ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805; Association Bylaws Article 11.3
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the El Rio Community Association violated statutory or community document requirements regarding access to records.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to fulfill a records request
Petitioner, a member and Board Director, requested to inspect Association books and records on March 30, 2021. Petitioner alleged the Association failed to completely fulfill the request. The ALJ determined that Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to demonstrate a violation of the governing statute or bylaws.
Orders: Petitioner's petition and request to levy a civil penalty against Respondent were denied. Respondent was not ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
Association Bylaws Article 11.3
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Records Request, HOA Bylaws, A.R.S. 33-1805
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
Association Bylaws Article 11.3
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et al.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2121053-REL Decision – 904187.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:10 (114.1 KB)
Questions
Question
How long does my HOA have to fulfill a request to examine records?
Short Answer
The HOA has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.
Detailed Answer
According to Arizona statute, an association is granted a period of ten business days to comply with a member's request to examine financial and other records.
Alj Quote
The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
Topic Tags
records request
timelines
HOA obligations
Question
Can the HOA charge me a fee to simply look at the books and records?
Short Answer
No, the HOA cannot charge a member for making material available for review.
Detailed Answer
State law prohibits the association from charging a member (or their designated representative) any fee for the act of making records available for inspection.
Alj Quote
The association shall not charge a member or any person designated by the member in writing for making material available for review.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
Topic Tags
records request
fees
homeowner rights
Question
How much can the HOA charge me if I want copies of the records?
Short Answer
The HOA may charge up to fifteen cents per page for copies.
Detailed Answer
While review is free, if a member requests physical copies of records, the association is legally permitted to charge a fee, capped at fifteen cents per page.
Alj Quote
An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
Topic Tags
records request
fees
copies
Question
Is the HOA allowed to withhold certain records from me?
Short Answer
Yes, specific categories of records, such as privileged attorney communications or employee records, can be withheld.
Detailed Answer
The law provides exceptions to disclosure for sensitive information, including privileged attorney-client communications, pending litigation, closed session minutes, and personal or financial records of individual members or employees.
Alj Quote
Books and records kept by or on behalf of the association and the board may be withheld from disclosure to the extent that the portion withheld relates to… Privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
Topic Tags
records request
exclusions
privacy
Question
Can I see records regarding complaints against specific HOA employees?
Short Answer
No, records regarding specific complaints against individual employees can be withheld.
Detailed Answer
The HOA is not required to disclose records that relate to specific complaints against an individual employee of the association or a contractor.
Alj Quote
Records relating to… specific complaints against an individual employee of the association or an individual employee of a contractor of the association who works under the direction of the association [may be withheld].
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(5)
Topic Tags
records request
employees
privacy
Question
What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a dispute hearing against my HOA?
Short Answer
You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence.'
Detailed Answer
The petitioner (homeowner) bears the burden of proof. This means you must provide enough evidence to convince the judge that your claim is more probably true than not.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.
Legal Basis
Conclusion of Law 3
Topic Tags
hearing procedure
burden of proof
legal standards
Question
If I believe documents are missing from my request, is my belief enough to prove a violation?
Short Answer
No, you must present credible evidence that the specific undisclosed documents actually exist.
Detailed Answer
Merely alleging that documents are missing is insufficient. The homeowner must provide credible evidence demonstrating that the documents requested actually exist and were withheld.
Alj Quote
Petitioner presented no credible evidence that documents existed which were not disclosed.
Legal Basis
Findings of Fact 18
Topic Tags
evidence
records request
burden of proof
Question
Does an HOA Director have different inspection rights than a regular homeowner?
Short Answer
Yes, Directors generally have an absolute right to inspect all books and records at any reasonable time.
Detailed Answer
Association bylaws often grant Directors broader access than general members, allowing them the absolute right to inspect all documents and physical properties at reasonable times.
Alj Quote
Every Director shall have the absolute right at any reasonable time to inspect all books, records, and documents of the Association and the physical properties owned or controlled by the Association.
Legal Basis
Association Bylaws Article 11.3
Topic Tags
board members
directors
inspection rights
Case
Docket No
21F-H2121053-REL
Case Title
Michael E Palacios vs. El Rio Community Association
Decision Date
2021-08-13
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Questions
Question
How long does my HOA have to fulfill a request to examine records?
Short Answer
The HOA has ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.
Detailed Answer
According to Arizona statute, an association is granted a period of ten business days to comply with a member's request to examine financial and other records.
Alj Quote
The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
Topic Tags
records request
timelines
HOA obligations
Question
Can the HOA charge me a fee to simply look at the books and records?
Short Answer
No, the HOA cannot charge a member for making material available for review.
Detailed Answer
State law prohibits the association from charging a member (or their designated representative) any fee for the act of making records available for inspection.
Alj Quote
The association shall not charge a member or any person designated by the member in writing for making material available for review.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
Topic Tags
records request
fees
homeowner rights
Question
How much can the HOA charge me if I want copies of the records?
Short Answer
The HOA may charge up to fifteen cents per page for copies.
Detailed Answer
While review is free, if a member requests physical copies of records, the association is legally permitted to charge a fee, capped at fifteen cents per page.
Alj Quote
An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
Topic Tags
records request
fees
copies
Question
Is the HOA allowed to withhold certain records from me?
Short Answer
Yes, specific categories of records, such as privileged attorney communications or employee records, can be withheld.
Detailed Answer
The law provides exceptions to disclosure for sensitive information, including privileged attorney-client communications, pending litigation, closed session minutes, and personal or financial records of individual members or employees.
Alj Quote
Books and records kept by or on behalf of the association and the board may be withheld from disclosure to the extent that the portion withheld relates to… Privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
Topic Tags
records request
exclusions
privacy
Question
Can I see records regarding complaints against specific HOA employees?
Short Answer
No, records regarding specific complaints against individual employees can be withheld.
Detailed Answer
The HOA is not required to disclose records that relate to specific complaints against an individual employee of the association or a contractor.
Alj Quote
Records relating to… specific complaints against an individual employee of the association or an individual employee of a contractor of the association who works under the direction of the association [may be withheld].
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(5)
Topic Tags
records request
employees
privacy
Question
What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a dispute hearing against my HOA?
Short Answer
You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence.'
Detailed Answer
The petitioner (homeowner) bears the burden of proof. This means you must provide enough evidence to convince the judge that your claim is more probably true than not.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.
Legal Basis
Conclusion of Law 3
Topic Tags
hearing procedure
burden of proof
legal standards
Question
If I believe documents are missing from my request, is my belief enough to prove a violation?
Short Answer
No, you must present credible evidence that the specific undisclosed documents actually exist.
Detailed Answer
Merely alleging that documents are missing is insufficient. The homeowner must provide credible evidence demonstrating that the documents requested actually exist and were withheld.
Alj Quote
Petitioner presented no credible evidence that documents existed which were not disclosed.
Legal Basis
Findings of Fact 18
Topic Tags
evidence
records request
burden of proof
Question
Does an HOA Director have different inspection rights than a regular homeowner?
Short Answer
Yes, Directors generally have an absolute right to inspect all books and records at any reasonable time.
Detailed Answer
Association bylaws often grant Directors broader access than general members, allowing them the absolute right to inspect all documents and physical properties at reasonable times.
Alj Quote
Every Director shall have the absolute right at any reasonable time to inspect all books, records, and documents of the Association and the physical properties owned or controlled by the Association.
Legal Basis
Association Bylaws Article 11.3
Topic Tags
board members
directors
inspection rights
Case
Docket No
21F-H2121053-REL
Case Title
Michael E Palacios vs. El Rio Community Association
Decision Date
2021-08-13
Alj Name
Adam D. Stone
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Michael E Palacios(petitioner) Property owner and member of the Association; was appointed to the Board,
Respondent Side
Quinten T. Cupps(HOA attorney) Represented El Rio Community Association
Denise Ferreira(property manager, witness) D & E Management Owns D & E Management and was the manager for the Association
Neutral Parties
Adam D. Stone(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.
Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent
Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:06:54 (101.7 KB)
21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:15 (46.9 KB)
21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:15 (124.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121051-REL
Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.
Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.
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Case Overview
• Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes
• Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
• Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)
• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.
• Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.
Factual Background and Timeline
1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.
2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.
3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.
4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”
5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:
◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.
◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.
6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).
Procedural History
• May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.
• July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
• July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.
• September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.
• September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.
• December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).
• January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.
Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing
In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.
Petitioner’s Argument
ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion
1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.
Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.
2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.
Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.
3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.
Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.
4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.
Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.
5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”
Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.
6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.
Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.
◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”
◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”
◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”
◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):
◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”
◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.
◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”
• Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):
◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”
Conclusion and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.
The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”
The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.
Study Guide – 21F-H2121051-REL
Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.
1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?
2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?
3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?
4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?
5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?
6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?
7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?
8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?
9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?
10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?
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Quiz Answer Key
1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.
2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.
3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.
4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.
5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.
6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.
7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.
8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.
9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.
10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.
2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?
3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.
4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Statute
Definition
Action without meeting
A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821
The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804
The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.
Clifford (Norm) Burnes
The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.
Unanimous Written Consent
The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.
Blog Post – 21F-H2121051-REL
Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It
1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality
For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.
But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.
2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”
The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.
This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.
Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”
3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict
Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”
On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.
The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.
In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.
This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.
4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence
Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).
The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.
Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.
5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency
While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.
This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:
1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.
2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Clifford (Norm) Burnes(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf at the original hearing
Respondent Side
John Crotty(HOA attorney) Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood Attorney for Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Esmerelda Sarina Martinez(board president, witness) Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Testified as a witness for Respondent
Madill(board member) Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Referred to as Mr. Madill
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) ADRE Commissioner during original decision transmittal
Louis Dettorre(Commissioner) ADRE Commissioner during rehearing transmittal
Miranda Alvarez(staff) Transmittal staff (also noted as Miranda A.)
c. serrano(staff) Transmittal staff
Other Participants
Jamie Argueta(staff) Conducted research; position and function apparently not in the record
The petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) or ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. The rule limiting sign use was deemed reasonable.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on both issues.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged unreasonable discrimination in adopting rules regarding common elements (monument sign)
Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&R 7.1(C) by adopting a rule limiting the use of the common element monument sign to only owners in Building B, arguing this was unreasonable discrimination against Building A owners.
Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.
Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
CC&R section 7.1(C)
CC&R section 6.26(a)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217
Alleged open meeting law violation at the June 10, 2020 Board meeting
Petitioner alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by communicating via email and reaching a decision prior to the June 10, 2020 meeting, claiming the President called for a vote without discussion.
Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.
Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Condominium, Commercial HOA, Signage rules, Open meeting law, Discrimination
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This briefing summarizes the administrative legal proceedings between Keith D. Smith (Petitioner) and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association (Respondent) regarding Case No. 21F-H2120003-REL and its subsequent rehearing. The dispute centered on two primary allegations: that the Association’s Board of Directors established an unreasonable and discriminatory rule regarding a common-element monument sign, and that the Board violated Arizona’s open meeting laws during the adoption of said rule.
Following an initial hearing on October 26, 2020, and a subsequent rehearing considered on June 3, 2021, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the petition in its entirety. The rulings established that the Association acted within its authority under the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) to create rules for common elements, provided those rules are reasonable. The ALJ found that limiting sign usage to specific buildings was a reasonable exercise of power based on the physical layout of the property. Furthermore, the Petitioner failed to provide substantial evidence to support claims of illegal pre-meeting communications by the Board.
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Core Dispute: Monument Sign Usage
The central conflict involved a monument sign located on the common elements of a commercial condominium consisting of two buildings, Building A and Building B.
The Challenged Rule
On June 10, 2020, the Association Board adopted a policy limiting the use of the monument sign exclusively to Unit owners in Building B. The monument sign contains only five advertising spaces.
Association Justification
The Association argued that the rule was necessary due to the physical limitations of the property:
• Space Scarcity: The sign has a finite capacity (five spaces) that cannot accommodate all owners.
• Building Frontage: Building A has direct street frontage, allowing its owners to hang signs directly on the building wall.
• Lack of Frontage: Building B does not have street frontage, significantly limiting the utility and visibility of any signs hung on its walls.
• Zoning Restrictions: Under the City of Phoenix Sign Code, businesses cannot post signs on buildings they do not occupy. Therefore, Building B owners are prohibited from hanging signs on Building A, making the monument sign their only viable external advertising option.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Mr. Smith, a Unit owner in Building A, challenged the rule based on the following:
• Common Interest: He asserted that his deed grants him an undivided interest in common elements, meaning no owner should have exclusive use of the sign.
• Disparate Treatment: He argued the rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a), which prohibits treating owners differently regarding occupancy and use restrictions.
• Alternative Solutions: Mr. Smith proposed altering the sign to increase capacity or reducing existing sign sizes by half (which he offered to fund).
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Legal Analysis of CC&R Provisions
The ALJ’s decision hinged on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s governing documents.
CC&R Section 7.1(C): Board Authority
This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal Rules and Regulations to restrict and govern the use of any area.
• Condition: Rules must not “unreasonably discriminate” and must be consistent with the Declaration and the Act.
• Ruling: The ALJ concluded that discriminating among owners is permitted under 7.1(c) as long as it is not unreasonable. Given the lack of street frontage for Building B, the restriction was deemed a reasonable management of limited resources.
CC&R Section 6.26(a): Use Restrictions
The Petitioner argued that this section required all limitations to be applicable to all occupants equally.
• Scope Limitation: The ALJ found that section 6.26(a) explicitly applies only to “occupancy and use restrictions contained in this Article 6.”
• Ruling: Because the sign rule was promulgated under Article 7, the restrictive language of Article 6.26(a) did not apply.
Common Element Status and Partition
During the proceedings, the Association initially argued the sign was not a common element but later waived this argument. The Petitioner argued that common elements cannot be partitioned under A.R.S. § 33-1217. However, the ALJ found no evidence that the monument sign had been “partitioned” in a legal sense, merely that its use was regulated.
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Open Meeting Law Allegations
Mr. Smith alleged that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1248 regarding the conduct of the June 10, 2020, meeting.
Claims of Pre-Meeting Deliberation
The Petitioner asserted that Board members had “obviously” communicated via email and reached a decision before the meeting. His evidence for this was:
• The Board President called for a vote immediately without initiating discussion.
• The Board members appeared to have their minds made up.
Evidence and Testimony
The ALJ rejected these claims based on the following:
• Lack of Proof: The Petitioner admitted he had no emails or physical evidence to support the claim of private deliberation.
• Conflicting Testimony: Association witnesses provided “credible testimony” that a protracted discussion took place, lasting approximately 90 minutes. Mr. Smith himself spoke for 20 minutes during this period.
