David Y. Samuels v. The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H025-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2024-04-18
Administrative Law Judge Amy M. Haley
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner David Y. Samuels Counsel
Respondent The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association Counsel Ashley N. Turner

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Outcome Summary

The petition filed by David Y. Samuels against The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association was dismissed. The Tribunal found that Samuels lacked standing to bring the action as an individual, and the cited statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803 (Planned Community Act), was improper for this condominium dispute.

Why this result: Petitioner lacked standing because the property was owned by Daso Properties, LLC, not by David Y. Samuels individually. Additionally, the Petitioner brought the action under the incorrect statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs planned communities, not condominiums.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation concerning late fees, collection fees, and attorney fees for delinquent assessment payments

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 by charging unwarranted late fees, collection fees, and attorney fees for delinquent assessments.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed because Petitioner lacked standing as an individual owner, and the cause of action was brought under the improper statute (Planned Community Act) for a condominium property.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: standing, condominium, planned community act, statutory violation, late fees, collection fees, attorney fees, jurisdiction, dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-106(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1124651.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1133120.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1134423.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1139633.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1139646.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1157271.pdf

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24F-H025-REL Decision – 1168680.pdf

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Questions

Question

If my property is owned by an LLC, can I file a petition against the HOA in my own name as the managing member?

Short Answer

No. The petition must be filed by the legal owner (the LLC), not an individual member, or it will be dismissed for lack of standing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that an individual managing member of an LLC does not have standing to bring an action on behalf of the property owned by the LLC. The dispute statute specifically applies to 'owners' and 'associations'.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal finds that, after taking testimony, Petitioner, as an individual, did not have standing to bring this action… The proper party to bring the action would have been Daso Properties, LLC.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • standing
  • LLC ownership
  • procedural requirements

Question

Can I use laws meant for Planned Communities (A.R.S. § 33-1803) to dispute charges if I live in a Condominium?

Short Answer

No. Condominiums are governed by a different set of statutes (Chapter 9) than Planned Communities (Chapter 16).

Detailed Answer

The ALJ dismissed the claim because the homeowner cited the Planned Community Act (A.R.S. § 33-1803) while the property was legally a condominium. Condominiums are not subject to the Planned Community Act.

Alj Quote

However, the Property is a condominium; therefore, Respondent is not subject to the Planned Community Act. … Chapter 9 governs condominiums.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • condominium vs planned community
  • statutory application

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction to hear a dispute if I am not the legal owner of the property?

Short Answer

No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to disputes specifically between an owner and an association.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that the administrative hearing process is strictly for disputes involving an 'owner' or 'association'. If the petitioner is not the legal owner (even if they manage the LLC that owns it), the Department lacks jurisdiction.

Alj Quote

The department does not have jurisdiction to hear a dispute that does not involve an owner or an association.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • standing
  • homeowner rights

Question

Who has the burden of proof when a homeowner claims an HOA violated state laws?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

In these administrative hearings, it is the responsibility of the person bringing the complaint to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 as alleged in his petition.

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I base my entire petition on a statute that doesn't apply to my type of property?

Short Answer

The petition will be dismissed because you have stated no claim upon which relief can be granted.

Detailed Answer

Because the petitioner cited the wrong statute (Planned Community Act for a Condominium), the judge ruled that there was no valid legal claim to rule on, resulting in dismissal.

Alj Quote

As such, Petitioner has stated no claim upon which relief can be granted under A.R.S. § 33-1801.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801

Topic Tags

  • dismissal
  • legal procedure
  • condominium act

Case

Docket No
24F-H025-REL
Case Title
David Y. Samuels vs The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association
Decision Date
2024-04-18
Alj Name
Amy M. Haley
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If my property is owned by an LLC, can I file a petition against the HOA in my own name as the managing member?

Short Answer

No. The petition must be filed by the legal owner (the LLC), not an individual member, or it will be dismissed for lack of standing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that an individual managing member of an LLC does not have standing to bring an action on behalf of the property owned by the LLC. The dispute statute specifically applies to 'owners' and 'associations'.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal finds that, after taking testimony, Petitioner, as an individual, did not have standing to bring this action… The proper party to bring the action would have been Daso Properties, LLC.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • standing
  • LLC ownership
  • procedural requirements

Question

Can I use laws meant for Planned Communities (A.R.S. § 33-1803) to dispute charges if I live in a Condominium?

Short Answer

No. Condominiums are governed by a different set of statutes (Chapter 9) than Planned Communities (Chapter 16).

Detailed Answer

The ALJ dismissed the claim because the homeowner cited the Planned Community Act (A.R.S. § 33-1803) while the property was legally a condominium. Condominiums are not subject to the Planned Community Act.

Alj Quote

However, the Property is a condominium; therefore, Respondent is not subject to the Planned Community Act. … Chapter 9 governs condominiums.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • condominium vs planned community
  • statutory application

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction to hear a dispute if I am not the legal owner of the property?

Short Answer

No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to disputes specifically between an owner and an association.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that the administrative hearing process is strictly for disputes involving an 'owner' or 'association'. If the petitioner is not the legal owner (even if they manage the LLC that owns it), the Department lacks jurisdiction.

Alj Quote

The department does not have jurisdiction to hear a dispute that does not involve an owner or an association.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • standing
  • homeowner rights

Question

Who has the burden of proof when a homeowner claims an HOA violated state laws?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

In these administrative hearings, it is the responsibility of the person bringing the complaint to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 as alleged in his petition.

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I base my entire petition on a statute that doesn't apply to my type of property?

Short Answer

The petition will be dismissed because you have stated no claim upon which relief can be granted.

Detailed Answer

Because the petitioner cited the wrong statute (Planned Community Act for a Condominium), the judge ruled that there was no valid legal claim to rule on, resulting in dismissal.

Alj Quote

As such, Petitioner has stated no claim upon which relief can be granted under A.R.S. § 33-1801.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801

Topic Tags

  • dismissal
  • legal procedure
  • condominium act

Case

Docket No
24F-H025-REL
Case Title
David Y. Samuels vs The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association
Decision Date
2024-04-18
Alj Name
Amy M. Haley
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • David Y. Samuels (petitioner)
    Daso Properties, LLC
    Managing member of the property owner (Daso Properties, LLC); Appeared on his own behalf.

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Turner (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Council for respondent; Also appeared as Ashley N. Moscarello in earlier filings.
  • Alyssa Butler (community manager)
    The Management Trust (TMT)
    Witness for the association.
  • Stephanie Beck (HOA staff)
    Involved in prior HOA correspondence regarding fines.
  • Catherine Green (HOA staff)
    Involved in prior HOA correspondence regarding fines.

Neutral Parties

  • Amy M. Haley (ALJ)
    OAH
    Conducted the hearing and issued the final decision.
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Issued an order on March 19, 2024.
  • A. Hansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • V. Nunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • L. Abril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • M. Neat (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • A. Kowaleski (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • G. Osborn (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].

Gregory Ehle V. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-07-11
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gregory Ehle Counsel
Respondent Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Emily H. Mann, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition after finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to show that the Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning an emergency board meeting. The evidence established that no such meeting took place, and the statute does not require the Board to hold one.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, as he conceded he did not know if an emergency meeting was held and could not provide legal authority showing that one was required.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation regarding an emergency meeting of the board members.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) concerning the procedures for an emergency board meeting, specifically regarding a message sent out by the HOA's managing agent. The case proceeded on this single issue after Petitioner failed to pay the required additional filing fees for four total issues claimed.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not hold an emergency board meeting and was not required by A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) to hold one.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: emergency meeting, board of directors, failure to pay filing fee, burden of proof, dismissal, A.R.S. 33-1804
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964714.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 964973.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965150.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 965339.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967084.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967089.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 967102.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 973304.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 977404.pdf

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22F-H2222031-REL Decision – 982867.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:09 (106.4 KB)

Questions

Question

Is my HOA board legally required to hold an emergency meeting for urgent matters?

Short Answer

No, the statute allows for emergency meetings but does not mandate them.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that while state law permits a board to call an emergency meeting for issues that cannot wait 48 hours, the homeowner failed to prove there is any legal requirement forcing the board to hold one. The board has the discretion to call such meetings but is not obligated to do so.

Alj Quote

Mr. Ehle failed to provide any legal authority in his petition or at hearing to support his contention that the Board was required to hold an emergency board meeting.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • board obligations

Question

Who is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the law?

Short Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the complaint must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Can I be penalized if I don't pay the full filing fees for all my complaints?

Short Answer

Yes, the tribunal will limit the hearing to only the issues covered by the paid fees.

Detailed Answer

If a homeowner alleges multiple violations but only pays the filing fee for one, the tribunal may dismiss the unpaid claims and order the homeowner to choose a single issue to proceed with at the hearing.

Alj Quote

The tribunal ordered Petitioner to pay an additional $1,500 for the four issues claimed. However, Petitioner failed to do so… IT IS ORDERED that the single issue to be addressed at hearing is an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)…

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure

Question

Can I punish my HOA for failing to produce minutes for a meeting they claim never happened?

Short Answer

No, if no meeting was held, there are no minutes to produce.

Detailed Answer

You cannot successfully claim a procedural violation (like missing minutes) for a meeting that did not take place. If the evidence shows no meeting occurred, the claim will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

The weight of the evidence shows that Fulton Ranch did not hold an emergency board meeting… Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Mr. Ehle has failed to establish that Fulton Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) and the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • meeting minutes
  • evidence

Question

What qualifies as an 'emergency' for an HOA board meeting?

Short Answer

Matters that cannot be delayed for the standard 48-hour notice period.

Detailed Answer

State law defines an emergency meeting as one called to discuss business or take action that is too urgent to wait for the standard 48 hours required for notice of a regular meeting.

Alj Quote

An emergency meeting of the board of directors may be called to discuss business or take action that cannot be delayed for the forty-eight hours required for notice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • definitions

Question

Can I attend my HOA dispute hearing virtually?

Short Answer

Yes, hearings can be conducted via video conferencing or telephone.

Detailed Answer

The Office of Administrative Hearings allows parties to appear either in person or virtually (e.g., via Google Meet) for the proceedings.

Alj Quote

Either party may appear virtually or in person for the hearing.

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • hearings
  • procedure

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This is the standard of proof used in these hearings. It is not about the number of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222031-REL
Case Title
Gregory Ehle v. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2022-07-11
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Is my HOA board legally required to hold an emergency meeting for urgent matters?

Short Answer

No, the statute allows for emergency meetings but does not mandate them.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that while state law permits a board to call an emergency meeting for issues that cannot wait 48 hours, the homeowner failed to prove there is any legal requirement forcing the board to hold one. The board has the discretion to call such meetings but is not obligated to do so.

Alj Quote

Mr. Ehle failed to provide any legal authority in his petition or at hearing to support his contention that the Board was required to hold an emergency board meeting.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • board obligations

Question

Who is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the law?

Short Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the complaint must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning they must show it is more likely than not that the violation occurred.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the Act or Respondent’s CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

Can I be penalized if I don't pay the full filing fees for all my complaints?

Short Answer

Yes, the tribunal will limit the hearing to only the issues covered by the paid fees.

Detailed Answer

If a homeowner alleges multiple violations but only pays the filing fee for one, the tribunal may dismiss the unpaid claims and order the homeowner to choose a single issue to proceed with at the hearing.

Alj Quote

The tribunal ordered Petitioner to pay an additional $1,500 for the four issues claimed. However, Petitioner failed to do so… IT IS ORDERED that the single issue to be addressed at hearing is an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)…

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure

Question

Can I punish my HOA for failing to produce minutes for a meeting they claim never happened?

Short Answer

No, if no meeting was held, there are no minutes to produce.

Detailed Answer

You cannot successfully claim a procedural violation (like missing minutes) for a meeting that did not take place. If the evidence shows no meeting occurred, the claim will be dismissed.

Alj Quote

The weight of the evidence shows that Fulton Ranch did not hold an emergency board meeting… Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Mr. Ehle has failed to establish that Fulton Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2) and the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • meeting minutes
  • evidence

Question

What qualifies as an 'emergency' for an HOA board meeting?

Short Answer

Matters that cannot be delayed for the standard 48-hour notice period.

Detailed Answer

State law defines an emergency meeting as one called to discuss business or take action that is too urgent to wait for the standard 48 hours required for notice of a regular meeting.

Alj Quote

An emergency meeting of the board of directors may be called to discuss business or take action that cannot be delayed for the forty-eight hours required for notice.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(2)

Topic Tags

  • emergency meetings
  • definitions

Question

Can I attend my HOA dispute hearing virtually?

Short Answer

Yes, hearings can be conducted via video conferencing or telephone.

Detailed Answer

The Office of Administrative Hearings allows parties to appear either in person or virtually (e.g., via Google Meet) for the proceedings.

Alj Quote

Either party may appear virtually or in person for the hearing.

Legal Basis

Procedural Order

Topic Tags

  • hearings
  • procedure

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This is the standard of proof used in these hearings. It is not about the number of witnesses, but the convincing force of the evidence that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Alj Quote

“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222031-REL
Case Title
Gregory Ehle v. Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association
Decision Date
2022-07-11
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gregory Ehle (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself.

Respondent Side

  • Emily H. Mann (HOA attorney)
    Phillips, Maceyko & Battock, PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Fulton Ranch Homeowners Association.
  • Kevin Hardy (witness)
    CCMC
    Division Vice President for Fulton Ranch's Community Manager (CCMC).

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Miranda Alvarez (legal secretary)
    OAH
    Handled document transmission.
  • c. serrano (staff)
    OAH
    Handled document transmission.
  • A. Hansen (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.
  • v. nunez (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.
  • d. jones (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.
  • l. abril (staff)
    ADRE
    Listed as contact for ADRE.

Other Participants

  • Natasha Bell (community manager)
    CCMC
    Former CCMC employee who served as the association's community manager in 2020.

Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2222035-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-06-24
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh Counsel
Respondent Cimmarron Superstition HOA Counsel Christopher Hanlon

Alleged Violations

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition filed by Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh against the Cimmarron Superstition HOA be dismissed, as the Petitioners failed to appear at the hearing set on their behalf and thus failed to meet the required burden of proof.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to appear at the hearing on June 24, 2022, and consequently did not present evidence to satisfy the burden of proof required under A.A.C. R2-19-119.

Key Issues & Findings

Petition Dismissal for Failure to Appear

Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to appear at the scheduled hearing and therefore presented no evidence to meet their burden of proof.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: dismissal, failure to appear, burden of proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 968715.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:45:27 (33.0 KB)

22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 969556.pdf

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22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 979812.pdf

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22F-H2222035-REL Decision – 989050.pdf

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Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving the claims in an HOA dispute hearing?

Short Answer

The petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the burden of proof lies with the party bringing the action (the Petitioners). If they fail to present evidence to support their petition, they cannot prevail.

Alj Quote

The burden of proof in this matter is on Petitioners. See A.A.C. R2-19-119.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I fail to attend my scheduled administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The petition will likely be dismissed because you failed to meet the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

Attendance is mandatory to present evidence. If a petitioner fails to appear, they offer no evidence to support their claims. Consequently, the ALJ will find that they failed to meet the burden of proof and will order the petition dismissed.

Alj Quote

By failing to appear at the hearing, Petitioners failed to meet the required burden of proof. Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Failure to Prosecute / Default

Topic Tags

  • attendance
  • procedural requirements
  • dismissal

Question

Is there a grace period if I am late to my hearing?

Short Answer

The judge may allow a short grace period (e.g., 15 minutes), but if you do not appear or contact the office by then, the hearing proceeds without you.

Detailed Answer

In this specific instance, the hearing was scheduled for 9:00 AM, but the judge noted on the record that the hearing did not start until approximately 9:15 AM to allow for a grace period. Since no one appeared or contacted the office to request a delay, the dismissal proceeded.

Alj Quote

Although the hearing did not start until approximately 9:15 a.m., no one appeared on behalf of Petitioners through an attorney, or contact the OAH to request that the start of the hearing be further delayed.

Legal Basis

Procedural Discretion

Topic Tags

  • attendance
  • procedural requirements

Question

What is the deadline for requesting a rehearing after a decision is issued?

Short Answer

You must file a request for rehearing with the Commissioner within 30 days of service of the order.

Detailed Answer

If a party disagrees with the ALJ's decision, they have a strict 30-day window from the date of service of the order to file a request for a rehearing with the Real Estate Commissioner.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this Order upon the parties.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

  • appeals
  • rehearing
  • deadlines

Question

Can I file an appeal or new documents directly with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) after the case is closed?

Short Answer

No, once the OAH has issued its decision, it generally cannot take further action or consider new documents.

Detailed Answer

Once the ALJ issues the final order or dismissal, the OAH loses jurisdiction to act further on the matter. Subsequent filings, such as notices of appeal or new evidence, will not be considered by the OAH.

Alj Quote

The documents will not be considered because no further action can be taken on the matter by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Legal Basis

Jurisdiction

Topic Tags

  • appeals
  • jurisdiction
  • procedural requirements

Question

Is the Administrative Law Judge's order automatically binding?

Short Answer

Yes, the order is binding on all parties unless a rehearing is officially granted.

Detailed Answer

The decision issued by the ALJ carries the weight of law and binds the parties involved immediately, subject only to the granting of a specific motion for rehearing.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), this Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • enforcement

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222035-REL
Case Title
Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh v. Cimmarron Superstition HOA
Decision Date
2022-06-24
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving the claims in an HOA dispute hearing?

Short Answer

The petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute, the burden of proof lies with the party bringing the action (the Petitioners). If they fail to present evidence to support their petition, they cannot prevail.

Alj Quote

The burden of proof in this matter is on Petitioners. See A.A.C. R2-19-119.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I fail to attend my scheduled administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The petition will likely be dismissed because you failed to meet the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

Attendance is mandatory to present evidence. If a petitioner fails to appear, they offer no evidence to support their claims. Consequently, the ALJ will find that they failed to meet the burden of proof and will order the petition dismissed.

Alj Quote

By failing to appear at the hearing, Petitioners failed to meet the required burden of proof. Therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

Legal Basis

Failure to Prosecute / Default

Topic Tags

  • attendance
  • procedural requirements
  • dismissal

Question

Is there a grace period if I am late to my hearing?

Short Answer

The judge may allow a short grace period (e.g., 15 minutes), but if you do not appear or contact the office by then, the hearing proceeds without you.

Detailed Answer

In this specific instance, the hearing was scheduled for 9:00 AM, but the judge noted on the record that the hearing did not start until approximately 9:15 AM to allow for a grace period. Since no one appeared or contacted the office to request a delay, the dismissal proceeded.

Alj Quote

Although the hearing did not start until approximately 9:15 a.m., no one appeared on behalf of Petitioners through an attorney, or contact the OAH to request that the start of the hearing be further delayed.

Legal Basis

Procedural Discretion

Topic Tags

  • attendance
  • procedural requirements

Question

What is the deadline for requesting a rehearing after a decision is issued?

Short Answer

You must file a request for rehearing with the Commissioner within 30 days of service of the order.

Detailed Answer

If a party disagrees with the ALJ's decision, they have a strict 30-day window from the date of service of the order to file a request for a rehearing with the Real Estate Commissioner.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this Order upon the parties.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

  • appeals
  • rehearing
  • deadlines

Question

Can I file an appeal or new documents directly with the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) after the case is closed?

Short Answer

No, once the OAH has issued its decision, it generally cannot take further action or consider new documents.

Detailed Answer

Once the ALJ issues the final order or dismissal, the OAH loses jurisdiction to act further on the matter. Subsequent filings, such as notices of appeal or new evidence, will not be considered by the OAH.

Alj Quote

The documents will not be considered because no further action can be taken on the matter by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Legal Basis

Jurisdiction

Topic Tags

  • appeals
  • jurisdiction
  • procedural requirements

Question

Is the Administrative Law Judge's order automatically binding?

Short Answer

Yes, the order is binding on all parties unless a rehearing is officially granted.

Detailed Answer

The decision issued by the ALJ carries the weight of law and binds the parties involved immediately, subject only to the granting of a specific motion for rehearing.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), this Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • enforcement

Case

Docket No
22F-H2222035-REL
Case Title
Stephen and Elizabeth Tosh v. Cimmarron Superstition HOA
Decision Date
2022-06-24
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Stephen Tosh (petitioner)
  • Elizabeth Tosh (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Christopher Hanlon (HOA attorney)
    Childers Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Transmissions
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Transmissions
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Transmissions
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Transmissions
  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmitted documents
  • Miranda Alvarez (legal secretary)
    Transmitted Decision

Daniel Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Assoc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121058-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-03-11
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Daniel B Belt Counsel
Respondent Beaver Valley Improvement Association Counsel Ellen B. Davis, Esq.

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued an Order dismissing the Petitioner’s Petition because the Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing on March 10, 2022, and thus failed to meet the burden of proof.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing. Petitioner had previously indicated he would unequivocally not participate in the hearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Petition alleging violation

Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing and thus failed to sustain the burden of proof required to establish the alleged violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed because Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing and failed to sustain the burden of proof.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazzano v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, failure_to_appear, dismissal, rehearing, OAH
Additional Citations:

  • 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • R2-19-119(A)
  • R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • 32-2199.02(B)
  • 12-904(A)
  • 41-1092.01
  • 41-1092.07(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121058-REL-RHG Decision – 936420.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:17 (52.8 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL-RHG Decision – 936523.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:20 (6.7 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL-RHG Decision – 942810.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:26 (53.5 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL-RHG Decision – 954077.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:31 (66.4 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL-RHG Decision – ../21F-H2121058-REL/915454.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:35 (133.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121058-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Daniel B. Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the proceedings and outcomes of the administrative case Daniel B. Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association (No. 21F-H2121058-REL), a dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Daniel B. Belt, alleged that the Beaver Valley Improvement Association (BVIA) violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(6) by refusing to provide him with unredacted copies of election ballots, a matter he characterized as “voter fraud” and of “life and death” importance.

The case was ultimately dismissed twice. The initial decision on October 5, 2021, dismissed the petition on its merits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the petitioner failed to prove a violation, concluding that the HOA’s community documents permitted secret ballots and that state law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4)) prohibited the disclosure of the personal voting information requested. Following the petitioner’s request for a rehearing, the case was dismissed a second time on March 11, 2022, after the petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearing, thereby failing to meet his burden of proof.

A significant theme throughout the proceedings was the petitioner’s conduct. Testimony from the HOA’s accounting services provider, Planned Development Services (PDS), described the petitioner’s behavior as “irrational, mean, and bullying.” This conduct included a 45-day picket of the PDS office, verbal threats, and behavior that led PDS to obtain an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment against the petitioner and ultimately resign its contract with the HOA. After the initial dismissal, the petitioner filed pleadings demanding that the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings act in an “appellate capacity” to “dispense justice,” a request the Director found he had no legal authority to grant. The petitioner also indicated his intent to not participate in the rehearing and to pursue the matter in federal court.

I. Case Overview and Procedural History

The Core Dispute: Access to Election Ballots

On June 8, 2021, Daniel B. Belt filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The petition alleged a single violation by the Beaver Valley Improvement Association of A.R.S. § 33-1812(6), a statute governing election materials.

The specific allegation, as articulated in the petition narrative, was that “…PDS refused to give petitioner the ballots containing the names, addresses and signatures, in compliance with ARS 33-1812(6)…”. The petitioner asserted that his petition, which he characterized as addressing “voter fraud,” was a “life and death matter.”

Key Parties

Name/Entity

Representation/Affiliation

Petitioner

Daniel B. Belt

Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent

Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Represented by Ellen B. Davis, Esq.

Witness (Initial Hearing)

Petra Paul

Managing Agent, Planned Development Services (PDS)

Witness (Initial & Final Hearing)

William Campbell

Member, BVIA Board of Directors

Administrative Law Judge

Sondra J. Vanella

Office of Administrative Hearings

Director

Greg Hanchett

Office of Administrative Hearings

Procedural Timeline

June 8, 2021: Petitioner Daniel B. Belt files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 10, 2021: An initial hearing is held before ALJ Sondra J. Vanella.

October 5, 2021: ALJ Vanella issues a decision dismissing the petition.

January 4, 2022: A minute entry is issued continuing a scheduled rehearing to March 10, 2022.

January 14, 2022: Petitioner files a pleading perceived by the Director as a motion for a change of judge.

January 28, 2022: Petitioner files a subsequent pleading clarifying he is not seeking a change of judge but is demanding the Director review the prior proceeding.

January 31, 2022: Director Greg Hanchett issues an order stating he lacks the statutory authority to review the case in an “appellate capacity” as requested.

March 10, 2022: The rehearing convenes. The petitioner fails to appear. Respondent’s counsel moves for dismissal.

March 11, 2022: ALJ Vanella issues a final decision dismissing the petition due to the petitioner’s failure to appear and sustain his burden of proof.

II. Analysis of the Initial Hearing and Decision

Respondent’s Defense and Evidence

The BVIA’s defense centered on the established practice and legal basis for maintaining voter privacy through secret ballots. Key points included:

Policy on Secret Ballots: The BVIA Board of Directors approved a “Ballot/Proxy Handling Procedure” on July 10, 2004, which explicitly states that ballots will be folded “TO MAINTAIN THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT.”

Reaffirmation of Policy: In a meeting on May 8, 2021, the Board unanimously passed two motions: one to allow members to review ballots without personally identifying information, and a second to “reaffirm that all Board of Directors elections be conducted with a secret ballot.”

Bylaws Protecting Privacy: The BVIA’s Bylaws (Article VII) explicitly state that “Personal . . . information about an individual Member of the Association” is not subject to inspection by parties other than the Board or its agent.

Statutory Protection: Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4) prohibits the disclosure of personal records of an individual member, which includes how they voted.

Constitutional Basis: Board member William Campbell cited Article VII, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution, which provides that “secrecy in voting shall be preserved,” opining that non-secret ballots would have a “chilling effect” on member participation.

Accommodations Offered: The petitioner was offered the opportunity to review the un-redacted ballots in person (but not take copies) and was provided with redacted copies of the ballots. He refused both offers.

Key Witness Testimony

Petra Paul, Managing Agent for PDS, testified that her company’s contract with BVIA was for accounting services only, not HOA management. PDS’s involvement in the election was limited to mailing ballots, collecting returns, and verifying a quorum.

Ms. Paul’s testimony detailed the petitioner’s conduct:

Escalating Demands: The petitioner demanded ballots before the election (which was denied) and demanded un-redacted copies the Monday after the election.

Harassment and Intimidation: Ms. Paul described the petitioner’s behavior as “irrational, mean, and bullying.” She testified that his actions grew increasingly agitated, that he refused to leave PDS’s premises, and that PDS staff was intimidated and concerned for their personal safety.

Workplace Injunction: The petitioner’s behavior, which impacted PDS’s business operations, culminated in PDS obtaining an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment against him. This came after he spent 45 days picketing outside the PDS office with a large sign that stated, “PDS Embezzlers, Frauds, Liars.”

Threats: The injunction noted threats made by the petitioner against PDS employees, including, “You’ll be sorry,” “You’ll regret this,” and “You haven’t seen the end of me.”

Contract Resignation: Due to the petitioner’s “abusive and erratic” interactions, PDS resigned its contract with the BVIA and demanded its legal fees be paid by the association.

William Campbell testified about the association’s long-standing policy of secret ballots. He acknowledged a procedural deviation—the ballots were folded for secrecy rather than being placed in manila envelopes as stipulated by the 2004 policy—but maintained that secrecy was preserved. Mr. Campbell also testified that multiple opportunities were provided in May, June, and July 2021 for members to view the ballots and confirm their votes were counted, but no one took advantage of the offers in June or July.

ALJ’s Conclusions of Law and Order (October 5, 2021)

ALJ Vanella concluded that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the BVIA violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(6). The decision found that:

1. The credible evidence established that the ballots were intended to be secret pursuant to community documents.

2. The Respondent was precluded by A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4) from disclosing the personal voting information demanded by the petitioner.

3. The petitioner was offered the chance to review the ballots and was provided redacted copies, both of which he declined. Based on these findings, the petition was ordered dismissed.

III. Rehearing Proceedings and Final Disposition

Petitioner’s Post-Decision Filings

Following the initial dismissal, the petitioner requested a rehearing. In subsequent filings, he created confusion regarding his intentions. A January 14, 2022 filing was perceived as a motion for a change of judge. However, in a January 28, 2022 pleading, the petitioner clarified this was not his intent. Instead, he demanded the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings intervene directly:

“if Director Hanchett declines to make the case, with rationale, that the actions of Petra Paul and ALJ Vanella did not constitute the felony crimes as cited by the Petitioner, and if Director Hanchett declines to dispense justice in this case . . . as outlined by Petitioner, those issues will be decided in federal court.

He further stated that the Director did not have the right to “pervert Petitioner’s request… for Impartial Justice and Equal Protection of the Laws, into a motion for a Change of Judge.”

Director’s Response

On January 31, 2022, Director Greg Hanchett issued an order rescinding a prior order that required the respondent to reply to the petitioner’s motion. The Director stated that the petitioner was not seeking a change of judge, but rather “seeks to have the Director review the earlier proceeding in some appellate capacity and pass judgment on the propriety of that proceeding.” Director Hanchett concluded that “There is no authority contained in either statute or rule that would permit the Director to undertake such action,” as an administrative agency has only those powers prescribed by law.

The Final Hearing and Dismissal (March 10-11, 2022)

The rehearing was held on March 10, 2022. The petitioner, Daniel Belt, failed to appear, despite having received proper notice at his address of record and email addresses. The hearing transcript notes that the petitioner had previously stated in a January 14 filing that he “would unequivocally not participate in the hearing.”

As the petitioner bears the burden of proof, and having failed to appear to present his case, the respondent’s counsel made a motion to dismiss. ALJ Vanella granted the motion. The final order, issued March 11, 2022, dismissed the petition, stating: “Because Petitioner failed to appear, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation by Respondent.” This decision was binding on the parties.






Study Guide – 21F-H2121058-REL-RHG


Study Guide for the Case of Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information presented in the case documents.

1. Identify the petitioner and respondent in this case and state the petitioner’s central allegation.

2. What specific Arizona Revised Statute did the petitioner claim the respondent violated, and what does this statute generally require?

3. What was the role of Planned Development Services (PDS) in the respondent’s election process, according to the testimony of Petra Paul?

4. Describe the petitioner’s behavior that prompted PDS to obtain an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment.

5. According to William Campbell, what was the respondent’s long-standing policy regarding elections, and what documents supported this policy?

6. Explain the two offers the respondent and its agent made to the petitioner to allow him to review the election ballots.

7. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final order in the initial decision on October 5, 2021, and what were the two key statutes cited to support this conclusion?

8. After filing for a rehearing, what was the petitioner’s stated intention regarding his participation, and what was the ultimate outcome of the March 10, 2022, hearing?

9. What did the petitioner demand from the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings in January 2022, and how did the Director respond?

10. What evidentiary standard was the petitioner required to meet, and did the judge find that he met this standard in either the initial hearing or the rehearing?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Daniel B. Belt, and the respondent was the Beaver Valley Improvement Association (HOA). Belt alleged the HOA violated state law by refusing to provide him with election ballots containing the names, addresses, and signatures of the voters, an act he characterized as “voter fraud.”

2. The petitioner claimed a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(6). This statute requires completed ballots to contain the voter’s name, address, and signature, but it provides an exception for secret ballots, where this identifying information need only appear on the envelope.

3. Petra Paul testified that PDS was contracted for accounting services only, not HOA management. PDS’s involvement in the election was limited to mailing the annual meeting documents, collecting the returned ballots, and reviewing the number of returns to ensure a quorum was met. PDS did not conduct the election or tabulate the ballots.

4. The petitioner’s behavior was described as “irrational, mean, and bullying.” He picketed the PDS office for 45 days with a sign calling employees “Embezzlers, Frauds, Liars,” made threats such as “You’ll be sorry,” and refused to leave the premises, causing employees to fear for their personal safety.

5. William Campbell testified that the respondent had a long-standing practice of using a secret ballot. This was supported by a Ballot/Proxy Handling Procedure approved in 2004 and a unanimous Board vote on May 8, 2021, to reaffirm that all Board of Directors elections would be conducted with a secret ballot.

6. First, Petra Paul of PDS offered the petitioner copies of the ballots with personal information such as names and signatures redacted, which he refused. Paul also offered him the opportunity to review the non-redacted ballots in the office but advised him he could not take them with him.

7. The judge ordered that the petitioner’s Petition be dismissed. The judge cited A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(6), noting that the community’s documents permitted secret ballots, and A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4), which precludes an HOA from disclosing personal records of its members.

8. In a January 14, 2022, filing, the petitioner stated he would “unequivocally not participate in the hearing.” Consequently, the petitioner failed to appear at the March 10, 2022, hearing, and the judge dismissed his petition for failure to sustain his burden of proof.

9. The petitioner demanded that the Director, Greg Hanchett, review the previous hearing in an appellate capacity, determine if felony crimes were committed, and “dispense justice.” The Director responded that he had no statutory authority to perform such an appellate review and rescinded his order related to what he had mistakenly perceived as a motion for a change of judge.

10. The petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In the initial hearing, the judge found he failed to meet this burden because the evidence showed the respondent had not violated the law. In the rehearing, he failed to meet the burden because he did not appear to present any evidence at all.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to promote a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, incorporating specific details and legal principles from the provided source documents.

1. Analyze the conflict between a member’s right to inspect association records under A.R.S. § 33-1805 and the protection of individual members’ personal information and voting privacy as outlined in the same statute and the association’s bylaws.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to the petitioner in both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing. How did the petitioner’s actions (and inaction) directly lead to the dismissal of his case on two separate occasions?

3. Evaluate the actions of the Beaver Valley Improvement Association and its agent, PDS, in response to the petitioner’s demands for election materials. Did their responses align with their own bylaws, state law, and established procedures as presented in the hearings?

4. Trace the petitioner’s escalating behavior as described in the testimony of Petra Paul. How did this behavior impact PDS and ultimately factor into the context of the hearing, even if it was not the direct legal violation being adjudicated?

5. Examine the petitioner’s apparent misunderstanding of the administrative legal process, as evidenced by his filings with Director Greg Hanchett. Contrast what the petitioner demanded of the Director with the actual legal authority vested in the Director’s office according to the case documents.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

An Arizona Revised Statute concerning the examination of a homeowners association’s financial and other records. It grants members the right to inspect records but also allows the association to withhold certain information, including personal records of individual members.

A.R.S. § 33-1812(6)

An Arizona Revised Statute detailing requirements for ballots used in HOA meetings. It mandates that ballots contain the voter’s name, address, and signature, but creates an exception for secret ballots permitted by community documents.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the respondent committed the alleged violation.

Bylaws

The official rules and regulations that govern a corporation or association. The respondent’s Bylaws, specifically Article VII, were cited to justify withholding personal member information.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium building that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Beaver Valley Improvement Association is the HOA in this case.

Injunction Against Workplace Harassment

A court order obtained by an employer to prohibit a person from committing acts of harassment against the business and its employees. PDS obtained one against Daniel B. Belt.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or initiates a legal action. In this case, Daniel B. Belt is the petitioner.

Planned Development Services (PDS)

An HOA management and accounting company. PDS provided accounting-only services to the respondent and was the entity that interacted directly with the petitioner regarding his ballot requests.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative case. It means that the trier of fact must be convinced that it is more probably true than not that the contention is correct.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid. PDS reviewed ballot returns to ensure a quorum was established for the respondent’s election.

Redacted

Edited to remove or obscure confidential or private information. The respondent offered the petitioner redacted copies of the ballots with names, email addresses, and signatures removed.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and evidence, which may be granted upon request after an initial decision. The petitioner was granted a rehearing but failed to appear.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Beaver Valley Improvement Association is the respondent.

Secret Ballot

A voting method in which a voter’s choices are anonymous, preventing intimidation and protecting privacy. The respondent’s bylaws and policies permitted the use of secret ballots for its elections.






Blog Post – 21F-H2121058-REL-RHG


An HOA Ballot Dispute, a 45-Day Picket, and 4 Shocking Lessons in Community Conflict

Introduction: When Neighborly Disagreements Go Nuclear

Disputes within Homeowners Associations (HOAs) are common, often revolving around landscaping, dues, or parking violations. But rarely do they escalate into a nearly year-long legal battle involving workplace harassment injunctions and vendor resignations. The story of one homeowner’s quest for election transparency in Arizona serves as a startling case study in how quickly a simple request can spiral out of control, offering crucial lessons for any community association. What began as a demand to see election ballots ended in a dismissed court case, but not before triggering a workplace harassment injunction, forcing its accounting firm to resign, and handing the HOA the bill for its legal fees.

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1.A Request for Ballots Can Escalate into a Harassment Injunction

The dispute began when petitioner Daniel B. Belt filed a petition against his HOA, the Beaver Valley Improvement Association. Alleging “voter fraud,” he demanded copies of unredacted election ballots in a conflict he framed as a “life and death matter.” When the HOA denied his request for unredacted copies, Mr. Belt’s tactics escalated from formal petitioning to direct, public confrontation aimed at the HOA’s accounting firm, Planned Development Services (PDS).

He picketed the PDS office for 45 consecutive days, holding a large sign that read, “PDS Embezzlers, Frauds, Liars.” According to court documents, he also allegedly made threats to PDS employees, stating, “You’ll be sorry,” “You’ll regret this,” and “You haven’t seen the end of me.” These actions crossed a critical legal line, resulting in PDS obtaining an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment against the petitioner.

This escalation provides a crucial lesson in community governance. The line between passionate advocacy and unlawful harassment is critical because volunteer boards and their essential vendors are uniquely vulnerable. Tactics involving defamatory signage and direct threats don’t just amplify a grievance; they can cripple an association’s ability to function, turning a dispute over records into an existential threat to its day-to-day management.

Ms. Paul described Petitioner’s behavior as “irrational, mean, and bullying” and that she and other employees were concerned for their personal safety.

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2.The “Right to Know” vs. The Right to Privacy and a Secret Ballot

The central conflict pitted one homeowner’s demand for total transparency against the community’s right to privacy. The petitioner insisted on receiving unredacted copies of all completed ballots, which contained the names, addresses, and signatures of every voter.

In response, the HOA did not deny access outright but instead offered a compromise. The petitioner was given the choice to either review the unredacted ballots in person under supervision or accept redacted copies with personal information removed. He refused both options. Notably, the HOA went a step further in its attempt to balance transparency with privacy. Board member William Campbell testified that he “devised a way in which he could match a members’ demographic information to the members’ vote if upon Petitioner’s inspection, something appeared irregular.”

The HOA grounded its refusal in multiple sources of authority, citing its own bylaws protecting member information, a long-standing practice of secret ballots, and, most critically, Arizona state law. A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4) explicitly permits an association to withhold the personal records of its members. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed, ruling that the HOA acted correctly and that state law sided with protecting member privacy.

Mr. Campbell referenced Article VII, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution which provides that “all elections by the people shall be by ballot, or by such other method as may be prescribed by law; Provided, that secrecy in voting shall be preserved.”

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3.Third Parties Can Become Expensive Collateral Damage

This dispute demonstrates how community conflicts can ensnare and inflict significant damage on essential third-party vendors. The accounting firm, PDS, had a limited, non-managerial role. Its contract was for accounting services only; it facilitated the mailing of election documents, collected the returned ballots, and confirmed a quorum was met. PDS did not conduct the election or tabulate the votes.

Despite this narrow involvement, PDS bore the brunt of the petitioner’s aggressive campaign. The harassment severely impacted its business operations and, according to testimony, created an “abusive and erratic” environment. This led the firm to take two drastic steps: first, obtaining the legal injunction, and second, resigning its contract with the HOA. Critically, the collateral damage had a direct financial cost for the entire community. Court documents reveal that “PDS demanded its legal fees be paid by Respondent [the HOA]” for the costs of securing the harassment injunction.

This outcome reveals the cascading governance failures that result from such conflicts. When a key vendor like an accounting firm resigns under duress, it creates instability, raises the prospect of missed payments or financial errors, and makes it harder to secure a new vendor, who may now view the HOA as a high-risk client—with any increased costs ultimately passed on to all homeowners.

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4.You Can’t Win a Legal Battle You Refuse to Fight

In a final, counter-intuitive act, the petitioner successfully filed for a rehearing after losing his initial case, earning a second chance to argue his claims. His actions leading up to the new hearing, however, signaled a preference for performative conflict over substantive legal engagement. He attempted to have the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings review the case in an “appellate capacity,” a power the Director confirmed he did not possess, and threatened to escalate the matter to federal court.

Then came the final twist. After securing the rehearing, the petitioner submitted a filing stating he would “unequivocally not participate in the hearing.”

True to his word, on the day of the hearing—March 10, 2022—the petitioner failed to appear. As the party bringing the complaint, he carried the burden of proof. His absence meant the judge had no evidence to consider and was compelled to dismiss the case. This chapter serves as a stark lesson in strategic failure. After doing the difficult work of securing a second hearing, the petitioner abandoned the field. The legal system, for all its complexities, responds to procedure and participation, not to external threats or pronouncements. Passionate conviction is powerless if you refuse to show up and fight the battle you initiated.

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Conclusion: Drawing the Line Between Advocacy and Anarchy

The arc of this conflict—from a simple request for ballots to a multi-stage legal dispute that ended not with a bang, but a whimper—is a cautionary tale. It illustrates how a homeowner’s campaign for transparency, when pursued without regard for legal boundaries or civil discourse, can backfire completely. It left a vendor harassed, forced the community to pay its agent’s legal fees, and ultimately left the original issue unresolved. This case leaves all community leaders and members with a critical question: How can we foster a culture that balances the legitimate need for transparency with the equally important need for member privacy and basic civility?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Daniel B. Belt (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Ellen B. Davis (HOA attorney)
    HENZE COOK MURPHY, PLLC
  • William Campbell (board member, witness)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Member of Respondent's Board of Directors; testified for Respondent
  • President Mexal (board member)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    President of Respondent's Board
  • Director Hallett (board member)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Director of Respondent's Board
  • Sarah Linkey (board member)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Treasurer of Respondent's Board

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Greg Hanchett (Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Issued an order regarding Petitioner’s pleading
  • c. serrano (admin staff)
    Signed transmittals
  • Miranda A. (admin staff)
    Signed transmittal

Other Participants

  • Petra Paul (witness, property manager)
    Planned Development Services HOA Management & Accounting Company (PDS)
    Managing Agent for PDS; testified regarding services provided to Respondent
  • Lori Rutledge (unknown)
    Recipient of official transmittal
  • Brandee Abraham (unknown)
    Recipient of official transmittal

Daniel B Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121058-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-03-11
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Daniel B Belt Counsel
Respondent Beaver Valley Improvement Association Counsel Ellen B. Davis, Esq.

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge issued an Order dismissing the Petitioner’s Petition because the Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing on March 10, 2022, and thus failed to meet the burden of proof.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing. Petitioner had previously indicated he would unequivocally not participate in the hearing.

Key Issues & Findings

Petition alleging violation

Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing and thus failed to sustain the burden of proof required to establish the alleged violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s Petition is dismissed because Petitioner failed to appear for the hearing and failed to sustain the burden of proof.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazzano v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, failure_to_appear, dismissal, rehearing, OAH
Additional Citations:

  • 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • R2-19-119(A)
  • R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • 32-2199.02(B)
  • 12-904(A)
  • 41-1092.01
  • 41-1092.07(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 915454.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:07:00 (133.6 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 936420.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:29 (52.8 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 936523.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:29 (6.7 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 942810.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:30 (53.5 KB)

21F-H2121058-REL Decision – 954077.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:37:30 (66.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2121058-REL


Briefing Document: Daniel B. Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the proceedings and outcomes of the administrative case Daniel B. Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association (No. 21F-H2121058-REL), a dispute adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Daniel B. Belt, alleged that the Beaver Valley Improvement Association (BVIA) violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(6) by refusing to provide him with unredacted copies of election ballots, a matter he characterized as “voter fraud” and of “life and death” importance.

The case was ultimately dismissed twice. The initial decision on October 5, 2021, dismissed the petition on its merits. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the petitioner failed to prove a violation, concluding that the HOA’s community documents permitted secret ballots and that state law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4)) prohibited the disclosure of the personal voting information requested. Following the petitioner’s request for a rehearing, the case was dismissed a second time on March 11, 2022, after the petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearing, thereby failing to meet his burden of proof.

A significant theme throughout the proceedings was the petitioner’s conduct. Testimony from the HOA’s accounting services provider, Planned Development Services (PDS), described the petitioner’s behavior as “irrational, mean, and bullying.” This conduct included a 45-day picket of the PDS office, verbal threats, and behavior that led PDS to obtain an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment against the petitioner and ultimately resign its contract with the HOA. After the initial dismissal, the petitioner filed pleadings demanding that the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings act in an “appellate capacity” to “dispense justice,” a request the Director found he had no legal authority to grant. The petitioner also indicated his intent to not participate in the rehearing and to pursue the matter in federal court.

I. Case Overview and Procedural History

The Core Dispute: Access to Election Ballots

On June 8, 2021, Daniel B. Belt filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The petition alleged a single violation by the Beaver Valley Improvement Association of A.R.S. § 33-1812(6), a statute governing election materials.

The specific allegation, as articulated in the petition narrative, was that “…PDS refused to give petitioner the ballots containing the names, addresses and signatures, in compliance with ARS 33-1812(6)…”. The petitioner asserted that his petition, which he characterized as addressing “voter fraud,” was a “life and death matter.”

Key Parties

Name/Entity

Representation/Affiliation

Petitioner

Daniel B. Belt

Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent

Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Represented by Ellen B. Davis, Esq.

Witness (Initial Hearing)

Petra Paul

Managing Agent, Planned Development Services (PDS)

Witness (Initial & Final Hearing)

William Campbell

Member, BVIA Board of Directors

Administrative Law Judge

Sondra J. Vanella

Office of Administrative Hearings

Director

Greg Hanchett

Office of Administrative Hearings

Procedural Timeline

June 8, 2021: Petitioner Daniel B. Belt files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 10, 2021: An initial hearing is held before ALJ Sondra J. Vanella.

October 5, 2021: ALJ Vanella issues a decision dismissing the petition.

January 4, 2022: A minute entry is issued continuing a scheduled rehearing to March 10, 2022.

January 14, 2022: Petitioner files a pleading perceived by the Director as a motion for a change of judge.

January 28, 2022: Petitioner files a subsequent pleading clarifying he is not seeking a change of judge but is demanding the Director review the prior proceeding.

January 31, 2022: Director Greg Hanchett issues an order stating he lacks the statutory authority to review the case in an “appellate capacity” as requested.

March 10, 2022: The rehearing convenes. The petitioner fails to appear. Respondent’s counsel moves for dismissal.

March 11, 2022: ALJ Vanella issues a final decision dismissing the petition due to the petitioner’s failure to appear and sustain his burden of proof.

II. Analysis of the Initial Hearing and Decision

Respondent’s Defense and Evidence

The BVIA’s defense centered on the established practice and legal basis for maintaining voter privacy through secret ballots. Key points included:

Policy on Secret Ballots: The BVIA Board of Directors approved a “Ballot/Proxy Handling Procedure” on July 10, 2004, which explicitly states that ballots will be folded “TO MAINTAIN THE SECRECY OF THE BALLOT.”

Reaffirmation of Policy: In a meeting on May 8, 2021, the Board unanimously passed two motions: one to allow members to review ballots without personally identifying information, and a second to “reaffirm that all Board of Directors elections be conducted with a secret ballot.”

Bylaws Protecting Privacy: The BVIA’s Bylaws (Article VII) explicitly state that “Personal . . . information about an individual Member of the Association” is not subject to inspection by parties other than the Board or its agent.

Statutory Protection: Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4) prohibits the disclosure of personal records of an individual member, which includes how they voted.

Constitutional Basis: Board member William Campbell cited Article VII, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution, which provides that “secrecy in voting shall be preserved,” opining that non-secret ballots would have a “chilling effect” on member participation.

Accommodations Offered: The petitioner was offered the opportunity to review the un-redacted ballots in person (but not take copies) and was provided with redacted copies of the ballots. He refused both offers.

Key Witness Testimony

Petra Paul, Managing Agent for PDS, testified that her company’s contract with BVIA was for accounting services only, not HOA management. PDS’s involvement in the election was limited to mailing ballots, collecting returns, and verifying a quorum.

Ms. Paul’s testimony detailed the petitioner’s conduct:

Escalating Demands: The petitioner demanded ballots before the election (which was denied) and demanded un-redacted copies the Monday after the election.

Harassment and Intimidation: Ms. Paul described the petitioner’s behavior as “irrational, mean, and bullying.” She testified that his actions grew increasingly agitated, that he refused to leave PDS’s premises, and that PDS staff was intimidated and concerned for their personal safety.

Workplace Injunction: The petitioner’s behavior, which impacted PDS’s business operations, culminated in PDS obtaining an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment against him. This came after he spent 45 days picketing outside the PDS office with a large sign that stated, “PDS Embezzlers, Frauds, Liars.”

Threats: The injunction noted threats made by the petitioner against PDS employees, including, “You’ll be sorry,” “You’ll regret this,” and “You haven’t seen the end of me.”

Contract Resignation: Due to the petitioner’s “abusive and erratic” interactions, PDS resigned its contract with the BVIA and demanded its legal fees be paid by the association.

William Campbell testified about the association’s long-standing policy of secret ballots. He acknowledged a procedural deviation—the ballots were folded for secrecy rather than being placed in manila envelopes as stipulated by the 2004 policy—but maintained that secrecy was preserved. Mr. Campbell also testified that multiple opportunities were provided in May, June, and July 2021 for members to view the ballots and confirm their votes were counted, but no one took advantage of the offers in June or July.

ALJ’s Conclusions of Law and Order (October 5, 2021)

ALJ Vanella concluded that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the BVIA violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(6). The decision found that:

1. The credible evidence established that the ballots were intended to be secret pursuant to community documents.

2. The Respondent was precluded by A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4) from disclosing the personal voting information demanded by the petitioner.

3. The petitioner was offered the chance to review the ballots and was provided redacted copies, both of which he declined. Based on these findings, the petition was ordered dismissed.

III. Rehearing Proceedings and Final Disposition

Petitioner’s Post-Decision Filings

Following the initial dismissal, the petitioner requested a rehearing. In subsequent filings, he created confusion regarding his intentions. A January 14, 2022 filing was perceived as a motion for a change of judge. However, in a January 28, 2022 pleading, the petitioner clarified this was not his intent. Instead, he demanded the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings intervene directly:

“if Director Hanchett declines to make the case, with rationale, that the actions of Petra Paul and ALJ Vanella did not constitute the felony crimes as cited by the Petitioner, and if Director Hanchett declines to dispense justice in this case . . . as outlined by Petitioner, those issues will be decided in federal court.

He further stated that the Director did not have the right to “pervert Petitioner’s request… for Impartial Justice and Equal Protection of the Laws, into a motion for a Change of Judge.”

Director’s Response

On January 31, 2022, Director Greg Hanchett issued an order rescinding a prior order that required the respondent to reply to the petitioner’s motion. The Director stated that the petitioner was not seeking a change of judge, but rather “seeks to have the Director review the earlier proceeding in some appellate capacity and pass judgment on the propriety of that proceeding.” Director Hanchett concluded that “There is no authority contained in either statute or rule that would permit the Director to undertake such action,” as an administrative agency has only those powers prescribed by law.

The Final Hearing and Dismissal (March 10-11, 2022)

The rehearing was held on March 10, 2022. The petitioner, Daniel Belt, failed to appear, despite having received proper notice at his address of record and email addresses. The hearing transcript notes that the petitioner had previously stated in a January 14 filing that he “would unequivocally not participate in the hearing.”

As the petitioner bears the burden of proof, and having failed to appear to present his case, the respondent’s counsel made a motion to dismiss. ALJ Vanella granted the motion. The final order, issued March 11, 2022, dismissed the petition, stating: “Because Petitioner failed to appear, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation by Respondent.” This decision was binding on the parties.






Study Guide – 21F-H2121058-REL


Study Guide for the Case of Belt v. Beaver Valley Improvement Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information presented in the case documents.

1. Identify the petitioner and respondent in this case and state the petitioner’s central allegation.

2. What specific Arizona Revised Statute did the petitioner claim the respondent violated, and what does this statute generally require?

3. What was the role of Planned Development Services (PDS) in the respondent’s election process, according to the testimony of Petra Paul?

4. Describe the petitioner’s behavior that prompted PDS to obtain an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment.

5. According to William Campbell, what was the respondent’s long-standing policy regarding elections, and what documents supported this policy?

6. Explain the two offers the respondent and its agent made to the petitioner to allow him to review the election ballots.

7. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final order in the initial decision on October 5, 2021, and what were the two key statutes cited to support this conclusion?

8. After filing for a rehearing, what was the petitioner’s stated intention regarding his participation, and what was the ultimate outcome of the March 10, 2022, hearing?

9. What did the petitioner demand from the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings in January 2022, and how did the Director respond?

10. What evidentiary standard was the petitioner required to meet, and did the judge find that he met this standard in either the initial hearing or the rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Daniel B. Belt, and the respondent was the Beaver Valley Improvement Association (HOA). Belt alleged the HOA violated state law by refusing to provide him with election ballots containing the names, addresses, and signatures of the voters, an act he characterized as “voter fraud.”

2. The petitioner claimed a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(6). This statute requires completed ballots to contain the voter’s name, address, and signature, but it provides an exception for secret ballots, where this identifying information need only appear on the envelope.

3. Petra Paul testified that PDS was contracted for accounting services only, not HOA management. PDS’s involvement in the election was limited to mailing the annual meeting documents, collecting the returned ballots, and reviewing the number of returns to ensure a quorum was met. PDS did not conduct the election or tabulate the ballots.

4. The petitioner’s behavior was described as “irrational, mean, and bullying.” He picketed the PDS office for 45 days with a sign calling employees “Embezzlers, Frauds, Liars,” made threats such as “You’ll be sorry,” and refused to leave the premises, causing employees to fear for their personal safety.

5. William Campbell testified that the respondent had a long-standing practice of using a secret ballot. This was supported by a Ballot/Proxy Handling Procedure approved in 2004 and a unanimous Board vote on May 8, 2021, to reaffirm that all Board of Directors elections would be conducted with a secret ballot.

6. First, Petra Paul of PDS offered the petitioner copies of the ballots with personal information such as names and signatures redacted, which he refused. Paul also offered him the opportunity to review the non-redacted ballots in the office but advised him he could not take them with him.

7. The judge ordered that the petitioner’s Petition be dismissed. The judge cited A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(6), noting that the community’s documents permitted secret ballots, and A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4), which precludes an HOA from disclosing personal records of its members.

8. In a January 14, 2022, filing, the petitioner stated he would “unequivocally not participate in the hearing.” Consequently, the petitioner failed to appear at the March 10, 2022, hearing, and the judge dismissed his petition for failure to sustain his burden of proof.

9. The petitioner demanded that the Director, Greg Hanchett, review the previous hearing in an appellate capacity, determine if felony crimes were committed, and “dispense justice.” The Director responded that he had no statutory authority to perform such an appellate review and rescinded his order related to what he had mistakenly perceived as a motion for a change of judge.

10. The petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In the initial hearing, the judge found he failed to meet this burden because the evidence showed the respondent had not violated the law. In the rehearing, he failed to meet the burden because he did not appear to present any evidence at all.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to promote a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, incorporating specific details and legal principles from the provided source documents.

1. Analyze the conflict between a member’s right to inspect association records under A.R.S. § 33-1805 and the protection of individual members’ personal information and voting privacy as outlined in the same statute and the association’s bylaws.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to the petitioner in both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing. How did the petitioner’s actions (and inaction) directly lead to the dismissal of his case on two separate occasions?

3. Evaluate the actions of the Beaver Valley Improvement Association and its agent, PDS, in response to the petitioner’s demands for election materials. Did their responses align with their own bylaws, state law, and established procedures as presented in the hearings?

4. Trace the petitioner’s escalating behavior as described in the testimony of Petra Paul. How did this behavior impact PDS and ultimately factor into the context of the hearing, even if it was not the direct legal violation being adjudicated?

5. Examine the petitioner’s apparent misunderstanding of the administrative legal process, as evidenced by his filings with Director Greg Hanchett. Contrast what the petitioner demanded of the Director with the actual legal authority vested in the Director’s office according to the case documents.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

An Arizona Revised Statute concerning the examination of a homeowners association’s financial and other records. It grants members the right to inspect records but also allows the association to withhold certain information, including personal records of individual members.

A.R.S. § 33-1812(6)

An Arizona Revised Statute detailing requirements for ballots used in HOA meetings. It mandates that ballots contain the voter’s name, address, and signature, but creates an exception for secret ballots permitted by community documents.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the respondent committed the alleged violation.

Bylaws

The official rules and regulations that govern a corporation or association. The respondent’s Bylaws, specifically Article VII, were cited to justify withholding personal member information.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium building that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Beaver Valley Improvement Association is the HOA in this case.

Injunction Against Workplace Harassment

A court order obtained by an employer to prohibit a person from committing acts of harassment against the business and its employees. PDS obtained one against Daniel B. Belt.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or initiates a legal action. In this case, Daniel B. Belt is the petitioner.

Planned Development Services (PDS)

An HOA management and accounting company. PDS provided accounting-only services to the respondent and was the entity that interacted directly with the petitioner regarding his ballot requests.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative case. It means that the trier of fact must be convinced that it is more probably true than not that the contention is correct.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid. PDS reviewed ballot returns to ensure a quorum was established for the respondent’s election.

Redacted

Edited to remove or obscure confidential or private information. The respondent offered the petitioner redacted copies of the ballots with names, email addresses, and signatures removed.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and evidence, which may be granted upon request after an initial decision. The petitioner was granted a rehearing but failed to appear.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Beaver Valley Improvement Association is the respondent.

Secret Ballot

A voting method in which a voter’s choices are anonymous, preventing intimidation and protecting privacy. The respondent’s bylaws and policies permitted the use of secret ballots for its elections.






Blog Post – 21F-H2121058-REL


An HOA Ballot Dispute, a 45-Day Picket, and 4 Shocking Lessons in Community Conflict

Introduction: When Neighborly Disagreements Go Nuclear

Disputes within Homeowners Associations (HOAs) are common, often revolving around landscaping, dues, or parking violations. But rarely do they escalate into a nearly year-long legal battle involving workplace harassment injunctions and vendor resignations. The story of one homeowner’s quest for election transparency in Arizona serves as a startling case study in how quickly a simple request can spiral out of control, offering crucial lessons for any community association. What began as a demand to see election ballots ended in a dismissed court case, but not before triggering a workplace harassment injunction, forcing its accounting firm to resign, and handing the HOA the bill for its legal fees.

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1.A Request for Ballots Can Escalate into a Harassment Injunction

The dispute began when petitioner Daniel B. Belt filed a petition against his HOA, the Beaver Valley Improvement Association. Alleging “voter fraud,” he demanded copies of unredacted election ballots in a conflict he framed as a “life and death matter.” When the HOA denied his request for unredacted copies, Mr. Belt’s tactics escalated from formal petitioning to direct, public confrontation aimed at the HOA’s accounting firm, Planned Development Services (PDS).

He picketed the PDS office for 45 consecutive days, holding a large sign that read, “PDS Embezzlers, Frauds, Liars.” According to court documents, he also allegedly made threats to PDS employees, stating, “You’ll be sorry,” “You’ll regret this,” and “You haven’t seen the end of me.” These actions crossed a critical legal line, resulting in PDS obtaining an Injunction Against Workplace Harassment against the petitioner.

This escalation provides a crucial lesson in community governance. The line between passionate advocacy and unlawful harassment is critical because volunteer boards and their essential vendors are uniquely vulnerable. Tactics involving defamatory signage and direct threats don’t just amplify a grievance; they can cripple an association’s ability to function, turning a dispute over records into an existential threat to its day-to-day management.

Ms. Paul described Petitioner’s behavior as “irrational, mean, and bullying” and that she and other employees were concerned for their personal safety.

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2.The “Right to Know” vs. The Right to Privacy and a Secret Ballot

The central conflict pitted one homeowner’s demand for total transparency against the community’s right to privacy. The petitioner insisted on receiving unredacted copies of all completed ballots, which contained the names, addresses, and signatures of every voter.

In response, the HOA did not deny access outright but instead offered a compromise. The petitioner was given the choice to either review the unredacted ballots in person under supervision or accept redacted copies with personal information removed. He refused both options. Notably, the HOA went a step further in its attempt to balance transparency with privacy. Board member William Campbell testified that he “devised a way in which he could match a members’ demographic information to the members’ vote if upon Petitioner’s inspection, something appeared irregular.”

The HOA grounded its refusal in multiple sources of authority, citing its own bylaws protecting member information, a long-standing practice of secret ballots, and, most critically, Arizona state law. A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(4) explicitly permits an association to withhold the personal records of its members. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed, ruling that the HOA acted correctly and that state law sided with protecting member privacy.

Mr. Campbell referenced Article VII, Section 1 of the Arizona Constitution which provides that “all elections by the people shall be by ballot, or by such other method as may be prescribed by law; Provided, that secrecy in voting shall be preserved.”

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3.Third Parties Can Become Expensive Collateral Damage

This dispute demonstrates how community conflicts can ensnare and inflict significant damage on essential third-party vendors. The accounting firm, PDS, had a limited, non-managerial role. Its contract was for accounting services only; it facilitated the mailing of election documents, collected the returned ballots, and confirmed a quorum was met. PDS did not conduct the election or tabulate the votes.

Despite this narrow involvement, PDS bore the brunt of the petitioner’s aggressive campaign. The harassment severely impacted its business operations and, according to testimony, created an “abusive and erratic” environment. This led the firm to take two drastic steps: first, obtaining the legal injunction, and second, resigning its contract with the HOA. Critically, the collateral damage had a direct financial cost for the entire community. Court documents reveal that “PDS demanded its legal fees be paid by Respondent [the HOA]” for the costs of securing the harassment injunction.

This outcome reveals the cascading governance failures that result from such conflicts. When a key vendor like an accounting firm resigns under duress, it creates instability, raises the prospect of missed payments or financial errors, and makes it harder to secure a new vendor, who may now view the HOA as a high-risk client—with any increased costs ultimately passed on to all homeowners.

——————————————————————————–

4.You Can’t Win a Legal Battle You Refuse to Fight

In a final, counter-intuitive act, the petitioner successfully filed for a rehearing after losing his initial case, earning a second chance to argue his claims. His actions leading up to the new hearing, however, signaled a preference for performative conflict over substantive legal engagement. He attempted to have the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings review the case in an “appellate capacity,” a power the Director confirmed he did not possess, and threatened to escalate the matter to federal court.

Then came the final twist. After securing the rehearing, the petitioner submitted a filing stating he would “unequivocally not participate in the hearing.”

True to his word, on the day of the hearing—March 10, 2022—the petitioner failed to appear. As the party bringing the complaint, he carried the burden of proof. His absence meant the judge had no evidence to consider and was compelled to dismiss the case. This chapter serves as a stark lesson in strategic failure. After doing the difficult work of securing a second hearing, the petitioner abandoned the field. The legal system, for all its complexities, responds to procedure and participation, not to external threats or pronouncements. Passionate conviction is powerless if you refuse to show up and fight the battle you initiated.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Drawing the Line Between Advocacy and Anarchy

The arc of this conflict—from a simple request for ballots to a multi-stage legal dispute that ended not with a bang, but a whimper—is a cautionary tale. It illustrates how a homeowner’s campaign for transparency, when pursued without regard for legal boundaries or civil discourse, can backfire completely. It left a vendor harassed, forced the community to pay its agent’s legal fees, and ultimately left the original issue unresolved. This case leaves all community leaders and members with a critical question: How can we foster a culture that balances the legitimate need for transparency with the equally important need for member privacy and basic civility?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Daniel B. Belt (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Ellen B. Davis (HOA attorney)
    HENZE COOK MURPHY, PLLC
  • William Campbell (board member/witness)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Vice President of the Board
  • Mexal (board member)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Identified as President in May 8, 2021 Meeting Minutes
  • Sarah Linkey (board member)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Identified as Treasurer in May 8, 2021 Meeting Minutes
  • Hallett (board member)
    Beaver Valley Improvement Association
    Identified as Director in May 8, 2021 Meeting Minutes

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Listed on initial decision transmission
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Listed on subsequent transmissions
  • Greg Hanchett (Director)
    OAH/ADRE
    Issued order regarding Petitioner's filing
  • c. serrano (administrative staff)
    OAH/ADRE
    Transmitted documents
  • Miranda A. (administrative staff)
    OAH/ADRE
    Transmitted documents

Other Participants

  • Petra Paul (managing agent/witness)
    Planned Development Services (PDS)
    Testified regarding PDS's role with Respondent's election
  • Lori Rutledge (unknown)
    Listed on transmission list
  • Brandee Abraham (unknown)
    Listed on transmission list

Ronald Borruso v. Sunland Village East Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121062-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-09-21
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Ronald Borruso Counsel
Respondent Sunland Village East Association Counsel Nicholas Nogami, Esq. and Nikolas Eicher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by Ronald Borruso, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence) regarding the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 concerning meeting procedures and unauthorized board actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof to show that the alleged violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 occurred.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations regarding member speaking rights at May 27, 2021 meeting and unauthorized board meetings concerning Operations Manager job qualifications

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated open meeting laws by restricting member speaking rights during deliberations at a special meeting on May 27, 2021, and by holding improperly noticed meetings to approve job qualifications for an Operations Manager.

Orders: Ronald Borruso’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Statute Violation, Burden of Proof, Dismissal, Filing Fee
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121062-REL Decision – 912276.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:38:53 (114.4 KB)

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can the HOA Board restrict when homeowners are allowed to speak during a meeting?

Short Answer

Yes, the Board is allowed to place reasonable time restrictions on speakers and determine the appropriate time for comments.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ cited Arizona law stating that while members have a right to speak, the Board may impose reasonable time restrictions. In this case, requiring members to wait until after the Board's presentation to speak was not a violation.

Alj Quote

The board may place reasonable time restrictions on those persons speaking during the meeting but shall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • homeowner rights
  • speaking limits

Question

If the Board calls part of a meeting 'closed', is it automatically an illegal executive session?

Short Answer

No, not if members are still allowed to attend and observe.

Detailed Answer

Even if the Board uses the term 'closed' inartfully to mean 'no comments allowed yet,' it is not an illegal meeting if members are physically permitted to attend. A true 'closed' meeting (executive session) is one members cannot attend.

Alj Quote

Consequently, although the Board referred to the initial part of the meeting as being 'closed' because it would not take members’ comments in that portion of the meeting, it was using that word in a different sense than it is used in section 33-1804.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and (C)

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • executive session
  • definitions

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You must prove your case by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner (petitioner) bears the burden of proof. This means showing that the allegations are more likely true than not—having the 'greater weight' of evidence.

Alj Quote

The standard of proof on all issues in this matter is that of a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.A.C. § R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • legal standards
  • burden of proof
  • procedure

Question

Is a Board President's verbal admission enough to prove an illegal meeting occurred?

Short Answer

Not necessarily, especially if other testimony contradicts it and there are no records.

Detailed Answer

In this case, a Board President said 'yes' when asked if the Board met to approve a job description. However, the ALJ found this insufficient because other Board members testified credibly that she was wrong and no such meeting took place.

Alj Quote

Although Ms. Haynie did answer 'yes' when asked, Messrs. Thurn and Fretwell provided credible testimony that she was wrong. … Consequently, the preponderance of the evidence shows that there is no violation

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • board meetings
  • testimony

Question

Can I file a single petition for multiple different complaints against my HOA?

Short Answer

Yes, but you must pay the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Detailed Answer

When filing a petition, you must either identify a single issue or pay the Department the fee required for a multi-issue hearing.

Alj Quote

Mr. Borruso that he was required either to identify a single issue for hearing or to pay to the Department the appropriate fee for a multi-issue hearing.

Legal Basis

Administrative Procedure

Topic Tags

  • filing fees
  • procedure
  • petitions

Question

Does the Board have to let me speak before they take a formal vote?

Short Answer

Yes, homeowners must be allowed to speak after discussion but before the vote.

Detailed Answer

The statute explicitly states that a member must be permitted to speak once after the board has discussed a specific item but before formal action is taken.

Alj Quote

[S]hall permit a member or member's designated representative to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • meetings
  • homeowner rights

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121062-REL
Case Title
Ronald Borruso vs. Sunland Village East Association
Decision Date
2021-09-21
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Ronald Borruso (petitioner)
  • Thomas Huston (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Nikolas Eicher (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Mark Thurn (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Current Board President, testified for Respondent
  • Marvin Fretwell (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Joyce Haynie (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Former President, subject of recall petition
  • Kim Shallue (board member)
    Sunland Village East Association
    Presided over May 27th meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision transmission

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-16
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura B Ganer Counsel
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners Association Counsel Mark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:39 (108.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020060-REL


Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

Parties:

Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020060-REL


Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020060-REL


3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

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2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

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3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

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Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-16
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura B Ganer Counsel
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners Association Counsel Mark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:27 (108.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020060-REL


Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

Parties:

Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020060-REL


Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020060-REL


3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

——————————————————————————–

3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.

John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – 814023.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:02 (99.2 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772795.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:06 (42.4 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772833.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:09 (67.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties Involved

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

John R. Ashley

Respondent

Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Attorney for Respondent

Wendy Erlich, Esq.

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Oversight Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation

The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.

Procedural Timeline

c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.

February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.

March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.

March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.

August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.

Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation

The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.

Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)

Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.

“Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.

Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.

Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)

Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.

Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.

Controlling Bylaw Provisions

Article

Pertinent Text / Description

Article III, Section 4

Meetings of Members; Quorum

“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”

Article VI, Section 3

Meetings of Directors; Quorum

Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.

Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)

In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:

• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.

• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”

• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.

Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)

The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:

Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.

Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.

Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:

◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.

◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”

Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.






Study Guide – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?

2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?

3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?

4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?

6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?

8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.

3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.

4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.

5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.

6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.

8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.

9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.

10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.

1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.

2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?

3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?

4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?

5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.






Blog Post – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG


4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association

Introduction: The Rules We All Live By

If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.

But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.

A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.

The Takeaways

Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.

The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:

and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.

A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.

Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”

A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.

In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.

However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.

Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.

During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.

The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print

The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.

When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (respondent attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission

Other Participants

  • A. Leverette (clerical staff)
    Signed document transmission in initial order

John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL Decision – 772795.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:18:24 (42.4 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL Decision – 772833.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:18:24 (67.3 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf at the rehearing,.

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (HOA attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Counsel for Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.,.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge who issued the original decision and the rehearing decision,,.
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the final orders,.
  • A. Leverette (ADRE staff)
    Signed the transmission of the original order dated March 3, 2020.
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.