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Keith Jackson v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H006-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-11-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition, finding that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1813 by rejecting both the initial recall petition (due to insufficient signatures) and the subsequent amended petition (which was barred by the one-petition-per-term rule for the same members).
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Keith Jackson Counsel —
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Eric Cook

Alleged Violations

ARS 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition, finding that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1813 by rejecting both the initial recall petition (due to insufficient signatures) and the subsequent amended petition (which was barred by the one-petition-per-term rule for the same members).

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proving that the Association violated ARS § 33-1813. The second petition was barred by statute (A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(g)).

Key Issues & Findings

Improper rejection of a recall petition to remove four Board members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly rejected his recall petition by misinterpreting ARS 33-1813, specifically arguing that the initial incomplete petition should not have been considered valid, thus allowing the amended petition to proceed. Respondent argued that the statute only permits one petition submission per term for the same board members (A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(g)).

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is dismissed. Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARS 33-1813
  • ARS 33-1813(A)(4)(g)
  • ARS 33-1813(A)(4)(b)
  • ARS 33-1804
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H006-REL Decision – 1011201.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-29T11:11:58 (113.7 KB)

23F-H006-REL Decision – 1011201.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:50:43 (113.7 KB)

Briefing: Keith Jackson v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (Case No. 23F-H006-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative hearing and subsequent legal decision in Case Number 23F-H006-REL, involving Petitioner Keith Jackson and Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association. The central conflict revolved around the proper interpretation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which governs the process for recalling members of a homeowner association’s board of directors.

The dispute was initiated after an initial recall petition, containing an insufficient number of signatures, was submitted to the Association’s board on July 12, 2022. A second, supplemented petition with a sufficient number of signatures was submitted on July 19, 2022. The Petitioner argued that the first submission was incomplete and therefore not a legally valid petition, meaning it should not have triggered the statute’s “one petition per term” limitation. The Respondent contended that the statute is unambiguous: once a petition is submitted, regardless of its numerical sufficiency, a second petition to recall the same board members is barred for the remainder of their terms.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision concluded that the Association did not violate the statute by rejecting the first petition for having insufficient signatures. Furthermore, the ALJ found that A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(g) clearly and unequivocally prohibits submitting more than one recall petition for the same board member during a single term of office. Consequently, the second petition was statutorily barred, and the Petitioner’s case was dismissed.

Case Overview

Parties and Key Individuals

Affiliation

Keith Jackson

Petitioner

Homeowner, Val Vista Lakes

Eric Cook

Attorney for Respondent

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaad & Smith LLP

Kay A. Abramsohn

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Doug Keats

Witness for Respondent; Treasurer

Val Vista Lakes Board of Directors

K. Adams

Witness for Respondent; Secretary

Val Vista Lakes Board of Directors

Andy Ball

Individual who submitted the initial petition

Friend of Petitioner, Association Member

Kirk Kowieski

Vice President of Management Company

First Service Residential (FSR)

Bill Suttell

Board President; target of recall petition

Val Vista Lakes Board of Directors

Sharon Maiden

Board Vice President; target of recall petition

Val Vista Lakes Board of Directors

Steve Nielson

Board Member; target of recall petition

Val Vista Lakes Board of Directors

Core Legal Issue

The case centered on the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1813, specifically the relationship between two subsections:

1. Subsection (A)(4)(b): This section establishes the signature threshold required to compel a board to call a special meeting for a recall vote. For an association with over 1,000 members, this is “at least ten percent of the votes in the association or…at least one thousand votes…whichever is less.”

2. Subsection (A)(4)(g): This section states, “A petition that calls for the removal of the same member of the board of directors shall not be submitted more than once during each term of office for that member.”

The central question before the court was whether an initial petition that fails to meet the signature threshold of (4)(b) still constitutes a formal submission that triggers the “one petition per term” limitation of (4)(g).

Chronology of Events

July 12, 2022

At a board meeting, Andy Ball submits an initial recall petition targeting four board members. The petition contains approximately 211-214 signatures, below the required threshold.

July 15, 2022

Board President Bill Suttell notifies Association members via email that the petition has been turned over to the management company, First Service Residential (FSR), for signature vetting.

July 18, 2022

The Association officially notifies its members that the initial recall petition has been rejected “for not meeting the criteria of the law.”

July 19, 2022

Kirk Kowieski of FSR informs an Association member that “a ‘new’ (amended) petition” could be submitted.

July 19, 2022

Keith Jackson submits a second, supplemented petition containing the original signatures plus additional ones, totaling over 250 signatures.

July 25, 2022

The Board of Directors votes to reject the second petition. FSR sends an email to members stating it was rejected based on A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(g).

July 30, 2022 (approx.)

Keith Jackson files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Board improperly rejected the recall petition.

October 24, 2022

An administrative hearing is held before ALJ Kay A. Abramsohn.

November 8, 2022

The ALJ issues a final decision, ruling in favor of the Respondent and dismissing the Petitioner’s case.

Petitioner’s Position and Arguments (Keith Jackson)

Grievances Leading to Recall Effort

Mr. Jackson testified that the recall effort was initiated due to significant community dissatisfaction with the Board’s direction. The primary concerns articulated during the hearing included:

• Lack of Transparency and Accountability: A general sentiment among members that the Board was not operating openly.

• Financial Mismanagement: The Association’s financial reserves had allegedly plummeted from $3.4 million to a projected “well under a million dollars” within the year.

• Loss of Revenue: The Board terminated the Association’s largest non-dues revenue source in an executive session without member input. Members reportedly learned of this decision through the media after a wedding was cancelled.

• Toxic Workplace Environment: The community manager and several employees had reportedly quit due to micromanagement and a poor work environment created by the Board.

Legal Argument

The Petitioner’s legal argument was founded on the principle that a petition is not legally cognizable until it meets the statutory requirements for action.

• Concept of a “Valid” Petition: Jackson argued that the initial July 12 submission was an “incomplete petition” and therefore not a “valid petition” under A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(b) because it failed to meet the signature threshold.

• Triggering the Statute: He contended that an invalid, incomplete petition should not be officially “considered” and thus should not trigger the one-petition-per-term limit in subsection (g).

• The “Amended” Petition: The only legally valid petition, in his view, was the completed version submitted on July 19, which contained over 250 signatures. He argued this was the first and only valid submission that the Board was required to act upon.

• Statutory Loophole: Jackson warned that the Association’s interpretation creates a dangerous loophole: “anyone on the board could never get recalled with the way the stat was being interpreted…you could submit any incomplete petition for anyone on the board and they would never get…recalled during their term.”

• Reliance on Management Company: Jackson pointed to Exhibit C, an email from Kirk Kowieski of FSR, stating that an “amended petition” could be submitted. Since the Board had delegated the vetting process to FSR, Jackson argued this communication affirmed the legitimacy of his second submission.

Respondent’s Position and Arguments (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

Legal Argument

The Respondent’s counsel, Eric Cook, argued for a plain-language reading of the statute, asserting that the law is clear and binding.

• Plain Meaning of the Statute: The core of the argument was that A.R.S. § 33-1813 says what it means. It refers to “a petition,” not a “valid petition” or a “complete petition,” when establishing the one-submission limit.

• Standalone Provision: A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(g) was presented as a standalone provision. It is not contingent on whether a petition meets the signature requirements of subsection (b). Its purpose is to prevent repeated recall efforts against the same board member.

• One Chance Rule: “Section G is a standalone provision that says if you file that petition, you get that one chance.”

• Chronology is Key: A petition was submitted on July 12. It was considered and rejected. The second petition, submitted on July 19, sought to remove the same four board members. This second submission was a clear violation of subsection (g).

• Function of Subsection (b): Respondent argued that the signature threshold in subsection (b) only determines whether the Board is obligated to call a special meeting. It does not define whether a document submitted as a petition constitutes “a petition” for the purposes of the one-per-term rule.

Witness Testimony

• Doug Keats (Treasurer) and K. Adams (Secretary) both testified that they were present at the July 12 meeting when Andy Ball submitted the initial petition directly to the Board President, Bill Suttell. They affirmed this petition was the one the Board officially considered and rejected for having an insufficient number of signatures.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

On November 8, 2022, ALJ Kay A. Abramsohn issued a decision dismissing Mr. Jackson’s petition, finding no violation of A.R.S. § 33-1813 by the Association.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association has more than 1,000 members.

• The initial petition submitted on July 12, 2022, contained an insufficient number of signatures to meet the statutory threshold for compelling a recall vote.

• The second petition submitted on July 19, 2022, petitioned for the removal of the same four board members named in the first petition.

Conclusions of Law

1. Rejection of the First Petition: The ALJ concluded that the Board did not violate the statute when it rejected the July 12 petition. Since the petition did not contain the required number of signatures, the Board was under no obligation to call a special meeting.

2. Rejection of the Second Petition: The central conclusion rested on a direct interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(g). The decision states: “a petition which calls for the removal of the same member of the board of directors ‘shall not be submitted more than once during each term of office for that member.’ Therefore, in this case, the July 19, 2022 ‘second’ petition which petitioned for the removal of the same four Board members…was not permitted by statute.”

3. Final Ruling: Because the second petition was statutorily prohibited, the Board did not violate the law by rejecting it. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish any violation by the Association, and the petition was therefore dismissed.

Study Guide: Johnson v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (Case No. 23F-H006-REL)

This study guide is designed to assess and deepen understanding of the administrative hearing held on October 24, 2022, and the subsequent decision regarding the dispute between Keith Jackson and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association. The materials cover the central arguments, key figures, procedural timeline, and legal interpretations at the heart of the case.

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Quiz: Short Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the provided source materials.

1. Who are the two primary parties in this case, and what is the nature of their dispute?

2. What specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) is the central point of legal contention, and what is its general purpose?

3. Describe the timeline and key differences between the first and second recall petitions that were submitted to the Association.

4. What was petitioner Keith Jackson’s core argument for why the first petition submitted on July 12th should have been considered invalid by the Board?

5. What was the respondent Association’s legal justification, based on the statute, for rejecting the second, “amended” petition submitted on July 19th?

6. Identify Kirk Kowieski and First Service Residential (FSR). What role did their communications and actions play in Mr. Jackson’s argument?

7. What authority does the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) have in this matter, and how does it relate to the Department of Real Estate?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, what was the legal standard Mr. Jackson had to meet, and did he succeed?

9. Identify the four board members targeted for recall and their respective positions within the Association’s board of directors.

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Keith Jackson (the Petitioner) and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association (the Respondent). The dispute centers on whether the Association’s Board of Directors improperly rejected a recall petition initiated by Mr. Jackson to remove four board members, based on their interpretation of state law.

2. The central statute is A.R.S. § 33-1813. Its purpose is to govern the process for removing a member of a community association’s board of directors, including the requirements for calling a special meeting based on a recall petition.

3. The first petition, containing approximately 211-214 signatures, was submitted by Andy Ball on July 12, 2022. The second, “amended” petition was submitted by Keith Jackson on July 19, 2022; it included the original signatures plus an additional 37, for a total of over 250, and was intended to be a complete version.

4. Mr. Jackson argued that the first petition was mistakenly turned in as an incomplete “first batch” and therefore was not a “valid” petition under the statute. He contended that the Board could only act upon a completed petition that met the statutory signature threshold, making the initial submission legally void.

5. The Association argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(g) is clear in its language. This subsection states that a petition to remove the same board member shall not be submitted more than once during that member’s term of office, and therefore the second petition was barred by statute.

6. First Service Residential (FSR) is the property management company for the Association, and Kirk Kowieski is its Vice-President. Mr. Jackson argued that an email from Mr. Kowieski (Exhibit C) confirming that an “amended petition” would be accepted showed that FSR, acting with authority from the Board, had agreed the completed petition submitted on July 19th was the only valid one.

7. The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is a separate state agency that conducts hearings and makes decisions on behalf of other agencies. It does not work for the Department of Real Estate but was tasked with conducting the hearing after Mr. Jackson filed his complaint with the Department.

8. The legal standard was the “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning Mr. Jackson had to prove that it was more probable than not that the Association had violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. The Judge concluded that Mr. Jackson did not meet this burden of proof.

9. The four board members targeted were: Bill Suttell (President), Sharon Maiden (Vice-President), Doug Keats (Treasurer), and Steve Nielson (General Board Member).

10. The final order, issued on November 8, 2022, was that the Petitioner’s Petition be dismissed. The Judge found that the Board did not violate the statute when it rejected either the July 12th or the July 19th petition.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, citing specific facts, arguments, and evidence from the hearing and the final decision.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1813 as presented by the petitioner and the respondent. Explain how each party used subsections (A)(4)(b) and (A)(4)(g) to support their respective positions regarding the validity of the two petitions.

2. Discuss the role and actions of First Service Residential (FSR) and its representative, Kirk Kowieski. Evaluate the significance of FSR’s communications as evidence in the petitioner’s case and explain how the final legal decision implicitly addresses the limits of FSR’s authority.

3. Trace the complete procedural history of the recall effort, beginning with Mr. Jackson’s collection of signatures and culminating in the Administrative Law Judge’s final order. Identify key dates, actions taken by each party, and the rationale provided for each decision along the way.

4. Examine the evidence presented during the hearing, specifically Petitioner’s Exhibits A, C, D, and F, and Respondent’s Exhibit 1. Describe the content and purpose of each exhibit and analyze its effectiveness in supporting the arguments made by each side.

5. Explain the final ruling in Case No. 23F-H006-REL. Detail the Administrative Law Judge’s legal conclusions regarding both the July 12th and July 19th petitions and articulate the reasoning that led to the dismissal of Mr. Jackson’s petition.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues legal decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Kay A. Abramsohn.

A.R.S. § 33-1813

The specific Arizona Revised Statute that provides the legal framework for the removal of a board of directors member in a community association, forming the basis of the entire dispute.

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

A separate state agency authorized to conduct administrative hearings and issue decisions for disputes referred by other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Exhibit

A document or item of physical evidence introduced during a hearing to support a party’s claims. Examples include the initial petition (Respondent’s Exhibit 1) and email correspondence (Petitioner’s Exhibit C).

First Service Residential (FSR)

The property management company hired by the Val Vista Lakes Community Association to handle tasks such as maintaining records, sending community notices, and vetting petition signatures.

Homeowners Association. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition or complaint. In this case, Keith Jackson.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The burden of proof in this administrative hearing. It requires the petitioner to show that the facts they allege are more probable than not.

Recall Petition

A document signed by a required number of association members to call for a special meeting to vote on the removal of one or more members of the board of directors.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting of the association members called for a specific purpose outside of regularly scheduled meetings, such as voting on a recall. The statute dictates the conditions under which the Board must call such a meeting.

Statute

A written law passed by a legislative body. The central statute in this case is A.R.S. § 33-1813.

Term of Office

The designated length of time a board member serves in their position. Under A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(g), a recall petition for the same member cannot be submitted more than once per term.

Vetting

The process of carefully examining and verifying the information presented, specifically the process FSR was tasked with to validate the signatures on the recall petition.

Their HOA Recall Had 250+ Signatures. It Was Voided by This One-Sentence Legal Booby Trap.

For many homeowners, a battle with their Homeowners Association (HOA) board is a familiar, frustrating story of feeling unheard. It was a reality that spurred homeowner Keith Jackson to action. Believing his board was failing the community, he channeled the widespread discontent of his neighbors, gathering significant support for a recall. Yet, despite his passionate efforts and clear community backing, the entire campaign was tragically derailed by a single, counter-intuitive rule, triggered by the simple, well-meaning mistake of a trusted friend.

Takeaway 1: The “One-Shot” Rule is Ironclad

The core legal issue that doomed the recall was a procedural trap hidden in plain sight. On July 12, 2022, a friend of Mr. Jackson, Andy Ball, submitted the recall petition to the board. The problem? It was incomplete and lacked the required number of signatures. According to Jackson’s testimony, his friend even tried to qualify the submission, telling the board, “here is the first batch of signatures more for coming.”