• New Evidence Barred: During the rehearing, Mr. Smith claimed to possess an email supporting his position. The ALJ refused to consider it, citing Arizona Administrative Code § R2-19-115, which requires all evidence to be presented at the original hearing.
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Procedural Findings and Rehearing
The rehearing (Case No. 21F-H2120003-REL-RHG) addressed the Petitioner’s claims of administrative error and “arbitrary” findings.
ALJ Determination
Number of Issues
The hearing was limited to two issues because the Petitioner only paid the fee for a two-issue hearing. Claims of other meeting deficiencies were excluded.
Sufficiency of Evidence
The ALJ found that the original decision was supported by substantial, reliable, and probative evidence as required by A.R.S. § 41-1092.07.
Reasonableness of Rule
The ALJ reaffirmed that the unequal access to the monument sign was not “unreasonable discrimination” given the objective differences in building locations.
Sign Modification
The Association argued that modifying the sign would require rescinding previous approvals granted to other businesses, a position the ALJ did not find unreasonable.
Final Conclusion
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition in both the original hearing and the rehearing. The final order, dated June 3, 2021, is binding. The Association’s rule limiting monument sign access to Building B was upheld as a reasonable exercise of Board authority, and the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of Arizona’s open meeting laws.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120003-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Keith D. Smith vs. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
This study guide examines the administrative proceedings and legal conclusions regarding the dispute between Keith D. Smith and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. The guide covers the original hearing (October 26, 2020) and the subsequent rehearing (March 21, 2021), focusing on the interpretation of CC&Rs, open meeting laws, and the standards of evidence in administrative hearings.
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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided source context.
1. What were the two primary issues the Petitioner was permitted to raise during the hearings?
2. Why did the Association Board decide to limit the use of the monument sign specifically to owners of units in Building B?
3. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding his “undivided interest” in the common elements of the condominium?
4. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) interpret the scope of CC&R section 6.26(a)?
5. What specific evidence did the Petitioner provide to support his allegation that Board members had communicated via email prior to the June 10, 2020, meeting?
6. How did the testimony of Stuart Rayburn and Harold Bordelon contradict the Petitioner’s claim regarding the lack of discussion at the June 10 meeting?
7. What were the two physical alterations to the monument sign suggested by the Petitioner to allow for more advertising space?
8. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider certain City of Phoenix zoning ordinance arguments and new email evidence during the rehearing?
9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” what is the definition of a “preponderance of the evidence”?
10. What is the final recourse for a party wishing to appeal the order issued following the rehearing?
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Part II: Answer Key
1. The Petitioner was limited to whether the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) regarding the Board’s authority to make rules for the monument sign and whether the Association violated open meeting laws under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. These limitations were enforced because the Petitioner only paid the required fees for a two-issue hearing.
2. The Board limited the sign to Building B because the monument sign has space for only five businesses, and unlike Building A, Building B does not have street frontage for advertising. Building A owners have the option to hang signs on their own building walls, a utility not available to Building B owners under city ordinances.
3. The Petitioner argued that his deed grants him an undivided interest in the common elements, which he interpreted to mean that no owner should have exclusive use of the monument sign. He contended that the Association’s common elements cannot be partitioned and that all owners should have access to the advertising space.
4. The ALJ ruled that section 6.26(a), which prohibits disparate treatment of owners, is expressly limited to the occupancy and use restrictions contained within Article 6. Because the rule in question was adopted under the authority of Article 7, the non-discrimination requirements of 6.26(a) did not apply.
5. The Petitioner admitted during the hearing that he had no emails or physical evidence to support his allegation of prior communication among Board members. He relied on the reasoning that because the President called for a vote immediately, they must have “obviously” reached a decision beforehand.
6. The Association’s witnesses provided credible testimony that a protracted discussion took place before the vote, lasting approximately 90 minutes. They noted that the Petitioner himself spoke for twenty minutes and that research on city ordinances and governing documents was presented before the board took action.
7. The Petitioner proposed either reducing the size of existing signs by one-half to create more slots—which he offered to pay for—or increasing the overall size of the monument sign. The Association resisted these plans, arguing they would require rescinding prior approvals and might not meet city codes.
8. The ALJ excluded this information because administrative findings must be based exclusively on evidence and issues raised in the original petition. New evidence or legal theories (such as ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217) not presented at the original hearing cannot be introduced during a rehearing.
9. A “preponderance of the evidence” is defined as the greater weight of the evidence that possesses the most convincing force. It is evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind toward one side of an issue rather than the other, even if it does not eliminate all reasonable doubt.
10. The order following a rehearing is binding; however, a party may seek judicial review as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6. This appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
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Part III: Essay Questions
Instructions: Use the provided documents to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts.
1. The Balance of Equity in Association Governance: Discuss how the Board justified a rule that seemingly treats Building A and Building B owners differently. In your answer, evaluate the ALJ’s conclusion that this “discrimination” was not unreasonable given the physical layout of the property.
2. Statutory Interpretation of CC&Rs: Analyze the conflict between reading the CC&Rs as a “continuous document” versus the ALJ’s strict adherence to the express terms of specific sections (Article 6 vs. Article 7). How does the wording “subject to the provisions of this Declaration” in section 7.1(c) impact this interpretation?
3. Procedural Rigidity in Administrative Hearings: Explain the impact of the Petitioner’s decision to only pay for two issues. How did this choice limit his ability to introduce alternative legal arguments, such as the non-partition of common elements or additional open meeting law violations?
4. The Role of Testimony vs. Allegation: Compare the Petitioner’s reliance on “rhetorical questions” and “obvious” conclusions with the Respondent’s use of witness testimony. How does this case demonstrate the burden of proof required to establish a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248?
5. Impact of Local Ordinances on Private Governance: Assess how the City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance (Section 705) and Sign Code influenced the Board’s policy and the ALJ’s final decision. Why was the distinction between “contiguous” signage and “flexible” placement critical to the reasonableness of the Association’s rule?
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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues decisions on disputes involving state agency regulations or statutes.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
The Arizona state statute governing open meeting laws for condominiums, requiring transparency in Board deliberations.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules and operations of a common interest development.
Common Elements
Portions of a condominium project other than the individual units, managed by the Association and intended for common use.
Monument Sign
A ground-level sign, typically located near a property entrance, used to identify the businesses or residents within a complex.
Partition
The act of dividing a property into separate parts or to sever the unity of possession; in this context, the Petitioner argued common elements cannot be partitioned.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The legal standard of proof in civil and administrative cases, meaning the evidence on one side is more convincing than the other.
Rehearing
A second consideration of a case, usually based on specific grounds such as an irregularity in the original proceeding or an error of law.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association.
Substantial Evidence
Evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; a requirement for the validity of an ALJ decision.
Undivided Interest
The legal right of each owner to use the whole of the common property, rather than a specific, physically divided portion.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120003-REL-RHG
The Monument Sign Mystery: 4 Surprising Lessons in HOA Power and “Reasonable” Fairness
1. Introduction: The Paradox of Undivided Interest
In the world of commercial real estate, few phrases carry as much weight—or cause as much confusion—as “undivided interest.” When Keith D. Smith purchased a unit in the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, his deed granted him an interest in the common elements. To many owners, this implies a fundamental right to equal use of every square inch of the property, including high-visibility signage.
However, a recent dispute between Mr. Smith and his Association highlights a complex legal paradox: an owner can have an undivided interest in a common element while being legally barred from using it. The conflict arose when the Board restricted a five-space monument sign to a specific subset of owners, sparking a claim of “unreasonable discrimination.”
Does fairness require a Board to grant every owner a “slice of the pie,” or can they prioritize certain owners for the functional benefit of the whole? The ruling in this case provides a masterclass in how administrative courts define “reasonableness” and “fairness” within a shared property.
2. Takeaway 1: When Equality Isn’t “Reasonable”
At first glance, the Association’s rule seemed blatantly unfair. The Board enacted a policy that limited the use of the monument sign exclusively to owners in Building B, completely barring Building A owners like Mr. Smith.
However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) looked beyond the surface-level exclusion to the “functional reality” of the property. Building A enjoys direct street frontage, allowing its owners to hang signs directly on their building. Building B, situated behind Building A, has no such visibility.
The “legal knot” that sealed the decision was a City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance. While Building A owners had their own signage options, the ordinance prohibited Building B owners from hanging signs on Building A—the only building visible from the street. Because Building B owners were effectively invisible without the monument sign, the Board’s “discrimination” was deemed a logical, functional necessity rather than an arbitrary act.
CC&R section 7.1(c) grants the Board broad authority to manage common areas:
The Board … subject to the provisions of this Declaration, may adopt, amend and repeal Rules and Regulations. The Rules and Regulations may … restrict and govern the use of any area by any Owner or Occupant…; provided however that the Rules and Regulations shall not unreasonably discriminate among Owners and Occupants.
Because the rule addressed a specific geographical disadvantage, the court found the Board’s decision was reasonable and consistent with its governing authority.
3. Takeaway 2: The “Fine Print” Trap of Article Silos
Mr. Smith argued that the sign rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a), which requires that use restrictions be “applicable to all Occupants.” It is a compelling argument for any property owner: if the rules say everyone must be treated the same, how can the Board pick favorites?
The legal reality, however, comes down to the structural logic of the CC&Rs—what we might call “Article Silos.” The ALJ pointed out that the “equality clause” Mr. Smith cited was explicitly limited to the confines of Article 6 (Occupancy and Use). The Board, however, enacted the sign rule under the powers granted in Article 7 (Association Powers).
In legal interpretation, the specific placement of a rule dictates its reach. The decision emphasized this “smoking gun” phrasing:
…although CC&R section 6.26 does prohibit disparate treatment of Owners, by its express terms, CC&R section 6.26 applies only to CC&R Article 6, and not Article 7.
This serves as a critical warning for property professionals: a protection in one article of a governing document does not necessarily limit the powers granted in another.
4. Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof and the “Pre-Meeting” Myth
Property owners often suspect that by the time a public meeting begins, the “real” decision has already been made in secret. Mr. Smith alleged that the Board violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1248) by reaching a consensus via email before the official vote on June 10, 2020.
His evidence was purely circumstantial; he posed a rhetorical question asking how the Board could call for a vote so quickly if they hadn’t already decided. The court, however, requires “substantial evidence” to overturn a Board action.
Testimony revealed that the meeting was far from a “rubber stamp” event. It involved a “protracted” discussion lasting an hour and a half, during which Mr. Smith himself was allowed to speak for 20 minutes. The ALJ applied the standard of the “Preponderance of the Evidence,” which favors the side with the most convincing weight of facts:
The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
5. Takeaway 4: The “Pay-to-Play” Reality of Administrative Hearings
The final lesson is a procedural one that every petitioner must understand: administrative law is a “one-shot” game governed by fees and strict paperwork.
When Mr. Smith filed his petition with the Department of Real Estate, he paid the fee for a two-issue hearing. Consequently, when he attempted to raise a new legal argument during his rehearing—citing A.R.S. § 33-1217 regarding the partition of common elements—the court flatly rejected it. Because the issue wasn’t in the original petition and he hadn’t paid for it to be heard, it simply didn’t exist in the eyes of the court.
The same “closed-door” policy applied to new evidence. During the rehearing, Mr. Smith claimed he finally had an email to prove the Board’s secret communications. The court refused to look at it, noting that because it wasn’t presented at the original hearing, it could not be considered later. In these proceedings, you must bring every issue and every piece of evidence to the table at the very beginning; there are no “add-ons” in the middle of the process.
6. Conclusion: A New Perspective on Common Ground
The dismissal of all claims against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association clarifies that “common elements” are not always equally shared in practice. Instead, they are managed for the functional benefit of the whole community. In this instance, providing visibility to the “hidden” units in Building B was a reasonable use of limited space, even if it meant Building A owners had to rely on their own street frontage.
This case leaves property owners with a challenging question: If your “undivided interest” doesn’t guarantee you a spot on the sign, what exactly are you entitled to? The answer is rarely found in the spirit of “fairness,” but rather in the specific, siloed mechanics of your Association’s CC&Rs.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Keith D Smith(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Sierra Foothills Condominium Association(respondent)
Stuart Rayburn(president) Sierra Foothills Condominium Association Appeared for Respondent
Harold Bordelon(witness) Testified for the Association
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
LDettorre(staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioners' petition, concluding they failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 regarding the availability of voting records.
Why this result: Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the HOA violated the statute through its NDA request or its method of providing the records (redacted ballots and separate unredacted envelopes) and failed to prove the records were not made reasonably available within the required statutory time frame.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to comply with voting records request (regarding assessment and cumulative voting records)
Petitioners alleged the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by requiring an NDA and providing redacted ballots and separate unredacted envelopes, which prevented Petitioners from cross-referencing votes with voters. Respondent argued it timely provided the totality of the requested information and that the manner of delivery did not violate the statute.
Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Records Request, HOA Governance, Statute Violation, Voting Records, Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA)
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2120020-REL Decision – 881665.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:06:27 (167.3 KB)
21F-H2120020-REL Decision – 944169.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:36:22 (184.1 KB)
21F-H2120020-REL Decision – 944171.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:36:22 (184.1 KB)
Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120020-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision: Swanson & Barnes v. Circle G Ranches 4 HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 21F-H2120020-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowners Sandra Swanson & Robert Barnes (“Petitioners”) and the Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) § 33-1805 by its handling of the Petitioners’ request for voting records.
The final order, issued on February 2, 2022, denied the petition. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof that a statutory violation occurred. The decision found that the Association’s method of providing the requested documents—redacted ballots in one stack and unredacted envelopes in another—was a “reasonable” approach that balanced the Petitioners’ right to examination with the Association’s duty to protect member privacy. While acknowledging this methodology was “not ideal,” the ALJ determined it made the totality of the requested information “reasonably available” as required by law and was not a violation. The ruling also established that the Association’s initial request for the Petitioners to sign a non-disclosure agreement did not constitute a statutory violation.
Case Overview
Entity
Details
Case Number
21F-H2120020-REL-RHG
Adjudicating Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Administrative Law Judge
Jenna Clark
Petitioners
Sandra Swanson & Robert Barnes
Respondent
Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association
Central Allegation
Respondent failed to comply with a January 16, 2020, voting records request, violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.
Final Order Date
February 2, 2022
Outcome
Petition Denied.
Chronology of Key Events
• October 4, 2017: The Association’s Board of Directors adopts the “Rule Requiring Secret Ballots” for votes on special assessments.
• October 28, 2019 (approx.): A vote occurs regarding an increase in association dues.
• December 2019: A vote occurs regarding a proposed CC&R amendment to prohibit cumulative voting.
