Carlos J Sanchez & Marinda K Minch, vs. Tempe Villages Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-09
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch Counsel
Respondent Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley Moscarello

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article 4 Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.

Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:33:33 (132.3 KB)

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)

This summary addresses the legal case hearing concerning the dispute between Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch (Petitioners) and Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. (Respondent). The hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on March 2, 2021.

Key Facts and Main Issues

Petitioners filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition on or about January 11, 2021, alleging the Respondent violated community Bylaws, specifically Article 4 Section 1.

The central issue was whether the HOA improperly maintained an unfilled seat on its Board of Directors. Petitioners asserted that the HOA violated the Bylaws by leaving a Board seat vacant for a period of time and attempted to prevent Petitioner Marinda Minch from joining the Board.

Respondent's defense focused on the interpretation of Article IV of the Bylaws. The Board's number is set at seven directors. A director resigned in August 2020, leaving six members. The subsequent annual meeting in October 2020 filled two regularly expiring seats via election, in which Petitioners were candidates but were not elected.

The August 2020 vacancy was subject to Article IV, Section 3 of the Bylaws, which states that in the event of resignation, the successor "shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board" to serve the unexpired term.

Hearing Proceedings and Arguments

Petitioners' Argument: Petitioner Marinda Minch testified that the Board delayed filling the vacancy (until November 2020) because of personal dislike for her, and she had petitioned the Board three times for appointment.

Respondent's Argument: Respondent’s President, Bradley Hudson, testified that the Board decided the newly elected Board should fill the vacancy. At the November 11, 2020, virtual meeting, a motion to appoint Ms. Minch failed (2-4 vote), and the Board subsequently appointed another individual (4-2 vote), thereby filling all seven seats. Crucially, the Respondent argued, and the ALJ noted, that the Bylaws do not contain a timeframe within which a vacancy due to resignation must be filled.

Legal Points and Outcome

Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

The ALJ determined that Article IV Sections 1, 2, and 3 must be read collectively. The process used by the Board to fill the August vacancy—selection by the remaining Board members—complied with Article IV, Section 3. Because the Bylaws did not mandate an immediate appointment timeframe, the Respondent was found to have acted within the scope of the community documents.

Final Decision: The Petitioners failed to sustain their burden to establish a violation of the Bylaws. IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carlos J. Sanchez (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Marinda K. Minch (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified

Respondent Side

  • Ashley Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Lawgroup
  • Bradley Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    President of the Board; testified as witness
  • Shawn Nurse (community manager)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as witness; received ballots for election
  • William Skanadore (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Will Terrick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Wendelyn Neal (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
  • Joel Krick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Kathy Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Christiane Pieraggi (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Appointed to fill vacancy

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • John Neelsen (unknown)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Tania Almonte (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
  • Ruby (witness assistant)
    Aided in counting votes

Debra K Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120001-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Debra K. Morin Counsel
Respondent Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Counsel Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The petition was affirmed in part (Complaint #1) and denied in part (Complaint #2). The Respondent HOA was found to have improperly conducted non-privileged business via email/unanimous written consent in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the $500 filing fee and comply with the statute, but no civil penalty was imposed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the alleged violation concerning the improper use of emergency executive sessions (Complaint #2).

Key Issues & Findings

Non-privileged Association Business Conducted in Closed Session

The HOA improperly conducted association business, which should have been open to members, through unanimous written consent solicited via individual emails during the COVID-19 shutdown, violating the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward and to reimburse Petitioner her $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. 33-1804
  • A.R.S. 10-3821

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, HOA Governance, Unanimous Written Consent, COVID-19, Executive Session
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. 33-1804
  • A.R.S. 10-3821
  • A.R.S. 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 864802.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:46 (101.9 KB)

21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 838004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:28:50 (125.4 KB)

21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 838004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:04 (125.4 KB)

Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Morin vs. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative law case involving a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (HOA). The central issue was whether the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by conducting association business and making decisions without open meetings accessible to its members.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner on her primary complaint. The investigation and subsequent hearings revealed that the HOA Board, citing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, utilized a process of “unanimous written consent” to approve numerous actions. This process, facilitated through individual emails to board members, was found to be an improper substitute for the open meetings required by law. The ALJ concluded that the specific transparency requirements for homeowners’ associations in A.R.S. § 33-1804 supersede the more general provisions for non-profit corporations in A.R.S. § 10-3821, which the HOA had cited as justification.

While the violation was established, no civil penalty was assessed due to the “unprecedented global pandemic.” The HOA was ordered to comply with the open meeting law moving forward and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500 filing fee. A second complaint from the petitioner, alleging the improper use of emergency executive sessions, was not proven and was therefore denied. A rehearing clarified the precise method of the violation—email voting rather than conference calls—but did not alter the final judgment.

Case Background and Allegations

This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed on July 10, 2020. The case centered on the actions of the Solera Chandler HOA’s Board of Directors between March and August 2020.

Petitioner: Debra K. Morin

Respondent: Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Case Number: 21F-H2120001-REL

Key Dates:

◦ Initial Hearing: October 29, 2020

◦ Initial Decision: November 18, 2020

◦ Rehearing: February 25, 2021

◦ Final Decision After Rehearing: March 17, 2021

Petitioner’s Formal Complaints

After being ordered to clarify her initial filing, the petitioner proceeded with two specific alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1804:

1. Complaint #1: Non-Privileged Business in Closed Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted non-privileged association business in closed sessions by using unanimous written consent. This practice circumvented statutory requirements for providing members with agendas, giving 48-hour notice, and allowing them an opportunity to speak on key issues before the Board took action.

2. Complaint #2: Improper Emergency Executive Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted privileged business under the guise of “emergency executive sessions.” This was done without properly identifying the legal exception to the open meeting law, providing an agenda or 48-hour notice, or submitting minutes at the next board meeting that stated the reason for the emergency.

Key Evidence and Factual Findings

The evidence presented centered on the HOA’s governance practices during the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Respondent’s Justification

The HOA’s defense rested on two main arguments:

• The COVID-19 pandemic made it impossible for the Board to meet in person, necessitating alternative methods to conduct business while protecting the health of directors and members.

• The use of unanimous written consents was authorized under A.R.S. § 10-3821, a statute that permits non-profit corporations to take action without a formal meeting if all directors consent in writing. The HOA acknowledged it had not used this method before the pandemic and did not intend to continue its use.

Unanimous Written Consents

At an open Board of Directors meeting on August 5, 2020, the Board formally ratified a series of actions taken via unanimous written consent during the “Covid 19 Shutdown.” A rehearing clarified the precise mechanism: a community management company would email each board member individually to solicit a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all votes were “yes,” the Board President would sign the written consent on behalf of the Board.

The actions taken through this process included:

Action Taken by Unanimous Written Consent

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.

March 30, 2020

Approve repair and replacement of cool decking surrounding both pools.

April 30, 2020

Approve Kirk Sandquist as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

April 30, 2020

Approve Tom Dusbabek as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.

May 5, 2020

Approve the Gilbert Road retention basin project, related irrigation replacement, and the addition of 420 tons of granite.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of a Carrier 6-ton heat pump.

May 8, 2020

Approve replacement of two Carrier 5-ton heat pumps.

May 27, 2020

Approve hiring Ken Eller to draft architectural drawings.

June 4, 2020

Approve a change to the Design Guidelines at the request of the Architectural Review Committee.

July 1, 2020

Approve the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.

Executive Sessions

The Board held numerous executive (closed) sessions during this period, including on March 13, March 16, March 19, March 24, April 6, April 10, May 4, May 15, May 27, June 24, and August 5, 2020. An “emergency executive session” was held on May 12, 2020. The agendas for these meetings cited specific legal exceptions under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) as justification for the closure.

Legal Analysis and Rulings

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the interpretation and primacy of two competing Arizona statutes.

The Core Statutory Conflict

A.R.S. § 33-1804 (HOA Open Meeting Law): This statute establishes a strong state policy that all HOA board and member meetings “be conducted openly.” It mandates that members receive at least 48-hours’ notice, be provided with agendas, and be permitted to “attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The statute explicitly directs that any interpretation of its provisions must be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

A.R.S. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting for Non-Profits): This statute, which applies more broadly to non-profit corporations, allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if the action is approved by one or more written consents signed by all directors.

Ruling on Complaint #1 (Violation Established)

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the open meeting law. The core of the ruling is that the specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 for homeowners’ associations must be followed, even if A.R.S. § 10-3821 provides a different mechanism for general non-profits.

The final decision states: “Respondent improperly conducted association business in closed sessions via email rather than in meetings open to the members.” The use of email voting to achieve unanimous consent was deemed a violation because it denied members the notice, agenda, and opportunity to speak that are guaranteed by the HOA open meeting law.

However, the ALJ gave “consideration to the fact that Respondent was faced with an unprecedented global pandemic” and found that “no civil penalty is appropriate given the circumstances.”

Ruling on Complaint #2 (Violation Not Established)

The ALJ found that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board conducted improper emergency executive sessions. The decision notes that there was “nothing in the record” to suggest the Board discussed topics outside the legally permitted exceptions for closed sessions, nor was there evidence to suggest the May 12, 2020, meeting was not a genuine emergency.

Final Order and Disposition

The final judgment, issued after the rehearing, is binding on both parties.

Outcome: The petitioner’s petition was affirmed in part (regarding Complaint #1) and denied in part (regarding Complaint #2).

Directives to Respondent (HOA):

1. The HOA is ordered to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

2. The HOA is directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

Appeal: Any appeal of the final order must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within 35 days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent), as detailed in Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 21F-H2120001-REL and No. 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and outcomes.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based only on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the central accusation in the Petitioner’s first complaint against the Respondent?

3. What two primary justifications did the Respondent provide for its actions during the COVID-19 pandemic?

4. According to the findings of the rehearing, what specific procedure did the Respondent use to obtain “unanimous written consents”?

5. Identify the two main Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that were central to the legal dispute and briefly describe the function of each.

6. What was the final ruling on Complaint #1, and what was the judge’s reasoning?

7. Why did the Petitioner fail to prove the allegations in Complaint #2?

8. What specific factual error in the first Administrative Law Judge Decision prompted the Respondent to request a rehearing?

9. What two orders were issued against the Respondent in the final decision?

10. What specific circumstance did the Administrative Law Judge cite as a reason for not imposing a civil penalty on the Respondent?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Debra K. Morin, the Petitioner and homeowner, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Respondent violated state law, while the Respondent defended its actions before an Administrative Law Judge.

2. The Petitioner’s first complaint accused the Solera Homeowners’ Association Board of Directors of conducting non-privileged association business in closed sessions. Specifically, she alleged they used unanimous written consent to take action without providing agendas, giving 48-hour notice, or allowing members an opportunity to speak on key issues.

3. The Respondent argued that the COVID-19 pandemic prevented the Board of Directors from meeting in person to protect the health of members and directors. The Respondent also asserted that its use of unanimous written consents was legally authorized for non-profit corporations under A.R.S. § 10-3821.

4. The rehearing established that an individual from the community management company would email each Board member individually to request a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all members replied “yes,” the item was considered passed by unanimous consent, and the Board President would sign the formal consent document.

5. The central statutes were A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821. A.R.S. § 33-1804 is the state’s open meeting law for homeowners’ associations, requiring meetings to be open to members with proper notice, while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent.

6. The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner on Complaint #1, affirming the violation. The judge reasoned that while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows for action without a meeting, the more specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 mandate that all HOA board meetings be open to members, a requirement the Respondent violated by conducting business via email.

7. The Petitioner failed to prove Complaint #2 because she did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent’s executive sessions were improper. The judge found nothing in the record to suggest the Board discussed issues outside the legal exceptions listed in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) or that the May 12, 2020, session was not a genuine emergency.

8. The Respondent requested a rehearing to correct a finding in Conclusion of Law 8 of the initial decision, which incorrectly stated that the association business at issue was conducted in closed sessions via “conference calls.” The Respondent acknowledged using conference calls for executive sessions but denied using them for the actions taken by unanimous written consent.

9. The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed. Additionally, the Respondent was directed to comply with all requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 in the future.

10. The Administrative Law Judge gave consideration to the fact that the Respondent was “faced with an unprecedented global pandemic while balancing the need to comply with the applicable statutes and conduct association business.” Because of these unique circumstances, the judge found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

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Suggested Essay Questions

1. Discuss the conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821 as it relates to the actions of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this imply about the hierarchy of state laws governing specific entities versus general corporations?

2. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that the COVID-19 pandemic justified their actions. To what extent did the Administrative Law Judge accept this argument, and how did it influence the final order?

3. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and detail how it was applied to both Complaint #1 and Complaint #2. Why did the Petitioner meet this burden for the first complaint but not the second?

4. Trace the evolution of the case from the initial hearing to the rehearing. What specific finding of fact was corrected, and why was this correction significant for the legal record, even though it did not change the ultimate outcome for either complaint?

