The Administrative Law Judge denied Petitioner Michael H. Jahr's petition, concluding that he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated ARS § 33-1816, because a clothesline is not a 'solar energy device' under ARS § 44-1761, and ARS § 33-439(a) was inapplicable.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof that the Association violated ARS § 33-1816. The Tribunal determined that a clothesline does not meet the statutory definition of a solar energy device.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of ARS § 33-1816 regarding denial of utilizing solar means to reduce energy consumption.
Petitioner alleged the Association violated ARS § 33-1816 by refusing him the ability to utilize solar means (a clothesline) to reduce energy consumption, arguing the clothesline met the definition of a 'solar energy device' under ARS § 44-1761, which the HOA cannot prohibit.
Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied. Respondent was ordered not to owe Petitioner any reimbursement for fees incurred.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1816(a-b)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1761
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-439(a)
Association Rules & Regulations 2-304(D)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Dispute, Solar Energy Device, Clothesline, Planned Community, Statutory Interpretation, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-439(a)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1808(a)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1816(a-b)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1761
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-111(4)
Association Rules & Regulations 2-304(D)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
23F-H032-REL Decision – 1041743.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:59 (161.1 KB)
23F-H032-REL Decision – 1057366.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:54:04 (55.7 KB)
Questions
Question
Can my HOA prohibit me from using a clothesline in my backyard?
Short Answer
Yes, if the community rules prohibit them.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ determined that an HOA can prohibit clotheslines because they do not qualify as protected solar energy devices under Arizona law. In this case, the association's rules explicitly prohibited clotheslines visible from outside the residence.
Alj Quote
Based on the relevant and credible evidence of record… the Tribunal finds that a clothesline is not a solar energy device. Moreover, Petitioner knew or should have known that clotheslines were prohibited by the Association under Rules & Regulations 2-304(D).
Legal Basis
Rules & Regulations 2-304(D); ARS 33-1816
Topic Tags
architectural_control
prohibited_items
solar_energy
Question
Is a clothesline considered a 'solar energy device' legally protected by Arizona statute?
Short Answer
No, a clothesline does not meet the statutory definition of a solar energy device.
Detailed Answer
The decision clarified that a clothesline does not fit the legal definition of a 'solar energy device' (specifically a 'system or series of mechanisms') under A.R.S. § 44-1761, and therefore does not enjoy the statutory protection that voids HOA restrictions on solar devices.
Alj Quote
Based on the relevant and credible evidence of record, including the aforementioned germane statutory definitions, and lacking any binding citations offered from a court of competent jurisdiction, the Tribunal finds that a clothesline is not a solar energy device.
Legal Basis
ARS 44-1761(8); ARS 33-439(a)
Topic Tags
solar_energy
definitions
statutory_interpretation
Question
What is the burden of proof for a homeowner challenging an HOA decision?
Short Answer
The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.
Detailed Answer
When a homeowner petitions for a hearing, they bear the burden of proving that the HOA violated community documents or statutes. The standard is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning it is more probable than not that the violation occurred.
Alj Quote
In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated a community document.
Legal Basis
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Topic Tags
burden_of_proof
legal_standards
hearing_procedure
Question
Can I be reimbursed for my filing fees if I lose the hearing?
Short Answer
No, reimbursement is generally not awarded if the petition is denied.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ ordered that because the petition was denied, the HOA did not owe the homeowner any reimbursement for fees incurred during the filing process.
Alj Quote
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent does not owe Petitioner any reimbursement(s) for fees incurred in association with the filing of this petition.
Legal Basis
Order
Topic Tags
fees
reimbursement
penalties
Question
Are CC&Rs considered a binding contract?
Short Answer
Yes, CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the HOA and the homeowner.
Detailed Answer
The decision affirms that when a property is purchased within a planned community, the buyer agrees to be bound by the CC&Rs, which function as a contract.
Alj Quote
Thus, the CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Legal Basis
Common Law
Topic Tags
cc&rs
contract_law
governing_documents
Question
Can I use a flag pole sleeve for something other than a flag, like a clothesline?
Short Answer
No, if the permit was granted specifically for a flag pole.
Detailed Answer
In this case, the homeowner obtained a permit for a flag pole sleeve but used it for a clothesline. The HOA was entitled to issue a violation notice because the use differed from the approved purpose and violated other rules.
Alj Quote
Respondent did, however, grant Petitioner’s sleeve request with the explicit instruction that its use was for the purpose of flag display… As such, the Association’s October 31, 2022, VIOLATION NOTICE was not issued unlawfully or in error.
Legal Basis
ARS 33-1808(a)
Topic Tags
architectural_requests
permits
flag_poles
Question
How do courts interpret words in statutes that aren't explicitly defined?
Short Answer
They use the ordinary meaning of the words, often consulting dictionaries.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ looked to the 'natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning' of words. Since the statute did not define 'clothesline,' the judge consulted Merriam Webster to define terms like 'system' and 'mechanism' to see if a clothesline fit the description.
Alj Quote
Words should be given 'their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning.'… BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY does not define 'clothesline' or 'solar energy device.' Per Merriam Webster, however, 'system' means a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole
Legal Basis
Statutory Construction Principles
Topic Tags
legal_standards
definitions
interpretation
Question
What is the deadline for filing a request for a rehearing?
Short Answer
30 days from the service of the order.
Detailed Answer
If a party wishes to request a rehearing, they must file it with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the decision.
Alj Quote
Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this ORDER upon the parties.
Legal Basis
ARS 41-1092.09
Topic Tags
appeals
deadlines
procedural_requirements
Case
Docket No
23F-H032-REL
Case Title
Michael H. Jahr vs. Leisure World Community Association
Decision Date
2023-03-14
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Questions
Question
Can my HOA prohibit me from using a clothesline in my backyard?
Short Answer
Yes, if the community rules prohibit them.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ determined that an HOA can prohibit clotheslines because they do not qualify as protected solar energy devices under Arizona law. In this case, the association's rules explicitly prohibited clotheslines visible from outside the residence.
Alj Quote
Based on the relevant and credible evidence of record… the Tribunal finds that a clothesline is not a solar energy device. Moreover, Petitioner knew or should have known that clotheslines were prohibited by the Association under Rules & Regulations 2-304(D).
Legal Basis
Rules & Regulations 2-304(D); ARS 33-1816
Topic Tags
architectural_control
prohibited_items
solar_energy
Question
Is a clothesline considered a 'solar energy device' legally protected by Arizona statute?
Short Answer
No, a clothesline does not meet the statutory definition of a solar energy device.
Detailed Answer
The decision clarified that a clothesline does not fit the legal definition of a 'solar energy device' (specifically a 'system or series of mechanisms') under A.R.S. § 44-1761, and therefore does not enjoy the statutory protection that voids HOA restrictions on solar devices.
Alj Quote
Based on the relevant and credible evidence of record, including the aforementioned germane statutory definitions, and lacking any binding citations offered from a court of competent jurisdiction, the Tribunal finds that a clothesline is not a solar energy device.
Legal Basis
ARS 44-1761(8); ARS 33-439(a)
Topic Tags
solar_energy
definitions
statutory_interpretation
Question
What is the burden of proof for a homeowner challenging an HOA decision?
Short Answer
The homeowner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.
Detailed Answer
When a homeowner petitions for a hearing, they bear the burden of proving that the HOA violated community documents or statutes. The standard is 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning it is more probable than not that the violation occurred.
Alj Quote
In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated a community document.
Legal Basis
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Topic Tags
burden_of_proof
legal_standards
hearing_procedure
Question
Can I be reimbursed for my filing fees if I lose the hearing?
Short Answer
No, reimbursement is generally not awarded if the petition is denied.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ ordered that because the petition was denied, the HOA did not owe the homeowner any reimbursement for fees incurred during the filing process.
Alj Quote
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent does not owe Petitioner any reimbursement(s) for fees incurred in association with the filing of this petition.
Legal Basis
Order
Topic Tags
fees
reimbursement
penalties
Question
Are CC&Rs considered a binding contract?
Short Answer
Yes, CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the HOA and the homeowner.
Detailed Answer
The decision affirms that when a property is purchased within a planned community, the buyer agrees to be bound by the CC&Rs, which function as a contract.
Alj Quote
Thus, the CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Legal Basis
Common Law
Topic Tags
cc&rs
contract_law
governing_documents
Question
Can I use a flag pole sleeve for something other than a flag, like a clothesline?
Short Answer
No, if the permit was granted specifically for a flag pole.
Detailed Answer
In this case, the homeowner obtained a permit for a flag pole sleeve but used it for a clothesline. The HOA was entitled to issue a violation notice because the use differed from the approved purpose and violated other rules.
Alj Quote
Respondent did, however, grant Petitioner’s sleeve request with the explicit instruction that its use was for the purpose of flag display… As such, the Association’s October 31, 2022, VIOLATION NOTICE was not issued unlawfully or in error.
Legal Basis
ARS 33-1808(a)
Topic Tags
architectural_requests
permits
flag_poles
Question
How do courts interpret words in statutes that aren't explicitly defined?
Short Answer
They use the ordinary meaning of the words, often consulting dictionaries.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ looked to the 'natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning' of words. Since the statute did not define 'clothesline,' the judge consulted Merriam Webster to define terms like 'system' and 'mechanism' to see if a clothesline fit the description.
Alj Quote
Words should be given 'their natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning.'… BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY does not define 'clothesline' or 'solar energy device.' Per Merriam Webster, however, 'system' means a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole
Legal Basis
Statutory Construction Principles
Topic Tags
legal_standards
definitions
interpretation
Question
What is the deadline for filing a request for a rehearing?
Short Answer
30 days from the service of the order.
Detailed Answer
If a party wishes to request a rehearing, they must file it with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the decision.
Alj Quote
Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this ORDER upon the parties.