• January 6, 2020: Petitioners submit a written request to view the votes for the cumulative voting amendment.
• January 13, 2020: The Association’s Board votes 8:1 to require Petitioners to sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) before viewing the ballots, citing member privacy concerns. Petitioners decline to sign the NDA.
• January 16, 2020: Counsel for Petitioners submits a formal written request for all ballots and related documents for both the dues increase vote and the cumulative voting amendment.
• January 30, 2020: The Association’s counsel responds, stating the Association must “balance your clients’ requests against the privacy and safety of all Owners” and that the records will be made available for inspection.
• February 7, 2020: Petitioners inspect documents at the office of the Association’s counsel. They are provided with two stacks of documents: redacted ballots and unredacted envelopes. They review the cumulative voting records for approximately 3.5 hours but cannot match specific ballots to specific voter envelopes.
• August 5, 2020: Petitioners issue a new demand for “unredacted ballots” and all related documents. No additional documentation is provided.
• September 22, 2020: Petitioners file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the formal dispute process.
• May 17, 2021: An initial ALJ Decision is issued.
• June 22, 2021: Petitioners file a request for a rehearing on the grounds that the decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”
• July 15, 2021: The rehearing request is granted.
• January 13, 2022: The evidentiary rehearing is held before the OAH.
• February 2, 2022: The final ALJ Decision is issued, again denying the Petitioners’ petition.
Central Legal Arguments
The rehearing focused on oral arguments from both parties regarding the interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805, which mandates that association records be made “reasonably available” for member examination.
Petitioners’ Position
• Unredacted Records Required: The statute requires the production of unredacted copies of requested documents, and the Association’s failure to provide original, unaltered documents was a violation.
• Methodology Impeded Access: By providing redacted ballots and separate unredacted envelopes, the Respondent prevented the Petitioners from cross-referencing votes with voters. This action meant the documents were not made “reasonably available.”
• NDA Was an Unlawful Barrier: The Association’s demand for an NDA was not supported by any enumerated exception in the statute and constituted an unlawful barrier to accessing records.
• No Expectation of Privacy: Petitioners argued that the ballots were not truly “secret ballots” because some had names or signatures on them, meaning voters “could not have reasonably held an expectation of privacy.”
Respondent’s Position
• Statute is Silent on Method: The statute does not specify how records must be made available, only that they must be. Respondent argued it had complied by providing the “totality of records” requested in a timely fashion.
• Balancing of Duties: The Association devised a method to satisfy its dual obligations: complying with the records request and protecting its members’ privacy and safety. This concern was heightened by complaints from other homeowners about “harassing” behaviors by the Petitioners.
• Information Was Provided: The two sets of documents (redacted ballots, unredacted envelopes) amounted to one complete set of unredacted records, allowing Petitioners to “cross reference and discern the information they sought.”
• NDA Was Reasonable: The NDA was proposed to protect member privacy regarding their secret ballot votes. Respondent argued it was ultimately irrelevant to the case, as the records were provided even after Petitioners declined to sign it.
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Final Order
The ALJ’s decision rested on a direct interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 and a finding that the Petitioners did not meet their evidentiary burden.
Key Rulings and Conclusions of Law
1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association violated the statute. The ALJ concluded they failed to do so.
2. On the NDA: The Judge explicitly held that “Respondent’s request that Petitioners sign an NDA does not constitute a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”
3. On Timeliness: The Association’s response on January 30, 2020, to the January 16, 2020, request was within the 10-business-day statutory deadline (which ended January 31, 2020). The Petitioners did not establish that the documents were unavailable for review prior to the February 7 inspection date.
4. On the Method of Disclosure: This was the central finding. The decision states that the manner in which the documents were provided did not violate the statute. The ALJ found that the record reflected that “Petitioners timely received the totality of the documents from their records request(s).” Because there was no evidence that the documents were not made “reasonably available,” a violation could not be concluded.
5. Reasonableness of Association’s Actions: The ALJ offered a final assessment of the Association’s methodology: “While Respondent’s methodology of document delivery to Petitioners may have not been ideal, under the totality of underlying circumstances the decision reasonable and within the requirements of the applicable statute(s).”
Final Order
Based on the finding that the Petitioners did not sustain their burden of proof, the final order was unambiguous: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”
The order is binding on the parties, who were notified of their right to seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the Superior Court within 35 days from the date of service.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120020-REL
Study Guide: Swanson & Barnes v. Circle G Ranches 4 HOA
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 21F-H2120020-REL-RHG. It is designed to test and reinforce understanding of the key parties, events, arguments, and legal principles outlined in the case.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who are the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what are their respective roles?
2. What specific statute did the Petitioners allege the Respondent violated, and what is the core requirement of that statute?
3. What two specific sets of voting records did the Petitioners request from the Association in their January 16, 2020 letter?
4. What action did the Association’s Board of Directors take on January 13, 2020, in response to the Petitioners’ initial request, and what was their stated reason for doing so?
5. Describe the method the Association used to provide the requested voting records to the Petitioners on February 7, 2020.
6. What was the Petitioners’ main argument for why the Association’s method of providing the documents failed to comply with the law?
7. What was the Association’s primary defense for the way it provided the records and for its overall actions?
8. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this proceeding, and what is the standard required to meet that burden?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the Association’s request that the Petitioners sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA)?
10. What was the ultimate outcome of the case as determined by the Administrative Law Judge in the final order issued on February 2, 2022?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties are Sandra Swanson & Robert Barnes, who are the “Petitioners,” and the Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association, which is the “Respondent.” The Petitioners are property owners and members of the Association who filed a complaint against it. The Association is the governing body for the residential development, managed by Vision Community Management, LLC.
2. The Petitioners alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) § 33-1805. The core requirement of this statute is that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association must be made “reasonably available” for examination by any member within ten business days of a request.
3. The January 16, 2020 letter requested all ballots and related documents from the vote regarding the increase in dues that occurred around October 28, 2019. It also requested all written consent forms and ballots for the Proposed Declaration Amendment regarding cumulative voting, which occurred in December 2019.
4. On January 13, 2020, the Board of Directors voted 8 to 1 to require the Petitioners to sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) before viewing the ballots. Their stated reason was a concern for members’ expectation of privacy regarding non-public information and a fear that members could be harassed based on their votes.
5. The Association provided the Petitioners with two separate stacks of documents. One stack contained redacted ballots, and the other stack contained unredacted envelopes that the ballots had been mailed in. This method separated the vote from the identity of the voter.
6. The Petitioners argued that by providing redacted copies and separate envelopes, the Respondent had not made the documents “reasonably available” as required by statute. They contended this method created an unlawful barrier because they were unable to cross-reference the ballots with the purported voters to verify the vote.
7. The Association defended its actions by arguing that the statute does not specify the how records should be produced, only that they be made available. It contended that it provided the totality of the information requested in a timely manner while also fulfilling its duty to protect the privacy and safety of its members from potential harassment.
8. The Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated the statute. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.
9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent’s request for the Petitioners to sign an NDA did not constitute a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805. The judge also noted the NDA was ultimately irrelevant to the outcome because the Association provided the documents even though the Petitioners declined to sign it.
10. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioners’ petition. The judge concluded that the Petitioners did not sustain their burden of proof to show that the Association had committed a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805, finding the Association’s actions to be reasonable under the circumstances.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each prompt, citing specific facts and arguments from the case documents.
1. Analyze the central legal conflict over the interpretation of the phrase “reasonably available” in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805. Contrast the arguments made by the Petitioners and the Respondent, and explain how the Administrative Law Judge ultimately resolved this conflict in the decision.
2. Discuss the competing interests the Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association attempted to balance in its response to the records request. Evaluate the measures it took, including the proposed NDA and the method of document delivery, in light of its duties to both the Petitioners and its general membership.
3. Trace the procedural history of the case from the initial petition filing on September 22, 2020, to the final order on February 2, 2022. What does this timeline reveal about the administrative hearing and appeals process for HOA disputes in Arizona?
4. The Petitioners argued that the ballots in question were not truly “secret ballots” and that voters could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Based on the evidence presented, construct an argument supporting this position and a counter-argument defending the Association’s stance on member privacy.
5. Examine the legal reasoning employed by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Conclusions of Law.” How did principles of statutory construction and the “preponderance of the evidence” standard directly influence the final order denying the Petitioners’ petition?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition in the Context of the Document
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on findings of fact and conclusions of law.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
The specific Arizona statute at the heart of the dispute, which mandates that a homeowners’ association’s records be made “reasonably available” for member examination within ten business days of a request.
Association / Respondent
The Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association, the governing body for the residential development and the party against whom the petition was filed.
Board of Directors (the Board)
The group that oversees the Association and is responsible for its governance. The Board voted to require an NDA before releasing voting records.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial (in this case, the Petitioners) to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents for the Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings involving homeowners’ associations.
Nondisclosure Agreement (NDA)
A legal contract proposed by the Association’s Board that would have required the Petitioners to keep the voting information confidential. The Petitioners declined to sign it.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for an evidentiary hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.
Petitioners
Sandra Swanson and Robert Barnes, members of the Association who filed the petition alleging a violation of state law by the Association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioners to win their case. It is defined as proof that convinces the judge that a contention is more probably true than not.
Redacted
Edited to remove or black out confidential or private information. The Association provided redacted ballots to the Petitioners to protect member privacy.
Vision Community Management, LLC (Vision)
The management company hired by and acting on behalf of the Association.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120020-REL
Your HOA Can Legally Keep Secrets From You. Here’s How.
Introduction: The Fight for Transparency
As a homeowner in an association, you assume a right to see the records. Transparency, after all, is the bedrock of accountability. But a recent legal dispute in Arizona offers a masterclass in how the gap between a right to information and the reality of obtaining it can be vast. The case demonstrates how a determined HOA, armed with a nuanced legal strategy and a literal interpretation of the law, can fulfill its obligation to provide records while ensuring they reveal almost nothing. It’s a story of escalation that began not with redacted documents, but with a demand for a nondisclosure agreement, setting the stage for a battle over what it truly means for records to be “available.”
1. The Two-Pile Shuffle: How “Access” Doesn’t Always Mean “Answers”
The conflict began with a standard request from a group of homeowners (the Petitioners) to examine their HOA’s voting records. The Board’s response, however, was anything but standard. Citing privacy concerns, the Board voted 8-to-1 on a crucial first move: it would require the homeowners to sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) before they could view the ballots. The homeowners refused, creating a standoff.
Forced to provide access but unwilling to yield on its privacy stance, the HOA (the Respondent) devised a clever workaround. When the homeowners arrived to inspect the approximately 122 pages of records, they weren’t handed a coherent set of documents. Instead, after spending roughly three and a half hours sifting through the materials, they discovered they had been given two separate stacks: one containing redacted ballots with the votes visible but the names blacked out, and another containing the unredacted envelopes they arrived in.
This “two-pile shuffle” made it impossible to match a ballot to a voter, effectively neutralizing the homeowners’ ability to verify the vote. They argued that this method failed to make the documents “reasonably available” as required by Arizona statute. The HOA’s strategy proved legally astute, leading to a court case that hinged on the very definition of access.
2. The Privacy Shield: A Proactive Defense
The HOA’s justification for its actions was a proactive and layered defense rooted in protecting its members. The Board’s initial demand for an NDA was not a retroactive excuse, but its opening move, signaling a deep-seated concern that releasing the voting information could lead to conflict within the community.
This concern was not merely abstract. Faced with multiple homeowner complaints labeling the Petitioners’ behavior as “harassing,” the Board first attempted to manage the information release by requiring the nondisclosure agreement. When that failed, it developed the two-pile system. The HOA’s legal position was that it had a duty to balance the homeowners’ request against the “privacy and safety of all Owners.” In a letter, the association’s counsel articulated this position clearly:
The Association’s position is that it has to balance your clients’ requests against the privacy and safety of all Owners within the Association. The Board is concerned with the personal information contained on the written consent forms or other documents and fears that individual members will be retaliated against or harassed based on a member’s decision to support, or not support, the matters up for a decision.
This defense, framed as a duty to protect the community from internal strife, became the cornerstone of the HOA’s successful legal argument.
3. The “Reasonably Available” Loophole
The entire legal battle was ultimately decided by the interpretation of a single phrase in Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which requires an association to make its records “reasonably available.” The case exposed a critical ambiguity in the law.
• The Homeowners’ View: They argued that “reasonably available” implies usability. To be meaningful, the records had to be provided in a way that allowed them to cross-reference votes with voters. A deliberately disorganized release, they contended, was not reasonable.
• The HOA’s View: The association countered with a brilliant legal distinction: the statute dictates what records must be produced, not how they must be presented. By providing all the components—the ballots and the envelopes—they had fulfilled their duty, even if they were separated.
In a decision that highlights the judiciary’s deference to the literal text of a statute, the Administrative Law Judge sided with the HOA. The judge’s ruling found no violation because, in the end, the homeowners had received everything they asked for. The legal linchpin of the decision was the finding that “the record reflects that Petitioners timely received the totality of the documents from their records request(s).” This interpretation effectively created a loophole, allowing the HOA to comply with the letter of the law while completely withholding the context the homeowners sought.
Conclusion: When “Legal” Isn’t the Whole Story
This case is a stark reminder that a legally defensible action can still feel like an affront to the spirit of community governance. The HOA’s victory demonstrates that in a dispute over transparency, the side with the more precise reading of the law, rather than the more open approach, may prevail. It reveals the profound tension between a homeowner’s right to know, an association’s duty to protect its members from potential harassment, and the powerful ambiguities hidden in legal statutes. An HOA can, with careful legal maneuvering, use privacy as a shield to deliver information in a way that obscures more than it reveals—and do so without breaking the law.
In a community governed by rules, what’s more important: absolute transparency, or the protection of every member’s privacy?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Sandra Swanson(petitioner)
Robert Barnes(petitioner)
Kristin Roebuck Bethell(petitioner attorney) Horne Siaton, PLLC Also listed as Kristin Roebuck, Esq.,
Respondent Side
Jeremy Johnson(respondent attorney) Joes, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC
Samantha Cote(respondent attorney) Joes, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC Also listed as Sam Cote, Esq.,
Patricia Ahler(witness) Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association
Amanda Stewart(witness) Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association
Jennifer Amundson(witness) Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association
Regis Salazar(witness) Circle G Ranches 4 Homeowners Association
Clint Goodman(HOA attorney) Vision Community Management, LLC Attorney for Vision, the HOA's property manager,
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner during initial decision phase
Louis Dettorre(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner during final/rehearing decision phase,
Dan Gardner(ADRE Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate ADRE contact c/o Commissioner,,
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2021-03-08
Administrative Law Judge
Jenna Clark
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Michael J Stoltenberg
Counsel
—
Respondent
Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
Counsel
Nicole Payne, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs Section 14.8
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition following a rehearing. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8, as that section applies only to the Association's notice obligation to members and not to assessment payments sent by members to the Association.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof because the CC&R provision cited was inapplicable to the dispute. Additionally, the Petitioner was found to have inadvertently caused delays in payment receipt by using restricted delivery, contrary to instructions.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8.
Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8 by failing to handle his monthly assessment payments correctly, resulting in late fees and threats of foreclosure. The ALJ found that Section 14.8 governs the Association's notice obligations to members and is inapplicable to the Petitioner's delivery of assessment payments to the Association.
Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied on rehearing.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: CC&Rs, Assessments, Late Fees, Notice Provision, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s complaint, alleging the Association violated its governing documents and acted in bad faith regarding the handling of his monthly assessment payments, was comprehensively reviewed and ultimately denied. This denial was subsequently affirmed in a rehearing.
The core of the dispute centered on the Petitioner’s unilateral decision to send his monthly payments via restricted U.S. Postal Service delivery to a specific, unpaid volunteer board member. This action, taken despite clear instructions to mail payments to the Association’s P.O. Box, resulted in delayed receipt and returned mail, leading to the imposition of late fees and threats of foreclosure against the Petitioner.
The Administrative Law Judge’s central finding was that the Petitioner fundamentally misinterpreted Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The judge concluded this section is unambiguously applicable only to notices sent from the Association to its members, and imposes no obligations on the Association regarding mail received from members. The payment delays and resulting penalties were determined to be the direct consequence of the Petitioner’s own “volitionally took” actions, for which the Association bore no responsibility. Furthermore, the Petitioner’s claims of “bad faith” under Arizona’s nonprofit corporation statutes were dismissed as falling outside the jurisdictional authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.
I. Case Overview
The legal matter concerns a petition filed by a homeowner against his condominium association, alleging violations of the community’s governing documents and state law.
Case Number
20F-H2020049-REL / 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
Petitioner
Michael J. Stoltenberg
Respondent
Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
Adjudicating Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Administrative Law Judge
Jenna Clark
The Petitioner’s initial complaint, filed on March 2, 2020, alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith,” specifically citing violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and Section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. He sought an order compelling the Association’s compliance and the issuance of a civil penalty.
II. Procedural History and Timeline
The dispute progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a granted request for rehearing, and a final binding order.
• March 2, 2020: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (“Department”).
• March 24, 2020: Respondent files an ANSWER, denying all complaint items.
• April 1, 2020: The Department refers the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing.
• July 14, 2020: The initial evidentiary hearing is held.
• August 3, 2020: An AMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.
• August 28, 2020: Petitioner submits a request for a rehearing.
• September 9, 2020: The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing is granted.
• February 16, 2021: A rehearing is held before the same Administrative Law Judge.
• March 8, 2021: A final ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION is issued, again denying the Petitioner’s petition.
III. Central Dispute: Assessment Payments and CC&R Section 14.8
The conflict originated from the Petitioner’s method of submitting monthly assessment payments and his interpretation of the Association’s obligations under its CC&Rs.
The Petitioner’s Actions and Their Consequences
• Instruction: On January 4, 2016, the Petitioner was advised that the Association’s “primary address for receiving all correspondence and all assessment payments from its members” was PO Box 4333, Yuma, Arizona 85366.
• Unilateral Change in Method: Beginning in November 2019, the Petitioner began sending his monthly payments via restricted delivery through the United States Postal Service (USPS), designated for “board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.”
• Petitioner’s Rationale: He took this action based on a belief that an agent of the Association’s property management company had previously thrown away one of his mailed payments.
• Petitioner’s Acknowledged Awareness: The Petitioner was aware that the Association employed a property management company to collect mail and that Ms. Carlisle was an “unpaid volunteer board member,” not an employee of that company.
• Resulting Delays and Penalties: This restricted delivery method caused significant issues.
◦ One payment was returned by USPS on January 25, 2020.
◦ Another was returned by USPS on June 8, 2020.
◦ Other payments were picked up late on various dates.
◦ For each instance where the payment was received late, the Petitioner was assessed a late fee and his residence was placed in danger of foreclosure.
The Disputed Provision: CC&Rs Section 14.8
The legal basis for the Petitioner’s claim rested on his interpretation of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Bylaws.
• Full Text of Section 14.8, Notices:
• Respondent’s Argument: The Association argued that this section was “inapplicable to the facts as presented” because it governs the Association’s obligation when sending notices to homeowners, not the other way around.
IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions
Across two separate decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that his interpretation of the governing documents was incorrect.
Initial Decision (August 3, 2020)
• Inapplicability of Section 14.8: The ALJ’s primary conclusion was a complete rejection of the Petitioner’s legal argument.
• Petitioner’s Culpability: The ALJ placed the responsibility for the late payments squarely on the Petitioner.
• Outcome: The petition was denied.
Rehearing Decision (March 8, 2021)
The rehearing was granted on the Petitioner’s grounds of an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law” and that the initial decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” The ALJ found no merit in these claims.
• Reaffirmation of Core Finding: The ALJ reiterated and strengthened the conclusion regarding Section 14.8.
• Jurisdictional Ruling: The ALJ explicitly addressed the Petitioner’s “bad faith” claim by citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers of nonprofit corporations.
• Failure to Support Rehearing Claims: The ALJ noted a complete lack of new evidence to justify the rehearing.
• Final Outcome: The petition was again denied. The order was made final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided legal documents.
1. Who are the two primary parties in case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, and what are their respective roles?
2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?
3. Why did the Petitioner, beginning in November 2019, change the way he mailed his monthly assessment payments?
4. What is the specific subject of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?
5. What were the consequences for the Petitioner each time the Association received his monthly assessment payment late?
6. According to the Administrative Law Judge, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs inapplicable to the facts of this case?
7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and what is its definition?
8. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?
9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge dismiss the Petitioner’s argument regarding Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842 during the rehearing?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on July 14, 2020, and the rehearing on February 16, 2021?
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Quiz Answer Key
1. The primary parties are Michael J Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner is a condominium owner and member of the Association who filed a petition alleging violations, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association that governs the development.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”
3. The Petitioner changed his mailing method because he believed an agent of the Association’s property management company had thrown away one of his mailed payments. As a result, he began sending payments via restricted delivery by the USPS, for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.
4. Section 14.8, titled “Notices,” pertains to any notice permitted or required by the Declaration or Bylaws. It specifically addresses the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information, outlining when such notices are deemed delivered.
5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence put his residence in danger of foreclosure by the Association.
6. The Judge concluded Section 14.8 was inapplicable because its language speaks specifically to the Association’s obligation to provide notice to its members. The section has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.
7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.
8. The Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” He also claimed that the initial findings of fact or decision were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”
9. The argument regarding ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers, was dismissed because it falls outside of the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction. The Petitioner had been advised of the Department’s jurisdictional limitations when he first filed his petition.
10. In both the initial decision (dated August 03, 2020) and the final order after the rehearing (dated March 08, 2021), the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to be answered in a detailed essay format, synthesizing information from across the provided documents. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark to deny the Petitioner’s claims in both the initial hearing and the rehearing. Discuss the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8, the concept of burden of proof, and jurisdictional limitations.
2. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 20F-H2020049-REL from the filing of the petition to the final order. Include all key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Department, and the specific reasons for each major step, such as the granting of the rehearing.
3. Evaluate the actions taken by the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, regarding his assessment payments. Explain why his unilateral decision to use restricted mail delivery, despite being aware of the Association’s procedures, ultimately caused the negative outcomes he sought to avoid.
4. Explain the contractual relationship between a homeowners’ association and a property owner as described in the legal documents. How do the CC&Rs function as an enforceable contract, and how was this concept central to the dispute?
5. Discuss the roles and authorities of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in resolving HOA disputes, as demonstrated by this case. What are their powers, and what specific limitations on their jurisdiction are identified in the text?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Association
The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association whose membership is comprised of the condominium owners in the Rancho Del Oro residential real estate development in Yuma, Arizona.
Board of Directors (the Board)
The body that oversees the Homeowners Association.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their contention. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.
An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These governing documents form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers matters for an evidentiary hearing. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret the contract (CC&Rs) between parties.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg, a homeowner and member of the Association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.
Statutory Agent
An individual listed as an official agent for an entity. For the years 2019 and 2020, Diana Crites was listed as the Association’s Statutory Agent.
Abbreviation for the United States Postal Service.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided legal documents.
1. Who are the two primary parties in case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, and what are their respective roles?
2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?
3. Why did the Petitioner, beginning in November 2019, change the way he mailed his monthly assessment payments?
4. What is the specific subject of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?
5. What were the consequences for the Petitioner each time the Association received his monthly assessment payment late?
6. According to the Administrative Law Judge, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs inapplicable to the facts of this case?
7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and what is its definition?
8. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?
9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge dismiss the Petitioner’s argument regarding Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842 during the rehearing?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on July 14, 2020, and the rehearing on February 16, 2021?
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Quiz Answer Key
1. The primary parties are Michael J Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner is a condominium owner and member of the Association who filed a petition alleging violations, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association that governs the development.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”
3. The Petitioner changed his mailing method because he believed an agent of the Association’s property management company had thrown away one of his mailed payments. As a result, he began sending payments via restricted delivery by the USPS, for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.
4. Section 14.8, titled “Notices,” pertains to any notice permitted or required by the Declaration or Bylaws. It specifically addresses the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information, outlining when such notices are deemed delivered.
5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence put his residence in danger of foreclosure by the Association.
6. The Judge concluded Section 14.8 was inapplicable because its language speaks specifically to the Association’s obligation to provide notice to its members. The section has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.
7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.
8. The Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” He also claimed that the initial findings of fact or decision were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”
9. The argument regarding ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers, was dismissed because it falls outside of the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction. The Petitioner had been advised of the Department’s jurisdictional limitations when he first filed his petition.
10. In both the initial decision (dated August 03, 2020) and the final order after the rehearing (dated March 08, 2021), the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to be answered in a detailed essay format, synthesizing information from across the provided documents. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark to deny the Petitioner’s claims in both the initial hearing and the rehearing. Discuss the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8, the concept of burden of proof, and jurisdictional limitations.
2. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 20F-H2020049-REL from the filing of the petition to the final order. Include all key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Department, and the specific reasons for each major step, such as the granting of the rehearing.
3. Evaluate the actions taken by the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, regarding his assessment payments. Explain why his unilateral decision to use restricted mail delivery, despite being aware of the Association’s procedures, ultimately caused the negative outcomes he sought to avoid.
4. Explain the contractual relationship between a homeowners’ association and a property owner as described in the legal documents. How do the CC&Rs function as an enforceable contract, and how was this concept central to the dispute?
5. Discuss the roles and authorities of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in resolving HOA disputes, as demonstrated by this case. What are their powers, and what specific limitations on their jurisdiction are identified in the text?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Association
The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association whose membership is comprised of the condominium owners in the Rancho Del Oro residential real estate development in Yuma, Arizona.
Board of Directors (the Board)
The body that oversees the Homeowners Association.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their contention. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.
An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These governing documents form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers matters for an evidentiary hearing. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret the contract (CC&Rs) between parties.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg, a homeowner and member of the Association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.
Statutory Agent
An individual listed as an official agent for an entity. For the years 2019 and 2020, Diana Crites was listed as the Association’s Statutory Agent.
Abbreviation for the United States Postal Service.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Michael J Stoltenberg(petitioner) Rancho Del Oro condominium owner Appeared on his own behalf,
Respondent Side
Nicole Payne(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Appeared on behalf of Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association,,
Rhea Carlisle(board member) Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Unpaid volunteer board member; Petitioner directed mail specifically to her,,,
Diana Crites(statutory agent) Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020,
Lydia Peirce(HOA attorney staff/contact) Linsmeier Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Listed as contact for Respondent in 2020 decision transmission
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(ADRE commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner receiving the OAH order,
Dan Gardner(HOA coordinator) Arizona Department of Real Estate HOA Coordinator contact for the Commissioner
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2020051-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2021-01-08
Administrative Law Judge
Kay Abramsohn
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Debra K. Morin
Counsel
—
Respondent
Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
Counsel
Lydia A. Perce Linsmeier, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Solera was in compliance with its governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, concluding that the Board is the 'sole judge' regarding appropriate maintenance of AREAS. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the Rehearing Petition was dismissed.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation. The governing documents grant the Board 'the sole judge' authority over maintenance, and Petitioner did not provide legal support requiring the HOA to meet the homeowner maintenance standard.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times
Petitioner alleged that Solera failed to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times, arguing that the same strict maintenance standard applied to homeowners (CC&R 7.2) should apply to the HOA (CC&R 7.1). The issue was heard on rehearing after the initial decision dismissed the petition.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Solera was in compliance with its governing documents and was the prevailing party. Petitioner's appeal (Rehearing Petition) was dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Violation, Maintenance Standard, Areas of Association Responsibility, Rehearing, Sole Judge
Briefing Document: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative law case involving a homeowner, Debra K. Morin (Petitioner), and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent/Solera). The case centered on the Petitioner’s allegations that the HOA failed to maintain common areas to the standards required by its own governing documents.
The Petitioner filed a two-issue petition, with the primary surviving issue being that Solera, its Board of Directors, and its management company were not maintaining the “Areas of Association Responsibility” (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times. The Petitioner’s core argument was that the same stringent maintenance standard applied to individual homeowners must be equally applied to the HOA. She provided extensive photographic evidence of issues such as weeds, deteriorating sidewalks, street disrepair, and exposed wiring.
The HOA defended its actions by citing its established procedures for maintenance, including a committee review process, a scheduled Reserves plan, and the use of licensed contractors. Critically, Solera’s defense rested on provisions within its Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which grant the Board of Directors the exclusive right to interpret the CC&Rs and designate it as the “sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement” of all common areas.
Following an initial hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had not met the burden of proof. The ALJ ruled that under the governing documents, the HOA Board has sole discretion in maintenance matters, and the Petitioner’s subjective opinions on how and when work should be done were not relevant to determining a violation. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing, where she presented additional evidence and arguments. However, the ALJ upheld the original decision, reaffirming that the CC&Rs grant the Board authority superseding that of an individual homeowner in determining appropriate maintenance. The petition was dismissed, and Solera was deemed the prevailing party in both instances.
Case Overview
Case Name
Debra K. Morin, Petitioner, v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., Respondent.
Case Number
No. 20F-H2020051-REL / 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Kay Abramsohn
Petitioner
Debra K. Morin (represented herself)
Respondent
Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (represented by Lydia Linsmeier, Esq.)