5. Based on the text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), discuss the stated policy of the state of Arizona regarding homeowner association meetings. How did the Respondent’s actions, specifically the use of email for unanimous consents, contravene this policy?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 10-3821

An Arizona Revised Statute that allows the board of directors of a non-profit corporation to take action without a formal meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and evidenced by one or more written consents.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

An Arizona Revised Statute, also known as the open meeting law for planned communities, which mandates that all meetings of an HOA board of directors must be open to all members. It requires 48-hour notice and allows for closed “executive sessions” only for specific, limited purposes.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims.

Executive Session

A portion of a meeting that is closed to association members. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), executive sessions are only permitted for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, discussing pending litigation, or addressing confidential personal or financial information.

Open Meeting

A meeting of an HOA’s board of directors that, according to A.R.S. § 33-1804, must be open to all members of the association, who must be permitted to attend and speak.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Debra K. Morin.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than opposing evidence, showing that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to re-examine specific issues or correct errors from an initial decision. A rehearing was granted in this case to clarify how the unanimous written consents were executed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge noted that the primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the statute’s plain language.

Unanimous Written Consent

A procedure, authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821, where a board takes action without a meeting through written consents signed by all directors. The HOA used this method via individual emails to approve business, which was found to be a violation of HOA open meeting laws.

She Sued Her HOA Over Secret Pandemic Votes—And Won. Here’s What Every Homeowner Needs to Know.

Introduction: The Closed Doors of Your HOA

For many homeowners, it can feel like their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) board makes its most important decisions behind closed doors. You see the results—a new rule, a major repair project, a change in vendors—but the discussion and the vote happen out of sight. While the COVID-19 pandemic forced many organizations to find new ways to operate, for one Arizona HOA, their adaptation to remote work crossed a legal line, sparking a legal challenge from a resident.

The central conflict was straightforward: a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, filed a petition against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. She alleged they were making official decisions in secret through email, violating state law that guarantees homeowners the right to open meetings. While not all of her claims were affirmed, her primary complaint—that the board was conducting business in secret—led to a landmark decision for homeowner rights. The outcome of her case reveals several surprising and crucial lessons for every person living in an HOA community.

Takeaway 1: An HOA’s Open Meeting Law Trumps General Non-Profit Rules

1. Even a Pandemic Doesn’t Suspend a Homeowner’s Right to an Open Meeting

The Solera Chandler HOA board believed it was acting within the law. They argued that because they were a non-profit corporation, they could make decisions using “unanimous written consents” without a formal meeting. This practice is allowed for many non-profits under a general Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 10-3821). During the pandemic, this seemed like a practical way to conduct business without meeting in person.

However, the Administrative Law Judge ruled against the HOA. The judge’s key finding was that a more specific law takes precedence. The statute governing planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804, explicitly requires that all meetings of the board must be open to all members of the association. This is a critical legal lesson: when a specific law exists to govern a specific entity (like the Open Meeting Law for HOAs), it almost always overrides a more general law (like the one for all non-profits).

While the judge acknowledged the challenges of the “unprecedented global pandemic,” this did not excuse the violation, though it was cited as a reason not to issue a civil penalty.

Takeaway 2: “Meeting” by Email Is Still a Secret Meeting

2. A String of Individual Emails Can Constitute an Illegal Meeting

In the initial ruling, the judge found the board conducted business improperly, believing it was done via conference calls. Seizing on this factual error, the HOA challenged the decision and requested a rehearing, arguing their method was different and therefore permissible. In the rehearing, they clarified their actual process: the community management company would email each board member individually to request a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. The HOA argued that because there was no simultaneous group discussion, this process wasn’t technically a “meeting.”

The challenge backfired. The judge’s final decision made it clear that this distinction didn’t matter. Whether by conference call or a series of individual emails, the result was the same: an illegal secret meeting. The method effectively prevented homeowners from observing the board’s process and speaking on agenda items before a vote was taken, as required by law. The HOA won their technical correction but lost the war, as the judge affirmed that the principle of transparency is more important than the specific technology used to circumvent it.

These weren’t minor housekeeping issues. The board was making substantial financial and operational decisions entirely out of public view, including:

• Repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.

• Repair and replacement of the cool decking around both pools.

• Appointing new members to the Architectural Review Committee.

• Approving a retention basin project and the purchase of 420 tons of granite.

• Approving the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.

Takeaway 3: The Law Is Built to Favor Transparency

3. The Law Itself Has a Built-in Bias for Openness

The judge’s decision wasn’t just a narrow interpretation; it was guided by a powerful policy statement built directly into the Arizona statute for planned communities. The law itself tells judges, board members, and community managers exactly how it should be interpreted.

The text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) leaves no room for doubt:

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly and that notices and agendas be provided for those meetings that contain the information that is reasonably necessary to inform the members of the matters to be discussed or decided and to ensure that members have the ability to speak after discussion of agenda items, but before a vote of the board of directors or members is taken. Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions…shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

This is a critical point. The law explicitly directs anyone interpreting it—including an HOA board—to resolve any ambiguity in favor of transparency and homeowner access. The default position is openness.

Takeaway 4: A Single Homeowner Can Force a Change

4. One Determined Homeowner Can Win

This case serves as an empowering lesson for homeowners who feel their board is operating in the shadows. Morin’s persistence paid off, proving that a single homeowner can successfully force a board to follow the law.

Her victory was clear and decisive. The court orders resulted in three key outcomes:

• The judge affirmed her petition, officially recognizing that the HOA had violated the law.

• The HOA was formally ordered to comply with the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.

• The HOA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Morin her $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome demonstrates that the system can work. An individual homeowner with a valid complaint can navigate the process and achieve a binding legal victory that forces their HOA board to operate correctly.

Conclusion: Is Your Board Operating in the Open?

The lesson from the Solera Chandler HOA case is simple: transparency in HOA governance is not optional. It is a legal requirement designed to protect the rights of every homeowner to observe and participate in the governance of their community. The convenience of an email vote cannot replace the legal mandate for an open meeting.

Don’t assume your board is operating correctly. Review your meeting minutes. Ask questions about decisions that seem to appear without public discussion. Remember, the law explicitly favors openness, and as Debra Morin proved, it’s an enforceable right.

This case was about secret votes via email, but it highlights a larger principle of transparency. Does your HOA board make it easy for you to know what is being decided and to have your voice heard?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Debra K. Morin (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Also cited as Lydia Linsmeier
  • Joshua M. Bolen (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Gail Ryan (board member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    President of Board, resigned August 5, 2020
  • Kirk Sandquist (ARC member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    Appointment approved April 30, 2020
  • Tom Dusbabek (ARC member)
    Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
    Appointment approved April 30, 2020
  • Ken Eller (contractor)
    Approved to be hired to draft architectural drawings

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Granted Request for Rehearing
  • f. del sol (Admin staff)
    Transmitted decisions

Werner A Reis v. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-07-14
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge issued a Final Order denying the Petitioner's claim on rehearing. The ALJ found that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Article III section 1 when its Board painted pickleball lines on one of the two existing tennis courts, as the action was within the Board's authority to manage Common Areas and did not infringe on members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Werner A Reis Counsel
Respondent Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association Counsel Edward O’Brien, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article III, section 1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued a Final Order denying the Petitioner's claim on rehearing. The ALJ found that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Article III section 1 when its Board painted pickleball lines on one of the two existing tennis courts, as the action was within the Board's authority to manage Common Areas and did not infringe on members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and the undisputed material facts supported the finding that the Association's actions were authorized by the governing documents (CC&Rs Articles II and VI) and did not deny or impede member access or use of the Common Areas.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents CC&Rs Article III, sec. 1.

Petitioner alleged that the Board's decision to paint pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts constituted an infringement or impediment of enjoyment rights for tennis players, thereby violating CC&Rs Article III section 1.

Orders: The ALJ denied the petition (on rehearing), concluding that Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof. The Association was authorized to manage and maintain Common Areas, and members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights were not violated.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, CC&Rs Interpretation, Common Area Use, Easement Rights, Recreational Facilities, Pickleball
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092.05(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1061(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019026-REL-RHG Decision – 792741.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:49 (47.0 KB)

20F-H2019026-REL-RHG Decision – 806920.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:53 (175.9 KB)

20F-H2019026-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019026-REL/770924.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:56 (153.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Reis v. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowner Werner A. Reis (Petitioner) and the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Respondent) concerning the modification of a common area tennis court. The core of the dispute, adjudicated under case numbers 20F-H2019026-REL and 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG, was the Association’s decision in June 2019 to paint pickleball lines on one of its two community tennis courts. The Petitioner alleged this action violated Article III, section 1 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), infringing upon his nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment. The Association contended that its Board of Directors acted within its authority, as granted by the CC&Rs, to manage, maintain, and improve common areas for the benefit of all members.

Following an evidentiary hearing and a subsequent rehearing, Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark ruled decisively in favor of the Association. The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Key findings established that the Board was fully authorized to make the modification without a member vote, that tennis play was not restricted, and that the Petitioner’s easement rights were not violated. The Petitioner’s arguments, based on a potential future conflict rather than an actual experienced impediment, were deemed “unfounded” and “without merit.” The final order, issued on July 14, 2020, denied the petition, affirming the Association’s right to manage the recreational facilities in this manner.

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I. Case Overview

This matter involves a formal complaint by a homeowner against his townhouse association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Detail

Information

Case Numbers

20F-H2019026-REL, 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Werner A. Reis

Respondent

Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark

Core Issue

Whether the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents (CC&Rs Article III, section 1) by adding pickleball lines to one of two community tennis courts.

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II. Procedural History

The dispute progressed through a formal administrative hearing process, including a petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final order.

November 18, 2019: Werner Reis files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 4, 2019: The Association files its ANSWER, denying all complaint items.

January 31, 2020: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Jenna Clark.

February 20, 2020: The ALJ issues a decision denying the Petitioner’s petition, finding he failed to sustain his burden of proof.

March 26, 2020: The Petitioner submits a REQUEST FOR REHEARING to the Department.

April 22, 2020: The Department grants the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

May 20, 2020: During a prehearing conference, both parties stipulate that no factual dispute exists and agree to adopt the prior hearing record and submit written closing arguments in lieu of a new hearing.

June 24, 2020: Deadline for written closing arguments. The Association submits a 17-page argument; the OAH receives no closing argument from the Petitioner.

July 14, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision, again denying the petition and ordering that the initial decision from February be the final order in the matter.

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III. Analysis of the Dispute

The central conflict was the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs regarding the Board’s authority to modify common areas versus a member’s right to their use and enjoyment.

Petitioner’s Position (Werner A. Reis)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise that adding pickleball as a competing use for a tennis court fundamentally diminished the rights of tennis-playing members.

Core Allegation: The Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants every member a “nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment in and to the Common Areas.”

Argument on Infringement: The Petitioner argued the Association created a situation where “Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play,” which he claimed “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment.”

Impediment of Enjoyment: He contended that reducing the number of exclusively available tennis courts from two to one amounts to “an impediment of enjoyment rights.”

Creation of Competition: He accused the Association of “creating a new class of people” (pickleball players) who could access the courts, creating new competition for members on a first-come, first-served basis.

Hypothetical Conflict: The “crux” of his complaint was the possible future conflict between his desire to play two singles matches simultaneously and up to sixteen “outsiders playing a raucous game of pickleball on the other designated tennis court.”

Requested Remedy: The Petitioner requested an order requiring the Association to designate the courts for tennis playing only.

Respondent’s Position (Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association)

The Association defended its decision as a reasonable exercise of the Board’s authority to manage community property for the benefit of all residents.

Board Authority: The Board asserted that its decision was permitted by Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants it the authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” without requiring a member vote. Article VI further requires the Board to maintain and manage recreational facilities.

Benefit to Community: The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests, and was also considered as a potential means to generate revenue.

No Restriction of Use: The Association maintained that tennis play was not restricted. Both courts remained available seven days a week on a first-come, first-served basis, with no changes to the reservation system. One court remained available exclusively for tennis at all times.

Nature of Modification: The modification involved painting lines and using portable nets, which must be detached after play. The permanent tennis nets on both courts remained in place.

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IV. Summary of Evidence and Testimony

Testimony from the Association’s representatives and the Petitioner established the key undisputed facts of the case.

Testimony for the Association (Charles Mitchell & Arland Averell)

Board Authority Confirmed: Charles Mitchell, the Board Director, testified that CC&Rs Articles II and VI, along with the Association’s Articles of Incorporation, authorize the Board to manage and improve common areas, including painting lines on the tennis courts.

Historical Context: Arland Averell, a 20-year Board member, explained that a taped pickleball court had existed in 2015 but was damaged. The Board decided in April 2019 to reestablish it with painted lines in response to requests from several families.

Practical Use: Pickleball is generally played only by a few families, typically on Saturday mornings. When pickleball is being played on the modified court, the other tennis court is always available.

No Denial of Access: Director Mitchell confirmed that the Petitioner had never been denied access to the tennis courts at any time.

Testimony of the Petitioner (Werner A. Reis)

Recent Homeowner: The Petitioner described himself as a “snowbird” who had purchased his townhouse in November 2019, shortly before filing his complaint.

Conflict is Hypothetical: He admitted that he “has not played tennis in ‘years'” and, as a result, “has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.”

No Direct Observation: The Petitioner testified that he had not personally observed contemporaneous tennis and pickleball games being played. His concerns about safety and inconvenience were speculative.

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V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions consistently found the Petitioner’s arguments to be legally and factually unsupported.

Conclusions of Law

Undisputed Facts: The Judge concluded that the material facts were not in dispute. The Association’s governing documents clearly authorize the Board to maintain, manage, and improve the Common Areas, including the recreational facilities.

No Violation of Easement Rights: The ruling stated, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner’s easement rights have not been violated by the Association because the Board painted blue pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts.”

Petitioner’s Arguments Dismissed: The Judge found the Petitioner’s arguments to be “unfounded” and “without merit.” Specifically, the claim that the availability of only one dedicated court was an “impediment of enjoyment rights” was rejected.

Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: In both the initial decision and the final order, the Judge concluded that the “Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of proof” by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs.

Failure to Prosecute Rehearing: The final decision noted that the Petitioner “did not provide OAH with a closing argument in support of his request for rehearing.”

Final Disposition

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.

The decision issued on July 14, 2020, affirmed the initial February 24, 2020, decision and was designated as the FINAL ORDER in the matter, binding on both parties.

Study Guide: Reis vs. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, in his petition filed on November 18, 2019?

2. On what grounds did the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association’s Board of Directors justify its decision to add pickleball lines to a tennis court?

3. According to the testimony of Arland Averell, what prompted the Board to reestablish a pickleball court in April 2019, and what was a prior experience with a pickleball court?

4. Describe the central, or “crux,” of the Petitioner’s complaint as summarized in the hearing evidence.

5. What key admissions did the Petitioner make during his testimony regarding his own tennis activity and his personal experience with the alleged conflict?

6. According to Director Charles Mitchell’s testimony, what is the physical setup of the nets on the courts, and how does this differ between tennis and pickleball?

7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is that standard defined in the legal documents?

8. What was the outcome of the initial evidentiary hearing held on January 31, 2020, and on what basis did the Administrative Law Judge reach this conclusion?

9. Describe the procedural change that occurred for the rehearing after the parties’ prehearing conference on May 20, 2020.

10. What action, or lack thereof, by the Petitioner on June 24, 2020, contributed to the final ruling in the rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The specific violation claimed was the modification of one of the two existing tennis courts for use as a pickleball court.

2. The Association’s Board of Directors justified the decision as an improvement to the Common Areas for the benefit of the Association, which it was permitted to do under Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs. The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests.

3. Arland Averell testified that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish the pickleball court with painted lines after several families requested it, and the Board also saw it as a way to generate additional revenue. A previous pickleball court established in 2015 had lines made of tape which were damaged approximately four months after being applied.

4. The crux of the Petitioner’s complaint was the possible future conflict between his personal desire to play two singles tennis matches on both courts simultaneously and the potential for up to sixteen “outsiders” to be playing a “raucous game of pickleball” on the modified court.

5. The Petitioner admitted that he had not played tennis in “years” and, as a result, had never actually faced the conflict he was complaining about. He also stated he had never been denied access to the courts and had not observed contemporaneous games of tennis and pickleball being played.

6. Director Mitchell testified that both tennis courts have fixed tennis nets. The pickleball court, however, has portable nets which must be attached for use and then detached at the end of play.

7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, representing the greater weight of evidence.

8. Following the January 31, 2020, hearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The judge concluded that the Petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of proof and that the evidence showed his easement rights had not been violated, as one tennis court always remained available.

9. During the prehearing conference, the parties stipulated that no factual dispute existed. They agreed to vacate the scheduled rehearing, adopt the evidentiary record from the first hearing without presenting new evidence, and submit written closing arguments instead.

10. On the deadline of June 24, 2020, the Office of Administrative Hearings received a 17-page closing argument from the Respondent (the Association). The Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, failed to submit a closing argument, which was noted in the final decision denying his petition again.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Formulate your answers by synthesizing information from across the case documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between the rights granted to members under CC&Rs Article III, section 1 (“easement of use and enjoyment”) and the powers granted to the Board under CC&Rs Article II, section 1 (“manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas”). How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent tension in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of the “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain why Werner Reis’s testimony and arguments ultimately failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the procedural history of this case from the initial petition on November 18, 2019, to the final order on July 14, 2020. Identify the key events and decisions at each stage, including the initial hearing, the request for rehearing, and the final disposition.

4. Evaluate the strength of the Petitioner’s case. Focus specifically on the evidence he presented versus the evidence presented by the Association’s witnesses, Charles Mitchell and Arland Averell.

5. The Petitioner argued that the availability of only one tennis court when pickleball is in play constituted an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” Explain the Association’s counter-arguments and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s argument to be “unfounded” and “without merit.”

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding official (Jenna Clark) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who reviews evidence, makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and issues orders and decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for the Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature that regulate planned communities and govern the administrative hearing process.

Association

The Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association, a non-profit Arizona corporation serving as the property owner’s association for the development. In this case, it is the Respondent.

Board of Directors (Board)

The governing body of the Association, empowered by the CC&Rs and Articles of Incorporation to manage, maintain, and improve the Common Areas.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a trial (in this case, the Petitioner) to produce the degree of evidence required to prove their case. The standard required here was “preponderance of the evidence.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, controlling property use within the development. The Restated Declaration was recorded on June 8, 2015.

Common Areas

Property within the development, such as the tennis courts, for the mutual benefit of all owners. The Association’s Board is granted authority to manage and improve these areas.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings regarding disputes in planned communities.

Easement of use and enjoyment

A non-exclusive, perpetual right granted to every member of the Association to use and enjoy the Common Areas, as established in CC&Rs Article III, section 1.

OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)

An independent state agency to which the Department refers cases for evidentiary hearings.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Werner A. Reis, a townhouse owner and member of the Association.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and representing the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association.

Snowbird

A colloquial term used by the Petitioner to describe himself as an out-of-state retiree who resides in Arizona during the winter months.

5 Surprising Lessons from a Bizarre HOA Lawsuit Over a Pickleball Court

Introduction: The Battle for the Tennis Court

Disputes with a homeowner association (HOA) are a common feature of suburban life, often revolving around landscaping, paint colors, or parking. But when you combine the rigid world of HOA rules with the explosive popularity of pickleball, you get a conflict that is uniquely modern. In a real-life legal case from Sedona, Arizona, one homeowner took his HOA to court over the decision to add pickleball lines to one of the community’s two tennis courts.

What might seem like a minor neighborhood squabble became a formal legal challenge, complete with hearings, testimony, and an official judicial decision. The court documents from this case offer a surprisingly revealing look into community rules, personal grievances, and the peculiar nature of legal battles. More importantly, they reveal several counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living in a planned community.

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1. You Can Sue Over a Problem That Doesn’t Exist (But You Probably Won’t Win)

The core of the legal challenge was filed by Werner Reis, a new homeowner in the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association. His complaint was over the modification of one of two community tennis courts to accommodate pickleball. The “crux” of his complaint was a concern over a possible future conflict: a hypothetical scenario where he might want to play two singles tennis matches while a large group of “outsiders” played a “raucous game of pickleball.”

This seems like a specific, if forward-thinking, concern. But the timeline and testimony revealed a truly bizarre situation. According to court records, Reis purchased his townhouse in November 2019 and filed his lawsuit on or about November 18, 2019—meaning he initiated a formal legal action within days or weeks of becoming a member of the community. Even more stunning was this fact from his own testimony:

Petitioner has not played tennis in “years.” As such, Petitioner has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.

The entire legal challenge—filed almost immediately upon moving in—was based on a hypothetical grievance for a sport the petitioner hadn’t even played in years. Unsurprisingly, the Administrative Law Judge found his argument “unfounded.” The lesson is clear: a legal claim based on “what if” is unlikely to succeed without any actual harm.

2. Your HOA’s Governing Documents Are a Legally Binding Contract

Many homeowners view their HOA’s rules as guidelines, but legally, they are a binding contract called Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). When you buy a property, you agree to their terms.

In its defense, the HOA pointed directly to its governing documents. Article VI requires the Board to manage all recreational facilities, and Article II, section 1, gives it the explicit authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” for the “general welfare and benefit of the Owners”—all without a member vote. This clause was the legal bedrock of the Board’s defense; in the eyes of the law, painting lines to accommodate a popular new sport is not a degradation of an amenity, but an improvement of it, squarely within the Board’s mandate.

The tennis courts are legally defined as “Common Areas.” This gave the Board the unambiguous right to paint new lines on them. This is an impactful takeaway for all homeowners: while you may feel a sense of personal ownership over shared amenities, the Board has broad, legally-defined powers to manage them for the entire community.

3. A Board’s Duty Is to Adapt to the Community’s Evolving Interests

The HOA Board’s decision wasn’t a whim; it was a response to a persistent community interest with a history. Testimony from a 20-year Board member, Arland Averell, revealed that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish a pickleball court “after several families requested they do so.” As a secondary benefit, the Board also saw it as a way to “generate additional revenue.”

But this wasn’t the community’s first foray into the sport. Court records show that back in 2015, the association had a pickleball court with taped lines, but it was damaged after only four months. This context is crucial. The 2019 decision to paint permanent lines was not just a reaction to new requests but an institutional lesson learned. It shows the Board was responding to a long-term, evolving interest and choosing a more durable solution, fulfilling its duty to adapt common resources to meet new demands.

4. An “Infringement” Requires an Actual Impediment

The petitioner’s legal argument was very specific. He claimed that adding pickleball “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment” and that having only one guaranteed tennis court is an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” He summarized his grievance with the line:

“Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play.”

However, the facts presented in court systematically dismantled this argument. The evidence showed:

• One of the two courts remained exclusively for tennis at all times.

• Both courts were still available for tennis on a first-come, first-served basis.

• The pickleball nets were portable and had to be detached at the end of play, leaving the court ready for tennis.

• Most critically, the petitioner himself testified that he had “never been denied access to the tennis courts at issue at any time.”

The judge determined that no violation occurred because the petitioner’s rights were never actually impeded. This reveals the critical legal distinction between an inconvenience and an infringement. The petitioner’s entire case rested on a hypothetical future inconvenience, but the law requires an actual, demonstrable impediment to rights. Since his own testimony confirmed one had never occurred, his claim was impossible to prove.

5. If You Demand a Rehearing, You Should Probably Show Up with an Argument

In a final, bizarre twist, the story doesn’t end with the initial ruling in February 2020. The petitioner filed a “REQUEST FOR REHEARING,” which the court granted, giving him a second chance to make his case.

To streamline the process, both parties agreed to skip a new evidentiary hearing and instead submit written “Closing Arguments” to the judge. The HOA’s legal team submitted a detailed, 17-page argument. What happened next was documented in the final court order:

OAH did not receive a closing argument from Petitioner.

The petitioner, who had initiated the entire legal process and successfully demanded a second chance, was given the final word. He had the opportunity to submit a closing argument that could have vindicated his entire complaint. Instead, he offered only silence. By ghosting his own rehearing, he left the judge with no choice but to conclude that he had once again “failed to sustain his burden of proof” and make the original ruling against him final.

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Conclusion: The Court of Community Opinion

This case is a fascinating lesson in the difference between a personal annoyance and an actual legal violation. It demonstrates that in the world of HOAs, feelings and hypothetical concerns carry little weight compared to the cold, hard text of the governing documents. Those documents give boards significant power, but also charge them with the difficult task of balancing the desires of all residents, not just the grievance of one.

As pickleball courts continue to replace shuffleboard courts and community gardens pop up in unused green spaces, this story leaves us with a critical question: As our communities change, how do we balance protecting the familiar traditions we love with making space for the new ones our neighbors are asking for?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Werner A Reis (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Edward O’Brien (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
  • Mark Sall (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Also cited as Mark Sahl)
  • Charles Mitchell (board member, witness)
    Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
    Current Director of the Association's Board
  • Arland Averell (board member, witness)
    Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
    Served on the Board for the past twenty years

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (department contact)
    ADRE
    Electronic contact for ADRE
  • c. serrano (staff)
    OAH
    Administrative staff/Clerk noted on document transmission

David & Brenda Norman v. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919051-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-28
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner David and Brenda Norman Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Lago Community Association Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) / Common Project Guidelines § 3.11(D)(1)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by David and Brenda Norman against Rancho Del Lago Community Association, finding that the Department of Real Estate did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute, as it was essentially a conflict between neighboring owners (Petitioners and Hendersons) regarding a wall.

Why this result: The Department lacked jurisdiction over the dispute among or between owners, per A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation by HOA approving a block wall built by neighbors (Hendersons)

Petitioners alleged that Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.11(D)(1) by approving a block wall built by their next-door neighbors, the Hendersons, and requested the Department require the Hendersons to permit Petitioners to connect to the wall or require the Hendersons to tear the wall down.

Orders: The petition was dismissed because the Department lacked jurisdiction to hear a dispute primarily among or between owners to which the association is not a party, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, HOA Governance, Architectural Review Committee (ARC), Party Wall, Neighbor Dispute, CC&Rs
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 737050.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:28 (40.9 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 710478.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:32 (150.0 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 711115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:36 (149.9 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 710478.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:06 (150.0 KB)

19F-H1919051-REL Decision – 711115.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:10 (149.9 KB)

Case Briefing: Norman v. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919051-REL, involving homeowners David and Brenda Norman (Petitioners) and the Rancho Del Lago Community Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute centers on the Petitioners’ allegation that the Respondent’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) violated community guidelines by approving a wall built by the Petitioners’ neighbors, the Hendersons.

The Petitioners claimed the Henderson’s wall, constructed 6 inches inside the property line, created a situation where any wall they might build on their property would be a “closely parallel wall,” which is prohibited by the community’s Common Project Guidelines § 3.11(D)(1). They requested that the Respondent either force the Hendersons to allow the Petitioners to connect to their wall, effectively making it a shared “party wall,” or compel the Hendersons to demolish it.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition entirely. The primary legal basis for the dismissal was a lack of jurisdiction; under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1), the Arizona Department of Real Estate cannot hear disputes solely between homeowners in which the association is not a party. The judge concluded this was fundamentally a neighbor-versus-neighbor conflict. Furthermore, the judge characterized the wall the Petitioners sought to build as an “archetypical spite fence” and noted that the Petitioners had failed to prove the Respondent had violated any community documents.

Case Overview

Parties and Key Entities

Name/Entity

Description

Petitioners

David and Brenda Norman

Homeowners in the Rancho Del Lago Community.

Respondent

Rancho Del Lago Community Association

The homeowners’ association (HOA) for the community.

Neighbors

The Hendersons

The Petitioners’ next-door neighbors who built the disputed wall.

Management Co.

Management Solutions

The company managing the Respondent HOA.

Witness (Respondent)

Spencer Brod

Employee of Management Solutions overseeing the Respondent’s affairs.

Administrative Law Judge

Diane Mihalsky

Presiding judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Regulating Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

State agency authorized to hear certain HOA disputes.

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings

Independent state agency that conducted the evidentiary hearing.

Procedural Details

Detail

Information

Case Number

19F-H1919051-REL

Petition Filed

On or about February 28, 2019

Hearing Date

May 8, 2019

Amended Decision Date

May 28, 2019

Timeline of Key Events

December 2003: The Respondent’s ARC adopts the Common Project Guidelines, which govern all exterior improvements.

March 8, 2017: The Hendersons submit an Architectural Variance Request (AVR) to extend the common wall between their property and the Petitioners’. Mrs. Norman signs the request, giving consent. The ARC approves this request.

April 27, 2017: The Hendersons submit a new AVR to build a wall extension 6 inches inside their property line, making it a private wall rather than a shared party wall. The record suggests Mrs. Norman may have rescinded her earlier approval for the common wall.

May 10, 2017: The ARC approves the Hendersons’ request to build the wall 6 inches inside their property line.

September 5, 2017: The Petitioners submit an AVR to build an 11-foot wide concrete driveway. The ARC denies the request.

Post-September 5, 2017: Despite the denial, the Petitioners construct the 11-foot wide driveway and are subsequently issued a Notice of Violation by the Respondent.

September 7, 2017: The Petitioners submit an AVR to build a wall extension on their property, positioned at least 3 feet away from the Hendersons’ wall.

October 13, 2017: The ARC approves the Petitioners’ wall extension request.

Post-October 13, 2017: The Petitioners decide not to build the approved wall, stating their contractor advised them against “giving up” the 3 feet of property that would lie between the two walls.

By November 2017: The Hendersons’ wall appears to have been constructed.

February 28, 2019: The Petitioners file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Respondent violated community rules.

March 27, 2019: The Petitioners file a new AVR to build a wall directly on the property line. This request did not include the Hendersons’ required consent and was still pending at the time of the hearing.

Governing Documents and Key Provisions

The dispute and subsequent legal decision referenced several specific articles from the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and the Common Project Guidelines.

Document

Provision

Description

Article I § (p)

Defines “Party Walls” built on a property line, establishing equal right of use, joint responsibility for maintenance and repair, and a process for the Board to resolve disputes over construction or cost-sharing.

Article II § 2(a)

Requires prior written approval from the ARC for any improvements that alter the exterior appearance of a property.

Article XII § 1

Establishes the ARC, noting that its decisions are “sole, absolute and final on all matters submitted to it.”

Common Project Guidelines

Section 3.11(D)(1)

States that “Closely parallel walls shall be disapproved.” The term “closely parallel” is not defined in the guidelines. This provision was the central focus of the Petitioners’ complaint.

Common Project Guidelines

Section 4.21

Grants the ARC the right “to waive, vary, or otherwise modify any of the standards or procedures set forth herein at its discretion, for good cause shown.”

Summary of Testimony and Evidence

Testimony of Brenda Norman (Petitioner)

Motivation for Wall: Stated that she and her husband are in law enforcement and want to enclose their side yard to protect utility meters from potential vandalism.

Reason for Not Building Approved Wall: Explained that their contractor advised them it was “crazy to give up the 3’ of property” that would be inaccessible between their proposed wall and the Hendersons’ wall.

Relationship with Neighbors: Acknowledged that the Petitioners “do not get along very well with the Hendersons” and therefore never asked for their consent for a wall on the property line.

Belief Regarding Parallel Walls: Believes that if she submitted a plan for a wall just inside her property line, it would be denied under the “close parallel wall” rule.

Requested Action: Opined that the Respondent should force the Hendersons to tear down their wall because it is not uniformly 6 inches from the property line.

Testimony of Spencer Brod (for Respondent)

HOA Policy: Testified that the HOA “never gets involved in disputes between neighbors” and that it is the homeowner’s responsibility to obtain neighbor consent for common wall projects.

Party vs. Private Walls: Explained that neighbor consent is required only for “party walls” on the property line due to shared maintenance liability. The Hendersons’ wall was approved because it was on their own property and therefore not a party wall.

Enforcement and Inspection: Admitted that the Hendersons’ wall may not be uniformly 6 inches from the line but stated the Respondent has no one to perform a “thorough inspection” and had not sent a violation letter.

“Closely Parallel Walls” Interpretation: Testified that while the term is undefined, the ARC’s approval of the Petitioners’ plan for a wall 3 feet away indicates that “closely parallel” means a distance of less than 3 feet.

Petitioners’ Unauthorized Construction: Confirmed that the Respondent sent the Petitioners a Notice of Violation for building a driveway that the ARC had explicitly denied.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The judge’s decision was based on a detailed analysis of the evidence, governing documents, and relevant state law.

1. Jurisdictional Failure: The primary reason for dismissal was a lack of jurisdiction. The judge cited A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1), which explicitly states, “The department does not have jurisdiction to hear [a]ny dispute among or between owners to which the association is not a party.” The judge determined this was a quintessential neighbor dispute, not a dispute with the HOA.

2. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated its own rules. The judge found they failed to do so.

3. Characterization as a “Spite Fence”: The decision describes the wall the Petitioners wish to build as an “archetypical spite fence between neighbors who cannot agree to mutually work for the improvement of their adjacent properties.”

4. HOA’s Limited Role: The judge affirmed that neither the CC&Rs nor the Common Project Guidelines compel the HOA to mediate or resolve disputes between neighbors by taking a side.

5. Distinction of Wall Types: The analysis distinguished between a party wall on a property line, which requires neighbor consent, and a private wall built entirely on one owner’s property, which does not. The Hendersons’ wall was approved as the latter.

6. Hypothetical Outcome: A concluding footnote in the decision states that even if the Department had jurisdiction, the Petitioners had not established that Guideline 3.11(D)(1) would authorize or require the Respondent to grant the relief they requested.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that the petition filed by David and Brenda Norman against the Respondent, Rancho Del Lago Community Association, is dismissed. The dismissal is based on the finding that the Arizona Department of Real Estate does not have jurisdiction to hear their dispute with the Hendersons.

Study Guide: Norman v. Rancho Del Lago Community Association

This guide is designed to review the administrative legal case between homeowners David and Brenda Norman and their homeowners’ association, the Rancho Del Lago Community Association, concerning a dispute over a neighbor’s wall.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing only from the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central violation of the homeowners’ association rules alleged by the Petitioners in their February 28, 2019, petition?

2. Identify the three main groups of individuals or entities involved in the dispute: the Petitioners, the Respondent, and the neighbors.

3. According to the Respondent’s CC&Rs, what is a “Party Wall” and what primary responsibility does it create for adjacent homeowners?

4. Describe the two separate wall-related Architectural Variance Requests (AVRs) submitted by the Hendersons in March and April of 2017.

5. Why did the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) initially deny the Petitioners’ request to build a new driveway, and what was the outcome of this denial?

6. What is the role of the “Declarant” within the Rancho Del Lago Community Association, and what influence do they hold over the board and the ARC?

7. The ARC approved a wall proposal for the Petitioners on October 13, 2017. Why did the Petitioners choose not to build this approved wall?

8. According to the CC&Rs, what is the ultimate authority of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) in rendering its decisions?

9. On what legal grounds did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss the Petitioners’ case?

10. Who bore the “burden of proof” in this hearing, and what does this legal standard require?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The Petitioners alleged that the Respondent (the homeowners’ association) violated Section 3.11(D)(1) of the Common Project Guidelines. This section states that “closely parallel walls shall be disapproved,” and the Petitioners argued that the association violated this rule by approving the wall built by their neighbors, the Hendersons.

2. The Petitioners were homeowners David and Brenda Norman. The Respondent was the Rancho Del Lago Community Association. The neighbors, who were central to the dispute but not a party to the case, were the Hendersons.

3. A “Party Wall” is a wall situated on the property line between two or more contiguous lots. It creates a shared right of use and a joint obligation for all adjoining owners to rebuild and repair the wall at their shared expense.

4. The Hendersons first submitted an AVR on March 8, 2017, to extend the existing common party wall, for which Mrs. Norman gave consent. On April 27, 2017, they submitted a different AVR to build a new wall located entirely on their property, 6 inches inside the property line, which did not require the Normans’ consent.

5. The ARC denied the Petitioners’ September 5, 2017, request for an 11-foot wide driveway because a driveway already existed on the opposite side of the house where the garage was located. Despite the denial, the Petitioners built the driveway anyway, which resulted in the Respondent issuing them a Notice of Violation.

6. The “Declarant” is the original developer that built the subdivision. At the time of the hearing, the Respondent association was still under the control of the Declarant, who appointed all three directors of the board and was also a member of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

7. The Petitioners did not build the approved wall because the plan required it to be built at least 3 feet inside their property line to avoid being a party wall. Their contractor advised them they would be “crazy to give up the 3’ of property” that would lie between their new wall and the Hendersons’ wall.

8. According to Article XII, § 1 of the CC&Rs, “the decision of the [ARC] shall be sole, absolute and final on all matters submitted to it pursuant to this Declaration and/or the Design Guidelines.”

9. The judge dismissed the case due to a lack of jurisdiction. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1), the Arizona Department of Real Estate does not have jurisdiction to hear disputes between owners to which the association is not a party. The judge framed the issue as a private dispute between the Normans and the Hendersons.

10. The Petitioners (the Normans) bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the community rules. This standard, known as a “preponderance of the evidence,” requires presenting evidence that is more convincing and more likely true than not.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts and rules from the case documents to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the concept of a “Party Wall” versus a privately-owned wall within the context of this case. How did the distinction between these two types of walls become the central point of contention and influence the decisions made by the Hendersons, the Normans, and the ARC?

2. Discuss the powers and limitations of the Rancho Del Lago Community Association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) as outlined in the CC&Rs and Common Project Guidelines. How did the ARC’s discretionary authority, particularly under Section 4.21 of the guidelines, impact the events of this dispute?

3. Trace the timeline of Architectural Variance Requests (AVRs) submitted by both the Normans and the Hendersons. Evaluate how the sequence of approvals, denials, and unbuilt projects contributed to the escalation of the dispute and ultimately led to the legal hearing.

4. Explain the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision. Why was the concept of “jurisdiction” more critical to the outcome than the merits of the Normans’ claim regarding “closely parallel walls”? Refer to the specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) cited in the decision.

5. The judge described the potential wall the Petitioners wish to build as an “archetypical spite fence.” Based on the testimony and evidence presented in the case, argue for or against this characterization.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Diane Mihalsky, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and renders decisions on disputes involving state agencies.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee established by the Declarant and governed by the CC&Rs, responsible for reviewing and approving or denying any proposed improvements that alter the exterior appearance of properties within the community. Its decisions are described as “sole, absolute and final.”

Architectural Variance Request (AVR)

The formal application submitted by a homeowner to the ARC to request approval for an exterior improvement or modification to their property.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (the Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations regarding violations of community documents.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The legal documents that establish the rules, regulations, and obligations for homeowners within a planned community like Rancho Del Lago.

Closely Parallel Walls

A term from Section 3.11(D)(1) of the Common Project Guidelines that are to be disapproved. The term is not explicitly defined, but testimony suggests a wall 3 feet from another would be approved, making the threshold for “close” less than that.

Common Project Guidelines

A set of rules adopted by the ARC in December 2003 that govern all exterior improvements and provide standards for the Design Review Process. These guidelines supplement the CC&Rs.

Declarant

The original developer that built the subdivision. In this case, the Declarant still controlled the association’s Board of Directors and the ARC.

Jurisdiction

The legal authority of a court or agency to hear and decide a case. The petition was dismissed because the Department was found to lack jurisdiction over disputes solely between homeowners.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted by an Administrative Law Judge.

Party Wall

As defined in the CC&Rs, a wall on the property line between contiguous lots. Owners have equal rights to use it and share joint financial responsibility for its repair and maintenance.

Petitioners

The party that initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, homeowners David and Brenda Norman.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this civil administrative hearing. It means the evidence presented must be sufficient to convince the judge that a claim is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Lago Community Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document (like a CC&R) that limits the use of the property. Arizona law holds that unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

The Six-Inch Wall That Ignited a Legal Battle: 4 Shocking Lessons from a Brutal HOA War

1.0 Introduction: The Neighbor Next Door

Living next to someone is a universal experience, and it’s remarkable how quickly a small disagreement over a fence or a property line can spiral into a full-blown conflict. For two families in an Arizona HOA, what started as a plan for a backyard wall ended in a formal administrative law hearing, providing a stark case study in property law, association rules, and human nature.

This dispute, involving homeowners David and Brenda Norman and their neighbors, the Hendersons, dissects four critical lessons that challenge common assumptions about homeowner rights and association duties. Their story is a powerful cautionary tale about property lines, HOA authority, and the high cost of a neighborhood war.

2.0 Takeaway 1: The Six-Inch Difference That Changes Everything

1. A Wall on the Property Line Isn’t the Same as a Wall Near It

In property law, inches are everything. The community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) defined a “Party Wall” as a structure sitting directly on the property line between two lots. By this definition, these walls are a shared responsibility, requiring mutual consent from both homeowners for construction and shared costs for maintenance.

This distinction became the pivot on which the entire case turned. Initially, the Hendersons submitted plans to build a shared Party Wall, and the Normans gave their required consent. But then the plan changed. The Hendersons withdrew that request and submitted a new one: to build a wall located just six inches inside their own property line. The record doesn’t state definitively why the Hendersons changed their plan, though testimony suggested the Normans may have rescinded their initial consent.

This was a masterstroke of procedural navigation; by sacrificing a mere six inches of their yard, the Hendersons effectively bought the legal right to build without their neighbors’ consent, turning a potential year-long dispute into a matter of a simple ARC approval. By moving the structure entirely onto their own lot, it was no longer a “Party Wall” but their private property. While the Hendersons had successfully navigated the HOA’s rules, the Normans’ next step was to try and force the HOA to intervene directly—a move that would expose a common misunderstanding about the limits of an association’s power.

3.0 Takeaway 2: Your HOA Isn’t the Neighborhood Referee

2. The HOA’s Power to Intervene Has Surprising Limits

A common assumption among homeowners is that the HOA must mediate any and all disputes between residents. This case proves that assumption is fundamentally incorrect.

When the conflict escalated, the HOA’s position was unwavering. Spencer Brod, an employee of the association’s management company, testified that the association “never gets involved in disputes between neighbors.” Its role is to enforce community rules as they relate to the association, not to take sides in personal conflicts between homeowners.

The Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case reinforced this legal reality, citing Arizona law to clarify the limits of both the HOA’s and the state’s jurisdiction. The judge’s finding was unequivocal:

Neither the CC&Rs nor the Common Project Guidelines require Respondent [the HOA] to mediate or resolve a dispute between neighbors by taking one side or the other. A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)(1) provides that ‘[t]he department does not have jurisdiction to hear [a]ny dispute among or between owners to which the association is not a party.’

This finding is a crucial lesson: while an HOA enforces its governing documents, it is not a neighborhood court and cannot be compelled to referee personal disagreements.

4.0 Takeaway 3: You Can’t Demand a Neighbor Play by the Rules If You Don’t

3. Coming to the Table with Clean Hands Matters

The case contained a powerful element of irony that proved fatal to the Normans’ petition. The judge’s official Findings of Fact reveal that while demanding the HOA enforce its rules against the Hendersons, the Normans had a significant compliance issue of their own.

In September 2017, the Normans submitted a request to build an 11-foot wide concrete driveway “to provide a solid walking surface because Mrs. Norman was disabled and had difficulty walking.” While the motivation was sympathetic, the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) denied the request. Despite the denial, the Normans built the driveway anyway and were subsequently issued a Notice of Violation by the HOA.

Critically, the Normans’ own rule-breaking occurred after the Hendersons’ wall was approved. In the very midst of their dispute, while formulating a case against their neighbors, they chose to defy the ARC themselves. This is a classic illustration of the “unclean hands” doctrine. In any legal or administrative forum, one’s credibility is paramount. The Normans were asking the HOA to be a strict enforcer of rules they themselves had flagrantly violated, a position that is almost always untenable.

5.0 Takeaway 4: When a Judge Calls It a “Spite Fence”

4. The Court May Look Past the Rules and See Your Intent

Even in a hearing focused on the technicalities of CC&Rs, the underlying human motivations of the conflict did not go unnoticed. The HOA’s ARC had previously approved a plan for the Normans to build their own wall, provided it was located three feet inside their property line. They refused. Brenda Norman testified that their contractor told them they were “crazy to give up the 3’ of property.” Mrs. Norman also argued that a wall on her property would be denied as a prohibited “closely parallel wall,” but this claim was directly contradicted by the ARC’s own actions—they had already approved her wall at the three-foot distance.

The judge’s “spite fence” comment wasn’t just an observation; it was the legal culmination of the Normans’ entire pattern of behavior. Their refusal to accept an approved wall on their own property (losing 3 feet) while demanding their neighbor tear down a wall built on theirs (losing 0 feet) painted a clear picture of animosity, not a genuine need for property protection. The judge saw through the legal arguments to the core of the issue:

The wall that Petitioners testified that they must build to protect their property appears to be an archetypical spite fence between neighbors who cannot agree to mutually work for the improvement of their adjacent properties.

A “spite fence” is a legal term for a structure erected with malicious intent, where the primary purpose is not to improve one’s own property but to annoy, inconvenience, or harm a neighbor. The judge’s use of this term was a powerful signal that, in the court’s view, the dispute was no longer about property rights, but about personal animus.

6.0 Conclusion: A Wall Is a Wall, But a Neighbor Is Forever

This case is a cautionary tale written in concrete and legal filings. It shows how a dispute over six inches of soil can metastasize, fueled by a misunderstanding of HOA rules and an unwillingness to compromise, ultimately costing both parties time, money, and peace of mind. From the critical importance of a few inches of land to the defined limits of an HOA’s authority, the details matter.

Ultimately, the story of the Normans and the Hendersons serves as a powerful reminder that navigating HOA living requires a clear-eyed understanding of the actual rules, not just a sense of what seems “fair.” It leaves us with a critical question to consider.

When it comes to our homes and neighbors, is it more important to be right, or to find a way to live in peace?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • David Norman (petitioner)
    Appeared telephonically on own behalf
  • Brenda Norman (petitioner)
    Testified on Petitioners' behalf

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Represented Rancho Del Lago Community Association
  • Spencer Brod (property manager/witness)
    Management Solutions
    Employee of Respondent's management company; testified

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically

Other Participants

  • Anthony Henderson (homeowner/neighbor)
    Next-door neighbor who built the wall in dispute
  • Mabel Gummere (property manager predecessor)
    Predecessor to Spencer Brod

Jay A. Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista NO. 8 Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918001-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-25
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome total
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $250.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jay A. Janicek Counsel Jake Kubert
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association Counsel Evan Thompson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B); Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4; Association Bylaws Article VIII, Section 1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petition, concluding that the HOA Board’s unilateral amendment of the Bylaws on November 20, 2017, was an invalid action taken without the required vote of the Association members and without statutory notice, violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and the Association’s governing documents. The amendment was invalidated, and the Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's filing fee and pay a $250.00 civil penalty.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated Association Bylaws Article III, Sections 3 & 4 and Article VIII, Section 1 in an action taken by the board on November 20, 2017.

The Board of Directors attempted a third amendment to the Bylaws on November 20, 2017, specifically changing the requirements for the Association's financial review (audit, review, or compilation). The ALJ concluded that this action was invalid because it was taken in the absence of a quorum of Association members voting in favor of the amendment, violating both the Bylaws and statutory notice requirements.

Orders: The petition was granted. The third amendment to the Association Bylaws taken on November 20, 2017, was invalidated. Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 and pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $250.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • Association Bylaws Article III

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Bylaws Amendment, Open Meeting Law, ARS 33-1804, Membership Vote, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373 (Ariz. 2006)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf

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19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 661797.pdf

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19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf

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19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 661797.pdf

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19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 661797.pdf

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19F-H1918001-REL Decision – 696205.pdf

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Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Jay A. Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG). The central issue was the validity of a bylaw amendment enacted by the Association’s Board of Directors on November 20, 2017, without a vote of the general homeowner membership.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Petitioner, Jay Janicek, finding that the Board’s action was invalid. The decision hinged on a critical interpretation of the Association’s governing documents, concluding that the term “members” in the context of bylaw amendments unambiguously refers to the homeowner membership, not the Board of Directors. The ruling established that the Board does not have the authority to amend bylaws where that power is reserved for the membership.

Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that the Board’s action violated Arizona’s Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by failing to provide the required notice to homeowners for a meeting concerning a proposed bylaw amendment. As a result, the amendment was invalidated, and the Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties and Jurisdiction

Petitioner: Jay A. Janicek, a property owner within the Sycamore Vista subdivision and a member of the Respondent Association.

Respondent: Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (“the Association”), a homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, governed by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and overseen by a Board of Directors.

Adjudicating Body: The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), an independent state agency, which received the case on referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

The Central Dispute

The core of the dispute was an action taken by the Association’s Board of Directors during a regular meeting on November 20, 2017. At this meeting, the Board, with three of five directors present, voted to approve a third amendment to the Association’s Bylaws. The amendment altered Article VIII Section 6(d), changing the requirement for an annual financial check from:

“cause an annual audit of the Association books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year”

“cause an annual audit, review, or compilation of the Associations financial records to be made by a public accountant within 180 days after the end of the HOA’s fiscal year.”

The Petitioner contended this action was invalid because it was undertaken without a vote of the general Association membership, as he believed the governing documents required.

Timeline of Adjudication

1. July 25, 2018: Petitioner files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. September 05, 2018: An initial evidentiary hearing is held before the OAH.

3. September 25, 2018: The OAH issues an ALJ Decision in the Petitioner’s favor.

4. October 23, 2018: The Respondent submits a Request for Rehearing.

5. November 07, 2018: The Department grants the rehearing request and refers the matter back to the OAH.

6. March 05, 2019: A rehearing is conducted, based on legal briefs and closing arguments without new evidence.

7. March 25, 2019: The final ALJ Decision is issued, reaffirming the initial ruling in favor of the Petitioner.

Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes

The case decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state statutes.

Key Bylaw Provisions

Article

Section

Description

Article IV

Section 1

States that the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board of not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) directors.”

Article VI

Section 1

Establishes that regular meetings of the Board of Directors shall be held monthly without notice.

Article VI

Section 2

Governs special meetings of the Board, requiring not less than three days’ notice to each Director.

Article VI

Section 3

Defines a quorum for Board meetings as “a majority of the number of Directors.”

Article VII

Section 1

Outlines the Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. This section does not explicitly grant the Board the power to amend the Bylaws.

Article XIII

Section 1

(The central provision in the dispute) States: “These Bylaws may be amended at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors of the Association by a vote of a majority of a quorum of members present in person or by proxy.”

Relevant Arizona Statutes

A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law): This statute was central to the Petitioner’s argument and the ALJ’s final decision.

Subsection (A): Requires that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors be open to all members of the association.

Subsection (B): Mandates specific notice requirements for any meeting of the members, stating that notice “shall also state the purpose for which the meeting is called, including the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws.”

Subsection (F): The ALJ noted that this section codifies the legislative intent of the statute, which, as cited from a Governor’s message, is to “promote transparency and participation for all residents in homeowners’ association governance.”

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Position (Jay Janicek)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a textual interpretation of the Bylaws and adherence to state law.

Interpretation of “Members”: The Petitioner argued that the word “members” in Article XIII, Section 1 refers to the general homeowner membership of the Association, not the members of the Board of Directors.

Textual Differentiation: The drafters of the Bylaws intentionally used the words “members” and “directors” distinctly throughout the document. Where the intent was to refer to the Board, the word “Director” was specifically used (e.g., Article VI).

Proxy Voting: The inclusion of the term “proxy” in Article XIII supports the argument that the vote is for the general membership, as Board members are not permitted to vote by proxy.

Lack of Explicit Power: Article VII, which details the Board’s powers, does not grant the authority to amend the Bylaws, implying such power is reserved for the membership.

Statutory Violation: The Board’s action violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 because the required notice for a meeting concerning a bylaw amendment was not provided to the general membership.

Legal Precedent: The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn, an Arizona Supreme Court case holding that restrictive covenants (which he argued include the Bylaws) should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties as determined from the entire document.

Respondent’s Position (Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA)

The Association argued that its actions were a valid exercise of the Board’s authority.

Broad Authority: The Respondent cited Article IV, which states the “affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board,” to assert its general authority.

Valid Board Meeting: The amendment occurred at a regular monthly Board meeting as allowed by Article VI. The meeting had three directors present, which constituted a valid quorum for transacting business.

Interpretation of Article XIII: The Respondent argued that the phrase “at a regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors” in Article XIII indicates that the Board is the body empowered to make the amendment, and the word “members” in that context refers to the members of the Board.

No Open Meeting Law Violation: The Respondent contended its conduct was not a violation because the action occurred during a regular Board meeting with a proper quorum of directors.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s conclusions were unequivocal, fully adopting the Petitioner’s interpretation of the governing documents and state law.

Conclusions of Law

Burden of Proof: The ALJ found that the Petitioner successfully sustained his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Interpretation of “Members” vs. “Directors”: The decision states that the governing documents are clear: “‘members’ refers to the body of owners who make up the membership of the Association, and ‘directors’ refers to the few who are elected to the membership’s Board.” The ALJ found the differentiation to be intentional by the drafters.

Avoiding Absurdity: The decision holds that construing the Bylaws to allow the Board to amend them would create an absurdity. The ALJ wrote, “The voices of few cannot speak for all, unless all have bestowed those few with the power and authority to speak on their behalf.”

Violation of Statute and Bylaws: The ALJ concluded that the Board’s action on November 20, 2017, violated both A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) due to a lack of notice and Article III of the Association Bylaws.

Rejection of Respondent’s Argument: The decision explicitly states, “The Tribunal is not swayed by Respondent’s closing arguments.”

Final Order

Based on the findings and conclusions, the ALJ issued the following binding order:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was officially granted.

2. Amendment Invalidated: The third amendment to the Association Bylaws, as enacted on November 20, 2017, was invalidated.

3. Fees and Penalties: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.00 to the Planned Community Hearing Office Fund.

Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

1. Who were the primary parties in the case No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action taken by the Respondent on November 20, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint?

3. According to the Petitioner, what was the crucial difference in meaning between the terms “members” and “directors” as used in the Association’s Bylaws?

4. What was the Respondent’s central argument for why the Board of Directors had the authority to amend the Bylaws at its regular meeting?

5. What is Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, and how did the Petitioner argue that the Respondent violated it?

6. What was the financial concern that the Petitioner argued could potentially impact him as a homeowner due to the Board’s amendment?

7. Describe the procedural history of this case after the initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision on September 25, 2018.

8. What case did the Petitioner cite regarding the interpretation of restrictive covenants, and what principle did it establish?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this proceeding, and how is it defined in the document?

10. What was the final outcome of the case, including the specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jay A. Janicek, the Petitioner, and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner is a property owner and member of the Association who brought the legal action, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association governed by a Board of Directors.

2. On November 20, 2017, the Respondent’s Board of Directors held a regular meeting where they voted to approve a third amendment to the Association’s Bylaws. This amendment changed the requirement for an “annual audit…by a public accountant” to an “annual audit, review, or compilation” of financial records.

3. The Petitioner argued that the term “members” in Article XIII of the Bylaws refers to the entire body of property owners in the Association, not the Board of Directors. He contended that if the drafter had intended to give amendment power to the Board, the specific word “directors” would have been used, as it was in other sections of the Bylaws.

4. The Respondent argued that its actions were proper because the Bylaws empower the Board to manage the Association’s affairs at regular monthly meetings. They contended that since a quorum of three directors was present at the November 20, 2017 meeting, the Board was empowered to transact business, which they interpreted to include amending the bylaws as described in Article XIII.

5. Arizona’s Open Meeting Law is ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, which requires meetings of a homeowners’ association’s board and members to be open to all members. The Petitioner argued the Respondent violated this by amending a bylaw without proper notice to the full membership, which is required for any proposed bylaw amendment, thus undermining the law’s legislative intent of transparency.

6. The Petitioner was concerned that the amendment weakened the financial oversight of the Association. It modified a requirement for a third-party audit to a less stringent “review, or compilation,” creating a risk that the Association could perform its own financial checks, and as a homeowner, he had an interest in ensuring the Association’s financials were correct.

7. After the initial decision in the Petitioner’s favor on September 25, 2018, the Respondent submitted a Request for Rehearing on October 23, 2018. The Department of Real Estate granted this request on November 7, 2018, and the matter was referred back to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing, which ultimately took place on March 5, 2019.

8. The Petitioner cited Powell v. Washburn. This case established the principle that restrictive covenants should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties, as determined from the language of the entire document and the purpose for which the covenants were created.

9. The legal standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The document defines this as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with the most “convincing force” that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.

10. The final outcome was a ruling in favor of the Petitioner. The ALJ granted the petition, invalidated the third amendment to the Bylaws that was passed on November 20, 2017, and ordered the Respondent to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty of $250.00.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning in differentiating between the terms “members” and “directors.” How did the principle of avoiding absurdity and considering the drafter’s intent, as seen throughout the Bylaws, contribute to the final decision?

2. Discuss the interplay between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) and state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804). Explain which authority took precedence in this case and why the Board’s actions were found to violate both.

3. Evaluate the legal strategy employed by the Petitioner, Jay A. Janicek. Consider his use of specific Bylaw articles, the citation of Powell v. Washburn, and his argument regarding the legislative intent of the Open Meeting Law.

4. Examine the arguments presented by the Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association. Why did the Judge find their interpretation of the Bylaws unconvincing, despite their claims that the Board was empowered to transact business with a quorum present?

5. Based on the text, discuss the broader implications of this ruling for homeowners’ associations in Arizona. How does this decision reinforce the principles of transparency and the limitations of a Board’s power relative to the association’s general membership?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

A section of the Arizona Revised Statutes, also known as Arizona’s Open Meeting Law, which mandates that meetings of an HOA’s members and board of directors must be open to all members and requires specific notice for meetings where bylaw amendments will be considered.

Bylaws

A set of rules that govern the internal operations of the homeowners’ association. In this case, key articles discussed include Article VI (Meeting of Directors), Article VII (Powers of the Board), and Article XIII (Amendments).

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are governing documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.

Member

As defined in the Association’s documents, a person entitled to membership by virtue of being a property owner within the Sycamore Vista subdivision. The Judge concluded this term refers to the body of owners, not the Board of Directors.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona, unaffiliated with the parties, responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings and making legal decisions in disputes like this one.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Jay A. Janicek, a homeowner in the Association.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof in this case. It is defined as evidence that is more likely true than not and has the most convincing force, sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue.

The authority to represent someone else, especially in voting. The document notes that the term “proxy” applies to votes of the members, as members of the Board are not permitted to vote by proxy.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of a deliberative assembly necessary to conduct the business of that group. For the Respondent’s Board of Directors, a quorum is defined as a majority of the number of Directors.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenants

Legal obligations imposed in a deed to real property to do or not do something. The Petitioner argued this term included the CC&Rs, Bylaws, and rules of the Association.

Tribunal

A body established to settle certain types of dispute. In this document, it refers to the Administrative Law Judge at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

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19F-H1918001-REL-RHG

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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Jay A. Janicek (Petitioner) and the Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core issue of the case, designated No. 19F-H1918001-REL-RHG, revolves around whether the Homeowners Association violated its Bylaws and Arizona state statute (§ 33-1804) when its Board of Directors unilaterally amended the Bylaws on November 20, 2017. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Board’s action was invalid because the power to amend the Bylaws was delegated to the Association’s general membership, not the Board of Directors, and the Board failed to provide the required notice for such an amendment. Consequently, the Petitioner’s request was granted, the amendment was invalidated, and the Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee and a civil penalty.

1 source

What central conflict drove the administrative hearing and subsequent rehearing process?
How did governing documents and Arizona statutes shape the final legal decision?
What ultimate implications does this ruling have for homeowners association governance and member rights?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jay A. Janicek (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf at initial hearing; Observed rehearing
  • Jake Kubert (petitioner attorney)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Appeared at rehearing

Respondent Side

  • Evan Thompson (HOA attorney)
    Thompson Krone, P.L.C.
  • Maxwell T. Riddiough (HOA attorney)
    Thompson Krone, P.L.C.
  • Andrew F. Vizcarra (property manager)
    Tucson Realty & Trust Co. Management
    Recipient of correspondence for Respondent HOA

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Dennis Legere (observer)
    Present at initial hearing
  • Becky Nutt (observer)
    Present at initial hearing
  • Caleb Rhodes (observer)
    Present at initial hearing

Lewis Smith v. Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-29
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner's request for relief, finding that the Respondent HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) by failing to provide adequate notice and agenda information regarding the proposed CC&R amendment to prohibit short term rentals. The Respondent was ordered to pay the filing fee to the Petitioner.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lewis Smith Counsel Mark J. Bainbridge, Esq.
Respondent Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel William D. Condray, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner's request for relief, finding that the Respondent HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) by failing to provide adequate notice and agenda information regarding the proposed CC&R amendment to prohibit short term rentals. The Respondent was ordered to pay the filing fee to the Petitioner.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of open meeting and notice requirements regarding CC&R amendment

The Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) when it failed to provide notice or an agenda to all of its members of information that was reasonably necessary to inform the members that an amendment to the CC&Rs to prohibit short term members would be discussed at its special board of directors meetings held on November 8, 2017 and November 20, 2017.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was granted. Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(E)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-2198.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, HOA Governance, Notice Requirements, CC&R Amendment, Short Term Rentals
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(E)(1)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-2198.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01

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Decision Documents

18F-H1817020-REL Decision – 629473.pdf

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Administrative Law Judge Decision Briefing: Smith vs. Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between Petitioner Lewis Smith and Respondent Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. The core of the case revolves around allegations that the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting laws.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the Petitioner, finding that the Desert Isle HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F). The decision established that the Board failed to provide its members with agendas containing information “reasonably necessary to inform the members” about discussions concerning a proposed amendment to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that would prohibit short-term rentals. This failure occurred during Board of Directors meetings held on November 8 and November 20, 2017.

As a result of this finding, the Petitioner’s petition was granted, and the Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee. The ruling underscores the state’s policy that planned community meetings must be conducted with transparency, and agendas must provide sufficient detail for members to understand the matters to be discussed or decided.

Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1817020-REL

Tribunal

Office of Administrative Hearings (Phoenix, Arizona)

Petitioner

Lewis Smith

Respondent

Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Hearing Date

April 16, 2018

Decision Date

May 29, 2018

Central Allegation

On or about December 5, 2017, Petitioner Lewis Smith filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that the Desert Isle HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The petition contended that the Board of Directors discussed and advanced a significant CC&R amendment without proper notification to the association members.

The petition states, in part:

“All Board members have been meeting to discuss and add an amendment to the CC&R’s [sic] Prohibiting short term renters. These meetings have not been conducted openly and no notice or agenda were provided containing information necessary to inform members of the association of the matters to be discussed… At no time was the issue to add an amendment for short term rentals properly noticed or on an agenda for discussion before it became a ballot vote.”

Chronology of Events

October 23, 2017:

• Lewis Smith, William H. Winn, Kevin Barnett, and Chester Jay submit a formal request to the Board for a special members’ meeting.

• The stated purposes of the meeting were to:

1. Select and fund an attorney to update the HOA’s bylaws and CC&Rs to comply with current Arizona law.

2. Discuss obtaining a reserve study for the association’s capital needs.

3. Discuss a separate attorney letter regarding HOA governance.

October 24, 2017:

• Board President Doug Robinson responds to the request, expressing support for a meeting but stating that more than 30 days would be needed to gather supporting documentation.

October 31, 2017:

• A second group of homeowners, including Board members Greg Yacoubian, Doug Robinson, Curt Carlson, and Mike Andrews, submits a request to add an item to the agenda of the forthcoming special meeting.

• Their request was to “amend the CC&Rs by adding a section prohibiting ‘Short Term Rentals’ and defining minimum time allowed for Rentals.”

November 5, 2017:

• The Board provides an agenda for a Board of Directors meeting scheduled for November 8, 2017. The agenda did not include any item related to the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals.

November 8, 2017:

• The Board of Directors meeting is held.

• The Board votes to call a special members’ meeting before November 23, 2017, to address the two petitions.

• During the “BOARD INPUT” section, member Curt Carlson “spoke of past issues about short term renting,” but this was not a formal agenda item for discussion or action.

November 10, 2017:

• The Board emails Lewis Smith, acknowledging his petition and requesting a “narrative explanation from you on each of your subjects” by November 17, 2017, to prepare the meeting information package for all homeowners.

November 18, 2017:

• The Board sends an agenda for another Board of Directors meeting scheduled for November 20, 2017.

• The agenda lists “Review/approval of special meeting mailing package” as a topic but provides no specific details regarding the proposed amendment on short-term rentals.

December 1, 2017:

• Board President Doug Robinson emails all homeowners to explain the upcoming special meeting on December 16, 2017.

• The email states: “To avoid cost and time we put both petitions together and are having one meeting that will required [sic] all owners to vote for or against these two petitions.”

• The agenda for the December 16 meeting is attached, which explicitly lists a vote on prohibiting short-term rentals.

December 16, 2017:

• The special members’ meeting is held. A vote is taken on the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals.

Vote Result: 9 homeowners in favor, 6 homeowners against.

Legal Framework and Analysis

The case centered on the interpretation and application of Arizona Revised Statutes related to planned communities.

Key Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

This statute governs meetings and notices for planned communities. The judge’s decision rested heavily on the policy outlined in subsection (F).

§ 33-1804(B): Requires that notice for any special meeting of members must state the purpose, including “the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws.”

§ 33-1804(E)(1): Requires that the agenda for a Board of Directors meeting be made available to all members in attendance.

§ 33-1804(F): This subsection contains the state’s declaration of policy, which was central to the judge’s conclusion. It states:

Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Lewis Smith, bore the burden of proving that the Respondent violated the statute by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that is sufficient “to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Findings and Conclusion of the Court

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner successfully met the burden of proof. The decision concludes that the agendas for the November 8 and November 20 Board of Directors meetings were legally insufficient.

Conclusion of Law #4:

“Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F) when it failed to provide notice or an agenda to all of its members of information that was reasonably necessary to inform the members that an amendment to the CC&Rs to prohibit short term members would be discussed at its special board of directors meetings held on November 8, 2017 and November 20, 2017.”

Final Order

• The Petitioner’s petition in the matter was granted.

• Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A), the Respondent (Desert Isle HOA) was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee.

• The Order is legally binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Parties and Legal Representation

Address

Legal Counsel

Petitioner

Lewis Smith
5459 E. Sorrento Dr.
Long Beach, CA 90803

Mark J. Bainbridge, Esq.
The Bainbridge Law Firm LLC
2122 E. Highland Ave. Ste. 250
Phoenix, AZ 85016-4779

Respondent

Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
411 Riverfront Dr. #7
Bullhead City, AZ 86442

William D. Condray, Esq.
2031 Highway 95 Ste. 2
Bullhead City, AZ 86442-6004

Study Guide: Smith v. Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 18F-H1817020-REL between Petitioner Lewis Smith and Respondent Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms and entities involved in the matter.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in case No. 18F-H1817020-REL, and who represented them legally?

2. What was the three-part purpose of the special meeting requested by Lewis Smith and other homeowners on October 23, 2017?

3. A second petition was submitted on October 31, 2017. What was its purpose and who were the petitioners?

4. What key actions were taken regarding officers and a special meeting during the Board of Directors meeting on November 8, 2017?

5. What did the Desert Isle HOA Board demand from Lewis Smith in its email on November 10, 2017, to proceed with the special meeting?

6. What was the central allegation Lewis Smith made in his petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate on December 5, 2017?

7. What was the outcome of the vote on the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals at the December 16, 2017 special meeting?

8. Which specific section of the Arizona Revised Statutes did the Administrative Law Judge find the Board had violated?

9. According to the case documents, what is the definition of “preponderance of the evidence”?

10. What was the final ruling issued by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson on May 29, 2018?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Lewis Smith, and the Respondent, Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. Lewis Smith was represented by Mark J. Bainbridge, Esq., and the Desert Isle HOA was represented by William D. Condray, Esq.

2. The purpose of the meeting was threefold: to select and fund an attorney to update the HOA’s bylaws and CC&Rs to comply with current Arizona law; to discuss obtaining a reserve study for the association’s capital needs; and to discuss an attorney letter regarding HOA governance.

3. Greg Yacoubian, Doug Robinson, Curt Carlson, and Mike Andrews submitted a request to amend the CC&Rs by adding a section to prohibit “Short Term Rentals.” They requested this subject be added to the agenda of the special meeting already requested by Lewis Smith’s group to save time and money.

4. At the November 8, 2017 meeting, a motion passed unanimously to remove the existing VP, treasurer, and secretary. New officers and assistants were elected, and another motion passed to call the special meeting requested by the two groups of owners before November 23, 2017.

5. The Board requested a “narrative explanation” from Lewis Smith for each of his proposed subjects. The Board stated it would expect four narratives plus any referenced attorney engagement letters and needed the materials by November 17, 2017, to prepare the special meeting package.

6. Lewis Smith alleged that the Desert Isle HOA Board members met to discuss and add an amendment prohibiting short-term rentals without conducting the meetings openly. He stated that no proper notice or agenda was provided to inform members of the matters to be discussed before the issue became a ballot vote.

7. At the December 16, 2017 meeting, the proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals was voted on by homeowners. Nine homeowners voted in favor of the amendment, and six homeowners voted against it.

8. The Judge found that the Board violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804(F). The violation occurred when the Board failed to provide an agenda with information reasonably necessary to inform members that an amendment to the CC&Rs prohibiting short-term rentals would be discussed at the board meetings on November 8 and November 20, 2017.

9. The documents provide two definitions. The first is “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The second, from Black’s Law Dictionary, is “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge’s order required the Respondent (Desert Isle HOA) to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by statute.

Essay Questions

1. Construct a detailed timeline of events from the initial petition by Lewis Smith on October 23, 2017, to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision on May 29, 2018. Include all key meetings, communications, and legal filings mentioned in the documents.

2. Analyze the ways in which the Desert Isle Homeowners Association Board failed to comply with the open meeting policies outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Use specific examples from the meeting agendas and communications to support the analysis.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain who held the burden of proof for the violation and any affirmative defenses, and how the “preponderance of the evidence” standard was met by the Petitioner.

4. Compare and contrast the two petitions submitted by homeowners in October 2017. Evaluate how the Board handled each request and the procedural steps it took that ultimately led to the legal dispute.

5. Based on the findings of fact, evaluate the communication between the Desert Isle HOA Board and its members. Discuss the effectiveness and legality of the Board’s notices, agendas, and email correspondence regarding the special meeting and the proposed CC&R amendment.

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson. The ALJ hears evidence and issues a decision based on findings of fact and conclusions of law.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804

An Arizona state statute governing meetings in planned communities. It requires open meetings, proper notice to members (between 10 and 50 days prior), and agendas that are reasonably necessary to inform members of matters to be discussed or decided.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-2198.01

An Arizona state statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or relevant statutes.

Board of Directors (Board)

The governing body of the Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc. At the time of the events, key members included Doug Robinson (President), Curt Carlson, and Mike Andrews.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden for any affirmative defenses.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents of the Desert Isle planned community. The petitions submitted by homeowners sought to amend these documents.

Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; the planned community organization and non-profit corporation responsible for managing the Desert Isle community.

Lewis Smith

The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner in the Desert Isle community who filed a petition against the HOA.

Notice of Hearing

A formal notification issued by the Department of Real Estate setting the date and location for an administrative hearing. In this case, it was issued on January 22, 2018.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state tribunal where the hearing for this case was conducted.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Lewis Smith.

Post-hearing Briefs

Written legal arguments submitted by parties after a hearing has concluded. The record in this case was held open until May 9, 2018, to receive these briefs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to convince the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

Reserve Study

A study to determine an association’s long-term capital needs for its common areas. Lewis Smith’s petition requested a discussion about obtaining one.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.

Special Meeting

A meeting of association members called for a specific purpose outside of regularly scheduled meetings. Both petitions in this case requested a special meeting.

Select all sources
629473.pdf
629515.pdf
636989.pdf

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18F-H1817020-REL

3 sources

The provided documents are related to a legal dispute between Lewis Smith and the Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc., heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The first two sources, 629473.pdf and 629515.pdf, are identical “Order Holding Record Open” documents dated April 18, 2018, which mandated that the parties submit post-hearing briefs by specific deadlines and required the Homeowners Association to clarify its objection to a specific exhibit. The final source, 636989.pdf, is the “Administrative Law Judge Decision” issued on May 29, 2018, which found that the Homeowners Association violated Arizona law by failing to properly inform members that they would be discussing a proposed amendment to prohibit short-term rentals at two special board meetings. Ultimately, the judge granted Lewis Smith’s petition and ordered the Homeowners Association to pay the required filing fee.

3 sources

Based on 3 sources

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lewis Smith (petitioner)
  • Mark J. Bainbridge (petitioner attorney)
    The Bainbridge Law Firm LLC
  • William H. Winn (homeowner)
    Submitted petition with Petitioner
  • Kevin Barnett (homeowner)
    Submitted petition with Petitioner
  • Chester Jay (homeowner)
    Submitted petition with Petitioner
  • Mike Sharp (homeowner/representative)
    Representative for Kevin Barnett
  • Kim Sharp (homeowner/representative)
    Representative for Kevin Barnett

Respondent Side

  • William D. Condray (respondent attorney)
  • Doug Robinson (board member)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Board President
  • Curt Carlson (board member)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Mike Andrews (board member)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
  • Greg Yacoubian (homeowner/board member)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Replaced Mike Andrews on 11/20/17
  • Judy Carlson (HOA officer)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Treasurer
  • Terri Robinson (HOA officer)
    Desert Isle Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Secretary
  • Jamie Kelly (HOA attorney)
    Consulted on Special Meeting package

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M.Aguirre (Clerk/Admin)
    Transmitting agent
  • LDettorre (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • djones (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission
  • ncano (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of transmission

Other Participants

  • Terry Constantino (homeowner/attendee)
  • Lynn Hammond (homeowner/attendee)
  • Dale Collins (guest speaker)

Charles Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817006-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-06
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA did not violate its CC&Rs by allowing play structures on properties that already contained a detached garage or shed, because play structures are not easily convertible into a second residence, which was the underlying concern of the relevant CC&R section.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles Mandela Counsel
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association Counsel Brian C. Axt, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a); Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA did not violate its CC&Rs by allowing play structures on properties that already contained a detached garage or shed, because play structures are not easily convertible into a second residence, which was the underlying concern of the relevant CC&R section.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated CC&R § 3.1. The ALJ determined that the HOA correctly clarified the status of play structures through an amendment to the Architectural Committee's regulations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) regarding allowing play structures (swing sets, treehouses) when another detached structure (garage or shed) is present.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) by permitting members to construct play structures (swingsets, treehouses, etc.) on properties that already contained one detached structure (garage or shed), arguing that the rules allowed only one detached structure of any type.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied because he failed to establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances. All play structures that the Architectural Committee has previously approved are allowed to remain, and the Architectural Committee may consider and grant future Play Structure Approval Requests.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, CC&R interpretation, detached structures, play structures, Architectural Committee regulations, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817006-REL Decision – 604710.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:07:52 (155.4 KB)

18F-H1817006-REL Decision – 604710.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:47 (155.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between a homeowner, Charles Mandela (“Petitioner”), and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by permitting homeowners to install play structures (e.g., swing sets, treehouses) on lots that already contained another detached structure, such as a garage or shed.

The Petitioner argued that the HOA had historically enforced a strict “one detached structure” rule and that its recent allowance of play structures constituted a violation of CC&R § 3.1. In contrast, the Respondent contended that the underlying intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent secondary residential dwellings, not to prohibit recreational structures consistent with a family-oriented community. The HOA asserted it had properly amended its Architectural Committee regulations, not the CC&Rs, to clarify this distinction.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent HOA. The central finding was that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to maintain the single-family residential character of the community. Because play structures cannot be easily converted into secondary residences, they are not inconsistent with this intent. The ALJ concluded that the HOA was not required to amend the CC&Rs (which requires a 75% member vote) but acted within its authority to amend its rules and regulations via a simple board vote. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Overview

Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Charles Mandela

Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association

Hearing Date: November 28, 2017

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D) by allowing members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on properties that already had another detached structure like a garage or shed.

Central Arguments and Presented Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.

Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.

Evidence and Testimony:

Historical Enforcement: Testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA enforced this rule by removing nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo, a playhouse, an observation deck, and a zipline structure.

2006 Legal Opinion: Submitted a February 7, 2006, letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC, which opined on the ambiguity of CC&R § 3.1. The letter stated, “It still appears that only one structure (garage or shed) is permitted,” and supported the HOA’s ability to “enforce the ‘one detached structure’ requirement.” The letter did not specifically mention play structures.

Invalid Approval Form: Presented a “Play Structure Approval Request” form he had drafted while on the board. This form incorrectly stated that the Board of Directors had voted on June 25, 2016, “to adopt changes to the CCR’s [sic], which will allow play structures.” Petitioner argued this was invalid because changing the CC&Rs requires a 75% vote of the membership, which was not obtained.

Ancillary Documents: Submitted documents related to a housing discrimination claim filed by the HOA’s current president, Joseph Hancock, and a letter concerning another member. Petitioner testified these matters involved play structures, though the documents themselves did not mention CC&R § 3.1.

Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)

The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.

Core Argument: The HOA did not violate the CC&Rs because the intent of the relevant articles is to prohibit secondary residential dwellings, not recreational structures suitable for a community intended to be a “uniquely planned recreation property.”

Evidence and Testimony:

Community Status: There are currently 16 swingsets or play structures within the 193-lot development. The HOA president, Joseph Hancock, testified he has a swingset used by his children, grandchildren, and neighbors.

Legal Counsel: The HOA retained the firm of Poli & Ball, PLC, which opined that because the community is for recreation and family use, “[p]lay structures are perfectly consistent with recreation and family use.” The firm advised that the Architectural Committee’s regulations could be changed to reflect this without amending the CC&Rs. Another law firm, Carpenter Hazlewood, generally agreed with this opinion.

Correction of Clerical Error: Mr. Hancock testified that the form submitted by the Petitioner contained a typographical error. The board’s intent in its June 25, 2016, vote was to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations, not the CC&Rs.

Board Meeting Minutes: The HOA submitted minutes from board meetings in December 2016 and October 2017. These minutes document the board’s discovery of the error on the website form and subsequent votes to formally clarify that the change was to the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs, thereby ratifying its decision.

Amended Approval Form: Respondent submitted the corrected “Play Structure Approval Request” form, which states, “Per the modified Rules and Regulations dated April 6, 2016, this form must be submitted to Architectural Committee for approval of any Play Structure.”

Governing Rules and Covenants

The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.

Document / Section

Key Provision

CC&R § 3.1

“No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage… No garage or shed shall be built prior to the issuance of a Coconino County building permit for the construction of a Single Family Residence.”

Architectural Regulation 3(D)

“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”

CC&R § 4.2

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”

CC&R § 12.2

Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale

The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.

Intent of the Covenant: The Judge determined that CC&R Article III is fundamentally “concerned with keeping Respondent single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second residential dwelling on a lot.” This interpretation is supported by other rules in the article prohibiting mobile homes and clarifying that “If you can live/sleep in it, you cannot park it” in the development.

Status of Play Structures: The decision concludes that a play structure “cannot be easily converted into a second residence.” Therefore, permitting a play structure in addition to a garage or shed is not inconsistent with the primary purpose of CC&R § 3.1.

Board Authority vs. Member Vote: Because allowing play structures was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not required to amend the CC&Rs through a 75% member vote. Instead, the Board was empowered by CC&R § 4.2 to “amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to provide clarification on the status of play structures” through a majority vote of the Board.

History of Enforcement: The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to establish a uniform history of enforcement against play structures. Rather, “it appears that the status of play structures, swingsets, and tree houses has been unsettled and the subject of some contention,” partly due to the Petitioner’s own advocacy.

Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.

Final Order and Implications

Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.

Outcome for the Community:

1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.

2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.

3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.

Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision No. 18F-H1817006-REL

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties in case No. 18F-H1817006-REL, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific violation did the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, allege against the Respondent?

3. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bears the initial burden?

4. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the CC&Rs and amending the “Rules and Regulations”?

5. What was the Petitioner’s primary evidence to support his claim that the HOA historically enforced a “one detached structure” rule?

6. How did the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates HOA, legally justify its decision to permit play structures even on lots that already had a detached garage or shed?

7. How did the Respondent explain the document from its website which stated that the Board had voted to “adopt changes to the CCR’s”?

8. What did the law firm Poli & Ball conclude regarding the permissibility of play structures within the community?

9. What did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky determine was the primary intent of Article III of the CC&Rs?

10. What was the final Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, and the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association. Mr. Mandela is a homeowner within the Blue Ridge Estates development and a member of the homeowners’ association.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D). He claimed the HOA wrongly allowed members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on their properties when another detached structure, such as a garage or shed, already existed.

3. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must convince the judge that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Charles Mandela, bears the initial burden of proof to establish that a violation occurred.

4. To amend the CC&Rs (the Declaration), an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots is required. In contrast, the Board of Directors can adopt, amend, or repeal “Rules and Regulations” by a simple majority vote of the Board.

5. The Petitioner testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA removed nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo and a playhouse. He also submitted a 2006 letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, which opined that the HOA could enforce a “one detached structure” requirement.

6. The Respondent argued that the intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent second residential dwellings on a lot, not to prohibit recreational items consistent with a family community. Therefore, the Board acted within its authority under CC&R § 4.2 to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to clarify that play structures are permitted.

7. The Respondent’s president, Joseph Hancock, testified that the wording was a typographical error made by the previous Chair of the Architectural Committee (the Petitioner). Board meeting minutes from December 2016 and October 2017 were submitted as evidence to show the Board’s actual intent was to modify the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs.

8. The Poli & Ball law firm opined that play structures are “perfectly consistent with recreation and family use” in a community intended to be a planned recreation property. The firm concluded that the HOA could change the Architectural Committee’s regulations to allow them as long as the change was consistent with the CC&Rs.

9. The Judge concluded that the purpose of Article III is to keep the community single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second dwelling. Since a play structure cannot be easily converted into a second residence, allowing one did not violate the intent of the CC&Rs.

10. The Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge found that the Petitioner had not established that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances, and that the HOA had properly resolved the issue by amending its regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon specific facts, arguments, and legal principles from the source document.

1. Discuss the critical distinction between amending the community’s CC&Rs and amending the Architectural Committee’s regulations. Explain how this distinction became the central pivot upon which the entire case turned.

2. Analyze the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s exhibits and testimony, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Respondent’s evidence more persuasive.

3. The “Conclusions of Law” section discusses the legal principle of interpreting restrictive covenants based on the “intent of the parties.” How did Judge Mihalsky apply this principle to CC&R § 3.1, and how did the community’s stated purpose as a “uniquely planned recreation property” influence this interpretation?

4. Charles Mandela, the Petitioner, was a former board member and president of the Architectural Committee who drafted one of the key documents in question. Discuss how his past involvement in HOA governance may have shaped his legal position and the evidence he presented.

5. Trace the timeline of the “play structure” controversy as detailed in the hearing evidence, from the 2015 discrimination claim to the “clarification vote” in October 2017. How does this sequence of events illustrate the challenges of community governance and rule interpretation within a homeowners’ association?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, the ALJ from the Office of Administrative Hearings heard the dispute between the homeowner and the HOA.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for approving any construction, alteration, or improvement to the exterior of any property to ensure it complies with community standards.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this hearing, the Petitioner had the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A legally binding document that governs a planned community or subdivision. It outlines the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.

Declaration

The formal legal document that creates the homeowners’ association and its CC&Rs. In this case, amending the Declaration required a 75% vote of the members.

Detached Structure

A building on a property that is separate from the main residence. The dispute centered on whether play structures counted as the “one detached structure” permitted by the CC&Rs.

Improvements

A broad term defined in the CC&Rs (§ 1.17) to include buildings, garages, fences, walls, landscaping, and all other structures of every type and kind on a property.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The judge noted that if Title 33 did not apply, the Office of Administrative Hearings would lack jurisdiction to hear the case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, homeowner Charles Mandela.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a claim is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&Rs that limits the use of the property. The “one detached structure” rule is an example of a restrictive covenant.

Single Family Residential Use

The designated purpose of the properties in Blue Ridge Estates, meaning they are to be used exclusively as private homes for single families, not for commercial or multi-family dwelling purposes.

Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between a homeowner, Charles Mandela (“Petitioner”), and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by permitting homeowners to install play structures (e.g., swing sets, treehouses) on lots that already contained another detached structure, such as a garage or shed.

The Petitioner argued that the HOA had historically enforced a strict “one detached structure” rule and that its recent allowance of play structures constituted a violation of CC&R § 3.1. In contrast, the Respondent contended that the underlying intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent secondary residential dwellings, not to prohibit recreational structures consistent with a family-oriented community. The HOA asserted it had properly amended its Architectural Committee regulations, not the CC&Rs, to clarify this distinction.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent HOA. The central finding was that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to maintain the single-family residential character of the community. Because play structures cannot be easily converted into secondary residences, they are not inconsistent with this intent. The ALJ concluded that the HOA was not required to amend the CC&Rs (which requires a 75% member vote) but acted within its authority to amend its rules and regulations via a simple board vote. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Overview

Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL

Parties:

Petitioner: Charles Mandela

Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association

Hearing Date: November 28, 2017

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D) by allowing members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on properties that already had another detached structure like a garage or shed.

Central Arguments and Presented Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.

Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.

Evidence and Testimony:

Historical Enforcement: Testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA enforced this rule by removing nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo, a playhouse, an observation deck, and a zipline structure.

2006 Legal Opinion: Submitted a February 7, 2006, letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC, which opined on the ambiguity of CC&R § 3.1. The letter stated, “It still appears that only one structure (garage or shed) is permitted,” and supported the HOA’s ability to “enforce the ‘one detached structure’ requirement.” The letter did not specifically mention play structures.

Invalid Approval Form: Presented a “Play Structure Approval Request” form he had drafted while on the board. This form incorrectly stated that the Board of Directors had voted on June 25, 2016, “to adopt changes to the CCR’s [sic], which will allow play structures.” Petitioner argued this was invalid because changing the CC&Rs requires a 75% vote of the membership, which was not obtained.

Ancillary Documents: Submitted documents related to a housing discrimination claim filed by the HOA’s current president, Joseph Hancock, and a letter concerning another member. Petitioner testified these matters involved play structures, though the documents themselves did not mention CC&R § 3.1.

Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)

The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.

Core Argument: The HOA did not violate the CC&Rs because the intent of the relevant articles is to prohibit secondary residential dwellings, not recreational structures suitable for a community intended to be a “uniquely planned recreation property.”

Evidence and Testimony:

Community Status: There are currently 16 swingsets or play structures within the 193-lot development. The HOA president, Joseph Hancock, testified he has a swingset used by his children, grandchildren, and neighbors.

Legal Counsel: The HOA retained the firm of Poli & Ball, PLC, which opined that because the community is for recreation and family use, “[p]lay structures are perfectly consistent with recreation and family use.” The firm advised that the Architectural Committee’s regulations could be changed to reflect this without amending the CC&Rs. Another law firm, Carpenter Hazlewood, generally agreed with this opinion.

Correction of Clerical Error: Mr. Hancock testified that the form submitted by the Petitioner contained a typographical error. The board’s intent in its June 25, 2016, vote was to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations, not the CC&Rs.

Board Meeting Minutes: The HOA submitted minutes from board meetings in December 2016 and October 2017. These minutes document the board’s discovery of the error on the website form and subsequent votes to formally clarify that the change was to the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs, thereby ratifying its decision.

Amended Approval Form: Respondent submitted the corrected “Play Structure Approval Request” form, which states, “Per the modified Rules and Regulations dated April 6, 2016, this form must be submitted to Architectural Committee for approval of any Play Structure.”

Governing Rules and Covenants

The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.

Document / Section

Key Provision

CC&R § 3.1

“No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage… No garage or shed shall be built prior to the issuance of a Coconino County building permit for the construction of a Single Family Residence.”

Architectural Regulation 3(D)

“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”

CC&R § 4.2

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”

CC&R § 12.2

Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale

The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.

Intent of the Covenant: The Judge determined that CC&R Article III is fundamentally “concerned with keeping Respondent single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second residential dwelling on a lot.” This interpretation is supported by other rules in the article prohibiting mobile homes and clarifying that “If you can live/sleep in it, you cannot park it” in the development.

Status of Play Structures: The decision concludes that a play structure “cannot be easily converted into a second residence.” Therefore, permitting a play structure in addition to a garage or shed is not inconsistent with the primary purpose of CC&R § 3.1.

Board Authority vs. Member Vote: Because allowing play structures was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not required to amend the CC&Rs through a 75% member vote. Instead, the Board was empowered by CC&R § 4.2 to “amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to provide clarification on the status of play structures” through a majority vote of the Board.

History of Enforcement: The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to establish a uniform history of enforcement against play structures. Rather, “it appears that the status of play structures, swingsets, and tree houses has been unsettled and the subject of some contention,” partly due to the Petitioner’s own advocacy.

Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.

Final Order and Implications

Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.

Outcome for the Community:

1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.

2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.

3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles Mandela (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf; previously served as president of the Architectural Committee.

Respondent Side

  • Brian C. Axt (attorney)
    Resnick & Louis, P.C.
    Represented Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.
  • Joseph Hancock (board member)
    Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association
    Board's president; presented testimony/witness for Respondent.
  • Jason Miller (counsel)
    Carpenter Hazlewood
    Provided an email opinion supporting the Respondent's position.

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate