Tag Archives: Rehearing

Joyce H Monsanto vs. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association

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Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joyce H Monsanto Counsel —
Respondent Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808; CC&R § 7.9

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the HOA's architectural guideline limiting homeowners to one flagpole per lot, while permitting the display of both the U.S. flag and a military flag (Marine Corps flag) on that single pole, constitutes a reasonable rule under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B). The ALJ also found the Board complied with the 45-day requirement for a written appeal decision under CC&R § 7.9 by memorializing the denial in the draft meeting minutes posted by December 4, 2018,,.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on both statutory and CC&R violations,.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA's denial of application to install two flagpoles for US and military flags, and alleged failure to follow CC&R appeal process.

Petitioner challenged the HOA's denial of her request to install two flagpoles, arguing the restriction violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 (flag statute) and that the Board failed to provide a written decision on her appeal within 45 days as required by CC&R § 7.9, which she argued meant the request was deemed approved. The ALJ found the single flagpole restriction reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B) since both flags could be flown from one pole, and determined the Board satisfied the CC&R § 7.9 requirement by posting the decision in the meeting minutes within 45 days,.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied, as she failed to establish that the Respondent's Board should not have denied her application under A.R.S. § 33-1808 or CC&R § 7. The Board can properly find Petitioner in violation of Architectural Guidelines and order her to remove one of her two flagpoles.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag display, Architectural Guidelines, CC&Rs, Statutory compliance, Planned Communities Act, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R § 7

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919053-REL-RHG Decision – 749213.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:16 (163.6 KB)

19F-H1919053-REL-RHG Decision – 753595.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:19 (163.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal reasoning from the Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Joyce H. Monsanto versus the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (HOA). The central conflict revolves around the HOA’s denial of Ms. Monsanto’s request to install two separate flagpoles on her home to display the United States flag and the United States Marine Corps flag. The petitioner alleged this denial violated Arizona state law and the HOA’s own governing documents.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision established two critical points: first, that the HOA’s rule limiting homeowners to a single flagpole is a “reasonable” regulation on the “placement and manner of display” explicitly permitted under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1808(B), and does not constitute a prohibition of flag display. Second, the HOA was found to have complied with its own appeal process as outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The ALJ concluded that an oral denial at a board meeting, later documented in publicly posted meeting minutes, satisfied the CC&R’s requirement to “render its written decision” within a 45-day timeframe. The ruling affirms an HOA’s authority to enforce uniform aesthetic standards, provided they are reasonable and applied according to the association’s governing documents.

Case Background and Procedural History

The case was brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) following a petition filed by homeowner Joyce H. Monsanto (“Petitioner”) against her HOA, Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (“Respondent”).

• Initial Petition: On March 6, 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1803) and its CC&Rs (§ 7.9) by refusing to approve her request for two flagpoles.

• First Hearing: An evidentiary hearing was held on May 30, 2019, after which the ALJ found that the Petitioner had not proven any violation by the HOA.

• Rehearing: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing on August 22, 2019. This rehearing took place on October 21, 2019.

• Amended Decision: On November 18, 2019, ALJ Diane Mihalsky issued an Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision, again denying the Petitioner’s petition and affirming the previous findings. The amendment was issued to correct a typographical error and clarify the parties’ appeal rights.

The Core Dispute: A Request for Two Flagpoles

The petitioner, whose husband and two sons have long careers in the U.S. Marines and Coast Guard, sought to display both the U.S. flag and the U.S. Marine Corps flag on her home.

• The Application: On August 31, 2018, she submitted a Design Review Application to install two 6-foot-long flagpoles on the exterior wall of her house, flanking her front door.

• The Rationale: The Petitioner stated her desire for two separate poles was for aesthetic reasons, believing the display would look better. She also expressed concern that a single, larger flagpole installed in her front yard would obstruct the view from her front window.

• The Denial: On September 22, 2018, the HOA’s Architectural Committee issued a written Notice of Disapproval, citing the Architectural Guidelines which permit only one flagpole per lot.

• The Appeal: On October 1, 2018, the Petitioner submitted a written appeal to the HOA Board, arguing the denial was unreasonable, that the guidelines were not uniformly enforced, and that the board could grant a waiver under CC&R § 7.6.

Governing Rules and Statutes

The case decision rested on the interpretation of Arizona state law and the HOA’s specific governing documents.

Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808

This statute governs the right of homeowners to display certain flags.

• Protection of Display: Subsection A states that an association “shall not prohibit the outdoor… display” of the American flag or a military flag, among others.

• Right to Regulate: Subsection B grants associations the authority to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations regarding the placement and manner of display.” It explicitly allows rules that “regulate the location and size of flagpoles,” “limit the member to displaying no more than two flags at once,” and limit flagpole height, while not prohibiting their installation.

HOA Architectural Guidelines

The community’s rules regarding flagpoles evolved but consistently maintained a key restriction.

• Original Guideline (May 24, 2016): “Poles must not exceed 12’ in height, and only one flagpole is permitted per Lot.”

• Amended Guideline (November 8, 2018): The board increased the maximum pole height to 20′ and added rules for nighttime illumination and inclement weather, but explicitly “did not change the limit of one flagpole per lot.”

HOA CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The procedural requirements for architectural review and appeals were central to the Petitioner’s claim.

• Section 7.8 (Board Approval): Pertaining to initial applications, this section requires the Board to provide the owner with a “written response within sixty (60) days,” otherwise the request is deemed approved.

• Section 7.9 (Appeal): Pertaining to appeals, this section requires the Board to consult with the Architectural Committee and “render its written decision” within 45 days. A failure by the Board to render a decision in this period “shall be deemed approval.” This section does not contain the same explicit language as § 7.8 requiring the response be provided to the owner.

Analysis of the Appeal Process and Conflicting Testimonies

A significant portion of the dispute centered on the events of the November 8, 2018, HOA Board meeting, where the Petitioner’s appeal was to be considered. The accounts of what transpired at this meeting were contradictory.

Petitioner’s Testimony (Joyce H. Monsanto)

Respondent’s Testimony (Anthony Nunziato, Board President)

Consultation

The board did not consult the Architectural Committee.

The board consulted with the Architectural Committee before the meeting.

Decision

The board did not consider or make any decision on her appeal.

The board considered the appeal and made a decision.

Notification

She was never told her appeal was denied at the meeting.

He was certain the board verbally informed the Petitioner that her appeal was denied at the meeting.

On December 4, 2018, draft minutes from the November 8 meeting were posted on the HOA’s website. The Petitioner acknowledged seeing them. These minutes included the following entry:

“[Petitioner’s] last request was for a waiver that would allow her to have two flagpoles on her property (one to fly the American flag and the other to fly the Marine flag). The Board rejected this request since our CC&Rs allow for the flying of both flags on a single flagpole.”

The Petitioner argued that these publicly posted draft minutes, which were not sent directly to her, did not constitute a valid written denial of her appeal under the CC&Rs.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s claims, relying on witness credibility, statutory interpretation, and contract construction principles.

Credibility Assessment

The ALJ made a clear determination on the conflicting testimonies regarding the November 8 meeting.

• Mr. Nunziato’s testimony that the board made a decision and informed the Petitioner was found to be “credible and supported by the minutes of the meeting.”

• The Petitioner’s testimony that the board made no decision on her appeal was deemed “incredible.”

Ruling on A.R.S. § 33-1808 (State Flag Law)

The ALJ concluded that the HOA’s one-flagpole rule did not violate state law.

• The rule was found to be a “reasonable rule or regulation under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B).”

• Because the Architectural Guidelines allow for flying two flags from a single flagpole up to 20′ long, the HOA was not prohibiting the display of flags, merely regulating the manner.

• The ALJ characterized the core issue as the “Petitioner’s petition is about her choice not to install a single flagpole for her own aesthetic reasons, not Respondent’s unreasonableness or lack of patriotism.”

Ruling on CC&R § 7.9 (Appeal Process)

The ALJ found that the HOA had followed the procedure required by its own CC&Rs.

• Consultation: Based on Mr. Nunziato’s credible testimony, the board fulfilled its duty to consult with the Architectural Committee.

• “Render a Decision”: The board “rendered a decision on her appeal at the November 8, 2018 board meeting” when it orally reached a decision.

• “Written Decision”: The board created a “writing memorializing its decision” by documenting it in the meeting minutes. Because the Petitioner saw these minutes on December 4, 2018, this action occurred within the 45-day window following her October 1, 2018 appeal.

• No Delivery Requirement: The ALJ applied the “negative implication cannon of contract construction.” By comparing CC&R § 7.9 (appeals) with § 7.8 (initial applications), the judge noted that § 7.9 lacks the explicit requirement to provide the written decision to the owner. Therefore, posting the minutes was sufficient, and the Petitioner’s request was not “deemed approved.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the ALJ issued a final, binding order.

IT IS ORDERED that the Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that the Respondent’s Board should not have denied her application to install two flagpoles on her property.

The decision concludes with a notice informing the parties that the order is binding and that any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor HOA

This study guide provides a detailed review of the legal case Joyce H. Monsanto v. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG, as detailed in the Amended Administrative Law Judge Decision dated November 18, 2019. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, a corresponding answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What specific action did the Petitioner request from the Respondent that initiated this dispute?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent’s Architectural Committee initially deny the Petitioner’s request on September 22, 2018?

4. Identify the key Arizona statute cited in the case and explain its two main provisions regarding flag displays.

5. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument regarding the Respondent’s handling of her appeal under CC&R § 7.9?

6. According to the testimony of Board President Tony Nunziato, how did the Board address the Petitioner’s appeal at the November 8, 2018 meeting?

7. What documentary evidence did the Respondent use to support the claim that a decision on the appeal was made and written down within the required timeframe?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) find the Respondent’s one-flagpole rule to be legally permissible?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required for the Petitioner in this case, and did she meet it according to the ALJ?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case and its practical consequence for the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Joyce H. Monsanto, a homeowner. The Respondent is the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association (HOA). Ms. Monsanto is a member of the Respondent HOA because she owns a house within its development in Sun City, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner submitted a Design Review Application to install two 6-foot-long flagpoles on the exterior wall of her house. She intended to fly the United States flag from one pole and the United States Marine Corps flag from the other.

3. The Architectural Committee denied the request because the community’s Architectural Guidelines only permitted one flagpole per lot. The written Notice of Disapproval explicitly stated this rule as the reason for the denial.

4. The key statute is A.R.S. § 33-1808. Its first provision, § 33-1808(A), prohibits an HOA from banning the display of the American flag and various military flags. The second provision, § 33-1808(B), allows an HOA to adopt reasonable rules regulating the placement, size, and number of flagpoles, explicitly permitting a limit of one flagpole per property.

5. The Petitioner argued that the Board violated CC&R § 7.9 because it failed to provide her with a formal written decision denying her appeal within the 45-day period. She contended that because she never received a dedicated letter, the request should have been “deemed approved” as stipulated in the CC&R for failure to render a timely decision.

6. Tony Nunziato testified that the Board did consult with the Architectural Committee regarding the appeal before the meeting. He stated with certainty that at the November 8, 2018 meeting, the Board considered the appeal and verbally informed Ms. Monsanto that her request for a waiver was denied.

7. The Respondent presented the draft minutes from the November 8, 2018 Board meeting, which were posted on the HOA’s website on December 4, 2018. These minutes explicitly stated that the Board rejected the Petitioner’s request for a waiver to have two flagpoles, fulfilling the requirement to have a written record of the decision within 45 days of her October 1 appeal.