Petition Filed
On or about March 12, 2020
Initial Hearing
May 20, 2020 and July 15, 2020
Initial Decision
August 19, 2020 (Petition Dismissed)
Rehearing Hearing
December 16, 2020
Rehearing Decision
January 8, 2021 (Original Dismissal Upheld)
Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments
The Petitioner, a resident of Solera for four years, filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging violations of Solera’s Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, CC&Rs, and Rules and Regulations (R&Rs). The allegations were organized into two primary issues.
Issue #1: Lack of Direct Communication
• Allegation: Solera, its Board, and its management company, Premier Management Company (Premier), “do not allow direct communication from homeowners.”
• Requested Relief: The Petitioner sought to have this “policy” rescinded.
• Outcome: This issue was connected to allegations of ethics violations based on the Board’s Code of Ethics, which the Tribunal determined was a non-governing document outside its jurisdiction. As a result, the Petitioner withdrew Issue #1 during the May 20, 2020 hearing.
Issue #2: Failure to Maintain Common Areas
• Allegation: Solera, its Board, and Premier “are not providing oversight to the General Manager in maintaining all Areas of Association Responsibility … in good condition and repair at all times.” Specific complaints included “uncontrolled weeds” and poor maintenance of the Community Center and other AREAS.
• Core Argument: The Petitioner’s central thesis was that the HOA must be held to the identical maintenance standard it imposes on homeowners. She argued that just as homeowners are required to maintain their lots “in a weed free condition 365 days a year,” the HOA has no discretion for delays in addressing maintenance issues in common areas.
• Requested Relief:
1. A public admission by the Board of its failures to follow governing documents.
2. The establishment of “direct communication rules” for reporting management deficiencies.
3. Compliance monitoring by the “Real Estate Board.”
Evidence and Specific Complaints
The Petitioner presented over 80 photographs at the initial hearing (growing to 310 by the rehearing) and multiple emails to document a wide range of perceived maintenance failures.
Maintenance Issue
Petitioner’s Specific Complaint
Uncontrolled weeds in granite rock locations throughout the community.
Community Center
Poor exterior condition.
Streets & Curbs
Deteriorating asphalt, cracking, and issues with sealing.
Sidewalks
Trip hazards and disintegrating cool-decking.
Drainage
Clogged storm drains and water pooling issues.
Landscaping
Exposed wiring for lights, exposed drip irrigation lines, and unremoved tree stumps.
Disrepair of boundary walls.
A key piece of evidence was a February 21, 2020 email exchange regarding weeds, which the ALJ found “representative of the overall situation.”
Petitioner’s Complaint: “This is NOT being done and our HOA looks disgusting with the continued presence of unchecked weeds inside and outside our community! No excuses, you cannot hold homeowners to a higher standard than you are willing to do for our HOA. You are on notice to rectify this violation immediately!”
General Manager’s Response: “…the landscape crew hula hoes and sprays daily, based on routine maintenance cycle and location of site work… Considering that we have 1,143,550 square feet of granite and 270,933 square feet of turf, the maintenance of weeds is a continuous and ongoing concern that is constantly being addressed.”
Petitioner’s Rebuttal: “YOUR response is just more excuses!… It appears that since it is not your personal money being spent, it is ok to have substandard work performance.”
Respondent’s Position and Defense
Solera HOA moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the issues were outside the Department’s jurisdiction and the requested relief could not be granted. While the motion was effectively denied after Issue #1 was withdrawn, Solera’s core defense remained consistent throughout the proceedings.
• Central Legal Argument: Solera contended that its Board of Directors is vested with the ultimate authority on maintenance matters by the community’s governing documents. It repeatedly cited CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states the Board “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].”
• Interpretation Authority: The HOA also pointed to CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5, which gives it the “exclusive right to construe and interpret the provisions of the [CC&Rs],” with such interpretations being “final, conclusive and binding.”
• Operational Defense: Denise Frazier, Solera’s on-site general manager, testified that the HOA has established processes for maintenance.
◦ Committee Structure: A Building and Grounds Committee (B&G) reviews projects, which are then assessed by a Finance Committee before going to the Board for approval.
◦ Reserves Schedule: Solera maintains a Reserves schedule for large projects, such as sidewalk repairs (every 4 years), street repairs (every 8 years), and sealing cracks (every 2 years).
◦ Vendor Management: The Board relies on licensed contractors for specialized work, including landscaping, tree trimming (by two different companies for different heights), and stump grinding.
• Response to Specific Issues:
◦ Weeds: Frazier attributed the prevalence of weeds in early 2020 to an unusual amount of rain, creating “optimal” conditions. She noted that Solera had instructed landscapers to use dye in the weed spray to demonstrate to residents that spraying was occurring.
◦ Sidewalks: Frazier acknowledged a several-month delay in repairing a specific sidewalk area but stated that warning cones had been placed in the interim. Solera uses a ¼ inch standard for review but the City of Chandler’s ½ inch trip-hazard guideline for repairs.
◦ Exposed Wiring: This was explained as a temporary measure by landscapers to avoid cutting electrical and irrigation lines during tree and granite replacement projects.
Rulings and Legal Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner’s case after the initial hearing and reaffirmed this dismissal after a rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet her legal burden of proof.
Key Legal Principles Applied
• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the Petitioner “bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a respondent has violated the planned community document(s’) provisions.”
• Supremacy of Governing Documents: The case was decided on the interpretation of the HOA’s CC&Rs, which function as the binding contract between the association and its members.
• Board’s Discretionary Authority: The central and decisive legal conclusion was that the HOA’s governing documents explicitly grant the Board superior authority over maintenance decisions.
◦ CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1 (“sole judge”) was interpreted to mean that only Solera is charged with determining when and how to perform maintenance, repair, and replacement in common areas.
◦ The ALJ concluded this provision “lifts the Board’s authority above that of a homeowner.” The Petitioner failed to provide legal support for her argument that the same maintenance standard must be applied to the Board as is applied to homeowners.
• Jurisdictional Limits: The Tribunal’s role is limited to adjudicating alleged violations of governing documents or statutes. The ALJ noted that a “homeowner’s dissatisfaction with management is not within the purview of this process or the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”
Final Order
The ALJ concluded that Solera was in compliance with its governing documents, including the critical CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1. The Petitioner’s subjective opinions about the timeliness or quality of repairs were deemed irrelevant in the face of the Board’s contractual authority to be the “sole judge.”
Initial Order (August 19, 2020): “IT IS ORDERED Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed and Solera is deemed the prevailing party.”
Rehearing Order (January 8, 2021): “IT IS ORDERED that Solera is the prevailing party with regard to the Rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal is dismissed.” The order was declared binding on the parties.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
This guide provides a review of the administrative case between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent), as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision of August 19, 2020, and the subsequent Rehearing Decision of January 8, 2021.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main issues the petitioner, Debra K. Morin, raised in her initial petition filed on March 12, 2020?
3. Why was the petitioner’s first issue, regarding direct communication, withdrawn during the initial hearing?
4. What was the petitioner’s central argument regarding the maintenance standard that Solera should be held to?
5. According to the CC&Rs, what specific authority does the Solera Board have regarding maintenance, which formed the core of its defense?
6. What type of evidence did the petitioner primarily use to document her claims of poor maintenance in the Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS)?
7. Who is Denise Frazier, and what role did she play in the proceedings?
8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision in the initial hearing on August 19, 2020?
9. On what grounds did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grant the petitioner’s request for a rehearing?
10. What was the final outcome of the case after the rehearing decision was issued on January 8, 2021?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Debra K. Morin, the Petitioner and a homeowner, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Solera), the Respondent. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn, and Solera was represented by Premier Management Company and its on-site general manager.
2. The petitioner’s Issue #1 alleged that Solera, its Board, and its management company “do not allow direct communication from homeowners.” Issue #2 alleged they were not providing oversight to the General Manager in maintaining all Areas of Association Responsibility in good condition and repair at all times.
3. The petitioner withdrew Issue #1 after it was determined that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction does not include interpreting or applying non-governing documents. Her complaint was based on the Solera Code of Ethics, which the Tribunal could not consider.
4. The petitioner argued that the same maintenance standard must be applied to Solera as is applied to homeowners. She contended that if homeowners are required by the governing documents to maintain their lots “in good condition and repair at all times,” then the HOA must be held to the identical standard for common areas (AREAS).
5. Solera’s defense centered on CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which states the Board “shall be the sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all [AREAS].” Additionally, CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5 gives Solera the exclusive right to construe and interpret the CC&Rs.
6. The petitioner presented a large volume of photographic evidence, including over eighty photos for the initial hearing and more for the rehearing. These photographs were intended to document weeds, issues with sidewalks, exposed wiring, storm drains, and other maintenance problems in the common areas.
7. Denise Frazier is the on-site general manager for Solera and an employee of Premier Management Company. She testified on behalf of Solera regarding its maintenance schedules, procedures, reserve studies, and responses to the specific issues raised by the petitioner.
8. In the initial hearing, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petitioner’s petition and deemed Solera the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated a violation of the governing documents, as the CC&Rs grant the Board sole judgment on maintenance matters.
9. The request for a rehearing was granted because the petitioner claimed there were irregularities in the proceedings, misconduct by the prevailing party, and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not supported by the evidence or contrary to law.
10. The rehearing affirmed the original decision. The Administrative Law Judge again concluded that the petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof and that Solera was in compliance with its governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1. The appeal was dismissed, and Solera was again named the prevailing party.
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the central legal conflict in this case by contrasting the petitioner’s interpretation of CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2 with the respondent’s defense based on CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1 and Article 9, Section 9.5. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this interpretive dispute?
2. Discuss the concept of jurisdiction as it applied to this case. Explain why certain arguments and evidence presented by the petitioner—such as the Board’s Code of Ethics, Premier Management Company standards, and City of Chandler ordinances—were deemed outside the Tribunal’s authority to consider.
3. Evaluate the petitioner’s strategy and use of evidence. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of relying heavily on photographic evidence and detailed email complaints. Why did this “enormity” of evidence ultimately fail to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard?
4. Explain the significance of the phrase “sole judge” in CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1. How does this clause grant discretionary authority to the HOA Board, and how did it function as the key element in defeating the petitioner’s claim?
5. Trace the procedural history of the case, from the initial Petition and Motion to Dismiss through the original hearing, the Decision, the Rehearing Request, and the final Rehearing Decision. Identify the key rulings and turning points that determined the ultimate outcome.
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The judge presiding over the administrative hearing at the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Judge Kay Abramsohn.
AREAS (Areas of Association Responsibility)
The common areas within the Solera development that the Homeowners’ Association is responsible for managing, maintaining, repairing, and replacing.
By-Laws
One of the governing documents for the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association.
CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
A primary governing document for the Solera development, specifically the “Solera Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Springfield Lakes.” It outlines the rights and responsibilities of the homeowners and the association.
Denise Frazier
The on-site general manager for Solera, employed by Premier Management Company, who testified on behalf of the association regarding its maintenance operations.
Maintenance Standard
Defined in CC&R Article 1, Section 1.30 as “the standard of maintenance of Improvements established from time to time by the Board and/or the Architectural Review Committee in the Design Guidelines, or in the absence of any such standards, the standards of maintenance of Improvements generally prevailing through the Project.”
Motion to Dismiss
A formal request filed by Solera asking the Department of Real Estate to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the issues were outside the Department’s jurisdiction and the requested relief could not be granted.
Petitioner
The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Debra K. Morin, a homeowner in Solera.
Preponderance of the evidence
The burden of proof in this administrative proceeding. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.
Premier Management Company
The management company hired by Solera to handle day-to-day operations of the community.
Project Documents
The set of governing documents for the community, defined as the CC&Rs, any supplemental declarations, the By-Laws, the R&Rs, and the Design Guidelines.
Respondent
The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
R&Rs (Rules and Regulations)
One of the governing documents for the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association.
Tribunal
A term used in the documents to refer to the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), where the hearing was conducted.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020051-REL-RHG
A Homeowner Took on Her HOA with Over 300 Photos of Evidence. The Reason She Lost Is a Warning for Everyone.
Introduction: The Familiar Fight
It’s a scenario familiar to millions of Americans living in planned communities. You receive a violation notice for a minor infraction on your property, yet when you look at the common areas your HOA is responsible for, you see overgrown weeds, cracked sidewalks, and general disrepair. It feels deeply unfair. Why are homeowners held to a strict standard while the association itself seems to neglect its duties?
This exact frustration drove Debra K. Morin to take on her Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. Armed with over 300 photographs documenting every weed and crack, she was certain her case was airtight. But she lost. The reasons why her case failed are a stark warning for any homeowner, revealing a legal battle that hinged entirely on the community’s binding contract: the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
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The 5 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s HOA Lawsuit
1. The “Sole Judge” Clause: Your HOA’s Ultimate Defense
The single most critical factor in this case was a single clause buried in the HOA’s governing documents. Ms. Morin argued that the HOA must “maintain in good condition and repair at all times” the common areas, believing this was the same standard applied to homeowners. However, the HOA pointed to CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, which designates the HOA Board as the “sole judge as to the appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement” of all common areas.
This clause proved to be an almost impenetrable defense. In essence, the legal standard for maintenance was not what a “reasonable person” would consider good repair, but whatever the Board, in its exclusive judgment, decided was appropriate. Even with extensive photo evidence, the case failed because the contract Ms. Morin agreed to when she bought her home gave the Board the ultimate discretion. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision made this crystal clear:
“While the CC&Rs allow an owner to bring to the Board a complaint, the CC&Rs specify that the Board is the sole judge regarding appropriate maintenance, repair and replacement of all AREAS.”
This “sole judge” clause is the cornerstone of a much broader power imbalance, one that is codified throughout the governing documents.
2. A Power Imbalance Is Written into the Rules
While Ms. Morin argued for an equal standard of responsibility, the legal documents revealed a clear and intentional power imbalance. CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5, granted the HOA the “exclusive right to construe and interpret the provisions of the [CC&Rs],” and stated that its interpretation is “final, conclusive and binding.”
This structure legally transforms the relationship from a partnership of equals into one of administrator and subject, where one party holds the power of final interpretation. The governing documents describe in detail how the HOA can levy penalties against an owner for violations, but they provide no equivalent process for an owner to penalize the HOA for its failures. The judge in the rehearing decision explicitly summarized this built-in hierarchy:
“Thus, it is clear, that pursuant to the governing documents, the Board’s authority is lifted above that of a homeowner.”
With the Board’s authority so clearly established, Ms. Morin’s mountain of evidence was about to run into a contractual brick wall.
