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Michael J. Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818023-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-04-17
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 2.5

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5, and the petition was filed after the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550) expired.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Community Governing Document regarding pipe installation

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R section 2.5 by installing pipes for a well. Respondent argued that CC&R section 2.5 was inapplicable as it governs additional easements conveyed to a third party, and that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
  • CC&R section 2.5
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Statute of Limitations, Easement, CC&R Violation, Well Installation
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
  • CC&R section 2.5

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:09:54 (77.0 KB)

18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:08 (77.0 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the HOA violated community governing documents (CC&Rs) by installing pipes related to a well through his lot.

The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, dismissed the petitioner’s case in its entirety. The decision was based on two independent and definitive grounds. First, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to meet his burden of proof on the merits of the case; the evidence demonstrated that the pipes were installed within a pre-existing easement and not improperly on his lot, and the specific CC&R section cited was inapplicable. Second, the petition was procedurally barred by Arizona’s four-year statute of limitations, as the installation occurred in the summer of 2013, and the action was filed after this period had expired. Consequently, the Rancho Del Oro HOA was deemed the prevailing party.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Michael J. Stoltenberg against his HOA.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Michael J. Stoltenberg, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Respondent

Case Number

18F-H1818023-REL

Hearing Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date

March 28, 2018

Decision Date

April 17, 2018

II. Core Dispute and Allegations

A. Petitioner’s Claim

The central allegation from the petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, was that the Rancho Del Oro HOA violated the Community Governing Document CC&Rs.

• Specific Allegation: The HOA improperly installed pipes through his lot as part of a well installation project.

• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition focused on violations of CC&R sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5. The decision notes that sections 1.13 and 1.19 are definition sections, making section 2.5 the substantive focus of the dispute.

B. Respondent’s Defense Strategy

The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a multi-faceted defense against the petitioner’s claims, combining a procedural dismissal argument with a substantive rebuttal.

1. Statute of Limitations: The HOA contended the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations established in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550. They asserted that since the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, the time frame for filing a petition had expired.

2. Inapplicability of CC&R Section 2.5: The HOA argued that this section was not relevant to the situation. They maintained that CC&R section 2.5 pertains specifically to instances where the HOA grants or conveys an additional easement to a third party, which had not occurred.

3. Factual Rebuttal: The HOA asserted that the pipes were installed within an easement that already existed at the time of installation, not on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot outside of an easement.

III. Adjudicated Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge made several key findings of fact and conclusions of law that formed the basis of the final order. The petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

A. Findings of Fact

The ALJ’s decision was based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. The key findings were:

• Witnesses: The court heard testimony from petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, HOA community manager Diana Crites, and HOA Board Chairman James Van Sickle.

• Location of Installation: Evidence showed the pipes were installed in an easement that was already in existence at the time of the 2013 installation.

• Failure of Evidentiary Support: The judge explicitly noted, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.”

B. Conclusions of Law

Based on the evidence and statutes, the ALJ reached the following legal conclusions:

• Statute of Limitations is Applicable: The judge affirmed that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550 establishes a four-year statute of limitations for such actions. The installation occurred in 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, rendering the claim time-barred.

• Interpretation of CC&R 2.5: The judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation, concluding that CC&R section 2.5 applies to easements granted to a third party by the HOA.

• No Violation Occurred: The “weight of the evidence” demonstrated that the pipes were in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party. Therefore, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5.

• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Due to the lack of evidence and the inapplicability of the cited CC&R section, the petitioner failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

IV. Final Order and Implications

Based on the dual findings that the claim was both time-barred and without merit, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decisive order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order’s service, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818023-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Michael J. Stoltenberg versus the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, against the Respondent?

3. What two primary legal arguments did the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association present in its defense?

4. According to the judge’s findings, what crucial piece of evidence was not presented at the hearing regarding the location of the well and pipes?

5. What is the statute of limitations cited in this case, and why was it a critical factor in the judge’s decision?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret Community Governing Document CC&R section 2.5 in relation to the Respondent’s actions?

7. Who has the burden of proof in this type of hearing, and what is the specific standard of proof required to win the case?

8. What was the ultimate Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and who was named the prevailing party?

9. Aside from the statute of limitations, what was the other fundamental reason the Petitioner failed to prove his case?

10. After the judge’s Order was issued on April 17, 2018, what recourse was available to the parties involved?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, who brought the complaint, and Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, who was defending against the complaint. Mr. Stoltenberg represented himself, while the Homeowners Association was represented by its attorney, Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.

2. Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the Homeowners Association violated sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5 of the Community Governing Document (CC&Rs). The basis of his petition was that the HOA had improperly installed pipes through his lot in connection with a new well.

3. The HOA argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, as the installation occurred in 2013, more than four years prior. The HOA also contended that CC&R section 2.5 did not apply because it refers to granting additional easements to a third party, which the HOA did not do.

4. The judge’s “Findings of Fact” state that “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.” This lack of evidence was a key failure in the Petitioner’s case.

5. The statute of limitations cited is ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, which requires actions to be brought within four years. This was critical because the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, making his claim untimely.

6. The judge concluded that CC&R section 2.5 specifically applies to easements that are granted or conveyed to a third party by the Respondent. Since the evidence showed the pipes were installed in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant a new one to a third party, the judge found that this section was not violated.

