Tag Archives: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

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Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – 814023.pdf

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20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772795.pdf

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Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Case Background and Procedural History

Parties Involved

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

John R. Ashley

Respondent

Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Attorney for Respondent

Wendy Erlich, Esq.

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Oversight Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation

The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.

Procedural Timeline

• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.

• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.

• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.

• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.

• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.

Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation

The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.

Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)

• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.

• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.

• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.

Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)

• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.

• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.

Controlling Bylaw Provisions

Article

Pertinent Text / Description

Article III, Section 4

Meetings of Members; Quorum

“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”

Article VI, Section 3

Meetings of Directors; Quorum

Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.

Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)

In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:

• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.

• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”

• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.

Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)

The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:

• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.

• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.

• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:

◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.

◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”

• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.

Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?

2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?

3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?

4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?

6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?

8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.

3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.

4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.

5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.

6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.

8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.

9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.

10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.

1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.

2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?

3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?

4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?

5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association

Introduction: The Rules We All Live By

If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.

But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.

A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.

The Takeaways

Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.

The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:

and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.

A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.

Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”

A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.

In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.

However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.

Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.

During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.

The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print

The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.

When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (respondent attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission

Other Participants

  • A. Leverette (clerical staff)
    Signed document transmission in initial order

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel —
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:17 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

• Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

• Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

• Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

• Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

• The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

• Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

• Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

• Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.

Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.

4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

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4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

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Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 737525.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:46:18 (176.7 KB)

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 700566.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:46:31 (149.3 KB)

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 737525.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:18:19 (176.7 KB)

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 700566.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:18:22 (149.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918037-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was the Association’s failure to fully comply with a request for records under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The case is notable for its complete reversal upon rehearing. An initial ruling on April 10, 2019, favored the Association, finding that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request by not emailing all Board members. However, this decision was overturned in a final, binding order on September 12, 2019. In the rehearing, the Petitioner presented new evidence demonstrating he was following the Association’s own prior written instructions for submitting such requests.

The ALJ ultimately concluded that the Association did violate A.R.S. § 33-1805 by providing only a summary document instead of making the full records available for examination. Consequently, the final order granted the Petitioner’s petition, mandated the full reimbursement of his $500 filing fee, and levied an additional $500 civil penalty against the Association. The case underscores the critical importance of procedural compliance and the weight of documented instructions in governing interactions between homeowners and their associations.

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I. Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

◦ Respondent: Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (“the Association”).

• Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark.

• Core Allegation: Whether the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner.

• Case Numbers:

◦ 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)

◦ 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

II. Chronology of the Dispute

Jul. 19, 2017

Association President Catherine Overby appoints Environmental Design Committee (EDC) Director Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s primary contact for records requests.

Jul. 18, 2018

Ms. Overby instructs the Petitioner to direct all requests to the Association’s management company, Associated Asset Management (AAM), specifically to Lori Lock-Lee.

Nov. 1, 2018

Petitioner submits the records request at issue via email to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee.

Nov. 2, 2018

Ms. Loch-Lee acknowledges the request, states she will forward it to all Board members, and clarifies that AAM is only the Association’s accounting firm.

Nov. 18, 2018

Mr. Schoeffler responds on behalf of the Association, providing a summary table of EDC actions but not the full records. He also advises the Petitioner that all Board members must be copied on future requests.

Dec. 17, 2018

Petitioner files a single-issue petition against the Association with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, paying a $500 fee.

Mar. 6, 2019

Petitioner sends a follow-up email specifying the exact documents he is seeking, referencing items listed in the summary table he received.

Mar. 11, 2019

Mr. Schoeffler replies, asserting the request was already fulfilled and instructing the Petitioner to submit a new request for the additional items.

Mar. 17, 2019

Mr. Schoeffler emails again, claiming the original request was improperly submitted to only two of four Board members and that providing more documents could be seen as an “admission of guilt.”

Mar. 21, 2019

The first evidentiary hearing is held at the OAH.

Apr. 10, 2019

The initial ALJ Decision is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Jun. 10, 2019

Petitioner submits an appeal to the Department, which is granted.

Aug. 27, 2019

A rehearing is held at the OAH.

Sep. 12, 2019

The final ALJ Decision is issued, reversing the initial ruling and granting the Petitioner’s petition.

III. The Records Request and Response

Petitioner’s Request (November 1, 2018)

The Petitioner submitted a clear and direct request for specific records via email, citing the relevant statute:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

Association’s Response (November 18, 2018)

The Association did not provide the requested documents (e.g., letters, emails, applications). Instead, it provided a “summary table listing of some, not all, EDC actions.” As of the August 27, 2019, rehearing, the Petitioner had still not received the full documentation he originally requested.

Petitioner’s Clarification (March 6, 2019)

In an attempt to resolve the issue, the Petitioner sent a detailed follow-up email outlining the specific missing records by referencing the line items in the Association’s own summary table. This demonstrated that his request was not for a vague “list of actions” but for the underlying correspondence. This included requests for:

• Copies of violation notices and “Full Compliance” correspondence.

• Complaint correspondence from homeowners regarding shrubs and subsequent citations.

• Submittal correspondence for a project from Mr. Schoeffler himself, along with approvals.

• Original submittals and approvals for a garage remodel and septic install.

IV. Analysis of the Two Administrative Rulings

The opposite outcomes of the two hearings hinged entirely on the validity of the Petitioner’s original email submission.

A. Initial ALJ Decision (April 10, 2019) – In Favor of Respondent (HOA)

• Central Finding: The Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request because he sent it to only two Board members, not the entire Board.

• Reasoning: The ALJ concluded that because the request was improperly submitted, the Association was not obligated to fulfill it under A.R.S. § 33-1805. Therefore, its failure to provide the full records did not constitute a violation. The decision noted, “Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation…”

• Outcome: The petition was denied. The Association was not required to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee, and his request for a civil penalty was denied.

B. Rehearing ALJ Decision (September 12, 2019) – In Favor of Petitioner (Barrs)

• Central Finding: The Petitioner did properly submit his records request by emailing the designated contacts.

• Key New Evidence: The Petitioner introduced two exhibits proving he had received explicit instructions from the Association President on where to direct his requests:

1. A July 19, 2017 communication appointing EDC Chairman Brian Schoeffler as his primary records request contact.

2. A July 18, 2018 communication instructing him to direct requests to the management company (AAM).

• Reasoning: The ALJ found this evidence dispositive, stating, “Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.” With the submission deemed proper, the focus shifted to the response. The ALJ concluded that providing a summary table was not compliant with the statute’s requirement to make records “reasonably available for examination.”

• Outcome: The initial decision was reversed, and the Petitioner’s petition was granted.

V. Key Arguments and Testimonies

• Petitioner (Tom Barrs):

◦ Argued his dispute was with the adequacy of the Association’s response, not its timeliness.

◦ Alleged the Association acted in bad faith and willfully withheld records, citing a previous OAH adjudication over a similar request.

◦ Successfully demonstrated he had followed the Association’s own prior instructions for submitting requests.

• Respondent (via Brian Schoeffler):

◦ Maintained that the request was invalid because it was not sent to all four Board members, an argument that collapsed during the rehearing.

◦ Admitted the Association’s governing documents do not contain a requirement that all Board members be copied on records requests.

◦ Justified the incomplete response by stating that providing additional documents after the petition was filed could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

◦ Reasoned that the Association acted as it did because a previous, similar dispute had been decided in its favor.

VI. Final Order and Penalties

The binding order issued on September 12, 2019, following the rehearing, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted in its entirety.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Association was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate for its violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Study Guide: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal case between petitioner Tom Barrs and respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, covering the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing. It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what are their respective roles?

2. What specific Arizona Revised Statute was the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association accused of violating, and what does this statute generally require?

3. What was the exact nature of the records request Tom Barrs submitted on November 1, 2018?

4. In the initial hearing, what was the key reason the Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Association?

5. What was the Association’s initial response to Barrs’ records request, and why did Barrs consider it incomplete?

6. Upon what grounds was a rehearing of the case granted?

7. What crucial new evidence presented at the rehearing changed the outcome of the case?

8. How did the Association’s own bylaws and concessions during the rehearing weaken its defense?

9. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision after the rehearing?

10. What financial penalties were imposed on the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association in the final order?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Tom Barrs, the Petitioner, and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. Barrs, a homeowner and member of the Association, filed a petition alleging the Association failed to comply with a records request. The Association, represented in the hearings by Brian Schoeffler, defended its actions against this claim.

2. The Association was accused of violating A.R.S. § 33-1805. This statute requires a homeowners’ association to make its financial and other records reasonably available for examination by a member within ten business days of a request. It also allows the association to charge a fee of not more than fifteen cents per page for copies.

3. On November 1, 2018, Tom Barrs requested “a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018.” He specified that electronic copies were preferable but that he was also willing to pick up hard copies.

4. In the initial hearing, the judge ruled for the Association because the evidence indicated Barrs had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board. This procedural error meant Barrs failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of the statute.

5. The Association responded on November 18, 2018, by providing Barrs with a summary table of Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions. Barrs considered this incomplete because his request was for the underlying communications, including all written requests and approvals, not just a summary list of actions.

6. A rehearing was granted after Petitioner Tom Barrs submitted an appeal to the Arizona Department of Real Estate on June 10, 2019. The Department granted the appeal and referred the matter back to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a new evidentiary hearing.

7. The crucial new evidence showed that the Association’s President had previously appointed Brian Schoeffler as Barrs’ primary contact for records requests. This evidence demonstrated that Barrs had, in fact, followed the specific instructions given to him and was not required to send his request to all board members, directly contradicting the basis for the initial ruling.

8. The Association conceded that its governing documents do not require members to copy all Board members on records requests. It also admitted that its own bylaws regarding the submission of forms for such requests were not adhered to or enforced, which undermined its argument that Barrs had failed to follow proper procedure.

9. The final ruling, issued September 12, 2019, granted the Petitioner’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Association’s conduct violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 because it did not fully comply with Barrs’ specific and properly submitted request.

10. The Association was ordered to reimburse Petitioner Tom Barrs’ $500.00 filing fee. Additionally, a civil penalty of $500.00 was levied against the Association, payable to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-format answers that require critical thinking and synthesis of information from the case documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Compare and contrast the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the initial decision (April 10, 2019) with those in the rehearing decision (September 12, 2019). Analyze how specific factual clarifications led to a complete reversal of the legal conclusion.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decisions. Detail why the petitioner initially failed to meet this burden and what specific evidence allowed him to successfully meet it in the rehearing.

3. Analyze the testimony and arguments presented by Brian Schoeffler on behalf of the Association across both hearings. Discuss the consistency of his defense, his reasoning based on prior OAH decisions, and his stated fear that providing more documents could be interpreted as an “admission of guilt.”

4. Trace the complete procedural timeline of case No. 19F-H1918037-REL, from the filing of the initial petition on December 17, 2018, to the final, binding order on September 12, 2019. Highlight the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

5. Using the details of this case, write an analysis of the function and importance of A.R.S. § 33-1805 in regulating the relationship between a homeowner and a homeowners’ association. Discuss the statute’s requirements for both parties and the consequences of non-compliance.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies like the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The section of the Arizona Revised Statutes that governs a homeowner’s right to access the records of a homeowners’ association. It mandates that an association must make records available for examination within ten business days of a request.

Associated Asset Management (AAM)

The management company that served as the accounting firm for the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association. Petitioner was instructed at one point to direct requests to Lori Lock-Lee at AAM.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The governing body that oversees the operations of the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision. The Desert Ranch HOA is governed by its CC&Rs.

Environmental Design Committee (EDC)

A committee within the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association responsible for reviewing and approving architectural and landscaping changes. Brian Schoeffler was the Chairman of the EDC.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Tom Barrs is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted upon appeal, to re-examine the issues and evidence. The rehearing in this case took place on August 27, 2019, and resulted in the reversal of the initial decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association is the Respondent.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, providing a neutral forum for resolving disputes like the one between Barrs and the Association.

Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918037-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was the Association’s failure to fully comply with a request for records under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The case is notable for its complete reversal upon rehearing. An initial ruling on April 10, 2019, favored the Association, finding that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request by not emailing all Board members. However, this decision was overturned in a final, binding order on September 12, 2019. In the rehearing, the Petitioner presented new evidence demonstrating he was following the Association’s own prior written instructions for submitting such requests.

The ALJ ultimately concluded that the Association did violate A.R.S. § 33-1805 by providing only a summary document instead of making the full records available for examination. Consequently, the final order granted the Petitioner’s petition, mandated the full reimbursement of his $500 filing fee, and levied an additional $500 civil penalty against the Association. The case underscores the critical importance of procedural compliance and the weight of documented instructions in governing interactions between homeowners and their associations.

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I. Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

◦ Respondent: Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (“the Association”).

• Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark.

• Core Allegation: Whether the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner.

• Case Numbers:

◦ 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)

◦ 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

II. Chronology of the Dispute

Jul. 19, 2017

Association President Catherine Overby appoints Environmental Design Committee (EDC) Director Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s primary contact for records requests.

Jul. 18, 2018

Ms. Overby instructs the Petitioner to direct all requests to the Association’s management company, Associated Asset Management (AAM), specifically to Lori Lock-Lee.

Nov. 1, 2018

Petitioner submits the records request at issue via email to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee.

Nov. 2, 2018

Ms. Loch-Lee acknowledges the request, states she will forward it to all Board members, and clarifies that AAM is only the Association’s accounting firm.

Nov. 18, 2018

Mr. Schoeffler responds on behalf of the Association, providing a summary table of EDC actions but not the full records. He also advises the Petitioner that all Board members must be copied on future requests.

Dec. 17, 2018

Petitioner files a single-issue petition against the Association with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, paying a $500 fee.

Mar. 6, 2019

Petitioner sends a follow-up email specifying the exact documents he is seeking, referencing items listed in the summary table he received.

Mar. 11, 2019

Mr. Schoeffler replies, asserting the request was already fulfilled and instructing the Petitioner to submit a new request for the additional items.

Mar. 17, 2019

Mr. Schoeffler emails again, claiming the original request was improperly submitted to only two of four Board members and that providing more documents could be seen as an “admission of guilt.”

Mar. 21, 2019

The first evidentiary hearing is held at the OAH.

Apr. 10, 2019

The initial ALJ Decision is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Jun. 10, 2019

Petitioner submits an appeal to the Department, which is granted.

Aug. 27, 2019

A rehearing is held at the OAH.

Sep. 12, 2019

The final ALJ Decision is issued, reversing the initial ruling and granting the Petitioner’s petition.

III. The Records Request and Response

Petitioner’s Request (November 1, 2018)

The Petitioner submitted a clear and direct request for specific records via email, citing the relevant statute:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

Association’s Response (November 18, 2018)

The Association did not provide the requested documents (e.g., letters, emails, applications). Instead, it provided a “summary table listing of some, not all, EDC actions.” As of the August 27, 2019, rehearing, the Petitioner had still not received the full documentation he originally requested.

Petitioner’s Clarification (March 6, 2019)

In an attempt to resolve the issue, the Petitioner sent a detailed follow-up email outlining the specific missing records by referencing the line items in the Association’s own summary table. This demonstrated that his request was not for a vague “list of actions” but for the underlying correspondence. This included requests for:

• Copies of violation notices and “Full Compliance” correspondence.

• Complaint correspondence from homeowners regarding shrubs and subsequent citations.

• Submittal correspondence for a project from Mr. Schoeffler himself, along with approvals.

• Original submittals and approvals for a garage remodel and septic install.

IV. Analysis of the Two Administrative Rulings

The opposite outcomes of the two hearings hinged entirely on the validity of the Petitioner’s original email submission.

A. Initial ALJ Decision (April 10, 2019) – In Favor of Respondent (HOA)

• Central Finding: The Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request because he sent it to only two Board members, not the entire Board.

• Reasoning: The ALJ concluded that because the request was improperly submitted, the Association was not obligated to fulfill it under A.R.S. § 33-1805. Therefore, its failure to provide the full records did not constitute a violation. The decision noted, “Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation…”

• Outcome: The petition was denied. The Association was not required to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee, and his request for a civil penalty was denied.

B. Rehearing ALJ Decision (September 12, 2019) – In Favor of Petitioner (Barrs)

• Central Finding: The Petitioner did properly submit his records request by emailing the designated contacts.

• Key New Evidence: The Petitioner introduced two exhibits proving he had received explicit instructions from the Association President on where to direct his requests:

1. A July 19, 2017 communication appointing EDC Chairman Brian Schoeffler as his primary records request contact.

2. A July 18, 2018 communication instructing him to direct requests to the management company (AAM).

• Reasoning: The ALJ found this evidence dispositive, stating, “Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.” With the submission deemed proper, the focus shifted to the response. The ALJ concluded that providing a summary table was not compliant with the statute’s requirement to make records “reasonably available for examination.”

• Outcome: The initial decision was reversed, and the Petitioner’s petition was granted.

V. Key Arguments and Testimonies

• Petitioner (Tom Barrs):

◦ Argued his dispute was with the adequacy of the Association’s response, not its timeliness.

◦ Alleged the Association acted in bad faith and willfully withheld records, citing a previous OAH adjudication over a similar request.

◦ Successfully demonstrated he had followed the Association’s own prior instructions for submitting requests.

• Respondent (via Brian Schoeffler):

◦ Maintained that the request was invalid because it was not sent to all four Board members, an argument that collapsed during the rehearing.

◦ Admitted the Association’s governing documents do not contain a requirement that all Board members be copied on records requests.

◦ Justified the incomplete response by stating that providing additional documents after the petition was filed could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

◦ Reasoned that the Association acted as it did because a previous, similar dispute had been decided in its favor.

VI. Final Order and Penalties

The binding order issued on September 12, 2019, following the rehearing, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted in its entirety.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Association was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate for its violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf in the initial hearing; appeared as a witness in the rehearing.
  • Jonathan Dessaules (petitioner attorney)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Appeared on behalf of Petitioner in the rehearing.