8. The ALJ found the rule permissible because A.R.S. § 33-1808(B) explicitly grants HOAs the authority to “adopt reasonable rules and regulations” which may “regulate the location and size of flagpoles” and “shall not prohibit the installation of a flagpole.” Since the HOA’s guidelines allowed for one flagpole up to 20 feet long, capable of flying two flags, the judge concluded the rule was reasonable under the statute.

9. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that her contention was more probably true than not. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner did not meet this burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated any statute or its own CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied the Petitioner’s petition. The practical consequence is that the HOA’s denial of her application for two flagpoles was upheld, and the Board could therefore properly find her in violation of the Architectural Guidelines and order her to remove one of her two flagpoles.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Analyze the conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1808(A), which protects a homeowner’s right to display military flags, and § 33-1808(B), which grants HOAs regulatory power. How did the Administrative Law Judge balance these two provisions to reach a conclusion in this case?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to the Petitioner. Detail the specific claims made by Joyce Monsanto and explain why, according to the legal decision, she failed to establish them by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

3. Examine the procedural dispute surrounding CC&R § 7.9. Contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of a “written decision” with the interpretation ultimately adopted by the Administrative Law Judge, referencing the role of the verbal notification and the meeting minutes.

4. Evaluate the role of testimony and credibility in this administrative hearing. Compare and contrast the testimony provided by Petitioner Joyce Monsanto and Respondent’s Board President Tony Nunziato regarding the events of the November 8, 2018 board meeting, and explain why the judge found Mr. Nunziato’s account more credible.

5. Based on the facts presented, construct an argument that the HOA’s actions, while legally permissible according to the judge, were inconsistent with the patriotic values of its community, which includes many retired military members. Conversely, construct an argument defending the Board’s decision as a necessary and fair application of rules essential for maintaining community standards.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition in Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues legal decisions. In this case, Diane Mihalsky served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. § 33-1808

An Arizona Revised Statute that governs the display of flags in planned communities. It forbids HOAs from prohibiting certain flags (like the U.S. and military flags) but permits them to establish reasonable rules regarding the number, size, and location of flagpoles.

Architectural Committee

A committee established by the HOA’s CC&Rs responsible for reviewing and approving or disapproving homeowners’ applications for external modifications to their property, such as installing flagpoles.

Architectural Guidelines

The specific rules adopted by the HOA that set forth requirements for property modifications. In this case, the guidelines limited each lot to one flagpole, with a maximum height of 20 feet.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. The Petitioner, Joyce Monsanto, bore the burden of proof to show the HOA had violated the law or its own rules.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that create the rules for a planned community. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated CC&R § 7.9, which outlines the appeal process for disapproved architectural applications.

Declarant

The original developer of a planned community who establishes the initial CC&Rs. In this case, K. Hovnanian was the Declarant for Four Seasons at the Manor.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing organization in a planned community responsible for enforcing the CC&Rs and managing common areas. The Respondent, Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association, is an HOA.

Negative Implication

A principle of legal interpretation which holds that the explicit inclusion of one thing implies the intentional exclusion of another. The ALJ used this to argue that because CC&R § 7.9 (appeals) does not specify that a written decision must be sent to the owner, unlike CC&R § 7.8 (initial applications), that requirement should not be read into the appeal rule.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent Arizona state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, providing an impartial forum to resolve disputes.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Joyce H. Monsanto is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required in this civil case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact (the judge) that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association is the Respondent.

Restrictive Covenant

A legally enforceable rule within the CC&Rs that limits what a homeowner can do with their property. The rule limiting homes to one flagpole is an example of a restrictive covenant.

Waiver

The act of intentionally relinquishing a known right or claim. The Petitioner argued that the HOA board could, and should, have waived the one-flagpole rule for her under CC&R § 7.6.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG


HOA vs. Military Family: 4 Lessons from a Legal Battle Over a Flagpole

For Joyce Monsanto, a member of a dedicated military family, displaying her patriotism was a matter of pride. Her husband served 25 years in the Marines, and her two sons have spent decades in the Marines and the Coast Guard. Naturally, she wanted to fly both the flag of the United States and the flag of the U.S. Marine Corps at her Arizona home. But when she submitted her plan to her Homeowners Association (HOA), she was met with a firm “no.”

The conflict wasn’t about the flags themselves. The Four Seasons at the Manor HOA had no issue with her displaying both. The dispute centered on how she wanted to display them. It was a disagreement over her vision for a symmetrical, two-pole display versus the HOA’s “one flagpole per lot” rule. This architectural dispute escalated from a simple request into a formal administrative hearing.

Ms. Monsanto’s fight reveals several surprising truths about the power of HOA rules and the specific language written into state law. Her case ultimately failed on two fronts—a substantive challenge to the rule itself, and a procedural challenge to how the HOA handled her appeal. Here’s what every homeowner can learn from each.

1. Your Right to Fly the Flag Has Limits—And They’re Written into Law.

Many homeowners believe the right to fly the American flag is unconditional. However, the legal reality is more nuanced. While Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1808) prevents an HOA from outright prohibiting the display of U.S. or military flags, it explicitly allows the association to create “reasonable rules and regulations” for their placement and manner of display.

The statute is specific about what these rules can cover. An HOA can legally regulate the size and location of flagpoles and can limit a homeowner to displaying no more than two flags at once. In this case, the HOA’s architectural guidelines permitted two flags, but only on a single flagpole. The Administrative Law Judge found this “one flagpole per lot” rule was a “reasonable” regulation and therefore perfectly legal. To underscore that the HOA’s stance was not about a lack of patriotism, the judge noted testimony that the HOA president himself “placed 140 small flags on his property” for Memorial Day. The issue was about the uniform enforcement of an architectural rule, not the patriotic display itself.

2. Your Personal Taste Is No Match for the Community Rulebook.

During the hearing, Ms. Monsanto acknowledged that she could fly both of her flags from a single pole as the HOA rules allowed. Her reason for wanting two poles was a matter of personal preference. She testified that she “wanted to install two flagpoles for aesthetic reasons” and also felt that a single pole placed in the middle of her lot would block the view from her front window.

The judge was unmoved by this line of reasoning. In the final decision, the response was direct and unambiguous:

Petitioner’s petition is about her choice not to install a single flagpole for her own aesthetic reasons, not Respondent’s unreasonableness or lack of patriotism.

This is a foundational principle of community association law: homeowners trade a degree of personal autonomy for the perceived benefits of uniform standards and predictable property values. The judge’s decision simply reaffirms that bargain. In the world of planned communities, the established rulebook will almost always outweigh an individual’s personal taste.

3. In HOA Law, the Appeal Isn’t a Re-do—It’s a Different Process.

One of Ms. Monsanto’s key arguments was procedural. She believed her appeal should have been automatically approved because the HOA failed to provide a written decision within the 45-day deadline stipulated in its own rules (CC&R § 7.9). This is where the judge identified a subtle but crucial legal distinction buried in the HOA’s governing documents.

The HOA’s CC&Rs had two different sections for architectural requests:

• CC&R § 7.8 (Initial Requests): This section explicitly required the Board to “inform the submitting party of the final decision” with a “written response.”

• CC&R § 7.9 (Appeals): This section, however, only required the Board to “render its written decision” within 45 days.

That small difference in wording—”written response” versus “written decision”—was the linchpin of her procedural case. The judge ruled that for an appeal, the HOA was not required to send a personal letter or direct notice to Ms. Monsanto. It only had to create a written record of its decision within the timeframe.

4. A Post on an HOA Website Can Count as an Official “Written Decision.”

The final surprise came down to what constitutes a “written decision” and how the deadline was met. Ms. Monsanto was waiting for a formal letter informing her that her appeal had been denied. She never received one. Her appeal was filed on October 1, 2018, starting a 45-day clock.

The judge found the HOA satisfied its obligation in a two-step process:

1. The Decision: The Board verbally denied her appeal during its public meeting on November 8, 2018. This action, which occurred 38 days after her appeal, fulfilled the requirement to “render its decision” within the 45-day period.

2. The Writing: That decision was then recorded in the draft meeting minutes, which were posted on the Board’s website on December 4, 2018. Ms. Monsanto acknowledged seeing the posted minutes.

The judge ruled that these online minutes satisfied the separate legal requirement for a “writing memorializing its decision.” Even though they weren’t sent directly to her, the publicly posted minutes served as the official record of the timely denial of her appeal, closing the final door on her argument for automatic approval.

Conclusion: Before You Plant Your Flag, Read the Fine Print

Joyce Monsanto’s case is a cautionary tale on two levels. First, it shows that even cherished rights like displaying the flag are subject to reasonable, neutrally-applied community rules. Second, and more critically, it demonstrates that procedural arguments live and die by the most precise definitions in the governing documents. A single word can be the difference between winning an appeal and being ordered to take your flagpole down.

This case came down to the difference between a “written response” and a “written decision”—do you know what the fine print says about your rights in your community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joyce H Monsanto (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Anthony Nunziato (board member)
    Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association
    President of the Board of Directors; also referred to as 'Tony'
  • Annette McCraw (property manager)
    Community Manager/Trestle Management (implied)
    Sent Notice of Disapproval on behalf of Respondent
  • Marc Vasquez (HOA representative)
    Addressed Petitioner's claim regarding violation letters at the Board meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Joyce H Monsanto vs. Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joyce H Monsanto Counsel —
Respondent Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808; CC&R § 7.9

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the HOA's architectural guideline limiting homeowners to one flagpole per lot, while permitting the display of both the U.S. flag and a military flag (Marine Corps flag) on that single pole, constitutes a reasonable rule under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B). The ALJ also found the Board complied with the 45-day requirement for a written appeal decision under CC&R § 7.9 by memorializing the denial in the draft meeting minutes posted by December 4, 2018,,.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on both statutory and CC&R violations,.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA's denial of application to install two flagpoles for US and military flags, and alleged failure to follow CC&R appeal process.

Petitioner challenged the HOA's denial of her request to install two flagpoles, arguing the restriction violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 (flag statute) and that the Board failed to provide a written decision on her appeal within 45 days as required by CC&R § 7.9, which she argued meant the request was deemed approved. The ALJ found the single flagpole restriction reasonable under A.R.S. § 33-1808(B) since both flags could be flown from one pole, and determined the Board satisfied the CC&R § 7.9 requirement by posting the decision in the meeting minutes within 45 days,.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied, as she failed to establish that the Respondent's Board should not have denied her application under A.R.S. § 33-1808 or CC&R § 7. The Board can properly find Petitioner in violation of Architectural Guidelines and order her to remove one of her two flagpoles.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag display, Architectural Guidelines, CC&Rs, Statutory compliance, Planned Communities Act, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • CC&R § 7.9
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R § 7

Decision Documents

19F-H1919053-REL Decision – 749213.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:17:40 (163.6 KB)

19F-H1919053-REL Decision – 753595.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:17:40 (163.3 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joyce H Monsanto (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf at the hearing and rehearing

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Represented the Respondent
  • Anthony Nunziato (board president)
    Four Seasons at the Manor Homeowners Association Board of Directors
    President of Respondent’s Board of Directors; testified at the hearing and rehearing; also referred to as 'Tony'
  • Annette McCraw (property manager)
    Community Manager (Implied Trestle Management)
    Sent notice regarding windsocks and the written Notice of Disapproval
  • Marc Vasquez (HOA representative)
    Addressed Petitioner's claim regarding violation letters compliance during the November 8, 2018 board meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge who issued the decision
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received electronic transmission of the decision

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel —
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:49 (89.7 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of decision transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmittal

Other Participants

  • JS (Clerk)
    Transmittal initials

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel —
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:17 (89.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

• Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

• Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

• Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

• Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

• The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

• Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

• Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

• Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

——————————————————————————–

1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

——————————————————————————–

2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

——————————————————————————–

3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

——————————————————————————–

4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Aripark, Inc.,

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) by charging a $25 late fee, as the statutory limit applies to all assessments,. However, the ALJ found no violation regarding the $325 assessment increase because the $209 portion was a special assessment and the remaining regular increase did not exceed the 20% limit,,.

Why this result: The Petitioners' primary loss on the assessment cap issue was due to a failed legal interpretation that 'regular assessment' encompasses all assessments, a view the ALJ found would render statutory language redundant,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to $325 Assessment Increase (Docket 029-RHG)

Petitioner Brown argued that 'regular assessment' refers to the procedure (motion, second, vote) and thus the entire $325 increase should be subject to the 20% cap,. The ALJ rejected this, finding that $116 was a regular increase (14.1%) and $209 was a special assessment, to which the cap did not apply,.

Orders: Petition in Docket No. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • Deer Valley v. Houser

Excessive Late Fee and Interest (Docket 045)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late charge and interest rate exceeded the limits of A.R.S. § 33-1803(A). The ALJ ruled that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all 'assessments', not just 'regular assessments', and found the HOA in violation,.

Orders: Respondent must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Petitioner his $500 filing fee within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix

Challenge to $325 Assessment Increase (Docket 054 & Rehearing)

Petitioner Stevens argued the entire $325 must be a regular assessment because the HOA lacked authority to impose special assessments or used deceptive accounting to justify the increase,,. The ALJ found that 'regular assessment' is a specific type of assessment and the $116 increase (14.1%) did not exceed the cap,,.

Orders: Petition in Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL and the subsequent rehearing are dismissed,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Assessment Increase Cap, Regular Assessment vs Special Assessment, Late Fee Limit, Statutory Construction, Accounting Impropriety Allegations, Rehearing, Consolidated Matter
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • A.A.C. § R2-19-119
  • Deer Valley v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:24 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:25 (144.6 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf and testified

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Counsel for Respondent, referred to as Greg Stein in rehearing
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Counsel for Respondent (also spelled Sahl/Saul)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff/clerk)
    Transmitting staff

Charles P. Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel —
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:59 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918006-REL/669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:02 (91.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the conflict involves Mr. Mandela’s multiple failed attempts to gain approval for a 150-square-foot patio structure on his property, which already contained a tool shed.

Blue Ridge denied Mr. Mandela’s three separate requests on distinct grounds: the first for exceeding the size limit for a “play structure,” the second for submitting incomplete plans for an “attached structure,” and the third for violating the “one detached structure” rule. In response, Mr. Mandela filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that Blue Ridge had violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and engaged in discriminatory practices.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge conclusively denied Mr. Mandela’s petition. The judge found that Mr. Mandela failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation by Blue Ridge. The decisions affirmed that the HOA’s denials were consistent with its governing documents, that Mr. Mandela’s interpretation of key terms like “detached structure” and “temporary structure” was incorrect, and that his allegations of discrimination were unsubstantiated by evidence. The final order from the rehearing is binding on both parties.

Case Overview

This case documents a series of requests and denials between a homeowner and his HOA, culminating in a formal legal dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Parties Involved

Name/Entity

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

Respondent’s Counsel

Paul Frame, Esq. (FRAME LAW PLLC)

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Timeline of Key Events

Date (Approx.)

Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request: a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied for exceeding the 80 sq. ft. size limit.

Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his second request: to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans.

Mar 8, 2018

Mr. Mandela’s second request is formally denied due to “incomplete information.”

Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an appeal with Blue Ridge regarding the denial, which is subsequently denied.

Undisclosed

Mr. Mandela submits his third request: to build a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. It is denied because he already has a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure.

Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a).

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision on the rehearing, once again denying the petition. This order is binding.

Analysis of Petitioner’s Requests and HOA Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed patio structure, each of which was denied for violating a different set of rules.

Request 1: Play Structure Application

Mr. Mandela first attempted to gain approval by using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form from the Blue Ridge website.

• Request Details: Construction of a cedar patio structure of approximately 150 square feet.

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied because the structure’s size exceeded the established limit. The application form explicitly states that play structures such as a “Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort” cannot exceed 80 square feet.

Request 2: Attached Patio Shade Application

Mr. Mandela next submitted a request to attach the cedar patio shade directly to his home.

• Request Details: The proposal involved attaching a structure to the main residence.

• HOA Actions: Blue Ridge Chairman John Hart requested documents, such as plans and materials, to verify the structure would not be free-standing.

• Petitioner’s Response: In a March 3, 2018 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof. The structures will be attached.”

• Reason for Denial: The request was denied on March 8, 2018, due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter specified that Mr. Mandela needed to provide detailed drawings matching the proposed construction and use the official 9-page form as required by CC&R guidelines. The subsequent appeal was also denied, with the board noting a need for an “elevation drawing of your specific construction” showing dimensions, materials, and foundation/attachment methods.

Request 3: Detached Patio Structure Application

Finally, Mr. Mandela submitted a request to build the 150-square-foot structure as a detached unit.

• Request Details: A free-standing, detached patio structure in his backyard.

• Reason for Denial: This request was denied because Mr. Mandela already had a tool shed on his property. According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one detached structure is permitted on a lot.

Core Legal Arguments and Adjudication

In the hearings, Mr. Mandela presented several arguments to challenge the HOA’s decisions. The Administrative Law Judge addressed each claim and found that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Definition of a “Detached Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Argued that the proposed patio structure was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, unlike a shed, it could not be “easily converted into a second residence.” He claimed this interpretation was supported by a prior ALJ decision involving Blue Ridge.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The Judge found this argument unpersuasive. The decision states that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.” It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela already had a shed, and the judge concluded the proposed patio was a “barred detached structure” under the governing rules.

Allegations of Discrimination and Unequal Enforcement

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela contended that Blue Ridge was discriminating against him. His claims included:

1. The play structure rule allowing a second detached structure under 80 sq. ft. unfairly discriminates against residents without children.

2. Blue Ridge was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. limit against other homeowners.

3. Blue Ridge had previously approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member, showing unequal enforcement.

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The petitioner failed to provide credible evidence for these claims. Testimony from Blue Ridge Vice President Joseph Hancock refuted Mandela’s specific examples, showing that cited lots either had no violations or contained structures predating the relevant rules. The judge found Hancock’s testimony credible and noted that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over potential constitutional equal protection claims.

Definition of a “Temporary Structure”

• Mandela’s Position: Mr. Mandela argued his proposed structure was not a prohibited temporary structure. He cited the product’s 5-year warranty against rot and his plan to use concrete pavers at the base, which he asserted constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules.

• HOA’s Position: Joseph Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.”

• ALJ’s Conclusion: The judge agreed with the HOA. The decision states: “The preponderance of the evidence shows that the proposed play structure is a temporary structure under the Blue Ridge CC&Rs because it does not have a cement or block foundation. The preponderance of the evidence shows that concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

Governing Rules and Regulations

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of specific sections of the Blue Ridge Estates CC&Rs and the Architectural Committee’s aligned regulations.

Regulation

Summary of Provision

CC&R § 3.1

Restricts property use to “Single Family Residential Use.” Prohibits any building or structure separate from the main residence, with the exception of a garage.

Arch. Committee Reg. 3(D)

Modifies CC&R § 3.1 by allowing one detached structure to be constructed on a property with prior committee approval.

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Reg.

Prohibits temporary structures. Defines a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

CC&R § 3.24

Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any structure to be “commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered.”

Modified Rules (April 6, 2016)

Establishes rules for “Play Structures.” Allows for one of each type but no more than two total. Limits Tree Houses, Viewing Stands, and Play Houses/Forts to a maximum of 80 square feet.

Final Orders and Outcome

The legal proceedings resulted in a definitive ruling in favor of the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association.

• Initial Decision (November 6, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

• Rehearing Decision (February 28, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision on the rehearing is noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days of the order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”






Blog Post – 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case involving petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. It is based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the initial hearing on October 17, 2018, and the rehearing on February 8, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Describe the three separate requests Charles Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA and the basis for the HOA’s denial of each.

2. What was Mr. Mandela’s central allegation in the petition he filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

3. Explain the argument Mr. Mandela made regarding a prior Administrative Law Judge decision concerning detached structures, and why Judge Moses-Thompson found it unpersuasive.

4. According to the Blue Ridge governing documents, what is the definition of a “temporary structure,” and how did Mr. Mandela argue his proposed patio did not fit this definition?

5. What specific, incomplete information did the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee cite when denying Mr. Mandela’s second request to build an attached cedar patio shade?

6. Identify the two different rules that limit the size and number of structures on a property and explain how they were applied to Mr. Mandela’s requests.

7. What was Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s play structure policy, and what was the stated purpose for which he wanted to build the patio?

8. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key points did his testimony establish during the rehearing?

9. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and identify which party in this case was responsible for meeting this burden of proof.

10. What was the final, binding order issued by the Administrative Law Judge after the rehearing, and what was the petitioner’s next course of action for an appeal?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot limit for play structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied for providing incomplete information and insufficient plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio, which was denied because he already had a tool shed, and rules permit only one detached structure per property.

2. In his petition, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its own CC&Rs, specifically § 3.1(a). He claimed the HOA was unfairly denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while it had allowed another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

3. Mr. Mandela contended that a prior ALJ decision had defined a “detached structure” as one that could be easily converted into a second residence, which his open-air patio could not. Judge Moses-Thompson rejected this argument, stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future cases.

4. The HOA’s rules define a temporary structure as one without a cement or block foundation to which it is permanently attached. Mr. Mandela argued his proposed patio was not temporary because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he asserted constituted a cement foundation.

5. The Architectural Committee denied the request for an attached structure due to incomplete information, specifically the lack of an elevation drawing. The denial letter stated that such a drawing was needed to show detailed views, sizes, dimensions, specifications, construction methods, and foundation attachment details for his specific proposed construction.

6. Architectural Committee Regulation 3(D) limits homeowners to one detached structure per property. The modified Rules and Regulations for “Play Structures” allow for a second structure if it is a play structure, but it cannot exceed 80 square feet. Mr. Mandela’s request for a 150-square-foot detached patio was denied under the first rule because he already had a shed, and his initial request under the play structure rule was denied because it exceeded the 80-square-foot size limit.

7. Mr. Mandela argued that the play structure policy, which allows for a second detached structure, discriminates against people who do not have children. He explained that he did not want the structure for children’s play but so that his mother would have a shaded place to come outside and rest.

8. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of Blue Ridge and a licensed contractor who assisted in reviewing Mr. Mandela’s requests. He testified that Mr. Mandela’s plans for an attached structure were insufficient, failing to account for height and width differentials, and opined that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or slab foundation under the HOA’s rules.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the legal standard requiring proof that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, Charles P. Mandela, bore the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

10. The final order denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, making the decision binding on the parties. The notice specified that any further appeal must be made through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case materials. Construct a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the series of requests and denials between Charles Mandela and the Blue Ridge HOA. Discuss how the HOA’s different governing documents (CC&Rs, Architectural Committee regulations, and modified Rules and Regulations) were applied at each stage of the process and evaluate the consistency of their application.

2. Examine the legal arguments presented by Charles Mandela in the rehearing, including his claims of discrimination, his interpretation of a “temporary structure,” and his assertion that he provided sufficient information. Discuss why the Administrative Law Judge found each of these arguments unpersuasive, citing specific evidence and testimony from the hearing.

3. Trace the distinction made in the Blue Ridge governing documents between a primary residence, a detached structure (like a garage or shed), and a “play structure.” How did this distinction become the central point of conflict in the case of Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates?

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail the specific ways in which the petitioner, Charles Mandela, failed to meet this burden according to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

5. The Blue Ridge HOA has at least three layers of governing documents mentioned: the CC&Rs (Declaration), Architectural Committee Aligned Standards, and the Rules and Regulations. Explain the hierarchy and purpose of these documents as revealed in the case, and discuss how the authority to create and modify them is defined.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over hearings for government agencies, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the Blue Ridge HOA responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any construction, erection, maintenance, improvement, or alteration of structures on any lot, as per CC&R § 3.24.

Blue Ridge Estates HOA

The homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development in Happy Jack, Arizona, and the respondent in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden of proof.

Charles P. Mandela

The homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA who filed the petition against the association; the petitioner in this case.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The primary governing document for the homeowners’ association, also referred to as the “Declaration.” It outlines land use, permitted structures, and restrictions.

Declaration

The formal term for the CC&Rs document. Amending it requires an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots.

Detached Structure

A building or structure erected or maintained separately from the Single Family Residence. Under Architectural Committee rules, only one is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela.

Play Structure

A specific type of structure defined in the modified Rules and Regulations, including swing sets, tree houses, and playhouses. When detached, certain types are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Single Family Residential Use

The exclusive use for which property in Blue Ridge Estates is designated, as outlined in CC&R § 3.1.

Temporary Structure

A structure prohibited by the CC&Rs and defined by the Architectural Committee regulations as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,.

Respondent Side

  • Paul K. Frame (HOA attorney)
    FRAME LAW PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Blue Ridge Estates HOA,.
  • John Hart (board member)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Chairman of Blue Ridge,.
  • Joseph Hancock (board member/witness)
    Blue Ridge Estates HOA
    Vice President of Blue Ridge; presented testimony,.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision.

Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-31
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Travis Prall Counsel —
Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Counsel Lydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

CC&R Section 7.1.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following a rehearing, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs (Section 7.1.4) by neglecting yard maintenance, specifically because the homeowner did not provide credible evidence that the landscaping at issue was 'originally installed by Declarant'.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to present credible evidence that the landscaping/tree in question was 'originally installed by Declarant', which was necessary to trigger the Respondent's maintenance obligation under CC&R Section 7.1.4.

Key Issues & Findings

The Petitioner alleges that the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowner’s Association (Respondent) violated the Association’s CC&R’s Article 7.1 by neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.

Petitioner asserted the HOA was responsible for the maintenance and replacement of landscaping, specifically a tree, in his back yard under CC&R Section 7.1.4, claiming it was a Public Yard and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant. The HOA denied responsibility.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance responsibility, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, originally installed by declarant, public yard vs private yard, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL-RHG Decision – 686236.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:07 (116.2 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818053-REL/661820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:47:56 (107.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG


Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Travis Prall (Petitioner) and the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the conflict was the Petitioner’s allegation that the HOA violated its governing documents by failing to maintain landscaping—specifically a large tree—in his backyard, which he contended was a “Public Yard” under the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The dispute culminated in two separate rulings by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), one in September 2018 and another following a rehearing in January 2019. In both instances, the petition was dismissed.

The central issue did not turn on the ambiguous definition of “Public Yard” vs. “Private Yard” in the CC&Rs, a point of significant debate between the parties. Instead, the case was decided on a critical qualifying phrase in the governing documents: the HOA’s maintenance obligation under Section 7.1.4 is limited to landscaping “as originally installed by Declarant” (the original developer).

The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the tree in question was installed by the developer. In the initial hearing, this conclusion was based on inference. In the rehearing, the HOA presented credible witness testimony from a board member involved in the community’s initial sales, who stated that all homes were sold with no landscaping or irrigation in the backyards, which were “just dirt.” The ALJ found this to be the only credible evidence on the matter, leading to the final dismissal of the case.

Case Overview

Case Name

Travis Prall (Petitioner) vs. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA (Respondent)

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Core Allegation

The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.”

Factual Background and Timeline

The dispute is centered within the Villas at Tierra Buena, a gated community comprising 43 homes on the outer perimeter with tall block fences and 19 interior homes with four-foot-tall walls (two feet of block with a two-foot aluminum fence on top). The Petitioner owns one of these interior homes.

• 2010: Travis Prall purchases his home. He believes, based on his reading of the CC&Rs, that the HOA is responsible for maintaining both his front and back yards. A large tree is present in the backyard at the time of purchase.

• 2010–2013: Prall testifies that the HOA provided landscaping maintenance to his front and back yards during this period. The HOA denies ever providing maintenance to any backyards in the community.

• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over the tree in Prall’s backyard. Prall pays for its removal but asserts at the time that it was the HOA’s responsibility.

• Post-2014: The tree regrows from the remaining stump.

• 2018: The HOA observes that the “pony wall” near the regrown tree is buckling. A repair company, Sun King Fencing & Gates, confirms “the reason the pony wall buckled was the tree roots in the area” and recommends the tree’s removal.

• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to Prall, stating, “Please trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

• June 4, 2018: Prall files an HOA Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• September 4, 2018: The initial administrative hearing is held.

• September 24, 2018: The ALJ issues a decision dismissing the petition.

• Post-September 2018: Prall’s request for a rehearing is granted.

• January 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

• January 31, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing the petition.

Central Point of Contention: Interpretation of CC&Rs

The primary disagreement focused on whether the Petitioner’s enclosed but visible backyard constituted a “Public Yard” or a “Private Yard” under the CC&Rs. The HOA’s maintenance obligation under Section 7.1.4 applies only to Public Yards.

Relevant CC&R Sections

Section

Language

Respondent must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…” (Emphasis added)

“‘Private Yard’ means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view by walls, fences, hedges or the like so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. ‘Public Yard’ means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property, whether or not it is located in front of, beside, or behind the Residential Dwelling.”

“‘Visible from Neighboring Property’ means, with respect to any given object, that such object is or would be visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…”

Competing Interpretations

• Petitioner’s Interpretation: A yard is “Private” only if it is both enclosed/shielded AND not generally visible. Because his backyard is enclosed but visible through the four-foot wall/fence, he argued it qualifies as a “Public Yard” that the HOA must maintain.

• Respondent’s Interpretation: A yard is “Private” if it is either enclosed or shielded from view. Because the Petitioner’s backyard is enclosed, it is a Private Yard, and the HOA has no maintenance responsibility.

While the ALJ acknowledged that “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards,” she explicitly stated that the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.” The case was decided on other grounds.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

• Argued that the HOA performed backyard maintenance from 2010 to 2013, establishing a precedent.

• Posited that the large size of the tree when he bought the home in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer.

• Suggested that the presence of just two types of irrigation systems across the community, accessible from the front, implied a uniform developer installation for both front and back yards.

• Noted that his backyard sprinkler system wrapped around the tree, suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

• Denied ever providing landscaping maintenance to any backyards, stating it only controls front yard irrigation and sprinkler systems.

• Raised liability concerns about maintenance workers entering residents’ enclosed backyards where pets could escape.

• Presented critical testimony from Board President Maureen Karpinski during the rehearing. Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent who was involved with the community’s development and sales from 2002, stated that to her knowledge, none of the homes were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards, which were “just dirt.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decisions and Rationale

The ALJ’s rulings in both hearings hinged on the specific requirement in Section 7.1.4 that the landscaping must have been “originally installed by Declarant.”

Initial Hearing Decision (September 24, 2018)

• Ruling: The Petition was dismissed.

• Rationale: The Petitioner failed to present evidence that the tree was installed by the developer. The ALJ noted that the tree had regrown to a significant height in approximately five years after being cut down in 2014. From this, she concluded that “it cannot be concluded that the tree in the photograph from 2010 was planted as part of the original landscape plan around 2000.”

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

• Ruling: The Petition was dismissed.

• Rationale: The ALJ found the Petitioner’s arguments to be “suppositions and inferences.” In contrast, she deemed the testimony of Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.” Ms. Karpinski’s statement that backyards were sold as “just dirt” directly refuted the claim that any landscaping was “originally installed by Declarant.”

• The final conclusion stated: “As there was no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant, there is no reason to conclude Respondent would be required to replace and maintain Petitioner’s back yard under the terms of Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs.”

Final Disposition

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be dismissed. The order resulting from the rehearing was final and binding on the parties. Any further appeal would require seeking judicial review in the superior court within 35 days of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Travis Prall and the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association, based on the legal decisions from September 2018 and January 2019. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the dispute, arguments, and legal reasoning involved.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source context.

1. What specific violation of the community’s CC&Rs did the Petitioner, Travis Prall, allege in his petition?

2. What was the key physical difference between the backyards of the “interior homes” and the “exterior homes” in the Villas at Tierra Buena community?

3. What was the central point of disagreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the definition of a “Private Yard” versus a “Public Yard”?

4. According to Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs, what specific condition must be met for the HOA to be responsible for maintaining landscaping in a Public Yard?

5. What was the “Courtesy Letter” issued by the Respondent on May 3, 2018, and what did it request of the Petitioner?

6. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument for why the tree in his backyard must have been installed by the original developer?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and what does it mean?

8. In the first hearing, why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the tree was not part of the original landscape plan?

9. During the rehearing, what “credible evidence” was presented by the Respondent that refuted the Petitioner’s claims about original backyard landscaping?

10. Why did the Administrative Law Judge state that it was not necessary to rule on the interpretation of “Public Yard” vs. “Private Yard” in either decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Petitioner Travis Prall alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). The specific allegation was that the HOA neglected its duty for yard maintenance in visible public yards.

2. The exterior homes have six to seven-foot-tall block wall fences enclosing the backyards. The interior homes, like the Petitioner’s, have a shorter back wall, consisting of a two-foot-tall block wall topped with a two-foot-tall aluminum fence, making the backyards more visible.

3. The Petitioner argued that a yard must be both enclosed and not generally visible to be private, meaning his visible, enclosed yard was public. The Respondent argued that a yard was private if it was enclosed or shielded from view, meaning the Petitioner’s enclosed yard was private regardless of visibility.

4. According to Section 7.1.4, the HOA is required to “replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots.” This means the landscaping in question must have been part of the original developer’s installation.

5. The “Courtesy Letter” was a notice from the HOA to the Petitioner concerning the tree in his backyard. It requested that he “Please trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall,” which had buckled due to the tree’s roots.

6. The Petitioner posited that the tree must have been installed by the developer due to its large size when he bought the home in 2010. He also noted that the backyard sprinkler system wrapped around the tree, suggesting they were installed together during original construction.

7. The Petitioner was required to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not; it is the greater weight of evidence.

8. The judge noted that after the original tree was removed in 2014, the present tree grew to a similar height in approximately five years from the remaining stump. Therefore, the judge concluded that the tree’s size in 2010 did not prove it was planted as part of the original landscape plan around the year 2000.

9. The Respondent presented the testimony of Maureen Karpinski, the Board President and a real estate agent who sold homes in the community during its development. She stated that to the best of her knowledge, none of the homes were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards and that they were “just dirt.”

