David & Brenda Norman v. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919051-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner David and Brenda Norman Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Lago Community Association Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) / Common Project Guidelines § 3.11(D)(1)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by David and Brenda Norman against Rancho Del Lago Community Association, finding that the Department of Real Estate did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, as it was essentially a conflict between neighboring owners (Petitioners and Hendersons) regarding a wall.

Why this result: The Department lacked jurisdiction over the dispute among or between owners, per A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation by HOA approving a block wall built by neighbors (Hendersons)

Petitioners alleged that Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) by approving a block wall built by their next-door neighbors, the Hendersons, and requested the Department require the Hendersons to permit Petitioners to connect to the wall or require the Hendersons to tear the wall down.

Orders: The petition was dismissed because the Department lacked jurisdiction to hear a dispute primarily among or between owners to which the association is not a party, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, HOA Governance, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), Party Wall, Neighbor Dispute, CC&Rs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 737050.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:28 (40.9 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 710478.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:32 (150.0 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 711115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:36 (149.9 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 710478.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:06 (150.0 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 711115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:10 (149.9 KB)

Case Briefing: Norman v. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919051-REL, involving homeowners David and Brenda Norman (Petitioners) and the Rancho Del Lago Community Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute centers on the Petitioners’ allegation that the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) violated community guidelines by approving a wall built by the Petitioners’ neighbors, the Hendersons.

The Petitioners claimed the Henderson’s wall, constructed 6 inches inside the property line, created a situation where any wall they might build on their property would be a “closely parallel wall,” which is prohibited by the community’s Common Project Guidelines § 3.11(D)(1). They requested that the Respondent either force the Hendersons to allow the Petitioners to connect to their wall, effectively making it a shared “party wall,” or compel the Hendersons to demolish it.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition entirely. The primary legal basis for the dismissal was a lack of jurisdiction; under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1), the Arizona Department of Real Estate cannot hear disputes solely between homeowners in which the association is not a party. The judge concluded this was fundamentally a neighbor-versus-neighbor conflict. Furthermore, the judge characterized the wall the Petitioners sought to build as an “archetypical spite fence” and noted that the Petitioners had failed to prove the Respondent had violated any community documents.

Case Overview

Parties and Key Entities

Name/Entity

Description

Petitioners

David and Brenda Norman

Homeowners in the Rancho Del Lago Community.

Respondent

Rancho Del Lago Community Association

The homeowners’ association (HOA) for the community.

Neighbors

The Hendersons

The Petitioners’ next-door neighbors who built the disputed wall.

Management Co.

Management Solutions

The company managing the Respondent HOA.

Witness (Respondent)

Spencer Brod

Employee of Management Solutions overseeing the Respondent’s affairs.

Administrative Law Judge

Diane Mihalsky

Presiding judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Regulating Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

State agency authorized to hear certain HOA disputes.

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings

Independent state agency that conducted the evidentiary hearing.

Procedural Details

Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H1919051-REL

Petition Filed

On or about February 28, 2019

Hearing Date

May 8, 2019

Amended Decision Date

May 28, 2019

Timeline of Key Events

December 2003: The Respondent’s ARC adopts the Common Project Guidelines, which govern all exterior improvements.

March 8, 2017: The Hendersons submit an Architectural Variance Request (AVR) to extend the common wall between their property and the Petitioners’. Mrs. Norman signs the request, giving consent. The ARC approves this request.

April 27, 2017: The Hendersons submit a new AVR to build a wall extension 6 inches inside their property line, making it a private wall rather than a shared party wall. The record suggests Mrs. Norman may have rescinded her earlier approval for the common wall.

May 10, 2017: The ARC approves the Hendersons’ request to build the wall 6 inches inside their property line.

September 5, 2017: The Petitioners submit an AVR to build an 11-foot wide concrete driveway. The ARC denies the request.

Post-September 5, 2017: Despite the denial, the Petitioners construct the 11-foot wide driveway and are subsequently issued a Notice of Violation by the Respondent.

September 7, 2017: The Petitioners submit an AVR to build a wall extension on their property, positioned at least 3 feet away from the Hendersons’ wall.

October 13, 2017: The ARC approves the Petitioners’ wall extension request.

Post-October 13, 2017: The Petitioners decide not to build the approved wall, stating their contractor advised them against “giving up” the 3 feet of property that would lie between the two walls.

By November 2017: The Hendersons’ wall appears to have been constructed.

February 28, 2019: The Petitioners file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Respondent violated community rules.

March 27, 2019: The Petitioners file a new AVR to build a wall directly on the property line. This request did not include the Hendersons’ required consent and was still pending at the time of the hearing.

Governing Documents and Key Provisions

The dispute and subsequent legal decision referenced several specific articles from the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Common Project Guidelines.

Document

Provision

Description

Article I § (p)

Defines “Party Walls” built on a property line, establishing equal right of use, joint responsibility for maintenance and repair, and a process for the Board to resolve disputes over construction or cost-sharing.

Article II § 2(a)

Requires prior written approval from the ARC for any improvements that alter the exterior appearance of a property.

Article XII § 1

Establishes the ARC, noting that its decisions are “sole, absolute and final on all matters submitted to it.”

Common Project Guidelines

Section 3.11(D)(1)

States that “Closely parallel walls shall be disapproved.” The term “closely parallel” is not defined in the guidelines. This provision was the central focus of the Petitioners’ complaint.

Common Project Guidelines

Section 4.21

Grants the ARC the right “to waive, vary, or otherwise modify any of the standards or procedures set forth herein at its discretion, for good cause shown.”

Summary of Testimony and Evidence

Testimony of Brenda Norman (Petitioner)

Motivation for Wall: Stated that she and her husband are in law enforcement and want to enclose their side yard to protect utility meters from potential vandalism.

Reason for Not Building Approved Wall: Explained that their contractor advised them it was “crazy to give up the 3’ of property” that would be inaccessible between their proposed wall and the Hendersons’ wall.

Relationship with Neighbors: Acknowledged that the Petitioners “do not get along very well with the Hendersons” and therefore never asked for their consent for a wall on the property line.

Belief Regarding Parallel Walls: Believes that if she submitted a plan for a wall just inside her property line, it would be denied under the “close parallel wall” rule.

Requested Action: Opined that the Respondent should force the Hendersons to tear down their wall because it is not uniformly 6 inches from the property line.

Testimony of Spencer Brod (for Respondent)

HOA Policy: Testified that the HOA “never gets involved in disputes between neighbors” and that it is the homeowner’s responsibility to obtain neighbor consent for common wall projects.

Party vs. Private Walls: Explained that neighbor consent is required only for “party walls” on the property line due to shared maintenance liability. The Hendersons’ wall was approved because it was on their own property and therefore not a party wall.

Enforcement and Inspection: Admitted that the Hendersons’ wall may not be uniformly 6 inches from the line but stated the Respondent has no one to perform a “thorough inspection” and had not sent a violation letter.

“Closely Parallel Walls” Interpretation: Testified that while the term is undefined, the ARC’s approval of the Petitioners’ plan for a wall 3 feet away indicates that “closely parallel” means a distance of less than 3 feet.

Petitioners’ Unauthorized Construction: Confirmed that the Respondent sent the Petitioners a Notice of Violation for building a driveway that the ARC had explicitly denied.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The judge’s decision was based on a detailed analysis of the evidence, governing documents, and relevant state law.

1. Jurisdictional Failure: The primary reason for dismissal was a lack of jurisdiction. The judge cited A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1), which explicitly states, “The department does not have jurisdiction to hear [a]ny dispute among or between owners to which the association is not a party.” The judge determined this was a quintessential neighbor dispute, not a dispute with the HOA.

2. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated its own rules. The judge found they failed to do so.

3. Characterization as a “Spite Fence”: The decision describes the wall the Petitioners wish to build as an “archetypical spite fence between neighbors who cannot agree to mutually work for the improvement of their adjacent properties.”

4. HOA’s Limited Role: The judge affirmed that neither the CC&Rs nor the Common Project Guidelines compel the HOA to mediate or resolve disputes between neighbors by taking a side.