Respondent Side

  • Brian Schoeffler (respondent representative / EDC chairman / witness)
    Desert Ranch Homeowners Association
    Also identified as a Board Director.
  • Catherine Overby (HOA president / board member)
    Desert Ranch Homeowners Association
    Appointed Mr. Schoeffler as Petitioner’s primary records request contact.
  • Lori Loch-Lee (property manager)
    Associated Asset Management (AAM)
    Vice President of Client Services.
  • Amanda Shaw (property manager)
    AAM LLC
    Contact for Respondent.
  • B. Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Received electronic transmission of the rehearing decision.

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Dan Gardner (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    HOA Coordinator.

Other Participants

  • Gerard Manieri (observer)
    Listed as 'G. Mangiero' in initial hearing source.
  • Peter Ashkin (observer)
    Observed initial hearing.
  • Stephen Banks (observer)
    Observed initial hearing.
  • Noah Banks (observer)
    Observed initial hearing.
  • Stephen Barrs (observer)
    Observed rehearing.
  • Abraham Barrs (observer)
    Observed rehearing.

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel —
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:51 (97.6 KB)

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:31 (97.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.

The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.

The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.

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1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

• Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)

◦ Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)

• Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Date: December 4, 2018

• Decision Date: December 20, 2018

The Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.

At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.

The Respondent’s Position

The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

2. Relevant CC&R Provisions

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.

Section

Title / Subject

Description

10.11.4

Inoperable Vehicles

Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”

10.11.2

Street Parking

Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.

Nuisances

Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline

Violation Notices and Fines

Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.

The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:

• September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.

• October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.

• December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.

• January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.

• April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.

Competing Testimonies

• Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.

• Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:

◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.

◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.

◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”

4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof

The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Judge’s Rationale

The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.

2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).

Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?

2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?

3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?

4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?

5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?

6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.

7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?

8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?

9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.

2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.

3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.

4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.

5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.

6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.

7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.

8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.

9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.

3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?

4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.

5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.

Appearances

A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.

The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.

Community Manager

An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Nuisance

A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.

Operating Condition

A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.

The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.

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19F-H18020-REL

1 source

The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry R. Collis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
  • Lisa Riesland (community manager)
    Laveen Meadows HOA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • f del sol (admin support)
    Signed copy distribution notice

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel —
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Notice Violation, A.R.S. 33-1242, Statutory Construction, Homeowner Petition Dismissed
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
  • Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T09:58:56 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T09:59:03 (85.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:40 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:44 (85.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the case is Mr. Garcia’s allegation that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 by failing to follow specific procedures after issuing notices for a violation of its short-term rental policy.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The central finding was that Mr. Garcia failed to meet a critical prerequisite outlined in the statute: he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period. This failure meant that the HOA’s corresponding statutory obligations—such as providing the name of the person who observed the violation—were never triggered.

Furthermore, the judge determined that the HOA was not required to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to an administrative hearing because the violation notices themselves included instructions on the HOA’s internal process for contesting the matter. Mr. Garcia’s argument that the HOA’s rapid issuance of fines and subsequent notices prevented him from responding was found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The decisions underscore a strict interpretation of the statute, placing the initial burden of response on the unit owner.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings after a petition was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involved an initial hearing and a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

Rogelio A. Garcia

Respondent

Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”)

Respondent’s Counsel

Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Case Number (Initial)

19F-H1918009-REL

Case Number (Rehearing)

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG

Core Allegation

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 by the Respondent.

II. Chronology of Events

• March 8, 2018: Villagio mails the first letter to Mr. Garcia, alleging a violation of short-term lease provisions in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The letter instructs him to file an appeal with the Board of Directors within 10 days of receipt.

• March 22, 2018: Villagio mails a second notice for the same violation, informing Mr. Garcia that a $1,000 fine has been posted to his account. This notice also contains instructions for contesting the violation.

• April 5, 2018: Villagio mails a third notice, informing Mr. Garcia that a $2,000 fine has been posted to his account for the continuing violation.

• Response from Garcia: Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-calendar-day period specified by statute. He did, at some point, file an appeal directly with Villagio, which held a hearing but did not change its position.

• August 17, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Garcia files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally initiating the administrative hearing process.

• October 30, 2018: The first evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

• November 19, 2018: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

• January 3, 2019 (approx.): The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues an order setting a rehearing for the matter, following a request from Mr. Garcia.

• February 12, 2019: The rehearing is held. Mr. Garcia testifies on his own behalf, and Villagio presents testimony from Community Manager Tom Gordon.

• March 4, 2019: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

III. Central Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1242

The entire dispute centered on the procedural requirements laid out in A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs how an HOA must handle notices of violation to a unit owner. The key provisions are:

• Unit Owner’s Responsibility (Subsection B): A unit owner who receives a written notice of violation may provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.

• Association’s Obligations upon Response (Subsection C): Within ten business days after receiving the certified mail response, the association must provide a written explanation that includes:

1. The specific provision of the condominium documents allegedly violated.

2. The date the violation occurred or was observed.

3. The first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

4. The process the unit owner must follow to contest the notice.

• Association’s Obligation Regarding Administrative Hearings (Subsection D): An association must provide written notice of the owner’s option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department unless the information required in Subsection C, paragraph 4 (the contest process) is provided in the initial notice of violation.

IV. Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Mr. Garcia’s arguments, presented across both hearings, focused on three primary claims of statutory violation by Villagio:

1. Failure to Provide Required Information: Villagio violated the statute by not providing him with the first and last name of the person who observed the violation.

2. Failure to Notify of Hearing Rights: Villagio did not inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

3. Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from responding via certified mail within the 21-day statutory period. He argued that the notices’ demand for compliance within 10 days, combined with the issuance of a second notice and a fine just 14 days after the first, led him to believe he only had 10 days to act before incurring another violation.

Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio presented a defense based on a direct reading of the statute and Mr. Garcia’s inaction:

1. Statutory Obligations Not Triggered: Villagio’s central argument was that its obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C)—including the duty to name the observer—are only triggered after a unit owner submits a written response by certified mail within 21 days. Since Mr. Garcia never sent such a response, these obligations never came into effect.

2. Internal Contest Process Satisfied Statute: Per A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), the duty to notify an owner of their right to an administrative hearing only applies if the HOA fails to provide its own contest process. Villagio argued that because all three notices explicitly stated the process for appealing to the Board of Directors, it had fulfilled its statutory duty.

3. No Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia was never legally or physically prevented from sending a certified letter. During cross-examination, he admitted he was not under any court order prohibiting him from responding.

4. Statute Inapplicability (Argument from Rehearing): Villagio further contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies specifically to violations concerning the “condition of the property,” not the “use” of the property. Since short-term renting is a use, Villagio argued the statute did not apply to this situation at all.

Key Testimony from Rehearing

During the February 12, 2019 rehearing, Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified.

• On direct examination, Mr. Gordon stated that Villagio does not restrict homeowners from responding to violation notices within the 21-day period.

• On cross-examination, when asked by Mr. Garcia if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” had he responded in 21 days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.” He explained this by stating that homeowners are given 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio pursuant to its own short-term rental policy.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decisions and Rationale

The judge’s findings were consistent across both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, leading to the same conclusion in each instance.

Initial Decision (November 19, 2018)

• Finding of Fact: It was undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the March 8, March 22, or April 5, 2018 notices within 21 calendar days.

• Conclusion 1: Because Mr. Garcia did not respond within the 21-day period, Villagio was not required to provide him with the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

• Conclusion 2: Because Villagio notified Mr. Garcia of the process for contesting the notice, it was not required under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) to provide him with notice of the right to petition for an administrative hearing.

• Outcome: Mr. Garcia failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (March 4, 2019)

The judge reaffirmed the initial findings and addressed Mr. Garcia’s argument that he was prevented from responding.

• Finding on “Prevention”: The judge found no evidence that Villagio informed Mr. Garcia he could not respond within 21 days or otherwise prevented him from doing so. The issuance of a second notice 14 days after the first was not deemed a preventative act that nullified Mr. Garcia’s statutory window to respond to the first notice.

• Statutory Construction: The decision invoked the legal principle that “what the Legislature means, it will say,” indicating a strict, literal interpretation of the statute’s requirements.

• Reaffirmed Conclusions: The judge again concluded that because Mr. Garcia failed to submit a written response by certified mail, Villagio’s obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) were not triggered, and its inclusion of an internal appeal process satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242(D).

• Outcome: Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed for a second time, with Villagio deemed the prevailing party.

VI. Final Disposition

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Garcia’s petition be dismissed. The decision issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the administrative case between Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, as detailed in case number 19F-H1918009-REL.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source context.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association initially accuse Mr. Garcia of committing?

3. What was the core of Mr. Garcia’s legal complaint against the Homeowners Association?

4. According to the court’s findings, what crucial step did Mr. Garcia fail to take after receiving the violation notices?

5. What was Villagio’s main argument for why it was not obligated to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?

6. Under what circumstance did Villagio argue it was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with notice of his right to petition for an administrative hearing?

7. What new fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia in the notices dated March 22, 2018, and April 5, 2018?