10. The judge did not need to rule on the yard definition because the Petitioner first had to prove the tree was “originally installed by the Declarant” per Section 7.1.4. Since the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence for this foundational claim in both hearings, the question of whether the yard was public or private became irrelevant to the outcome.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

These questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” and analyze how the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard was the determining factor in the dismissal of his petition in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

2. Provide a detailed analysis of the competing interpretations of “Private Yard” and “Public Yard” as defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs. Discuss the arguments made by both the Petitioner and the Respondent and explain why, despite this being a central point of contention, the final ruling did not hinge on this issue.

3. Compare the evidence presented by Travis Prall with the evidence presented by the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. How did the nature and credibility of the evidence, particularly witness testimony versus suppositions, influence the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?

4. Trace the procedural history of this case, starting from the initial event that triggered the HOA’s notice through the final decision after the rehearing. What were the key decision points and legal options available to the parties at each stage?

5. Discuss the significance of Maureen Karpinski’s testimony in the rehearing. How did her personal and professional experience with the community’s development directly address the central weakness of the Petitioner’s case from the first hearing?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

The judicial officer who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions, in this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions,Restrictions and Easements, the legal documents that govern a planned community or HOA.

Common Area

Land within the community for the common use and enjoyment of the owners; the HOA is responsible for maintaining landscaping in these areas.

Courtesy Letter

A formal notice issued by the HOA to a resident. In this case, it was a letter dated May 3, 2018, requesting that the Petitioner trim or remove a tree causing damage to a wall.

Declarant

The original developer who installed the initial landscaping and improvements in the community.

An abbreviation for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, which was the Respondent.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, homeowner Travis Prall.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Private Yard

As defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs, it is the portion of a Yard “which is enclosed or shielded from view by walls, fences, hedges or the like so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property.” The interpretation of this definition was a key dispute in the case.

Public Yard

As defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs, it is the portion of a Yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property, whether or not it is located in front of, beside, or behind the Residential Dwelling.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA.

Visible from Neighboring Property

A term defined in Section 1.37 of the CC&Rs. An object is considered visible if it can be seen by a six-foot-tall person standing on a neighboring property, with a specific exception for objects visible only through a wrought iron fence.

As defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs, it is “the portion of the Lot devoted to Improvements other than the Residential Dwelling.”






Blog Post – 18F-H1818053-REL-RHG


He Fought His HOA Over a Single Tree—And Lost Because of a Clause Everyone Missed

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association is a delicate balance of rules, fees, and occasional frustrations. It’s a familiar story: a dispute arises over a seemingly minor issue, and suddenly you’re deep in the weeds of your community’s governing documents, convinced you’re in the right.

This was exactly the position of homeowner Travis Prall. He believed the rules for his community, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, clearly stated they were responsible for maintaining a troublesome tree in his backyard. Confident in his interpretation of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), he took his case to an administrative law judge.

But the outcome of his legal battle hinged not on the clause he was arguing, but on details everyone had overlooked. The way he lost—first in an initial hearing, and then decisively in a rehearing he himself requested—reveals crucial lessons for any homeowner hidden within the dense language of community documents.

The Definition You Debate Isn’t Always the One That Matters

The core of Mr. Prall’s argument was a battle of definitions. According to the CC&Rs, the HOA was responsible for maintaining “Public Yards.” The rules defined a “Public Yard” as any part of a yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property.” Even though his backyard was enclosed by a four-foot wall, it was visible to his neighbors, so he argued it qualified.

The HOA countered with its own interpretation. They pointed to the definition of a “Private Yard,” which included any yard that is “enclosed.” Since his yard was enclosed, they claimed, it was his responsibility, regardless of visibility.

The two sides were locked in a debate over these competing definitions. But in the first hearing, the judge delivered a surprising twist: the entire debate was irrelevant. The judge acknowledged that Prall’s reading of the rules might even be plausible but declared that the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue.” Why? Because Prall had failed to clear an even more fundamental hurdle first. The judge found that Prall had “failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant,” a fatal flaw that sidestepped his primary argument entirely.

“While the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes even if that is contrary to the intention of the drafters of the CC&Rs, the tribunal is not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

Prall had lost the first round not because his interpretation was wrong, but because he hadn’t proven his case on a different, more critical point.

It All Comes Down to “As Originally Installed”

Unsatisfied with the outcome, Prall requested and was granted a rehearing—a second chance to make his case. But this second chance also gave the HOA an opportunity to sharpen its defense, and it zeroed in on the exact clause that had decided the first hearing.

The case was ultimately decided by Section 7.1.4. This clause stated the HOA was only responsible for landscaping “as originally installed by Declarant”—a legal term for the original developer of the community.

This single phrase shifted the entire focus of the dispute. The question was no longer about “Public vs. Private” yards, but about the historical fact of what the developer had installed when the homes were first built around the year 2000.

At the rehearing, the HOA introduced the knockout blow: the testimony of Maureen Karpinski, an early resident and real estate agent who had sold homes in the community during its construction. She testified that to her knowledge, none of the homes were sold with any landscaping in the backyards. Her exact description was that the yards were “just dirt.”

The judge found this to be the “only credible evidence offered.” It completely undermined Prall’s case. If the developer never installed any landscaping in the backyards, there was no “original” landscaping for the HOA to maintain. Their responsibility under the governing documents was zero.

“Suppositions and Inferences” Aren’t Enough

In any formal dispute, the person making a claim has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Prall needed to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” a legal standard meaning it was more likely true than not.

He tried to meet this burden with logical arguments. He “posited that, given the size of the tree” in a 2010 photograph, it must have been planted when the home was built. He added that the “sprinkler system in his back yard wrapped around the tree as further evidence” that they were installed together by the developer.

But these deductions failed to convince the judge. In the final decision after the rehearing, these arguments were dismissed as the petitioner’s “suppositions and inferences.”

This stands in stark contrast to the HOA’s evidence. While Prall offered logical conclusions, the HOA offered direct testimony from someone who was there at the beginning. This case underscores a fundamental legal truth: personal belief and common-sense deductions are no substitute for verifiable facts and credible, first-hand testimony.

The Final Word is in the Fine Print

This homeowner’s fight over a single tree serves as a powerful cautionary tale. He built a logical case based on his interpretation of a key definition, only to lose because of a clause and a historical fact he hadn’t sufficiently proven.

The lessons are clear. Winning a dispute requires understanding every relevant clause in the governing documents, not just the one that seems most obvious. It requires acknowledging that the history of the community can be more powerful than a present-day interpretation of the rules. And most importantly, it requires presenting concrete proof, not just strong beliefs.

For any homeowner in an HOA, this story poses a crucial question: When was the last time you read your HOA’s documents from start to finish, and what hidden details might be waiting for you?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Travis Prall (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Maureen Karpinski (board member)
    President of the Board; witness
  • Frank Peake (property manager)
    Pride Community Management
    Witness; Owner of Pride Community Management
  • Rebecca Stowers (community manager)
    Witness
  • Lydia Pierce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE

Patricia Wiercinski vs. Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski Counsel —
Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition upon rehearing, holding that the email chain discussing an incident involving the Petitioner's husband was an informal communication among Board members, not an official record of the association under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), since the Board never took any formal action on the matter. Therefore, the HOA was not required to produce an un-redacted copy.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the email string constituted 'financial and other records of the association' which Respondent was required to provide.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to produce association records (un-redacted email string) upon member request

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce an un-redacted copy of an email chain among Board members concerning an incident where Petitioner's husband allegedly harassed potential buyers, arguing the email constituted an official association record.

Orders: Petition denied and dismissed. The HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) as the email string was determined not to be an official record of the association.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA records, Statutory violation, Document production, Informal communication, Board quorum, A.R.S. § 33-1805, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918028-REL Decision – 684134.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:45 (149.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918028-REL


Legal Dispute Briefing: Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between homeowner Patricia Wiercinski and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The case, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, centered on the HOA’s alleged failure to produce official records in violation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805. The dispute originated from a June 19, 2017 incident where Wiercinski’s husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly confronted and verbally abused potential buyers of a neighboring property, causing them to withdraw their interest.

The core of the legal challenge involved an email exchange among HOA board members discussing the incident. Wiercinski’s petition, filed on October 18, 2018, demanded access to what she believed were official HOA documents related to this event. The case proceeded through an initial hearing on January 10, 2019, and a subsequent rehearing on April 22, 2019, both overseen by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

In both hearings, the Judge ruled decisively in favor of the HOA. The central finding was that the private email communications among board members did not constitute an “official record of the association.” Therefore, the HOA had no statutory obligation to produce them or provide an un-redacted version. The judge upheld the HOA’s decision to redact the names of the potential buyers and their agent, citing credible testimony regarding Mr. Coates’ history of “threatening and bullying neighbors” as a reasonable justification for protecting those individuals from potential harassment. Both of Wiercinski’s petitions were ultimately denied and dismissed.

Case Overview and Parties Involved

The dispute was formally adjudicated within the jurisdiction of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for evidentiary proceedings.

• Case Number: 19F-H1918028-REL

• Initial Hearing Date: January 10, 2019

• Rehearing Date: April 22, 2019

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

Key Individuals and Entities

Name/Entity

Patricia Wiercinski

Petitioner; homeowner and member of the HOA.

Wayne Coates

Petitioner’s husband; central figure in the June 19, 2017 incident.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.

Respondent; the Homeowners’ Association (“HOA”).

Michael “Mike” Olson

President of the Respondent’s Board of Directors.

Gregg Arthur

Director on the Respondent’s Board and a realtor.

Joe Zielinski

Director on the Respondent’s Board.

Kathy Andrews

Community Manager for the Respondent, employed by HOAMCO.

John Allen

HOA member and owner of the lot being sold.

Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq. (Goodman Law Group)

Legal representative for the Respondent.

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

The Core Incident of June 19, 2017

The legal dispute stemmed from an encounter on June 19, 2017, involving Wayne Coates and a family considering the purchase of a vacant lot on Puntenney Rd., located across the street from the Wiercinski/Coates residence.

According to an email from the prospective buyers, Mr. Coates confronted them, their son, and their architect as they were viewing the property.

• Coates’ Alleged Actions: He “came out of his house and was belligerent and cursing at them,” claiming “nothing was for sale around here.” The potential buyer described him as “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational,” making “rude remarks while cussing” and displaying “extreme aggressive behavior.”

• Impact on the Sale: The confrontation directly caused the potential buyers to withdraw their offer. In their correspondence, they stated:

• Broader Concerns: The incident was seen by some as detrimental to the entire community. Board Director Gregg Arthur noted, “Wayne thru his actions appears to have interfered with and destroyed a property sale. We need to meet and take action on this matter as it will have a broad and chilling effect amongst the realtor community (effecting us all) not to mention the property owners.”

The Initial Hearing and Decision (January 2019)

The initial hearing focused on whether the HOA had withheld official records of its deliberations or decisions regarding the June 19, 2017 incident.

Petitioner’s Position

Patricia Wiercinski argued that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents. Her key assertions were:

• Because an email about the incident was sent to a quorum of the Board, the matter constituted official business.

• The Board was legally required to make a formal motion and arrive at a documented decision, even if that decision was to take no action.

• She had never received any such documentation, such as minutes from an executive session or an open meeting.

• She pointed to a Board resolution regarding the electronic storage of documents as evidence that such records must exist.

Respondent’s Position

The HOA, represented by Ashley N. Moscarello, denied any violation. Their defense included:

• The email chain was an informal communication among neighbors and Board members on their personal email servers, not an official HOA record.

• No member had ever requested the Board take official action on the matter.

• The email string was provided voluntarily to the Petitioner.

• The names of the potential buyers and their real estate agent were redacted specifically because “Mr. Coates had a history of bullying and intimidating people.”

• The Board never formally discussed the incident, held a meeting, voted, or took any official action.

• The Community Manager, Kathy Andrews, testified that no official records (agendas, resolutions, minutes, etc.) pertaining to the incident existed.

Outcome and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition. The key conclusions of law were:

• The burden of proof was on the Petitioner to show a violation occurred.

• The simple fact that a quorum of Board members discussed a topic in private emails “does not make it official Board business,” especially when no action is taken.

• Forcing volunteer board members to formally document every informal discussion would be an “unnecessary and burdensome requirement.”

• Because the Petitioner did not establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed, the petition was dismissed.

The Rehearing and Final Decision (May 2019)

Wiercinski requested and was granted a rehearing, alleging “misconduct by the judge.” In this second hearing, she significantly altered her legal argument.

Petitioner’s Evolved Position

Wiercinski abandoned her claim that the Board was required to create a formal record of inaction. Instead, her new theory was:

• The email string itself, having been voluntarily produced by the HOA, must be considered an “official record of the association.”

• As an official record, A.R.S. § 33-1805 required the HOA to produce a complete, un-redacted copy.

• She argued that she and Mr. Coates had a right to know the identities of those who had accused him of belligerence.

Respondent’s Defense

The HOA’s defense remained consistent:

• The redaction of names was a necessary and reasonable measure to protect the individuals from potential harassment by Mr. Coates.

• The incident was a personal dispute between neighbors and did not violate any of the HOA’s governing documents (CC&Rs, bylaws), placing it outside the Board’s enforcement authority.

• Kathy Andrews again testified that the email was not part of the association’s archived business records, as the Board took no official action.

Final Outcome and Rationale

The Judge once again dismissed the petition. The final ruling reinforced the initial decision and provided further clarity:

• The email string was definitively not a “record of the association.”

• Because it was not an official record, A.R.S. § 33-1805 did not compel the HOA to provide an un-redacted version.

• The Judge explicitly validated the HOA’s motive for the redactions, stating that the Board President’s fear that “Mr. Coates would harass the real estate agent and potential purchaser… does not appear unreasonable.”

Key Evidence and Testimony

The email communications provided the primary evidentiary basis for the case.

Incriminating Email Content

Several emails from June 20, 2017, highlighted the severity of the incident and concerns about Wayne Coates:

• From Real Estate Agent to Potential Buyer: “He [John Allen] knows this person, Wayne Coates, and said he has been an issue in the neighborhood before. He has contacted Hoamco and is seeking legal [counsel] to stop this menace.”

• From Director Joe Zielinski to the Board: “The YCSO [Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office] may file charges against Wayne for disorderly conduct/harassment… given Wayne’s arrest record and prison term and criminal history. … I don’t believe Wayne (and Patricia’s) aggressive and disruptive behavior will stop.”

• From Director Gregg Arthur to the Board: “I was hoping that this would not be a situation we would have to encounter with Wayne Coates and Patricia however here it is on our door step.”

Definition of “Official Records”

Testimony from Community Manager Kathy Andrews was crucial in establishing the distinction between official and unofficial communications. She defined official records as including:

• Governing documents and architectural guidelines.

• Board and general meeting minutes.

• Expenditures, receipts, contracts, and financials.

• Anything submitted to the Board for official action.

She confirmed that because the Board took no action on the June 19, 2017 incident, the related emails were not included in Respondent’s archived records.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918028-REL


Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA: A Case Study

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative case of Patricia Wiercinski versus the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. The case revolves around a homeowner’s request for association records and the legal definition of what constitutes an official document that a homeowners’ association is required to produce under Arizona law. The material is drawn from two Administrative Law Judge Decisions, dated January 22, 2019, and May 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Individuals

Role / Title

Affiliation

Patricia Wiercinski

Petitioner

Homeowner, Member of Respondent

Wayne Coates

Petitioner’s Husband

Homeowner

Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.

Respondent

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Office of Administrative Hearings

Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Legal Counsel for Respondent

Goodman Law Group

Michael “Mike” Olson

President of the Board

Respondent (HOA)

Gregg Arthur

Director on the Board

Respondent (HOA)

Kathy Andrews

Community Manager

HOAMCO (Respondent’s management company)

John Allen

Property Owner / HOA Member

Long Meadow Ranch East

Joe Zielinski

Director on the Board

Respondent (HOA)

Jim Robertson

Director on the Board

Respondent (HOA)

Tom Reid

Director on the Board

Respondent (HOA)

Boris Biloskirka

Former Board Member

Respondent (HOA)

Timeline of Key Events

June 19, 2017

An incident occurs where Wayne Coates allegedly acts belligerently toward potential buyers of John Allen’s property.

June 20, 2017

An email exchange regarding the incident occurs between John Allen, his realtor, and members of the HOA Board.

October 18, 2018

Patricia Wiercinski files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805.

January 10, 2019

The initial evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

January 22, 2019

The ALJ issues a decision denying Wiercinski’s petition.

Post-Jan 22, 2019

Wiercinski requests a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The request is granted.

April 22, 2019

The rehearing is held.

May 1, 2019

The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing Wiercinski’s petition.

The Core Dispute: The June 19, 2017 Incident

On June 19, 2017, potential buyers, along with their builder, architect, and son, were viewing a lot for sale owned by John Allen on Puntenney Rd. The lot was across the street from the home of Patricia Wiercinski and Wayne Coates. An elderly man, later identified as Wayne Coates, came out of the house and was allegedly “belligerent and cursing” at the group, telling them nothing was for sale and they should not be snooping around. The potential buyers described the individual as “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational,” displaying “extreme aggressive behavior.” As a result of this encounter, the potential buyers decided to remove the lot from their list of considerations, stating they were seeking a “quiet, peaceful, and neighborly place to retire. Not a place with hostility and confrontation.”

This incident prompted John Allen to contact his realtor and members of the HOA Board, seeking action to prevent such behavior from interfering with future property sales.

The Legal Proceedings

Petitioner’s Argument: Patricia Wiercinski alleged that the HOA (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents related to its deliberations, decisions, and actions regarding the June 19, 2017 incident. Her core arguments were:

• The email about the incident was sent to a quorum of the Board, making it official business.

• The Board was required to make a formal motion and decision, even if it decided to take no action against her husband.

• She never received documents showing the Board addressed the incident in an executive session or open meeting.

• She did not receive a map referenced in one of the emails or a letter mentioned by board member Joe Zielninski in a video.

• An HOA resolution to electronically store all association business documents meant the requested records must exist.

Respondent’s Argument: The HOA denied violating any statute. Its defense was based on the following points:

• The Board never took any official action against Wiercinski or Coates as a result of the incident.

• The email string was an informal communication among Board Directors on their personal servers and was not kept as an official record. It was provided to Wiercinski voluntarily.

• The names of the potential purchasers and real estate agent were redacted from the emails because Wayne Coates has a known history of “threatening and bullying neighbors and others.”

• No official discussion or vote on the incident ever occurred in an executive session or general meeting.

ALJ’s Decision (January 22, 2019): The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition. The decision concluded that Wiercinski did not meet her burden of proof to establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed that the Respondent failed to produce. The judge reasoned that the mere fact a quorum of Board members informally discusses a topic in private emails does not make it official Board business, especially when no action is taken.

Reason for Rehearing: Wiercinski requested a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request without noting any specific misconduct or stating why it should have changed the result.

Petitioner’s Changed Argument: At the rehearing, Wiercinski changed her theory of the case. She no longer argued that the Board failed to produce a record of a formal decision. Instead, she argued that:

• The email string itself was an official record of the association’s business.

• A.R.S. § 33-1805 therefore required the HOA to produce a fully un-redacted copy of the emails.

• She and Mr. Coates had a right to know the names of the individuals accusing Mr. Coates of belligerence.

Respondent’s Rebuttal: The HOA maintained its position:

• The email string was not an official record because the Board never took any action on the matter. The incident did not violate any of the HOA’s CC&Rs, bylaws, or anything else it was empowered to enforce.

• Community Manager Kathy Andrews testified that official records include governing documents, minutes, and items submitted to the Board for action. Since the Board took no action, the email was not included in the association’s archived records.

• The names were redacted because of Mr. Coates’s history of intimidation, and the Board president feared he would harass the individuals involved.

ALJ’s Final Decision (May 1, 2019): The petition was dismissed again. The ALJ reaffirmed that the email string was not a “record of the association.” Therefore, A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) did not require the Respondent to provide an un-redacted version to the Petitioner. The judge also noted that the fear of harassment by Mr. Coates, which prompted the redactions, “does not appear unreasonable.”

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What specific event on June 19, 2017, initiated the legal dispute?

2. What Arizona statute did Patricia Wiercinski claim the HOA violated, and what does that statute generally require?

3. Why did the HOA state it redacted names from the email chain it provided to Wiercinski?

4. In the initial hearing, what did Wiercinski argue the HOA Board was required to do even if it decided to take no action on the incident?

5. How did Wiercinski’s primary legal argument change between the first hearing and the rehearing?

6. Who is Kathy Andrews, and what was her testimony regarding the HOA’s official records?

7. Did the HOA Board ever hold a formal meeting or take an official vote regarding the incident involving Wayne Coates?

8. According to the ALJ, does an informal email discussion among a quorum of board members automatically constitute “official Board business”?

9. What was the final ruling in the case after the rehearing?

10. What reason did HOA President Mike Olson give for the Board not taking official action on the June 19, 2017 incident?

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Answer Key

1. The event was an alleged confrontation where Wayne Coates was belligerent and verbally abusive toward potential buyers who were viewing a property for sale across the street from his home. This encounter caused the buyers to lose interest in the property.

2. Wiercinski claimed the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. This statute requires that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association be made reasonably available for examination by any member.

3. The HOA stated it redacted the names of the potential purchasers and their real estate agent due to Wayne Coates’s history of “threatening and bullying neighbors and others.” Board President Mike Olson testified he feared Mr. Coates would harass the individuals if their identities were revealed.

4. In the initial hearing, Wiercinski argued that the Board was required to make a formal motion and arrive at a formal, documented decision even if it decided it was not going to take any action against her husband.

5. In the rehearing, Wiercinski’s argument shifted from claiming the HOA failed to produce a record of a decision to arguing the email string itself was an official record. She then demanded that the HOA provide a fully un-redacted version of this email string.

6. Kathy Andrews is the community manager for the HOA, employed by the management company Hoamco. She testified that the association’s official records include items like governing documents, meeting minutes, and anything submitted to the Board for action, and that the email was not an official record because the Board took no action.

7. No. Testimony from multiple witnesses, including Mike Olson and Gregg Arthur, confirmed that the Board never discussed the incident at an executive meeting or general membership meeting and never voted or took any official action as a result of the incident.

8. No. The ALJ’s decision states that the mere fact a quorum of Board members discusses a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not take any action to make it so.

9. The final ruling was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The ALJ found that the email string was not an official record of the association, so the HOA was not required by law to provide an un-redacted version.

10. Mike Olson testified that the Board never voted to take any action because the alleged incident did not violate the Respondent’s CC&Rs, bylaws, or anything else that the HOA was authorized or empowered to enforce.

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Essay Questions

1. Analyze the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between informal discussions among board members and “official Board business.” How did this distinction shape the outcome of both hearings?

2. Discuss the evolution of Patricia Wiercinski’s legal strategy from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Was the change in argument effective, and why or why not?

3. Examine the roles of A.R.S. § 33-1805 and A.R.S. § 33-1804 in this case. Explain how the Petitioner and Respondent interpreted these statutes differently and how the Administrative Law Judge ultimately applied them.

4. Based on the testimony of Mike Olson and Kathy Andrews, describe the HOA’s official position on record-keeping and its justification for not treating the email string as an official document.

5. Evaluate the Respondent’s decision to redact the names of non-members from the email string. What reasons were given for this action, and how did the Administrative Law Judge view this justification in the final ruling?

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Glossary

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): The impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Diane Mihalsky.

• A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case which provides that “all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member.”

• A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4): An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case which provides that any quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting and notice provisions.

• Homeowners’ Association (HOA): An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium building that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc.

• Petitioner: The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Patricia Wiercinski.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with the “most convincing force.”

• Quorum: The minimum number of members of a deliberative assembly (such as a board of directors) necessary to conduct the business of that group. The petitioner argued that because a quorum of the board was included on the emails, the discussion constituted official business.

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918028-REL


4 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit About a “Nightmare Neighbor”

Introduction: Behind the Closed Doors of the HOA Board

Many people live in communities governed by a Homeowners’ Association (HOA), navigating the rules and paying the dues as part of modern suburban life. But what happens when a serious dispute between neighbors erupts? What if one resident’s behavior is so aggressive that it costs another the sale of their property? A real-life administrative law case from Prescott, Arizona, provides a rare and fascinating look into the messy reality of HOA governance. The lawsuit, filed by a homeowner against her HOA for allegedly withholding records, reveals surprising truths about what constitutes “official business” and the real-world limits of an HOA’s power.

——————————————————————————–

1. Not All HOA Talk is “Official Business”—Even When the Whole Board Is In on It.

The case centered on a dramatic incident. A homeowner’s husband, Wayne Coates, was accused of being “belligerent and cursing” at potential buyers viewing a lot across the street, causing them to back out of the sale. The distressed property seller, John Allen, emailed an HOA board member, Gregg Arthur, who then forwarded the complaint to the entire board. The petitioner, Mr. Coates’ wife, argued that this email chain was an official HOA record.

Her argument rested on a profound misunderstanding of board governance that many residents likely share: she claimed the board was legally required to make a motion and arrive at a formal decision even if it decided to do nothing. The administrative law judge firmly rejected this idea. The emails were deemed informal, private communications, not official records.

The judge clarified that “official business” is triggered when a board moves toward a formal decision or action that would bind the association, such as spending funds, issuing a violation, or changing a rule. These emails were purely informational and investigatory, never reaching that threshold. This distinction is a cornerstone of volunteer board governance, as it protects boards from being paralyzed by procedure. The judge’s decision powerfully refutes the notion that boards must formally document every issue they choose not to pursue:

the mere fact that a quorum of Board members may discuss a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not end up taking any action to make a matter board business. Any other result would impose an unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers who are not compensated for their time who are may be neighbors and who may also be friends, in addition to being Board members.

2. A Neighbor’s Behavior Can Kill a Property Sale, and Your HOA Might Be Powerless.

The impact of Mr. Coates’ alleged actions was immediate and severe. The potential buyers, seeking a peaceful retirement, were so shaken by the confrontation that they explicitly withdrew their interest in the property.

An email from the potential buyer, submitted as evidence, vividly illustrates the direct financial consequence of the neighbor’s behavior:

In closing when we returned one thing that stands out is would we want to live next to this type of behavior of [a] neighbor? The answer is no, this lot was one that we had in our top 2 Lots as a consideration for purchase but due to the volatile potential of this man, we have decided at this point to remove it from our list.

Despite the clear harm to a member, the HOA concluded it could not intervene. According to testimony, Community Manager Kathy Andrews explained that the HOA had “no authority to become involved in a personal dispute between neighbors.” Further, Board President Mike Olson testified that the incident did not violate any specific CC&Rs or bylaws the board was empowered to enforce. This highlights a counter-intuitive reality for many homeowners: not all bad neighbor behavior falls under an HOA’s jurisdiction, even when it negatively affects property sales. However, while the HOA was powerless, the situation was not a dead end for the seller, who court records show did eventually sell his lot to someone else.

3. Transparency Has Limits, Especially When a Resident Is Seen as a Threat.

The petitioner demanded an un-redacted copy of the emails, wanting to know exactly who was accusing her husband. The HOA refused, redacting the names of the potential buyers and their real estate agent.

The reason, according to sworn testimony from HOA President Mike Olson, was that Mr. Coates had a “history of threatening and bullying neighbors and others.” This case highlights the inherent tension between a member’s right to information and the board’s fiduciary duty to protect individuals from harm. While members have a right to access official records, that right is not absolute.

The judge validated the board’s exercise of its duty of care, finding its rationale for the redactions to be sound. In a moment of legal irony, the judge noted that the board’s fear was reasonable, “especially given Mr. Coates’ role in causing Petitioner to prosecute this petition at the original hearing and rehearing.” In effect, the petitioner’s own aggressive pursuit of the case in court helped to legally justify the board’s initial decision to protect identities from her husband.

4. Suing Your HOA Can Put Your Own Dirty Laundry on Display.

Perhaps the greatest irony of the lawsuit is what it ultimately accomplished. In her quest to obtain what she believed were improperly withheld documents, the petitioner’s legal action placed deeply unflattering information about her husband directly into the public record for anyone to see.

Emails submitted as evidence contained damaging statements, including an email from board member Joe Zielinski that is now a permanent part of the court file. It contained severe allegations that went far beyond the initial incident.

The YCSO [Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office] may file charges against Wayne for disorderly conduct/harassment, based on what happened to Mr. Allan and the others in attendance, given Wayne’s arrest record and prison term and criminal history. . . . I don’t believe Wayne (and Patricia’s) aggressive and disruptive behavior will stop.

This serves as a powerful “be careful what you wish for” lesson in HOA litigation. The lawsuit, intended to hold the HOA accountable, permanently enshrined the allegations about her husband’s “arrest record and prison term” in the public court record—the very opposite of the privacy and vindication the petitioner was likely seeking.

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Conclusion: The Fine Line Between Community and Controversy

This case peels back the curtain on the complex world of volunteer-run HOAs. It demonstrates that the line between an informal discussion among neighbors and official, actionable HOA business is finer and more consequential than most residents assume. It shows that an HOA’s power has clear limits and that a board’s duty to protect individuals can sometimes override demands for total transparency. It makes you wonder: when you see a problem in your neighborhood, is it truly the HOA’s business to solve, or is it a personal dispute between neighbors?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patricia Wiercinski (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf
  • Wayne Coates (petitioner's husband)
    Central figure in the June 19, 2017 incident

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Represented Respondent
  • Michael Olson (board president, witness)
    President of Respondent's board; testified at hearing and rehearing
  • Gregg Arthur (board director, witness)
    Director on Respondent's board; testified at hearing
  • Kathy Andrews (property manager, witness)
    HOAMCO
    Respondent's community manager; employed by HOAMCO; testified at hearing and rehearing
  • John Allen (member/complainant)
    Owner trying to sell property across the street from Petitioner; member of Respondent
  • Jim Robertson (board director)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Joe Zielinski (board director, witness)
    Director on Respondent's board; mentioned conversation with YCSO deputy
  • Tom Reid (board director)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Boris Biloskirka (former board member)
    Recipient of emails; identified as a former Board member
  • Josh (compliance officer)
    Referenced in emails regarding compliance inspections

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Shelia Polk (head prosecutor)
    Head of the office Joe Zielinski sought to contact regarding Wayne Coates
  • YCSO’s deputy (deputy)
    Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office
    Conversed with Joe Zielinski regarding the incident
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowner’s Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel —
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners' Association Counsel —

Alleged Violations

Bylaw 2.4

Outcome Summary

In the initial decision, Petitioner established violations of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (election materials disposal) and A.R.S. § 33-1804 (closed/improperly noticed meetings), but failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Issue 1). The rehearing only addressed Issue 1, which was ultimately dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 violation) because the ALJ found that while the Bylaw applied to Members, Petitioner failed to show it prohibited a Director from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned, and the investigation was initiated by a Board member immediately following the meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Election Objection Waiver)

Whether Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on an objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting, given that the Bylaw requires members to object to irregularities 'at the meeting' to avoid waiver.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed as to Issue 1.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Election Challenge, Bylaw Violation, Meeting Notice, Record Retention, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Bylaw 3.3
  • Bylaw 2.4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG Decision – 678304.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:44 (117.5 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG Decision – 678305.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:47 (38.8 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818035-REL/655766.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:50 (113.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Tom Barrs vs. Desert Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative legal dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning the HOA’s board election of March 18, 2017. The core of the dispute involved the HOA board’s decision to investigate and ultimately overturn the initially announced election results, leading to a run-off election.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) overseeing the case and a subsequent rehearing issued a mixed final decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, successfully proved that the Desert Ranch HOA committed two statutory violations:

1. Destruction of Election Materials: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by destroying ballot envelopes shortly after the election, materials which are required to be retained for at least one year.

2. Improper Closed Meeting: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding a board meeting with its attorney at a private residence without providing the required notice to its members.

However, the Petitioner’s primary challenge—that the board violated its own Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned—was dismissed. The ALJ ruled that the bylaw’s waiver of claims applied to general “Members” but not to “Directors” acting in their official capacity. This ruling effectively upheld the board’s authority to investigate the election, which led to the discovery of invalid ballots and the eventual run-off election won by Brian Schoeffler.

As the prevailing party on two of the three issues, Mr. Barrs was awarded a reimbursement of his $1,000.00 filing fee. The judge, however, found that no civil penalty against the HOA was appropriate.

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I. Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Tom Barrs

◦ Respondent: Desert Ranch HOA, represented by Catherine Overby (President) and Brian Schoeffler (Vice President)

• Case Number: 18F-H1818035-REL

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

• Subject of Dispute: Alleged violations of Arizona statutes and HOA bylaws related to the handling and outcome of the March 18, 2017, annual board election.

II. Chronology of the Contested Election

The dispute originated from the following sequence of events surrounding the 2017 election for two vacant seats on the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors.

1. Pre-Election: Absentee ballots were distributed to members, listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates and providing a space for a write-in candidate.

2. March 18, 2017 (Annual Meeting): Ballots were submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger (a write-in) were announced as the winning candidates. No members present objected to the results before the meeting was adjourned.

3. Immediately Following the Meeting: Board member Patrick Rice gathered the ballots and “expressed his concerns with the election results.”

4. Circa March 18, 2017: All ballot envelopes from the election were destroyed.

5. March 19, 2017: Candidate Brian Schoeffler sent an email regarding the election, stating, “I’m asking you to review the situation and make a decision if there is enough concern that there should be a revote.”

6. March 20, 2017: Board President Catherine Overby emailed the members, announcing that the election had been “contested.” In the email, she asserted that the bylaws did not permit write-in candidates and declared that she and Mr. Schoeffler were the new directors.

7. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Ms. Overby and Mr. Rice, held an unannounced meeting with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s home. During this meeting, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot” had been improperly counted.

8. Post-March 29, 2017: After consulting the attorney, the board determined that the valid vote count resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board decided to hold a run-off election.