Legal Basis
ARS 41-1092.09
Topic Tags
appeals
deadlines
procedural_requirements
Case
Docket No
23F-H032-REL
Case Title
Michael H. Jahr vs. Leisure World Community Association
Decision Date
2023-03-14
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Michael H. Jahr(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Daniel Clark Collier(assistant community manager) Leisure World Community Association Appeared on behalf of Respondent and testified as a witness
Regis Salazar(witness) Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) OAH
Susan Nicolson(commissioner) ADRE Recipient of recommended decision
Other Participants
AHansen(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of electronic transmission
vnunez(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of electronic transmission
djones(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of electronic transmission
labril(ADRE staff) ADRE Recipient of electronic transmission
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842; Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Bylaws Art. III Sec. 2
Outcome Summary
The ALJ denied the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated community documents or statutes. The ALJ noted that Petitioner lacked the authority to request the inspection on behalf of the HOA, and one primary statute cited (ARS § 10-3842) was inapplicable/outside jurisdiction.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding the alleged statutory and community document violations. The ALJ found Petitioner lacked the authority to act for the Association, and the inspection had not yet commenced when directed to stop.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged interference with wildfire risk assessment
Petitioner alleged Respondent stopped the Green Valley Fire Department's in-progress wildfire risk assessment, interfering with the assessment and failing to act in good faith or in the best interests of the Corporation.
Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied. All pending post-hearing motions were denied as moot.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Bylaws Art. III Sec. 2
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA dispute, wildfire risk, homeowner authority, jurisdiction, planned community
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Bylaws Art. III Sec. 2
Can an individual homeowner authorize vendors or government agencies to perform inspections on HOA common property?
Short Answer
No. Unless explicitly granted permission by the governing documents, an individual homeowner does not have the authority to act on behalf of the Association.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ determined that a homeowner cannot unilaterally request services, such as a fire inspection, for the entire subdivision. The authority to manage association affairs and property generally resides with the Board of Directors.
Alj Quote
Here, the record reflects that Petitioner did not have the authority or permission to act on behalf of the Association to request that GVFD perform a wild fire inspection in and for the Quail Creek Villas subdivision.
Legal Basis
Association Bylaws Art. III, Section 2; ARS 33-1802
Topic Tags
Homeowner Authority
Common Area Inspections
Board Powers
Question
Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an administrative hearing?
Short Answer
The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.
Detailed Answer
The person bringing the complaint must prove their case. The HOA does not inherently have to disprove the allegations; the homeowner must first provide sufficient evidence that a violation occurred.
Alj Quote
In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.
Legal Basis
Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
Topic Tags
Burden of Proof
Hearing Procedures
Question
Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction over the standards of conduct for corporate officers (ARS Title 10)?
Short Answer
No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to specific real estate and planned community statutes.
Detailed Answer
Allegations regarding the general corporate conduct of officers under Title 10 (Corporations and Associations) generally fall outside the scope of the administrative hearing process provided by the Department of Real Estate.
Alj Quote
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, Corporations and Association – Standards of Conduct for Officers, is outside the jurisdiction of the Department and inapplicable to this matter.
Legal Basis
Jurisdictional Limits
Topic Tags
Jurisdiction
Corporate Law
Officer Conduct
Question
What is the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard used in these hearings?
Short Answer
It means the evidence shows the claim is 'more probably true than not'.
Detailed Answer
This is the standard of proof required in civil and administrative hearings. It is a lower standard than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' used in criminal cases. It essentially means the evidence must tip the scale slightly in favor of the petitioner.
Alj Quote
A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.
Legal Basis
Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence
Topic Tags
Legal Standards
Evidence
Question
If I accidentally email my evidence to the wrong email address for the HOA's attorney, will it still be admitted?
Short Answer
Likely not. The responsibility for properly serving evidence lies with the person sending it.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ ruled that if a petitioner misspells the opposing counsel's email address, resulting in the evidence not being received, the petitioner is responsible for that error, and the evidence may be excluded.
Alj Quote
Thus, Petitioner bore the onus of any mishandling/compromise of his proposed hearing exhibits.
Legal Basis
Procedural Rules
Topic Tags
Evidence
Procedure
Mistakes
Question
Can I cite general statutes or non-existent statutes in my petition?
Short Answer
No, you must cite specific, valid statutes. Citing non-existent codes weakens the case.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ noted that the petitioner cited statutes that did not exist (e.g., ARS 33-9). While the judge may try to interpret the intent based on evidence, relying on invalid statutes makes it difficult to sustain the burden of proof.
Alj Quote
The conundrum of Petitioner’s confusing reliance on statutes that do not exist and/or are outside the jurisdiction of the Department is solved, in large part, based on the substantive evidence of record.
Legal Basis
Statutory Interpretation
Topic Tags
Legal Research
Petition Drafting
Question
What is the deadline for requesting a rehearing if I disagree with the decision?
Short Answer
30 days from the date the order is served.
Detailed Answer
If a party wishes to contest the ALJ's decision, they must file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days.
Alj Quote
Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this ORDER upon the parties.
Legal Basis
ARS 41-1092.09
Topic Tags
Appeals
Deadlines
Case
Docket No
23F-H004-REL
Case Title
Randall White vs. Quail Creek Villas Association Inc.
Decision Date
2022-12-29
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Questions
Question
Can an individual homeowner authorize vendors or government agencies to perform inspections on HOA common property?
Short Answer
No. Unless explicitly granted permission by the governing documents, an individual homeowner does not have the authority to act on behalf of the Association.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ determined that a homeowner cannot unilaterally request services, such as a fire inspection, for the entire subdivision. The authority to manage association affairs and property generally resides with the Board of Directors.
Alj Quote
Here, the record reflects that Petitioner did not have the authority or permission to act on behalf of the Association to request that GVFD perform a wild fire inspection in and for the Quail Creek Villas subdivision.
Legal Basis
Association Bylaws Art. III, Section 2; ARS 33-1802
Topic Tags
Homeowner Authority
Common Area Inspections
Board Powers
Question
Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an administrative hearing?
Short Answer
The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.
Detailed Answer
The person bringing the complaint must prove their case. The HOA does not inherently have to disprove the allegations; the homeowner must first provide sufficient evidence that a violation occurred.
Alj Quote
In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.
Legal Basis
Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119
Topic Tags
Burden of Proof
Hearing Procedures
Question
Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction over the standards of conduct for corporate officers (ARS Title 10)?
Short Answer
No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to specific real estate and planned community statutes.
Detailed Answer
Allegations regarding the general corporate conduct of officers under Title 10 (Corporations and Associations) generally fall outside the scope of the administrative hearing process provided by the Department of Real Estate.
Alj Quote
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, Corporations and Association – Standards of Conduct for Officers, is outside the jurisdiction of the Department and inapplicable to this matter.
Legal Basis
Jurisdictional Limits
Topic Tags
Jurisdiction
Corporate Law
Officer Conduct
Question
What is the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard used in these hearings?
Short Answer
It means the evidence shows the claim is 'more probably true than not'.
Detailed Answer
This is the standard of proof required in civil and administrative hearings. It is a lower standard than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' used in criminal cases. It essentially means the evidence must tip the scale slightly in favor of the petitioner.
Alj Quote
A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.
Legal Basis
Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence
Topic Tags
Legal Standards
Evidence
Question
If I accidentally email my evidence to the wrong email address for the HOA's attorney, will it still be admitted?
Short Answer
Likely not. The responsibility for properly serving evidence lies with the person sending it.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ ruled that if a petitioner misspells the opposing counsel's email address, resulting in the evidence not being received, the petitioner is responsible for that error, and the evidence may be excluded.
Alj Quote
Thus, Petitioner bore the onus of any mishandling/compromise of his proposed hearing exhibits.
Legal Basis
Procedural Rules
Topic Tags
Evidence
Procedure
Mistakes
Question
Can I cite general statutes or non-existent statutes in my petition?
Short Answer
No, you must cite specific, valid statutes. Citing non-existent codes weakens the case.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ noted that the petitioner cited statutes that did not exist (e.g., ARS 33-9). While the judge may try to interpret the intent based on evidence, relying on invalid statutes makes it difficult to sustain the burden of proof.
Alj Quote
The conundrum of Petitioner’s confusing reliance on statutes that do not exist and/or are outside the jurisdiction of the Department is solved, in large part, based on the substantive evidence of record.
Legal Basis
Statutory Interpretation
Topic Tags
Legal Research
Petition Drafting
Question
What is the deadline for requesting a rehearing if I disagree with the decision?
Short Answer
30 days from the date the order is served.
Detailed Answer
If a party wishes to contest the ALJ's decision, they must file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days.
Alj Quote
Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this ORDER upon the parties.
Legal Basis
ARS 41-1092.09
Topic Tags
Appeals
Deadlines
Case
Docket No
23F-H004-REL
Case Title
Randall White vs. Quail Creek Villas Association Inc.
Decision Date
2022-12-29
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Randall White(petitioner) Quail Creek Villas homeowner Appeared on his own behalf.
Respondent Side
Carolyn B. Goldschmidt(HOA attorney) Goldschmidt | Shupe LLC Counsel for Respondent.
Lori Wuollet(community manager) CAD Community Management Witness for Respondent; also known as Lori Don Wlette or Gloria Wlette.
John Messner(board member) Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Vice President and witness for Respondent.
Robert Jelen(board member) Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. President and witness for Respondent; sometimes referred to as Bob Kellen.
Max Tittle(board member) Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Also referred to as Max Tibble or Matt Tittle.
Diane(board member) Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Mentioned by Petitioner as a board member.
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) OAH Presided over the hearing and issued the decision.
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) OAH Signed minute entries (Sept 27, 2022) and order regarding virtual appearance (Nov 28, 2022).
John O'Campo(fire inspector) Green Valley Fire Department Contacted by Petitioner regarding wildfire assessment.
Roger Thompson(fire inspector) Green Valley Fire Department Parallel to John O'Campo; communicated with Petitioner and Respondent's board member.
Corey Guerin(inspector) AZ Dept Forestry & Fire Management Performed the Firewise assessment on November 3, 2022.