8. At the rehearing, what was Mr. Garcia’s explanation for why he was unable to respond to the notices within the statutory 21-day period?

9. What argument did Villagio introduce at the rehearing concerning the distinction between a property’s “condition” and its “use”?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Rogelio A. Garcia, the Petitioner who brought the complaint, and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, the Respondent defending against the complaint. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

2. Villagio accused Mr. Garcia of violating the short-term lease provisions located in the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The association alleged that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of its short-term rental policy.

3. Mr. Garcia alleged that Villagio violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. He claimed Villagio failed to provide him the opportunity to respond by certified mail within 21 days, did not inform him of his right to an administrative hearing, and did not provide the name of the person who observed the violation.

4. The court found that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the violation notices sent on March 8, March 22, and April 5, 2018. Specifically, he failed to provide the association with a written response by sending it via certified mail within 21 calendar days after the date of the notices.

5. Villagio argued that its obligation to provide the observer’s name under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) is only triggered if the unit owner first submits a written response by certified mail within the 21-day period. Because Mr. Garcia did not do so, Villagio was not required to provide that information.

6. Villagio argued it was not required to provide notice of the right to petition for a hearing because it had already fulfilled its legal obligation under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D). The violation notices it sent to Mr. Garcia contained instructions on the process for contesting the notice with the Board of Directors.

7. The notice dated March 22, 2018, informed Mr. Garcia that a fine of $1,000 had been posted to his account. The subsequent notice on April 5, 2018, stated that an additional $2,000 fine had been posted for the same violation.

8. Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio prevented him from responding because it did not wait 21 days before issuing subsequent notices and fines. He believed he only had 10 days to comply based on language in the notices, which created confusion and pressure.

9. At the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition of the property.” Villagio asserted its notices concerned the “use” of Mr. Garcia’s property (short-term renting), not its physical condition.

10. In both the initial hearing decision issued on November 19, 2018, and the rehearing decision issued on March 4, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove Villagio had violated the statute. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to provoke deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing evidence and reasoning exclusively from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson to dismiss Mr. Garcia’s petition. How did the judge interpret and apply the specific subsections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242 to the facts presented in the initial hearing and the rehearing?

2. Trace the progression of arguments made by both Rogelio A. Garcia and Villagio from the initial petition through the rehearing. How did their claims and defenses evolve, and what new evidence or legal theories were introduced in the second hearing?

3. Discuss the significance of the “burden of proof” in this case, which rested upon Mr. Garcia. Explain the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decision and detail why the judge concluded Mr. Garcia failed to meet this standard.

4. Evaluate the strength and potential implications of Villagio’s argument, introduced at the rehearing, that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge did not base the final decision on this point, discuss how this interpretation could affect future disputes between homeowners and associations.

5. Based on the dates and actions described in the two decisions, construct a detailed procedural timeline of this case. Begin with the first violation letter from Villagio and conclude with the notice of the right to appeal the rehearing decision, including all key notices, filings, hearings, and fines.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The central statute in this case was A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this matter, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof to show that Villagio committed the alleged violation.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents that dictate how a condominium or planned community must be operated and maintained, and which contain the rules that unit owners must follow. Mr. Garcia was accused of violating the short-term lease provisions of Villagio’s CC&Rs.

Certified Mail

A type of mail service that provides the sender with a mailing receipt and electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made. A.R.S. § 33-1242(B) specifies this method for a unit owner’s written response to a violation notice.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding, similar to a trial, where parties present evidence (such as testimony and documents) to a neutral decision-maker. Hearings were held in this case on October 30, 2018, and February 12, 2019.

Office of Administrative Hearings

A state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies, boards, and commissions. This office was responsible for conducting the hearings in this case.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the original decision, often granted to review the evidence or arguments. Mr. Garcia requested and was granted a rehearing after the initial decision was issued.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association was the Respondent.

Unit Owner

A person who owns a unit within a condominium or planned community and is subject to the association’s governing documents. Mr. Garcia is a unit owner in the Villagio at Tempe community.

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19F-H1918009-REL-RHG

2 sources

These sources consist of two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The first document records the initial decision from October 2018, which dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition alleging the HOA violated Arizona statute § 33-1242 by not providing required information following a notice of violation for short-term leasing. The second document details the rehearing decision from February 2019, which again found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove the HOA violated the statute because he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the mandatory 21-day period to trigger the HOA’s legal obligations. Both rulings concluded that since the HOA provided him with the process for contesting the notices, they were not required to provide written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing. Consequently, both decisions dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition and designated the HOA as the prevailing party.

2 sources

What are the legal requirements concerning notice and response for HOA violations?
How did the unit owner’s failure to respond impact their statutory rights?
What legal interpretation was key to dismissing the homeowner’s administrative petition?

Based on 2 sources

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NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rogelio A. Garcia (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association,
  • Tom Gordon (Community Manager/witness)
    AAM LLC
    Community Manager for Villagio; testified on behalf of Villagio

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of the decision,

Other Participants

  • Amanda Shaw (Representative/Contact)
    AAM LLC
    Listed as c/o for service of process for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Dina R. Galassini vs. Plaza Waterfront Condominiums Owners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dina R. Galassini Counsel —
Respondent Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. Counsel —

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner’s petition for rehearing, concluding that the OAH has the authority, pursuant to statute and precedent, to resolve disputes involving the interpretation of condominium documents and related regulating statutes, rejecting Petitioner's constitutional claims regarding separation of powers. Respondent's request for attorney's fees was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's argument that the original ALJ decision was contrary to law due to separation of powers violation was dismissed, as the OAH confirmed its statutory authority (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) to interpret condominium documents and regulating statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent Association correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget

Petitioner sought rehearing arguing the ALJ lacked constitutional authority (separation of powers) to interpret condominium documents (contracts) and statutory definitions of common/limited common elements (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202) related to the posting of the 2018 parking lot budget assessment.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Assessment, Jurisdiction, ALJ Authority, Condominium Documents, Separation of Powers
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. CONST. Art. 3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 655375.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:00 (65.7 KB)

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 636950.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:08 (128.6 KB)

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 655375.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:36 (65.7 KB)

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 636950.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:39 (128.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG, which dismissed a petition filed by Dina R. Galassini against the Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The central conflict revolved around the jurisdictional authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Petitioner, Ms. Galassini, argued that the OAH, as part of the executive branch, violated the constitutional separation of powers by interpreting private condominium documents, a power she claimed was reserved exclusively for the judicial branch.

The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, rejected this argument and dismissed the petition as a matter of law. The decision affirms that the OAH is statutorily empowered by Arizona Revised Statutes to hear disputes concerning alleged violations of condominium documents. The ALJ’s rationale rests on established legal precedent, citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov to confirm that condominium documents are a contract and Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. to support an agency’s authority to take actions reasonably implied by its governing statutes. Consequently, the Petitioner’s core constitutional challenge was deemed “unfounded,” leading to the dismissal of her petition. While the petition was dismissed, the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied.

1. Case Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute between a condominium owner and a condominium association, brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Dina R. Galassini

◦ Respondent: Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

• Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

• Presiding Judge: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

• Decision Date: August 22, 2018

The matter arrived before Judge Shedden following a series of procedural steps initiated after an original ALJ decision.

• June 26, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

• July 20, 2018: The Department of Real Estate issued an Order Granting Rehearing, based on the reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request.

• August 15, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate Rehearing, arguing the case could be resolved as a matter of law.

• August 21, 2018: The Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Respondent’s motion.

2. Core Dispute: Petitioner’s Jurisdictional Challenge

The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing was founded on a direct constitutional challenge to the authority of the Administrative Law Judge. The underlying substantive issue concerned the association’s handling of “owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget,” which turned on the interpretation of “common element” versus “limited common element.”

Petitioner’s Arguments

• Violation of Separation of Powers: The Petitioner contended that the original ALJ decision was “contrary to law” because it involved the interpretation of private contracts (the condominium documents). She argued this function is reserved exclusively for the judicial branch under Arizona’s Constitution, Article 3 (Separation of Powers).

• Due Process Violation: By interpreting the contract, the ALJ allegedly committed a “due process violation.” The Petitioner stated, “For the ALJ to definitively interpret actual contracts between two private parties is a due process violation (separation of powers).”

• Improper Delegation of Power: The Petitioner claimed the ALJ’s action “redistributed interpreted power from the Judiciary to the Executive and this is a congressional encroachment on my rights.”

3. The Administrative Law Judge’s Legal Rationale and Decision

The ALJ agreed with the Respondent that the case could be resolved as a matter of law, focusing entirely on the jurisdictional question raised by the Petitioner. The decision systematically refutes the Petitioner’s separation of powers argument by outlining the OAH’s legal authority.

Statutory Authority

The decision establishes the OAH’s jurisdiction through Arizona state law:

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11: This statute describes the administrative process for referring disputes between owners and condominium associations to the OAH.

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A): This section specifically grants the OAH authority to conduct hearings for alleged “violations of condominium documents … or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums….”

• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202: The decision notes that analyzing the Petitioner’s claim inherently requires interpreting definitions found in the statutes that regulate condominiums, such as this section defining “common element” and “limited common element.”