But that verbal clarification was powerless. The simple act of handing over the documents was legally considered a formal submission. This premature action triggered a critical and unforgiving clause in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(g):

A petition that calls for the removal of the same member of the board of directors shall not be submitted more than once during each term of office for that member.

Because the first petition was officially submitted and rejected for having insufficient signatures, the second, corrected petition—even with more than enough community support—was automatically barred. As the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision confirmed, the board was legally correct to reject the second attempt. The first try, flawed as it was, was the only one the law allowed.

Takeaway 2: Your Property Manager Isn’t Your Lawyer

This case exposes a common and dangerous misconception in community governance: the difference between operational guidance and binding legal counsel. After the first petition was rejected, Mr. Jackson and his supporters were led to believe they could simply submit a corrected version based on advice from Kirk Kowieski, a Vice President at the HOA’s management company, First Service Residential (FSI).

In a July 19, 2022 email, Kowieski seemed to give them a green light:

The group submitting the recall petition can submit a “new” (amended) petition that has the same names, addresses and signatures as the original as well as any additional signees. Because the first/original petition was “officially” submitted and became a record of the Association, the Association had to accept it and consider it as presented.

This advice, while seemingly authoritative, offered false hope and had no legal standing. Tellingly, while the judge noted the manager’s email in the factual summary of the case, it was given zero weight in the legal analysis. The advice wasn’t just wrong; in the final decision, it was legally nonexistent.

Takeaway 3: Passion and Signatures Don’t Beat Procedure

The recall effort was not born from minor disagreements; it was fueled by serious grievances that resonated deeply within the community. In his testimony, Keith Jackson outlined a compelling case against the board:

• A severe lack of transparency and accountability.

• The community’s reserve fund plummeting from $3.4 million to under $1 million in just one year.

• Cutting off the community’s biggest source of revenue without any member input.

• Creating a “toxic workplace” that led to the resignation of the community manager and other key employees.

These concerns prompted over 250 homeowners to sign the petition in just 10 days. Yet, the merits of their case were never heard. From the very first moments of the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge made the narrow scope of the proceeding clear, even stopping Mr. Jackson’s opening statement to clarify, “The only authority I have is to determine whether or not the statute was interpreted correctly.” The legal system, in this administrative context, was procedurally deaf to their valid concerns, illustrating a stark reminder that passion and popular support are secondary to the cold, hard rules of procedure.

Conclusion: A Cautionary Tale in Black and White

In the highly regulated world of HOA governance, understanding and adhering to the exact letter of the law is non-negotiable. Keith Jackson’s story is a powerful cautionary tale of how a community movement can be undone by a simple, irreversible mistake. A friend turning in a petition before it was ready wasn’t a minor stumble to be corrected—it was the single action that sealed the fate of the entire campaign.

This case forces us to confront the purpose of such a strict rule. Proponents argue this “one-shot” provision prevents boards from being paralyzed by serial, frivolous recall attempts, ensuring stable governance. Critics, however, contend that its unforgiving nature creates a procedural minefield that disempowers homeowners and shields inept or malicious boards from accountability. This leaves us with a crucial question: Does a strict, one-shot rule for recalls truly protect boards from harassment, or does it create an insurmountable barrier for homeowners seeking accountability?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Keith Jackson (petitioner)
    Self-represented
  • Andy Ball (member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Submitted the initial incomplete petition

Respondent Side

  • Eric Cook (HOA attorney)
    Lewis Brisbois Bisgaad & Smith LLP
    Represented Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Doug Keats (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Treasurer; Board member being recalled; Witness
  • K. Adams (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Secretary; Witness; Assigned to work with HOA attorney
  • Bill Suttell (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    President; Board member being recalled
  • Sharon Maiden (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Vice President; Board member being recalled
  • Steve Nielson (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    General Board Member; Board member being recalled
  • Kirk Kowieski (property manager)
    First Service Residential (FSR)
    Vice President/Interim Manager of the HOA management company
  • Melissa Scoville (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Board member mentioned in context of Rob Act's petition
  • Joanie U (board member)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
  • Lenny KNik (HOA attorney)
    Consulted by Kirk regarding the petition process
  • Andreas Vas (HOA attorney)
    Consulted by Kirk regarding the petition process

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Miranda Alvarez (Legal Secretary)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Other Participants

  • Rob Act (member)
    Submitted a separate incomplete petition
  • Stephanie (intern manager)
    FSR
    Works with Kirk

Terry Marvin & Lori J Lefferts v. The Stone Canyon Community

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Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221018-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-08-05
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome The Petition alleging that the Stone Canyon Community Association violated its Design Guidelines by granting a variance for secondary improvements within the side-yard setback to Lot 19 owners was dismissed. The ALJ found that the DRC exercised reasonable discretion in granting a deviation (variance) under Guidelines Section 5, Item 12, and the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Terry Marvin & Lori J. Lefferts Counsel —
Respondent The Stone Canyon Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nicholas C.S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 11.3; Guidelines § 1, Items 1 & 32; Guidelines § 5, Item 12

Outcome Summary

The Petition alleging that the Stone Canyon Community Association violated its Design Guidelines by granting a variance for secondary improvements within the side-yard setback to Lot 19 owners was dismissed. The ALJ found that the DRC exercised reasonable discretion in granting a deviation (variance) under Guidelines Section 5, Item 12, and the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof.

Why this result: The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Design Review Committee acted reasonably within its authority to grant a deviation (variance) to the Guidelines to allow the proposed secondary improvements (grading, driveway, enclosure) within the 15’ side-yard setback in extenuating circumstances, consistent with the requirements outlined in Guideline Section 5, Item 12.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation by DRC when granting a variance for side-yard setback requirements for secondary improvements.

Petitioners (Lot 20 owners) alleged the DRC violated guidelines by granting a variance to Lot 19 owners for placing secondary improvements (driveway, grading, site walls, enclosure) within the 15-foot side-yard setback. Petitioners sought rescission of the variance, arguing the DRC failed to establish an unreasonable hardship or burden as required by Guideline Section 5, Item 12, thereby acting unreasonably and causing diminution in Lot 20 value.

Orders: Petitioners' Petition is dismissed. Petitioners bear their $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Guidelines Section 1, Item 1
  • Guidelines Section 1, Item 32
  • Guidelines Section 5, Item 12
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA dispute, Design Review Committee, variance, setback, secondary improvements, reasonable discretion
Additional Citations:

  • CC&R Section 11.3
  • Guidelines Section 1, Item 1
  • Guidelines Section 1, Item 32
  • Guidelines Section 5, Item 12
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 940674.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:40:53 (56.7 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 953784.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:40:58 (64.2 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 954492.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:41:04 (46.5 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 958478.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:41:09 (48.5 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 958503.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:41:18 (7.4 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 990387.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:41:21 (167.8 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 940674.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:42:06 (56.7 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 953784.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:42:09 (64.2 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 954492.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:42:13 (46.5 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 958478.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:42:16 (48.5 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 958503.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:42:19 (7.4 KB)

22F-H2221018-REL Decision – 990387.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:42:22 (167.8 KB)

The administrative hearing concerned a dispute between Terry Marvin and Lori J. Lefferts (Petitioners, owners of Lot 20) and The Stone Canyon Community Association, Inc. (Respondent/Association) regarding the approval of construction plans for Lot 19.

Key Facts and Issues

On October 11, 2021, Petitioners filed a Petition alleging that the Association’s Design Review Committee (DRC) violated adopted Development Design Guidelines (Guidelines). The core allegation was that the DRC improperly granted a variance to Lot 19 Owners regarding side-yard setback requirements. The approval allowed secondary improvements—specifically a driveway extension, grading, site walls, and mechanical enclosure—to encroach into the required 15-foot side setback area.

The issue before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was whether the Association, through the DRC, violated Guidelines Section 1 (Items 1 and 32) and Section 5 (Item 12) when granting this variance.

Key Arguments

  1. Petitioners' Position: Petitioners argued that documentary evidence, including DRC minutes from June 29, 2021, and subsequent legal correspondence, proved the DRC granted a variance. Petitioners asserted this variance was invalid because the DRC members failed to make a required finding of "unreasonable hardship or burden" for the Lot 19 Owners, as mandated by Guideline Section 5, Item 12. Petitioners contended the DRC acted unreasonably, resulting in a diminution of Lot 20’s property value and aesthetic detriment.
  2. Respondent's Position: The Association admitted that the term "variance" was used but argued this was a semantic error or "misnomer". The Association maintained that no variance was necessary or granted. Instead, the approval was properly granted as a "modification" for secondary improvements (grading, driveways, site walls, etc.) under Guideline Section 1, Item 32, which allows such approvals on a "case-by-case basis". The Association's Consulting Architect testified that the modification provisions were added to accommodate development constraints on unique lots, and the DRC meticulously reviewed the Lot 19 merits.

Legal Points Focused On

The hearing focused heavily on the distinction between a variance (which requires a finding of unreasonable hardship/burden per Guidelines Section 5, Item 12) and a modification (which is considered on a case-by-case basis for secondary improvements per Guidelines Section 1, Item 32). DRC members testified that they did not believe they were granting a variance. Petitioners argued that approving encroachments without applying clear standards, whether classified as a variance or modification, was an unreasonable breach of duty.

Outcome and Decision

The ALJ found that "semantics are at play" in the matter. The ALJ ultimately concluded that the hearing record demonstrated the DRC "exercised reasonable discretion" under its authority to grant a Section 5, Item 12 deviation, characterized by the ALJ as "i.e., a variance," to allow the proposed secondary improvements within the setback. The ALJ found that Petitioners did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Association had violated the alleged Guideline provisions. Therefore, the Petition was dismissed.

Questions

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner challenging an HOA's architectural decision?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove by a 'preponderance of the evidence' that the HOA violated its governing documents.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the petitioner (homeowner) bears the burden of proof. They must demonstrate that it is more probable than not that the Association or its Committee violated specific provisions of the governing documents (such as Design Guidelines).

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that, as alleged, Association through actions of Committee had violated Guidelines Section 1, Items 1 and 32 requirements and Section 5, Item 12 requirements when Committee granted a variance…1

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • evidence

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA hearing?

Short Answer

It means evidence that is more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact is 'more probable than not.'

Detailed Answer

The ALJ defines this legal standard as evidence that carries greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition. It does not require absolute certainty, but rather that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is “[e]vidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”2

Legal Basis

Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • standards of evidence

Question

Can my HOA grant a neighbor a variance for construction setbacks?

Short Answer

Yes, if the governing documents grant the Design Review Committee discretion to deviate from requirements in extenuating circumstances.

Detailed Answer

If the Design Guidelines provide the Committee with discretion to deviate from requirements when following them would create an unreasonable hardship or burden, the HOA can validly grant a variance. The ALJ looks for whether the Committee exercised 'reasonable discretion' under this authority.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that the hearing record demonstrates that Committee exercised reasonable discretion under its authority to grant… a Section 5, Item 12 deviation, i.e., a variance… to allow the proposed/approved secondary improvements to be placed within the 15’ side-yard setback.3

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines Section 5, Item 12

Topic Tags

  • variances
  • setbacks
  • HOA discretion
  • architectural review

Question

Can the HOA treat driveways and landscaping differently than main house structures regarding setbacks?

Short Answer

Yes, governing documents may allow 'modifications' for secondary improvements even if structures have strict setbacks.

Detailed Answer

Governing documents may distinguish between 'building structures' (which must strictly comply with setbacks) and 'secondary improvements' like driveways, grading, or site walls. The documents may allow modifications to setbacks for these secondary items on a case-by-case basis.

Alj Quote

All building Structures shall comply with the above outlined setback distances. Modifications to the above outlined setback distances will be considered on a case-by-case basis for secondary improvements such as grading, landscaping, driveways, site walls, etc.4

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines Section 1, Item 32

Topic Tags

  • setbacks
  • driveways
  • landscaping
  • architectural guidelines

Question

What qualifies as an 'unreasonable hardship' that justifies a variance?

Short Answer

Practical necessities, such as needing access to a garage that otherwise complies with setbacks, can be considered an extenuating circumstance.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Committee determined that needing driveway access to a new garage (which itself was built within the allowable building envelope) constituted an 'extenuating circumstance.' This practical necessity justified granting a variance for the driveway and grading to encroach into the setback area.

Alj Quote

The hearing record demonstrates that… Association supported the Committee’s determination that needing access to the new RV garage which itself was being built within the building envelope… met the criteria of “extenuating” circumstances… for purposes of granting a “variance” for the new driveway to be placed and necessary grading to occur within the 15’ side-yard setback.5

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines Section 5, Item 12

Topic Tags

  • hardship
  • variances
  • construction

Question

If I lose my case against the HOA, do I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

No, if the petition is dismissed, the homeowner is typically ordered to bear the cost of the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ has the authority to order who pays the costs. In this decision, after dismissing the petition because the homeowners failed to prove a violation, the ALJ ordered the homeowners to pay their own filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioners bears their $500.00 filing fee.6

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • costs

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221018-REL
Case Title
Terry Marvin & Lori J. Lefferts v. The Stone Canyon Community Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2022-08-05
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner challenging an HOA's architectural decision?

Short Answer

The homeowner must prove by a 'preponderance of the evidence' that the HOA violated its governing documents.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the petitioner (homeowner) bears the burden of proof. They must demonstrate that it is more probable than not that the Association or its Committee violated specific provisions of the governing documents (such as Design Guidelines).

Alj Quote

Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that, as alleged, Association through actions of Committee had violated Guidelines Section 1, Items 1 and 32 requirements and Section 5, Item 12 requirements when Committee granted a variance…1

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • evidence

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA hearing?

Short Answer

It means evidence that is more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact is 'more probable than not.'

Detailed Answer

The ALJ defines this legal standard as evidence that carries greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition. It does not require absolute certainty, but rather that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is “[e]vidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”2

Legal Basis

Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • standards of evidence

Question

Can my HOA grant a neighbor a variance for construction setbacks?

Short Answer

Yes, if the governing documents grant the Design Review Committee discretion to deviate from requirements in extenuating circumstances.

Detailed Answer

If the Design Guidelines provide the Committee with discretion to deviate from requirements when following them would create an unreasonable hardship or burden, the HOA can validly grant a variance. The ALJ looks for whether the Committee exercised 'reasonable discretion' under this authority.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that the hearing record demonstrates that Committee exercised reasonable discretion under its authority to grant… a Section 5, Item 12 deviation, i.e., a variance… to allow the proposed/approved secondary improvements to be placed within the 15’ side-yard setback.3

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines Section 5, Item 12

Topic Tags

  • variances
  • setbacks
  • HOA discretion
  • architectural review

Question

Can the HOA treat driveways and landscaping differently than main house structures regarding setbacks?

Short Answer

Yes, governing documents may allow 'modifications' for secondary improvements even if structures have strict setbacks.

Detailed Answer

Governing documents may distinguish between 'building structures' (which must strictly comply with setbacks) and 'secondary improvements' like driveways, grading, or site walls. The documents may allow modifications to setbacks for these secondary items on a case-by-case basis.

Alj Quote

All building Structures shall comply with the above outlined setback distances. Modifications to the above outlined setback distances will be considered on a case-by-case basis for secondary improvements such as grading, landscaping, driveways, site walls, etc.4

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines Section 1, Item 32

Topic Tags

  • setbacks
  • driveways
  • landscaping
  • architectural guidelines

Question

What qualifies as an 'unreasonable hardship' that justifies a variance?

Short Answer

Practical necessities, such as needing access to a garage that otherwise complies with setbacks, can be considered an extenuating circumstance.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Committee determined that needing driveway access to a new garage (which itself was built within the allowable building envelope) constituted an 'extenuating circumstance.' This practical necessity justified granting a variance for the driveway and grading to encroach into the setback area.