Miranda Alvarez(Legal Secretary) OAH Signed transmission lists.
c. serrano(Staff) OAH Clerical staff involved in document transmission.
Other Participants
Louis Dettorre(Commissioner) ADRE Recipient of official transmissions.
AHansen(ADRE Staff) ADRE Recipient of official transmissions.
vnunez(ADRE Staff) ADRE Recipient of official transmissions.
djones(ADRE Staff) ADRE Recipient of official transmissions.
labril(ADRE Staff) ADRE Recipient of official transmissions.
CC&Rs Article V Section 1, CC&Rs Article VI Section 1a, and Bylaws Article IV Section 2c
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge granted Petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated its community documents regarding common area maintenance because a bottle tree in the common area caused damage to Petitioner's property. The ALJ ordered the HOA to comply with the relevant community document provisions and refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee. The ALJ noted she lacked statutory authority to award the approximately $28,486.00 in monetary damages requested by Petitioner.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA failure to maintain common area landscaping resulting in root damage to homeowner property.
The Respondent HOA violated its community document obligations for common area maintenance (including landscaping) because a bottle tree located in the common area caused substantial root intrusion damage (lifting and heaving) to the Petitioner's patio and concrete slab.
Orders: Petition granted. Respondent ordered to abide by CC&Rs Article V Section 1, CC&Rs Article VI Section 1a, and Bylaws Article IV Section 2c. Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days. No civil penalty imposed.
If a tree in the HOA common area damages my home, is the HOA responsible even if the tree was planted by a previous homeowner?
Short Answer
Yes. The HOA's duty to maintain the common area applies regardless of who originally planted the tree.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ determined that even though the parties presumed the trees were planted by an original homeowner decades ago, the HOA still had an obligation to maintain the common area. The HOA was found in violation of the CC&Rs because the tree located in the common area caused damage to the homeowner's property.
Alj Quote
Respondent’s duty to maintain the Common Area did not end at the boundary line of the Common Area. A tree in Respondent’s Common Area caused damage to Petitioner’s property.
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Article V Section 1; Article VI Section 1a
Topic Tags
common area maintenance
property damage
landscaping
liability
Question
Can the Administrative Law Judge award me money (damages) to cover the cost of repairs to my home?
Short Answer
No. The ALJ does not have the statutory authority to award monetary damages or injunctive relief.
Detailed Answer
While the ALJ can determine that a violation occurred and order the HOA to abide by the community documents, they cannot order the HOA to pay for the repairs (damages). The homeowner may need to pursue a separate civil action for monetary compensation beyond the filing fee.
Alj Quote
Nothing in the statutes applicable to these disputes provides the Administrative Law Judge with any additional authority to award damages, injunction relief, or declaratory judgments.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Topic Tags
damages
remedies
jurisdiction
repairs
Question
If I win my hearing against the HOA, will I get my filing fee back?
Short Answer
Yes. If the petitioner prevails, the ALJ is required to order the respondent to pay the filing fee.
Detailed Answer
The decision explicitly ordered the HOA to reimburse the homeowner for the $500 filing fee because the petition was granted. This is a statutory requirement when the petitioner wins.
Alj Quote
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Topic Tags
filing fees
reimbursement
costs
Question
Does the HOA's duty to 'maintain' landscaping include preventing root damage, or just trimming trees?
Short Answer
The duty to maintain includes preventing damage. Regular trimming is not sufficient if the roots are causing damage.
Detailed Answer
The HOA argued that they fulfilled their duty by having a landscaper trim the trees. However, the ALJ found that despite this regular maintenance, the HOA violated the CC&Rs because the tree's existence and condition caused damage to the adjacent property.
Alj Quote
Despite Respondent’s contract with CityScape for regular arbor maintenance, the bottle tree’s roots caused lifting and heaving of Petitioner’s patio and concrete slab.
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Article V Section 1
Topic Tags
maintenance definition
landscaping
negligence defense
Question
What is the standard of proof I need to meet to win a hearing against my HOA?
Short Answer
You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.
Detailed Answer
The homeowner bears the burden of proof. This standard means you must show that your claim is 'more probably true than not' or carries the greater weight of the evidence.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated a community document.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07
Topic Tags
burden of proof
legal standards
evidence
Question
Is the HOA liable if they claim they didn't know the roots were causing problems?
Short Answer
Yes. Lack of knowledge or 'negligence' is not necessarily the standard for a CC&R violation in this context.
Detailed Answer
The HOA argued they were not negligent because they did not know about the root intrusion. The ALJ ruled against them anyway, basing the decision on the strict violation of the duty to maintain the common area which resulted in damage, effectively setting aside the 'we didn't know' defense.
Alj Quote
Respondent further argued that because it did not know or have reason to know of the root intrusion, Respondent was not negligent… [However,] the undersigned Administrative Law Judge concludes that… Petitioner established a violation… her petition must be granted.
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Article V Section 1
Topic Tags
negligence
liability
defense arguments
Case
Docket No
22F-H2221013-REL
Case Title
Nancy L. Pope vs. La Vida Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2022-03-02
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Questions
Question
If a tree in the HOA common area damages my home, is the HOA responsible even if the tree was planted by a previous homeowner?
Short Answer
Yes. The HOA's duty to maintain the common area applies regardless of who originally planted the tree.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ determined that even though the parties presumed the trees were planted by an original homeowner decades ago, the HOA still had an obligation to maintain the common area. The HOA was found in violation of the CC&Rs because the tree located in the common area caused damage to the homeowner's property.
Alj Quote
Respondent’s duty to maintain the Common Area did not end at the boundary line of the Common Area. A tree in Respondent’s Common Area caused damage to Petitioner’s property.
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Article V Section 1; Article VI Section 1a
Topic Tags
common area maintenance
property damage
landscaping
liability
Question
Can the Administrative Law Judge award me money (damages) to cover the cost of repairs to my home?
Short Answer
No. The ALJ does not have the statutory authority to award monetary damages or injunctive relief.
Detailed Answer
While the ALJ can determine that a violation occurred and order the HOA to abide by the community documents, they cannot order the HOA to pay for the repairs (damages). The homeowner may need to pursue a separate civil action for monetary compensation beyond the filing fee.
Alj Quote
Nothing in the statutes applicable to these disputes provides the Administrative Law Judge with any additional authority to award damages, injunction relief, or declaratory judgments.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Topic Tags
damages
remedies
jurisdiction
repairs
Question
If I win my hearing against the HOA, will I get my filing fee back?
Short Answer
Yes. If the petitioner prevails, the ALJ is required to order the respondent to pay the filing fee.
Detailed Answer
The decision explicitly ordered the HOA to reimburse the homeowner for the $500 filing fee because the petition was granted. This is a statutory requirement when the petitioner wins.
Alj Quote
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this Order.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Topic Tags
filing fees
reimbursement
costs
Question
Does the HOA's duty to 'maintain' landscaping include preventing root damage, or just trimming trees?
Short Answer
The duty to maintain includes preventing damage. Regular trimming is not sufficient if the roots are causing damage.
Detailed Answer
The HOA argued that they fulfilled their duty by having a landscaper trim the trees. However, the ALJ found that despite this regular maintenance, the HOA violated the CC&Rs because the tree's existence and condition caused damage to the adjacent property.
Alj Quote
Despite Respondent’s contract with CityScape for regular arbor maintenance, the bottle tree’s roots caused lifting and heaving of Petitioner’s patio and concrete slab.
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Article V Section 1
Topic Tags
maintenance definition
landscaping
negligence defense
Question
What is the standard of proof I need to meet to win a hearing against my HOA?
Short Answer
You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.
Detailed Answer
The homeowner bears the burden of proof. This standard means you must show that your claim is 'more probably true than not' or carries the greater weight of the evidence.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated a community document.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07
Topic Tags
burden of proof
legal standards
evidence
Question
Is the HOA liable if they claim they didn't know the roots were causing problems?
Short Answer
Yes. Lack of knowledge or 'negligence' is not necessarily the standard for a CC&R violation in this context.
Detailed Answer
The HOA argued they were not negligent because they did not know about the root intrusion. The ALJ ruled against them anyway, basing the decision on the strict violation of the duty to maintain the common area which resulted in damage, effectively setting aside the 'we didn't know' defense.
Alj Quote
Respondent further argued that because it did not know or have reason to know of the root intrusion, Respondent was not negligent… [However,] the undersigned Administrative Law Judge concludes that… Petitioner established a violation… her petition must be granted.
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Article V Section 1
Topic Tags
negligence
liability
defense arguments
Case
Docket No
22F-H2221013-REL
Case Title
Nancy L. Pope vs. La Vida Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2022-03-02
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Nancy L Pope(petitioner)
Ed Humston(witness) H&H Enterprises of Arizona Petitioner's Contractor
Respondent Side
Erik J. Stone(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Gabrielle Sherwood(property manager) City Property Management Community Manager for La Vida HOA
Debbie Duffy(board member) La Vida Homeowners Association Board Secretary
Lawrence Oliva(board member) La Vida Homeowners Association Board President
Barbara(board member) La Vida Homeowners Association Mentioned in email correspondence
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) OAH
Louis Dettorre(Commissioner) ADRE
Santos Diaz(witness) CareScape Area Manager for CareScape, Respondent's landscaper
c. serrano(unknown) Transmitted documents
Miranda Alvarez(unknown) Transmitted documents
AHansen(unknown) ADRE staff Recipient of transmission
djones(unknown) ADRE staff Recipient of transmission
DGardner(unknown) ADRE staff Recipient of transmission
vnunez(unknown) ADRE staff Recipient of transmission
tandert(unknown) ADRE staff Recipient of transmission
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2022-01-03
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
none
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Clifford (Norm) Burnes
Counsel
—
Respondent
Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Counsel
John Crotty
Alleged Violations
ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
Outcome Summary
The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.
Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent
Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.
Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.
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Case Overview
• Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes
• Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
• Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)
• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.
• Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.
Factual Background and Timeline
1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.
2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.
3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.
4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”
5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:
◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.
◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.
6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).