5. Distinction of Wall Types: The analysis distinguished between a party wall on a property line, which requires neighbor consent, and a private wall built entirely on one owner’s property, which does not. The Hendersons’ wall was approved as the latter.

6. Hypothetical Outcome: A concluding footnote in the decision states that even if the Department had jurisdiction, the Petitioners had not established that Guideline 3.11(D)(1) would authorize or require the Respondent to grant the relief they requested.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that the petition filed by David and Brenda Norman against the Respondent, Rancho Del Lago Community Association, is dismissed. The dismissal is based on the finding that the Arizona Department of Real Estate does not have jurisdiction to hear their dispute with the Hendersons.

Study Guide: Norman v. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

This guide is designed to review the administrative legal case between homeowners David and Brenda Norman and their homeowners’ association, the Rancho Del Lago Community Association, concerning a dispute over a neighbor’s wall.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing only from the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central violation of the homeowners’ association rules alleged by the Petitioners in their February 28, 2019, petition?

2. Identify the three main groups of individuals or entities involved in the dispute: the Petitioners, the Respondent, and the neighbors.

3. According to the Respondent’s CC&Rs, what is a “Party Wall” and what primary responsibility does it create for adjacent homeowners?

4. Describe the two separate wall-related Architectural Variance Requests (AVRs) submitted by the Hendersons in March and April of 2017.

5. Why did the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) initially deny the Petitioners’ request to build a new driveway, and what was the outcome of this denial?

6. What is the role of the “Declarant” within the Rancho Del Lago Community Association, and what influence do they hold over the board and the ARC?

7. The ARC approved a wall proposal for the Petitioners on October 13, 2017. Why did the Petitioners choose not to build this approved wall?

8. According to the CC&Rs, what is the ultimate authority of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) in rendering its decisions?

9. On what legal grounds did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss the Petitioners’ case?

10. Who bore the “burden of proof” in this hearing, and what does this legal standard require?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The Petitioners alleged that the Respondent (the homeowners’ association) violated Section 3.11(D)(1) of the Common Project Guidelines. This section states that “closely parallel walls shall be disapproved,” and the Petitioners argued that the association violated this rule by approving the wall built by their neighbors, the Hendersons.

2. The Petitioners were homeowners David and Brenda Norman. The Respondent was the Rancho Del Lago Community Association. The neighbors, who were central to the dispute but not a party to the case, were the Hendersons.

3. A “Party Wall” is a wall situated on the property line between two or more contiguous lots. It creates a shared right of use and a joint obligation for all adjoining owners to rebuild and repair the wall at their shared expense.

4. The Hendersons first submitted an AVR on March 8, 2017, to extend the existing common party wall, for which Mrs. Norman gave consent. On April 27, 2017, they submitted a different AVR to build a new wall located entirely on their property, 6 inches inside the property line, which did not require the Normans’ consent.

5. The ARC denied the Petitioners’ September 5, 2017, request for an 11-foot wide driveway because a driveway already existed on the opposite side of the house where the garage was located. Despite the denial, the Petitioners built the driveway anyway, which resulted in the Respondent issuing them a Notice of Violation.

6. The “Declarant” is the original developer that built the subdivision. At the time of the hearing, the Respondent association was still under the control of the Declarant, who appointed all three directors of the board and was also a member of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

7. The Petitioners did not build the approved wall because the plan required it to be built at least 3 feet inside their property line to avoid being a party wall. Their contractor advised them they would be “crazy to give up the 3’ of property” that would lie between their new wall and the Hendersons’ wall.

8. According to Article XII, § 1 of the CC&Rs, “the decision of the [ARC] shall be sole, absolute and final on all matters submitted to it pursuant to this Declaration and/or the Design Guidelines.”

9. The judge dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1), the Arizona Department of Real Estate does not have jurisdiction to hear disputes between owners to which the association is not a party. The judge framed the issue as a private dispute between the Normans and the Hendersons.

10. The Petitioners (the Normans) bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the community rules. This standard, known as a “preponderance of the evidence,” requires presenting evidence that is more convincing and more likely true than not.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts and rules from the case documents to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the concept of a “Party Wall” versus a privately-owned wall within the context of this case. How did the distinction between these two types of walls become the central point of contention and influence the decisions made by the Hendersons, the Normans, and the ARC?

2. Discuss the powers and limitations of the Rancho Del Lago Community Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) as outlined in the CC&Rs and Common Project Guidelines. How did the ARC’s discretionary authority, particularly under Section 4.21 of the guidelines, impact the events of this dispute?

3. Trace the timeline of Architectural Variance Requests (AVRs) submitted by both the Normans and the Hendersons. Evaluate how the sequence of approvals, denials, and unbuilt projects contributed to the escalation of the dispute and ultimately led to the legal hearing.

4. Explain the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision. Why was the concept of “jurisdiction” more critical to the outcome than the merits of the Normans’ claim regarding “closely parallel walls”? Refer to the specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) cited in the decision.

5. The judge described the potential wall the Petitioners wish to build as an “archetypical spite fence.” Based on the testimony and evidence presented in the case, argue for or against this characterization.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders decisions on disputes involving state agencies.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee established by the Declarant and governed by the CC&Rs, responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any proposed improvements that alter the exterior appearance of properties within the community. Its decisions are described as “sole, absolute and final.”

Architectural Variance Request (AVR)

The formal application submitted by a homeowner to the ARC to request approval for an exterior improvement or modification to their property.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (the Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations regarding violations of community documents.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The legal documents that establish the rules, regulations, and obligations for homeowners within a planned community like Rancho Del Lago.

Closely Parallel Walls

A term from Section 3.11(D)(1) of the Common Project Guidelines that are to be disapproved. The term is not explicitly defined, but testimony suggests a wall 3 feet from another would be approved, making the threshold for “close” less than that.

Common Project Guidelines

A set of rules adopted by the ARC in December 2003 that govern all exterior improvements and provide standards for the Design Review Process. These guidelines supplement the CC&Rs.

Declarant

The original developer that built the subdivision. In this case, the Declarant still controlled the association’s Board of Directors and the ARC.

Jurisdiction

The legal authority of a court or agency to hear and decide a case. The petition was dismissed because the Department was found to lack jurisdiction over disputes solely between homeowners.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted by an Administrative Law Judge.

Party Wall

As defined in the CC&Rs, a wall on the property line between contiguous lots. Owners have equal rights to use it and share joint financial responsibility for its repair and maintenance.

Petitioners

The party that initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, homeowners David and Brenda Norman.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this civil administrative hearing. It means the evidence presented must be sufficient to convince the judge that a claim is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Lago Community Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document (like a CC&R) that limits the use of the property. Arizona law holds that unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

The Six-Inch Wall That Ignited a Legal Battle: 4 Shocking Lessons from a Brutal HOA War

1.0 Introduction: The Neighbor Next Door

Living next to someone is a universal experience, and it’s remarkable how quickly a small disagreement over a fence or a property line can spiral into a full-blown conflict. For two families in an Arizona HOA, what started as a plan for a backyard wall ended in a formal administrative law hearing, providing a stark case study in property law, association rules, and human nature.

This dispute, involving homeowners David and Brenda Norman and their neighbors, the Hendersons, dissects four critical lessons that challenge common assumptions about homeowner rights and association duties. Their story is a powerful cautionary tale about property lines, HOA authority, and the high cost of a neighborhood war.

2.0 Takeaway 1: The Six-Inch Difference That Changes Everything

1. A Wall on the Property Line Isn’t the Same as a Wall Near It

In property law, inches are everything. The community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) defined a “Party Wall” as a structure sitting directly on the property line between two lots. By this definition, these walls are a shared responsibility, requiring mutual consent from both homeowners for construction and shared costs for maintenance.

This distinction became the pivot on which the entire case turned. Initially, the Hendersons submitted plans to build a shared Party Wall, and the Normans gave their required consent. But then the plan changed. The Hendersons withdrew that request and submitted a new one: to build a wall located just six inches inside their own property line. The record doesn’t state definitively why the Hendersons changed their plan, though testimony suggested the Normans may have rescinded their initial consent.