Alj Quote

The hearing record demonstrates that… Association supported the Committee’s determination that needing access to the new RV garage which itself was being built within the building envelope… met the criteria of “extenuating” circumstances… for purposes of granting a “variance” for the new driveway to be placed and necessary grading to occur within the 15’ side-yard setback.5

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines Section 5, Item 12

Topic Tags

  • hardship
  • variances
  • construction

Question

If I lose my case against the HOA, do I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

No, if the petition is dismissed, the homeowner is typically ordered to bear the cost of the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ has the authority to order who pays the costs. In this decision, after dismissing the petition because the homeowners failed to prove a violation, the ALJ ordered the homeowners to pay their own filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioners bears their $500.00 filing fee.6

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • costs

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221018-REL
Case Title
Terry Marvin & Lori J. Lefferts v. The Stone Canyon Community Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2022-08-05
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Terry Marvin (petitioner)
  • Lori J. Lefferts (petitioner)
    Also referred to as Lori Lebert/Leopards

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C.S. Nogami (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN, LLP
  • Parker C. Fox (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN, LLP
  • Sami M. Farhat (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN, LLP
  • Mark Saul (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN, LLP
    Partner of Mr. Nogami and counsel to the HOA
  • Jerry Young (Consulting Architect)
    Association representative and Consulting Architect for the Design Review Committee
  • Theodore Riggs (DRC member)
    Also referred to as Ted Riggs; witness called by Petitioners
  • Richard Reese (DRC member)
    Also referred to as Dick Reif/Rice/Reef; former DRC member; witness called by Petitioners
  • Kevin Given (DRC member)
    Head of the DRC; voted against Lot 19 approval
  • Steve Hall (DRC member)
    Absent from July 27, 2021 Committee meeting
  • Andrew Deni (Architect)
    Architect for Lot 19 Owners (also referred to as Andy Deni/Denah/Dencki)
  • Martin Coe (Lot owner)
    Lot 19 Owner
  • Lydia Roos (Lot owner)
    Lot 19 Owner
  • Tim Stampson (General Contractor)
    General Contractor for Lot 19 Project (also referred to as Ken Samson)
  • Divine Homes (observer)
    Summer associate observing proceedings with HOA attorneys
  • Edward GA (observer)
    Summer associate observing proceedings with HOA attorneys

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • A. Hansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D. Gardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • d. jones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • v. nunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (OAH staff)
    Signed transmittal
  • Miranda Alvarez (Legal Secretary)
    Signed transmittal (also referred to as M Alvarez)
  • Gina Marcus (Design Review Coordinator)
    Association staff/minutes taker
  • Cindy Nichols (unknown)
    Possible minutes taker

Other Participants

  • Nicholas Dana (Lot owner)
    Owner of Lot 24 and resident of Lot 25
  • Steven Schmidt (observer)
    Petitioner in a different matter, observing the hearing

John D Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120009-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-12-17
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John D Klemmer Counsel —
Respondent Caribbean Gardens Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne, Esq., Lydia A. Pierce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 1, Sections 1.5 and 1.8; Article 3, Section 3.4; Article 4, Section 4.1; Article 8, Section 8.1; and, Article 12, Section 12.4

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent Association violated the cited CC&R provisions by refusing to manage the disputed area, which the ALJ determined was a limited common element.

Why this result: The Petitioner lost because the area in dispute was determined to be a 'limited common element' (a balcony serving Unit 207) under Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1212(A)), not a 'common area' the Association was required to manage under the referenced CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusal to manage, operate, maintain and administer common area

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated multiple CC&Rs by refusing to maintain an area between Unit 206 and Unit 207, which he claimed was a common area. The HOA argued the area was a limited common element. The ALJ concluded, relying on A.R.S. § 33-1212(A), that the disputed area was a limited common element (a balcony) allocated exclusively to Unit 207, thus Petitioner failed to establish a CC&R violation.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is dismissed. Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(A)
  • CC&Rs Article 1, Section 1.5
  • CC&Rs Article 1, Section 1.6
  • CC&Rs Article 3, Section 3.4
  • CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1
  • CC&Rs Article 8, Section 8.1
  • CC&Rs Article 12, Section 12.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, common elements, limited common elements, balcony dispute, CC&R violation, A.R.S. 33-1212
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1212
  • A.R.S. § 33-1218
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Article 1, Sections 1.5, 1.8
  • CC&Rs Article 3, Section 3.4
  • CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1
  • CC&Rs Article 8, Section 8.1
  • CC&Rs Article 12, Section 12.4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120009-REL Decision – 876384.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:29:57 (124.8 KB)

21F-H2120009-REL Decision – 843358.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:30:03 (129.8 KB)

21F-H2120009-REL Decision – 843358.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:35:00 (129.8 KB)

Briefing Document: Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative case of John D. Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association (No. 21F-H2120009-REL). The core of the dispute was the legal classification of an outdoor space located between two condominium units. The Petitioner, a unit owner, argued the space was a “common area” that the Association was legally obligated to manage under its governing documents (CC&Rs). The Respondent Association countered that the space was a “balcony” or “limited common element” for the exclusive use of the adjacent unit owner.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition. While the Association’s 1973 CC&Rs and the official Plat document were ambiguous regarding the space, the decision hinged on the application of a later state statute, Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1212. This statute defines balconies designed to serve a single unit as “limited common elements” allocated exclusively to that unit. Because the disputed area was only accessible from a single unit (Unit 207), the ALJ concluded it met this statutory definition. Consequently, the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association had violated its CC&Rs by not treating the space as a general common area.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Name

John D Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

Case Number

21F-H2120009-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn

Hearing Date

November 6, 2020

Decision Date

December 17, 2020

Petitioner

John D. Klemmer (Unit 101 Owner), representing himself

Respondent

Caribbean Gardens Association, represented by Nicole D. Payne, Esq.

Fundamental Dispute: The case centered on whether the Caribbean Gardens Association violated its Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by refusing to manage, operate, and maintain an outdoor area located on the second level between Units 206 and 207, which the Petitioner claimed was a common area belonging to all 40 unit owners.

Petitioner’s Position (John D. Klemmer)

The Petitioner’s case rested on the argument that the disputed area was a “common area” or “common element” as defined by the Association’s governing documents.

• Core Allegation: On April 15, 2020, the Caribbean Board violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs by refusing to administer a common area.

• Basis of Claim: The Petitioner argued that all space not explicitly delineated on the official Plat document as an “Apartment,” “patio,” or “balcony” must be considered a common area. The area in question is blank on the Plat.

• Ownership Argument: Each of the 40 unit owners possesses an “undivided ownership interest in the common areas and [common] elements.” He contended that if the Board did not acknowledge ownership, this common area would be lost to its rightful owners.

• Evidence of Misuse: The Petitioner presented photographic evidence showing that the owners of Unit 207 were exclusively occupying the space as if it were another room, adding furniture, walls, and making improvements to the exterior walls of Unit 206.

• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition alleged violations of the following articles:

◦ Article 1, Sections 1.5 and 1.8: Definitions of “Apartment” and “Plat.”

◦ Article 3, Section 3.4: Requirement for the Association to manage Common Elements.

◦ Article 4, Section 4.1: Vests title of Common Elements in the owners.

◦ Article 8, Section 8.1: Pertains to encroachments.

◦ Article 12, Section 12.4: Binds all owners to the Declaration.

Respondent’s Position (Caribbean Gardens Association)

The Association denied the allegations, arguing that the space was not a common area under its purview.

• Core Defense: The disputed area is not a common area but is instead a “balcony” attached to Unit 207, or alternatively, a “limited common element” for the exclusive use of the Unit 207 owners.

• Testimony: Board Member Alex Gomez testified that the Board’s position is that the area is a balcony. He further stated that the Association has never maintained any balconies within the community, including the one in question.

• Procedural Motions: The Association initially filed a Motion to Dismiss and a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, the Petitioner was seeking relief that couldn’t be granted (declaratory and injunctive), and that other procedural and constitutional issues existed. These motions were denied by the tribunal.

Findings of Fact and Evidence

The ALJ established the following key facts based on the hearing record:

• Description of Disputed Area: The space is a concrete slab on the second level, located between the exterior walls of Unit 206 and Unit 207. It includes outside iron railings that fence it off.

• Exclusive Access: The area is not a staircase landing and can only be accessed through a door from a room within Unit 207. This access is an original feature of the building’s construction.

• Status on the Plat: The official Plat document, which defines the boundaries of apartments and their associated balconies and patios, is blank in the location of the disputed area. It is not specifically delineated in any way.

• Current Use: Photographic evidence confirmed the space contains furniture and other decorative items, indicating exclusive use by the occupants of Unit 207.

Legal Analysis and Conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge

The ALJ’s decision was based on an interpretation of both the community’s CC&Rs and overriding state law.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner, Mr. Klemmer, bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association had violated the specified CC&R provisions.

• Ambiguity in Governing Documents: The judge acknowledged a conflict in the 1973 CC&Rs.

◦ Article 1.5 defines an “Apartment” by its depiction on the Plat, which does not include the disputed area.

◦ Article 1.6 defines “Common Elements” as “all other portions of the Property except the Apartments.” This definition would logically include the undelineated disputed area.

• Application of State Statute: The decisive factor was the application of A.R.S. § 33-1212, a statute enacted in 1985, after the CC&Rs were recorded. The judge focused on subsection 4:

• Final Conclusion: The ALJ concluded that the disputed area fits the statutory description of a balcony “designed to serve a single unit,” as it is only accessible from Unit 207. Therefore, under Arizona law, it is classified as a “limited common element” allocated exclusively to that unit. Because it is not a general common area, the Association had no obligation to manage it as such. The Petitioner thus failed to establish a violation of the CC&Rs.

Final Order

Based on the analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders on December 17, 2020:

1. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed.

2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.

Study Guide: Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John D. Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association, No. 21F-H2120009-REL. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key legal and case-specific terms.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner, John D. Klemmer, in his petition filed on August 21, 2020?

3. Describe the specific physical location and characteristics of the disputed area at the heart of this case.

4. On what grounds did the Petitioner argue that the disputed area should be considered a “common area”?

5. What was the initial position of the Caribbean Gardens Association Board regarding the status of the disputed area, as testified by Board Member Alex Gomez?

6. Before the hearing, what arguments did the Respondent make in its Motion for Summary Judgment?

7. How do the CC&Rs define an “Apartment” versus “Common Elements”?

8. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rely upon to classify the disputed area?

9. What was the final conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge regarding the nature of the disputed area?

10. What was the final recommended order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties are John D. Klemmer, the Petitioner who brought the complaint, and the Caribbean Gardens Association, the Respondent and condominium community association. Mr. Klemmer represented himself, while the Association was represented by counsel, Nicole D. Payne, Esq.

2. The Petitioner alleged that on April 15, 2020, the Caribbean Board violated its CC&Rs by refusing to manage, operate, maintain, and administer a specific “common area.” He claimed this refusal would lead to the loss of the area to its rightful owners, the 40 unit owners of Caribbean Gardens.

3. The disputed area is located on the second level of the building, between the exterior walls of Unit 206 and Unit 207. It consists of a concrete slab with attached iron railings and can only be accessed through a door from Unit 207.

4. The Petitioner argued the area was a “common area” because it was not specifically delineated on the Plat document as part of an apartment, patio, or balcony. He contended that any space not explicitly designated as part of a unit on the Plat must therefore be a common element belonging to all 40 unit owners.

5. Board Member Alex Gomez testified that the Board’s position was that the disputed area is not a common area but is a “balcony” attached to Unit 207. He stated that the Association has never maintained any balconies, including the one in question.

6. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Respondent argued that the Petitioner was seeking relief that the Tribunal could not grant, that he should have filed a derivative action, and that he had not paid sufficient filing fees for multiple issues. The Respondent also challenged the constitutionality of the Enabling Statutes and the jurisdiction of the Department and the Tribunal.

7. Article 1, Section 1.5 of the CC&Rs defines an “Apartment” as the space enclosed by the planes shown on the Plat, including any patio or balcony areas identified on said Plat. In contrast, Article 1, Section 1.6 defines “Common Elements” as all other portions of the Property except the Apartments, including specific items like pools and landscaping.

8. The Judge relied on A.R.S. § 33-1212, which states that balconies and other fixtures designed to serve a single unit but located outside its boundaries are “limited common elements allocated exclusively to that unit.”

9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the disputed area must be a balcony “designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit’s boundaries.” Therefore, it is considered a limited common element, and the Petitioner did not establish that the Caribbean Gardens Association had violated any CC&R provisions.

10. The recommended order was that the Petitioner’s Petition be dismissed. It was further ordered that the Petitioner bear his own $500.00 filing fee.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the disputed area presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. How did their respective readings of the CC&Rs and the Plat document lead to their opposing conclusions?

2. Discuss the critical role of the Plat document in this dispute. Explain how the blank space on the Plat between Units 206 and 207 created an ambiguity that was central to the arguments of both parties.

3. Trace the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn. Detail her process of weighing the definitions in the 1973 CC&Rs against the provisions of the 1985 Arizona Revised Statutes to reach a final decision.

4. Evaluate the arguments raised by the Caribbean Gardens Association in its Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the motion was not granted, what significant legal and jurisdictional challenges did it present against the Petitioner’s case and the hearing body’s authority?

5. This case highlights a tension between a condominium’s original governing documents (the 1973 Declaration) and subsequent state law (the 1985 Condominium statutes). Discuss how this dynamic influenced the outcome and what it reveals about the hierarchy of legal authority in condominium governance.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over an administrative hearing and issues a written decision. In this case, the ALJ was Kay A. Abramsohn.

Apartment

As defined by Article 1, Section 1.5 of the CC&Rs, it is a part of the Property intended for independent use as a dwelling unit, consisting of the space enclosed by the planes shown on the Plat, including any patio and balcony areas identified on that Plat.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, the governing legal documents for the Caribbean Gardens community. These were originally recorded in 1973.

Common Elements

As defined by Article 1, Section 1.6 of the CC&Rs, this term includes “general common elements” as defined in the former A.R.S. § 33-551, along with specific areas like parking, yards, the swimming pool, and “all other portions of the Property except the Apartments.”

Horizontal Property Regime

The legal framework governing the property, established under A.R.S. § 33-551 through § 33-561 at the time of the 1973 Declaration. These statutes were later repealed and replaced by the current Condominium laws.

Limited Common Elements

A legal classification defined in A.R.S. § 33-1212. It refers to fixtures like porches, balconies, patios, and entryways that are designed to serve a single unit but are located outside that unit’s boundaries, and are therefore allocated exclusively to that unit.

Petition

The formal, single-issue legal document filed by John D. Klemmer with the Department to initiate the dispute, alleging that the Caribbean Board violated its CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party initiating a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, John D. Klemmer, a resident of Unit 101.

The official two-page survey map of the Property and all Apartments, attached to the Declaration as Exhibit “B.” It delineates the boundaries of individual units and other areas within the community.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet. It means the evidence presented must be more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact in question is more probable than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Caribbean Gardens Association.

Tribunal

A term used in the decision to refer to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the state agency authorized to hear and decide the contested matter.

Questions

Question

If a balcony or patio serves only my unit but isn't explicitly drawn on the community Plat map, is it considered general common area?

Short Answer

Likely not. Under Arizona law, fixtures designed to serve a single unit located outside its boundaries are considered 'limited common elements' allocated exclusively to that unit, even if the Plat is ambiguous.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the ALJ determined that an area not drawn on the Plat was a limited common element because it was physically accessible only from one unit. The judge cited A.R.S. § 33-1212(4), which defines features like balconies and patios designed to serve a single unit as limited common elements.

Alj Quote

Accordingly, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that the disputed area must be a balcony 'designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit’s boundaries.'

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)

Topic Tags

  • Common Elements
  • Plat Maps
  • Property Boundaries

Question

What is the burden of proof for a homeowner filing a petition against their HOA?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner must demonstrate that their claims are more probable than not. It is not the HOA's job to disprove the allegations; the homeowner must provide evidence of greater weight.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that, as alleged, Caribbean has violated CC&Rs…

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction to hear disputes about CC&R violations and maintenance issues?