Procedural History
• May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.
• July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
• July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.
• September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.
• September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.
• December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).
• January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.
Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing
In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.
Petitioner’s Argument
ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion
1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.
Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.
2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.
Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.
3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.
Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.
4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.
Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.
5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”
Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.
6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.
Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.
◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”
◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”
◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”
◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):
◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”
◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.
◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”
• Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):
◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”
Conclusion and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.
The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”
The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.
Study Guide – 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.
1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?
2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?
3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?
4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?
5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?
6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?
7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?
8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?
9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?
10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?
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Quiz Answer Key
1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.
2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.
3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.
4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.
5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.
6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.
7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.
8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.
9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.
10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.
2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?
3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.
4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Statute
Definition
Action without meeting
A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821
The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804
The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.
Clifford (Norm) Burnes
The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.
Unanimous Written Consent
The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.
Blog Post – 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG
Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It
1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality
For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.
But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.
2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”
The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.
This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.
Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”
3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict
Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”
On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.
The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.
In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.
This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.
4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence
Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).
The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.
Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.
5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency
While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.
This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:
1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.
2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Clifford (Norm) Burnes(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Ms. Burnes(spouse of petitioner) Wife of Clifford (Norm) Burnes; raised issues with the Board
Respondent Side
John Crotty(HOA attorney) Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood
Esmerelda Sarina Martinez(board member) Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Board president and witness
Madill(board member) Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Referred to as 'Mr. Madill'
Jennifer Elias(HOA attorney) Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressee of original decision
Miranda Alvarez(clerk) Transmitted original decision and final rehearing decision (By Miranda Alvarez/Miranda A.)
Louis Dettorre(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressee of documents relating to the rehearing
c. serrano(clerk) Transmitted Order Concluding Matter
Other Participants
Jamie Argueta(researcher/staff) Conducted research regarding issues raised by Petitioner
The petition was denied because Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof that the Association violated Community Bylaws 3.03, as the issue regarding a special meeting was found to be unripe. Other alleged statutory violations were inapplicable.
Why this result: Petitioner did not sustain the burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on the Bylaws violation because the condition precedent (requesting or holding a special meeting) had not occurred, rendering the issue unripe. The statutory violations cited were inapplicable to the Association.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether Foothills Townhomes Association, Inc. violated Community Bylaws 3.03 and ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(A), 33-1248(B), and 33-1261(D).
Petitioner alleged the Association violated Community Bylaws 3.03 when it drafted and posted a letter directed to Petitioner on its online platform, in response to private correspondence (a draft special meeting request) that had not yet been submitted to the Board, which Petitioner perceived as an attempt to dismantle a platform for discussion and retaliate against her.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Community Bylaws 3.03
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1261(D)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Dispute, Planned Community, Bylaws Violation, Jurisdiction, Unripe Issue, Special Meeting, Filing Fee Paid
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1248(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1261(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
Community Bylaws 3.03
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2121048-REL Decision – 906190.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:37:43 (117.4 KB)
Questions
Question
If I pay for a single-issue petition, can the judge rule on other grievances I mention during the hearing?
Short Answer
No. The tribunal is limited to the specific issue paid for and filed.
Detailed Answer
If a petitioner only pays the filing fee for the adjudication of one issue, the Administrative Law Judge cannot address other issues raised in the petition or during testimony.
Alj Quote
Because Petitioner only paid for the adjudication of one (1) issue, this Tribunal may not address all of the issues Petitioner raised in her petition or during her testimony.
Legal Basis
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
Topic Tags
procedure
jurisdiction
filing fees
Question
What happens if I cite Condominium statutes in a dispute regarding a Planned Community?
Short Answer
The claims will likely be dismissed as moot or inapplicable.
Detailed Answer
Different statutes regulate Condominiums (Title 33, Chapter 9) and Planned Communities (Title 33, Chapter 16). If a homeowner alleges violations of statutes that do not govern their specific type of association, the burden of proof is not met and the concerns are rendered moot.
Alj Quote
However, because Petitioner’s amended petition specifically alleges violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(A), 33-1248(B) and 33-1261(D), which are inapplicable as the Association is not subject to governance or regulation by these statutes, the concerns are rendered moot.
Legal Basis
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 33, Chapter 9 vs. Chapter 16
Topic Tags
legal standards
statutes
planned communities
Question
Does the HOA posting my private correspondence on the community website violate bylaws regarding special meetings?
Short Answer
No. Public dissemination of private letters does not violate bylaws strictly governing the calling of meetings.
Detailed Answer
While a homeowner may feel that publishing private correspondence is retaliatory or malicious, it does not constitute a violation of bylaws specifically designed to regulate the calling and holding of special meetings.
Alj Quote
Instead, Petitioner’s grievance is the Association’s public dissemination and address of her private correspondence; which is not a violation of Bylaws Section 3.03.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Section 3.03
Topic Tags
privacy
bylaws
communications
Question
Can the ADRE hear claims regarding my constitutional rights or general 'rights as a homeowner'?
Short Answer
No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to violations of community documents and specific statutes.
Detailed Answer
The Department lacks jurisdiction over broad claims such as constitutional rights, general homeowner rights, or fiduciary responsibilities unless they are framed as specific violations of the community documents or relevant statutes.
Alj Quote
Petitioner also alleged no less than four (4) additional violations in her Amended Petition that the Department has no jurisdiction over or she lacked standing to bring, such as (1) 'my rights as a homeowner,' (2) 'my constitutional rights as an American citizen'…
Legal Basis
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102, 32-2199
Topic Tags
jurisdiction
constitutional rights
adre authority
Question
Can I claim the HOA violated the rules for calling a special meeting if I never formally requested one?
Short Answer
No. The issue is considered 'unripe' if no meeting was actually requested or held.
Detailed Answer
A violation regarding the calling of a special meeting cannot be established if the homeowner never submitted the request for the meeting prior to filing the petition. The tribunal cannot rule on a hypothetical refusal.
Alj Quote
No violation of Bylaws Section 3.03 exists because the issue is unripe. Here, the record reflects that a special meeting was not held, nor had Petitioner requested one prior to the filing of her petition in this matter.
Legal Basis
ripeness doctrine
Topic Tags
meetings
procedural requirements
violations
Question
What is the standard of proof required for a homeowner to win an administrative hearing?
Short Answer
Preponderance of the evidence.
Detailed Answer
The petitioner must provide enough evidence to convince the judge that their contention is 'more probably true than not.' It requires superior evidentiary weight, not necessarily a greater number of witnesses.
Alj Quote
A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.
Legal Basis
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Topic Tags
burden of proof
legal standards
evidence
Question
Are the CC&Rs considered a legal contract between me and the HOA?
Short Answer
Yes. CC&Rs form an enforceable contract that binds the owner upon purchase.
Detailed Answer
When a party purchases a property within the development, they agree to be bound by the terms of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, creating a contractual relationship.
Alj Quote
Thus, the CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, and the Bylaws outline how the Association is permitted to operate.
Legal Basis
Contract Law Principles
Topic Tags
CC&Rs
contracts
enforcement
Case
Docket No
21F-H2121048-REL
Case Title
Nancy Bender vs. Foothills Townhomes Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-08-23
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Questions
Question
If I pay for a single-issue petition, can the judge rule on other grievances I mention during the hearing?
Short Answer
No. The tribunal is limited to the specific issue paid for and filed.
Detailed Answer
If a petitioner only pays the filing fee for the adjudication of one issue, the Administrative Law Judge cannot address other issues raised in the petition or during testimony.
Alj Quote
Because Petitioner only paid for the adjudication of one (1) issue, this Tribunal may not address all of the issues Petitioner raised in her petition or during her testimony.
Legal Basis
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
Topic Tags
procedure
jurisdiction
filing fees
Question
What happens if I cite Condominium statutes in a dispute regarding a Planned Community?
Short Answer
The claims will likely be dismissed as moot or inapplicable.
Detailed Answer
Different statutes regulate Condominiums (Title 33, Chapter 9) and Planned Communities (Title 33, Chapter 16). If a homeowner alleges violations of statutes that do not govern their specific type of association, the burden of proof is not met and the concerns are rendered moot.
Alj Quote
However, because Petitioner’s amended petition specifically alleges violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1248(A), 33-1248(B) and 33-1261(D), which are inapplicable as the Association is not subject to governance or regulation by these statutes, the concerns are rendered moot.
Legal Basis
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 33, Chapter 9 vs. Chapter 16
Topic Tags
legal standards
statutes
planned communities
Question
Does the HOA posting my private correspondence on the community website violate bylaws regarding special meetings?
Short Answer
No. Public dissemination of private letters does not violate bylaws strictly governing the calling of meetings.
Detailed Answer
While a homeowner may feel that publishing private correspondence is retaliatory or malicious, it does not constitute a violation of bylaws specifically designed to regulate the calling and holding of special meetings.
Alj Quote
Instead, Petitioner’s grievance is the Association’s public dissemination and address of her private correspondence; which is not a violation of Bylaws Section 3.03.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Section 3.03
Topic Tags
privacy
bylaws
communications
Question
Can the ADRE hear claims regarding my constitutional rights or general 'rights as a homeowner'?
Short Answer
No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to violations of community documents and specific statutes.
Detailed Answer
The Department lacks jurisdiction over broad claims such as constitutional rights, general homeowner rights, or fiduciary responsibilities unless they are framed as specific violations of the community documents or relevant statutes.
Alj Quote
Petitioner also alleged no less than four (4) additional violations in her Amended Petition that the Department has no jurisdiction over or she lacked standing to bring, such as (1) 'my rights as a homeowner,' (2) 'my constitutional rights as an American citizen'…
Legal Basis
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102, 32-2199
Topic Tags
jurisdiction
constitutional rights
adre authority
Question
Can I claim the HOA violated the rules for calling a special meeting if I never formally requested one?
Short Answer
No. The issue is considered 'unripe' if no meeting was actually requested or held.