Precedent from Case Law

The ALJ grounded the OAH’s interpretive authority in two key Arizona appellate court decisions:

1. Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007): This case is cited to establish the legal principle that “the condominium documents are a contract between the parties.” By defining the documents as a contract, the decision links the dispute directly to the type of documents the OAH is empowered to review.

2. Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 392 P.3d 506 (App. 2017): This case is cited to support the broader principle of administrative authority. The ruling states, “[I]t is the law of this state that an agency may” take such action “which may be reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole.’” This supports the conclusion that the OAH’s authority to hear disputes over condominium documents implies the authority to interpret them.

Conclusion of the Court

Based on the cited statutes and case law, the ALJ concluded that the OAH possesses the necessary authority to interpret both the condominium documents and the relevant state statutes. Therefore, the Petitioner’s central argument that the original decision was “contrary to law” was declared “unfounded,” and dismissing the matter was deemed appropriate.

4. Final Orders and Directives

The Administrative Law Judge issued the following final orders on August 22, 2018:

Outcome

Petitioner’s Petition

Dismissed

Respondent’s Request for Attorney’s Fees

Denied

The decision also included the following legally mandated notices for the parties:

• Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as a result of the rehearing, per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B).

• Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five (35) days from the date the order was served. The appeal process is prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. title 12, chapter 7, article 6 and § 12-904(A).

Study Guide: Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG, issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It is designed to assess comprehension of the case’s key arguments, legal precedents, and procedural history.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source document.

1. Identify the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case and state the official case number.

2. What was the Petitioner’s core legal argument for requesting a rehearing, as detailed in her filing on June 26, 2018?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent file a Motion to Vacate Rehearing on August 15, 2018?

4. According to the Petitioner’s Response, what was the specific issue that the Department’s Commissioner had ordered the rehearing to address?

5. Which Arizona Revised Statute section is cited as describing the process for hearings on disputes between owners and condominium associations?

6. To resolve the Petitioner’s claim, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) needed to interpret the definitions of what two key terms from the Arizona Revised Statutes?

7. What legal precedent was cited in the decision to establish that condominium documents are considered a contract between the parties?

8. What was the final decision issued by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden on August 22, 2018, regarding the Petitioner’s petition and the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees?

9. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B), what is the legal status of an administrative law judge order that has been issued as the result of a rehearing?

10. What specific steps must a party take to appeal this order, including the timeframe and the court where the appeal must be filed?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Dina R. Galassini, and the Respondent is Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The official case number is 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG.

2. The Petitioner argued that the original Administrative Law Judge’s decision was contrary to law because it violated the principle of separation of powers. She claimed that by interpreting contracts between private parties, the ALJ, part of the Executive branch, encroached upon the power of the Judiciary, resulting in a due process violation.

3. The Respondent argued that the matter could be resolved as a matter of law. This argument was based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01, which governs administrative hearings for condominium disputes.

4. The Petitioner asserted in her Response that the Department’s Commissioner had ordered a rehearing specifically on the issue of whether the Respondent Association had correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget.

5. ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11, specifically section 32-2199.01(A), is cited as governing the process. It states that hearings are conducted for alleged “violations of condominium documents … or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums.”

6. To analyze the Petitioner’s claim, the ALJ needed to interpret the definitions of “common element” and “limited common element.” These definitions are found in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1202.

7. The case Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007) was cited to support the legal principle that condominium documents (like CC&Rs) constitute a contract between the parties involved.

8. Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. He further ordered that the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees be denied.

9. According to the statute, an administrative law judge order issued as a result of a rehearing is binding on the parties.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. title 12, chapter 7, article 6. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s “separation of powers” argument. Explain why she believed the ALJ’s decision constituted a due process violation and a congressional encroachment on her rights, and discuss how the final decision legally refuted this claim.

2. Detail the legal basis and precedents cited by the Administrative Law Judge to establish the authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Explain how ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A) and the cases Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov and Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. were used to justify the OAH’s jurisdiction in this matter.

3. Trace the procedural history of this case from the Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Include key dates, motions filed by both parties, and the reasoning behind the Department of Real Estate’s initial decision to grant a rehearing.

4. Discuss the relationship between condominium documents and state statutes as presented in this decision. How does the ruling define condominium documents, and what authority does it grant the OAH in interpreting both these documents and the statutes that regulate condominiums?

5. Based on the final decision and the provided notice, explain the legal options available to the Petitioner following the dismissal of her petition. What specific steps must be taken to pursue an appeal, and what legal standard is established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B) regarding the finality of the ALJ’s order?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Thomas Shedden of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Common Element

A term defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1202. The interpretation of this term was central to the Petitioner’s original dispute.

Condominium Documents

The governing documents of a condominium association (e.g., CC&Rs). The decision establishes these as a contract between the parties, citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov.

Department of Real Estate

The state agency that issued the Order Granting Rehearing in this matter on July 20, 2018.

Due Process Violation

An alleged infringement of legal rights. The Petitioner claimed this occurred when the ALJ interpreted a contract between private parties.

Judicial Review

The legal process by which a party can appeal an administrative order to a court. The decision specifies this must be done by filing with the superior court within 35 days.

Limited Common Element

A term defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1202. The interpretation of this term was central to the Petitioner’s original dispute.

Motion to Vacate Rehearing

A formal request filed by the Respondent on August 15, 2018, arguing that the case could be resolved as a matter of law.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where disputes between owners and condominium associations are referred for hearings, as per ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Petitioner

The party initiating a legal petition. In this case, Dina R. Galassini.

Request for Rehearing

A formal request filed by the Petitioner on June 26, 2018, after an initial decision, which was granted by the Department of Real Estate.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

Separation of Powers

A constitutional principle cited by the Petitioner. She argued that only the judicial branch, not the executive branch (where the OAH resides), can make decisions that legally bind private parties.

4 Surprising Legal Lessons from a Condo Parking Lot Dispute

Introduction: The Anatomy of a Neighborhood Fight

Disputes with a Condominium or Homeowner’s Association are a common, and often frustrating, part of modern life. But what happens when a seemingly minor conflict over assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget escalates into a direct challenge to the power of the state?

The case of Dina R. Galassini vs. the Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. did just that. This neighborhood fight quickly grew to question fundamental legal principles, revealing some counter-intuitive truths about the power and jurisdiction of administrative agencies. The final court decision provides a masterclass in administrative law, a powerful, court-like system designed for efficiency that operates with more flexibility and authority than most people realize. Here are the top surprising takeaways from the final ruling.

Takeaway 1: Administrative Agencies Can Act Like Courts

At the heart of her appeal, Ms. Galassini made a powerful constitutional argument: she believed that only a judge in the judicial branch—not an administrator in the executive branch—had the authority to interpret a private contract like her condominium documents.

In her “Request for Rehearing,” she argued forcefully:

The decision by the administrative law judge (ALJ) is contrary to law, and the decision that was handed down to me only belongs in the judicial branch. Regarding what is a common element or a limited common element (see Exhibit C) should only be decided upon by a judge. For the ALJ to definitively interpret actual contracts between two private parties is a due process violation (separation of powers). In doing so the ALJ redistributed interpreted power from the Judiciary to the Executive and this is a congressional encroachment on my rights. According to Arizona’s Constitution Article 3, Separation of Powers—only the judicial branch can make decisions that make decisions that bind private parties as law.

The surprising outcome was that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument entirely. The judge found that the Office of Administrative Hearings was specifically empowered by Arizona statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A)) to handle disputes involving “violations of condominium documents.” Creating specialized administrative bodies like this is a common legislative strategy. It provides expert, efficient resolution for specific types of disputes, preventing the judicial courts from being overwhelmed.

Takeaway 2: Your Condo Agreement is a Legally Binding Contract

The ALJ’s authority to reject such a powerful constitutional claim hinged on a foundational question: what exactly are a condo’s governing documents in the eyes of the law? The answer is what gives administrative bodies their power in these disputes.

The decision affirms that these documents are not just community guidelines, but a formal, legally binding contract between the unit owner and the association. To support this, the judge referenced the legal precedent set in Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, which established that “the condominium documents are a contract between the parties.”

This is a critical takeaway because by defining these governing documents as a contract, it provides the legal foundation for an administrative body, like the Office of Administrative Hearings, to step in and resolve disputes using principles of contract law.

Takeaway 3: An Agency’s Power Can Be “Reasonably Implied”

Another surprising lesson from the decision is that a government agency’s authority doesn’t always have to be spelled out word-for-word for every possible action it might take.

To make a broader point about administrative law, the judge cited a separate case, Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. The principle from that case is that an agency can take actions that “may be reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole.’”

This concept is crucial for government to function. Legislatures cannot possibly foresee and explicitly write laws for every conceivable scenario an agency might face. This doctrine of “implied power” allows agencies the flexibility to adapt and act effectively within the spirit of the law, fulfilling their duties based on the overall purpose of the statutes they enforce.