7. The Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition be dismissed. As a result of the dismissal, the Respondent (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

9. The Petitioner failed to prove his case because the weight of the evidence showed the HOA did not violate CC&R section 2.5. The evidence indicated the pipes were installed in a pre-existing easement, and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party as described in that section.

10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B) and A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. This request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.

1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, particularly regarding the location of the pipes, contribute to the dismissal of his petition?

2. Discuss the significance of the statute of limitations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550) in the judge’s decision. Why are such statutes important in legal proceedings, and how did it provide a separate and independent basis for dismissing the case?

3. Explain the legal reasoning behind the judge’s interpretation of CC&R section 2.5. Why was the distinction between an “existing easement” and granting a “new easement to a third party” a critical factor in the outcome?

4. Imagine you were legal counsel for the Petitioner. Based on the information in the decision, what kind of evidence would have been necessary to successfully prove a violation of the Community Governing Documents and overcome the Respondent’s defenses?

5. Examine the roles of the different entities involved in this dispute: the Petitioner, the Homeowners Association, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate. How does the structure of this administrative hearing process provide a mechanism for resolving disputes between homeowners and HOAs?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Several statutes are cited, including those governing real estate, HOA disputes, and the statute of limitations.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules set forth in a Community Governing Document that property owners in a planned community or condominium must follow.

Easement

A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific, limited purpose. In this case, it refers to the area where pipes were installed, which the judge found was an “existing easement.”

Findings of Fact

The section of a legal decision that details the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence and testimony presented at a hearing.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

An organization in a planned community (like Rancho Del Oro) that creates and enforces rules for the properties and residents within its jurisdiction.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued to inform the parties of the date, time, location, and subject matter of a scheduled legal hearing.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition, seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. Defined in the document as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Statute of Limitations

A law that sets the maximum amount of time that parties involved in a dispute have to initiate legal proceedings. In this case, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550 established a four-year limit.

Ellipsis

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Lydia Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Diana Crites (community manager)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • James Van Sickle (board member)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Chairman of the Board; testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Jerry L. Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-02-09
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Petitioner's claim that the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 (Notice of Violation) was dismissed because the Article governs only recorded notices, and the Petitioner did not prove the notices in question were recorded.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry L. Webster Counsel —
Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 10, Section 10.8

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 (Notice of Violation) was dismissed because the Article governs only recorded notices, and the Petitioner did not prove the notices in question were recorded.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs Article 10.8, because that provision applies only to recorded notices, and the notices issued to the Petitioner were not recorded.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&R notice requirements regarding clarity and completeness of violation notices.

The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs Article 10.8 because the violation notices sent to him failed to include five mandatory pieces of information required by that section of the CC&Rs. The Petitioner also sought the refund of $175 in fines.

Orders: Petitioners' petition in this matter is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Notice of Violation, Recording
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817019-REL Decision – 620124.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:08:57 (78.5 KB)

18F-H1817019-REL Decision – 620124.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:41 (78.5 KB)

Case Briefing: Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817019-REL, wherein Petitioner Jerry L. Webster’s complaint against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association was dismissed. The central issue revolved around Mr. Webster’s claim that the HOA engaged in a pattern of harassment by issuing vague and improper violation notices that failed to comply with Article 10.8 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The case was decided on a critical legal interpretation of the CC&Rs. The presiding judge determined that the specific requirements of Article 10.8, which Mr. Webster cited as being violated, apply exclusively to violation notices that are formally “Recorded” with the Maricopa County Recorder’s office. The petitioner failed to provide any evidence, or even make the claim, that the notices he received had been recorded. Consequently, Mr. Webster did not meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that the HOA had violated the cited article. The dismissal of the petition was based entirely on this procedural and definitional distinction, without a ruling on the petitioner’s underlying allegations of harassment or selective enforcement.

Case Background

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.

◦ Respondent: Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (“Mountain Rose”), located in Scottsdale, Arizona.

• Adjudicating Body:

◦ The Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona.

◦ Administrative Law Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson.

• Key Dates:

◦ 2016–2017: Mountain Rose issues a series of violation notices to Mr. Webster regarding tree trimming and debris cleanup.

◦ December 6, 2017: Mr. Webster files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

◦ February 9, 2018: A hearing is held.

◦ February 9, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issues the decision dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Webster’s petition centered on the claim that the HOA’s actions constituted harassment and violated specific provisions of the governing documents.

Core Claim: Violation of CC&Rs Article 10.8

Mr. Webster contended that the violation notices he received from Mountain Rose were invalid because they failed to contain information mandated by Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”) of the CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged the notices omitted the following required elements:

• (ii) The legal description of the lot against which the notice is being Recorded.

• (iii) A brief description of the nature of the violation.

• (iv) A statement that the notice is being Recorded by the Association pursuant to the Declaration.

• (v) A statement of the specific steps which must be taken by the Owner or occupant to cure the violation.

Allegations of Harassment and Prejudicial Treatment

In his petition, Mr. Webster framed the HOA’s actions as a targeted and unfair campaign against him.

• Stated Intent: “The intent of this action is to stop the HOA from violating our civil rights by prejudicially harassing us with unclear and unwarranted violation notices.”

• History of Conflict: He alleged that “The HOA has harassed us for over 10 years with vague violation notices.”