Short Answer

Yes, the Department has jurisdiction to receive petitions and hear disputes regarding property owners and condominium associations.

Detailed Answer

The decision affirms that the Tribunal has the authority to hear contested matters between owners and associations regarding alleged violations of the CC&Rs and statutes.

Alj Quote

The Department has jurisdiction to receive petitions, hear disputes between a property owner and a condominium community association, and take other actions pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.), Title 33, Chapter 16.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16

Topic Tags

  • Jurisdiction
  • ADRE Authority
  • Dispute Resolution

Question

Who is responsible for paying the filing fee if the homeowner loses the hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) typically bears the cost of the filing fee if the petition is dismissed.

Detailed Answer

In this case, after dismissing the homeowner's petition, the judge ordered the homeowner to bear the cost of the $500 filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner bears his $500.00 filing fee.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • Fees
  • Penalties
  • Hearing Costs

Question

What specifically counts as a 'limited common element' under Arizona law?

Short Answer

Fixtures like shutters, awnings, balconies, and patios that are outside a unit's boundaries but designed to serve that single unit.

Detailed Answer

State statute specifically lists items such as doorsteps, stoops, porches, balconies, and exterior doors as limited common elements if they are designed for the exclusive use of one unit.

Alj Quote

Any shutters, awnings, window boxes, doorsteps, stoops, porches, balconies, entryways or patios, and all exterior doors and windows or other fixtures designed to serve a single unit, but located outside the unit's boundaries, are limited common elements allocated exclusively to that unit.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1212

Topic Tags

  • Definitions
  • Limited Common Elements
  • Statutes

Question

Can the HOA Board make rules regarding the use of common elements without a vote of the owners?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the exclusive right to manage and regulate common elements.

Detailed Answer

The CC&Rs in this case provided the Board with the exclusive power to establish rules governing the use and maintenance of common elements.

Alj Quote

The Board shall have the exclusive right and power to establish and impose rules and regulations governing the use, maintenance and development of all and any part of the Common Elements…

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 3, Section 3.4

Topic Tags

  • Board Authority
  • Rules and Regulations
  • Common Elements

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120009-REL
Case Title
John D Klemmer v. Caribbean Gardens Association
Decision Date
2020-12-17
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John D. Klemmer (petitioner)
    represented himself

Respondent Side

  • Nicole D. Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Alex Gomez (board member)
    Caribbean Board
    testified at hearing
  • Lydia A. Pierce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120012-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-12-13
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was granted because the statute cited by Petitioners (A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)) regarding mandatory design approval meetings applies only to the construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure,' not to a shed.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Anthony & Karen Negrete Counsel —
Respondent Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Quinten Cupps, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

The Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was granted because the statute cited by Petitioners (A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)) regarding mandatory design approval meetings applies only to the construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure,' not to a shed.

Why this result: The key statute relied upon by Petitioners was deemed inapplicable to the construction of a shed.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide opportunity to participate in design approval meeting for replacement shed

Petitioners alleged they were not given the opportunity to participate in a final design approval meeting for building a replacement shed on their property, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Orders: Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss is granted and Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Design Review, Shed, Architectural Approval, Motion to Dismiss, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120012-REL Decision – 842597.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:30:33 (131.7 KB)

21F-H2120012-REL Decision – 842597.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:35:17 (131.7 KB)

This administrative hearing, held on November 2, 2020, before Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn, addressed a dispute between homeowners Anthony & Karen Negrete (Petitioners) and Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association (Sundance or Respondent).

Key Facts and Procedural Background:

Petitioners, long-time residents of Sundance, removed an existing shed (approved in 2005) due to deterioration from rodents and bees, and constructed a replacement shed in a new location on their property, intending to build a pool where the old shed stood. Petitioners did not initially seek approval for the replacement or the new location, believing it was unnecessary since a shed had been previously approved.

Sundance issued violation notices in March and April 2020, asserting the new shed was built without approval from the Architectural Committee. After applying for retroactive approval in June 2020, Sundance denied the application in July 2020, stating the new shed violated Design Guidelines regarding height, materials, and placement against a shared wall, and arguing the original approved shed could not be moved.

Main Issues and Arguments:

Petitioners filed a petition alleging Sundance violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b). The specific issue Petitioners raised at the hearing was that they were not given the opportunity to participate in a design approval meeting pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b). Sundance denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the Petition.

The Design Guidelines require prior written approval from the Design Review Committee for any improvement, alteration, or change in the exterior appearance of structures. A.R.S. § 33-1803 governs the HOA's authority regarding enforcement and fines.

Legal Points and Outcome:

Petitioners had the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The crucial legal point centered on the applicability of A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates that the association must hold a final design approval meeting allowing the member to attend.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) applies only to the "new construction of the main residential structure on a lot or for rebuilds of the main residential structure on a lot". Since the dispute involved a replacement shed—not the main residential structure—this statutory mandate for a meeting did not apply.

The ALJ concluded that Petitioners failed to establish a violation by Sundance of either A.R.S. § 33-1803 or A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b). Consequently, the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss was granted, and Petitioners’ Petition was dismissed. Petitioners were ordered to bear their $500.00 filing fee.

Questions

Question

Do I need HOA approval to replace an old structure (like a shed) that was approved years ago?

Short Answer

Yes. Prior approval of an original structure does not automatically apply to a replacement, especially if the location or condition changes.

Detailed Answer

Even if a structure was approved in the past, building a replacement is considered a new improvement or alteration. The ALJ found that despite having a shed approved in 2005, the homeowners were required to seek approval for the new shed, particularly because the governing documents stated that no improvements or alterations could be made without prior written approval.

Alj Quote

All subsequent additions to or changes or alterations in any building, fence, wall or other structure … shall be subject to the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1(a)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Improvements
  • Grandfathering

Question

Is the HOA required to hold a 'final design approval meeting' for backyard projects like sheds?

Short Answer

No. The legal requirement for a design approval meeting applies only to the main residential structure.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ clarified that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates a design approval meeting, is specific to the new construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure.' It does not apply to ancillary structures like sheds.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) contains a mandate for a “design approval” meeting in the circumstance of construction of a “main residential structure.” That was not the circumstance in this case.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Topic Tags

  • Meetings
  • Statutory Interpretation
  • Homeowner Rights

Question

Can I move an approved structure to a different location on my lot without new approval?

Short Answer

No. Moving a structure is considered a change that must adhere to current guidelines and receive approval.

Detailed Answer

The HOA successfully argued that an approval from 2005 was for a specific location and condition. Moving the structure constitutes a change that requires adherence to current guidelines.

Alj Quote

Again, the shed that was approved in 2005 cannot move or change- it is not denied, it simply cannot be moved or change. Any changes must adhere to the guidelines and be approved.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • modifications
  • Architectural Review
  • Compliance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof when a homeowner challenges an HOA in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proving the HOA violated the law.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, it is up to the homeowner to provide evidence that carries more weight than the evidence offered by the HOA to prove a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119, Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Legal Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Can the HOA restrict the height and placement of backyard sheds?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA can enforce specific design guidelines regarding dimensions and location relative to neighbors and the street.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld the validity of Design Guidelines that mandated maximum heights and specific lot placements to ensure conformity with city codes and minimize visibility.

Alj Quote

Sundance Design Guidelines regarding “sheds” mandates: (a) a maximum height, including the roof pitch, of no more than eight (8) feet, … [and] (c) lot placement has to conform to City codes and have approval from the Design Committee “based on neighboring properties and visibility from the street,”

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Guidelines
  • Restrictions
  • Property Use

Question

What happens if I start construction without approval?

Short Answer

The HOA may issue violation notices, impose fines, and require the structure be returned to its original state.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the HOA acted within its rights to issue violation notices and fines when it discovered unapproved construction. They also warned the homeowner to return the property to its original state.

Alj Quote

If the work has been started or completed, you will have 30 days from the date of this letter to have the submitted items returned to the original state. Or fines will be imposed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

  • Violations
  • Fines
  • Enforcement

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120012-REL
Case Title
Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-12-13
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Do I need HOA approval to replace an old structure (like a shed) that was approved years ago?

Short Answer

Yes. Prior approval of an original structure does not automatically apply to a replacement, especially if the location or condition changes.

Detailed Answer

Even if a structure was approved in the past, building a replacement is considered a new improvement or alteration. The ALJ found that despite having a shed approved in 2005, the homeowners were required to seek approval for the new shed, particularly because the governing documents stated that no improvements or alterations could be made without prior written approval.

Alj Quote

All subsequent additions to or changes or alterations in any building, fence, wall or other structure … shall be subject to the prior written approval of the Design Review Committee.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Article 4, Section 4.1(a)

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Review
  • Improvements
  • Grandfathering

Question

Is the HOA required to hold a 'final design approval meeting' for backyard projects like sheds?

Short Answer

No. The legal requirement for a design approval meeting applies only to the main residential structure.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ clarified that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b), which mandates a design approval meeting, is specific to the new construction or rebuild of the 'main residential structure.' It does not apply to ancillary structures like sheds.

Alj Quote

The Administrative Law Judge concludes that A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b) contains a mandate for a “design approval” meeting in the circumstance of construction of a “main residential structure.” That was not the circumstance in this case.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1817(B)(2)(b)

Topic Tags

  • Meetings
  • Statutory Interpretation
  • Homeowner Rights

Question

Can I move an approved structure to a different location on my lot without new approval?

Short Answer

No. Moving a structure is considered a change that must adhere to current guidelines and receive approval.

Detailed Answer

The HOA successfully argued that an approval from 2005 was for a specific location and condition. Moving the structure constitutes a change that requires adherence to current guidelines.

Alj Quote

Again, the shed that was approved in 2005 cannot move or change- it is not denied, it simply cannot be moved or change. Any changes must adhere to the guidelines and be approved.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs / Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • modifications
  • Architectural Review
  • Compliance

Question

Who bears the burden of proof when a homeowner challenges an HOA in a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proving the HOA violated the law.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, it is up to the homeowner to provide evidence that carries more weight than the evidence offered by the HOA to prove a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, pursuant to Arizona Administrative Code (A.A.C.) R2-19-119, Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 33-1817(B)(2)(b).

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Legal Procedure
  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearings

Question

Can the HOA restrict the height and placement of backyard sheds?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA can enforce specific design guidelines regarding dimensions and location relative to neighbors and the street.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ upheld the validity of Design Guidelines that mandated maximum heights and specific lot placements to ensure conformity with city codes and minimize visibility.

Alj Quote

Sundance Design Guidelines regarding “sheds” mandates: (a) a maximum height, including the roof pitch, of no more than eight (8) feet, … [and] (c) lot placement has to conform to City codes and have approval from the Design Committee “based on neighboring properties and visibility from the street,”

Legal Basis

Design Guidelines

Topic Tags

  • Architectural Guidelines
  • Restrictions
  • Property Use

Question

What happens if I start construction without approval?

Short Answer

The HOA may issue violation notices, impose fines, and require the structure be returned to its original state.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the HOA acted within its rights to issue violation notices and fines when it discovered unapproved construction. They also warned the homeowner to return the property to its original state.

Alj Quote

If the work has been started or completed, you will have 30 days from the date of this letter to have the submitted items returned to the original state. Or fines will be imposed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Topic Tags

  • Violations
  • Fines
  • Enforcement

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120012-REL
Case Title
Anthony & Karen Negrete v. Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2020-12-13
Alj Name
Kay A. Abramsohn
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Anthony Negrete (petitioner)
  • Karen Negrete (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Quinten Cupps (HOA attorney)
    Sundance Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Foothills Club West Homeowners Association v. Subrahmanyam & Sheila

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-27
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome The ALJ concluded that Foothills demonstrated Respondents' violation of the community governing documents by commencing and continuing construction of a second-story Addition without obtaining the required Architectural Committee approval. Foothills was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondents' appeal was dismissed.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Foothills Club West Homeowners Association Counsel John Halk, Esq.
Respondent Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust Counsel Mary T. Hone, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5

Outcome Summary

The ALJ concluded that Foothills demonstrated Respondents' violation of the community governing documents by commencing and continuing construction of a second-story Addition without obtaining the required Architectural Committee approval. Foothills was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondents' appeal was dismissed.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized 2nd story addition

Respondents constructed a second-story Addition to their property without first obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee, violating the community governing documents.

Orders: Respondents’ appeal is dismissed, and Foothills is deemed the prevailing party with regard to its Petition.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5

Analytics Highlights

Topics: architectural review, cc&r violation, unapproved construction, second story addition, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120004-REL Decision – 839537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:53:36 (135.4 KB)

21F-H2120004-REL Decision – 839537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:43 (135.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Foothills Club West Homeowners Association v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust (No. 21F-H2120004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core dispute involved the construction of a second-story addition by homeowners (Respondents) without the prior approval of the Homeowners Association (Petitioner), a direct violation of the community’s governing documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found conclusively in favor of the Foothills Club West HOA. The evidence demonstrated that the Respondents not only began construction without seeking approval but continued the project even after receiving a formal denial from the HOA’s Architectural Committee. A subsequent agreement between the parties, wherein the Respondents would demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines, was not honored by the Respondents. The ALJ dismissed the Respondents’ appeal and declared the HOA the prevailing party, validating its authority to enforce the community’s architectural standards as outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

I. Case Overview

• Case Name: Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, Petitioner, v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust, Respondent.

• Case Number: 21F-H2120004-REL

• Jurisdiction: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Administrative Law Judge: Kay Abramsohn

• Hearing Date: October 5, 2020

• Decision Date: November 27, 2020

• Central Issue: The petition filed by Foothills HOA on July 24, 2020, alleged that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. This action was alleged to be in violation of CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5.

II. Chronology of Key Events

The hearing record established the following undisputed sequence of events:

Oct. 2018

Respondents begin construction of the second-story addition.

Nov. 7, 2018

The City of Phoenix issues a stop-work order, noting a permit is required.

Nov. 7, 2018

Foothills HOA issues a violation notice to the Respondents.

Dec. 17, 2018

Respondents obtain a permit from the City of Phoenix.

Jan. 18, 2019 (approx.)

Respondents submit a request for approval to the Foothills Architectural Committee.

Jan. 18, 2019

Foothills HOA issues a penalty notice to the Respondents, with further notices issued monthly.

Feb. 22, 2019

Foothills HOA issues a formal denial of the application.

Mar. 15, 2019

The City of Phoenix gives final approval to the construction and issues a Certificate of Occupancy.

Post Feb. 2019

The parties reach an agreement for Respondents to demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines.

July 24, 2020

Foothills HOA files its petition, noting Respondents have not complied with the demolition agreement.

Oct. 5, 2020

The administrative hearing is held.

Nov. 27, 2020

The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.

III. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner: Foothills Club West HOA

• Violation of CC&Rs: The HOA argued that the Respondents violated CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 by commencing construction without first obtaining approval from the Architectural Committee.

• Disregard for Denial: The HOA asserted that the Respondents completed the addition after receiving a formal denial of their application.

• Breach of Agreement: The HOA noted that the parties had reached a settlement agreement for demolition, which the Respondents failed to honor. The HOA requested that the Tribunal enforce this agreement.

• Jurisdictional Distinction: The HOA maintained that approval from the City of Phoenix was a separate matter and did not negate the requirement to obtain approval from the HOA as mandated by the governing documents.

B. Respondents: Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust

• Initial Ignorance: Respondents claimed they were initially unaware of the HOA approval requirements.

• Attempted Compliance: They argued that once notified, they followed the association’s guidance, met with the Board, and sought approval.

• Vague Denial: Respondents stated they did not understand the meaning of the denial reason, “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community,” or how the addition specifically violated community rules.

• Lack of Due Process: They argued they did not receive a letter indicating an appeal process was available and therefore felt they had not received a final “denial.”

• Demolition Delay: While not disputing the existence of the demolition agreement, Respondents cited COVID-19 issues and safety concerns for their at-risk family as reasons for requesting more time.

• Final Appeal: At the hearing, Respondents reversed their position on the agreement and requested to be allowed to keep the addition.

IV. Analysis of Governing Documents

The decision centered on specific provisions within the Foothills Club West governing documents, which constitute the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.

• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 (Architectural Approval): This section was central to the case. It states in pertinent part:

• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4 (Obligation to Obtain Approval): This provision explicitly sets forth a homeowner’s obligation to secure approval from the Architectural Committee.

• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5 (Exterior Appearance): This section clarifies that while the HOA cannot limit interior remodeling, it retains jurisdiction over any changes that are “visible from outside such [home] … or affects the exterior appearance of such [home].”

• Amended Architectural Guidelines (2013): These guidelines reinforce the CC&Rs, specifying that a homeowner’s plans must be submitted for approval through the Architectural Committee on a case-by-case basis.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions of law provided a clear framework for the final order.

A. Burden of Proof

The ALJ established that in this proceeding, the petitioner (Foothills HOA) bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondents had violated the governing documents. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

B. Core Conclusion on Violations

The ALJ found that the HOA had successfully met its burden of proof. The central conclusion of law states:

“The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Foothills has demonstrated Respondents’ violation of the community governing documents, as stated in CC&R Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5, because Respondents began to construct a modification, the Addition, to their existing home prior to obtaining approval from Foothills Architectural Committee and, further, Respondents continued to construct the Addition despite receiving a denial of approval from Foothills Architectural Committee.”

This finding affirmed that the Respondents committed two distinct violations: starting work without approval and continuing work after being explicitly denied approval.

VI. Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the ALJ issued a decisive order.

• Order:

• Binding Nature: The decision notes that the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is requested. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 21F-H2120004-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the document.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who are the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What was the single issue raised in the petition filed by Foothills Club West Homeowners Association?

3. According to the Petition, which specific articles and sections of the governing documents did the Respondents allegedly violate?

4. What action did the City of Phoenix take on November 7, 2018, regarding the Respondents’ construction project?

5. What reasons did the Foothills Architectural Committee provide for denying the Respondents’ application on February 22, 2019?

6. Prior to the hearing, what agreement did the parties reach in an attempt to resolve the dispute?

7. What was the Respondents’ primary argument for their actions and for their failure to comply with the association’s denial?

8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

9. Explain the difference between the City of Phoenix’s approval and the Foothills Architectural Committee’s approval, as argued by the Petitioner.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association (“Foothills”). The Respondent is the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust. Their relationship is that of a homeowners’ association and a member homeowner residing within the planned community for 22 years.

2. The single issue raised was that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. The construction was completed even after the Foothills Architectural Committee had issued a denial of the project.

3. Foothills alleged that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. These articles pertain to the rights and obligations of the association and the architectural standards requiring prior approval for modifications.

4. On November 7, 2018, the City of Phoenix issued a stop-work order for the Respondents’ construction project. The order noted that the work being performed required a permit, which had not yet been obtained.

5. The Foothills Architectural Committee denied the application because it needed copies of the City permit, the plans were incomplete, and there was no documentation on the roof line or roofing materials. Furthermore, the denial stated that the project “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community.”

6. The parties came to an agreement wherein the Respondents would complete the demolition of the second-story addition. In exchange, Foothills agreed to waive the penalties that had been imposed on the Respondents for the violation.

7. The Respondents argued that they initially did not know what was required and that they cooperated with the association’s Board once notified. They claimed they did not understand what “Fails aesthetics” meant, did not receive a letter about an appeal process, and therefore did not feel they had received a final “denial.”

8. The legal standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Foothills, bore the burden of proving the Respondents’ violation by this standard.

9. Foothills argued that approval from the City of Phoenix and approval from the association’s Architectural Committee were two different and separate matters. Even though the Respondents eventually received a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy, this did not override the CC&R requirement to first obtain approval from Foothills.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Respondents’ appeal be dismissed. The Judge deemed Foothills the prevailing party with regard to its petition, finding that Foothills had demonstrated the Respondents’ violation of the community’s governing documents.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing evidence and support directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner (Foothills) and the Respondents at the hearing. Discuss the key evidence and claims each party used to support their position and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s case more persuasive.

2. Explain the distinct roles and jurisdictions of the Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee and the City of Phoenix regarding the Respondents’ construction project. Why was obtaining a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy insufficient for the Respondents to proceed without violating the community’s governing documents?

3. Trace the procedural history of case No. 21F-H2120004-REL, from the filing of the initial petition to the final order. Discuss key filings, motions, and deadlines mentioned in the document, including the Respondents’ attempt to consolidate another case.

4. Discuss the significance of the “contract” between the parties, as defined in footnote 15. How do the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines function as this contract, and which specific sections were central to the judge’s conclusion that a violation occurred?

5. Evaluate the Respondents’ attempt to justify their failure to demolish the addition as per their agreement with Foothills, citing COVID-19 issues. How did their request at the hearing to keep the addition conflict with their prior agreement, and what does this reveal about their position in the dispute?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues decisions.

Architectural Committee

A committee appointed by the Foothills HOA, as established by CC&R Article 9, with the authority to review, approve, or disapprove plans for construction, modifications, and additions to properties within the community.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that form a binding contract between the homeowners association and the property owners, outlining their rights and obligations.

Disclosure

The formal process by which parties in a legal case provide evidence, exhibits, and information to each other before a hearing. The deadline for disclosure in this case was September 29, 2020.

Governing Documents

The set of rules for the planned community, including the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines, which have the same force and effect as association rules.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association.

Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to initiate a hearing concerning violations of community governing documents. In this case, it was a “single-issue petition.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust.

Tribunal

The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, the state agency authorized by statute to hear and decide contested matters referred to it, such as this dispute.

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21F-H2120004-REL

1 source

This text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association and the Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust. The Petitioner, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, filed a petition alleging that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized second-story addition to their property in violation of the association’s governing documents, specifically the CC&Rs Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Respondents violated these community documents by beginning construction prior to obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee and continuing the work despite receiving a denial. The judge ultimately concluded that Foothills was the prevailing party and dismissed the Respondents’ appeal, effectively upholding the violation finding.

1 source

What are the specific governing document violations alleged and proven against the homeowners?
How did the legal and administrative process address the unauthorized construction dispute?
What was the final resolution ordered regarding the unapproved second-story home addition?

Based on 1 source

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John Halk (HOA attorney)
    BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC
    Represented Petitioner Foothills Club West Homeowners Association
  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC
    Counsel for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Mary T. Hone (Respondent attorney)
    Mary T. Hone, PLLC
    Counsel for Respondent Trustees Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar
  • Subrahmanyam Sudhakar (respondent)
    Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust
    Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust
  • Sheila Sudhakar (respondent)
    Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust
    Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • AHansen (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • djones (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • DGardner (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
  • ncano (Agency Staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of Order

Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-01-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel —
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Solera was in compliance with its governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, concluding that the Board is the 'sole judge' regarding appropriate maintenance of AREAS. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the Rehearing Petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation. The governing documents grant the Board 'the sole judge' authority over maintenance, and Petitioner did not provide legal support requiring the HOA to meet the homeowner maintenance standard.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times

Petitioner alleged that Solera failed to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times, arguing that the same strict maintenance standard applied to homeowners (CC&R 7.2) should apply to the HOA (CC&R 7.1). The issue was heard on rehearing after the initial decision dismissed the petition.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Solera was in compliance with its governing documents and was the prevailing party. Petitioner's appeal (Rehearing Petition) was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Violation, Maintenance Standard, Areas of Association Responsibility, Rehearing, Sole Judge
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
  • CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
  • CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 816310.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:18 (199.6 KB)

20F-H2020051-REL Decision – 847175.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:26:21 (246.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision in the case of Debra K. Morin versus the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Solera), dated January 8, 2021. The central dispute involved a homeowner’s allegation that the association failed to maintain its common areas in good condition and repair.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petitioner’s case, finding conclusively in favor of the Solera HOA. The decision rested on a critical provision within the association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which designates the Solera Board as the “sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement” of all common areas. This clause grants the Board exclusive discretion, superseding an individual homeowner’s opinion on the timing or quality of maintenance.

Despite the petitioner presenting extensive photographic evidence documenting various maintenance issues, the ALJ concluded that this evidence failed to prove a violation of the governing documents. The petitioner did not meet her burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board had acted outside its granted authority. The ruling affirms that the authority of the Board is explicitly elevated above that of an individual homeowner in matters of common area maintenance under the controlling legal documents.

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I. Case Background and Procedural History

The case originates from a petition filed by Debra K. Morin, a four-year resident of the Solera community, against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. The matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (Tribunal).

A. Initial Petition

On March 12, 2020, Ms. Morin filed a two-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Solera, its Board of Directors, and its management company (Premier) had violated numerous governing documents, including the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, CC&Rs, and Rules & Regulations (R&Rs).

• Issue #1: Alleged that Solera did not permit “direct communication from homeowners” and sought to have this “policy” rescinded.

• Issue #2: Alleged that Solera was not providing oversight to the General Manager in maintaining the “Areas of Association Responsibility” (AREAS) in “good condition and repair at all times.” Specific complaints included uncontrolled weeds and poor maintenance of the Community Center and other common areas.

B. Procedural Developments

• Motion to Dismiss: Solera filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the issues were outside the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction.

• Withdrawal of Issue #1: At a May 20, 2020 hearing, the Tribunal noted its jurisdiction did not extend to non-governing documents like the Board’s Code of Ethics. Consequently, Ms. Morin withdrew Issue #1. The Tribunal denied the Motion to Dismiss for the remaining “bare-bones” maintenance allegation in Issue #2.

• Initial Decision (August 19, 2020): Following the original hearing, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Solera was the “sole judge” regarding maintenance of the AREAS and had not violated its governing documents. The petition was dismissed.

• Rehearing Request (September 24, 2020): Ms. Morin filed a request for rehearing, citing irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and arguing the decision was arbitrary and capricious, particularly in its interpretation of CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

• Rehearing Granted and Conducted: The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing, which was conducted telephonically on December 16, 2020.

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II. Core Arguments of the Parties

The fundamental conflict centered on the interpretation of the maintenance standards outlined in the community’s CC&Rs.

A. Petitioner’s Position (Debra K. Morin)

Ms. Morin’s case was built on the principle of equal application of maintenance standards.

• Central Argument: The same maintenance standard requiring homeowners to keep their lots “in good condition and repair at all times” (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2) must be applied equally to Solera’s responsibility for the common AREAS (per CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1).

• Core Belief: Because homeowners are given no discretion regarding delays in maintenance, Solera should not be able to take months to address reported issues.

• Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted extensive documentation, including over 80 photographs (referenced in the rehearing as “310 pictures”), emails, and other documents. This evidence was intended to show persistent maintenance failures, including:

◦ Uncontrolled weeds in granite rock locations

◦ Poor exterior condition of the Community Center

◦ Deficiencies in street asphalt, storm drains, sidewalks, and curbing

◦ Water pooling and intrusion issues

◦ Exposed landscaping lights and irrigation lines

◦ Unremoved tree stumps

B. Respondent’s Position (Solera HOA)

Solera’s defense relied entirely on the specific authority granted to its Board by the governing documents.

• Central Argument: The association met its responsibilities, and the petitioner’s subjective opinions about what, when, or how maintenance should be done are irrelevant.

• Dispositive Legal Provision: Solera consistently cited CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states the Board “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].”

• Interpretation: This provision grants the Board exclusive discretion and authority to determine the nature and timing of maintenance, insulating its decisions from a single homeowner’s critique.

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III. Analysis and Key Findings of the Administrative Law Judge

The Rehearing Decision provided a thorough review of the evidence and legal arguments, ultimately reinforcing the original ruling in favor of Solera.

A. The “Sole Judge” Clause and Board Authority

The ALJ’s conclusion hinged on the unambiguous language of the CC&Rs, which establishes a clear hierarchy of authority.

• CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1: This article was identified as the dispositive text. It states, in pertinent part: “the Board ‘shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS], but all [AREAS], and the Improvements located thereon, shall be maintained in good condition and repair at all times.'” The ALJ found that the “sole judge” provision grants the Board exclusive authority to determine how the “good condition and repair” standard is met.

• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5: This section further strengthens the Board’s position by granting Solera the “exclusive right to construe and interpret the provisions of the [CC&Rs],” with its interpretation being “final, conclusive and binding.”

• Conclusion on Authority: The ALJ concluded that these provisions clearly lift the Board’s authority above that of an individual homeowner in determining appropriate maintenance.

B. Rejection of the “Equal Standard” Argument

The petitioner’s primary argument for an equal, non-discretionary standard for both the HOA and homeowners was explicitly rejected.

• The ALJ found that the petitioner “failed to provide legal support for her argument that the same maintenance standard is required to be applied to the Board as it is applied to a homeowner.”

• The governing documents themselves create different levels of authority and obligation for the Board versus individual owners.

C. Evaluation of Evidence and Burden of Proof

• Burden of Proof: The decision reiterates that the petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• Photographic Evidence: The ALJ acknowledged reviewing all photographs from both hearings. The decision states that this evidence successfully documented “the existence, at those dates embedded in the photographs, of items that deal with maintenance and repairs in various locations of Solera AREAS.”

• Failure to Prove a Violation: Crucially, while the photos proved maintenance issues existed, they did not prove a violation of the CC&Rs. Because the Board is the “sole judge,” the existence of a weed or a cracked curb does not automatically constitute a breach of its duties, as the Board retains discretion over the timeline and method of repair.

D. Jurisdictional Limitations

The decision affirmed the Tribunal’s limited jurisdiction, noting that many of the petitioner’s underlying frustrations were not legally actionable in this venue.

• Not Actionable: A homeowner’s dissatisfaction with the Board, its management company, or the General Manager is “not within the purview of this process or the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”

• Irrelevant Documents: Arguments based on City of Chandler standards, the landscaping contract with Integrated Landscape Management (ILM), or Premier’s General Manager job description were deemed irrelevant, as the Tribunal’s review is limited to the association’s governing documents and applicable state statutes.

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IV. Final Order and Conclusion

Based on an exhaustive review of the record from both the original hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

• Final Finding: The petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The ALJ concluded that Solera is in compliance with its governing documents, including CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

• Order:

◦ IT IS ORDERED that Solera is the prevailing party with regard to the Rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.

◦ The order was issued on January 8, 2021.

◦ As a decision issued after a rehearing, the order is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be filed with the Superior Court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative rehearing case No. 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG, between Petitioner Debra K. Morin and Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms derived from the case documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and who represented them at the telephonic hearing on December 16, 2020?

2. What were the two initial issues Petitioner Debra K. Morin raised in her petition filed on March 12, 2020?

3. Why did the Petitioner withdraw Issue #1 from her petition during the May 20, 2020 hearing?

4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the maintenance standard that Solera should be held to?

5. What type of evidence did the Petitioner primarily present to document the alleged maintenance failures in the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)?

6. What specific clause in the CC&Rs did Solera (the Respondent) rely on to defend its actions and decisions regarding maintenance?

7. What were the primary reasons the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?

8. How did the Administrative Law Judge rule on the relevance of non-governing documents, such as the City of Chandler ordinances and the Premier Management Company job description?

9. What is the legal standard of proof that a petitioner must meet in these proceedings, and how is it defined in the decision?

10. What was the final conclusion and order of the Administrative Law Judge in the Rehearing Decision issued on January 8, 2021?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Debra K. Morin, who represented herself, and the Respondent, Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association (Solera). Solera was represented by Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.

2. Issue #1 alleged that Solera did not allow direct communication from homeowners. Issue #2 alleged that Solera, its Board, and its management company were not providing proper oversight to maintain the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair.

3. The Petitioner withdrew Issue #1 after the Tribunal ruled that the statutory parameters of its jurisdiction did not include the interpretation or application of a non-governing document like the Board’s Code of Ethics. The allegations regarding ethics and mismanagement based on this code were therefore removed from consideration.