Takeaway 4: Winning a Rehearing Isn’t Winning the War

The case’s procedure offers a fascinating lesson in legal strategy. The Department of Real Estate initially granted the petitioner’s request for a rehearing, a decision made, crucially, “for the reasons outlined in Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing.” This shows the Department initially found her legal argument about separation of powers compelling enough to warrant a second look.

However, the outcome was deeply ironic. Instead of re-arguing the facts, the respondent (the Condo Association) “filed a Motion to Vacate Rehearing, arguing that… this matter can be resolved as a matter of law” (meaning no facts were in dispute, only the interpretation of the statutes and contracts).

The ALJ agreed. The petitioner, by winning the rehearing, had inadvertently given the respondent a perfect platform to argue the case on purely legal grounds—the respondent’s strength. The rehearing forced the core jurisdictional issue to the forefront, leading directly to the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. It’s a stark reminder that a procedural victory doesn’t guarantee a final win.

Conclusion: The Law in Your Daily Life

Born from a dispute over a parking lot, this single case reveals the hidden legal machinery designed to resolve specific conflicts efficiently, without overburdening the traditional court system. It demonstrates how everyday disagreements can touch upon complex principles of constitutional power, contract law, and implied statutory authority. From a simple assessment, we see a system where administrative bodies act with court-like power, a power built upon the contractual nature of community rules and the flexibility of implied authority. It’s a powerful reminder of the intricate legal frameworks operating just beneath the surface of our daily lives.

What hidden legal complexities might be shaping the rules and agreements in your own life?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Dina R. Galassini (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Jim Flood (board member)
  • Roger Isaacs (witness)
  • Gary Pedersen (witness, statutory agent)

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)

Other Participants

  • Peter Saiia (observer)
  • Suzanne Isaacs (observer)
  • Paul Blessing (observer)
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Michael J. Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818023-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-04-17
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&R section 2.5

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the alleged CC&R violation, and the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5, and the petition was filed after the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550) expired.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Community Governing Document regarding pipe installation

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R section 2.5 by installing pipes for a well. Respondent argued that CC&R section 2.5 was inapplicable as it governs additional easements conveyed to a third party, and that the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations (A.R.S. § 12-550).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
  • CC&R section 2.5
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Statute of Limitations, Easement, CC&R Violation, Well Installation
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550
  • CC&R section 2.5

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:09:54 (77.0 KB)

18F-H1818023-REL Decision – 629162.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:08 (77.0 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Stoltenberg vs. Rancho Del Oro HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the HOA violated community governing documents (CC&Rs) by installing pipes related to a well through his lot.

The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, dismissed the petitioner’s case in its entirety. The decision was based on two independent and definitive grounds. First, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to meet his burden of proof on the merits of the case; the evidence demonstrated that the pipes were installed within a pre-existing easement and not improperly on his lot, and the specific CC&R section cited was inapplicable. Second, the petition was procedurally barred by Arizona’s four-year statute of limitations, as the installation occurred in the summer of 2013, and the action was filed after this period had expired. Consequently, the Rancho Del Oro HOA was deemed the prevailing party.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by Michael J. Stoltenberg against his HOA.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Michael J. Stoltenberg, Petitioner, vs. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Respondent

Case Number

18F-H1818023-REL

Hearing Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date

March 28, 2018

Decision Date

April 17, 2018

II. Core Dispute and Allegations

A. Petitioner’s Claim

The central allegation from the petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, was that the Rancho Del Oro HOA violated the Community Governing Document CC&Rs.

• Specific Allegation: The HOA improperly installed pipes through his lot as part of a well installation project.

• Cited CC&R Violations: The petition focused on violations of CC&R sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5. The decision notes that sections 1.13 and 1.19 are definition sections, making section 2.5 the substantive focus of the dispute.

B. Respondent’s Defense Strategy

The Rancho Del Oro HOA presented a multi-faceted defense against the petitioner’s claims, combining a procedural dismissal argument with a substantive rebuttal.

1. Statute of Limitations: The HOA contended the claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitations established in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550. They asserted that since the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, the time frame for filing a petition had expired.

2. Inapplicability of CC&R Section 2.5: The HOA argued that this section was not relevant to the situation. They maintained that CC&R section 2.5 pertains specifically to instances where the HOA grants or conveys an additional easement to a third party, which had not occurred.

3. Factual Rebuttal: The HOA asserted that the pipes were installed within an easement that already existed at the time of installation, not on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot outside of an easement.

III. Adjudicated Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge made several key findings of fact and conclusions of law that formed the basis of the final order. The petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

A. Findings of Fact

The ALJ’s decision was based on the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing. The key findings were:

• Witnesses: The court heard testimony from petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, HOA community manager Diana Crites, and HOA Board Chairman James Van Sickle.

• Location of Installation: Evidence showed the pipes were installed in an easement that was already in existence at the time of the 2013 installation.

• Failure of Evidentiary Support: The judge explicitly noted, “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.”

B. Conclusions of Law

Based on the evidence and statutes, the ALJ reached the following legal conclusions:

• Statute of Limitations is Applicable: The judge affirmed that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-550 establishes a four-year statute of limitations for such actions. The installation occurred in 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, rendering the claim time-barred.

• Interpretation of CC&R 2.5: The judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation, concluding that CC&R section 2.5 applies to easements granted to a third party by the HOA.

• No Violation Occurred: The “weight of the evidence” demonstrated that the pipes were in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party. Therefore, Mr. Stoltenberg failed to establish a violation of CC&R section 2.5.

• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Due to the lack of evidence and the inapplicability of the cited CC&R section, the petitioner failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

IV. Final Order and Implications

Based on the dual findings that the claim was both time-barred and without merit, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decisive order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the order’s service, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.

Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818023-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Michael J. Stoltenberg versus the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties in case number 18F-H1818023-REL, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, against the Respondent?

3. What two primary legal arguments did the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association present in its defense?

4. According to the judge’s findings, what crucial piece of evidence was not presented at the hearing regarding the location of the well and pipes?

5. What is the statute of limitations cited in this case, and why was it a critical factor in the judge’s decision?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret Community Governing Document CC&R section 2.5 in relation to the Respondent’s actions?

7. Who has the burden of proof in this type of hearing, and what is the specific standard of proof required to win the case?

8. What was the ultimate Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and who was named the prevailing party?

9. Aside from the statute of limitations, what was the other fundamental reason the Petitioner failed to prove his case?

10. After the judge’s Order was issued on April 17, 2018, what recourse was available to the parties involved?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg, who brought the complaint, and Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, who was defending against the complaint. Mr. Stoltenberg represented himself, while the Homeowners Association was represented by its attorney, Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.

2. Mr. Stoltenberg alleged that the Homeowners Association violated sections 1.13, 1.19, and 2.5 of the Community Governing Document (CC&Rs). The basis of his petition was that the HOA had improperly installed pipes through his lot in connection with a new well.

3. The HOA argued that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, as the installation occurred in 2013, more than four years prior. The HOA also contended that CC&R section 2.5 did not apply because it refers to granting additional easements to a third party, which the HOA did not do.

4. The judge’s “Findings of Fact” state that “There was no evidence presented at hearing that the well or the well pipe were installed on Mr. Stoltenberg’s lot.” This lack of evidence was a key failure in the Petitioner’s case.

5. The statute of limitations cited is ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550, which requires actions to be brought within four years. This was critical because the well and pipes were installed in the summer of 2013, and Mr. Stoltenberg filed his petition after this four-year period had expired, making his claim untimely.

6. The judge concluded that CC&R section 2.5 specifically applies to easements that are granted or conveyed to a third party by the Respondent. Since the evidence showed the pipes were installed in an existing easement and the HOA did not grant a new one to a third party, the judge found that this section was not violated.

7. The Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must have the most convincing force and be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stoltenberg’s petition be dismissed. As a result of the dismissal, the Respondent (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

9. The Petitioner failed to prove his case because the weight of the evidence showed the HOA did not violate CC&R section 2.5. The evidence indicated the pipes were installed in a pre-existing easement, and the HOA did not grant or convey a new easement to a third party as described in that section.

10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B) and A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, the parties had the right to request a rehearing. This request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive essay-style response for each.

1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, particularly regarding the location of the pipes, contribute to the dismissal of his petition?

2. Discuss the significance of the statute of limitations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550) in the judge’s decision. Why are such statutes important in legal proceedings, and how did it provide a separate and independent basis for dismissing the case?

3. Explain the legal reasoning behind the judge’s interpretation of CC&R section 2.5. Why was the distinction between an “existing easement” and granting a “new easement to a third party” a critical factor in the outcome?

4. Imagine you were legal counsel for the Petitioner. Based on the information in the decision, what kind of evidence would have been necessary to successfully prove a violation of the Community Governing Documents and overcome the Respondent’s defenses?

5. Examine the roles of the different entities involved in this dispute: the Petitioner, the Homeowners Association, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Arizona Department of Real Estate. How does the structure of this administrative hearing process provide a mechanism for resolving disputes between homeowners and HOAs?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Several statutes are cited, including those governing real estate, HOA disputes, and the statute of limitations.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.

An abbreviation for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules set forth in a Community Governing Document that property owners in a planned community or condominium must follow.