3. An “Enormity of Evidence” Isn’t Always the Right Evidence
Ms. Morin presented a significant volume of evidence, starting with over 80 photographs in the first hearing and later referencing what she called an “enormity” of evidence totaling over 300 pictures of weeds, damaged sidewalks, and other maintenance issues.
The critical legal distinction the judge made was that the photographs documented the condition of the common areas, but they did not prove a violation of the governing documents. The legal question was not, “Are there weeds?” The question was, “Did the Board violate a contract that explicitly makes it the sole judge of maintenance?” This demonstrates that in a contract dispute, the quality of evidence is defined by its relevance to the specific contractual terms, not its sheer volume.
4. “At All Times” Doesn’t Mean “Instantly”
A key part of the homeowner’s argument was that the HOA was failing to “maintain in good condition and repair at all times” by allowing maintenance issues to persist for months. In response, the HOA detailed its operational reality. The HOA provided evidence of long-term capital plans, such as sealing street cracks every two years and major sidewalk repairs on a four-year cycle. Daily tasks, like weed control, were handled by landscape crews operating on a continuous, rotating schedule across the large community.
From a legal perspective, “at all times” is interpreted through the lens of operational reasonableness for a large entity, not as a guarantee of immediate perfection. For an organization managing a vast property, this standard is met through consistent processes and schedules, not by fixing every issue the moment it is reported.
5. Your Dissatisfaction Is Not a Lawsuit
At its heart, the case was driven by Ms. Morin’s deep frustration. The judge recognized that her petition stemmed from a core belief that the Board and its General Manager were unresponsive and providing poor oversight. While these feelings may have been valid, they were not legally actionable on their own. The judge’s decision in the rehearing drew a firm line between a homeowner’s frustration and a legal claim:
“However, a homeowner’s dissatisfaction with management is not within the purview of this process or the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”
This highlights a common misconception: while feelings of poor customer service are valid, they are legally irrelevant unless they can be tied to a specific, provable breach of the governing documents or a violation of state law.
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Conclusion: Read Before You Sign
The primary lesson from this case is the absolute authority of a community’s governing documents. In any dispute, the specific, written words of the CC&Rs—the contract you sign when you buy your home—will almost always outweigh a homeowner’s subjective standards, sense of fairness, or even a mountain of photographic evidence.
This case serves as a powerful reminder that from a contractual standpoint, the rules are not always designed to be “fair,” but to be enforceable. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question:
Before you complain about your HOA, have you read the rulebook they’re playing by—and that you agreed to?
CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5
Outcome Summary
The ALJ concluded that Foothills demonstrated Respondents' violation of the community governing documents by commencing and continuing construction of a second-story Addition without obtaining the required Architectural Committee approval. Foothills was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondents' appeal was dismissed.
Key Issues & Findings
Unauthorized 2nd story addition
Respondents constructed a second-story Addition to their property without first obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee, violating the community governing documents.
Orders: Respondents’ appeal is dismissed, and Foothills is deemed the prevailing party with regard to its Petition.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3
CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3
CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4
CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
Analytics Highlights
Topics: architectural review, cc&r violation, unapproved construction, second story addition, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2120004-REL Decision – 839537.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:43 (135.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120004-REL
Briefing Document: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Foothills Club West Homeowners Association v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust (No. 21F-H2120004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core dispute involved the construction of a second-story addition by homeowners (Respondents) without the prior approval of the Homeowners Association (Petitioner), a direct violation of the community’s governing documents.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found conclusively in favor of the Foothills Club West HOA. The evidence demonstrated that the Respondents not only began construction without seeking approval but continued the project even after receiving a formal denial from the HOA’s Architectural Committee. A subsequent agreement between the parties, wherein the Respondents would demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines, was not honored by the Respondents. The ALJ dismissed the Respondents’ appeal and declared the HOA the prevailing party, validating its authority to enforce the community’s architectural standards as outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
I. Case Overview
• Case Name: Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, Petitioner, v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust, Respondent.
• Case Number: 21F-H2120004-REL
• Jurisdiction: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Administrative Law Judge: Kay Abramsohn
• Hearing Date: October 5, 2020
• Decision Date: November 27, 2020
• Central Issue: The petition filed by Foothills HOA on July 24, 2020, alleged that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. This action was alleged to be in violation of CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5.
II. Chronology of Key Events
The hearing record established the following undisputed sequence of events:
Oct. 2018
Respondents begin construction of the second-story addition.
Nov. 7, 2018
The City of Phoenix issues a stop-work order, noting a permit is required.
Nov. 7, 2018
Foothills HOA issues a violation notice to the Respondents.
Dec. 17, 2018
Respondents obtain a permit from the City of Phoenix.
Jan. 18, 2019 (approx.)
Respondents submit a request for approval to the Foothills Architectural Committee.
Jan. 18, 2019
Foothills HOA issues a penalty notice to the Respondents, with further notices issued monthly.
Feb. 22, 2019
Foothills HOA issues a formal denial of the application.
Mar. 15, 2019
The City of Phoenix gives final approval to the construction and issues a Certificate of Occupancy.
Post Feb. 2019
The parties reach an agreement for Respondents to demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines.
July 24, 2020
Foothills HOA files its petition, noting Respondents have not complied with the demolition agreement.
Oct. 5, 2020
The administrative hearing is held.
Nov. 27, 2020
The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.
III. Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioner: Foothills Club West HOA
• Violation of CC&Rs: The HOA argued that the Respondents violated CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 by commencing construction without first obtaining approval from the Architectural Committee.
• Disregard for Denial: The HOA asserted that the Respondents completed the addition after receiving a formal denial of their application.
• Breach of Agreement: The HOA noted that the parties had reached a settlement agreement for demolition, which the Respondents failed to honor. The HOA requested that the Tribunal enforce this agreement.
• Jurisdictional Distinction: The HOA maintained that approval from the City of Phoenix was a separate matter and did not negate the requirement to obtain approval from the HOA as mandated by the governing documents.
B. Respondents: Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust
• Initial Ignorance: Respondents claimed they were initially unaware of the HOA approval requirements.
• Attempted Compliance: They argued that once notified, they followed the association’s guidance, met with the Board, and sought approval.
• Vague Denial: Respondents stated they did not understand the meaning of the denial reason, “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community,” or how the addition specifically violated community rules.
• Lack of Due Process: They argued they did not receive a letter indicating an appeal process was available and therefore felt they had not received a final “denial.”
• Demolition Delay: While not disputing the existence of the demolition agreement, Respondents cited COVID-19 issues and safety concerns for their at-risk family as reasons for requesting more time.
• Final Appeal: At the hearing, Respondents reversed their position on the agreement and requested to be allowed to keep the addition.
IV. Analysis of Governing Documents
The decision centered on specific provisions within the Foothills Club West governing documents, which constitute the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.
• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 (Architectural Approval): This section was central to the case. It states in pertinent part:
• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4 (Obligation to Obtain Approval): This provision explicitly sets forth a homeowner’s obligation to secure approval from the Architectural Committee.
• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5 (Exterior Appearance): This section clarifies that while the HOA cannot limit interior remodeling, it retains jurisdiction over any changes that are “visible from outside such [home] … or affects the exterior appearance of such [home].”
• Amended Architectural Guidelines (2013): These guidelines reinforce the CC&Rs, specifying that a homeowner’s plans must be submitted for approval through the Architectural Committee on a case-by-case basis.
V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s conclusions of law provided a clear framework for the final order.
A. Burden of Proof
The ALJ established that in this proceeding, the petitioner (Foothills HOA) bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondents had violated the governing documents. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
B. Core Conclusion on Violations
The ALJ found that the HOA had successfully met its burden of proof. The central conclusion of law states:
“The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Foothills has demonstrated Respondents’ violation of the community governing documents, as stated in CC&R Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5, because Respondents began to construct a modification, the Addition, to their existing home prior to obtaining approval from Foothills Architectural Committee and, further, Respondents continued to construct the Addition despite receiving a denial of approval from Foothills Architectural Committee.”
This finding affirmed that the Respondents committed two distinct violations: starting work without approval and continuing work after being explicitly denied approval.
VI. Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the ALJ issued a decisive order.
• Order:
• Binding Nature: The decision notes that the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is requested. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120004-REL
Study Guide: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 21F-H2120004-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the document.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who are the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?
2. What was the single issue raised in the petition filed by Foothills Club West Homeowners Association?
3. According to the Petition, which specific articles and sections of the governing documents did the Respondents allegedly violate?
4. What action did the City of Phoenix take on November 7, 2018, regarding the Respondents’ construction project?
5. What reasons did the Foothills Architectural Committee provide for denying the Respondents’ application on February 22, 2019?
6. Prior to the hearing, what agreement did the parties reach in an attempt to resolve the dispute?
7. What was the Respondents’ primary argument for their actions and for their failure to comply with the association’s denial?
8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?
9. Explain the difference between the City of Phoenix’s approval and the Foothills Architectural Committee’s approval, as argued by the Petitioner.
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner is the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association (“Foothills”). The Respondent is the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust. Their relationship is that of a homeowners’ association and a member homeowner residing within the planned community for 22 years.
2. The single issue raised was that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. The construction was completed even after the Foothills Architectural Committee had issued a denial of the project.
3. Foothills alleged that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. These articles pertain to the rights and obligations of the association and the architectural standards requiring prior approval for modifications.
4. On November 7, 2018, the City of Phoenix issued a stop-work order for the Respondents’ construction project. The order noted that the work being performed required a permit, which had not yet been obtained.
5. The Foothills Architectural Committee denied the application because it needed copies of the City permit, the plans were incomplete, and there was no documentation on the roof line or roofing materials. Furthermore, the denial stated that the project “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community.”
6. The parties came to an agreement wherein the Respondents would complete the demolition of the second-story addition. In exchange, Foothills agreed to waive the penalties that had been imposed on the Respondents for the violation.
7. The Respondents argued that they initially did not know what was required and that they cooperated with the association’s Board once notified. They claimed they did not understand what “Fails aesthetics” meant, did not receive a letter about an appeal process, and therefore did not feel they had received a final “denial.”
8. The legal standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Foothills, bore the burden of proving the Respondents’ violation by this standard.
9. Foothills argued that approval from the City of Phoenix and approval from the association’s Architectural Committee were two different and separate matters. Even though the Respondents eventually received a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy, this did not override the CC&R requirement to first obtain approval from Foothills.
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Respondents’ appeal be dismissed. The Judge deemed Foothills the prevailing party with regard to its petition, finding that Foothills had demonstrated the Respondents’ violation of the community’s governing documents.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing evidence and support directly from the provided legal decision.
1. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner (Foothills) and the Respondents at the hearing. Discuss the key evidence and claims each party used to support their position and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s case more persuasive.
2. Explain the distinct roles and jurisdictions of the Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee and the City of Phoenix regarding the Respondents’ construction project. Why was obtaining a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy insufficient for the Respondents to proceed without violating the community’s governing documents?
3. Trace the procedural history of case No. 21F-H2120004-REL, from the filing of the initial petition to the final order. Discuss key filings, motions, and deadlines mentioned in the document, including the Respondents’ attempt to consolidate another case.
4. Discuss the significance of the “contract” between the parties, as defined in footnote 15. How do the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines function as this contract, and which specific sections were central to the judge’s conclusion that a violation occurred?
5. Evaluate the Respondents’ attempt to justify their failure to demolish the addition as per their agreement with Foothills, citing COVID-19 issues. How did their request at the hearing to keep the addition conflict with their prior agreement, and what does this reveal about their position in the dispute?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues decisions.
Architectural Committee
A committee appointed by the Foothills HOA, as established by CC&R Article 9, with the authority to review, approve, or disapprove plans for construction, modifications, and additions to properties within the community.
An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that form a binding contract between the homeowners association and the property owners, outlining their rights and obligations.
Disclosure
The formal process by which parties in a legal case provide evidence, exhibits, and information to each other before a hearing. The deadline for disclosure in this case was September 29, 2020.
Governing Documents
The set of rules for the planned community, including the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines, which have the same force and effect as association rules.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association.
Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to initiate a hearing concerning violations of community governing documents. In this case, it was a “single-issue petition.”
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust.
Tribunal
The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, the state agency authorized by statute to hear and decide contested matters referred to it, such as this dispute.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120004-REL
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21F-H2120004-REL
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This text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association and the Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust. The Petitioner, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, filed a petition alleging that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized second-story addition to their property in violation of the association’s governing documents, specifically the CC&Rs Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Respondents violated these community documents by beginning construction prior to obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee and continuing the work despite receiving a denial. The judge ultimately concluded that Foothills was the prevailing party and dismissed the Respondents’ appeal, effectively upholding the violation finding.
What are the specific governing document violations alleged and proven against the homeowners?
How did the legal and administrative process address the unauthorized construction dispute?
What was the final resolution ordered regarding the unapproved second-story home addition?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John Halk(HOA attorney) BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC Represented Petitioner Foothills Club West Homeowners Association
Nathan Tennyson(HOA attorney) BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC Counsel for Petitioner
Respondent Side
Mary T. Hone(Respondent attorney) Mary T. Hone, PLLC Counsel for Respondent Trustees Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar
Subrahmanyam Sudhakar(respondent) Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust
Sheila Sudhakar(respondent) Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Administrative Law Judge
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
AHansen(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
djones(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
DGardner(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
ncano(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
Petitioners were the prevailing party because the Respondent acknowledged violating the CC&Rs by approving the pergola. Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee, but the request for a civil penalty was denied.
Key Issues & Findings
View Obstruction by Pergola Approval
Petitioners alleged that Respondent, by granting approval in February 2018 for the construction of a pergola on lot 47, violated the CC&Rs requirement that an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains be maintained for owners of View Lots (Lot 46) and sought a civil penalty.
Orders: Respondent acknowledged the violation, rescinded the pergola approval prior to the Notice of Hearing, and was ordered to pay Petitioners the $500.00 filing fee. A civil penalty was sought but denied.
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (No. 21F-H2120005-REL). The central conflict involved an allegation by Petitioners that the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving a pergola on an adjacent property that obstructed their mountain view.
The Respondent initially defended its approval but, after the Petitioners filed a formal complaint, reversed its position, admitted the approval was an error, and rescinded it. Despite this corrective action, the hearing proceeded. The ALJ’s final decision declared the Petitioners the “prevailing party,” as their legal action prompted the resolution. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioners’ $500 filing fee. However, the ALJ denied the Petitioners’ request for an additional civil penalty, stating they had not met the burden of proof for such an assessment. The decision effectively resolved the core dispute in the Petitioners’ favor while limiting the financial penalty on the Respondent.