This was a masterstroke of procedural navigation; by sacrificing a mere six inches of their yard, the Hendersons effectively bought the legal right to build without their neighbors’ consent, turning a potential year-long dispute into a matter of a simple ARC approval. By moving the structure entirely onto their own lot, it was no longer a “Party Wall” but their private property. While the Hendersons had successfully navigated the HOA’s rules, the Normans’ next step was to try and force the HOA to intervene directly—a move that would expose a common misunderstanding about the limits of an association’s power.

3.0 Takeaway 2: Your HOA Isn’t the Neighborhood Referee

2. The HOA’s Power to Intervene Has Surprising Limits

A common assumption among homeowners is that the HOA must mediate any and all disputes between residents. This case proves that assumption is fundamentally incorrect.

When the conflict escalated, the HOA’s position was unwavering. Spencer Brod, an employee of the association’s management company, testified that the association “never gets involved in disputes between neighbors.” Its role is to enforce community rules as they relate to the association, not to take sides in personal conflicts between homeowners.

The Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case reinforced this legal reality, citing Arizona law to clarify the limits of both the HOA’s and the state’s jurisdiction. The judge’s finding was unequivocal:

Neither the CC&Rs nor the Common Project Guidelines require Respondent [the HOA] to mediate or resolve a dispute between neighbors by taking one side or the other. A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1) provides that ‘[t]he department does not have jurisdiction to hear [a]ny dispute among or between owners to which the association is not a party.’

This finding is a crucial lesson: while an HOA enforces its governing documents, it is not a neighborhood court and cannot be compelled to referee personal disagreements.

4.0 Takeaway 3: You Can’t Demand a Neighbor Play by the Rules If You Don’t

3. Coming to the Table with Clean Hands Matters

The case contained a powerful element of irony that proved fatal to the Normans’ petition. The judge’s official Findings of Fact reveal that while demanding the HOA enforce its rules against the Hendersons, the Normans had a significant compliance issue of their own.

In September 2017, the Normans submitted a request to build an 11-foot wide concrete driveway “to provide a solid walking surface because Mrs. Norman was disabled and had difficulty walking.” While the motivation was sympathetic, the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) denied the request. Despite the denial, the Normans built the driveway anyway and were subsequently issued a Notice of Violation by the HOA.

Critically, the Normans’ own rule-breaking occurred after the Hendersons’ wall was approved. In the very midst of their dispute, while formulating a case against their neighbors, they chose to defy the ARC themselves. This is a classic illustration of the “unclean hands” doctrine. In any legal or administrative forum, one’s credibility is paramount. The Normans were asking the HOA to be a strict enforcer of rules they themselves had flagrantly violated, a position that is almost always untenable.

5.0 Takeaway 4: When a Judge Calls It a “Spite Fence”

4. The Court May Look Past the Rules and See Your Intent

Even in a hearing focused on the technicalities of CC&Rs, the underlying human motivations of the conflict did not go unnoticed. The HOA’s ARC had previously approved a plan for the Normans to build their own wall, provided it was located three feet inside their property line. They refused. Brenda Norman testified that their contractor told them they were “crazy to give up the 3’ of property.” Mrs. Norman also argued that a wall on her property would be denied as a prohibited “closely parallel wall,” but this claim was directly contradicted by the ARC’s own actions—they had already approved her wall at the three-foot distance.

The judge’s “spite fence” comment wasn’t just an observation; it was the legal culmination of the Normans’ entire pattern of behavior. Their refusal to accept an approved wall on their own property (losing 3 feet) while demanding their neighbor tear down a wall built on theirs (losing 0 feet) painted a clear picture of animosity, not a genuine need for property protection. The judge saw through the legal arguments to the core of the issue:

The wall that Petitioners testified that they must build to protect their property appears to be an archetypical spite fence between neighbors who cannot agree to mutually work for the improvement of their adjacent properties.

A “spite fence” is a legal term for a structure erected with malicious intent, where the primary purpose is not to improve one’s own property but to annoy, inconvenience, or harm a neighbor. The judge’s use of this term was a powerful signal that, in the court’s view, the dispute was no longer about property rights, but about personal animus.

6.0 Conclusion: A Wall Is a Wall, But a Neighbor Is Forever

This case is a cautionary tale written in concrete and legal filings. It shows how a dispute over six inches of soil can metastasize, fueled by a misunderstanding of HOA rules and an unwillingness to compromise, ultimately costing both parties time, money, and peace of mind. From the critical importance of a few inches of land to the defined limits of an HOA’s authority, the details matter.

Ultimately, the story of the Normans and the Hendersons serves as a powerful reminder that navigating HOA living requires a clear-eyed understanding of the actual rules, not just a sense of what seems “fair.” It leaves us with a critical question to consider.

When it comes to our homes and neighbors, is it more important to be right, or to find a way to live in peace?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • David Norman (petitioner)
    Appeared telephonically on own behalf
  • Brenda Norman (petitioner)
    Testified on Petitioners' behalf

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Represented Rancho Del Lago Community Association
  • Spencer Brod (property manager/witness)
    Management Solutions
    Employee of Respondent's management company; testified

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Other Participants

  • Anthony Henderson (homeowner/neighbor)
    Next-door neighbor who built the wall in dispute
  • Mabel Gummere (property manager predecessor)
    Predecessor to Spencer Brod

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:17 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.

Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.

4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

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4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

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Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, Rehearing, HOA Dispute, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:02 (130.3 KB)

Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

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Case Overview and Procedural History

The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.

January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Central Jurisdictional Question

The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.

The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:

“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”

A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

Arguments of the Parties

The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.

Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)

The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.

Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

“Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.

Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”

Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:

◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.

◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).

◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.

◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”

◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.

Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)

The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.

Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”

Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.

Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.

The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.

To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”

Source

Definition of “Roadway”

English Oxford Living Dict.

“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”

Merriam-Webster

“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”

Dictionary.com

“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”

Cambridge Dictionary

“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

American Heritage Dictionary

“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”

Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”

The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”

Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”

Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).

Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”

These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.

Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.

Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.

1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?

2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?

3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?

4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?

5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?

7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?

9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?

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Answer Key

1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.

2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.

3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.

4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.

5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.

6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.

8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”

9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.

2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?

3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?

5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Complete Streets

An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.

Covenant

A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.

Petitioner

The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.

Right-of-Way

The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”

Roadway

Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.

  • don't play in the street

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del sol (staff)
    Clerk/Distribution staff

Other Participants

  • Ana M. Olivares (Director)
    Pima County Transportation
    Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance

Dina R. Galassini vs. Plaza Waterfront Condominiums Owners

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Dina R. Galassini Counsel
Respondent Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner’s petition for rehearing, concluding that the OAH has the authority, pursuant to statute and precedent, to resolve disputes involving the interpretation of condominium documents and related regulating statutes, rejecting Petitioner's constitutional claims regarding separation of powers. Respondent's request for attorney's fees was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's argument that the original ALJ decision was contrary to law due to separation of powers violation was dismissed, as the OAH confirmed its statutory authority (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) to interpret condominium documents and regulating statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent Association correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget

Petitioner sought rehearing arguing the ALJ lacked constitutional authority (separation of powers) to interpret condominium documents (contracts) and statutory definitions of common/limited common elements (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202) related to the posting of the 2018 parking lot budget assessment.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed. Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Assessment, Jurisdiction, ALJ Authority, Condominium Documents, Separation of Powers
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass'n v. Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 67, 392 P.3d 506, 511 (App. 2017)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. CONST. Art. 3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 655375.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:00 (65.7 KB)

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 636950.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:08 (128.6 KB)

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 655375.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:36 (65.7 KB)

18F-H1818032-REL Decision – 636950.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:39 (128.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG, which dismissed a petition filed by Dina R. Galassini against the Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The central conflict revolved around the jurisdictional authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Petitioner, Ms. Galassini, argued that the OAH, as part of the executive branch, violated the constitutional separation of powers by interpreting private condominium documents, a power she claimed was reserved exclusively for the judicial branch.

The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, rejected this argument and dismissed the petition as a matter of law. The decision affirms that the OAH is statutorily empowered by Arizona Revised Statutes to hear disputes concerning alleged violations of condominium documents. The ALJ’s rationale rests on established legal precedent, citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov to confirm that condominium documents are a contract and Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. to support an agency’s authority to take actions reasonably implied by its governing statutes. Consequently, the Petitioner’s core constitutional challenge was deemed “unfounded,” leading to the dismissal of her petition. While the petition was dismissed, the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied.

1. Case Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute between a condominium owner and a condominium association, brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Parties:

Petitioner: Dina R. Galassini

Respondent: Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Presiding Judge: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Decision Date: August 22, 2018

The matter arrived before Judge Shedden following a series of procedural steps initiated after an original ALJ decision.

June 26, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

July 20, 2018: The Department of Real Estate issued an Order Granting Rehearing, based on the reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s request.

August 15, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Vacate Rehearing, arguing the case could be resolved as a matter of law.

August 21, 2018: The Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Respondent’s motion.

2. Core Dispute: Petitioner’s Jurisdictional Challenge

The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing was founded on a direct constitutional challenge to the authority of the Administrative Law Judge. The underlying substantive issue concerned the association’s handling of “owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget,” which turned on the interpretation of “common element” versus “limited common element.”

Petitioner’s Arguments

Violation of Separation of Powers: The Petitioner contended that the original ALJ decision was “contrary to law” because it involved the interpretation of private contracts (the condominium documents). She argued this function is reserved exclusively for the judicial branch under Arizona’s Constitution, Article 3 (Separation of Powers).

Due Process Violation: By interpreting the contract, the ALJ allegedly committed a “due process violation.” The Petitioner stated, “For the ALJ to definitively interpret actual contracts between two private parties is a due process violation (separation of powers).”

Improper Delegation of Power: The Petitioner claimed the ALJ’s action “redistributed interpreted power from the Judiciary to the Executive and this is a congressional encroachment on my rights.”

3. The Administrative Law Judge’s Legal Rationale and Decision

The ALJ agreed with the Respondent that the case could be resolved as a matter of law, focusing entirely on the jurisdictional question raised by the Petitioner. The decision systematically refutes the Petitioner’s separation of powers argument by outlining the OAH’s legal authority.

Statutory Authority

The decision establishes the OAH’s jurisdiction through Arizona state law:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11: This statute describes the administrative process for referring disputes between owners and condominium associations to the OAH.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A): This section specifically grants the OAH authority to conduct hearings for alleged “violations of condominium documents … or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums….”

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1202: The decision notes that analyzing the Petitioner’s claim inherently requires interpreting definitions found in the statutes that regulate condominiums, such as this section defining “common element” and “limited common element.”

Precedent from Case Law

The ALJ grounded the OAH’s interpretive authority in two key Arizona appellate court decisions:

1. Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007): This case is cited to establish the legal principle that “the condominium documents are a contract between the parties.” By defining the documents as a contract, the decision links the dispute directly to the type of documents the OAH is empowered to review.

2. Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs., 242 Ariz. 62, 392 P.3d 506 (App. 2017): This case is cited to support the broader principle of administrative authority. The ruling states, “[I]t is the law of this state that an agency may” take such action “which may be reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole.’” This supports the conclusion that the OAH’s authority to hear disputes over condominium documents implies the authority to interpret them.

Conclusion of the Court

Based on the cited statutes and case law, the ALJ concluded that the OAH possesses the necessary authority to interpret both the condominium documents and the relevant state statutes. Therefore, the Petitioner’s central argument that the original decision was “contrary to law” was declared “unfounded,” and dismissing the matter was deemed appropriate.

4. Final Orders and Directives

The Administrative Law Judge issued the following final orders on August 22, 2018:

Outcome

Petitioner’s Petition

Dismissed

Respondent’s Request for Attorney’s Fees

Denied

The decision also included the following legally mandated notices for the parties:

Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as a result of the rehearing, per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B).

Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five (35) days from the date the order was served. The appeal process is prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. title 12, chapter 7, article 6 and § 12-904(A).

Study Guide: Galassini v. Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG, issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It is designed to assess comprehension of the case’s key arguments, legal precedents, and procedural history.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source document.

1. Identify the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case and state the official case number.

2. What was the Petitioner’s core legal argument for requesting a rehearing, as detailed in her filing on June 26, 2018?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent file a Motion to Vacate Rehearing on August 15, 2018?

4. According to the Petitioner’s Response, what was the specific issue that the Department’s Commissioner had ordered the rehearing to address?

5. Which Arizona Revised Statute section is cited as describing the process for hearings on disputes between owners and condominium associations?

6. To resolve the Petitioner’s claim, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) needed to interpret the definitions of what two key terms from the Arizona Revised Statutes?

7. What legal precedent was cited in the decision to establish that condominium documents are considered a contract between the parties?

8. What was the final decision issued by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden on August 22, 2018, regarding the Petitioner’s petition and the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees?

9. According to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B), what is the legal status of an administrative law judge order that has been issued as the result of a rehearing?

10. What specific steps must a party take to appeal this order, including the timeframe and the court where the appeal must be filed?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Dina R. Galassini, and the Respondent is Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. The official case number is 18F-H1818032-REL-RHG.

2. The Petitioner argued that the original Administrative Law Judge’s decision was contrary to law because it violated the principle of separation of powers. She claimed that by interpreting contracts between private parties, the ALJ, part of the Executive branch, encroached upon the power of the Judiciary, resulting in a due process violation.

3. The Respondent argued that the matter could be resolved as a matter of law. This argument was based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01, which governs administrative hearings for condominium disputes.

4. The Petitioner asserted in her Response that the Department’s Commissioner had ordered a rehearing specifically on the issue of whether the Respondent Association had correctly posted owner assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget.

5. ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11, specifically section 32-2199.01(A), is cited as governing the process. It states that hearings are conducted for alleged “violations of condominium documents … or violations of the statutes that regulate condominiums.”

6. To analyze the Petitioner’s claim, the ALJ needed to interpret the definitions of “common element” and “limited common element.” These definitions are found in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1202.

7. The case Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007) was cited to support the legal principle that condominium documents (like CC&Rs) constitute a contract between the parties involved.

8. Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. He further ordered that the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees be denied.

9. According to the statute, an administrative law judge order issued as a result of a rehearing is binding on the parties.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. title 12, chapter 7, article 6. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s “separation of powers” argument. Explain why she believed the ALJ’s decision constituted a due process violation and a congressional encroachment on her rights, and discuss how the final decision legally refuted this claim.

2. Detail the legal basis and precedents cited by the Administrative Law Judge to establish the authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Explain how ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A) and the cases Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov and Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. were used to justify the OAH’s jurisdiction in this matter.

3. Trace the procedural history of this case from the Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Include key dates, motions filed by both parties, and the reasoning behind the Department of Real Estate’s initial decision to grant a rehearing.

4. Discuss the relationship between condominium documents and state statutes as presented in this decision. How does the ruling define condominium documents, and what authority does it grant the OAH in interpreting both these documents and the statutes that regulate condominiums?

5. Based on the final decision and the provided notice, explain the legal options available to the Petitioner following the dismissal of her petition. What specific steps must be taken to pursue an appeal, and what legal standard is established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B) regarding the finality of the ALJ’s order?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Thomas Shedden of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Common Element

A term defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1202. The interpretation of this term was central to the Petitioner’s original dispute.

Condominium Documents

The governing documents of a condominium association (e.g., CC&Rs). The decision establishes these as a contract between the parties, citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov.

Department of Real Estate

The state agency that issued the Order Granting Rehearing in this matter on July 20, 2018.

Due Process Violation

An alleged infringement of legal rights. The Petitioner claimed this occurred when the ALJ interpreted a contract between private parties.

Judicial Review

The legal process by which a party can appeal an administrative order to a court. The decision specifies this must be done by filing with the superior court within 35 days.

Limited Common Element

A term defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1202. The interpretation of this term was central to the Petitioner’s original dispute.

Motion to Vacate Rehearing

A formal request filed by the Respondent on August 15, 2018, arguing that the case could be resolved as a matter of law.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where disputes between owners and condominium associations are referred for hearings, as per ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Petitioner

The party initiating a legal petition. In this case, Dina R. Galassini.

Request for Rehearing

A formal request filed by the Petitioner on June 26, 2018, after an initial decision, which was granted by the Department of Real Estate.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc.

Separation of Powers

A constitutional principle cited by the Petitioner. She argued that only the judicial branch, not the executive branch (where the OAH resides), can make decisions that legally bind private parties.

4 Surprising Legal Lessons from a Condo Parking Lot Dispute

Introduction: The Anatomy of a Neighborhood Fight

Disputes with a Condominium or Homeowner’s Association are a common, and often frustrating, part of modern life. But what happens when a seemingly minor conflict over assessments for the 2018 parking lot budget escalates into a direct challenge to the power of the state?

The case of Dina R. Galassini vs. the Plaza Waterfront Condominium Owners Association, Inc. did just that. This neighborhood fight quickly grew to question fundamental legal principles, revealing some counter-intuitive truths about the power and jurisdiction of administrative agencies. The final court decision provides a masterclass in administrative law, a powerful, court-like system designed for efficiency that operates with more flexibility and authority than most people realize. Here are the top surprising takeaways from the final ruling.

Takeaway 1: Administrative Agencies Can Act Like Courts

At the heart of her appeal, Ms. Galassini made a powerful constitutional argument: she believed that only a judge in the judicial branch—not an administrator in the executive branch—had the authority to interpret a private contract like her condominium documents.

In her “Request for Rehearing,” she argued forcefully:

The decision by the administrative law judge (ALJ) is contrary to law, and the decision that was handed down to me only belongs in the judicial branch. Regarding what is a common element or a limited common element (see Exhibit C) should only be decided upon by a judge. For the ALJ to definitively interpret actual contracts between two private parties is a due process violation (separation of powers). In doing so the ALJ redistributed interpreted power from the Judiciary to the Executive and this is a congressional encroachment on my rights. According to Arizona’s Constitution Article 3, Separation of Powers—only the judicial branch can make decisions that make decisions that bind private parties as law.

The surprising outcome was that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument entirely. The judge found that the Office of Administrative Hearings was specifically empowered by Arizona statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01(A)) to handle disputes involving “violations of condominium documents.” Creating specialized administrative bodies like this is a common legislative strategy. It provides expert, efficient resolution for specific types of disputes, preventing the judicial courts from being overwhelmed.

Takeaway 2: Your Condo Agreement is a Legally Binding Contract

The ALJ’s authority to reject such a powerful constitutional claim hinged on a foundational question: what exactly are a condo’s governing documents in the eyes of the law? The answer is what gives administrative bodies their power in these disputes.

The decision affirms that these documents are not just community guidelines, but a formal, legally binding contract between the unit owner and the association. To support this, the judge referenced the legal precedent set in Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, which established that “the condominium documents are a contract between the parties.”

This is a critical takeaway because by defining these governing documents as a contract, it provides the legal foundation for an administrative body, like the Office of Administrative Hearings, to step in and resolve disputes using principles of contract law.

Takeaway 3: An Agency’s Power Can Be “Reasonably Implied”

Another surprising lesson from the decision is that a government agency’s authority doesn’t always have to be spelled out word-for-word for every possible action it might take.

To make a broader point about administrative law, the judge cited a separate case, Ariz. Cannabis Nurses Ass’n v. Ariz. Dep’t of Health Servs. The principle from that case is that an agency can take actions that “may be reasonably implied from ‘a consideration of the statutory scheme as a whole.’”

This concept is crucial for government to function. Legislatures cannot possibly foresee and explicitly write laws for every conceivable scenario an agency might face. This doctrine of “implied power” allows agencies the flexibility to adapt and act effectively within the spirit of the law, fulfilling their duties based on the overall purpose of the statutes they enforce.

Takeaway 4: Winning a Rehearing Isn’t Winning the War

The case’s procedure offers a fascinating lesson in legal strategy. The Department of Real Estate initially granted the petitioner’s request for a rehearing, a decision made, crucially, “for the reasons outlined in Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing.” This shows the Department initially found her legal argument about separation of powers compelling enough to warrant a second look.

However, the outcome was deeply ironic. Instead of re-arguing the facts, the respondent (the Condo Association) “filed a Motion to Vacate Rehearing, arguing that… this matter can be resolved as a matter of law” (meaning no facts were in dispute, only the interpretation of the statutes and contracts).

The ALJ agreed. The petitioner, by winning the rehearing, had inadvertently given the respondent a perfect platform to argue the case on purely legal grounds—the respondent’s strength. The rehearing forced the core jurisdictional issue to the forefront, leading directly to the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. It’s a stark reminder that a procedural victory doesn’t guarantee a final win.

Conclusion: The Law in Your Daily Life

Born from a dispute over a parking lot, this single case reveals the hidden legal machinery designed to resolve specific conflicts efficiently, without overburdening the traditional court system. It demonstrates how everyday disagreements can touch upon complex principles of constitutional power, contract law, and implied statutory authority. From a simple assessment, we see a system where administrative bodies act with court-like power, a power built upon the contractual nature of community rules and the flexibility of implied authority. It’s a powerful reminder of the intricate legal frameworks operating just beneath the surface of our daily lives.

What hidden legal complexities might be shaping the rules and agreements in your own life?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Dina R. Galassini (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Jim Flood (board member)
  • Roger Isaacs (witness)
  • Gary Pedersen (witness, statutory agent)

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)

Other Participants

  • Peter Saiia (observer)
  • Suzanne Isaacs (observer)
  • Paul Blessing (observer)
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716018-REL, 17F-H1716022-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-07-07
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas Satterlee Counsel
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association Counsel James Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitions were dismissed with prejudice because the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), thereby denying the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the statutory definition of a 'planned community'.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction regarding definition of Planned Community

The Respondent moved to vacate claiming the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Association was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The Respondent did not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant. The ALJ agreed that OAH lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: The Petitions in these consolidated matters are recommended to be dismissed with prejudice. This recommendation was adopted as a Final Order by the Commissioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, planned community definition, A.R.S. 33-1802(4), dismissal with prejudice
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 622756.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:50 (85.6 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 574052.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:01:58 (91.5 KB)

17F-H1716018-REL Decision – 575056.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:02:06 (566.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee versus the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association (POA). The central issue was a successful jurisdictional challenge by the Respondent POA, leading to the dismissal of petitions filed by Mr. Satterlee.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner concluded that they lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Respondent POA does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4). This definition requires an association to own and operate real estate or hold an easement or covenant to maintain roadways. Both parties agreed that the Respondent POA did not meet these criteria.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that jurisdiction should be inferred from a prior case and from the Respondent’s own community documents—were rejected. The ALJ’s decision emphasized the legal principle that subject matter jurisdiction is dictated by statute, cannot be waived by parties, and cannot be conferred by estoppel or prior administrative oversight. The petitions were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, with the Petitioner retaining the right to pursue action in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Overview

This matter involves consolidated petitions brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Parties and Legal Representation

Representation

Petitioner

Thomas Satterlee

Represented himself

Respondent

Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Represented by James Robles, Esq.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

Final Authority

Commissioner Judy Lowe

Department of Real Estate

Note: The Petitioner argued that Mr. Robles was not authorized to represent the Respondent. The ALJ determined that the filing of a Notice of Appearance was sufficient for the proceeding and that concerns over the propriety of the representation could be addressed in another forum.

Case Identification

Identifier

Details

Consolidated OAH Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Docket Numbers

17F-H1716022-REL & 17F-H1716018-REL

Consolidated Dept. of Real Estate Case Numbers

HO 17-16/022 & HO 17-16/018

Key Dates

March 15, 2017: Respondent files a motion to vacate, challenging subject matter jurisdiction.

June 27, 2017: Oral argument held on the jurisdictional motion.

July 6, 2017: ALJ Suzanne Marwil issues a decision recommending dismissal.

July 7, 2017: Commissioner Judy Lowe issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision.

Jurisdictional Challenge and Arguments

The case pivoted from a substantive hearing to a dispositive oral argument focused exclusively on the OAH’s authority to hear the dispute.

Respondent’s Motion to Vacate

On March 15, 2017, the Respondent moved to vacate the proceedings, asserting that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The core of this argument was that the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA did not qualify as a “planned community” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). The statute requires such a community’s association to either own and operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

During the oral argument on June 27, 2017, a critical fact was established: both the Petitioner and the Respondent agreed that the association did not currently own or operate real estate or possess a roadway easement or covenant.

Petitioner’s Arguments for Jurisdiction

Despite agreeing with the central fact, the Petitioner urged the OAH to exercise jurisdiction based on two main arguments:

1. Prior Precedent: A former Administrative Law Judge, Douglas, had previously exercised jurisdiction over a petition filed by Mr. Satterlee against the same Respondent in docket number 15F-H1515008-BFS.

2. Community Documents: The Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the laws governing planned communities, which, the Petitioner argued, should confer jurisdiction upon the OAH.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

ALJ Suzanne Marwil’s decision methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s arguments and affirmed that jurisdiction was statutorily barred.

Statutory Interpretation of “Planned Community”

The decision centered on the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

The Definition: The statute defines a “planned community” as a development where an association of owners owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing or improving the property.

Statutory History: The statute was amended in 2014. The ALJ noted that prior to the amendment, the definition only required ownership of real estate. However, the Respondent association failed to meet the definition under either the pre- or post-2014 versions of the law.

Rejection of Flexible Interpretation: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s invitation to use the statute’s introductory phrase, “unless the context otherwise requires,” to expand the definition. Citing the appellate case Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, the decision states that this phrase does not permit a court or agency to “disregard the language of a statute or the legislative intent embodied by that language.” Interpreting the statute to require ownership and operation of real property is “neither mechanical nor rigid” but simply an application of its plain meaning.

Rejection of Estoppel and Prior Case Jurisdiction

The ALJ addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the prior case and the non-waivable nature of subject matter jurisdiction.

Analysis of Prior Decision: Upon reviewing the earlier decision by Judge Douglas (15F-1515008-BFS), ALJ Marwil found that while it contained “standard boilerplate language regarding jurisdiction,” the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by any party and, therefore, was not considered by the judge.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Waived: The decision strongly affirms a core legal doctrine: a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fatal flaw that cannot be waived by the parties or overlooked. The ALJ states, “Administrative decisions that reach beyond an agency’s statutory power are void.”

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred by Estoppel: Citing legal precedent (Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer), the decision clarifies that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court or agency by the estoppel of a party. The fact that the Respondent may have previously submitted to OAH jurisdiction does not grant the OAH authority where none exists by statute. As stated in the decision, “the statutes, not the parties, lay out the boundaries of administrative jurisdiction.”

Final Disposition and Order

Based on the finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction, the following actions were taken:

Recommendation: That the consolidated petitions be dismissed with prejudice.

Petitioner’s Recourse: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner “remains free, however, to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by Respondent’s community documents.”

Effective Date: The order would become effective 40 days after certification by the Director of the OAH.

Adoption of Decision: Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.08, Commissioner Judy Lowe adopted the ALJ’s decision in full.

Final Action: The Commissioner accepted the recommendation and ordered that the petitions be dismissed with prejudice. This order constituted a final administrative action and was effective immediately.

Further Action: The Final Order specified that it was binding unless a party requested a rehearing within 30 days. It also informed the parties of their right to appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review, noting that the order would not be stayed unless a stay was granted by the reviewing court.

Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative legal case involving Thomas Satterlee and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. It covers the core legal issues, arguments, and final rulings as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision and the Final Order from the Department of Real Estate.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central legal question that Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil had to decide?

3. On what grounds did the Respondent, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, argue that the case should be dismissed?

4. According to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1802(4), what specific criteria must an entity meet to be legally defined as a “planned community”?

5. What two key arguments did the Petitioner, Thomas Satterlee, present to persuade the Office of Administrative Hearings to accept jurisdiction over his case?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge address the Petitioner’s point about a previous case presided over by Judge Douglas?

7. Explain the legal principle that “subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived” and how it was applied in this decision.

8. What was the final recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge, and what does the term “with prejudice” signify in this context?

9. What final action was taken by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate regarding the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

10. Although the petitions were dismissed, what alternative path was the Petitioner advised he could still pursue?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas Satterlee, who served as the Petitioner, and the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who brought the case, and the Respondent is the party against whom the case was filed.

2. The central legal question was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) had subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions. The case hinged on determining if the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant the OAH authority to hear the dispute.

3. The Respondent argued for dismissal by filing a motion to vacate, alleging that the OAH lacked subject matter jurisdiction. They contended they were not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because the association did not own or operate real estate or hold a roadway easement or covenant.

4. To be defined as a “planned community,” an entity must be a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by, or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways by, a nonprofit corporation or association of owners. The owners of separate lots are mandatory members required to pay assessments to the association for these purposes.

5. The Petitioner argued that the OAH should exercise jurisdiction because a former Administrative Law Judge (Douglas) had previously done so in a different case involving the same parties. He also argued that the Respondent’s own community documents contemplate being bound by the law governing planned communities.

6. The Administrative Law Judge reviewed the prior decision by Judge Douglas and found that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction had not been raised or considered in that case. Therefore, Judge Douglas’s prior action did not set a binding precedent on the jurisdictional question.

7. This principle means that a court’s or agency’s fundamental authority to hear a type of case is determined by statute and cannot be created by the agreement, consent, or failure to object (estoppel) of the parties involved. In this case, even if the parties had previously acted as if the OAH had jurisdiction, the judge was required to dismiss the case because the statutory requirements for jurisdiction were not met.

8. The Administrative Law Judge recommended that the petitions be dismissed “with prejudice.” This means the dismissal is final and the Petitioner is barred from filing the same claim again within the same administrative forum (the OAH).

9. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision in full. The Commissioner issued a Final Order on July 7, 2017, formally dismissing the petitions with prejudice.

10. The Petitioner was advised that he remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction. This means he could pursue his claims against the Respondent in the appropriate state court system as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the provided source material.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Marwil to reject the Petitioner’s arguments. Discuss the specific statutes and case law she cited (e.g., Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas) and explain how they supported her conclusion that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

2. Discuss the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802. How did the pre-2014 and post-2014 definitions of a “planned community” differ, and why was the Respondent found not to qualify under either definition?

3. Explore the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction as presented in the case documents. Explain why it is a critical issue that cannot be waived by the parties or established by estoppel, citing the legal authorities mentioned in the decision (Ariz. Bd. of Regents and Swichtenberg).

4. Evaluate the Petitioner’s arguments for jurisdiction. Why might he have believed that the previous ruling by Judge Douglas and the language in the community’s documents were sufficient grounds for the OAH to hear his case, and why were these arguments ultimately unpersuasive from a legal standpoint?

5. Trace the procedural history of the case from the filing of the Respondent’s motion to the Final Order by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Describe each key step and the role played by the Petitioner, the Respondent, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and often issues a recommended decision to an agency head. In this case, Suzanne Marwil.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which is the complete body of laws enacted by the Arizona State Legislature.

Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate

The head of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, who has the authority to adopt, reject, or modify the recommended decisions of an ALJ. In this case, Judy Lowe.

Consolidated Matters

Two or more separate legal cases (in this instance, No. 17F-H1716022-REL and No. 17F-H1716018-REL) that are combined into a single proceeding for efficiency.

Estoppel

A legal principle that prevents a party from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what they have previously stated or agreed to by their own actions. The decision notes jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel.

Motion to Vacate

A formal request made to a court or administrative body to cancel or set aside a prior judgment, order, or hearing.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The Arizona state agency responsible for conducting impartial administrative hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a formal complaint or petition, bringing a case before a court or administrative body. In this case, Thomas Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development where an association owns and operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways, and where property owners are mandatory, assessment-paying members.

Recommended Order

The proposed decision issued by an Administrative Law Judge following a hearing or argument. This order is not final until it is adopted by the relevant agency director or commissioner.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The legal authority of a court or administrative agency to hear and decide a particular type of case. Its absence is a fatal flaw that cannot be overlooked or waived.

With Prejudice

A legal term for the dismissal of a case, indicating that the action is final and the petitioner is barred from bringing the same case on the same grounds before that same body again.

⚖️

17F-H1716018-REL

2 sources

These sources document the administrative legal proceedings in the case of Thomas Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association. The initial source contains the Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, which recommends the dismissal of Satterlee’s petitions due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This lack of jurisdiction is based on the finding that the Property Owners Association does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community” because it does not own or operate real estate or have a roadway easement or covenant, which are requirements under Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802. The second source, a Final Order from the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally adopts the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, accepting the recommendation that the consolidated matters be dismissed with prejudice. Both documents confirm that Satterlee’s only recourse is to pursue his claims in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas Satterlee (petitioner)
    Represented himself

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Handled mailing of the Final Order and addressed requests for rehearing
  • Douglas (former ALJ)
    Former ALJ who exercised jurisdiction in a prior related case (15F-H1515008-BFS)

Kurt Gronlund vs. Cottonfields Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716024-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-05-11
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, recommending dismissal of the petition due to the Department's lack of statutory jurisdiction over the dispute, which involved a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the rights of a third-party Golf Course Owner.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Kurt Gronlund Counsel
Respondent Cottonfields Community Association Counsel Troy B. Stratman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Commissioner accepted the ALJ decision granting the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, recommending dismissal of the petition due to the Department's lack of statutory jurisdiction over the dispute, which involved a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the rights of a third-party Golf Course Owner.

Why this result: The Department lacked jurisdiction to resolve the dispute because the REMA was not considered a 'community document' under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) and the requested relief implicated the rights of a non-party (the Golf Course Owner) over whom the Department has no jurisdiction.

Key Issues & Findings

Jurisdiction over REMA Amendment Dispute

Petitioner sought a finding that REMA Amendments 2 and 3 were void because the HOA board unilaterally amended the REMA without the required member vote (two-thirds majority) as specified in the CC&Rs and REMA, and sought an order for the removal of the amendments from the record.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge recommended granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the Complaint.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(2)
  • CC&Rs 14.2
  • REMA Article 12

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, summary judgment, golf course, REMA, third party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1802(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • CC&Rs 14.2
  • REMA 5.1
  • REMA Article 12

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 563660.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-29T10:12:19 (99.8 KB)

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 568840.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-29T10:12:24 (854.5 KB)

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 563660.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:21 (99.8 KB)

17F-H1716024-REL Decision – 568840.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:19:24 (854.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Gronlund vs. Cottonfields Community Association (Case No. 17F-H1716024-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and decision in the case of Kurt Gronlund versus the Cottonfields Community Association, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute centers on the petitioner’s allegation that the Homeowners Association (HOA) board improperly amended a critical land-use agreement in 2011 without a required vote of the membership, ultimately enabling the commercial rezoning of an adjacent golf course.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted the HOA’s motion for summary judgment, and the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted this decision, dismissing the petition. The dismissal was not based on the merits of the petitioner’s claim but on a crucial lack of jurisdiction. The ALJ determined that the Department of Real Estate could not rule on the matter for two primary reasons:

1. The governing agreement in question (the REMA) is not a “community document” as defined by the relevant Arizona statute, placing it outside the Department’s purview.

2. The relief sought by the petitioner would directly implicate the property rights of a third party (the Golf Course Owner) and a prior legal settlement, which exceeds the Department’s statutory authority.

While acknowledging the petitioner’s concerns about the golf course development may be “well-founded,” the decision concluded that the petitioner’s available remedies lie in electing a new HOA board, filing a lawsuit in a judicial forum, or seeking legislative change.

Case Overview

This case involves a dispute between a homeowner and his HOA regarding the amendment of a land-use agreement governing a golf course property.

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

Kurt Gronlund

A homeowner within the Cottonfields community and a member of the Respondent association.

Respondent

Cottonfields Community Association

The Homeowners Association (HOA) for the Cottonfields development.

Third Party

The Golf Course Owner

A separate legal entity that owns the golf course property adjacent to the community.

Case Chronology

December 11, 2001: The developer records both the Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) and the community’s CC&Rs.

March 2011: The Cottonfields HOA board votes 3-2 to amend the REMA.

March 3 & May 16, 2011: Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA, which alter the legal description of the golf course property, are officially recorded.

2014: Litigation (Case No. CV2014-000639) begins in Maricopa County Superior Court between the HOA and the Golf Course Owner regarding the REMA and its amendments.

July 2015: The HOA and the Golf Course Owner execute a settlement agreement.

August 7, 2015: The superior court lawsuit is dismissed with prejudice.

October 5, 2016: The HOA president represents to the City Council that homeowners favor rezoning the golf course. The Council approves a rezone from “GC” (Golf Course) to Commercial, relying on the 2011 REMA amendments.

February 3, 2017: Kurt Gronlund files a Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

April 27, 2017: The HOA files a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

May 10, 2017: Oral arguments on the motion are held.

May 11, 2017: The Administrative Law Judge issues a decision recommending dismissal.

May 11, 2017: The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision and dismissing the case.

Core Dispute: Unilateral Amendment of the REMA

The petitioner’s case is founded on the claim that the HOA board acted in violation of its own governing documents when it facilitated changes to the REMA without consulting the community’s homeowners.

Petitioner’s Allegations

On February 3, 2017, Kurt Gronlund filed a petition asserting that the HOA board’s actions in 2011 were illegal and directly led to the loss of protection for homeowner property values.

The Unilateral Action: The petition states, “[In] March 2011 the HOA board voted 3-2 to unilaterally amend REMA 5.1’s use restriction on the golf course property without the required vote of the approximately 450 eligible class members…”

The Consequence: These amendments were used as justification for the HOA president to support a commercial rezoning of the golf course property before the City Council on October 5, 2016. The petitioner argues this “stripped away that last layer of protection” for homeowners who believed the golf course could not be developed without their approval.

Homeowner Reliance: During oral arguments, the petitioner testified that members relied on the protections within the CC&Rs and REMA when purchasing their homes, believing development required a two-thirds majority vote.

Petitioner’s Requested Relief

The petitioner respectfully requested that the Administrative Court issue the following orders:

1. Find that REMA Section 5.1 may not be amended without the member vote required by REMA Article 12 and CC&Rs Section 14.2.

2. Find that Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA are void and unenforceable.

3. Order the HOA Board to remove Amendments 2 and 3 from the public record.

Analysis of Governing Document Provisions

The dispute hinges on the interpretation of and interaction between two key legal documents: the REMA and the HOA’s CC&Rs.

Document

Section

Description

Key Language

Section 5.1

Use Restriction: Restricts the golf course property’s use to either a golf course or open space.

“The Golf Course Property shall be used solely and exclusively for Golf Course Use or as open space, and for no other purposes.”

Article 12

Amendment Procedure: Stipulates that changes to Section 5.1 require the same member vote as an amendment to the HOA’s Declaration (CC&Rs).

“…no termination, cancellation, change, modification or amendment of paragraph 5.1… shall be made without the written approval thereof by the number of Members… required to amend the Declaration pursuant to Section 13.2 thereof.”

Section 14.2

Member Vote Requirement: Defines the threshold for amending the CC&Rs.

“…may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than two-thirds (2/3) of all Class A votes then entitled to be cast; and (b) Members holding not less than two thirds (2/3) of all Class B votes…”

Section 14.17

Third-Party Rights: Protects the rights of the Golf Course Owner, stating that provisions benefiting them cannot be amended without their written consent.

“…no provision of this Declaration… which grants to or confers upon the Golf Course Owner or the Golf Course Property any rights… shall be modified, amended or revoked in any way without the express written consent of the Golf Course Owner.”

Jurisdictional Challenge and Legal Rationale for Dismissal

The HOA’s defense focused not on the factual allegations but on the argument that the Department of Real Estate was the improper forum for this dispute. The ALJ ultimately agreed with this position.

Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment

The Cottonfields Community Association argued that the Department could not grant the petitioner’s requested relief because:

1. The REMA is not a “community document” as defined under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)).

2. The Golf Course Owner is a third party over whom the Department lacks jurisdiction.

3. Any ruling would affect the rights of this third party and could impact the 2015 settlement agreement from the superior court case.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The ALJ’s decision was based on a strict interpretation of the Department’s statutory authority.

REMA is Not a “Community Document”: The judge found that although the REMA references the CC&Rs, it does not meet the legal definition of a community document under A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), which defines them as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The Department’s authority under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) is limited to violations of these specific documents.

Implication of Third-Party Rights: The decision states that the petitioner’s request to void the amendments “implicates the Golf Course Owner’s interests in its property and may affect the settlement that the Golf Course Owner entered into with Respondent.” The law does not grant the Department “jurisdiction over disputes that implicate the rights of third parties.”

Petitioner’s Available Remedies: While validating the petitioner’s underlying worries, the judge outlined specific alternative courses of action. The decision states: “Petitioner’s concerns about development of the golf course may be well-founded. However, under applicable statutes, at this time, his available remedies are to elect a board that will better protect members’ interest in maintaining the golf course, to file suit in a judicial forum against Respondent and the Golf Course Owner, or to ask the legislature to amend A.R.S. §§ 33-1802(2) and 32-2199.01(A).”

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the legal conclusions regarding jurisdiction, the case was dismissed.

ALJ Recommendation: On May 11, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky recommended that the complaint be dismissed.

Commissioner’s Final Order: On May 11, 2017, Judy Lowe, Commissioner for the Arizona Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order stating: “The Commissioner accepts the ALJ decision that the petition in this matter be dismissed.”

Further Action: The Final Order noted that a party may file for a rehearing or review within thirty days, or may appeal the final administrative decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide: Gronlund v. Cottonfields Community Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Kurt Gronlund v. Cottonfields Community Association (No. 17F-H1716024-REL), focusing on the key legal arguments, governing documents, and the court’s final decision regarding jurisdiction.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided legal documents.

1. Who are the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What central allegation did the Petitioner make regarding the HOA board’s actions in March 2011?

3. What specific relief did the Petitioner request from the Administrative Court in his petition?

4. Identify the two key legal documents at the heart of the dispute and briefly explain their respective roles.

5. According to REMA Article 12 and CC&Rs Section 14.2, what was the required procedure to amend the use restriction on the golf course property?

6. On what primary grounds did the Respondent, Cottonfields Community Association, file a motion for summary judgment?

7. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s key legal conclusion regarding the status of the Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA)?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked the jurisdiction to grant the Petitioner’s requested relief?

9. What alternative remedies did the Administrative Law Judge suggest were available to the Petitioner?

10. What was the final outcome of the case as determined by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is Kurt Gronlund, a homeowner and member of the Cottonfields Community Association. The Respondent is the Cottonfields Community Association, which is the Homeowners Association (HOA) for the residential development where the Petitioner owns a home.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the HOA board voted 3-2 to unilaterally amend REMA Section 5.1’s use restriction on the golf course property. This action was allegedly taken without the required vote of the approximately 450 eligible class members, which constituted a violation of the governing documents.

3. The Petitioner requested that the court find Amendments 2 and 3 to the REMA to be void and unenforceable, order the HOA Board to remove these amendments from the public record, and issue a finding that REMA 5.1 may not be amended without the member vote required by the CC&Rs.

4. The key documents are the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA). The CC&Rs are the primary governing documents for the HOA, while the REMA is a separate agreement between the developer/HOA and the Golf Course Owner specifically governing the use of the golf course property.

5. REMA Article 12 required that any amendment to Section 5.1 (the use restriction) receive written approval from the number of Members specified in the CC&Rs. CC&Rs Section 14.2 stipulates this requires an affirmative vote or written consent of members holding at least two-thirds (2/3) of all Class A and Class B votes.

6. The Respondent argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to rule on the matter. This argument was based on two points: the REMA was not a “community document” as defined by Arizona statute, and the dispute involved the rights of the Golf Course Owner, a third party over whom the Department had no authority.

7. The Judge concluded that although the REMA references the CC&Rs, it is not a “community document” as defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2). This determination was central to the case, as the Department’s jurisdiction is limited to disputes concerning community documents.

8. The Department’s jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) does not extend to disputes that implicate the rights of third parties. Because the Petitioner’s request would affect the property interests of the Golf Course Owner and a 2015 legal settlement, the Department was not statutorily authorized to resolve the issue.

9. The Judge suggested three potential remedies: elect a new HOA board that will better protect members’ interests, file a lawsuit in a judicial forum against both the HOA and the Golf Course Owner, or ask the state legislature to amend the relevant statutes governing HOAs and community documents.

10. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s recommendation in a Final Order dated May 11, 2017. The Commissioner accepted the decision that the Department lacked jurisdiction and ordered that the Petitioner’s complaint be dismissed.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “community document” and the REMA as presented in this case. Why was this distinction the pivotal point in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to recommend dismissal for lack of jurisdiction?

2. Discuss the procedural history of the dispute over the golf course property, beginning with the REMA amendments in 2011 and including the 2014 litigation, the 2015 settlement, and the 2016 rezoning. How did these prior events impact the arguments and outcome of Gronlund’s 2017 petition?

3. Explain the conflict between the powers granted to the HOA Board and Golf Course Owner in REMA Article 12 and the protections afforded to homeowners in the same article’s reference to CC&Rs Section 14.2. How did the Petitioner and Respondent interpret these clauses differently?

4. Evaluate the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over third parties like the Golf Course Owner. Why would resolving Gronlund’s petition necessarily implicate the rights of this third party?

5. The Judge outlines three potential remedies for the Petitioner: electoral, judicial, and legislative. Describe each of these remedies and discuss the potential challenges and benefits of each path in seeking to protect the golf course from development.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over administrative hearings at a government agency, in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The ALJ in this matter was Diane Mihalsky.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of all the laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Specific statutes, such as A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) and § 33-1802(2), were central to this case.

CC&Rs (Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions)

The primary governing legal documents for a planned community or homeowners’ association that outline the rules and member obligations.

Commissioner

The head of a government department. In this case, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, issued the Final Order.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these include a planned community’s declaration (CC&Rs), bylaws, articles of incorporation, and rules. The REMA was determined not to fall under this definition.

Dismissed with Prejudice

A legal term for a final judgment that prevents the plaintiff from filing another case on the same claim. The 2014 lawsuit between the HOA and the Golf Course Owner was dismissed with prejudice.

Golf Course Owner

A separate legal entity that owned the golf course property and was a primary party to the REMA, but was not a party to this administrative case.

HOA (Homeowners Association) | An organization in a subdivision or planned community that creates and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Cottonfields Community Association. | | Jurisdiction | The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The central legal issue of the case was whether the Arizona Department of Real Estate had jurisdiction over the dispute. | | Motion for Summary Judgment | A request made by a party asking the court to decide a case in their favor without a full trial, arguing that there are no material facts in dispute and that they are entitled to win as a matter of law. | | Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) | An independent Arizona state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies to ensure fair and impartial decisions. | | Petitioner | The party who files a petition or brings an action before a court or administrative body. In this case, Kurt Gronlund. | | REMA (Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement) | A recorded legal agreement between the original developer/HOA and the Golf Course Owner that established mutual rights, easements, and obligations, including the critical use restriction on the golf course property. | | Respondent | The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Cottonfields Community Association. |

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17F-H1716024-REL

2 sources

The provided sources consist of an Administrative Law Judge Decision and a subsequent Final Order from the Arizona Department of Real Estate concerning a dispute between homeowner Kurt Gronlund, the Petitioner, and the Cottonfields Community Association, the Respondent. The administrative law judge recommended granting the Association’s motion for summary judgment because the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter, a recommendation which the Commissioner ultimately accepted. The core of the conflict was Gronlund’s petition challenging the Association’s 2011 amendments to a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA), which governed the use of a golf course adjacent to the community. The decision clarified that the REMA was not classified as a “community document” under the relevant statutes, and furthermore, the requested relief would improperly implicate the rights of the Golf Course Owner, a third party over whom the Department had no authority. The final ruling therefore dismissed the petition, suggesting judicial action or legislative change as alternative remedies for the petitioner.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Kurt Gronlund (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Troy B. Stratman (attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Responsible for processing rehearing requests and listed on ADRE service email list.
  • LDettorre (administrative staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed ([email protected])
  • djones (administrative staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed ([email protected])
  • jmarshall (administrative staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed ([email protected])
  • ncano (administrative staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed ([email protected])