• Lack of Communication: He claimed that his “Numerous requests were made for clarification…which were ignored.”

• Financial Penalties: Mr. Webster stated he was recently fined three times for a total of $175, which he sought to have refunded.

• Alleged Bias: To demonstrate selective enforcement, Mr. Webster noted that a review of the neighborhood revealed “22 trees touching dwellings, including ours,” and stated, “It is very doubtful any other member received notices or fines for identical circumstances.”

• Supporting Evidence: Mr. Webster submitted an aerial photo from 2012 showing the tree in a similar condition, a 2017 photo of another home with a tree touching the dwelling, and a 2017 photo of HOA-maintained trees.

Respondent’s Position

The Mountain Rose HOA, represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., presented a focused defense based on the specific language of the CC&Rs.

• Central Argument: The HOA contended that the violation notices issued to Mr. Webster were not recorded with the Maricopa County Recorder.

• Legal Position: Because the notices were not recorded, the stringent requirements outlined in Article 10.8 did not apply to them.

• Additional Detail: The HOA also argued that it had previously communicated the necessary corrective action to Mr. Webster, stating that “his tree needed to be trimmed 8 feet above the ground.”

The Decisive Legal Interpretation and Ruling

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the precise definition and application of “Recording” as established within the Mountain Rose CC&Rs.

The Definition of “Recording”

Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs provides the controlling definition:

“Recording” means placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona, and “Recorded” means having been so placed of public record.

Application of Law to Facts

The Judge concluded that Mr. Webster’s entire case rested on a misapplication of Article 10.8.

• Limited Scope of Article 10.8: The ruling states, “Mountain Rose CC&Rs Article 10.8. applies to the recording of notices and recorded notices.”

• Burden of Proof: Under Arizona law (A.A.C. R2-19-119), the burden of proof fell to the petitioner, Mr. Webster, to demonstrate his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Crucial Factual Finding: The decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.“

• Petitioner’s Failure to Allege: The Judge further noted, “Mr. Webster did not even contend that Mountain Rose recorded the notices issued to him.”

Conclusion of Law

Based on the evidence and the plain language of the CC&Rs, the Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to make his case.

“Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Mountain Rose violated its CC&Rs as described above.”

Final Order and Disposition

The petition was summarily dismissed based on the failure to prove that the relevant CC&R article was applicable to the facts presented.

Order:

“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition in this matter is dismissed.”

The order was dated February 9, 2018, and transmitted to the parties on February 28, 2018.

Study Guide: Case No. 18F-H1817019-REL

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jerry L. Webster v. Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, heard on February 9, 2018. It includes a quiz to test comprehension, suggested essay topics for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the source document.

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source text.

1. Identify the primary parties involved in this case and describe their respective roles.

2. What was the central accusation that Petitioner Jerry L. Webster made against the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association?

3. Which specific article of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) did Mr. Webster claim the HOA violated, and what key information did he allege was missing from the notices he received?

4. Beyond the content of the violation notices, what other complaints did Mr. Webster include in his petition regarding the HOA’s conduct?

5. According to the Mountain Rose CC&Rs, what is the specific definition of “Recording”?

6. What was the key piece of evidence that was absent from the hearing, which proved critical to the final decision?

7. What was the Mountain Rose HOA’s primary defense against Mr. Webster’s allegation that it had violated Article 10.8 of the CC&Rs?

8. In this type of administrative hearing, who holds the burden of proof, and what is the standard of proof required to win the case?

9. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson in this matter?

10. What recourse did the parties have after the judge issued the Order on February 9, 2018?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the association, and Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association, a planned community in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Webster filed a petition alleging violations by the HOA, making him the accuser, while the HOA was the party responding to the allegations.

2. Mr. Webster’s central accusation was that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its own CC&Rs. He contended that the HOA engaged in prejudicial harassment by sending him a series of vague, unclear, and unwarranted violation notices over a period of more than 10 years.

3. Mr. Webster claimed the HOA violated Article 10.8, titled “Notice of Violation.” He alleged the notices he received failed to include several required subsections, including the legal description of the lot (ii), a brief description of the violation (iii), a statement that the notice was being Recorded (iv), and a statement of the specific steps needed to cure the violation (v).

4. Mr. Webster also complained that his numerous requests for clarification were ignored and that the HOA’s intent was harassment. He claimed he was fined $175 based on invalid notices and that the HOA was engaging in selective enforcement, noting 22 other homes had trees touching dwellings without receiving similar notices or fines.

5. According to Article 1.33 of the CC&Rs, “Recording” is defined as placing an instrument of public record in the office of the County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona. “Recorded” means that the instrument has been placed on public record in that office.

6. The key piece of evidence absent from the hearing was any proof that the violation notices sent to Mr. Webster were ever recorded with the County Recorder of Maricopa County. The judge’s decision explicitly states, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the notices issued to Mr. Webster were recorded.”

7. The HOA’s primary defense was that the requirements of Article 10.8 only apply to recorded notices. Since the notices issued to Mr. Webster were never recorded, the HOA argued that the article’s specific formatting requirements were not applicable to their correspondence with him.

8. The burden of proof falls to the party asserting the claim, which in this case was the Petitioner, Mr. Webster. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue.