4. The Petitioner’s central argument was that the same maintenance standard must be applied to Solera as is applied to homeowners. She contended that just as homeowners are required by CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2 to maintain their lots in good condition at all times, Solera must be held to the same standard for common AREAS under CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1.

5. The Petitioner presented an “enormity” of photographic evidence to document the maintenance issues. The decision notes she presented over eighty photographs at the original hearing and an additional “310 pictures” were mentioned in the rehearing, showing weeds, debris, exposed wiring, and other issues at various dates.

6. Solera relied on CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states that the Solera Board of Directors “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].” Solera argued that the Petitioner’s subjective opinions on maintenance were therefore not relevant.

7. The rehearing was granted for reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request, which claimed: irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and that the original decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not supported by evidence, or contrary to law.

8. The Judge ruled that such documents were not relevant or justiciable. City standards were not under review, and the management company’s job description and landscape contract were not Solera governing documents, so they could not be used to prove a violation of the association’s governing documents.

9. The petitioner bears the burden of proving their case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, and it represents the greater weight of evidence.

10. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation by Solera of the governing documents. The Judge found Solera to be the prevailing party, in compliance with CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, and ordered that the Petitioner’s appeal be dismissed.

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Suggested Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the balance of power between a homeowner and an HOA as depicted in this case. Discuss how specific clauses in the CC&Rs, particularly Article 7 (Section 7.1) and Article 9 (Sections 9.5 and 9.9), grant authority to the Board and limit the recourse available to an individual owner within the association’s own framework.

2. Examine the role and limitations of evidence in this administrative hearing. Why was the Petitioner’s photographic evidence, despite its volume, ultimately insufficient to meet the burden of proof? Discuss the distinction made by the Tribunal between evidence of a maintenance issue and evidence of a violation of the governing documents.

3. The Petitioner argued for an equal application of the “maintenance standard” to both homeowners and the HOA, stating “[t]here must be equal consideration to have a valid contract.” Evaluate this argument in the context of the specific language found in the Solera CC&Rs. Is the concept of “equal consideration” legally applicable in the way the Petitioner suggests?

4. Discuss the jurisdiction of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (the Tribunal) in HOA disputes as described in the decision. Explain why the Tribunal could rule on the maintenance of common areas but had to dismiss claims related to the Solera Code of Ethics, City of Chandler ordinances, and Premier Management’s internal documents.

5. Based on the findings of fact, trace the procedural journey of this case from the initial petition to the final rehearing order. Identify the key turning points, such as the Motion to Dismiss and the Order Granting Rehearing, and explain their impact on the scope and outcome of the dispute.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact, issues decisions, and conducts rehearings.

Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)

The common areas within the Solera community that the homeowners’ association is responsible for managing and maintaining. This includes landscaping, the Community Center exterior, street conditions, storm drains, sidewalks, walls, and curbing.

Articles of Incorporation

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit A.

By-Laws

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit B.

CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A primary governing document for the Solera at Springfield Lakes community. It outlines the rights and responsibilities of both the homeowners and the association.

Maintenance Standard

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.30 as “the standard of maintenance of Improvements established from time to time by the Board and/or the Architectural Review Committee in the Design Guidelines, or in the absence of any such standards, the standards of maintenance of Improvements generally prevailing through the Project.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party (in this case, Solera) asking for a petition or case to be dismissed on the grounds that the issues are outside the Department’s jurisdiction or that the requested relief cannot be granted as a matter of law.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Debra K. Morin, a homeowner in the Solera community.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for a petitioner to win in these proceedings. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Premier Management Company (Premier)

The management company hired by the Solera Board of Directors to handle duties including the oversight of a General Manager.

Project Documents

Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.37 as the CC&Rs, any supplements to the CC&Rs, the By-Laws, the Rules and Regulations (R&Rs), and the Design Guidelines.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

R&Rs (Rules and Regulations)

One of the governing documents of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, referenced as Solera Exhibit D.

Tribunal

A term used to refer to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), the body responsible for conducting administrative hearings for disputes referred by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

🧑‍⚖️

20F-H2020051-REL-RHG

1 source

This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Rehearing Decision regarding a dispute between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent). The Petitioner initially filed a two-issue complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that the HOA had violated various governing documents, primarily concerning lack of direct homeowner communication and a failure to maintain Association Responsibility Areas (AREAS) in good condition. After the first issue was withdrawn due to jurisdictional limitations, the initial decision dismissed the petition, finding the HOA was the sole judge of appropriate maintenance under the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This rehearing decision, granted due to claims of procedural irregularities and arbitrary findings, ultimately reaffirms the original dismissal, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish a violation of the governing documents.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)
    Represented herself

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
  • Denise Frazier (general manager/witness)
    Premier Management Company / Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association
    Solera's onsite general manager who testified

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for both original and rehearing decisions
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative)
    Transmitted the original August 19, 2020 Decision

Magnus LD MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (ROOT)

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Magnus L.D. MacLeod Counsel Jeffrey M. Proper, Esq.
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)

Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(a)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)(b)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Amendment Validity, Planned Community, Homeowner Violation, Full-Time Residency, Hangar Home, Statutory Interpretation 33-1817, Cross-Petitions, Filing Fee Bear Own Costs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et al.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019019-REL Decision – 810246.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:53 (188.3 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the cross-petitions between Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP). The central dispute revolves around the validity of a 2018 Amendment to the community’s Declaration and MacLeod’s alleged violation of this Amendment by residing full-time in an aircraft hangar.

MacLeod (Petition #19) contended that the Amendment was invalid because it was not unanimously approved by all lot owners, as he argued was required by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) since it applied to fewer than all properties. MAP (Petition #34) argued the Amendment was properly adopted with the required 75% approval and that MacLeod was in violation by living in his Tract G hangar, which also allegedly failed to meet the minimum living space requirement.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of Mogollon Airpark, Inc., deeming it the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the Amendment was properly adopted under the 75% approval threshold outlined in the community’s Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), thereby dismissing MacLeod’s petition. On MAP’s petition, the ALJ found that MacLeod had indeed violated the Amendment by living full-time in the hangar, affirming that part of the petition. However, the ALJ dismissed MAP’s claim regarding the hangar’s living space size due to insufficient evidence. The final order dismisses Petition #19, partially affirms and partially dismisses Petition #34, and orders each party to bear their own filing fees.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Magnus L.D. MacLeod
Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Kay Abramsohn

Hearing Date

June 19, 2020

Decision Date

July 28, 2020

The Cross-Petitions

The legal conflict originated from two separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petition #19: Filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod

• Filing Date: On or about October 15, 2019.

• Core Allegation: MAP violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b) in its adoption of the October 18, 2018 “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…”

• MacLeod’s Argument: The Amendment could not be enforced because it lacked the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which it applied. He specifically noted that three of the nine Real Property Tracts (Tract G, Tract H, and Tract M) did not provide an affirmative vote and that he personally did not sign it. He argued the amendment required unanimous approval.

Petition #34: Filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

• Filing Date: On or about December 16, 2019.

• Core Allegations:

1. Violation of the Amendment: MacLeod was in continued violation of the properly adopted Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar.

2. Violation of Square Footage Requirement: MAP alleged, upon information and belief, that the living space in the hangar was “only 549 square feet,” which violated the Declaration’s requirement that structures for living purposes contain no less than 1,200 square feet.

• Requested Relief: MAP sought enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, including injunctive relief to compel MacLeod’s compliance, and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

Analysis of the Disputed Amendment

The conflict centers on an amendment recorded on October 18, 2018. This amendment introduced several significant changes to the community’s governing documents.

Key Provisions of the Amendment

• Creates Two Lot Categories: The Amendment establishes “Residential lots” (lots #178 through #213) and “Hangar Tracts” (Tracts E through M).

• Regulates Hangar Use: It designates Tracts E through M for the purpose of “aircraft storage only.”

• Restricts Occupancy: While guest quarters may be constructed within a hangar, they are for “temporary living only.” “Temporary” is explicitly defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” An owner can request an extension in special circumstances.

• Maintains Living Space Requirement: It affirms that any single-family structure or combination hangar/house must have a living area of “not less than 1,200 square feet.”

• Adds Taxiway Access: The Amendment adds Lot 213 to the list of properties authorized to use the aircraft taxiway. This change was necessitated by a fence MacLeod had erected that blocked the Lot 213 owner’s access.

MacLeod’s Objections to the Amendment

In his petition, MacLeod argued the Amendment fundamentally and unreasonably altered the original covenants:

• It “substantially alters” the covenants for Tract Hangar/Homes by imposing the new four-month temporary living limit where unrestricted usage was previously allowed.

• It replaced the allowance for “Guest Homes with Kitchens” with “Guest Quarters without Kitchens,” impacting Tract G.

• It created a “large burden upon me to buy or build an additional home that I do not want and do not need.”

Background and History of the Dispute

• Property Acquisition: MacLeod purchased Tract G from his brother, Pat MacLeod, in February 2017 with the stated expectation of living in the hangar/home full-time.

• Occupancy: After acquiring the property, MacLeod made interior improvements and began living full-time in the aircraft hangar.

• Conflict Origin: The issue of MacLeod’s full-time residency first arose in May 2017 when he requested to build a group home for disabled veterans, a request that drew opposition from other lot owners.

• Initial Violation Notice: On September 18, 2017, MAP’s Architectural Committee sent MacLeod a letter notifying him that living full-time in a hangar intended for aircraft storage was a violation and requested he vacate within 60 days.

• Formal Non-Compliance Notices & Fines:

◦ December 29, 2018: MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance,” imposing a $100 fine.

◦ April 29, 2019: MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

Legal Framework and Adjudicated Issues

The central legal question was the standard of approval required to pass the Amendment. The parties stipulated that the core dispute was whether a 75% approval or a unanimous approval was necessary.

Stipulated Fact #11

The parties agreed to the following crucial point, which narrowed the scope of the legal argument:

“The AMENDMENT contains at least the required minimum signatures and authorizations from the Lot Owners in Unit IVB to adopt the AMENDMENT, provided that unanimous approval of all affected property owners was not required.”

Conflicting Legal Standards

• Declaration Requirement (75% Rule): The original Declaration states it can be amended “by an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision…”

• Arizona Statute (Unanimous Rule): A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) requires unanimous “affirmative vote or written consent of all of the owners of the lots or property to which the amendment applies” if the amendment “apply to fewer than all of the lots or less than all of the property that is bound by the Declaration.”

Parties’ Core Arguments

• MacLeod’s Position: The Amendment required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) because it applied to “fewer than all the lots,” specifically pointing out that Tract B (a common area) was not included.

• MAP’s Position: The 75% rule under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable standard. MAP argued that Tract B was a common area not subject to the Declaration’s conditions, so its exclusion from an amendment concerning residential use was irrelevant and did not trigger the unanimity requirement.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions systematically addressed each petition.

Ruling on Petition #19 (Amendment Validity)

• Conclusion: The Amendment was properly adopted.

• Rationale: The ALJ concluded that the 75% approval threshold, as specified in the Declaration and permitted by A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), was the correct standard. Because the parties stipulated that the 75% threshold had been met, MAP was not in violation of the statute.

• Outcome: Petition #19 was dismissed.

Ruling on Petition #34 (MacLeod’s Violations)

• Conclusion on Full-Time Occupancy: MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home.

• Rationale: MacLeod acknowledged living there full-time. His testimony regarding when he ceased this practice was found to be “widely inconsistent,” and the ALJ could not conclude that the violation had stopped by the time MAP filed its petition.

• Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was affirmed.

• Conclusion on Living Space Requirement: MAP failed to prove its allegation that the living space was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

• Rationale: MAP did not clearly document or otherwise prove its claim that the living space was only 549 square feet. MacLeod, in contrast, cited a 2007 architectural committee sign-off indicating 1,656 square feet.

• Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was dismissed.

• Conclusion on Injunctive Relief: The Tribunal lacked the authority to grant the requested relief.

• Rationale: MAP “cited no statutory authority of this Tribunal with regard to ‘enforcement’ of a homeowner’s association governing documents or with regard to any injunctive relief.”

Final Order

1. Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) is deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

2. Petition #19 (MacLeod v. MAP): Dismissed.

3. Petition #34 (MAP v. MacLeod):

◦ Partially affirmed as to the allegation of MacLeod living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home in violation of the Amendment.

◦ Partially dismissed as to the allegation regarding the amount of living space within the hangar.

4. Filing Fees: Each party shall bear their own filing fee.

Study Guide: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

1. What were the two primary allegations made by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) in its petition (Petition #34) against Magnus L.D. MacLeod?

2. What was the core argument presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod in his petition (Petition #19) regarding the October 18, 2018 Amendment?

3. According to the original Declaration, what was the minimum approval threshold required to amend it?

4. How did the Amendment of October 18, 2018 change the rules regarding residency in Hangar Tracts like Tract G?

5. What was the central legal question that the parties stipulated to regarding the adoption of the Amendment?

6. Describe the two notices that MAP issued to MacLeod prior to filing its petition.

7. What argument did MacLeod make regarding A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) and why he believed the Amendment required unanimous approval?

8. Why was MAP’s allegation regarding the living space in MacLeod’s Tract G hangar (that it was only 549 sq. ft.) dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge?

9. What was MacLeod’s testimony regarding his occupancy of the Tract G hangar, and how did the Administrative Law Judge view this testimony?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge regarding Petition #19 and Petition #34, and which party was deemed the prevailing party?

Answer Key

1. In Petition #34, MAP first alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar. Second, MAP requested enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, seeking injunctive relief and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.

2. MacLeod’s petition alleged that the Amendment was unenforceable because it was not properly adopted pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817. He argued it did not receive the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which the amendment applied, specifically noting that owners of three of the nine affected tracts (G, H, and M) did not consent.

3. The original Declaration stipulated that it could be amended by “an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision.” This represents a 75% approval threshold.

4. The Amendment established that guest quarters in aircraft storage hangars (Tracts E through M) were for “temporary living only,” which was defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” It also specified that such quarters could not be used as a permanent residence.

5. The parties stipulated that the central dispute was whether the Amendment required 75% approval from lot owners as specified in the Declaration, or if it required unanimous approval from all affected property owners pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).

6. On December 29, 2018, MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance” with a $100 fine for living full-time in the hangar. On April 29, 2019, MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.

7. MacLeod argued that pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2), unanimous approval was required because the Amendment applied to fewer than all the lots bound by the Declaration. He specifically pointed out that Tract B, a common area, was not included in the Amendment.

8. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed this part of MAP’s petition because MAP failed to clearly document or prove its allegation. The judge concluded that MAP did not sufficiently demonstrate that the living space within the Tract G Hangar/Home was less than the required 1,200 square feet.

9. MacLeod gave widely inconsistent dates for his full-time occupancy of the hangar and testified that he had moved to Concho in January 2019. The Administrative Law Judge found his testimony inconsistent and could not conclude that MacLeod had stopped living in the hangar at the time Petition #34 was filed.

10. The judge ordered that MacLeod’s Petition #19 be dismissed entirely. The judge partially dismissed MAP’s Petition #34 regarding the living space allegation but affirmed the allegation that MacLeod was living in the hangar in violation of the Amendment. MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately sided with MAP’s interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable statute.

2. Trace the timeline of the dispute, starting with MacLeod’s purchase of Tract G and his proposal for a group home. Discuss how the actions and reactions of both parties escalated the conflict, leading to the filing of cross-petitions with the Department of Real Estate.

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both parties. How did the parties’ joint stipulation of facts narrow the central legal issue? Discuss the impact of MacLeod’s inconsistent testimony on the judge’s final decision regarding his residency.

4. MacLeod argued that MAP had waived its right to enforce the Amendment due to “longstanding and widespread utilization of Tract Hanger/Homes as full-time residences.” Although the Judge did not address this argument due to jurisdictional limits, construct an argument for or against this claim based on the facts available in the decision.