Easement

A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific, limited purpose. In this case, it refers to the area where pipes were installed, which the judge found was an “existing easement.”

Findings of Fact

The section of a legal decision that details the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence and testimony presented at a hearing.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

An organization in a planned community (like Rancho Del Oro) that creates and enforces rules for the properties and residents within its jurisdiction.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued to inform the parties of the date, time, location, and subject matter of a scheduled legal hearing.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition, seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. Defined in the document as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Statute of Limitations

A law that sets the maximum amount of time that parties involved in a dispute have to initiate legal proceedings. In this case, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-550 established a four-year limit.

Ellipsis

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Lydia Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Diana Crites (community manager)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • James Van Sickle (board member)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Chairman of the Board; testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The ALJ decision, certified as the final administrative decision, dismissed the Petitioner's claim after rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The challenged $660 fee was determined to be a permissible working capital contribution under the CC&Rs, not a fee restricted by the statutory cap on resale disclosure services.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ decision, certified as the final administrative decision, dismissed the Petitioner's claim after rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The challenged $660 fee was determined to be a permissible working capital contribution under the CC&Rs, not a fee restricted by the statutory cap on resale disclosure services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in question was determined to be a working capital fee/assessment governed by the CC&Rs and ARS § 33-1242(A)(2), and not subject to the limitation set forth in ARS § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged excessive fee collection for resale disclosure/transfer services

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 fee, which he argued exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure/transfer services. The Association argued the $660 fee was a working capital contribution mandated by CC&R section 8.13 and was mislabeled, and therefore not subject to the statutory limitations of § 33-1260.

Orders: Brian D. Sopatyk’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fee dispute, Working capital fee, Transfer fee, Resale disclosure, Statutory interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:00:00 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:00:09 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:00:20 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:00:26 (59.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:41 (67.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:44 (154.0 KB)

Briefing: Sopatyk v. Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and outcomes of an administrative legal case brought by petitioner Brian Sopatyk against The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute was Mr. Sopatyk’s allegation that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660 upon the sale of a condominium unit, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at an aggregate of $400.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition on both occasions. The central finding was that the petitioner failed to prove a statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 charge was not a resale disclosure fee governed by A.R.S. § 33-1260, but rather a “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association admitted that this fee had been historically mislabeled as a “transfer fee,” an error it had since identified and corrected. The actual fee charged for resale disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “statement fee.” The ALJ’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision in the matter on August 10, 2017.

Case Overview

Case Number

17F-H1716004-REL (Initial Hearing)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Jurisdiction

State of Arizona, Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Core Allegation

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits fees for resale disclosure services to a maximum of $400.

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a disclosure statement for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, showing a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

May 18, 2016

Prompted by Mr. Sopatyk, the Association’s Board discusses the fee structure. It concludes the $660 fee is a mislabeled “working capital fee” and not a statutory violation.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the violation.

November 14, 2016

The initial administrative hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate adopts the ALJ’s recommendation, issuing a Final Order to dismiss the petition.

Post-Dec. 2016

Mr. Sopatyk requests a rehearing of the matter.

June 9, 2017

The rehearing is conducted, again before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, once again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 10, 2017

With no modifying action from the Department of Real Estate, the ALJ’s June 26 decision is certified as the final administrative decision.

Core Dispute Analysis

The case centered on the interpretation and classification of two fees charged by the Association during the sale of Mr. Sopatyk’s condominium unit.

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

• Allegation of Violation: Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660, which directly contravened the $400 statutory maximum established by A.R.S. § 33-1260 for services related to resale disclosure.

• Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted a March 2, 2015 disclosure form from the Association listing both a “660transferfee”anda”30 statement fee.” A HUD-1 disclosure statement for the purchase was also entered, showing the $660 “Transfer Fee” was split, with $330 paid from the buyer’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the seller’s funds.

• Contradictory Testimony: The ALJ noted a discrepancy in the petitioner’s statements. The sworn petition stated the $660 fee was split between him and the seller, while his testimony at the rehearing claimed he “had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price.” The ALJ decision stated, “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

• Requested Remedies: Mr. Sopatyk requested that the Association be ordered to comply with the statute, that refunds be paid to those who paid fees in excess of the statutory maximum, and that a civil penalty be imposed against the Association.

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc.)

• Distinction Between Fees: The Association’s central argument was that two separate and legally distinct fees were assessed:

1. A $30 Resale Statement Fee: This was the charge for preparing documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260 and was well within the $400 limit.

2. A $660 Working Capital Fee: This fee was authorized under a separate provision, Section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, which mandates an assessment from each new owner equal to two monthly installments to fund the Association’s working capital (reserve) fund.

• “Mislabeled” Fee: The Association acknowledged that the $660 working capital fee was incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee.” Association Manager Amy Telnes testified that she received erroneous information from the prior manager and had been using the wrong label.

• Board Action and Corrective Measures: The minutes from the May 18, 2016 Board meeting show that the Board, after reviewing a legal opinion, concluded the issue was one of “labeling, not violating the statute.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected into the Reserve Account. To prevent future confusion, the Board also voted to assess a single $400 transfer fee on all future transactions, with no other fees.

• Fund Allocation: Ms. Telnes testified that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, consistent with its purpose as a working capital contribution, while the $30 fee was the charge pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260(C).

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

ALJ Thomas Shedden presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing, reaching the same conclusion in both instances.

Key Rulings and Legal Reasoning

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• Core Finding: The evidence demonstrated that the Association charged two distinct fees. The $30 fee was for document preparation under A.R.S. § 33-1260, while the $660 fee was a working capital assessment authorized by CC&R Section 8.13. The ALJ concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1260 was not applicable to the $660 fee.

• Conclusion on Violation: Based on the evidence, including the testimony of the Association manager and the board meeting minutes, the ALJ found that the $660 fee was mislabeled but was not collected for services related to resale disclosure. Therefore, Mr. Sopatyk did not meet his burden to show that the Association violated the statute.

• Rejection of Harm-Based Argument: The ALJ did not accept the Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Mr. Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400. The judge clarified that A.R.S. § 33-2199.01 “does not require this type of particularized harm, but rather applies to all statutory violations.”

• Dismissal of Petition: In both the November 29, 2016 decision and the June 26, 2017 decision, the order was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition and deem the Association the prevailing party.

Final Disposition and Legal Status

The decision issued by ALJ Shedden on June 26, 2017, was transmitted to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The Department had until August 1, 2017, to accept, reject, or modify the decision. As no action was taken by the deadline, the Office of Administrative Hearings issued a Certification of Decision of Administrative Law Judge on August 10, 2017. This certification established the ALJ’s decision as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate in the matter.

Key Legal Citations and Definitions

• A.R.S. § 33-1260 (Resale of Units; Information Required): This Arizona statute governs the information a condominium association must provide to a prospective purchaser. It explicitly limits the fees an association can charge for these services:

• CC&R Section 8.13 (Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund): This section of The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association’s governing documents provides the authority to collect a fee from new owners for a different purpose:

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof required for the petitioner to prevail, defined in the legal decisions as:

Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and state the core legal violation the petitioner alleged.

2. What specific fees were charged during the petitioner’s condominium purchase that became the central point of the dispute?

3. According to the Association, what was the true nature of the $660 fee, and how did it explain the “transfer fee” label on the disclosure documents?

4. What role did Amy Telnes, the Association manager, play in explaining the history of the disputed fee?

5. What actions did the Association’s Board take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, to address the petitioner’s concerns and correct its internal procedures?

6. Who held the burden of proof in this matter, and what was the legal standard required to meet that burden?

7. What was the official outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?

8. Why was a re-hearing conducted, and what was the final outcome of that hearing on June 9, 2017?

9. According to the re-hearing decision, there was a significant contradiction between the petitioner’s sworn petition and his later testimony. What was this contradiction?

10. What was the legal basis, according to the Association’s CC&Rs, for collecting the $660 working capital fee?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Brian Sopatyk, and the respondent was The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 by charging a transfer fee in excess of the statutory maximum of $400.

2. The disputed fees were a $660 “transfer fee,” which was split between the buyer (Mr. Sopatyk) and the seller, and a separate $30 “statement fee” or “Resale Statement Fee.” The petitioner’s claim focused on the $660 fee being above the legal limit for resale disclosure services.

3. The Association argued the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was a “working capital fee” authorized by its CC&Rs. It explained that the fee had been mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to an error passed down from a previous property manager.

4. Amy Telnes testified that when she became the Association manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She further testified that the $660 was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, and the actual fee charged for disclosure under the statute was the separate $30 statement fee.

5. At the May 18, 2016, meeting, the Board concluded it was not in violation of the law but that its fee labeling was confusing. The Board directed Amy Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all mislabeled fees into the Reserve Account and voted to assess a single, correctly labeled $400 transfer fee on all future transactions.

6. The petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

7. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The judge ordered that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition be dismissed.

8. A re-hearing was conducted after Mr. Sopatyk requested one following the initial decision. The final outcome of the June 9, 2017, re-hearing was the same as the first: the Administrative Law Judge found the petitioner did not meet his burden of proof and ordered the petition to be dismissed.

9. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 transfer fee was split between him and the seller. However, during his testimony at the re-hearing, he stated that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.

10. The legal basis was Section 8.13 of the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section, titled “Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund,” called for an assessment from each new owner of two monthly installments of the annual fee to be deposited into the working capital fund.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, incorporating specific facts, legal arguments, and procedural details from the source documents.

1. Trace the complete timeline of the case, beginning with the filing of the petition. Include key dates of filings, hearings, decisions, and final certifications, and describe the significance of each event in the legal process.

2. Analyze the central legal argument of the Respondent, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association. Explain how the distinction between a “transfer fee” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 and a “working capital fee” under the Association’s CC&Rs was crucial to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain why the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the re-hearing, citing specific evidence presented by the Association.

4. Evaluate the importance of the Association’s Board Meeting Minutes from May 18, 2016, as a piece of evidence. Detail the specific findings and resolutions from that meeting and explain how they were used to build the Association’s defense.

5. Examine the roles of the key individuals and entities in this administrative action. Describe the functions and contributions of Brian Sopatyk (Petitioner), Amy Telnes (Association Manager), Michael Cibellis (Association President), Thomas Shedden (Administrative Law Judge), and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to provide certain disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser. It also limits the fee an association can charge for the preparation of these documents to an aggregate of four hundred dollars.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. In this case, section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs authorized the collection of a fee from new owners for a working capital fund.

Final Administrative Decision

The ultimate, legally binding decision in the administrative matter. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision became the final administrative decision after the Department of Real Estate did not act to accept, reject, or modify it within the statutory time limit.

HUD-1 Disclosure Statement

A document used in the petitioner’s property purchase that itemized all charges imposed upon a borrower and seller for a real estate transaction. It was used as evidence to show how the $660 “Transfer Fee” and $30 “Resale Statement Fee” were assessed and paid.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Brian Sopatyk was the petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Reserve Fund

An account maintained by the Condominium Association. The Association referred to its “working capital fund” as the Reserve Fund, into which the disputed $660 fees were deposited.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. was the respondent.

Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee

A $30 fee charged by the Association for the preparation of disclosure documents. The Association argued this was the fee governed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260, which was compliant with the $400 statutory cap.

Transfer Fee

In the context of the petitioner’s allegation, a fee charged for resale disclosure services, limited to $400 by statute. In the context of the Association’s defense, this was the erroneous label applied to the working capital fee.

Working Capital Fee

A fee authorized by section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, assessed to each new owner to be deposited into the working capital fund (or Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 fee was this type of fee, not one for resale disclosure.

How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute

We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?

For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.

1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm

A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.

The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.

Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.

The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.

2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form

Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.

The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.

3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War

How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.

Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.

In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”

As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.

4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase

What it really means to have to prove your case.

In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.

5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility

When every word you say (and write) is on the record.

A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.

There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”

The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.

Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details

This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.

The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brian Sopatyk (petitioner)
    Represented himself at the initial hearing; sought rehearing
  • Nathan Andrews (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Jill M. Kennedy (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Judy Sopatyk (petitioner's wife)
    Co-purchaser of the condominium unit,
  • Chance Peterson (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group

Respondent Side

  • Bradley R. Jardine (HOA attorney)
    Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston
  • Amy Telnes (property manager/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Association manager who testified,
  • Michael Cibellis (Association president/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Testified at the rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Contact for requests for rehearing
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    OAH
    Signed the Certification of Decision,

Other Participants

  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (administrative staff)
    Administrative staff for transmission/mailing,

Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:44:10 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

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Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

• Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

• Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

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Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

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Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

• Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

• Evidence Presented:

◦ March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

◦ HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

• Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

• Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

• Evidence and Testimony:

◦ CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

◦ Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

◦ May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

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Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

• Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

• Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

• Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

• Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

• Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.

Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences in length.

1. What specific Arizona Revised Statute did petitioner Brian Sopatyk allege that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated, and what is the core requirement of that statute?

2. Identify the two fees charged in connection with Mr. Sopatyk’s unit purchase, the amount of each fee, and how they were documented on the HUD-1 disclosure statement.

3. What was the Association’s central argument for why the $660 fee did not violate the statute in question?

4. Who was the Association’s manager, and what explanation did she provide for the labeling of the $660 fee?

5. According to the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs), what is the purpose of the fee outlined in section 8.13?

6. What was the outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?

7. During the rehearing, a discrepancy was noted between Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn petition and his testimony regarding the payment of the $660 fee. What was this discrepancy?

8. What corrective actions did the Association’s Board vote to take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, after Mr. Sopatyk raised the issue?

9. What is the standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this case, and did the Administrative Law Judge find that he met it?

10. What was the final, certified administrative decision in this matter after the rehearing on June 9, 2017?

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Answer Key

1. Brian Sopatyk alleged a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260. This statute requires a condominium association to provide specific disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser and limits the aggregate fee for preparing these documents and other related services to no more than four hundred dollars.

2. The two fees were a $660 “Transfer Fee” and a $30 “Resale Statement Fee.” The HUD-1 disclosure statement shows the $660 fee was split, with $330 paid by the borrower (Sopatyk) and $330 paid by the seller, while the seller alone paid the $30 fee.

3. The Association’s central argument was that the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was actually a “working capital fee” collected pursuant to section 8.13 of its CC&Rs. They contended that the fee had been incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error.

4. The Association’s manager was Amy Telnes. She testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee, and these fees had been mislabeled since that time.

5. According to CC&R section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”), each new unit owner is to be assessed a fee of at least twice the average monthly assessment. These fees are to be deposited into the working capital fund, which the Association refers to as its Reserve Fund.

6. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The Judge’s decision was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition, and this decision was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate.

7. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 fee was split between him and the seller. However, at the hearing, he testified that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit, meaning one of his statements had to be false.

8. The Board directed Ms. Telnes to account for all working capital fees and transfer them to the Reserve Account to correct the error. The Board also determined its system was confusing and voted to assess a single transfer fee of $400 (and no other fees) on all future transactions.

9. The petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof and was required to meet the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both hearings that Mr. Sopatyk did not meet this burden.

10. The final decision was that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed again. On August 10, 2017, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate because the Department took no action to reject or modify it.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the legal concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain in detail why the evidence presented by the Association was deemed to have greater convincing force than the evidence presented by the Petitioner, leading to the dismissal of his petition.

2. Discuss the critical role of the Association’s governing documents, specifically CC&R section 8.13, in its successful defense. How did the language of this section allow the Association to re-characterize the disputed $660 fee and differentiate it from the fees regulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260?

3. Trace the procedural history of case No. 17F-H1716004-REL, from the filing of the petition to the final certified order. Identify the key dates, participants (judges, legal counsel, witnesses), and the function of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in the process.

4. Examine the actions taken by the Association’s Board during its May 18, 2016, meeting. Evaluate whether these actions demonstrated good-faith governance and a proactive attempt to correct a procedural error, and discuss how the minutes from this meeting were used as evidence in the hearing.

5. Despite losing the case, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition prompted significant changes in the Association’s fee structure. Argue whether the petitioner’s actions ultimately served the public interest for future condominium purchasers in the Lakeshore Village community, even though he did not prevail in his specific legal claim.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on the evidence presented.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260

The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to furnish a prospective purchaser with disclosure documents and other information. It explicitly limits the fee an association can charge for these services to “no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars.”

Burden of Proof

The responsibility of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk.

The Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, which are the governing documents for the condominium association. Section 8.13 of the Lakeshore Village CC&Rs authorizes the collection of a fee for a working capital fund.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Brian Sopatyk.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party defending against a petition. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Reserve Fund

The account into which the Association deposits its working capital fees. It is also referred to as the Working Capital Fund.

Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee

A $30 fee, separate from the disputed $660, that was paid by the seller to the Association for the preparation of the resale statement. This fee was considered part of the allowable charges under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260.

Transfer Fee

The label erroneously applied to the $660 fee on the disclosure statement and HUD-1 form. The central dispute of the case was whether this was a true transfer fee subject to the statutory cap or a mislabeled working capital fee.

Working Capital Fee

A fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13 to be assessed from each new unit owner for the purpose of funding the Association’s working capital fund (Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued the $660 charge was this type of fee.

How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute

We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?

For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.

1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm

A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.

The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.

Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.

The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.

2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form

Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.

The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.

3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War

How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.

Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.

In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”

As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.

4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase

What it really means to have to prove your case.

In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.

5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility

When every word you say (and write) is on the record.

A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.

There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”

The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.

Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details

This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.

The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brian Sopatyk (petitioner)
  • Nathan Andrews (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Jill M. Kennedy (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Chance Peterson (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Judy Sopatyk (party)
    Wife of petitioner and co-purchaser of the unit

Respondent Side

  • Bradley R. Jardine (HOA attorney)
    Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston
    Attorney for Respondent
  • Amy Telnes (property manager/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Association manager who testified
  • Michael Cibellis (association president/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Association president who testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    OAH
    Signed Certification of Decision
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    ADRE
    Administrative contact for rehearing requests
  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (administrative staff)
    Involved in copy mailing/distribution