9. The final Order issued by the judge was that the Petitioner’s petition in the matter be dismissed. This means Mr. Webster’s case was unsuccessful.

10. After the Order was issued, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form, analytical answers. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument as presented in the petition. What was the critical legal misinterpretation regarding Article 10.8 that ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?

2. Explain the direct relationship between Article 1.33 (“Recording”) and Article 10.8 (“Notice of Violation”). How did the specific definition in the former article completely undermine the petitioner’s entire claim, which was based on the latter?

3. Discuss the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. Citing specific findings from the decision, explain exactly how the petitioner failed to meet this standard.

4. Mr. Webster raised several secondary issues in his petition, including allegations of long-term harassment, selective enforcement (“22 trees touch dwellings”), and ignored requests for clarification. Why were these claims ultimately not addressed or validated in the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?

5. Based on the text of Article 10.8, what is the specific function and legal purpose of a recorded Notice of Violation? Why might an HOA choose to go through the formal process of recording a notice rather than just sending an unrecorded letter to a homeowner?

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Glossary

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

An Arizona Revised Statute that permits a homeowner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.

Burden of Proof

The responsibility of the party asserting a claim or right to prove their case. In this matter, the burden of proof fell to the Petitioner.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Mountain Rose, which are the governing documents for the homeowners association.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which Mr. Webster filed his petition.

Notice of Violation (Article 10.8)

A written notice that the Association has the right to record. This article specifies that such a recorded notice must contain five key pieces of information, including the legal description of the lot and the specific steps to cure the violation. Its provisions apply specifically to notices that are formally recorded.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition. In this case, it was Jerry L. Webster, a homeowner and member of the Mountain Rose HOA.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “the greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that…is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Recording (Article 1.33)

The act of “placing an instrument of public record in the office of County Recorder of Maricopa County, Arizona.” “Recorded” means having been so placed on public record.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, it was the Mountain Rose Homeowners Association.

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18F-H1817019-REL

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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, addressing a dispute between Petitioner Jerry L. Webster and the Respondent Mountain Rose Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Webster alleged that the HOA violated Article 10.8 of its CC&Rs by issuing unclear and unwarranted violation notices, specifically regarding the trimming of his tree and cleaning debris, and he sought the refund of recent fines. The HOA contended that the notices were not recorded, making the specific requirements of Article 10.8—which applies to recorded notices—inapplicable to the general violation notices Mr. Webster received. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Webster failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the CC&Rs because the notices in question were never officially recorded, leading to the dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition.

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry L. Webster (petitioner)
  • Pamela Webster (witness)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
  • Frank Puma (manager)
    Mountain Rose

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717032-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely provide access to association records

The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.

Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:09 (79.9 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:12 (726.4 KB)

17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:15 (95.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.

The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.

Case Timeline and Factual Background

The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.

February 6, 2017

William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.

February 14, 2017

Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.

Post-Feb. 6, 2017

Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

April 13, 2017

The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.

May 2, 2017

Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

May 3, 2017

The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

June 26, 2017

The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.

July 14, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.

July 24, 2017

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805

The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”

Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)

Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.

• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.

• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.

• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.

Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)

Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.

• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.

• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine

The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:

“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”

Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.

The Correct Interpretation of the Law

The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:

“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”

Final Conclusion

The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:

1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.

2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.

3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.

Final Order and Mandates

The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.

The key directives of the order were:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.

• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.

• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.

Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (No. 17F-H1717032-REL), heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It covers the central conflict, the legal arguments, the statutory interpretations, and the final resolution of the dispute.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.

1. What was the initial action taken by William M. Brown on February 6, 2017, and what was Terravita Country Club’s response?

2. On what legal grounds did Terravita justify its refusal to provide the requested records?

3. What was William M. Brown’s primary legal argument against Terravita’s position during the hearing?

4. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Terravita’s argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2), and why was it rejected?

5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this case?

6. What key fact regarding the “pending litigation” was central to the Judge’s final decision?

7. What was the final conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Terravita’s actions?

8. Identify the three specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Recommended Order.”

9. What state department adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, making it a “Final Order”?

10. Besides complying with the records request and paying the filing fee, what specific penalty was explicitly not levied against Terravita?

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Answer Key

1. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown requested records from Terravita Country Club. On February 14, 2017, Terravita responded via email, refusing to disclose the records because they were allegedly part of pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.

2. Terravita justified its refusal by citing Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805(B)(2). The club argued that this statute allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

3. Mr. Brown’s primary argument was that Terravita had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide records within 10 business days. He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” in § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only when the association itself is a party to that litigation, which Terravita was not in his criminal case.

4. The Judge interpreted Terravita’s argument to mean that an association could deny any records request if the documents related to pending litigation between any two parties anywhere. This interpretation was rejected because it would lead to the “absurd result” of broadly denying access to records, which was not the statute’s intent.

5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the evidentiary standard where the trier of fact must be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that Terravita violated the statute, while the Respondent (Terravita) bore the burden of proving its affirmative defenses.

6. The central fact was that Terravita Country Club was not a party to the criminal case brought against Mr. Brown by the City of Scottsdale. Because the association was not a party, the judge ruled that the statutory exemption for withholding records related to pending litigation did not apply.