5. Discuss the scope and limitations of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in this case. Why was the Judge able to rule on the validity of the Amendment’s adoption and MacLeod’s violation, but not grant MAP’s request for injunctive relief and enforcement?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judicial authority, Kay Abramsohn, who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Arizona Revised Statute governing the amendment of a planned community’s Declaration. Subsection (A)(1) allows amendment by the vote specified in the Declaration, while (A)(2) requires unanimous consent of affected owners if the amendment applies to fewer than all lots.

Amendment

The “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…” recorded on October 18, 2018. It created categories for Residential and Hangar lots and restricted hangar occupancy to temporary living of no more than four months per year.

A colloquial acronym used by the Petitioner to refer to the original “Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions and Mutual and Reciprocal Covenants and Liens Running with the Land.”

Declaration

The original governing document for Mogollon Airpark, Inc., establishing conditions, reservations, and restrictions for the properties. It required a three-fourths (75%) vote of lot owners to be amended.

Hangar Tracts

Tracts E through M, inclusive, as designated by the Amendment for the primary purpose of aircraft storage, though guest quarters for temporary living are permitted.

Magnus L.D. MacLeod

The Petitioner in Petition #19 and Respondent in Petition #34. He is the owner of Tract G and resided in the hangar on that property.

Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)

The Respondent in Petition #19 and Petitioner in Petition #34. It is the planned community association responsible for administering the Declaration.

Petition #19

The petition filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod on October 15, 2019, alleging MAP improperly adopted the Amendment in violation of Arizona statute.

Petition #34

The petition filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. on December 16, 2019, alleging MacLeod was violating the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in the hearing, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Residential Lots

Lots numbered 178 through 213, inclusive, as categorized by the Amendment.

Tract G

An aircraft storage hangar lot in Unit 4B owned by Magnus L.D. MacLeod, which was the central property in the dispute.

Unit 4B

The specific subdivision within Mogollon Airpark subject to the Declaration and Amendment. It includes Lots 178-213 and Tracts B, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M.

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20F-H2019019-REL

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This administrative law judge decision concerns cross-petitions filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) regarding disputes within a planned community association in Arizona. MacLeod’s petition challenged the validity of an amendment to the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs), arguing it was improperly adopted and unreasonably altered prior usage rights for hangar/homes, specifically his Tract G property. MAP’s petition alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the amendment by living full-time in his aircraft storage hangar and requested injunctive relief to compel compliance. The judge ruled to dismiss MacLeod’s petition, finding the amendment was properly adopted, and partially affirmed MAP’s petition, concluding that MacLeod had violated the amendment by residing full-time in the hangar. Ultimately, MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the proceedings.

1 source

What were the central legal issues and findings in this property dispute case?
How did the contested amendment change the community’s declaration and rules?
What were the core arguments and outcomes for each party involved in this hearing?

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jeffrey M. Proper (attorney)
    JEFFREY M. PROPER, PLLC
    Counsel for Magnus L.D. MacLeod

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Counsel for Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
  • Craig Albright (board member)
    MAP Board of Directors
    Then President of the MAP Board of Directors

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Magnus L.D. MacLeod (party)
    Petitioner in 20F-H2019019-REL and Respondent in 20F-H2019034-REL
  • Pat MacLeod (HOA president)
    HOA
    Brother of Petitioner; previous owner of Tract G; appeared to be HOA President around 2017

Steven D. Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918033-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-04-01
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome The Petitioner was the prevailing party. The ALJ affirmed that the HOA violated its CC&Rs regarding enforcement procedures, particularly by failing to adhere to Section 18 requirements and incorrectly applying Section 1.1 against the owner, rendering the legal fee demands improper. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee,.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Steven D. Stienstra Counsel —
Respondent Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association Counsel Michelle Molinario, Diana J. Elston, Keith D. Collett

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1806.01; CC&Rs Section 1.1; CC&Rs Section 18

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was the prevailing party. The ALJ affirmed that the HOA violated its CC&Rs regarding enforcement procedures, particularly by failing to adhere to Section 18 requirements and incorrectly applying Section 1.1 against the owner, rendering the legal fee demands improper. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee,.

Why this result: The HOA failed to follow the explicit due process requirements (written notice and 30 days to appear) mandated by CC&Rs Section 18 for enforcement against the owner, and incorrectly relied on Section 1.1 to justify its demand for unauthorized flat fees,,,,.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA enforcement action regarding CC&R violations and asserted legal fees

Petitioner challenged the HOA's enforcement actions regarding short-term rentals and leasing less than the entire lot. The ALJ found the HOA proceeded inappropriately under Section 1.1 (intended for action against occupants on the owner's behalf) and failed to follow the mandatory enforcement requirements of Section 18, thus violating its own CC&Rs. Consequently, the asserted legal fees were not assigned to Petitioner,,,.

Orders: The Petition was granted. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee,. The asserted legal fees of $1,500 and $2,600 sought by the HOA were determined not to be assignable to the Petitioner,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806.01
  • CC&Rs Section 1.1
  • CC&Rs Section 18

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Legal Fees, Due Process, Rental Restriction
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806.01
  • CC&Rs Section 1.1
  • CC&Rs Section 18
  • A.R.S. § 10-3830

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918033-REL-RHG Decision – 779896.pdf

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19F-H1918033-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918033-REL/753362.pdf

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Briefing Document: Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Steven D. Stienstra (Petitioner) and the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association (HOA/Respondent). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s enforcement actions and subsequent demand for attorney’s fees related to alleged violations of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) prohibiting short-term rentals.

The ALJ ultimately ruled in favor of the Petitioner in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The decisions established that the HOA violated its own CC&Rs by employing an incorrect and unreasonable enforcement procedure. Specifically, the HOA misapplied Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs, which governs an owner’s failure to take action against a non-compliant tenant, instead of following the prescribed due process for owner violations outlined in Section 18. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that the attorney’s fees demanded by the HOA were not assignable to the Petitioner. The final order required the HOA to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, affirming that the HOA’s actions, including a series of escalating cease and desist letters, were procedurally flawed and unreasonable given the circumstances.

Case Overview and Core Dispute

The case, No. 19F-H1918033-REL, involved a petition filed by Steven D. Stienstra in November 2018 with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. Mr. Stienstra alleged that the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association, a voluntary board in Sedona, Arizona, violated A.R.S. § 33-1806.01 and Sections 1.1 and 18 of its own CC&Rs.

The dispute originated from short-term rental activity at Mr. Stienstra’s property, which he purchased in August 2017. While the Petitioner admitted to the initial violations, he contended that he ceased the activity immediately after a phone call from the HOA President in April 2018. Despite his assurances, the HOA, acting on legal advice, pursued enforcement through a series of cease and desist letters, culminating in a demand for $2,600 in attorney’s fees.

The central issue before the Office of Administrative Hearings was whether the HOA’s enforcement process was proper under its governing documents and, consequently, whether Mr. Stienstra was liable for the legal fees incurred by the HOA.

Chronology of the Dispute

Details

Aug 2017

Property Purchase

Steven D. Stienstra purchases the residence. He acknowledges the CC&R restrictions on short-term rentals.

Jan-Apr 2018

Rental Activity

Stienstra’s son uses VRBO to manage stays for friends and family, which expands to produce some revenue from rentals of less than 30 days.

Apr 3, 2018

Motor Home Incident

HOA Secretary Vic Burolla calls Stienstra about a motor home parked in the driveway, a separate CC&R violation.

April 2018

Ferguson’s Phone Call

HOA President Bill Ferguson calls Stienstra about the short-term rentals. Recollections vary, but Stienstra claims he agreed to cease the activity. Ferguson’s impression was that Stienstra was not going to stop.

Apr 26, 2018

HOA Retains Counsel

The first noted contact between the HOA and its law firm occurs after the phone call with Stienstra.

May 11, 2018

First Cease & Desist Letter

The HOA’s attorney sends a letter demanding Stienstra cease all rentals of less than 30 days and rentals of less than the entire property within ten days, threatening a lawsuit under Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs.

June 1, 2018

Second Cease & Desist Letter

The HOA rejects Stienstra’s explanation of compliance. The letter demands payment of $1,500.00 by July 2, 2018, described as a “flat amount to resolve the matter.”

June 17, 2018

Third Cease & Desist Letter

Citing a new Facebook Marketplace post by Stienstra’s son (offering to lease bedrooms separately), the HOA sends another letter. The demand for attorney’s fees increases to $2,600.00.

Sep 4, 2018

Informal Meeting

At Stienstra’s request, three HOA board members meet with him in an unofficial capacity to discuss the dispute. The meeting transcript reflects a tense relationship.

Nov 2018

Petition Filed

Stienstra files his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Oct 7, 2019

Initial Hearing

The Office of Administrative Hearings conducts a hearing on the matter.

Nov 15, 2019

Initial Decision

ALJ Kay Abramsohn issues a decision finding the HOA violated its CC&Rs and grants Stienstra’s petition.

Dec 19, 2019

Rehearing Request

The HOA requests a rehearing, arguing the ALJ’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.”

Mar 12, 2020

Rehearing

A rehearing is conducted where the HOA introduces new arguments, including that its board acted in good faith on legal advice.

Apr 1, 2020

Rehearing Decision

The ALJ issues a final decision affirming the original order, finding Stienstra to be the prevailing party and ordering the HOA to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Steven D. Stienstra)

• Compliance: Stienstra argued that he and his son ceased all short-term rental activity immediately following the April 2018 phone call from HOA President Bill Ferguson.

• Improper Procedure: The core of his argument was that the HOA failed to follow the enforcement procedures mandated by Section 18 of the CC&Rs. This section requires the Board to provide written notice of a breach, a 30-day period for the owner to appear before the Board, and a reasonable time (up to 60 days) to remedy the breach before levying fines.

• Misapplication of CC&Rs: Stienstra contended the HOA incorrectly proceeded under Section 1.1, which he argued applies to an owner’s failure to take legal action against a non-compliant tenant, not direct violations by the owner themselves.

• Unjustified Fees: Because the HOA did not provide due process and followed an improper enforcement path, Stienstra argued he should be released from any liability for the attorney’s fees the HOA incurred.

Respondent’s Position (Cedar Ridge HOA)

• Reasonable Belief of Violation: The HOA argued it had reason to believe violations were ongoing. It cited the continued presence of a VRBO listing (which Stienstra’s son claimed was inactive for booking) and observations of “multiple cars parked there daily” as evidence.

• Reliance on Legal Counsel: The HOA maintained that its actions were reasonable because it sought and followed the advice of its attorney. At the rehearing, it cited A.R.S. § 10-3830, arguing it discharged its duties in good faith.

• Discretion in Enforcement: The Board believed it had the discretion to enforce the CC&Rs under either Section 1.1 or Section 18. Board Secretary Vic Burolla testified at the rehearing that Section 1.1 was chosen because it “seemed more expeditious, to be able to collect” legal fees.

• “Unclean Hands” Doctrine: At the rehearing, the HOA argued for the first time that because Stienstra had admittedly violated the CC&Rs initially, he had “unclean hands” and was not entitled to seek relief regarding the HOA’s subsequent actions.

Key Evidence Presented

• CC&Rs: The text of Section 1.1 (“Leasing”) and Section 18 (“Enforcement of Covenants”) were central to the case.

• Cease & Desist Letters: The series of three letters from the HOA’s attorney documented the escalating demands and the HOA’s legal strategy.

• Testimony of Board Members: Testimony from Bill Ferguson and Vic Burolla provided insight into the Board’s decision-making process, including their impression of the April 2018 phone call and their justification for hiring an attorney. Vic Burolla provided conflicting testimony, stating in the initial hearing he was “not aware of any specific instructions in the CC&Rs” for notifications, but stating in the rehearing that the Board had discussed the benefits of proceeding under either Section 1.1 or Section 18.

• VRBO and Facebook Listings: Printouts of the online rental listings were used as evidence by the HOA to demonstrate ongoing or attempted violations.

• Meeting Transcript: A transcript of the informal September 4, 2018 meeting revealed the “tense relationship” and communication breakdown between the parties. When asked who was in the house if not tenants, Stienstra replied, “It’s not anybody’s business who’s in our house, really.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s conclusions were consistent across both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, ultimately finding that the Petitioner had proven his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Interpretation of Governing CC&Rs

• Section 1.1 vs. Section 18: The ALJ decisively concluded that the two sections govern different circumstances.

◦ Section 1.1 applies when an occupant or lessee violates the CC&Rs. It requires the owner to take legal action against that occupant within 10 days of a written demand from the Board. If the owner fails, the Board may act “on behalf of such owner against owner’s occupant.” The ALJ found these were “not the circumstances in this case.”

◦ Section 1.8 is the proper procedure for violations committed directly by the owner. It provides a clear due process framework: written notice, an opportunity to be heard by the Board, and a period to cure the breach.

• Conclusion: The ALJ ruled that the “appropriate action that was required to be taken by Respondent was set forth in Section 18 of the CC&Rs.” By using Section 1.1, the HOA committed a procedural violation.

Assessment of HOA Enforcement Actions

• Verbal Warning: The ALJ characterized the April 2018 phone call from Mr. Ferguson as “appropriate in the nature of education” but clarified it “is not an ‘enforcement’ action under the CC&Rs.”

• Unreasonable Continuation: The Judge found the HOA’s continued actions after the May 11 letter to be unreasonable. The decision notes that the HOA’s characterization of Stienstra “intentionally” continuing to violate the CC&Rs “simply demonstrates that the Board members did not and were not going to believe Petitioner or his son no matter what information they provided.”

• Distrust: The decision highlights the Board’s fundamental distrust, quoting Mr. Burolla’s testimony that even if the HOA had called to clarify the situation, “there’s no reason to suspect we would have been told the truth.”

Ruling on Attorney’s Fees

• Not Assignable to Petitioner: Because the HOA violated its own CC&Rs by following an improper enforcement procedure, the ALJ ruled that the “asserted legal fees are not assigned to Petitioner.”

• Improper Demand: The ALJ specifically analyzed the demand in the June 1, 2018 letter for “$1,500.00… authorized by the Board as a flat amount to resolve the matter.” The ruling states this amount “could only be looked at as either a settlement offer or as some sort of fine, which is not authorized under Section 1.1 but only under Section 18.” It was not a legitimate accounting of actual fees incurred as permitted by the CC&Rs.

• No Expenses Incurred Under Section 1.1: The Judge found that since Stienstra took action to stop the leasing, no legal action by the HOA “on behalf of the owner against the occupant” was required. Therefore, no expenses were actually incurred pursuant to the parameters of Section 1.1.

Final Decisions and Order

• Initial Decision (Nov 15, 2019): The petition was granted, and the HOA was ordered to reimburse Mr. Stienstra the $500.00 filing fee.

• Rehearing Decision (Apr 1, 2020): The ALJ affirmed the original order. The HOA’s new arguments regarding “good faith” and “unclean hands” did not alter the core finding of procedural failure. The final order declared the Petitioner the prevailing party and re-stated the requirement for the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Study Guide: Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing and rehearing decisions in the case between petitioner Steven D. Stienstra and respondent Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a series of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central issue that prompted the administrative hearing?

2. What specific violations of the CC&Rs did the homeowner, Steven Stienstra, or his son commit that initiated the dispute?

3. Describe the initial action taken by HOA President Bill Ferguson in April 2018 and explain why the Administrative Law Judge did not consider it a formal enforcement action.

4. The HOA’s attorneys sent three Cease & Desist letters. What was the primary demand of the first letter, and what financial demands were added in the second and third letters?

5. What were the two key sections of the CC&Rs at the center of the dispute, and what did each section generally govern?

6. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclude that the HOA’s decision to proceed under Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs was inappropriate for the violations committed by the owner?

7. According to the ALJ’s decision, what specific procedural steps should the HOA have followed under Section 18 of the CC&Rs to properly enforce the covenants against an owner?

8. On what grounds did the Cedar Ridge HOA request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued in favor of the petitioner?

9. During the rehearing, the HOA introduced an “unclean hands” argument. What did this argument claim, and how did the ALJ respond to it?