Detailed Answer
A violation regarding the calling of a special meeting cannot be established if the homeowner never submitted the request for the meeting prior to filing the petition. The tribunal cannot rule on a hypothetical refusal.
Alj Quote
No violation of Bylaws Section 3.03 exists because the issue is unripe. Here, the record reflects that a special meeting was not held, nor had Petitioner requested one prior to the filing of her petition in this matter.
Legal Basis
ripeness doctrine
Topic Tags
meetings
procedural requirements
violations
Question
What is the standard of proof required for a homeowner to win an administrative hearing?
Short Answer
Preponderance of the evidence.
Detailed Answer
The petitioner must provide enough evidence to convince the judge that their contention is 'more probably true than not.' It requires superior evidentiary weight, not necessarily a greater number of witnesses.
Alj Quote
A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.
Legal Basis
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Topic Tags
burden of proof
legal standards
evidence
Question
Are the CC&Rs considered a legal contract between me and the HOA?
Short Answer
Yes. CC&Rs form an enforceable contract that binds the owner upon purchase.
Detailed Answer
When a party purchases a property within the development, they agree to be bound by the terms of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, creating a contractual relationship.
Alj Quote
Thus, the CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, and the Bylaws outline how the Association is permitted to operate.
Legal Basis
Contract Law Principles
Topic Tags
CC&Rs
contracts
enforcement
Case
Docket No
21F-H2121048-REL
Case Title
Nancy Bender vs. Foothills Townhomes Association, Inc.
The ALJ dismissed the Petitioner's complaint, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because the action was taken without a meeting via unanimous written consent as authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821.
Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred, as the board acted without holding a formal meeting.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of open meeting law by taking action via unanimous written consent
Petitioner alleged that the Board of Directors violated the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on May 3, 2020, by taking two actions using unanimous written consent of the Board members, which the Respondent claimed was permissible under A.R.S. § 10-3821 as action without a meeting.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Rehearing, Planned Community
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV STAT. 33-1804
ARIZ. REV STAT. 10-3821
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 32-2199.02(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 41-1092.08
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3701(F)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 10-3071
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 899423.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:06:54 (101.7 KB)
21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 930803.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:15 (46.9 KB)
21F-H2121051-REL Decision – 935756.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:15 (124.8 KB)
Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121051-REL
Briefing Document: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and final decision in the case of Clifford (Norm) Burnes versus the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 21F-H2121051-REL). The core of the dispute was Petitioner Burnes’s allegation that the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities by taking two official actions on May 3, 2020, without holding a public meeting. The HOA defended its actions, stating that it utilized a provision in the Arizona statutes for non-profit corporations (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821) that allows a board to take action “without a meeting” through the unanimous written consent of all directors.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Thomas Shedden, ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA. The key finding was that no “meeting” as defined by the open meeting law actually occurred on May 3, 2020. Instead, the Board President individually visited other board members to obtain signatures on consent forms. The ALJ concluded that the two relevant statutes—the open meeting law (§ 33-1803/1804) and the action-by-consent statute (§ 10-3821)—are not in conflict. An HOA board can legally use the action-by-consent procedure, but if it chooses to hold a meeting, it must comply with the open meeting law.
Mr. Burnes’s request for a rehearing, which raised several legal and jurisdictional arguments, was granted but ultimately denied on its merits. The ALJ systematically rejected each of Burnes’s arguments, reaffirming the original decision. The final order dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition, making the HOA the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
• Petitioner: Clifford (Norm) Burnes
• Respondent: Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
• Case Number: 21F-H2121051-REL (and 21F-H2121051-REL-RHG for rehearing)
• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that on May 3, 2020, the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 in the initial decision and § 33-1804 in the rehearing decision) by taking two formal actions via unanimous written consent without allowing members to attend and speak.
• Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent acknowledged taking action by unanimous consent but asserted this was permissible under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which allows for action without a meeting. Therefore, the open meeting law did not apply.
Factual Background and Timeline
1. April 2020: Mr. Burnes and his wife raised two issues with the HOA Board concerning “lot 7,” which is adjacent to their property. The issues were related to a construction bond waiver and the placement of a house on the lot.
2. April 2020 (Post-Complaint): Following the complaint, research was conducted by Jamie Argueta, and emails were exchanged between Mr. Burnes, the Board members, and Mr. Argueta.
3. April 19 & 21, 2020: The Board members met with Mr. and Ms. Burnes to discuss the issues. Minutes were kept for these meetings.
4. Undated Discussions: Board President Esmerelda Sarina Martinez and Board member Mr. Madill had informal discussions with other HOA members, which Ms. Martinez characterized as “neighbors talking and not a meeting.”
5. May 3, 2020: Ms. Martinez, acting alone, drafted two unanimous consent forms. She personally brought the forms and related documents to the homes of the other Board members, who each read the information and signed. The two actions taken by consent were:
◦ Honoring a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7.
◦ A decision regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.
6. August 29, 2020: The first regularly scheduled Board meeting after the May 3rd actions was held. The meeting minutes did not include an entry showing that the written consent documents had been filed with the corporate records, a requirement of § 10-3281(A).
Procedural History
• May 7, 2021: Mr. Burnes filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initially asserting seven violations but being required to select only one for adjudication due to paying a single fee. He selected the violation of members not being permitted to attend and speak before the Board took formal action on May 3, 2020.
• July 16, 2021: An initial hearing was held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.
• July 28, 2021: The ALJ issued a decision dismissing Mr. Burnes’s petition, finding he had not proven a violation because no meeting occurred on May 3, 2020.
• September 2, 2021 (approx.): Mr. Burnes filed a Rehearing Request.
• September 22, 2021: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.
• December 9, 2021: The ALJ issued an order concluding the rehearing matter, noting that since only legal issues were raised, the decision would be based on the existing record and supplemental briefs (though neither party filed one).
• January 3, 2022: The ALJ issued the final decision on the rehearing, once again dismissing the petition and upholding the original ruling. This order was final and binding, subject to judicial review in the Superior Court.
Analysis of Legal Arguments from Rehearing
In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Burnes raised six primary legal arguments against the initial decision. The ALJ addressed and rejected each one.
Petitioner’s Argument
ALJ’s Analysis and Conclusion
1. Limited Jurisdiction: The ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 and does not include ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.
Rejected. Jurisdiction was proper because Mr. Burnes alleged a violation of § 33-1804 (which is in Title 33, Ch. 16). Nothing prohibits a Respondent from raising defenses from outside Title 33, or the ALJ from considering them.
2. Inapplicability of § 10-3821: The statute for action-by-consent only applies to actions found in Title 10, Chapters 24-40. The actions the HOA took are not found there.
Rejected. The ALJ noted that Mr. Burnes himself acknowledged that “voting” is an action found within those chapters of Title 10, and voting is precisely the action that was taken by unanimous consent.
3. Conflict of Law (§ 10-3701(F)): Statute § 10-3701(F) states that in cases of inconsistency, Title 33 (planned communities) controls over Title 10.
Rejected. This analysis is flawed because § 10-3701(F) applies specifically to membership meetings (Title 10, Ch. 30). The statute for action by consent, § 10-3821, deals with directors’ meetings and is in a different chapter (Title 10, Ch. 31), which has no similar provision. The legislature’s choice to include this provision for membership meetings but not for board meetings indicates an intent to allow boards more latitude to act by consent.
4. Specific vs. General Statute: § 33-1804 is specific to planned communities and should control over § 10-3821, which applies to all non-profits. The policy of the state favors open meetings.
Rejected. This principle of statutory construction only applies when statutes are in conflict and cannot both be given effect. Here, they are not in conflict. Both can be given full effect: an HOA may take action without a meeting per § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, it must follow the open meeting requirements of § 33-1804.
5. Bylaws Are Irrelevant: The ALJ wrongly cited the HOA’s bylaws allowing action-by-consent, because § 33-1804 applies “notwithstanding any provision in the… bylaws.”
Rejected. Mr. Burnes was correct that bylaws do not trump the open meeting law. However, he overlooked that § 10-3821 itself contains an exception: it does not apply if the corporation’s bylaws prohibit action by consent. The finding regarding the bylaws was necessary only to show that this exception did not apply to the HOA, thus making § 10-3821 available to them.
6. A Meeting Did Occur: Mr. Burnes asserted a meeting did take place on May 3, 2020.
Rejected. The ALJ found this position had several flaws: Mr. Burnes cited no evidence from the record to prove discussion occurred on May 3rd; he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd; and he provided no legal authority to show that drawing on past discussions to draft a consent form constitutes a “meeting.” The ALJ also dismissed his reliance on new dictionary definitions not presented at the original hearing.
◦ Mandates that “all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors… are open to all members of the association.”
◦ Members “shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”
◦ A “quorum of the board of directors that meets informally to discuss association business… shall comply with the open meeting and notice provisions.”
◦ Reflects a state policy that provisions should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting):
◦ “Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, action… to be taken at a directors’ meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action is taken by all of the directors.”
◦ The action must be evidenced by one or more written consents, signed by each director, and included in the minutes filed with corporate records.
◦ A consent signed under this section has “the effect of a meeting vote.”
• Saguaro Crest HOA Bylaws (Section 3.5):
◦ The association’s bylaws explicitly provide directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”
Conclusion and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Saguaro Crest HOA violated the open meeting law. The central finding was that the HOA’s actions on May 3, 2020, did not constitute a “meeting” but were a legally permissible “action without a meeting” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821. The subsequent rehearing confirmed this legal interpretation.
The final order, issued January 3, 2022, was:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes’s petition is dismissed.”
The order was final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review by the Superior Court within 35 days.
Study Guide – 21F-H2121051-REL
Study Guide: Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Petitioner Clifford (Norm) Burnes and Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the information in the case documents.
1. What was the single, specific violation that Clifford (Norm) Burnes alleged against the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association’s Board of Directors?
2. What was the Respondent’s primary legal justification for the actions its Board of Directors took on May 3, 2020?
3. What two specific decisions did the Board make using the unanimous consent forms on May 3, 2020?
4. According to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), how can both the open meeting law (§ 33-1804) and the statute allowing action without a meeting (§ 10-3821) be given effect without being in conflict?
5. What was the purpose of the rehearing granted to Mr. Burnes, and what was the outcome?
6. How did the HOA’s bylaws, specifically section 3.5, support the Respondent’s case?
7. What argument did Mr. Burnes make regarding the ALJ’s jurisdiction to consider ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821?
8. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and who bears the burden of meeting it?
9. Mr. Burnes asserted that a meeting did occur on May 3, 2020. What flaws did the ALJ identify in this assertion?
10. What specific requests did Mr. Burnes make in his petition as a remedy for the alleged violation?
——————————————————————————–
Quiz Answer Key
1. Mr. Burnes’s single alleged violation was that at the “meeting” on May 3, 2020, HOA members were not permitted to attend and speak after discussion but before the Board took formal action. This, he claimed, was a violation of Arizona’s open meeting law, cited as ARIZ. REV STAT. § 33-1803 and later § 33-1804.
2. The Respondent acknowledged taking two actions by consent but argued that no meeting actually occurred. Their defense was that they acted under the authority of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821, which explicitly allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if it is done via unanimous written consent of all directors.
3. The two decisions made via unanimous consent related to issues Mr. Burnes had raised about lot 7, which abuts his property. The first action was to honor a waiver of the construction deposit for lot 7, and the second action was regarding the placement of the home on lot 7.
4. The ALJ reasoned that the statutes are not in conflict because they apply to different situations. Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by § 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow all the requirements of the open meeting law, § 33-1804.
5. Mr. Burnes requested a rehearing, alleging that the initial ALJ decision’s findings of fact were not supported by evidence or were contrary to law. The rehearing was granted to review these legal issues, but the outcome was the same: the ALJ once again concluded that no violation had occurred and dismissed Mr. Burnes’s petition.
6. Section 3.5 of the Association’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly provides the directors with “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.” This directly supported the Respondent’s claim that its actions were permissible under its own governing documents as well as state law.
7. Mr. Burnes argued that the ALJ’s jurisdiction is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16, and therefore the ALJ had no jurisdiction to consider section 10-3821 as a defense because it is not found in that title. The ALJ rejected this, stating that jurisdiction was proper because the complaint was about a violation of Title 33, and nothing prohibits a respondent from raising defenses from outside that title.
8. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Burnes, bore the burden of proof to show that the alleged violation occurred.
9. The ALJ found several flaws in this assertion: Mr. Burnes did not cite evidence from the record proving a discussion occurred on May 3rd, he conflated prior meetings with the events of May 3rd, and he provided no legal authority showing that prior discussions are pertinent to whether a meeting occurred on that specific day.
10. Mr. Burnes requested that the Respondent be ordered to rescind the consent actions, comply with the open meeting law, pay his filing fee, and be assessed a civil penalty.
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Essay Questions
1. Analyze the central conflict between ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 (“Open meetings”) and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 (“Action without meeting”) as presented in this case. Explain the ALJ’s reasoning for concluding that the statutes do not conflict and can both be given effect.
2. Describe the timeline of events leading up to the May 3, 2020 unanimous written consent. How did the meetings and communications in April 2020 between Mr. Burnes and the Board influence the context of the dispute, even though they were not the subject of the final legal violation claim?
3. Evaluate the six specific legal arguments Mr. Burnes raised in his request for rehearing. For each, summarize his point and the ALJ’s counter-argument or legal conclusion.
4. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain why the ALJ concluded that Mr. Burnes failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
5. Examine the relationship between state statutes and an association’s governing documents (like bylaws) in this case. How did the ALJ address Mr. Burnes’s argument that § 33-1804 should apply “notwithstanding any provision in the…bylaws”?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Statute
Definition
Action without meeting
A procedure allowed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821 and the Association’s Bylaws (Section 3.5) where a board of directors may take action if it is evidenced by one or more written consents signed by all directors. The consent has the effect of a meeting vote.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, assigned to adjudicate complaints and ensure compliance with relevant statutes for the Office of Administrative Hearings.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821
The state statute titled “Action without meeting” that permits a board of directors to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent, unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803 / § 33-1804
The state’s “Open meetings” law for planned communities. It requires that all meetings of an HOA board be open to all members, who shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Burnes) bore the burden of proof.
Clifford (Norm) Burnes
The Petitioner in the case, a member of the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings an action; in this case, Clifford (Norm) Burnes.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
The Respondent in the case; a planned community governed by a Board of Directors.
Unanimous Written Consent
The method used by the Respondent’s Board of Directors on May 3, 2020, to take action. It involved each board member signing written consent forms, as permitted by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3821.
Blog Post – 21F-H2121051-REL
Your HOA Board Can Legally Make Decisions in Secret—Here’s How One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Proved It
1.0 Introduction: The Expectation vs. The Reality
For most homeowners living in a planned community, the principle of transparency is paramount. The common expectation is that all significant decisions made by the Homeowners Association (HOA) board of directors will happen in open meetings. These are forums where members can attend, listen to the deliberations, and, at the appropriate time, make their voices heard before the board takes a formal vote. This commitment to openness is often seen as a cornerstone of fair governance.
But what if a board could make a decision without ever holding a meeting at all? This question was at the heart of a legal dispute in Arizona, where a homeowner named Clifford (Norm) Burnes took his HOA, Saguaro Crest, to court. Mr. Burnes alleged that his board violated the state’s open meeting law when it took action on two separate issues without convening a meeting. The case worked its way through an administrative law court, and the final decision sided with the HOA, establishing a critical legal precedent that boards can, under specific circumstances, bypass open meetings entirely.
2.0 Takeaway 1: Boards Can Legally Act “Without a Meeting”
The central facts of the case were not in dispute. On May 3, 2020, the Saguaro Crest HOA board made two formal decisions concerning a neighboring lot, specifically regarding a construction bond waiver and home placement—issues that Mr. Burnes himself had previously raised. Instead of calling a meeting, the board used a procedure known as “unanimous written consent.” The Board President, Ms. Martinez, drafted two consent forms, personally brought them to the homes of the other board members, and had each director sign them.
This action, while sidestepping an open meeting, was found to be perfectly legal. The board was operating under the authority of a specific Arizona state law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821, titled “Action without meeting.” This statute explicitly allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and is documented by written consent.
Furthermore, this power was not just granted by state law; it was also written directly into the HOA’s own governing documents. Section 3.5 of the Saguaro Crest HOA’s bylaws, titled “Action Without a Meeting,” explicitly grants its directors “the right to take any action in the absence of a meeting, which they could take at a meeting by obtaining the written consent of all the directors.”
3.0 Takeaway 2: A Legal Puzzle—When Two State Laws Seem to Conflict
Mr. Burnes’s case created a compelling legal puzzle by highlighting two state laws that appeared to be in direct opposition. On one side was Arizona’s Planned Community law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804), which strongly mandates open meetings for HOA boards and includes a policy statement that any interpretation of the law should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”
On the other side was the state’s Nonprofit Corporation law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 10-3821), which, as noted, expressly permits a board to act without a meeting. Mr. Burnes argued that the open meeting law should take precedence.
The Administrative Law Judge, however, made a crucial distinction. Applying a standard legal principle that courts must try to give effect to both laws if possible, the judge determined the two statutes do not actually conflict. The judge’s reasoning clarifies how both can exist and be applied legally.
In this case, both sections 10-3821 and 33-1804 can be given effect in that Respondent may take action without a meeting as allowed by section 10-3821, but if a meeting is held, Respondent must follow the requirements of section 33-1804.
This interpretation is the core of the decision. The open meeting law, with all its requirements for notice and member participation, only applies if a meeting is held. By using the “action without meeting” statute, the Saguaro Crest board legally sidestepped the requirement to hold a meeting in the first place, thereby rendering the open meeting law inapplicable to their actions on that day.
4.0 Takeaway 3: Legislative Intent Can Be Read in a Law’s Silence
Mr. Burnes also advanced a more sophisticated legal argument: that in any conflict, the specific laws written for HOAs (found in Title 33 of the state code) should overrule the more general laws for non-profit corporations (found in Title 10).
The judge’s response to this provided a fascinating lesson in how courts interpret legislative intent, not just from what a law says, but from what it doesn’t say. The judge noted that the section of law governing general membership meetings does contain a specific clause stating that in the case of an inconsistency, the HOA laws control.
Crucially, the section of law governing board meetings, where the “action without meeting” statute is found, has no such clause. The judge interpreted this difference not as an oversight, but as a deliberate choice by lawmakers. This “silence” in the statute was read as a “legislative intent to allow boards latitude to act by consent.” In other words, if the legislature had intended for the open meeting law to always override the board’s ability to act by written consent, it would have explicitly said so, just as it did for membership meetings.
5.0 Conclusion: Efficiency vs. Transparency
While homeowners understandably value and expect open meetings as a tool for transparency and participation, the law also recognizes the need for boards to operate efficiently. The unanimous written consent procedure provides a legal mechanism for boards to make decisions, particularly on straightforward matters, without the time and expense of convening a formal meeting.
This case is more than a legal curiosity; it’s a practical lesson for every homeowner. The power wielded by the Saguaro Crest board is not unique to Arizona. If you want to understand the true scope of your own board’s authority, take these two steps:
1. Review your HOA’s bylaws. Look for a clause titled “Action Without a Meeting” or similar language that grants the board the right to act via written consent. This is the internal authorization.
2. Check your state’s Nonprofit Corporation Act. Search for a statute similar to Arizona’s § 10-3821. This is the ultimate source of the board’s power, and it likely exists in some form in your state, defining the boundary between efficiency and transparency for your community.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Clifford (Norm) Burnes(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf at the original hearing
Respondent Side
John Crotty(HOA attorney) Law Offices of Farley, Choate & Wood Attorney for Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Esmerelda Sarina Martinez(board president, witness) Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Testified as a witness for Respondent
Madill(board member) Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Referred to as Mr. Madill
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) ADRE Commissioner during original decision transmittal
Louis Dettorre(Commissioner) ADRE Commissioner during rehearing transmittal
Miranda Alvarez(staff) Transmittal staff (also noted as Miranda A.)
c. serrano(staff) Transmittal staff
Other Participants
Jamie Argueta(staff) Conducted research; position and function apparently not in the record
Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.
Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)
Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).
Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].
Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.
Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)
Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).
Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].
Administrative Law Judge Decision: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the cross-petitions between Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP). The central dispute revolves around the validity of a 2018 Amendment to the community’s Declaration and MacLeod’s alleged violation of this Amendment by residing full-time in an aircraft hangar.
MacLeod (Petition #19) contended that the Amendment was invalid because it was not unanimously approved by all lot owners, as he argued was required by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) since it applied to fewer than all properties. MAP (Petition #34) argued the Amendment was properly adopted with the required 75% approval and that MacLeod was in violation by living in his Tract G hangar, which also allegedly failed to meet the minimum living space requirement.
The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of Mogollon Airpark, Inc., deeming it the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the Amendment was properly adopted under the 75% approval threshold outlined in the community’s Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), thereby dismissing MacLeod’s petition. On MAP’s petition, the ALJ found that MacLeod had indeed violated the Amendment by living full-time in the hangar, affirming that part of the petition. However, the ALJ dismissed MAP’s claim regarding the hangar’s living space size due to insufficient evidence. The final order dismisses Petition #19, partially affirms and partially dismisses Petition #34, and orders each party to bear their own filing fees.
Case Overview
Case Numbers
No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL
Parties
Petitioner: Magnus L.D. MacLeod Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Kay Abramsohn
Hearing Date
June 19, 2020
Decision Date
July 28, 2020
The Cross-Petitions
The legal conflict originated from two separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Petition #19: Filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod
• Filing Date: On or about October 15, 2019.
• Core Allegation: MAP violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b) in its adoption of the October 18, 2018 “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…”
• MacLeod’s Argument: The Amendment could not be enforced because it lacked the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which it applied. He specifically noted that three of the nine Real Property Tracts (Tract G, Tract H, and Tract M) did not provide an affirmative vote and that he personally did not sign it. He argued the amendment required unanimous approval.
Petition #34: Filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)
• Filing Date: On or about December 16, 2019.
• Core Allegations:
1. Violation of the Amendment: MacLeod was in continued violation of the properly adopted Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar.
2. Violation of Square Footage Requirement: MAP alleged, upon information and belief, that the living space in the hangar was “only 549 square feet,” which violated the Declaration’s requirement that structures for living purposes contain no less than 1,200 square feet.
• Requested Relief: MAP sought enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, including injunctive relief to compel MacLeod’s compliance, and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.
Analysis of the Disputed Amendment
The conflict centers on an amendment recorded on October 18, 2018. This amendment introduced several significant changes to the community’s governing documents.
Key Provisions of the Amendment
• Creates Two Lot Categories: The Amendment establishes “Residential lots” (lots #178 through #213) and “Hangar Tracts” (Tracts E through M).
• Regulates Hangar Use: It designates Tracts E through M for the purpose of “aircraft storage only.”
• Restricts Occupancy: While guest quarters may be constructed within a hangar, they are for “temporary living only.” “Temporary” is explicitly defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” An owner can request an extension in special circumstances.
• Maintains Living Space Requirement: It affirms that any single-family structure or combination hangar/house must have a living area of “not less than 1,200 square feet.”
• Adds Taxiway Access: The Amendment adds Lot 213 to the list of properties authorized to use the aircraft taxiway. This change was necessitated by a fence MacLeod had erected that blocked the Lot 213 owner’s access.
MacLeod’s Objections to the Amendment
In his petition, MacLeod argued the Amendment fundamentally and unreasonably altered the original covenants:
• It “substantially alters” the covenants for Tract Hangar/Homes by imposing the new four-month temporary living limit where unrestricted usage was previously allowed.
• It replaced the allowance for “Guest Homes with Kitchens” with “Guest Quarters without Kitchens,” impacting Tract G.
• It created a “large burden upon me to buy or build an additional home that I do not want and do not need.”
Background and History of the Dispute
• Property Acquisition: MacLeod purchased Tract G from his brother, Pat MacLeod, in February 2017 with the stated expectation of living in the hangar/home full-time.
• Occupancy: After acquiring the property, MacLeod made interior improvements and began living full-time in the aircraft hangar.
• Conflict Origin: The issue of MacLeod’s full-time residency first arose in May 2017 when he requested to build a group home for disabled veterans, a request that drew opposition from other lot owners.
• Initial Violation Notice: On September 18, 2017, MAP’s Architectural Committee sent MacLeod a letter notifying him that living full-time in a hangar intended for aircraft storage was a violation and requested he vacate within 60 days.
• Formal Non-Compliance Notices & Fines:
◦ December 29, 2018: MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance,” imposing a $100 fine.
◦ April 29, 2019: MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.
Legal Framework and Adjudicated Issues
The central legal question was the standard of approval required to pass the Amendment. The parties stipulated that the core dispute was whether a 75% approval or a unanimous approval was necessary.
Stipulated Fact #11
The parties agreed to the following crucial point, which narrowed the scope of the legal argument:
“The AMENDMENT contains at least the required minimum signatures and authorizations from the Lot Owners in Unit IVB to adopt the AMENDMENT, provided that unanimous approval of all affected property owners was not required.”
Conflicting Legal Standards
• Declaration Requirement (75% Rule): The original Declaration states it can be amended “by an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision…”
• Arizona Statute (Unanimous Rule): A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) requires unanimous “affirmative vote or written consent of all of the owners of the lots or property to which the amendment applies” if the amendment “apply to fewer than all of the lots or less than all of the property that is bound by the Declaration.”
Parties’ Core Arguments
• MacLeod’s Position: The Amendment required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) because it applied to “fewer than all the lots,” specifically pointing out that Tract B (a common area) was not included.
• MAP’s Position: The 75% rule under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable standard. MAP argued that Tract B was a common area not subject to the Declaration’s conditions, so its exclusion from an amendment concerning residential use was irrelevant and did not trigger the unanimity requirement.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s conclusions systematically addressed each petition.
Ruling on Petition #19 (Amendment Validity)
• Conclusion: The Amendment was properly adopted.
• Rationale: The ALJ concluded that the 75% approval threshold, as specified in the Declaration and permitted by A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), was the correct standard. Because the parties stipulated that the 75% threshold had been met, MAP was not in violation of the statute.
• Outcome: Petition #19 was dismissed.
Ruling on Petition #34 (MacLeod’s Violations)
• Conclusion on Full-Time Occupancy: MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home.
• Rationale: MacLeod acknowledged living there full-time. His testimony regarding when he ceased this practice was found to be “widely inconsistent,” and the ALJ could not conclude that the violation had stopped by the time MAP filed its petition.
• Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was affirmed.
• Conclusion on Living Space Requirement: MAP failed to prove its allegation that the living space was less than the required 1,200 square feet.
• Rationale: MAP did not clearly document or otherwise prove its claim that the living space was only 549 square feet. MacLeod, in contrast, cited a 2007 architectural committee sign-off indicating 1,656 square feet.
• Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was dismissed.
• Conclusion on Injunctive Relief: The Tribunal lacked the authority to grant the requested relief.
• Rationale: MAP “cited no statutory authority of this Tribunal with regard to ‘enforcement’ of a homeowner’s association governing documents or with regard to any injunctive relief.”
Final Order
1. Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) is deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.
2. Petition #19 (MacLeod v. MAP): Dismissed.
3. Petition #34 (MAP v. MacLeod):
◦ Partially affirmed as to the allegation of MacLeod living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home in violation of the Amendment.
◦ Partially dismissed as to the allegation regarding the amount of living space within the hangar.
4. Filing Fees: Each party shall bear their own filing fee.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019019-REL
Study Guide: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Short-Answer Quiz
1. What were the two primary allegations made by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) in its petition (Petition #34) against Magnus L.D. MacLeod?
2. What was the core argument presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod in his petition (Petition #19) regarding the October 18, 2018 Amendment?
3. According to the original Declaration, what was the minimum approval threshold required to amend it?
4. How did the Amendment of October 18, 2018 change the rules regarding residency in Hangar Tracts like Tract G?
5. What was the central legal question that the parties stipulated to regarding the adoption of the Amendment?
6. Describe the two notices that MAP issued to MacLeod prior to filing its petition.
7. What argument did MacLeod make regarding A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) and why he believed the Amendment required unanimous approval?
8. Why was MAP’s allegation regarding the living space in MacLeod’s Tract G hangar (that it was only 549 sq. ft.) dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge?
9. What was MacLeod’s testimony regarding his occupancy of the Tract G hangar, and how did the Administrative Law Judge view this testimony?
10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge regarding Petition #19 and Petition #34, and which party was deemed the prevailing party?
Answer Key
1. In Petition #34, MAP first alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar. Second, MAP requested enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, seeking injunctive relief and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.
2. MacLeod’s petition alleged that the Amendment was unenforceable because it was not properly adopted pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817. He argued it did not receive the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which the amendment applied, specifically noting that owners of three of the nine affected tracts (G, H, and M) did not consent.
3. The original Declaration stipulated that it could be amended by “an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision.” This represents a 75% approval threshold.
4. The Amendment established that guest quarters in aircraft storage hangars (Tracts E through M) were for “temporary living only,” which was defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” It also specified that such quarters could not be used as a permanent residence.
5. The parties stipulated that the central dispute was whether the Amendment required 75% approval from lot owners as specified in the Declaration, or if it required unanimous approval from all affected property owners pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).
6. On December 29, 2018, MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance” with a $100 fine for living full-time in the hangar. On April 29, 2019, MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.
7. MacLeod argued that pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2), unanimous approval was required because the Amendment applied to fewer than all the lots bound by the Declaration. He specifically pointed out that Tract B, a common area, was not included in the Amendment.
8. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed this part of MAP’s petition because MAP failed to clearly document or prove its allegation. The judge concluded that MAP did not sufficiently demonstrate that the living space within the Tract G Hangar/Home was less than the required 1,200 square feet.
9. MacLeod gave widely inconsistent dates for his full-time occupancy of the hangar and testified that he had moved to Concho in January 2019. The Administrative Law Judge found his testimony inconsistent and could not conclude that MacLeod had stopped living in the hangar at the time Petition #34 was filed.
10. The judge ordered that MacLeod’s Petition #19 be dismissed entirely. The judge partially dismissed MAP’s Petition #34 regarding the living space allegation but affirmed the allegation that MacLeod was living in the hangar in violation of the Amendment. MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.
Essay Questions
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately sided with MAP’s interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable statute.
2. Trace the timeline of the dispute, starting with MacLeod’s purchase of Tract G and his proposal for a group home. Discuss how the actions and reactions of both parties escalated the conflict, leading to the filing of cross-petitions with the Department of Real Estate.
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both parties. How did the parties’ joint stipulation of facts narrow the central legal issue? Discuss the impact of MacLeod’s inconsistent testimony on the judge’s final decision regarding his residency.
4. MacLeod argued that MAP had waived its right to enforce the Amendment due to “longstanding and widespread utilization of Tract Hanger/Homes as full-time residences.” Although the Judge did not address this argument due to jurisdictional limits, construct an argument for or against this claim based on the facts available in the decision.
5. Discuss the scope and limitations of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in this case. Why was the Judge able to rule on the validity of the Amendment’s adoption and MacLeod’s violation, but not grant MAP’s request for injunctive relief and enforcement?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The judicial authority, Kay Abramsohn, who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.
A.R.S. § 33-1817
Arizona Revised Statute governing the amendment of a planned community’s Declaration. Subsection (A)(1) allows amendment by the vote specified in the Declaration, while (A)(2) requires unanimous consent of affected owners if the amendment applies to fewer than all lots.
Amendment
The “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…” recorded on October 18, 2018. It created categories for Residential and Hangar lots and restricted hangar occupancy to temporary living of no more than four months per year.
A colloquial acronym used by the Petitioner to refer to the original “Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions and Mutual and Reciprocal Covenants and Liens Running with the Land.”
Declaration
The original governing document for Mogollon Airpark, Inc., establishing conditions, reservations, and restrictions for the properties. It required a three-fourths (75%) vote of lot owners to be amended.
Hangar Tracts
Tracts E through M, inclusive, as designated by the Amendment for the primary purpose of aircraft storage, though guest quarters for temporary living are permitted.
Magnus L.D. MacLeod
The Petitioner in Petition #19 and Respondent in Petition #34. He is the owner of Tract G and resided in the hangar on that property.
Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)
The Respondent in Petition #19 and Petitioner in Petition #34. It is the planned community association responsible for administering the Declaration.
Petition #19
The petition filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod on October 15, 2019, alleging MAP improperly adopted the Amendment in violation of Arizona statute.
Petition #34
The petition filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. on December 16, 2019, alleging MacLeod was violating the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required in the hearing, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Residential Lots
Lots numbered 178 through 213, inclusive, as categorized by the Amendment.
Tract G
An aircraft storage hangar lot in Unit 4B owned by Magnus L.D. MacLeod, which was the central property in the dispute.
Unit 4B
The specific subdivision within Mogollon Airpark subject to the Declaration and Amendment. It includes Lots 178-213 and Tracts B, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019019-REL
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20F-H2019019-REL
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This administrative law judge decision concerns cross-petitions filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) regarding disputes within a planned community association in Arizona. MacLeod’s petition challenged the validity of an amendment to the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs), arguing it was improperly adopted and unreasonably altered prior usage rights for hangar/homes, specifically his Tract G property. MAP’s petition alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the amendment by living full-time in his aircraft storage hangar and requested injunctive relief to compel compliance. The judge ruled to dismiss MacLeod’s petition, finding the amendment was properly adopted, and partially affirmed MAP’s petition, concluding that MacLeod had violated the amendment by residing full-time in the hangar. Ultimately, MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the proceedings.
What were the central legal issues and findings in this property dispute case?
How did the contested amendment change the community’s declaration and rules?
What were the core arguments and outcomes for each party involved in this hearing?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jeffrey M. Proper(attorney) JEFFREY M. PROPER, PLLC Counsel for Magnus L.D. MacLeod
Respondent Side
Gregory A. Stein(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Counsel for Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Craig Albright(board member) MAP Board of Directors Then President of the MAP Board of Directors
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Magnus L.D. MacLeod(party) Petitioner in 20F-H2019019-REL and Respondent in 20F-H2019034-REL
Pat MacLeod(HOA president) HOA Brother of Petitioner; previous owner of Tract G; appeared to be HOA President around 2017
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1918042-REL
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Joan A. Tober
Counsel
—
Respondent
Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
Counsel
Diana J. Elston
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.
Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”
The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.
The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.
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Case Overview
This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Case Name
Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.
Case Number
19F-H1918042-REL
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Core Issue
Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.
Initial Hearing Date
June 5, 2019
Initial Decision Date
July 29, 2019
Rehearing Date
December 11, 2019
Final Decision Date
January 15, 2020
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Key Parties and Individuals
• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober
◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.
◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.
◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.
◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.
◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.
• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)
◦ The governing body for the planned community.
◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn
◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
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Chronology of the Dispute
Nov 20, 2018
At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.
Nov 26, 2018
Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.
Nov 27, 2018
Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.
Nov 29, 2018
At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
Nov 29, 2018
At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.
Dec 13, 2018
Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”
Dec 26, 2018
Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Jan 15-16, 2019
The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.
June 5, 2019
The initial administrative hearing is held.
July 29, 2019
Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.
Aug 5, 2019
Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”
Aug 23, 2019
The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.
Dec 11, 2019
The rehearing is conducted.
Jan 15, 2020
Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.
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Core Dispute and Arguments
Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)
1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”
2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.
3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).
Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)
1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.
4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.
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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence
The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.
• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”
• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.
• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:
◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.
◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”
◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”
◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.
• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.
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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law
Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)
• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.
• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”
• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.
Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)
• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.
• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”
• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”
• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”
• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”
• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
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Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.
1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?
2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?
3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?
4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?
5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?
6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?
7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?
8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?
9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.
10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?
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Answer Key
1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.
4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.
5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.
6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.
8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.
9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.
10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.
2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.
3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?
5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.
A.R.S. § 33-1805
The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.
Attorney-Client Privilege
A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.
Executive Session
A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.
An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.
Petition
The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”
Rehearing
A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
The Letter
The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.
Introduction: The Fight for Information
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.
This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.
1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.
The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.
The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.
2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.
Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.
After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”
In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:
An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.
The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.
3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.
What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.
But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:
Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.
Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.
Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort
The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.
This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Joan A. Tober(petitioner) Former Board member; current Finance Committee member
Respondent Side
Diana J. Elston(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Mr. Mastrosimone(Board President) Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Testified at rehearing
Neutral Parties
Kay A. Abramsohn(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
c. serrano(Clerk)
Felicia Del Sol(Clerk)
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1918042-REL
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Joan A. Tober
Counsel
—
Respondent
Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
Counsel
Diana J. Elston
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA) was the prevailing party. The ALJ found that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B) because the specific attorney letter requested was privileged and could be withheld,, and Petitioner's request for additional 'background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified,.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) as the HOA lawfully withheld privileged documents under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B) and was not required to guess what records were requested due to the vague nature of the demand for 'any and all documentation'.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA violation of requirement to provide association records.
Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide all requested documentation, specifically an attorney letter concerning the North Ridge wall, and failed to comply with the 10-business day response period required for record requests.
Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party on rehearing and Petitioner's appeal was dismissed. The HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B). The requested attorney letter was privileged communication and could be withheld.
Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”
The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.
The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.
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Case Overview
This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Case Name
Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.
Case Number
19F-H1918042-REL
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Core Issue
Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.
Initial Hearing Date
June 5, 2019
Initial Decision Date
July 29, 2019
Rehearing Date
December 11, 2019
Final Decision Date
January 15, 2020
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Key Parties and Individuals
• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober
◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.
◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.
◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.
◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.
◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.
• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)
◦ The governing body for the planned community.
◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn
◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
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Chronology of the Dispute
Nov 20, 2018
At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.
Nov 26, 2018
Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.
Nov 27, 2018
Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.
Nov 29, 2018
At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
Nov 29, 2018
At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.
Dec 13, 2018
Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”
Dec 26, 2018
Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Jan 15-16, 2019
The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.
June 5, 2019
The initial administrative hearing is held.
July 29, 2019
Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.
Aug 5, 2019
Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”
Aug 23, 2019
The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.
Dec 11, 2019
The rehearing is conducted.
Jan 15, 2020
Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.
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Core Dispute and Arguments
Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)
1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”
2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.
3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).
Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)
1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.
4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.
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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence
The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.
• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”
• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.
• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:
◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.
◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”
◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”
◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.
• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.
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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law
Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)
• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.
• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”
• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.
Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)
• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.
• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”
• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”
• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”
• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”
• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
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Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.
1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?
2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?
3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?
4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?
5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?
6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?
7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?
8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?
9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.
10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?
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Answer Key
1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.
4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.
5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.
6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.
8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.
9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.
10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.
2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.
3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?
5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.
A.R.S. § 33-1805
The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.
Attorney-Client Privilege
A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.
Executive Session
A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.
An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.
Petition
The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”
Rehearing
A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
The Letter
The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.
Introduction: The Fight for Information
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.
This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.
1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.
The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.
The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.
2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.
Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.
After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”
In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:
An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.
The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.
3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.
What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.
But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:
Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.
Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.
Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort
The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.
This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Joan A. Tober(petitioner) Former Board member; current Finance Committee member
Respondent Side
Diana J. Elston(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Mr. Mastrosimone(Board President) Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Testified at rehearing
Neutral Parties
Kay A. Abramsohn(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
c. serrano(Clerk)
Felicia Del Sol(Clerk)
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