7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Brown had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his records request within the required 10 business days. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

8. The Judge ordered that: (1) the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) be deemed the prevailing party; (2) Terravita must comply with the records request within 10 days of the Order; and (3) Terravita must pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within 30 days of the Order.

9. The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This action, dated July 24, 2017, made the decision a binding Final Order.

10. The Recommended Order, which was adopted as the Final Order, explicitly states that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal principles, and arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) presented by William M. Brown and Terravita Country Club. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to resolve this dispute, including the principle of avoiding “absurd results.”

2. Describe the complete timeline of the case, from the initial records request to the issuance of the Final Order. For each key date, explain the event’s significance to the progression and outcome of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain how this standard was applied to both the Petitioner’s claim and the Respondent’s affirmative defense and why the Judge ultimately found that the Petitioner had met this burden.

4. Examine the role of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in resolving disputes within planned communities, as demonstrated by this case. How does the process flow from an initial petition to a binding order?

5. Based on the Judge’s decision, formulate an argument about the balance between a homeowner’s right to access association records and an association’s right to protect its interests in legal matters. How does A.R.S. § 33-1805 attempt to strike this balance, and how did the ruling in this case clarify its limits?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments raised by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. Terravita’s claim that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) exempted them was their affirmative defense.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that requires a planned community association to make financial and other records available for member examination within 10 business days.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that allows an association to withhold books and records from disclosure if the portion withheld relates to “pending litigation.”

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

The Arizona statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of statutes or community documents.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. The Petitioner bore the burden to prove the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden to establish its defense.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that received the Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown and ultimately adopted the ALJ’s decision, making it final.

Final Order

The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which adopted the ALJ’s Recommended Order. This order is an administrative action and is effective immediately upon service.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct hearings on disputes, such as the one between Mr. Brown and Terravita.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or hearing by filing a petition. In this case, William M. Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Prevailing Party

The party who is successful in a legal case. The Final Order deemed William M. Brown the prevailing party.

Recommended Order

The initial decision and orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. This decision is then sent to the relevant state agency (in this case, the Department of Real Estate) for adoption.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. In this case, Terravita Country Club, Inc. was the Respondent.

Your HOA Can’t Use “Pending Litigation” to Hide Records. This Homeowner Proved It.

Introduction: The Wall of Secrecy

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like confronting an organization that operates with total authority and little transparency. Board decisions can seem arbitrary, and getting straight answers or access to official documents can be a frustrating, uphill battle. But what happens when an HOA flatly denies a simple request for records, citing a vague legal reason?

One homeowner decided to find out. The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a fascinating look at how a single individual challenged his HOA’s interpretation of state law. In doing so, he not only won access to the records he sought but also revealed a crucial limit on an HOA’s power to operate in secret.

The Takeaways: Four Lessons from a Landmark HOA Dispute

This case offers several powerful and practical lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt stonewalled by their association’s board.

Takeaway 1: “Pending Litigation” Isn’t a Blank Check to Deny Records

At the heart of the dispute was a simple request. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown asked his HOA, Terravita, for access to association records. The HOA denied the request, citing an exemption in Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)) that allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”

Terravita’s argument was that this exemption applied because of a pending criminal case against Mr. Brown. Crucially, they argued this was not just any unrelated case; the criminal charges stemmed from allegations that Mr. Brown had threatened the HOA’s board members and property. From their perspective, the records request was directly linked to a hostile legal situation involving the association’s leadership. However, the critical fact remained that the HOA itself was not a formal party to the criminal case.

The judge’s ruling was definitive and clear: the “pending litigation” exemption can only be used to withhold records if the litigation is between the association and the member. Because Terravita was not a party to Mr. Brown’s criminal case, it had no legal grounds to use that case as an excuse to withhold its records from him. This ruling draws a bright line: The “pending litigation” shield cannot be borrowed from a separate case, even one that feels highly relevant to the HOA.

Takeaway 2: Legal Interpretations Must Be Sensible, Not Absurd

The HOA argued for a literal interpretation of the law, claiming the statute didn’t explicitly state that the association had to be a party to the litigation. Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson rejected this line of reasoning, stating that it would lead to an “absurd result.”

This is a critical lesson for homeowners. Judges are tasked with ensuring laws are applied sensibly. When an HOA’s interpretation of a rule would create an illogical or unfair outcome, it is vulnerable to legal challenge. The judge highlighted the flaw in the HOA’s logic with a powerful statement in her decision:

Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.

Takeaway 3: A Single Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge Their HOA

Perhaps the most empowering aspect of this case is who argued it. The court documents show that while the HOA was represented by legal counsel (“Joshua Bolen, Esq. appeared on behalf of Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.”), Mr. Brown represented himself (“Petitioner William M. Brown appeared on behalf of himself”).

Despite being outmatched on paper, Mr. Brown successfully researched the law, presented a logical argument, and held his ground. His victory demonstrates that the legal process is not just for lawyers. A well-researched, logical argument from a homeowner can be more powerful than a law firm’s flawed interpretation of a statute. The judge ultimately found that “Mr. Brown established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within 10 business days.”

Takeaway 4: Misapplying the Law Can Have Financial Consequences

This wasn’t just a moral victory. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017, came with tangible consequences for the HOA. For its failure to correctly apply the law, Terravita faced direct and tangible consequences.

• The HOA was ordered to provide the requested records within 10 days.