9. April 29, 2017: The run-off election was held, and Brian Schoeffler was announced as the winner.

10. May 10, 2017: The newly constituted Board of Directors held its organizational meeting.

III. Adjudicated Issues and Rulings

The petition, originally filed as a single issue, was converted to a multiple-issue case. At the hearing, the dispute was clarified into three distinct issues, each with a specific ruling from the ALJ.

Petitioner’s Allegation

Legal Basis

Final Ruling

The HOA improperly overturned the election results based on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned.

Bylaw 2.4

Dismissed

The HOA unlawfully discarded ballot envelopes and related election materials.

A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)

Violation Found

The HOA held closed board meetings without providing proper notice to the membership.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Violation Found

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A. Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Improperly Overturning Election)

• Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs contended that the board was barred from investigating or acting on any concerns about the election after the meeting had concluded. His argument was based on Bylaw 2.4, which states:

• ALJ Finding: The petition on this issue was dismissed. The judge’s finding was affirmed after a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.

• ALJ Rationale:

1. Initiation of Investigation: Testimony established that Board member Patrick Rice expressed concerns “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” Therefore, Mr. Schoeffler’s email the following day did not initiate the board’s investigation.

2. Distinction Between “Member” and “Director”: The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. The waiver in Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member,” and the Petitioner failed to prove that a “Director” was prohibited from raising questions about the validity of an election after a meeting.

B. Issue 2: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (Destruction of Election Materials)

• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law mandates that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… for at least one year after completion of the election.”

• Respondent’s Action: The HOA destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election.

• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.

• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” presented at the hearing that established the destruction of the materials.

C. Issue 3: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Improper Closed Meetings)

• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law requires all HOA board meetings to be open to all members. A meeting can only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must provide notice and cite the legal authority for entering a closed session.

• Respondent’s Action: Certain board members met with an attorney at a private residence on March 29, 2017, to discuss the election. No notice was provided to the membership regarding this meeting.

• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.

• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” that the meeting occurred and that the board “did not provide any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or provide notice that the meeting would be closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.”

IV. Final Order and Disposition

The final decision, issued on August 23, 2018, and upheld after a rehearing decision on December 26, 2018, ordered the following:

• Dismissal: The petition regarding Issue 1 (violation of Bylaw 2.4) was dismissed.

• Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Tom Barrs, was deemed the prevailing party as to Issue 2 and Issue 3.

• Monetary Award: The Respondent, Desert Ranch HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00.

• Civil Penalty: The judge determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”

• Finality: The decision after rehearing was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG


Study Guide:Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions issued on August 23, 2018, and December 26, 2018.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the initially announced results of the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors election on March 18, 2017?

3. What were the two primary procedural violations that the Desert Ranch HOA Board committed following the March 18, 2017 election?

4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the violation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4?

5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismiss the Petitioner’s claim regarding Bylaw 2.4?

6. Explain the violation related to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1812(A)(7) that the ALJ found the Respondent had committed.

7. Describe the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 concerning open meetings.

8. What was the final order from the initial hearing on August 23, 2018?

9. What was the specific focus of the rehearing held on December 6, 2018?

10. What was the ultimate outcome of the rehearing, and what legal recourse was available to the parties afterward?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Tom Barrs, who filed the dispute, and Respondent Desert Ranch HOA. The HOA was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. At the Annual Board Meeting on March 18, 2017, the ballots were counted and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates for the two vacant seats on the Board of Directors. No members present raised an objection before the meeting was adjourned.

3. The HOA Board committed two primary procedural violations. First, they destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election, and second, certain Board members met with an attorney without providing notice to the association members that a meeting was being held or that it would be a closed session.

4. The Petitioner argued that candidate Brian Schoeffler’s challenge to the election was invalid because it was raised the day after the meeting adjourned. According to Bylaw 2.4, any “Member” who fails to object to an irregularity at the meeting waives their claim, and the Petitioner argued this rule should also apply to Board members.

5. The ALJ dismissed the claim because the investigation was initiated by Board member Patrick Rice, who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting, not by Mr. Schoeffler’s later email. The judge also determined that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific, non-interchangeable meanings, and the Petitioner failed to show that a Director was barred from raising concerns after a meeting.

6. The ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) based on uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing. This statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related election materials be retained for at least one year after an election, but the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.

7. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when certain Board members met with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s house on March 29, 2017. The HOA failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the members and did not announce that the meeting would be closed to discuss legal advice, as required by the statute.

8. In the initial order, the ALJ dismissed the petition as to Issue 1 (the Bylaw 2.4 violation) but found the Petitioner to be the prevailing party on Issues 2 and 3 (the statutory violations). The judge ordered the Respondent HOA to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00 but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

9. The rehearing focused exclusively on the first issue from the initial hearing: whether the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on objections to the election results after the Annual Meeting had adjourned. The Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the lack of penalties for the other two violations.

10. The rehearing upheld the original decision, dismissing the petition as to Issue 1. The decision from the rehearing was final and binding, and any party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing upon specific facts and legal arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4, specifically the distinction between a “Member” and a “Director.” Discuss the strength of the Petitioner’s counter-argument and why the judge’s reasoning ultimately prevailed.

2. Examine the series of actions taken by the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors following the March 18, 2017 election announcement. Evaluate whether their actions to investigate irregularities, consult an attorney, and hold a run-off election were ultimately justified, despite the procedural violations they committed.

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as the burden of proof in this case. For each of the three issues presented, explain how the Petitioner either met or failed to meet this standard, citing specific evidence mentioned in the decisions.

4. Based on the events described, from the initial election to the final administrative ruling, critique the effectiveness of the HOA’s internal governance and dispute resolution processes. What systemic failures are evident, and how did they lead to a formal administrative hearing?

5. Although the Petitioner was the “prevailing party” on two of the three issues, the remedy was limited to a refund of his filing fee, with no civil penalty imposed. Argue for or against the appropriateness of this remedy, considering the nature of the HOA’s violations and their impact on the integrity of the election process.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Statute

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on evidence and law. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all meetings of a homeowners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. A meeting may only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must state the statutory reason for closing the meeting.

A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)

An Arizona Revised Statute that mandates the retention of election materials, including ballots and envelopes, in either electronic or paper format for at least one year after the completion of an election for member inspection.

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

An Arizona statute that permits an owner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4

A provision in the HOA’s bylaws stating, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal proceeding against their HOA for alleged violations.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Tom Barrs.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to consider a decision that has already been made, typically granted if there are perceived errors of law, misconduct, or if the decision was not supported by the evidence.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch HOA.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG


A Homeowner Sued His HOA Over a Botched Election—Here Are 3 Lessons Every Board Should Learn

Friction between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) board is a common feature of community living, and nowhere is that friction more apparent than in disputes over elections and rule enforcement. But what happens when a board, trying to correct an error, makes the situation exponentially worse?

This article is a deep dive into the real administrative law case of Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, a seemingly straightforward dispute that reveals surprising and practical lessons for anyone living in or governing a planned community. It’s a story of a cascade of errors, where initial election confusion led to a panicked and procedurally flawed response, compounded by a pre-existing failure in record-keeping. As we’ll see, the outcome wasn’t what anyone expected, and the board’s biggest mistakes weren’t the ones they thought they were fighting.

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1. You Can Lose the Main Argument But Still Win the Case

The dispute began at the Desert Ranch HOA’s annual meeting, where election results were announced. The trouble started immediately after the meeting adjourned when a board Director, Patrick Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed concerns about irregularities. A day later, a losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, echoed those concerns via email. Citing the Director’s objection, the board overturned the initial results, prompting homeowner Tom Barrs to file a petition arguing this was a violation of the HOA’s own rules.

Barrs’ case hinged on Bylaw 2.4, which stated that any “Member” must object to irregularities during the meeting itself, or else they waive their right to complain. Barrs argued that since no one objected before adjournment, the results should stand. However, the judge disagreed, pointing to two critical distinctions in the evidence. First, the investigation was triggered by the concerns of a “Director,” not the losing candidate’s later email. Second, a close reading of the bylaws showed that the terms “Member” and “Director” were used as distinct categories and were not interchangeable. Since the bylaw only restricted “Members,” it did not prevent a Director from raising concerns after the meeting. Barrs lost his primary argument.

Despite this, in a counter-intuitive twist, the judge declared Barrs the “prevailing party” in the overall case and ordered the HOA to repay his $1,000 filing fee. Why? Because while investigating the petitioner’s main claim, the judge found the board had committed other clear violations of state law while trying to “fix” the election. This outcome underscores a critical principle for all boards: procedural integrity is paramount. The HOA won the battle over its right to review the election but lost the war because of its flawed process.

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2. Your Records (or Lack Thereof) Will Be Your Downfall

One of the board’s most significant errors was a simple but critical failure of administrative duty: they destroyed election materials in direct violation of state law. The HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), which is unambiguous about an HOA’s responsibility.

According to A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), “Ballots, envelopes and related materials…shall be retained…for at least one year after completion of the election.”

The legal decision states the evidence was “uncontroverted” that the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. Because the HOA could not dispute this fact, it was an easy violation for the petitioner to prove.

This wasn’t just a minor administrative oversight; it was a catastrophic error. By destroying the envelopes, the board not only violated the law but also eliminated any possibility of independently verifying the vote count after their own director discovered irregularities. This single failure trapped them in a procedural corner of their own making. It made a definitive resolution of the election challenge impossible, leading to the messy and expensive situation of declaring a tie and holding a run-off, all of which could have been avoided if the primary evidence had been preserved as required by law.

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3. “Private” Board Business Can Be an Illegal Secret Meeting

In an attempt to resolve the election dispute correctly, the board took what it likely considered a responsible step: seeking legal advice. After the election was contested, certain board members met with an attorney at a board member’s house to figure out how to proceed. However, the way they did it constituted another clear violation of state law.

This private meeting violated Arizona’s open meeting law, A.R.S. § 33-1804. While the statute does allow a board to enter a closed session to receive legal advice, it has strict procedural requirements. The board must first provide notice of the meeting to all members and then, at that public meeting, officially vote to enter the closed session for that specific, legally permissible reason. The evidence was “uncontroverted” that the board failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the association members.

The board’s desire for confidential legal advice was understandable, but their method created an unforced legal error. The correct procedure—notifying members of a meeting and then voting to enter a closed session—protects the board by demonstrating procedural propriety. The shortcut they took exposed them to a clear-cut violation that was impossible to defend. For an HOA board, transparency is the default, and secrecy is a narrow, legally defined exception. The process of going private matters as much as the reason for doing so.

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Conclusion: It’s Not Just What You Do, It’s How You Do It

The Desert Ranch HOA board, in its attempt to correct a perceived election error, committed two clear statutory violations. In their haste, they held an illegal secret meeting and were hamstrung by their prior failure to properly retain election records—the very evidence needed for a clean resolution. These procedural missteps ultimately cost them the case.

The ultimate lesson from Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA is that for any governing body, procedural correctness is just as important as substantive correctness. This case serves as a stark reminder that good intentions are no defense against procedural law. When a crisis hits, does your board have the discipline to follow procedure, or will the rush to find a solution lead you to commit unforced errors that are far worse than the original problem?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Stephen Barrs (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Catherine Overby (board president, witness)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Brian Schoeffler (board vice president, witness)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Patrick Rice (board member)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Board member who expressed concerns with election results

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Jerome Klinger (board member)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Director elected in disputed election

Charles P Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel —
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL Decision – 669528.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:49 (91.9 KB)