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Case Overview
This matter was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute over view obstruction within a planned community.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges, Petitioner, vs. San Ignacio Heights, Inc., Respondent.
Case Number
21F-H2120005-REL
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Hearing Date
November 3, 2020
Decision Date
November 20, 2020
Core Allegation
Respondent violated its own CC&Rs, specifically Article VI (D) “View Obstructions,” which mandates that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”
Petitioners’ Property
Lot 46, located at 1546 West Acala Street in Green Valley, a designated “view lot.”
Disputed Structure
A pergola constructed on the neighboring Lot 47.
The hearing was conducted without testimony, with the decision based on the administrative record and closing arguments from both parties.
Chronology of Key Events
The dispute unfolded over a period of more than two years, marked by the Respondent’s significant change in position after formal legal action was initiated.
• February 2018: The Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) grants approval to the owners of Lot 47 to construct a pergola.
• On or Before July 30, 2018: Petitioners purchase Lot 46. They contend the pergola was built after the previous owners of their lot had moved but before their purchase was finalized.
• December 2019: Petitioners attempt to resolve the issue directly with the owners of Lot 47 but are unsuccessful.
• January 15, 2020: In a letter, the Respondent’s Board informs the Petitioners that it is standing by its February 2018 decision to approve the pergola.
• July 24, 2020: Petitioners file a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• August 20, 2020: The Respondent’s Board holds a special executive session and determines that the approval of the pergola was “made in error.” The Board rescinds the approval.
• August 25, 2020: The Respondent files its answer to the petition, stating the approval has been rescinded and requesting the Department dismiss the matter.
• October 5, 2020: The Department does not dismiss the matter and issues a Notice of Hearing.
• November 3, 2020: At the hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informs the tribunal that a contractor is scheduled to remove the pergola on the following day.
Central Arguments and Positions
Petitioners (Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges)
• Violation: The pergola on Lot 47 constitutes a view obstruction in direct violation of CC&R Article VI(D).
• Relief Sought: The Petitioners initially sought the removal of the structure. After the Respondent rescinded its approval, the Petitioners argued that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty for the violation.
Respondent (San Ignacio Heights, Inc.)
• Initial Defense (Pre-Litigation): The Respondent offered two primary reasons for upholding its initial approval:
1. The previous owners of the Petitioners’ lot (Lot 46) were given notice of the pergola request and did not object at the time of its approval in February 2018.
2. The configuration of the nine lots on West Acala Street makes a “truly unobstructed view” impossible, and for the Petitioners, achieving such a view would require removing eight other houses.
• Post-Petition Position: After the formal petition was filed, the Respondent’s position shifted entirely.
1. Admission of Error: The Respondent formally acknowledged that the approval of the pergola was a mistake and rescinded it.
2. Mootness: The Respondent argued that because it had provided the relief the Petitioners requested (rescission of approval), the matter was resolved and should be dismissed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s decision addressed the acknowledged violation, the status of the parties, and the appropriateness of financial penalties.
Findings on the Violation
• The Respondent explicitly acknowledged its violation of CC&R Article VI(D) by granting approval for the pergola.
• Because the Respondent had already rescinded its approval and the structure was scheduled for removal, the ALJ determined that an order compelling the Respondent to abide by the CC&Rs was unnecessary.
Prevailing Party Status
• Despite the Respondent’s admission of error and corrective actions occurring before the formal hearing, the ALJ designated the Petitioners as the prevailing party.
• The rationale is that the Petitioners’ legal action was the catalyst for the Respondent’s decision to rescind its approval and resolve the violation.
Financial Orders and Penalties
• Filing Fee: Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), the ALJ is required to order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee if the petitioner prevails. Consequently, the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioners’ $500.00 filing fee.
• Civil Penalty: The Petitioners argued for the assessment of a civil penalty against the Respondent. The ALJ denied this request, stating in the Conclusions of Law that “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.” The decision does not provide further detail on the reasoning for this conclusion.
Legal Framework
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate has authority over the matter under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11, as the case involves alleged violations of community documents.
• Standard of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proof, which is a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119.
Final Order
The decision, issued on November 20, 2020, concluded with the following binding orders:
1. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges are the prevailing party in this matter.
2. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent San Ignacio Heights Inc. must pay to Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of receipt of the Order.
The order is final unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120005-REL
Study Guide: Fern & Hedges v. San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2120005-REL)
This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Donald S. Fern & Judith A. Hedges (Petitioners) and San Ignacio Heights, Inc. (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms.
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Short Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?
2. What specific rule from the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?
3. What physical structure caused the dispute, and where was it located relative to the Petitioners’ property?
4. What two arguments did the Respondent initially use to defend its decision to approve the structure?
5. At what point did the Respondent’s Board change its position, and what action did it take?
6. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party had the burden of meeting it?
7. Despite the Respondent admitting its error before the hearing, why were the Petitioners declared the “prevailing party”?
8. What specific financial penalty was ordered against the Respondent in the final decision?
9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge decide not to levy a civil penalty against the Respondent?
10. What did the Respondent’s counsel state at the hearing regarding the future of the structure in question?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges, and the Respondent, their homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc. The Petitioners filed a complaint against the homeowners’ association for allegedly violating community rules.
2. The dispute centered on Article VI (D) of the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” titled “View Obstructions.” This rule states that “An unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains shall be maintained for Owners of View Lots.”
3. The dispute was caused by a pergola that the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) approved for construction on lot 47. This lot was adjacent to the Petitioners’ property, lot 46, which is designated as a “view lot” under the CC&Rs.
4. The Respondent initially argued that the approval was valid because (1) the previous owners of lot 46 were notified but did not object, and (2) the configuration of the lots meant a truly unobstructed view was impossible and would require removing eight other houses.
5. The Board changed its position on August 20, 2020, after the Petitioners had already filed their complaint. In a special executive session, the Board determined its February 2018 approval of the pergola was an error and officially rescinded that approval.
6. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.
7. The Petitioners were declared the “prevailing party” because their legal action was the cause of the Respondent’s decision to rescind the erroneous approval. Under Arizona statute, a tribunal is required to order the respondent to pay the filing fee to the prevailing party.
8. The Judge ordered the Respondent, San Ignacio Heights Inc., to pay the Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00. The payment was to be made within thirty days of receipt of the order.
9. The Judge did not levy a civil penalty because the decision explicitly states, “Petitioners have not proven that the Respondent should be assessed a civil penalty.”
10. At the November 3, 2020 hearing, the Respondent’s counsel informed the tribunal that the owners of lot 47 had a contractor scheduled to remove the pergola the very next day.
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Essay Questions for Further Study
The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the timeline of events from the initial approval of the pergola in February 2018 to the final order in November 2020. How did the Respondent’s actions and communications contribute to the escalation of the dispute, and at what points could it have potentially been resolved before reaching a formal hearing?
2. Discuss the legal concept of the “prevailing party” as it applies to this case. Explain why the Petitioners were granted this status and what financial remedy it entitled them to, even though the Respondent had already conceded the central issue before the hearing.
3. Examine the two initial arguments made by the Respondent to justify its approval of the pergola. Based on the case outcome, why were these arguments ultimately insufficient to defend its position, leading the Board to rescind its approval?
4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the role and authority of the Administrative Law Judge in this type of dispute. What specific powers did the judge have according to Arizona statutes, and how were they applied or not applied in the final order?
5. The decision notes that no testimony was taken and the ruling was based on the administrative record. Discuss the potential advantages and disadvantages of this approach for both the Petitioners and the Respondent in this specific case.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders a binding legal decision and order.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
The section of Arizona’s administrative rules cited in the decision that establishes the “preponderance of the evidence” as the standard of proof for the matter.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
The Arizona state law that grants the ALJ the authority to order parties to abide by community documents, levy civil penalties, and order a losing respondent to pay the prevailing petitioner’s filing fee.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.
An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. In this case, it refers to the “Second Amended and Restated Declaration of CC&Rs,” the official governing documents for the San Ignacio Heights community.
Civil Penalty
A monetary fine that an ALJ may levy for each violation of a statute or community document. A civil penalty was considered but not assessed in this case.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency with legal authority over disputes concerning alleged violations of a community’s CC&Rs.
Filing Fee
The fee ($500.00 in this case) required by Arizona statute to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate. The Judge ordered the Respondent to repay this fee to the Petitioners.
Petitioner
The party that initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, homeowners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in the hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Prevailing Party
The party that wins a legal case. The Petitioners were declared the prevailing party, which legally entitled them to have their filing fee reimbursed by the Respondent.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the homeowners’ association, San Ignacio Heights, Inc.
View Lot
A specific property designation defined in the CC&Rs, such as the Petitioners’ lot 46, which is guaranteed an unobstructed view of the Santa Rita Mountains.
View Obstructions
The title of Article VI (D) of the CC&Rs, the specific rule that the Petitioners alleged the Respondent violated by approving the construction of the pergola.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120005-REL
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This administrative law judge decision details a dispute between Petitioners Donald S. Fern and Judith A. Hedges and Respondent San Ignacio Heights, Inc. regarding a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The petitioners alleged that a pergola approved by the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee was a view obstruction in violation of Article VI(D) of the CC&Rs. Although the Respondent acknowledged its error and rescinded the approval for the pergola before the hearing, the matter was not dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioners to be the prevailing party and ordered the Respondent to pay the petitioners’ $500 filing fee, though no additional civil penalty was assessed.
What are the core legal and procedural issues decided in this administrative hearing?
How did the Respondent’s actions impact the Petitioners’ prevailing party status and remedy?
What is the significance of the CC&Rs and view obstruction clause in this dispute?
Audio Overview
Video Overview Video Overview
Mind Map Mind Map
Reports Reports
Flashcards Flashcards
Quiz Quiz
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Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Donald S Fern(petitioner)
Judith A. Hedges(petitioner)
Lance Leslie(petitioner attorney) Law Office of Susan A Siwek
Respondent Side
Michael S. Shupe(respondent attorney) Goldschmidt | Shupe, PLLC
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Listed as recipient of transmission
The petition was dismissed as the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated CC&R section 7.1(C) or ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248. The rule limiting sign use was deemed reasonable.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on both issues.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged unreasonable discrimination in adopting rules regarding common elements (monument sign)
Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&R 7.1(C) by adopting a rule limiting the use of the common element monument sign to only owners in Building B, arguing this was unreasonable discrimination against Building A owners.
Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.
Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
CC&R section 7.1(C)
CC&R section 6.26(a)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217
Alleged open meeting law violation at the June 10, 2020 Board meeting
Petitioner alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by communicating via email and reaching a decision prior to the June 10, 2020 meeting, claiming the President called for a vote without discussion.
Orders: Petition dismissed for this issue.
Filing fee: $250.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Condominium, Commercial HOA, Signage rules, Open meeting law, Discrimination
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248
CC&R section 7.1(C)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2120003-REL Decision – 837073.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:29 (103.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120003-REL
Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association: A Briefing on the Monument Sign Dispute
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between Keith D. Smith, a commercial condominium unit owner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. The core of the dispute is a rule enacted by the Association on June 10, 2020, which restricts the use of a common element monument sign exclusively to unit owners in one of the property’s two buildings.
Mr. Smith filed a petition alleging two primary violations:
1. Unreasonable Discrimination: The sign rule violated the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by unfairly discriminating against owners in his building.
2. Open Meeting Law Violation: The Association’s Board violated state open meeting laws by allegedly deciding on the rule via email before the public meeting and calling for a vote without discussion.
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Smith’s petition in an initial decision on November 16, 2020, and again after a rehearing in a final decision on June 3, 2021. The judge concluded that Mr. Smith failed to meet his burden of proof on both claims. The sign rule was deemed a reasonable measure to address the differing visibility and street frontage of the two buildings. The allegation of an open meeting law violation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence from the petitioner and credible contradictory testimony from the Association’s representatives.
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Case Overview
This matter was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involves a petition filed by a unit owner against his condominium association regarding rules governing common elements.
July 24, 2020: Petition filed by Keith D. Smith. October 26, 2020: Original hearing conducted. November 16, 2020: Initial decision issued, dismissing the petition. June 3, 2021: Rehearing decision issued, reaffirming dismissal.
Central Issues and Allegations
The dispute centered on a monument sign with space for only five businesses at a commercial condominium property consisting of two buildings, Building A and Building B.
1. The Monument Sign Rule (CC&R Violation)
At a meeting on June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a rule limiting the use of the monument sign to unit owners in Building B. Mr. Smith, an owner in Building A, alleged this violated the Association’s governing documents.
• Petitioner’s Allegations:
◦ The rule violates CC&R Section 7.1(C), which states that rules “shall not unreasonably discriminate among Owners and Occupants.”
◦ The rule violates the principle of CC&R Section 6.26(a), which requires use restrictions within Article 6 of the CC&Rs to be applicable to all occupants.
◦ As an owner, Mr. Smith holds an undivided interest in the common elements, meaning no owner should have exclusive use of the sign. He argued the rule amounted to an improper “partition” of a common element.
• Respondent’s Position:
◦ The rule is reasonable and non-discriminatory because it addresses a fundamental inequity in property layout: Building A has street frontage for signage, while Building B does not.
◦ The limited space on the monument sign (five slots) necessitates a managed approach to its use.
◦ While initially questioning if the sign was a common element, the Association waived this argument by acknowledging it as such in its official answer.
2. The June 10, 2020 Board Meeting (Open Meeting Law Violation)
Mr. Smith alleged that the Board’s conduct during the meeting at which the rule was passed violated Arizona’s open meeting law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248.
• Petitioner’s Allegations:
◦ The Association’s president called for a vote on the new rule “without discussion,” implying a decision had already been made.
◦ Mr. Smith asserted that Board members must have “Obviously communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”
• Respondent’s Position:
◦ Association President Stuart Rayburn and witness Harold Bordelon provided “credible testimony” that a “protracted discussion lasting about an hour and a half” occurred before the vote.
◦ They testified that Mr. Smith himself spoke for approximately twenty minutes during this discussion.
Evidence and Proposed Solutions
• Petitioner’s Evidence: Mr. Smith testified on his own behalf and submitted an email from the City of Phoenix regarding signage rules. He also presented two estimates for altering the monument sign to accommodate more businesses—one by reducing the size of existing signs (which he offered to fund) and another by enlarging the monument itself.
• Respondent’s Evidence: The Association presented testimony from its president, Stuart Rayburn, and Harold Bordelon. They submitted Section 705 of the City of Phoenix’s Zoning Ordinance, which they argued showed flexibility in the sign code. Mr. Bordelon testified that some of Mr. Smith’s proposed alterations to the sign did not comply with the city code.
Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale
The ALJ’s decisions in both the original hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the dismissal of Mr. Smith’s petition. The core rationale rested on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.
Original Decision (November 16, 2020)
The initial ruling found decisively in favor of the Association.
• On the CC&R Violation: The ALJ concluded that Mr. Smith did not prove a violation of CC&R Section 7.1(C) for two primary reasons:
1. The rule was not unreasonable, as it rationally addressed the physical disadvantage of Building B, which “does not have street frontage,” compared to Building A, which does.
2. Mr. Smith’s reliance on CC&R Section 6.26(a) was misplaced, as “by its express terms, CC&R section 6.26 applies only to CC&R Article 6, and not Article 7,” where the Board’s authority to make rules resides.
• On the Open Meeting Law Violation: The ALJ found the allegation unsupported.
◦ Mr. Smith “offered no substantial evidence” for his claim of pre-meeting communication.
◦ His testimony that the Board called for a vote “without discussion is proven to be in error” based on credible opposing testimony.
Rehearing Decision (June 3, 2021)
Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularities, errors of law, and claims that the findings were arbitrary or not supported by evidence. The ALJ granted the rehearing but ultimately reaffirmed the original decision.
• Scope of the Rehearing: The judge clarified that the rehearing was limited to the two original issues and could not consider new evidence or allegations not raised in the initial petition.
◦ Evidence that Mr. Smith claimed to have (an email supporting the open meeting violation) was not considered because it was not offered at the original hearing.
◦ Arguments related to new statutes (e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217 on partitioning common elements) were dismissed as they were not part of the original petition.
• Reaffirmation of Rulings:
◦ The judge reiterated that CC&R Section 6.26(a) explicitly limits its effect to Article 6. He noted that Mr. Smith himself had argued the CC&Rs “should be read and applied as one continuous document unless the document clearly states otherwise,” which it did in this case.
◦ The conclusion that the sign rule was reasonable was upheld.
◦ The dismissal of the open meeting law claim was reaffirmed, as Mr. Smith still presented no substantial evidence, instead relying on a “rhetorical question” about how a vote could be called without prior communication.
Key Legal Standards Applied
The ALJ’s decisions were guided by specific legal principles and administrative codes.
Standard
Application in the Case
Burden of Proof
The Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden to prove his allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded this standard was not met.
Preponderance of the Evidence
Defined as evidence with the “most convincing force” that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Substantial Evidence
The standard required for an ALJ’s decision, defined as evidence a “reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion.”
Scope of Adjudication
The hearing and subsequent decisions were strictly limited to the issues formally raised and paid for in the original petition, pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(F)(6).
Admissibility of Evidence
Evidence not presented at the original hearing cannot be considered in a rehearing, as established by ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-115.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120003-REL
Study Guide: Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Keith D. Smith v. Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, based on the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision and the subsequent Decision on Rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the proceedings.
Quiz: Short Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two central allegations Keith D. Smith made against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association in his petition?
3. What specific action did the Association’s Board take on June 10, 2020, that initiated this dispute?
4. What justification did the Association provide for creating a rule that exclusively benefited the owners of units in Building B?
5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reject Mr. Smith’s argument that the sign rule violated CC&R section 6.26(a)?
6. What was the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of meeting it in this case?
7. Why was Mr. Smith’s allegation of an open meeting law violation dismissed in the original hearing?
8. What were the primary grounds Mr. Smith cited when requesting a rehearing of the initial decision?
9. In the rehearing, Mr. Smith mentioned having an email that supported his open meeting law claim. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider this evidence?
10. What was the final outcome of both the original hearing on October 26, 2020, and the subsequent rehearing decision on June 3, 2021?
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Quiz Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Keith D. Smith, the Petitioner, and the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association, the Respondent. Mr. Smith, an owner of a unit in Building A, filed a petition alleging violations by the Association, which manages the common elements of the condominium complex.
2. Mr. Smith alleged that the Association had violated CC&R section 7.1(C) by creating an unreasonable and discriminatory rule. He also alleged a violation of the open meeting law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248, claiming the Board made its decision before the public meeting.
3. On June 10, 2020, the Association’s Board adopted a new rule regarding the monument sign, a common element. This rule limited the use of the sign, which had space for only five businesses, to the owners of units located in Building B.
4. The Association argued the rule was reasonable because Building A has street frontage where signs can be hung, providing visibility. In contrast, Building B lacks street frontage, making the monument sign a critical advertising tool for its occupants.
5. The ALJ rejected the argument because the text of CC&R section 6.26(a) explicitly states its applicability is limited to the restrictions “contained in this Article 6.” The disputed rule was created under the authority of Article 7, so the non-discrimination clause of Article 6 did not apply.
6. The “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring that the evidence be of greater weight and more convincing force, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue. In this administrative hearing, the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith, bore the burden of proof to show the alleged violations occurred by this standard.
7. The allegation was dismissed due to a lack of substantial evidence. Mr. Smith acknowledged he had no emails to support his claim of prior communication, and the credible testimony of Stuart Rayburn and Harold Bordelon established that a lengthy discussion did occur at the meeting before the vote was taken.
8. Mr. Smith requested a rehearing on several grounds, including alleged irregularity in the proceedings, abuse of discretion by the ALJ, errors of law (such as in the admission or rejection of evidence), and that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and not supported by the evidence.
9. The ALJ refused to consider the email because evidence must be presented during the original hearing. Since Mr. Smith did not offer the document at the October 26, 2020 hearing, it could not be introduced for the first time in a request for a rehearing.
10. In both the original hearing decision (November 16, 2020) and the rehearing decision (June 3, 2021), Keith D. Smith’s petition was dismissed. The ALJ consistently found that Mr. Smith had failed to meet his burden of proof for both the CC&R violation and the open meeting law violation.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: Formulate detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from both administrative decisions.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning employed by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden to conclude that the monument sign rule was not an “unreasonable” discrimination among owners under CC&R section 7.1(c).
2. Trace the evolution of Keith D. Smith’s open meeting law allegation from his initial petition through his request for rehearing. Discuss the specific evidence presented (or lack thereof) and explain why the ALJ found his claims unconvincing at every stage.
3. Explain the concept of procedural limitations in administrative hearings, using Mr. Smith’s case as an example. Focus on why the ALJ could only consider two issues, why new evidence was rejected on rehearing, and why other “perceived deficiencies” were not addressed.
4. Discuss the significance of the “common elements” in this dispute. How did Mr. Smith’s claim of an “undivided interest” in the monument sign contrast with the Association’s right to regulate its use, and how was this conflict ultimately resolved by the ALJ?
5. Evaluate the arguments presented regarding CC&R section 6.26(a). Explain Mr. Smith’s interpretation of the clause and the ALJ’s contrary interpretation based on the explicit text of the document.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Sections 33-1248 (open meeting law) and 33-1217 (partition of common elements) were cited.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Keith D. Smith.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)
The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. The key sections in this case were 6.10, 6.24, 6.26(a), and 7.1(c).
Common Elements
Parts of a condominium property that are owned in common by all unit owners and managed by the association. The monument sign was acknowledged by the Association as a common element.
Monument Sign
A freestanding sign at the property entrance that was the central subject of the dispute. It had space for only five businesses to advertise.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency where the hearings for this case were conducted.
Open Meeting Law
A state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1248) requiring that meetings of governing bodies, like an HOA board, be conducted in public with proper notice and opportunity for member input.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Keith D. Smith.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to reconsider the initial decision, typically granted on specific grounds such as procedural error or a decision contrary to evidence. Mr. Smith’s request for rehearing was granted but the original decision was upheld.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association.
Substantial Evidence
Evidence that a reasonable mind would use to reach a conclusion. The ALJ found that Mr. Smith offered no substantial evidence for his open meeting law claim.
Waived
The voluntary relinquishment of a known right or argument. The Association waived its argument that the monument sign was not a common element by acknowledging that it was in its official Answer.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120003-REL
I Read a 17-Page HOA Lawsuit Over a Sign. Here Are 5 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner.
Introduction: The Signpost to a Bigger Story
For anyone living in a community with a Homeowner or Condominium Association, the rulebook can feel like a source of endless frustration. The rules often seem complex, arbitrary, and difficult to challenge. But what really happens when an owner decides to fight back?
I recently analyzed the initial ruling and final rehearing decision—17 pages in all—from just such a fight: a formal petition filed by Keith D. Smith against the Sierra Foothills Condominium Association. This wasn’t a residential dispute over lawn ornaments or paint colors; it was a commercial conflict over who was allowed to use a single monument sign. But within this seemingly small micro-drama are universal lessons that are shockingly relevant to any owner navigating a dispute with their association.
Here are five surprising lessons from Mr. Smith’s legal battle that every owner should understand.
1. Read the Fine Print. No,ReallyRead It.
Mr. Smith’s primary argument was one of unfair discrimination. He owned a unit in Building A and was prohibited from using the monument sign, a common element, while owners in Building B were allowed to use it. He pointed to a specific rule in the governing documents, CC&R section 6.26(a), which stated that use restrictions must be applicable to all owners. This seemed like a clear-cut case of the board violating its own rules.
He lost. The reason was a tiny but critical detail in the fine print. The judge found that the non-discrimination clause Mr. Smith cited explicitly stated it only applied to rules “contained in this Article 6.” The board’s authority to create the sign rule came from a different section entirely, “Article 7,” specifically section 7.1(c), which did not contain the same mandate for equal application.
The judge’s finding on the rehearing was conclusive:
“Section 6.26(a) provides that the use restrictions ‘contained in this Article 6’ are applicable to all owners. Consequently, section 6.26(a) cannot be read to require that rules promulgated under section 7.1(c) must apply to all owners.”
The specific structure and wording of your governing documents are paramount. An assumption about a rule’s general intent is not enough. A single phrase—like “in this Article 6″—can make or break an entire legal argument.
2. What Feels Unfair Isn’t Always Legally “Unreasonable”
From Mr. Smith’s perspective, the situation was fundamentally unfair. As a property owner, he had an undivided interest in all common elements, including the monument sign. To be completely excluded from using it felt like a violation of his ownership rights.
However, the Association and the judge saw it differently. The rule was deemed legally “reasonable” for two logical and practical reasons:
1. The sign had a very limited number of spaces—only five businesses could be advertised.
2. Building A, where Mr. Smith’s unit was located, had valuable street frontage where businesses could place their own signs. Building B, in contrast, had no street frontage, making the monument sign the primary and essential tool for visibility for those businesses.
This is where the fine print from the first lesson comes roaring back. The judge noted that the board’s authority under section 7.1(c) “on its face allows discrimination among owners” as long as it wasn’t unreasonable. The specific language of the documents gave the board the explicit power to treat owners differently, provided there was a rational basis—which, in this case, there was. In association disputes, the legal standard is often “reasonableness,” which is evaluated based on context and logic, not just an individual’s feeling of fairness.
3. Suspecting a “Secret Meeting” Isn’t Enough to Prove It
Mr. Smith also alleged that the board violated the open meeting law. He claimed that when the sign issue came up at the board meeting, the president immediately called for a vote without any discussion. This led him to believe the decision had already been made in secret via email.
In his petition, he stated his certainty in plain terms:
“Obviously, the board members communicated with each other via email and reached their decision without ever hearing my argument.”
This claim failed completely. At the hearing, Mr. Smith acknowledged that he had no emails or other documents to support his allegation. Furthermore, the Association’s president and another member presented “credible testimony” that, contrary to Mr. Smith’s recollection, a “protracted” discussion lasting about an hour and a half had, in fact, taken place before the vote was called.
An accusation, no matter how “obvious” it seems to you, is not evidence. To successfully challenge an association’s procedure, you must provide proof. Suspicion and personal interpretation of events are not enough to win a legal claim.
4. Your First Shot Is Often Your Only Shot
After the judge dismissed his initial petition, Mr. Smith filed for a rehearing. In this new request, he tried to introduce new arguments and evidence to bolster his case. Specifically, he raised:
• A brand-new claim that the sign rule violated a state statute (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1217) concerning the partitioning of common elements.
• A reference to an email he now claimed to possess that would support his open meeting law violation argument.
The judge flatly rejected these new points. The reason was purely procedural: the rules of the legal process require all claims and evidence to be presented in the initial petition and at the original hearing. You cannot hold arguments in reserve to see how the first ruling goes.
The judge’s decision was unequivocal:
“Consequently, evidence that Mr. Smith did not present at the original hearing cannot be considered in this rehearing.”
The legal process is not flexible. You must build your entire case and present all your evidence from the very beginning. Your first shot is often your only shot.
5. The Burden of Proof Is on the Accuser
This may be the most crucial lesson of all. In a dispute like this, the legal responsibility, or “burden of proof,” was on Mr. Smith to prove that the Association had acted improperly. It was not the Association’s job to prove its innocence.
The standard he had to meet was “a preponderance of the evidence.” The judge’s decision included a formal definition of this standard, which clearly explains the high bar an accuser must clear:
“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Ultimately, the judge concluded that Mr. Smith “did not prove” that either of his claims met this standard. His feelings of unfairness and his suspicions of improper procedure were not supported by superior evidentiary weight, and his petition was dismissed. If you decide to formally challenge your association, you are the accuser, and you carry the burden of proof.
Conclusion: Know the Rules of the Game
A seemingly minor dispute over a commercial sign reveals fundamental truths about navigating any rule-based organization, especially an HOA or Condo Association. The outcome hinged on the precise language of the documents, the legal definition of “reasonable,” the high bar for proving misconduct, and the rigid procedures of the hearing process. Mr. Smith’s case serves as a powerful reminder that to successfully challenge the rules, you must first master the rules of the game.
This entire conflict hinged on the specific wording of a few sentences in a thick rulebook. When was the last time you truly read the documents that govern your own community, and what crucial details might be hiding in plain sight?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Keith D Smith(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf; Unit Owner
Respondent Side
Stuart Rayburn(association president) Sierra Foothills Condominium Association Representative for Respondent
Harold Bordelon(witness) Sierra Foothills Condominium Association Testified for the Association
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmission
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmission (email handle)
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmission (email handle)
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmission (email handle)
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmission (email handle)
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmission (email handle)
The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to demonstrate a violation by the Association, conceding that the Association was not in violation of the cited CC&R section.
Why this result: Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not in violation of CC&R section 2.7, the single issue raised in the petition.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&R section 2.7 by the Association (later asserted as estoppel regarding enforcement)
Petitioner alleged the Respondent Association violated CC&R section 2.7. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged the Association was not actually in violation of section 2.7, but argued the Association was estopped from enforcing the provision requiring a six-foot gate for RV storage. Petitioner sought invalidation of outstanding fines.