• The homeowner, Mr. Brown, was deemed the “prevailing party.”

• The HOA, Terravita, was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.

This outcome underscores a critical point: when an HOA oversteps its authority or misinterprets the law, it can be held financially responsible for the costs incurred by the homeowner forced to challenge its actions.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

The story of William M. Brown’s dispute with his HOA serves as a powerful reminder that HOAs do not have unlimited power. They are governed by specific state laws, and understanding those laws is the most effective tool a homeowner possesses.

The central lesson is that an HOA’s authority is not absolute, and its interpretation of its own rules—and, more importantly, state law—must be reasonable and sensible. This case affirms the right of members to transparency and proves that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully stand up for those rights.

After seeing how one homeowner held his board accountable, will you take the time to learn your rights before you need them?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William M. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Joshua Bolen (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

William M. Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716005-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-10
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after the Tribunal concluded that the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc., violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to timely provide access to records within the mandated 10 business days. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was imposed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to timely respond to records request

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to timely respond to his July 30, 2016 records request, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The Tribunal found that Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed to fulfill the request for examination of records within 10 business days, violating A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request for records within 10 days of the Order. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Records Request, Failure to Respond, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:42:37 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:42:43 (789.4 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 574630.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:51 (87.9 KB)

17F-H1716005-REL Decision – 575115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:55 (789.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and final order in the case of William M. Brown (Petitioner) versus Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL. The central issue was Terravita’s failure to respond to a member’s request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioner’s testimony and evidence to be credible, establishing that Mr. Brown submitted a valid records request via e-mail on July 30, 2016, to which Terravita did not timely respond. The ALJ found the testimony of Terravita’s key witness to be unreliable and rejected Terravita’s defenses, which included claims of non-receipt, improper submission procedure, and falsified evidence.

Ultimately, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The recommended order, which was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, mandated that Terravita comply with the records request, reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, and deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party. No civil penalty was assessed.

Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

17F-H1716005-REL (OAH) / HO 17-16/005 (DRE)

Petitioner

William M. Brown (Appeared on behalf of himself)

Respondent

Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Represented by Joshua Bolen, Esq.)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Adopting Authority

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

June 19, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

July 10, 2017

Final Order Date

July 11, 2017

Chronology of Events

• February 12, 2016: Anita Bell requests records from Terravita via Mr. Brown’s e-mail account. The request is forwarded to General Manager Tom Forbes.

• February 19, 2016: Mr. Forbes informs Ms. Bell that the records will be ready on February 22.

• March 14, 2016: Ms. Bell submits another records request from Mr. Brown’s e-mail account.

• March 18, 2016: Cici Rausch, Terravita’s Director of Administration, informs Ms. Bell when the records can be retrieved.

• July 29, 2016: Date of the records request at the center of the legal dispute.

• July 30, 2016: Mr. Brown e-mails the records request to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley. On the same day, he separately requests records from the Terravita Community Association, Inc. (TCA).

• August 6, 2016: Mr. Brown sends another records request to Ms. Wiley.

• August 8, 2016: TCA responds to Mr. Brown’s July 30 request.

• August 12, 2016: Terravita responds to Mr. Brown’s August 6 request.

• August 18, 2016: Mr. Brown files a Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond to his July 30 request.

• September 9, 2016: Terravita files a response, alleging it did not receive the July 30 records request.

• June 19, 2017: The administrative hearing is held.

• July 10, 2017: The ALJ issues a decision finding in favor of Mr. Brown.

• July 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepts the ALJ’s decision and issues a Final Order.

Analysis of the Central Dispute

The core of the case revolved around whether Terravita violated its statutory duty to respond to Mr. Brown’s records request dated July 29, 2016, which he e-mailed on July 30, 2016.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence

• Core Allegation: Mr. Brown testified that he sent the records request via e-mail to Terravita’s Secretary, Fran Wiley, on July 30, 2016, and that Terravita failed to respond within the 10-business-day period mandated by law.

• Evidence: Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016 forwarded e-mail (Exhibit P2) that contained the original July 30, 2016 e-mail sent to Ms. Wiley.

• Judicial Finding: The ALJ found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be “credible.”

Respondent’s Defenses and the Court’s Findings

Terravita presented several arguments to contest the allegation, all of which were ultimately unpersuasive to the court.

1. Claim of Non-Receipt: Terravita contended it never received the July 30, 2016 request. Ms. Wiley testified she did not receive a request from Mr. Brown on July 29 or July 30.

◦ Court’s Finding: The ALJ found Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be “unreliable.” The decision noted that Ms. Wiley testified that Terravita was “indirectly” informed around August 5 that “perhaps Mr. Brown had made the request,” which undermined the claim of complete non-awareness.

2. Use of an Incorrect E-mail Address: Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the e-mail address to which Mr. Brown sent the request for Terravita affairs, claiming she used a different one in her official capacity as Secretary.

◦ Court’s Finding: This argument was implicitly rejected, as the ALJ concluded that Mr. Brown had successfully proven he submitted the request “to its Secretary, Ms. Wiley.”

3. Allegation of Falsified Evidence: Terravita contended that the forwarded e-mail evidence offered by Mr. Brown was falsified.

◦ Court’s Finding: The ALJ noted an inconsistency in Terravita’s position, stating, “Terravita did not contend that the written evidence of Mr. Brown’s August 5, 2016 records request, sent by e-mail to Ms. Wiley, was falsified.” This weakened the credibility of the falsification claim against the July 30 e-mail.

4. Non-Compliance with Internal Policy: Terravita argued that its own Rules, Policies, and Procedures required members to submit records requests to the General Manager and/or Director of Administration, not the Secretary.

◦ Court’s Finding: The decision focused entirely on the violation of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805, indicating that the statutory obligation superseded the association’s internal procedural preferences.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) mandates that a homeowners’ association “shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination” of its financial and other records by a member.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner was required to prove the violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that Mr. Brown successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that:

1. He submitted a request for records to Terravita’s Secretary via e-mail on July 30, 2016.

2. Terravita failed to fulfill this request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.

• Final Judgment: The Tribunal concluded that “Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.” It was also noted that Terravita did not contend that any of the statutory exceptions to disclosure, such as privileged communication or pending litigation, applied.

Final Order and Directives

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on July 11, 2017, making it a Final Order with the following mandates:

• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

• Compliance with Request: Terravita was ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding Petitioner’s request of Terravita’s records” within 10 days of the Order.

• Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Terravita was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 directly to him within thirty (30) days.

• Civil Penalty: The court determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

• Effective Date: The Order was made effective five (5) days from the date of its certification. The Final Order itself is effective immediately from the date of service, July 11, 2017.

Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716005-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing decision concerning William M. Brown’s records request to the Terravita Country Club. The case centers on the interpretation and application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing information exclusively from the provided case documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was their established relationship?

2. What specific failure by Terravita Country Club, Inc. led Mr. Brown to file his Petition for Hearing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to A.R.S. § 33-1805, what is the required timeframe for an association to fulfill a member’s request to examine its records?

4. What were the primary arguments Terravita presented to defend its failure to provide the requested records?

5. How did the Administrative Law Judge assess the credibility of the testimony provided by Mr. Brown and Terravita’s witness, Ms. Fran Wiley?

6. What piece of documentary evidence did Mr. Brown submit to prove he had sent the records request on July 30, 2016?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this hearing, and how is that standard defined in the decision?

8. What two specific actions did the final Recommended Order compel Terravita to take as a result of the ruling?

9. Why was Terravita’s argument that Mr. Brown failed to follow its internal rules for submitting records requests ultimately unsuccessful?

10. What was the role of the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate after the Administrative Law Judge issued her decision?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was William M. Brown, and the Respondent was Terravita Country Club, Inc. At all times relevant to the matter, Mr. Brown was a member of the Terravita Country Club.

2. Mr. Brown filed the petition because Terravita failed to respond to his July 30, 2016, request for records within the 10-business-day timeframe mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). This failure to provide timely access to the records was the central violation alleged.

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that the association must fulfill a request for examination of its records within ten business days. If copies are requested, the association has ten business days to provide them and may charge up to fifteen cents per page.

4. Terravita argued that it never received the July 30, 2016, request from Mr. Brown. They also contended that his email evidence was falsified and that he failed to comply with their internal policy requiring such requests be sent to the General Manager or Director of Administration.

5. The Administrative Law Judge found Mr. Brown’s testimony to be credible. Conversely, the Judge found the testimony of Ms. Wiley, who testified on behalf of Terravita, to be unreliable.

6. Mr. Brown submitted an August 12, 2016, forwarded email that contained his original July 30, 2016, email to Ms. Wiley. This original email contained the records request dated July 29, 2016.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as having “the most convincing force” or “superior evidentiary weight.”

8. The Recommended Order compelled Terravita to pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee within thirty days of the order. It also ordered Terravita to comply with the records request and provide the documents within ten days of the order.

9. The argument was unsuccessful because the Judge concluded that Terravita violated the plain meaning of the state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1805. The ruling focused on this statutory violation, noting that Terravita did not contend that any of the law’s specific exceptions for withholding records applied.

10. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, was responsible for reviewing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. The Commissioner accepted the decision and issued a Final Order, which made the Judge’s recommendations legally binding and enforceable.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based solely on the provided source documents.

1. Analyze Terravita’s defense strategy. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments regarding not receiving the email, the alleged falsification of evidence, and the club’s internal policies for records requests.

2. Explain the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this standard to the conflicting testimonies of William Brown and Fran Wiley to reach her conclusion?

3. Discuss the significance of A.R.S. § 33-1805 in the context of planned communities. Based on the details in the case, why is a member’s right to access association records important, and what protections does this statute provide?

4. Trace the procedural path of this dispute from Mr. Brown’s initial records request to the Final Order. What roles did the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Department of Real Estate play in this process?

5. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision rested heavily on findings of credibility. Explore the factors detailed in the case documents that might have led the judge to find Mr. Brown’s testimony “credible” and Ms. Wiley’s “unreliable.”

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, evaluates evidence and testimony, and issues a recommended decision based on the law.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute at the heart of the case. It mandates that a planned community association must make all financial and other records reasonably available for a member’s examination within ten business days of a request.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove an assertion. The Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that the Respondent (Terravita) violated the statute.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency where Mr. Brown filed his Petition for Hearing. Its Commissioner (Judy Lowe) has the authority to accept an ALJ’s decision and issue a final, binding order.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent agency that conducts formal hearings for disputes concerning violations of planned community statutes, as authorized by A.R.S. § 41-1092.01.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this matter, the Petitioner was William M. Brown.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to prove his case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

Prevailing Party

The party who is successful and wins the legal dispute. The Administrative Law Judge’s order deemed the Petitioner, William M. Brown, to be the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the Respondent was Terravita Country Club, Inc.

He Sued His HOA Over an Unanswered Email—And Won. Here Are 4 Lessons from the Judge’s Ruling.

1. Introduction: The Black Hole of Bureaucracy

We’ve all been there. You draft a clear, important request, send it to a large organization, and wait. And wait. The silence that follows can feel like your message was sent into a black hole. This frustration is especially common for homeowners dealing with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA), where getting a straight answer or a timely response can seem impossible.

But what if being ignored is more than just frustrating? What if it’s a violation of the law? The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a powerful real-world example of one member who fought back against being ignored—and won. His persistence offers crucial lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt powerless against their association’s bureaucracy.

2. Takeaway 1: The “We Never Got the Email” Defense Isn’t Bulletproof

When faced with Mr. Brown’s petition, Terravita’s primary defense was simple: they claimed they never received his July 30, 2016, email requesting association records. They went even further, contending that the email evidence he provided was falsified.

This defense crumbled under scrutiny. Mr. Brown presented a forwarded email as evidence of his original request. In the end, the case came down to witness testimony, and the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion was direct and unambiguous. The judge made two critical findings on the credibility of the parties involved:

I find Mr. Brown’s testimony to be credible.

And regarding the testimony from Terravita’s representative, the Secretary Ms. Wiley:

I find Ms. Wiley’s testimony to be unreliable.

The judge’s conclusion was not arbitrary; it was based on a clear contradiction in the evidence. Ms. Wiley testified that she did not use the specific email address where Mr. Brown sent the request for association business. However, evidence presented to the court showed that just a few months prior, she had successfully received and processed two separate records requests sent to that very same email address, proving it was a valid and functioning channel for communication. This detail demonstrates how an individual’s careful documentation can expose an organization’s flawed defense.

3. Takeaway 2: State Law Overrules Internal Red Tape

Terravita offered a second line of defense: even if they had received the email, Mr. Brown hadn’t followed their internal “Rules, Policies and Procedures.” The association argued that members were required to submit records requests to the General Manager or Director of Administration, not the association’s Secretary, whom Mr. Brown had emailed.

This argument was deemed irrelevant by the judge. The decision hinged not on Terravita’s internal rules, but on the plain language of Arizona state law, A.R.S. § 33-1805. The statute simply requires the association to make records available within ten business days of a request; it does not specify which officer or employee must receive that request.

By failing to respond, Terravita violated the statute, regardless of its own procedural preferences. This is a critical reminder for all homeowners: your rights are often enshrined in state law, and those rights cannot be diminished or negated by an HOA’s internal bylaws or policies.

4. Takeaway 3: A Simple Request Has a Firm Deadline

The core violation in this case was a failure to meet a specific, legally mandated deadline. Under Arizona law A.R.S. § 33-1805, an association has ten business days to fulfill a member’s request for the examination of records.

The timeline of events was clear:

• Mr. Brown sent his records request via email on July 30, 2016.

• The judge found that “Terravita did not respond to Mr. Brown’s records request within 10 business days.”

Adding weight to this was the fact that the association had previously proven itself more than capable of handling requests sent from Mr. Brown’s email account. Earlier that year, another individual had successfully requested records through the same channel. In those instances, Terravita had been prompt, often acknowledging requests within a day or two and making records available well within the legal deadline. This history undermined any claim of inability to respond. The law’s ten-day deadline is not a vague guideline; it is a specific and enforceable protection for members’ right to information.

5. Takeaway 4: Persistence Can Literally Pay Off

After reviewing the evidence, the judge ruled that Mr. Brown was the “prevailing party.” This victory was not just symbolic; it came with concrete orders that held the association accountable.

The judge’s final decision included the following orders:

• Terravita was ordered to comply with the records request within 10 days.

• Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.

Mr. Brown’s persistence didn’t just get him the documents he was legally entitled to; it also resulted in the full reimbursement of his filing costs. This outcome serves as a powerful example that standing up for your rights as a homeowner is not always a futile or expensive endeavor. With proper documentation and an understanding of the law, a single member can hold their association accountable.

6. Conclusion: Your Rights Are Written in Law

While homeowners are obligated to follow their HOA’s rules, the association is equally obligated to follow state law. These laws provide clear rights and protections designed to ensure transparency and fairness. The case of William M. Brown is a testament to the power of a single, well-documented request and the importance of understanding the laws that govern your association.

The next time you feel ignored by a large organization, what’s the one simple step you can take to ensure your request is not only heard, but documented?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William M. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself
  • Anita Bell (records requester)
    Requested records via Mr. Brown's e-mail account

Respondent Side

  • Joshua Bolen (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Appeared for Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Fran Wiley (secretary/witness)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
    Terravita Secretary; testified on behalf of Terravita
  • Tom Forbes (general manager)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Cici Rausch (director of administration)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Signed the Final Order
  • Abby Hansen (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed for rehearing requests and signed mailing notice