10. What was the final, binding outcome of this case after the rehearing, including the ruling on attorney’s fees and the petitioner’s filing fee?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra, and the Respondent, Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association (HOA). While the dispute began over rental violations, the central issue at the hearing was the liability for legal fees the HOA incurred and asserted were owed by the Petitioner.

2. The Petitioner’s son violated Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs by listing the property on VRBO for short-term rentals (less than 30 consecutive days) and producing revenue from January to April 2018. He also later posted on Facebook Marketplace offering to rent separate units within the home, which violated the rule requiring the lease of an “owner’s entire lot.”

3. HOA President Bill Ferguson made a phone call to Mr. Stienstra in April 2018 to bring the short-term rental violations to his attention. The ALJ characterized this as a “courtesy or informational call” and not a formal enforcement action because it did not comply with the written notice procedures required by either Section 1.1 or Section 18 of the CC&Rs.

4. The first letter (May 11, 2018) demanded that Stienstra cease all rentals of less than 30 days. The second letter (June 1, 2018) added a demand for $1,500 in attorney’s fees, and the third letter (June 17, 2018) increased this demand to $2,600.

5. The key sections were Section 1.1 and Section 18. Section 1.1 governed leasing requirements (e.g., minimum 30-day term) and detailed a process for an owner to take action against a non-compliant tenant (occupant). Section 18, titled “Enforcement of Covenants,” provided the formal process for the HOA Board to take action against a non-compliant owner.

6. The ALJ concluded that Section 1.1 was inappropriate because its enforcement mechanism empowers the HOA to act “on behalf of such owner against owner’s occupant” if the owner fails to do so. In this case, the HOA was taking direct action against the owner (Stienstra) for his own violations, a scenario that the ALJ determined was governed by Section 18.

7. Under Section 18, the HOA was required to notify the owner “in writing of the breach,” provide the owner 30 days to appear before the Board to respond, and then grant a reasonable time period (not to exceed 60 days) to remedy the breach before it could levy a fine.

8. The HOA requested a rehearing on the grounds that the ALJ’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and was not support by the evidence.” The HOA specifically alleged the ALJ had not considered evidence that it had reason to believe violations were continuing and had erred in interpreting the CC&Rs.

9. The HOA argued that because the Petitioner had admittedly violated the CC&Rs, he had “unclean hands” and therefore was not entitled to seek relief from the Department regarding the HOA’s actions. The ALJ noted that the remedy sought by the Petitioner was monetary (release from fees), not equitable, and the core issue remained whether the HOA’s enforcement actions were valid under its own governing documents.

10. The final outcome, upheld on rehearing, was that the Petitioner’s petition was granted. The HOA was ordered to reimburse Mr. Stienstra for his $500 filing fee, and the ALJ concluded that the asserted legal fees were not assignable to him due to the HOA’s failure to follow its own CC&R enforcement procedures.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each question using only the facts and arguments presented in the provided legal decisions.

1. Analyze the procedural missteps made by the Cedar Ridge HOA Board in its enforcement actions against Steven Stienstra. How did its choice to proceed under Section 1.1 instead of Section 18 fundamentally undermine its position, according to the Administrative Law Judge?

2. Discuss the role of communication and miscommunication in escalating the conflict between Stienstra and the HOA. Use specific examples from the text, such as the Ferguson phone call, the continued VRBO listing, the HOA’s internal distrust, and the unofficial board meeting, to illustrate your points.

3. Evaluate the HOA’s argument on rehearing that its actions were protected because they acted in good faith based on the advice of their attorney, as allowed under A.R.S. § 10-3830. Why was this argument ultimately unpersuasive to the Administrative Law Judge?

4. The central issue in this case evolved from CC&R violations to a dispute over attorney’s fees. Trace this evolution, explaining how each Cease & Desist letter escalated the financial stakes and why the ALJ ultimately determined the fees were not assignable to Stienstra.

5. Compare and contrast the enforcement mechanisms detailed in Section 1.1 and Section 18 of the Cedar Ridge CC&Rs. Explain the specific purpose of each section and why applying the correct one was critical to the outcome of this case.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1806.01

An Arizona Revised Statute providing that a planned community property owner may use their property as a rental unless prohibited in the declaration and must abide by the declaration’s rental time period restrictions.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and rulings. In this case, the ALJ was Kay Abramsohn.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the HOA’s violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Cease & Desist Letter

A formal written demand from an attorney or party to stop (cease) and not restart (desist) an allegedly illegal or infringing activity.

Declaration

The legal document that creates a homeowners association and its CC&Rs.

Forcible Entry and Detainer

A legal action, often used for eviction, to recover possession of real property from someone who is in wrongful possession. Section 1.1 mentions this as an action an owner could take against a non-compliant tenant.

A legal claim or right against a property to secure the payment of a debt. Section 18 of the CC&Rs allows the HOA to place a lien on a property for an unpaid special assessment or fine.

Occupant

As used in Section 1.1, refers to a tenant or lessee under a lease agreement, distinct from the property owner.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, meaning that the evidence as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association.

Special Assessment

A charge levied by an HOA against an owner for a specific purpose, such as repaying attorney’s fees incurred by the HOA or as a fine, as described in Sections 1.1 and 18.

Unclean Hands

A legal doctrine arguing that a party who has acted unethically or in bad faith in relation to the subject of a complaint should not be entitled to seek relief. The HOA raised this argument against the Petitioner on rehearing.

An Expedia Group website containing listings for vacation property rentals, which the Petitioner’s son used to list the property.

Study Guide: Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing and rehearing decisions in the case between petitioner Steven D. Stienstra and respondent Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a series of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the legal decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central issue that prompted the administrative hearing?

2. What specific violations of the CC&Rs did the homeowner, Steven Stienstra, or his son commit that initiated the dispute?

3. Describe the initial action taken by HOA President Bill Ferguson in April 2018 and explain why the Administrative Law Judge did not consider it a formal enforcement action.

4. The HOA’s attorneys sent three Cease & Desist letters. What was the primary demand of the first letter, and what financial demands were added in the second and third letters?

5. What were the two key sections of the CC&Rs at the center of the dispute, and what did each section generally govern?

6. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclude that the HOA’s decision to proceed under Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs was inappropriate for the violations committed by the owner?

7. According to the ALJ’s decision, what specific procedural steps should the HOA have followed under Section 18 of the CC&Rs to properly enforce the covenants against an owner?

8. On what grounds did the Cedar Ridge HOA request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued in favor of the petitioner?

9. During the rehearing, the HOA introduced an “unclean hands” argument. What did this argument claim, and how did the ALJ respond to it?

10. What was the final, binding outcome of this case after the rehearing, including the ruling on attorney’s fees and the petitioner’s filing fee?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra, and the Respondent, Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association (HOA). While the dispute began over rental violations, the central issue at the hearing was the liability for legal fees the HOA incurred and asserted were owed by the Petitioner.

2. The Petitioner’s son violated Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs by listing the property on VRBO for short-term rentals (less than 30 consecutive days) and producing revenue from January to April 2018. He also later posted on Facebook Marketplace offering to rent separate units within the home, which violated the rule requiring the lease of an “owner’s entire lot.”

3. HOA President Bill Ferguson made a phone call to Mr. Stienstra in April 2018 to bring the short-term rental violations to his attention. The ALJ characterized this as a “courtesy or informational call” and not a formal enforcement action because it did not comply with the written notice procedures required by either Section 1.1 or Section 18 of the CC&Rs.

4. The first letter (May 11, 2018) demanded that Stienstra cease all rentals of less than 30 days. The second letter (June 1, 2018) added a demand for $1,500 in attorney’s fees, and the third letter (June 17, 2018) increased this demand to $2,600.

5. The key sections were Section 1.1 and Section 18. Section 1.1 governed leasing requirements (e.g., minimum 30-day term) and detailed a process for an owner to take action against a non-compliant tenant (occupant). Section 18, titled “Enforcement of Covenants,” provided the formal process for the HOA Board to take action against a non-compliant owner.

6. The ALJ concluded that Section 1.1 was inappropriate because its enforcement mechanism empowers the HOA to act “on behalf of such owner against owner’s occupant” if the owner fails to do so. In this case, the HOA was taking direct action against the owner (Stienstra) for his own violations, a scenario that the ALJ determined was governed by Section 18.

7. Under Section 18, the HOA was required to notify the owner “in writing of the breach,” provide the owner 30 days to appear before the Board to respond, and then grant a reasonable time period (not to exceed 60 days) to remedy the breach before it could levy a fine.

8. The HOA requested a rehearing on the grounds that the ALJ’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and was not support by the evidence.” The HOA specifically alleged the ALJ had not considered evidence that it had reason to believe violations were continuing and had erred in interpreting the CC&Rs.

9. The HOA argued that because the Petitioner had admittedly violated the CC&Rs, he had “unclean hands” and therefore was not entitled to seek relief from the Department regarding the HOA’s actions. The ALJ noted that the remedy sought by the Petitioner was monetary (release from fees), not equitable, and the core issue remained whether the HOA’s enforcement actions were valid under its own governing documents.

10. The final outcome, upheld on rehearing, was that the Petitioner’s petition was granted. The HOA was ordered to reimburse Mr. Stienstra for his $500 filing fee, and the ALJ concluded that the asserted legal fees were not assignable to him due to the HOA’s failure to follow its own CC&R enforcement procedures.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each question using only the facts and arguments presented in the provided legal decisions.

1. Analyze the procedural missteps made by the Cedar Ridge HOA Board in its enforcement actions against Steven Stienstra. How did its choice to proceed under Section 1.1 instead of Section 18 fundamentally undermine its position, according to the Administrative Law Judge?

2. Discuss the role of communication and miscommunication in escalating the conflict between Stienstra and the HOA. Use specific examples from the text, such as the Ferguson phone call, the continued VRBO listing, the HOA’s internal distrust, and the unofficial board meeting, to illustrate your points.

3. Evaluate the HOA’s argument on rehearing that its actions were protected because they acted in good faith based on the advice of their attorney, as allowed under A.R.S. § 10-3830. Why was this argument ultimately unpersuasive to the Administrative Law Judge?

4. The central issue in this case evolved from CC&R violations to a dispute over attorney’s fees. Trace this evolution, explaining how each Cease & Desist letter escalated the financial stakes and why the ALJ ultimately determined the fees were not assignable to Stienstra.

5. Compare and contrast the enforcement mechanisms detailed in Section 1.1 and Section 18 of the Cedar Ridge CC&Rs. Explain the specific purpose of each section and why applying the correct one was critical to the outcome of this case.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1806.01

An Arizona Revised Statute providing that a planned community property owner may use their property as a rental unless prohibited in the declaration and must abide by the declaration’s rental time period restrictions.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and rulings. In this case, the ALJ was Kay Abramsohn.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the HOA’s violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Cease & Desist Letter

A formal written demand from an attorney or party to stop (cease) and not restart (desist) an allegedly illegal or infringing activity.

Declaration

The legal document that creates a homeowners association and its CC&Rs.

Forcible Entry and Detainer

A legal action, often used for eviction, to recover possession of real property from someone who is in wrongful possession. Section 1.1 mentions this as an action an owner could take against a non-compliant tenant.

A legal claim or right against a property to secure the payment of a debt. Section 18 of the CC&Rs allows the HOA to place a lien on a property for an unpaid special assessment or fine.

Occupant

As used in Section 1.1, refers to a tenant or lessee under a lease agreement, distinct from the property owner.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, meaning that the evidence as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association.

Special Assessment

A charge levied by an HOA against an owner for a specific purpose, such as repaying attorney’s fees incurred by the HOA or as a fine, as described in Sections 1.1 and 18.

Unclean Hands

A legal doctrine arguing that a party who has acted unethically or in bad faith in relation to the subject of a complaint should not be entitled to seek relief. The HOA raised this argument against the Petitioner on rehearing.

An Expedia Group website containing listings for vacation property rentals, which the Petitioner’s son used to list the property.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Steven D. Stienstra (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf,.
  • Petitioner's son (witness)
    Related to Petitioner
    Managed rental property listings (referred to as 'Son'),,; testified at hearing,.

Respondent Side

  • Michelle Molinario (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC.
    Represented Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association,.
  • Keith D. Collett (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC.
    Represented Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association/HOA,,.
  • Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
    Represented Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association/HOA,.
  • Vic Burolla (board member)
    Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
    HOA Board Secretary,,; witness at initial hearing,,; no longer Secretary by time of hearing,.
  • Bill Ferguson (board member)
    Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
    HOA Board President,; no longer President by time of hearing,; witness at initial hearing.
  • Tucker (board member)
    Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
    HOA Board Vice-president,; participated in September 4, 2018 meeting,.
  • Griffin (board member)
    Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
    HOA Board Treasurer,; participated in September 4, 2018 meeting,.
  • Dick Ellis (board member)
    Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
    May have attended portion of September 4, 2018 meeting,.

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge,,.
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner,,.

Joan A. Tober, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joan A. Tober Counsel —
Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – 764197.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:27 (187.4 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/714863.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:32 (51.7 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/725808.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:37 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”

The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.

The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.

Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.

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Case Overview

This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Name

Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1918042-REL

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Kay A. Abramsohn

Core Issue

Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.

Initial Hearing Date

June 5, 2019

Initial Decision Date

July 29, 2019

Rehearing Date

December 11, 2019

Final Decision Date

January 15, 2020

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Key Parties and Individuals

• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober

◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.

◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.

◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.

◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.

◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.

• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)

◦ The governing body for the planned community.

◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn

◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Chronology of the Dispute

Nov 20, 2018

At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.

Nov 26, 2018

Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.

Nov 27, 2018

Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.

Nov 29, 2018

At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

Nov 29, 2018

At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.

Dec 13, 2018

Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”

Dec 26, 2018

Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jan 15-16, 2019

The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.

June 5, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

July 29, 2019

Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.

Aug 5, 2019

Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”

Aug 23, 2019

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

Dec 11, 2019

The rehearing is conducted.

Jan 15, 2020

Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.

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Core Dispute and Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)

1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”

2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.

3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)

1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.

4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.

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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence

The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.

• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”

• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.

• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:

◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.

◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”

◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”

◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.

• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.

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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law

Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)

• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.

• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”

• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.

Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)

• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.

• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”

• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”

• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”

• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”

• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.

Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?

2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?

3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?

6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?

7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?

8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?

9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.

10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?

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Answer Key

1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.

4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.

6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.

8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.

9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.

10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?

5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.

Attorney-Client Privilege

A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.

Executive Session

A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.

Petition

The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

The Letter

The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.

She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.

Introduction: The Fight for Information

Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.

This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.

1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.

The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.

The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.

2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.

Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.

After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”

In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:

An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.

The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.

3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.

What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.

But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:

Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.

Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.

Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort

The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.

This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joan A. Tober (petitioner)
    Former Board member; current Finance Committee member

Respondent Side

  • Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
  • Mr. Mastrosimone (Board President)
    Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
    Testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (Clerk)
  • Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal

John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John W. Gray Counsel —
Respondent Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association Counsel Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
  • MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:17 (139.6 KB)

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:52 (139.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

• Parties Involved:

◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

• Specific Violations Alleged:

◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

• Evidence Presented at Hearing:

◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

• Core Arguments:

◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

• Actions Taken by MCIII:

◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.

Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?

3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?

4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.

5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?

6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?

7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?

9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.

2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.

3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.

4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.

5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.

6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.

7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.

8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.

9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.

10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.

2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.

4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?

5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.

Common Elements

Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.

Community Manager

An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.

Inoperable Vehicle

A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.

A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Prevailing Party

The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.

He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.

Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking

For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.

This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.

The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.

1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work

The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.

The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.

The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:

MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.

2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon

John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:

• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.

• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.

• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.

The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.

3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures

In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.

The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.

This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.

4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis

Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.

Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.

The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:

Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.

The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.

5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient

Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:

• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.

• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.

The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.

For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.

Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One

The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John W. Gray (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Austin Baillio (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan PC
    Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
  • Andrea Lacombe (community manager)
    Curtiss Management
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically