failed to blend in with the natural surroundings.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated the Community Bylaws, Community CC&Rs, and the Community Architectural Guidelines when Respondent approved the Martins’ request to install the copper-colored roof.

The order was made binding unless a rehearing was requested within 30 days of service.

Study Guide: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing case between Patricia Davies-Brown, et al., and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the context of the provided legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information presented in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL?

2. What specific architectural feature was the central point of the dispute?

3. What were the three main questions the Petitioners raised in their petition filed on March 26, 2018?

4. How did the Respondent (Starwood Estates HOA) justify the approval of other reflective metal roofs in the community?

5. According to the Petitioners, which two procedural errors did the Board of Directors commit when approving the Martins’ roof?

6. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the prohibition of “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioners were required to meet, and did they succeed?

8. Which governing documents grant the Board of Directors the authority to approve architectural plans?

9. When was the disputed roof originally approved by the Board, and what was the vote count?

10. What evidence did the Board review before its initial approval, and what evidence was not reviewed at that time?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioners were Patricia Davies-Brown (Individually and as Trustee of the Trust), Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies. The Respondent was the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association.

2. The central dispute was an aluminum, “copper-colored metal roof” installed by homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin on their property at Lot 40 of Starwood Estates. The Petitioners challenged the HOA Board’s approval of this roof.

3. The Petitioners’ petition questioned whether the roof blended with the “natural surrounding and landscape,” whether it constituted a “reflective surface,” and if so, whether the Board and ACC violated the CC&Rs and Guidelines by permitting it.

4. The Respondent submitted evidence of other reflective green and red metal roofs within the Pinetop Country Club area that had been previously approved by the Board. This was used to argue that roofs with a shine were not explicitly barred.

5. The Petitioners contended the Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample. They also argued that the roof required approval from the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) and could not be approved by the Board alone.

6. The Judge concluded that the bar on reflective surfaces, as written in the Architectural Guidelines, applies specifically to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines that does not contain the same prohibition.

7. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means showing their contention is more probably true than not. The Judge ruled that they failed to meet this standard.

8. Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs states that actions taken by the Board are valid, and Article VII of the Starwood Bylaws grants the Board the power to exercise Association authority and to review and approve architectural plans. The Judge found this authority allowed the Board to approve the roof.

9. The roof was approved by the Board of Directors in the summer of 2013. The approval passed with a 5-1 vote, with Petitioner Scott R. Davies being the sole board member who voted against it.

10. Before approving the roof, the Board reviewed a brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof. However, the Board did not observe a physical sample of the actual roofing material.

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Essay Questions for Further Study

The following questions are designed for deeper, analytical consideration of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between CC&Rs Section 3.1.4 (requiring ACC approval) and other governing documents (like CC&Rs Section 5.2 and Bylaws Article VII) that grant broad authority to the Board. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent contradiction in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail why the Petitioners failed to meet this standard with respect to their claims about the roof’s reflective nature and its harmony with the natural surroundings.

3. Examine the interpretation of the Architectural Guidelines regarding “reflective surfaces.” How did the Respondent and the Administrative Law Judge construe this rule, and what evidence and reasoning supported their interpretation over the Petitioners’ broader application?

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioners and the Respondent. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s evidence (e.g., the blurred photograph vs. the brochure and photos of other roofs) and explain how this likely influenced the outcome of the case.

5. Based on the issues raised in this case, what specific changes or clarifications could be made to the community’s CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines to prevent similar disputes in the future?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition in Context

ACC (Architectural Committee)

A committee, as referenced in the CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines, responsible for approving exterior alterations and ensuring all building materials and colors conform to community standards.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding official (Velva Moses-Thompson) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducts hearings, evaluates evidence, and issues a binding decision on the matter.

Architectural Guidelines

A set of community documents establishing goals and specific rules for exterior appearance, colors, materials, and site development to retain the character of Starwood Estates.

Board of Directors (Board)

The governing body of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which is empowered by the CC&Rs and Bylaws to conduct the affairs of the Association and approve architectural plans.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, including the powers and duties of the Board of Directors.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in the Starwood Estates community that govern what homeowners may or may not do with their property.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the ALJ’s decision that applies legal principles, statutes, and case law to the established facts of the case to reach a final judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the ALJ’s decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Petitioner

The party that initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies, who brought the complaint against the HOA.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has a greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, persuading the fact-finder that a contention is more likely true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which had to defend its decision to approve the roof.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document (like a CC&R) that limits the use of the property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

This Copper Roof Caused a Legal Battle: 3 Surprising Lessons Every Homeowner Should Learn

Introduction: The Neighborhood Dispute That Went to Court

The relationship between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a delicate balance. Architectural rules, designed to maintain a community’s aesthetic, often become a source of friction. But what happens when a disagreement over design choices escalates?

In the case of Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, a dispute over Jeff and Karen Martin’s new copper-colored metal roof didn’t just cause whispers over the fence—it went all the way to a formal administrative hearing. When the HOA board approved the roof in a 5-1 vote, the lone dissenting board member, Scott R. Davies, joined two other homeowners to formally challenge the decision.

This seemingly simple disagreement over a roofing material reveals several powerful, and often counter-intuitive, lessons for anyone living in a planned community. From the structural placement of a single sentence to the evidentiary power of a blurry photograph, this case offers a masterclass in HOA law. Here are three surprising lessons every homeowner should learn.

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1. The Devil in the Document: How a Single Sentence Can Decide Everything

The first major lesson from this case is that the hyper-specific wording and structure of your community guidelines are paramount. The location and context of a rule can be just as important as the rule itself.

The petitioners’ core argument was that the copper-colored roof violated the Architectural Guidelines because it was a “reflective surface,” which they believed was forbidden. On the surface, this seems like a straightforward complaint.

However, the HOA mounted a successful counter-argument based on document structure. The Administrative Law Judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation. The rules for roofs were addressed in a distinct section titled “Roofs, Materials, and Pitches.” The ban on “reflective surfaces,” meanwhile, was located in an entirely separate section, “Exterior Appearance and Colors,” which also contained rules for windows and doors. This seemingly minor structural detail was the deciding factor on this point.

The exact rule the petitioners cited, found in the “Exterior Appearance and Colors” section, illustrates the point perfectly:

Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.

Because this prohibition was not located in the roofing section, the judge concluded it applied only to windows, doors, and general exterior surfaces—not roofs. This case highlights that homeowners must read their community documents with extreme care. A prohibition you think is universal might, in fact, be limited to a very specific context by its placement in the text.

2. The Power of Precedent: What Your Neighbors Did Years Ago Matters Today

The second key takeaway is that an HOA board’s decisions can be heavily influenced by the character of the surrounding area, not just by what has been approved inside the development’s gates.

During the hearing, the HOA presented evidence of other reflective metal roofs, including green and red ones, that existed in the broader Pinetop Country Club area. Starwood Estates is part of this larger community, and the judge’s official findings noted this evidence, which significantly supported the HOA’s position to approve the Martins’ copper-colored roof.

This reveals a nuanced lesson: an HOA doesn’t exist in a vacuum. Once a certain style or material becomes common in the surrounding region, it can establish a de facto community standard. This makes it significantly more difficult for other homeowners to argue against a similar request, as the board can point to the broader neighborhood aesthetic to justify its decision. Before you challenge a project, it’s crucial to look not only at what has been approved within your HOA, but also at the character of the community at large.

3. The Burden of Proof: Your Complaint Is Only as Good as Your Evidence

The third critical lesson is that in any formal dispute, the quality of your evidence is non-negotiable. A subjective feeling or personal opinion holds little weight without objective proof.

The petitioners attempted to prove the roof was overly reflective by submitting a photograph as evidence. However, the judge’s official findings delivered a devastating blow, noting with precise and revealing language: “Although the image showed a reflective the image, the photograph was blurred.”

This detail underscores a vital point: in a legal or formal setting, a complaint must be backed by clear, objective proof. Weak or poor-quality evidence, like a blurred photo, can completely undermine an otherwise valid concern. Even though the image hinted at the issue, its poor quality rendered it useless. If you are going to make a claim, the burden is on you to prove it with convincing, high-quality evidence. Without it, your case is likely to be dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Before You Build or Battle, Do Your Homework

The Starwood Estates case serves as a powerful reminder that navigating HOA rules requires diligence. From this single dispute over a copper roof, we learn to read the fine print—and the structure—of governing documents, understand the power of aesthetic standards in the broader community, and ensure any complaint is backed by strong, clear evidence.

The next time you plan a home project or question a neighbor’s, ask yourself: have you really done your homework on the rules, the history, and the facts?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patricia Davies-Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of petitioners
  • Bart A. Brown, Jr. (petitioner)
  • Scott R. Davies (petitioner, board member)
    Starwood Estates HOA Board
    Voted against the roof approval

Respondent Side

  • Kristopher L. Smith (HOA attorney)
    O'Connor & Campbell, P.C.
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Daniel Campbell (HOA attorney)
    O'Connor & Campbell, P.C.
  • Pat Knight (board member)
    Starwood Estates HOA Board

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • L Dettorre (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • A Hansen (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D Jones (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D Gardner (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • N Cano (ADRE Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • C Serrano (OAH Staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transmitted the order

Other Participants

  • Jeff Martin (Starwood Estates resident)
    Starwood Estates
    Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute
  • Karen Martin (Starwood Estates resident)
    Starwood Estates
    Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute

Lewis Smith v. Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-29
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner's request for relief, finding that the Respondent HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) by failing to provide adequate notice and agenda information regarding the proposed CC&R amendment to prohibit short term rentals. The Respondent was ordered to pay the filing fee to the Petitioner.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lewis Smith Counsel Mark J. Bainbridge, Esq.
Respondent Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel William D. Condray, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner's request for relief, finding that the Respondent HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) by failing to provide adequate notice and agenda information regarding the proposed CC&R amendment to prohibit short term rentals. The Respondent was ordered to pay the filing fee to the Petitioner.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting and notice requirements regarding CC&R amendment

The Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) when it failed to provide notice or an agenda to all of its members of information that was reasonably necessary to inform the members that an amendment to the CC&Rs to prohibit short term members would be discussed at its special board of directors meetings held on November 8, 2017 and November 20, 2017.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was granted. Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(E)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-2198.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, HOA Governance, Notice Requirements, CC&R Amendment, Short Term Rentals
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(E)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-2198.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01

Related election workflow tool

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 629473.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T09:18:43 (46.2 KB)

18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 629515.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T09:18:46 (51.9 KB)

18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 636989.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T09:18:50 (139.8 KB)

18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 629473.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:47 (46.2 KB)

18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 629515.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:50 (51.9 KB)

18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 636989.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:54 (139.8 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Smith vs. Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between Petitioner Lewis Smith and Respondent Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. The core of the case revolves around allegations that the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting laws.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the Petitioner, finding that the Desert Isle HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F). The decision established that the Board failed to provide its members with agendas containing information “reasonably necessary to inform the members” about discussions concerning a proposed amendment to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that would prohibit short-term rentals. This failure occurred during Board of Directors meetings held on November 8 and November 20, 2017.

As a result of this finding, the Petitioner’s petition was granted, and the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee. The ruling underscores the state’s policy that planned community meetings must be conducted with transparency, and agendas must provide sufficient detail for members to understand the matters to be discussed or decided.

Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1817020-REL

Tribunal

Office of Administrative Hearings (Phoenix, Arizona)

Petitioner

Lewis Smith

Respondent

Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date

April 16, 2018

Decision Date

May 29, 2018

Central Allegation

On or about December 5, 2017, Petitioner Lewis Smith filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that the Desert Isle HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The petition contended that the Board of Directors discussed and advanced a significant CC&R amendment without proper notification to the association members.

The petition states, in part:

“All Board members have been meeting to discuss and add an amendment to the CC&R’s [sic] Prohibiting short term renters. These meetings have not been conducted openly and no notice or agenda were provided containing information necessary to inform members of the association of the matters to be discussed… At no time was the issue to add an amendment for short term rentals properly noticed or on an agenda for discussion before it became a ballot vote.”

Chronology of Events

October 23, 2017:

• Lewis Smith, William H. Winn, Kevin Barnett, and Chester Jay submit a formal request to the Board for a special members’ meeting.

• The stated purposes of the meeting were to:

1. Select and fund an attorney to update the HOA’s bylaws and CC&Rs to comply with current Arizona law.

2. Discuss obtaining a reserve study for the association’s capital needs.

3. Discuss a separate attorney letter regarding HOA governance.

October 24, 2017:

• Board President Doug Robinson responds to the request, expressing support for a meeting but stating that more than 30 days would be needed to gather supporting documentation.

October 31, 2017:

• A second group of homeowners, including Board members Greg Yacoubian, Doug Robinson, Curt Carlson, and Mike Andrews, submits a request to add an item to the agenda of the forthcoming special meeting.

• Their request was to “amend the CC&Rs by adding a section prohibiting ‘Short Term Rentals’ and defining minimum time allowed for Rentals.”

November 5, 2017:

• The Board provides an agenda for a Board of Directors meeting scheduled for November 8, 2017. The agenda did not include any item related to the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals.

November 8, 2017:

• The Board of Directors meeting is held.

• The Board votes to call a special members’ meeting before November 23, 2017, to address the two petitions.

• During the “BOARD INPUT” section, member Curt Carlson “spoke of past issues about short term renting,” but this was not a formal agenda item for discussion or action.

November 10, 2017:

• The Board emails Lewis Smith, acknowledging his petition and requesting a “narrative explanation from you on each of your subjects” by November 17, 2017, to prepare the meeting information package for all homeowners.

November 18, 2017:

• The Board sends an agenda for another Board of Directors meeting scheduled for November 20, 2017.

• The agenda lists “Review/approval of special meeting mailing package” as a topic but provides no specific details regarding the proposed amendment on short-term rentals.

December 1, 2017:

• Board President Doug Robinson emails all homeowners to explain the upcoming special meeting on December 16, 2017.

• The email states: “To avoid cost and time we put both petitions together and are having one meeting that will required [sic] all owners to vote for or against these two petitions.”

• The agenda for the December 16 meeting is attached, which explicitly lists a vote on prohibiting short-term rentals.

December 16, 2017:

• The special members’ meeting is held. A vote is taken on the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals.

• Vote Result: 9 homeowners in favor, 6 homeowners against.

Legal Framework and Analysis

The case centered on the interpretation and application of Arizona Revised Statutes related to planned communities.

Key Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

This statute governs meetings and notices for planned communities. The judge’s decision rested heavily on the policy outlined in subsection (F).

• § 33-1804(B): Requires that notice for any special meeting of members must state the purpose, including “the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws.”

• § 33-1804(E)(1): Requires that the agenda for a Board of Directors meeting be made available to all members in attendance.

• § 33-1804(F): This subsection contains the state’s declaration of policy, which was central to the judge’s conclusion. It states:

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Lewis Smith, bore the burden of proving that the Respondent violated the statute by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that is sufficient “to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Findings and Conclusion of the Court

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner successfully met the burden of proof. The decision concludes that the agendas for the November 8 and November 20 Board of Directors meetings were legally insufficient.

Conclusion of Law #4:

“Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) when it failed to provide notice or an agenda to all of its members of information that was reasonably necessary to inform the members that an amendment to the CC&Rs to prohibit short term members would be discussed at its special board of directors meetings held on November 8, 2017 and November 20, 2017.”

Final Order

• The Petitioner’s petition in the matter was granted.

• Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), the Respondent (Desert Isle HOA) was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee.

• The Order is legally binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Parties and Legal Representation

Address

Legal Counsel

Petitioner

Lewis Smith
5459 E. Sorrento Dr.
Long Beach, CA 90803

Mark J. Bainbridge, Esq.
The Bainbridge Law Firm LLC
2122 E. Highland Ave. Ste. 250
Phoenix, AZ 85016-4779

Respondent

Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
411 Riverfront Dr. #7
Bullhead City, AZ 86442

William D. Condray, Esq.
2031 Highway 95 Ste. 2
Bullhead City, AZ 86442-6004

Study Guide: Smith v. Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 18F-H1817020-REL between Petitioner Lewis Smith and Respondent Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms and entities involved in the matter.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in case No. 18F-H1817020-REL, and who represented them legally?

2. What was the three-part purpose of the special meeting requested by Lewis Smith and other homeowners on October 23, 2017?

3. A second petition was submitted on October 31, 2017. What was its purpose and who were the petitioners?

4. What key actions were taken regarding officers and a special meeting during the Board of Directors meeting on November 8, 2017?

5. What did the Desert Isle HOA Board demand from Lewis Smith in its email on November 10, 2017, to proceed with the special meeting?

6. What was the central allegation Lewis Smith made in his petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate on December 5, 2017?

7. What was the outcome of the vote on the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals at the December 16, 2017 special meeting?

8. Which specific section of the Arizona Revised Statutes did the Administrative Law Judge find the Board had violated?

9. According to the case documents, what is the definition of “preponderance of the evidence”?

10. What was the final ruling issued by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson on May 29, 2018?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Lewis Smith, and the Respondent, Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. Lewis Smith was represented by Mark J. Bainbridge, Esq., and the Desert Isle HOA was represented by William D. Condray, Esq.

2. The purpose of the meeting was threefold: to select and fund an attorney to update the HOA’s bylaws and CC&Rs to comply with current Arizona law; to discuss obtaining a reserve study for the association’s capital needs; and to discuss an attorney letter regarding HOA governance.

3. Greg Yacoubian, Doug Robinson, Curt Carlson, and Mike Andrews submitted a request to amend the CC&Rs by adding a section to prohibit “Short Term Rentals.” They requested this subject be added to the agenda of the special meeting already requested by Lewis Smith’s group to save time and money.

4. At the November 8, 2017 meeting, a motion passed unanimously to remove the existing VP, treasurer, and secretary. New officers and assistants were elected, and another motion passed to call the special meeting requested by the two groups of owners before November 23, 2017.

5. The Board requested a “narrative explanation” from Lewis Smith for each of his proposed subjects. The Board stated it would expect four narratives plus any referenced attorney engagement letters and needed the materials by November 17, 2017, to prepare the special meeting package.

6. Lewis Smith alleged that the Desert Isle HOA Board members met to discuss and add an amendment prohibiting short-term rentals without conducting the meetings openly. He stated that no proper notice or agenda was provided to inform members of the matters to be discussed before the issue became a ballot vote.

7. At the December 16, 2017 meeting, the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals was voted on by homeowners. Nine homeowners voted in favor of the amendment, and six homeowners voted against it.

8. The Judge found that the Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F). The violation occurred when the Board failed to provide an agenda with information reasonably necessary to inform members that an amendment to the CC&Rs prohibiting short-term rentals would be discussed at the board meetings on November 8 and November 20, 2017.

9. The documents provide two definitions. The first is “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The second, from Black’s Law Dictionary, is “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge’s order required the Respondent (Desert Isle HOA) to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by statute.

Essay Questions

1. Construct a detailed timeline of events from the initial petition by Lewis Smith on October 23, 2017, to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision on May 29, 2018. Include all key meetings, communications, and legal filings mentioned in the documents.

2. Analyze the ways in which the Desert Isle Homeowners Association Board failed to comply with the open meeting policies outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Use specific examples from the meeting agendas and communications to support the analysis.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain who held the burden of proof for the violation and any affirmative defenses, and how the “preponderance of the evidence” standard was met by the Petitioner.

4. Compare and contrast the two petitions submitted by homeowners in October 2017. Evaluate how the Board handled each request and the procedural steps it took that ultimately led to the legal dispute.

5. Based on the findings of fact, evaluate the communication between the Desert Isle HOA Board and its members. Discuss the effectiveness and legality of the Board’s notices, agendas, and email correspondence regarding the special meeting and the proposed CC&R amendment.

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson. The ALJ hears evidence and issues a decision based on findings of fact and conclusions of law.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804

An Arizona state statute governing meetings in planned communities. It requires open meetings, proper notice to members (between 10 and 50 days prior), and agendas that are reasonably necessary to inform members of matters to be discussed or decided.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-2198.01

An Arizona state statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or relevant statutes.

Board of Directors (Board)

The governing body of the Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. At the time of the events, key members included Doug Robinson (President), Curt Carlson, and Mike Andrews.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden for any affirmative defenses.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents of the Desert Isle planned community. The petitions submitted by homeowners sought to amend these documents.

Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; the planned community organization and non-profit corporation responsible for managing the Desert Isle community.

Lewis Smith

The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner in the Desert Isle community who filed a petition against the HOA.

Notice of Hearing

A formal notification issued by the Department of Real Estate setting the date and location for an administrative hearing. In this case, it was issued on January 22, 2018.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state tribunal where the hearing for this case was conducted.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Lewis Smith.

Post-hearing Briefs

Written legal arguments submitted by parties after a hearing has concluded. The record in this case was held open until May 9, 2018, to receive these briefs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to convince the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

Reserve Study

A study to determine an association’s long-term capital needs for its common areas. Lewis Smith’s petition requested a discussion about obtaining one.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Special Meeting

A meeting of association members called for a specific purpose outside of regularly scheduled meetings. Both petitions in this case requested a special meeting.

Select all sources
629473.pdf
629515.pdf
636989.pdf

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18F-H1817020-REL

3 sources

The provided documents are related to a legal dispute between Lewis Smith and the Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc., heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The first two sources, 629473.pdf and 629515.pdf, are identical “Order Holding Record Open” documents dated April 18, 2018, which mandated that the parties submit post-hearing briefs by specific deadlines and required the Homeowners Association to clarify its objection to a specific exhibit. The final source, 636989.pdf, is the “Administrative Law Judge Decision” issued on May 29, 2018, which found that the Homeowners Association violated Arizona law by failing to properly inform members that they would be discussing a proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals at two special board meetings. Ultimately, the judge granted Lewis Smith’s petition and ordered the Homeowners Association to pay the required filing fee.

3 sources

Based on 3 sources

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NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lewis Smith (petitioner)
  • Mark J. Bainbridge (petitioner attorney)
    The Bainbridge Law Firm LLC
  • William H. Winn (homeowner)
    Submitted petition with Petitioner
  • Kevin Barnett (homeowner)
    Submitted petition with Petitioner
  • Chester Jay (homeowner)
    Submitted petition with Petitioner
  • Mike Sharp (homeowner/representative)
    Representative for Kevin Barnett
  • Kim Sharp (homeowner/representative)
    Representative for Kevin Barnett

Respondent Side

  • William D. Condray (respondent attorney)
  • Doug Robinson (board member)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Board President
  • Curt Carlson (board member)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Mike Andrews (board member)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Greg Yacoubian (homeowner/board member)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Replaced Mike Andrews on 11/20/17
  • Judy Carlson (HOA officer)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Treasurer
  • Terri Robinson (HOA officer)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Secretary
  • Jamie Kelly (HOA attorney)
    Consulted on Special Meeting package

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M.Aguirre (Clerk/Admin)
    Transmitting agent
  • LDettorre (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission

Other Participants

  • Terry Constantino (homeowner/attendee)
  • Lynn Hammond (homeowner/attendee)
  • Dale Collins (guest speaker)

Jeffrey Kreitzberg vs. Arcadia Spring Townhomes Unit 1

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID «Matter Matter ID»
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 1996-07-04
Administrative Law Judge «Professional Full Name»
Outcome —
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner «Client Contact Full Name» Counsel —
Respondent «Client Contact Company» Counsel —

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Key Issues & Findings

statute

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1717040-REL Decision – 634939.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:37:27 (39.0 KB)

Briefing on the Administrative Law Judge Decision Document

Executive Summary

The source material provides a standardized template for an “Administrative Law Judge Decision” issued by the Office of Administrative Hearings located in Phoenix, Arizona. The document is structured to formalize the outcome of an administrative hearing, delineating key procedural and case-specific information. Its core components include sections for case identification, hearing details, participant appearances, and the presiding judge’s official signature. A notable feature is the explicit protocol for electronic transmission of the final decision to a designated client contact, indicating a formalized digital workflow. The template utilizes a series of placeholders to be populated with specific details for each case.

Document Origin and Jurisdiction

The document template originates from a specific governmental body, establishing its context and authority within an administrative legal framework.

• Issuing Authority: Office of Administrative Hearings

• Physical Address: 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, Phoenix, Arizona 85007

This information firmly places the document within the purview of this Arizona-based administrative office.

Core Components of the Decision Template

The template is systematically organized to ensure all critical information for a legal decision is captured and presented clearly.

1. Case Identification

The header section is designed to uniquely identify the matter being adjudicated.

• Case Number: The document includes a field for a unique identifier, denoted as No. «Matter Matter ID».

• Matter Notes: A placeholder, «Matter Notes», is provided at the top, likely for a case title, subject matter, or other essential preliminary information.

2. Hearing and Participant Details

The template formalizes the record of the hearing and its attendees.

• Hearing Information: A dedicated HEARING: section is included to record the specifics of the hearing itself, such as the date and nature of the proceedings.

• Appearances: A section labeled APPEARANCES: is designated for listing the parties and representatives who were present.

• Presiding Judge: The decision is attributed to a specific judge, identified by the placeholder ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: «Professional Full Name».

3. Decision and Execution

The concluding section of the template is structured for the formal issuance and authentication of the judge’s decision.

• Date of Decision: The document is dated with the line: Done this day, «Today: July 4, 1996».

• Judge’s Signature: A formal signature line is provided for the judge: /s/ «Professional Full Name» Administrative Law Judge.

4. Transmission Protocol

The template includes explicit instructions for the document’s dissemination after being finalized.

• Method of Delivery: The document specifies it is “Transmitted electronically to:”.

• Recipient Information: It contains placeholders to detail the recipient, including their full name («Client Contact Full Name»), title («Client Contact Title»), and organization («Client Contact Company»).

Analysis of Placeholder Fields

The template’s functionality relies on a series of placeholder fields, which reveal the specific data points required to complete a formal decision document.

Placeholder Field

Inferred Purpose

«Matter Notes»

To be replaced with the case title, subject, or other key contextual notes.

«Matter Matter ID»

The unique docket or case number assigned to the administrative matter.

«Professional Full Name»

The full name of the presiding Administrative Law Judge; used in two locations.

«Today: July 4, 1996»

The specific date on which the judge finalizes and issues the decision.

«Client Contact Full Name»

The full name of the primary contact person receiving the decision.

«Client Contact Title»

The professional title of the recipient.

«Client Contact Company»

The company or organization to which the recipient belongs.

Study Guide: Administrative Law Judge Decision Document

This guide provides a detailed review of the structure, components, and terminology found within the provided document template from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based solely on the information provided in the source document.

1. What is the official name and full address of the government body that issues this document?

2. What is the formal title of the document, and what is the title of the official who signs it?

3. How is the document delivered to its intended recipient after being finalized?

4. Identify two placeholders in the document that are used to specify the unique details of a particular case.

5. What two distinct sections are designated in the body of the document’s template, apart from the header and signature blocks?

6. Who is the specific audience for the electronic transmission of this document, as indicated by the placeholders?

7. What information is located in the header of the document?

8. Describe the function of the placeholder «Professional Full Name» in the context of this document.

9. What action is indicated as being completed on the date specified by the «Today: July 4, 1996» placeholder?

10. Where is the Office of Administrative Hearings located within its building?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The issuing body is the Office of Administrative Hearings. Its full address is 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, Phoenix, Arizona 85007.

2. The formal title of the document is “ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION.” The official who signs the document holds the title of “Administrative Law Judge.”

3. After being finalized and signed, the document is “Transmitted electronically” to the designated client contact.

4. The placeholders «Matter Notes» and No. «Matter Matter ID» are used to specify the unique details of a case. These likely correspond to a short description or title of the matter and its official case number.

5. The two distinct sections designated in the body of the template are “HEARING” and “APPEARANCES.” These sections are intended to contain details about the proceeding and the parties involved.

6. The audience for the electronic transmission is a specific individual identified by placeholders for their full name («Client Contact Full Name»), professional title («Client Contact Title»), and company («Client Contact Company»).

7. The header contains the name of the issuing body, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and its physical address. It also includes the case identifier («Matter Matter ID») and a space for case notes («Matter Notes»).

8. The placeholder «Professional Full Name» appears twice. It is used for the name of the presiding Administrative Law Judge in the main body and again above the signature line to indicate which judge authored and signed the decision.

9. The date placeholder signifies when the decision was officially completed and signed by the Administrative Law Judge. The document states, “Done this day,” followed by the date.

10. The Office of Administrative Hearings is located on the “Lower Level” of the building at 1740 West Adams Street.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper, more analytical understanding of the document. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt.

1. Describe the structure and key components of the “ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION” document as presented in the source. What does this structure suggest about the formal legal process it represents?

2. Analyze the role of placeholders (e.g., «Matter Matter ID», «Professional Full Name», «Client Contact Company») in this document. Discuss their function in transforming a generic template into a case-specific official record.

3. Based on the information provided, explain the complete procedural flow of this document, from its creation and signing by an Administrative Law Judge to its final delivery.

4. Discuss the significance of the “Office of Administrative Hearings” and the “Administrative Law Judge” in the context of the legal system, as implied by the details in this document template.

5. Evaluate the methods of communication and record-keeping indicated in the source text (e.g., electronic transmission, formal titling, unique case identifiers). How do these elements contribute to the document’s authority and administrative efficiency?

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Glossary of Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

The title of the presiding official within the Office of Administrative Hearings who signs and issues the formal decision.

Administrative Law Judge Decision

The formal title of the document, indicating it is the official ruling resulting from a hearing conducted by an Administrative Law Judge.

Appearances

A designated section in the document template, intended to formally list the parties and/or legal counsel who participated in the hearing.

Hearing

A designated section in the document template, referring to the formal proceeding where arguments and evidence were presented before the Administrative Law Judge.

Matter Matter ID

A placeholder for the unique numerical or alphanumerical identifier assigned to a specific legal case or matter.

Matter Notes

A placeholder at the top of the document, likely used for a brief title or summary description of the legal case.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The governmental body, located in Phoenix, Arizona, that is responsible for conducting hearings and issuing administrative law decisions.

Transmitted electronically

The official method specified for the delivery of the finalized and signed decision document to the designated recipient.

What a Blank Legal Form Reveals About the Systems We Live In

Introduction: The Stories Hidden in Plain Sight

We tend to see legal documents as the epitome of boring: dense, intimidating, and irrelevant until we’re forced to deal with them. They are the paperwork we ignore, the fine print we scroll past. But what if even the most mundane administrative form held surprising insights into the systems that shape our society? A closer look at a template for an “ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION” from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona, reveals just that. This single page exposes the inherent tension in modern justice: the system’s need for standardized, machine-like efficiency clashing with the unique, messy human stories it is built to process. Let’s explore the lessons hidden within its structure.

The Unexpected Takeaways

The first thing one notices is not a dramatic narrative but a series of placeholders: «Matter Matter ID», «Matter Notes», and «Professional Full Name». Running down the left margin are line numbers, 1 through 30, a tool for absolute precision, allowing legal professionals to reference exact parts of the document in future arguments. This is not a unique script for a high-stakes battle; it is a template, a fill-in-the-blanks form.

This reality stands in stark contrast to the dramatic courtroom scenes portrayed in media. The day-to-day process of justice is less about impassioned speeches and more about systematic procedure. From a systems analyst’s perspective, this banality is a cornerstone of fairness. Templates, line numbers, and standardization are mechanisms designed to reduce variance and ensure predictable outputs. They ensure each case is processed through the same structural lens, making justice a repeatable, and therefore equitable, procedure. But within this rigid template, the system must still make space for the very thing it seeks to control: people.

While the format is rigid, it is ultimately a vessel for human conflict. The fields for APPEARANCES and the ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE are waiting for human names. But the analysis deepens when we see the recipient information: «Client Contact Full Name», «Client Contact Title», and «Client Contact Company». The system needs to know not just who you are, but what you do and who you represent.

This form acts as an input protocol, designed to convert a complex human narrative into structured, machine-readable data for the legal system. Each filled-out template signifies a human story—a dispute, a claim, a need—being processed. It reveals that the system sees people not just as individuals, but as actors within a larger organizational and economic context. It’s a framework built to contain the messiness of human affairs, reminding us that even our most personal problems must be assigned a title and a case number to be resolved. And this system, designed to process human data, is itself grounded in a very real place.

The law can feel like an abstract, untouchable force. Yet, printed at the top of the form is a concrete, physical location: Office of Administrative Hearings 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level Phoenix, Arizona 85007.

This small detail grounds the entire process in reality. The law isn’t just an idea; it’s an institution run by people working in a specific building. Decisions that impact lives are made not in some ethereal cloud of authority, but in a lower-level office on West Adams Street. This detail demystifies the system, making it more tangible and, perhaps, more accountable. And it is in this physical building, steeped in procedural tradition, that we find the most telling signs of adaptation to a new world.

The document announces its formal gravity with an almost archaic header: IN THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS. This language evokes a sense of place, history, and tradition. Yet, this tradition is forced to confront modernity in a few subtle keystrokes. Below the formal signature line for the judge, we find /s/ «Professional Full Name».

That /s/ is a ghost in the machine. It is a modern typographic convention signifying a digital signature, a symbol that represents the authority of a handwritten signature in an electronic context. This quiet nod to the digital age is confirmed by the final line on the page: Transmitted electronically. The juxtaposition is powerful. A document that begins with the formal weight of a physical office ends with the frictionless speed of digital transmission. This, combined with a legacy placeholder date of «Today: July 4, 1996», paints a perfect picture of an institution in transition, holding onto its analog legacy while operating with the tools of the present.

Conclusion: Finding Meaning in the Margins

Insightful truths about our society are not always found in grand pronouncements. Sometimes, they are quietly embedded in the structure of administrative paperwork, revealing the constant negotiation between systematic order and human reality. By looking closely at the mundane, we uncover the logic, values, and contradictions of the complex world we have built—a world of templates designed to process unique lives, and of digital signatures that carry the weight of centuries of law.

What other everyday documents do we overlook, and what stories might they tell if we looked closer?

Case Participants

Neutral Parties

  • «Professional Full Name» (ALJ)

Other Participants

  • «Client Contact Full Name» (client contact)
    «Client Contact Company»
    «Client Contact Title»