Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Association’s Bylaws Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1804(A)
Outcome Summary
The Petitioner's petition is denied, as she failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law) or selectively enforced Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws regarding term limits.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof on both issues. The closed board meeting was authorized for discussing legal advice, and the HOA's interpretation of the term limit provision aligned with the amendment's purpose to prevent Board members from serving long terms.
Key Issues & Findings
Selective enforcement of Bylaws regarding term limits.
Petitioner alleged Respondent selectively enforced the 2021 Bylaws amendment concerning term limits by retroactively applying the two-term limit to disqualify her 2024 candidacy.
Orders: Petition denied. Petitioner failed to establish a violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Administrative Hearing Briefing:Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative hearing case Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 25F-H030-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The petitioner, Sharon Maiden, a former board member, alleged that the association selectively enforced its bylaws to disqualify her from running for the board and violated Arizona’s open meeting laws by making this decision in a closed executive session.
The central conflict revolved around the interpretation of a 2021 bylaw amendment that shortened board member term limits. The petitioner argued for a prospective application, which would reset the term-limit clock for sitting board members, while the respondent association argued for an interpretation that counted prior service.
On June 2, 2025, Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issued a decision denying the petition in its entirety. The judge concluded that the association’s board acted within the bounds of Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)) by holding a closed session to consider legal advice. Furthermore, the judge found that the petitioner failed to prove a bylaw violation, reasoning that the association’s interpretation was consistent with the membership’s clear intent to shorten, not lengthen, the potential tenure of board members.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
Case Name
Sharon M. Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Case Number
25F-H030-REL
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Petitioner
Sharon M. Maiden
Respondent
Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Respondent’s Counsel
Josh Bolen, Esq. (CHDB Law LLP)
Presiding Judge
Velva Moses-Thompson
Petition Allegations
The petition, filed by Sharon Maiden on December 15, 2024, asserted two primary violations by the Val Vista Lakes Community Association:
1. Selective Enforcement of Bylaws: An alleged violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Association’s Bylaws, stemming from the board’s decision to disqualify the petitioner from running for a board position in 2024 based on its interpretation of term limits.
2. Open Meeting Law Violation: An alleged violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A), contending that the board failed to hold an open meeting when it made the binding decision to disqualify her candidacy.
Initially filed as a single-issue petition for which a $500 fee was paid, the OAH ordered on March 12, 2025, that the petitioner must either pay an additional $500 to pursue both issues or select one to proceed with at the hearing.
——————————————————————————–
Procedural History
• January 27, 2025: The Arizona Department of Real Estate refers the petition to the OAH for an administrative hearing.
• February 4, 2025: Respondent files a Motion to Strike the Petition, arguing the petitioner improperly disclosed attorney-client privileged communications.
• February 11, 2025: Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn denies the Motion to Strike. The hearing is continued to March 26, 2025.
• March 26, 2025: The first day of the evidentiary hearing is conducted.
• April 11, 2025: A further hearing is conducted. At its conclusion, the record is held open to allow for post-hearing briefing.
• May 13, 2025: The post-hearing briefing period concludes, and the record is closed.
• June 2, 2025: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues the final decision, denying the petition.
Central Dispute: Interpretation of Bylaw Term Limits
The core of the dispute was the interpretation of Article IV, Section 2 of the association’s bylaws, which was amended in 2021. The amendment’s purpose, as testified by multiple witnesses, was to shorten the length of time directors could serve on the board.
Evolution of the Bylaw
• 2012 Bylaws: Introduced term limits for the first time, establishing a maximum of three consecutive two-year terms (six years total), followed by a required one-year break.
• 2021 Bylaws: The membership approved a rewrite that reduced term limits to two consecutive elected two-year terms (four years total), followed by a required two-year break.
Both versions of the bylaw contained the following critical sentence: “Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits as follows.” The meaning of this sentence became the primary point of contention.
Competing Interpretations
Position
Argument Summary
Key Evidence and Testimony
Petitioner’s Position (Prospective Application)
The “Commencing with…” language resets the clock. Terms served before the 2021 amendment should not count toward the new, shorter limits. The association’s sudden shift to a retroactive interpretation was selective and targeted.
William Sutell (Former President): Testified the intent was to “reset the clock for everybody.” His 2022 newsletter stating his “term limit of four years is up” was “ineloquent” and meant to express he was tired of serving. Douglas Keats (Former Board Member): Stated the intent of the rewrite was to “Go forward.” Historical Precedent: The association, based on a 2016 legal opinion from Goodman Law Group, had allowed Director Cheryl McCoy to serve nine consecutive years despite the 2012 bylaw’s six-year limit. Legal Opinions: An opinion from Krupnik & Speas in November 2023 stated the 2021 bylaws were prospective, not retroactive.
Respondent’s Position (Prior Service Counts)
The clear intent of the membership and the bylaw committee was to shorten terms. The petitioner’s interpretation creates a loophole allowing sitting board members to serve for 8 or more years, directly contradicting the amendment’s purpose.
Jill Brown (Bylaw Committee Chair): Testified the committee’s intent was to apply the new limits to sitting directors and there was no discussion of “grandfathering” anyone. Bryan Patterson (Current President): Testified that the membership voted for two two-year terms “and that’s it.” Sutell’s 2022 Newsletter: Presented as a direct admission from the former president that the four-year limit applied to him based on his service from 2018-2022. Drafting Logic: The “Commencing with…” clause is a standard legal provision to prevent a new rule from invalidating a board member’s current term, not to erase their entire service history.
Central Dispute: Alleged Open Meeting Law Violation
The second major issue concerned the board’s decision-making process. On October 11, 2024, the board held a closed executive session where it voted 5-4 to accept the legal opinion of its counsel (CHDB Law) and disqualify Ms. Maiden from the ballot.
Competing Arguments
Position
Argument Summary
Key Evidence and Testimony
Petitioner’s Argument (Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A))
The vote to disqualify a candidate was a final, binding decision that must be made in an open meeting. The closed session was not justified under the narrow exceptions of the statute.
Improper Notice: The meeting notice cited the incorrect statute (for condominiums, not planned communities) and was not properly distributed to all board members. Lack of Statutory Justification: No attorney was present at the meeting, and there was no pending litigation at that specific moment. The agenda item was to “accept opinion,” not simply “receive advice.”
Respondent’s Argument (Compliance with Law)
The executive session was permissible under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1), which allows closed meetings for the “consideration of… Legal advice from an attorney for the board or the association” and matters concerning “pending or contemplated litigation.”
Contemplated Litigation: Testimony indicated that Ms. Maiden had threatened to file an ADR complaint or lawsuit. Consideration of Legal Advice: The board was reviewing three separate legal opinions regarding Ms. Maiden’s eligibility. Petitioner’s Participation: Ms. Maiden was present at the meeting, participated in the vote, and did not object to the session being held in private at that time.
——————————————————————————–
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ denied Ms. Maiden’s petition on both counts, finding that she failed to meet her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ruling on the Open Meeting Law
The ALJ concluded that the board did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).
• Key Rationale: The evidence demonstrated that the board met in executive session “to consider a legal opinion regarding the 2021 Amendment.” This action falls squarely within the statutory exception outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1).
• On Disclosure: The statute permits, but does not require, the board to disclose information from such a session after a “final resolution.” As the matter was still being litigated, no final resolution had been reached.
Ruling on the Bylaw Violation
The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the respondent violated Article IV of its bylaws.
• Key Rationale: The judge focused on the underlying purpose of the 2021 amendment, which testimony from both sides confirmed was to “prevent Board members from serving for long periods of time.”
• Rejection of Petitioner’s Interpretation: The decision noted that the petitioner, along with her witnesses, admitted that their interpretation “would have allowed the then-sitting Board Members the right to serve 6, 8, and potentially 10-year term limits.” The ALJ found this outcome would be contrary to the amendment’s purpose.
• Jurisdictional Note: The decision explicitly stated that the “issue of selective enforcement is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” The ruling was based on the interpretation of the bylaw’s text and intent, not on whether it was applied unevenly.
Final Order
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that Respondent’s Board violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 or Article IV, Sections 2 and 3 of the Bylaws.”
Study Guide – 25F-H030-REL
Administrative Hearing Study Guide: Maiden v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source context.
1. What were the two primary legal issues Sharon Maiden raised in her petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association?
2. What was the key phrase in the 2021 bylaws that became the central point of interpretive conflict regarding term limits?
3. According to the hearing testimony, what were the main purposes of the 2021 bylaw committee’s rewrite of the association’s bylaws?
4. Explain the Respondent’s justification for holding a closed executive session on October 11, 2024, to decide on Sharon Maiden’s eligibility.
5. How did the legal opinions from the Goodman Law Group (Ashley Turner) and Krupnik & Spees (Adrien Speed) support the Petitioner’s case?
6. Describe the key piece of evidence the Respondent used involving former board president William (Bill) Sutell to argue against a prospective interpretation of the term limits.
7. What decision did the Board of Directors make during the October 11, 2024, executive session, and what was the final vote count?
8. What procedural issue did Petitioner Douglas Keats identify with the notice for the October 11, 2024, executive session?
9. According to witness Jill Brown, what was the general intent of the bylaw committee and community members regarding the length of board service?
10. What were the final conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge in the June 2, 2025, decision?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. Petitioner Sharon Maiden alleged that the Respondent (1) selectively enforced the Bylaws in violation of Article IV, Sections 2 and 3, and (2) failed to hold an open meeting when it decided to disqualify her from running for the Board, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(A).
2. The central point of conflict was the phrase in Article IV, Section 2: “Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits…” The Petitioner argued this indicated a prospective “reset,” while the Respondent argued it did not erase prior service.
3. Testimony from witnesses like Douglas Keats and William Sutell indicated the rewrite was intended to address multiple issues, not just term limits. Key purposes included establishing secret ballots, eliminating the nominating committee which was seen as counter to the CCNRs, and creating a formal procedure for replacing board members based on vote counts rather than board appointments.
4. The Respondent justified the closed session under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1), which allows for closed meetings to consider legal advice from an attorney. The board was discussing three separate legal opinions regarding Ms. Maiden’s eligibility and also noted that Ms. Maiden had contemplated legal action against the association.
5. The Petitioner argued that these opinions demonstrated a consistent historical interpretation by the association’s own general counsels. Both opinions stated that the term limit language in the 2012 and 2021 bylaws should be interpreted prospectively, meaning terms served prior to the adoption of the new bylaws did not count toward the new limits.
6. The Respondent heavily relied on a November 2022 newsletter message from then-president Bill Sutell. In it, Mr. Sutell stated, “This will be my last president’s message to the community as my term limit of four years is up,” which the Respondent argued was an admission that the term limits were not reset by the 2021 bylaw amendment.
7. The Board of Directors voted to accept the opinion of CHDB Law LLP regarding term limits, which effectively disqualified Sharon Maiden from running in the 2024 election. The motion passed with a vote of 5 to 4.
8. Douglas Keats testified that the email notice for the executive session was not sent to him or two other board members (Christine Rucker and Curtis Weile) at their correct addresses, while it was sent to a former board member. He also noted the notice cited an incorrect statute (A.R.S. § 33-1248 for condominiums) instead of the one for planned communities.
9. Jill Brown, who chaired the bylaw committee, testified that the general consensus of the committee and community members was that they did not want directors serving for long periods. The intent was to shorten the available terms to encourage turnover and prevent directors from serving for “excessive amounts of time.”
10. The Administrative Law Judge denied Sharon Maiden’s petition. The Judge concluded that the Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) because the closed meeting to consider legal advice was permissible. Furthermore, the Judge found Maiden failed to prove a violation of the bylaws, stating the purpose of the 2021 amendment was to prevent long service periods, and deemed the issue of selective enforcement to be outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Construct detailed responses to the following prompts, synthesizing evidence and arguments from across the source documents. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioner and Respondent regarding the proper interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law). Discuss the specific actions taken by the board and how each party framed those actions in the context of the statute’s exceptions for closed sessions.
2. Compare and contrast the testimonies of William Sutell and Douglas Keats with that of Jill Brown. How did their recollections and interpretations of the bylaw committee’s intent differ, particularly concerning whether the new term limits should apply prospectively or retroactively to sitting board members?
3. Trace the evolution of the Val Vista Lakes Community Association’s bylaws regarding term limits from 2012 to 2021. Evaluate the arguments concerning “long-standing practice” and “selective enforcement,” referencing the specific cases of board members Cheryl McCoy, William Sutell, and Sharon Maiden.
4. Examine the role of conflicting legal advice in this dispute. Discuss the different opinions offered by the Goodman Law Group, Krupnik & Spees, and CHDB Law LLP, and analyze how the Board of Directors chose to navigate these contradictory recommendations.
5. The Administrative Law Judge’s final decision states that the “issue of selective enforcement is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” Based on the testimony and arguments presented, construct an argument that Sharon Maiden might have made regarding selective enforcement, and explain why the Respondent would have refuted it.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms and Entities
Term / Entity
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Kay A. Abramsohn and Velva Moses-Thompson served as ALJs.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from members of homeowners’ associations. It referred this case to the OAH.
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)
The codified laws of the state of Arizona. Key statutes in this case include § 33-1804(A) and § 32-2199.
A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
The Arizona statute concerning open meeting laws for planned community associations. It mandates that meetings be open to members but provides specific, limited exceptions for closed (executive) sessions, such as to discuss legal advice.
Bolen, Josh
An attorney with CHDB Law LLP who served as counsel for the Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association.
Brown, Jill
A witness for the Respondent. She served as the chair of the 2021 bylaw committee and was a current board member at the time of the hearing.
Bylaw Committee
A committee established by the board in 2021 to review and recommend changes to the association’s bylaws. Its members included Jill Brown, William Sutell, and Douglas Keats.
Carpenter Hazelwood (CHDB LAW LLP)
The law firm that represented the Respondent. The Petitioner filed an unsuccessful motion to disqualify the firm.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing documents for the community. The 2021 bylaw committee sought to address bylaw provisions that were counter to the CCNRs, such as the nominating committee.
Commencing with…
The key phrase in Article IV, Section 2 of the bylaws that was central to the dispute. The Petitioner argued it signaled a prospective application of term limits, while the Respondent disagreed.
Executive Session
A closed meeting of the Board of Directors, permitted under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) for specific purposes, such as discussing legal advice or pending litigation.
Keats, Douglas
A witness for the Petitioner. He was a former board member who served as secretary of the 2021 bylaw committee.
Maiden, Sharon M.
The Petitioner in the case, a homeowner in Val Vista Lakes and a former member of its Board of Directors who was disqualified from running for a third consecutive term.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH / Tribunal)
The independent state agency that conducted the administrative hearing for this case after referral from the Department of Real Estate.
Patterson, Bryan
A witness for the Respondent. He was the HOA President at the time of the hearing and was Vice President when the vote to disqualify the Petitioner occurred.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Sharon M. Maiden.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this administrative hearing, defined as evidence that is more likely true than not. The ALJ found the Petitioner failed to meet this burden.
Prospective Interpretation
The argument that a new rule or law applies only “going forward” from its effective date and does not consider service or actions that occurred prior to that date. This was the Petitioner’s central argument.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Val Vista Lakes Community Association.
Retroactive Interpretation
The argument that a new rule or law applies to past events, meaning prior service on the board would count against the newly established term limits. This was the Respondent’s position.
Sutell, William (Bill)
A witness for the Petitioner. He is an attorney, a former board president, and served on the 2021 bylaw committee.
Val Vista Lakes Community Association
The Respondent in the case; a homeowners’ association (HOA) in Gilbert, Arizona.
Blog Post – 25F-H030-REL
5 Surprising Lessons from an HOA War Over a Single Sentence
Introduction: The Butterfly Effect of Bylaws
For many homeowners, the rules set by their homeowners’ association (HOA) can feel arbitrary, buried in dense legal documents. But the precise wording of those governing documents has massive, unforeseen consequences—a legal butterfly effect where a minor change creates a major storm. This dynamic was on full display in the case of Sharon Maiden vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, where one seemingly simple sentence sparked a complex, year-long legal dispute.
The case offers a masterclass in the tension between the technical reading of a text versus its clear, underlying intent. It provides surprising insights into law, community governance, and human nature. Here are five key lessons from this HOA war over a single sentence.
——————————————————————————–
1. One Sentence, Two Meanings, and a Mountain of Legal Bills
A 2021 bylaw amendment, designed to reduce board member term limits, lit the fuse for the central conflict. The entire dispute hinged on the interpretation of one introductory phrase, demonstrating just how much can ride on a few words.
The critical sentence from Article IV, Section 2 of the 2021 Bylaws reads:
“Commencing with the first Annual Meeting after the adoption of these Amended and Restated Bylaws, Directors will be subject to term limits as follows.”
This single sentence gave rise to two completely opposite interpretations:
• The “Reset” Theory (Petitioner’s view): Proponents argued this language meant the term limit clock reset for all sitting board members. Under this view, their prior years of service didn’t count toward the new, shorter limit. This interpretation seemed solid, even supported by a formal legal opinion from the association’s previous general counsel, attorney Adrien Spees.
• The “Look-Back” Theory (Respondent’s view): The association argued the phrase was merely a legal formality to prevent sitting members from being disqualified mid-term. They contended that a board member’s prior service absolutely still counted toward the new limit.
The fact that this ambiguity was enough to fuel a formal administrative hearing shows the high stakes of precise legal drafting. What’s truly surprising is how a standard legal phrase like “Commencing with…” could be interpreted so diametrically as to potentially erase years of board service from the term-limit calculation.
2. The Architect of the Rule Became Its Most Complicated Case
One of the most fascinating aspects of the case involved the testimony of Bill Sutell, the former Board President. Mr. Sutell was in charge when the 2021 bylaw changes were drafted and approved, and he testified in support of the “reset” theory, which would have allowed him and other members to serve longer.
However, the strongest piece of evidence used against his position came from his own hand. In a 2022 newsletter to the community, Mr. Sutell had written:
“This will be my last president’s message to the community as my term limit of four years is up.”
When questioned, he explained the statement was “ineloquent.” He testified he was tired and had a “self-imposed term limit” because he “didn’t want to be a career board member.” This created a paradox where the rule’s architect argued for one interpretation in court while his own public statement seemed to support the opposing view. As community governance analysts, we see a crucial lesson here: for HOA volunteers, informal communications like a newsletter can be scrutinized with the same intensity as a legal document—a trap many well-meaning leaders are unprepared for.
3. Why a “Correct” Interpretation Can Still Be Wrong
The petitioner’s side came to the hearing with what seemed like very strong evidence. They had testimony about the bylaw committee’s intent and presented a formal legal opinion from attorney Adrien Spees that appeared to settle the matter:
“This amendment is prospective not retroactive. The Term limits only apply to directors elected beginning the first annual meeting following November 9th, 2021. Thus, a director who has served for several years before November 9th, 2021 will still be eligible to serve two consecutive terms after November 9th, 2021.”
This seems clear-cut. However, the argument that ultimately won focused not on what the words said, but on what they would do. The fatal blow to the “reset” theory came not from the respondent’s lawyers, but from the petitioner’s own key witnesses. During testimony, both Sutell and another witness, Douglas Keats, admitted that their interpretation would create a massive loophole, allowing sitting board members “the right to serve 6, 8, and potentially 10-year term limits.” This admission was critical. The Administrative Law Judge rejected an interpretation—even one supported by a legal opinion—because it led to an “absurd result” that directly contradicted the stated purpose of the rule, which was to shorten term limits, not accidentally lengthen them for a select few.
4. The Peril of a Closed-Door Meeting
The second major issue was the claim that the board violated Arizona’s open meeting laws. The vote to disqualify Sharon Maiden from the 2024 ballot was not taken in public. Instead, it happened during a closed executive session while she, a sitting board member, was present.
The board justified the closed-door meeting by stating they were discussing legal advice and contemplated litigation, a valid exception under A.R.S. § 33-1804. However, the ALJ’s final decision highlighted a crucial detail:
“Petitioner was a member of the Board at the time of the meeting and did not object to the Board voting on whether Article IV, Section 2 of Respondent’s Bylaws permitted Petitioner to run for the board…”
This offers a stark lesson. A person’s failure to object to a process in the moment can significantly weaken their ability to challenge it later. It’s easy to see why someone might stay silent: they may be intimidated, unsure of the rules, or simply not realize the procedural gravity of their silence. This surprising takeaway underscores that understanding the rules of order as they are happening is critical, because silence can be interpreted as consent.
5. The “Why” Trumped the “What”
The story concluded when the Administrative Law Judge denied the petitioner’s case on both counts. In the face of ambiguous text and competing legal opinions, the judge focused on the fundamental purpose of the 2021 bylaw amendment. The final decision stated:
“…the preponderance of the evidence presented at hearing shows that the purpose of the 2021 amendment was to prevent Board members for serving on the Board for long periods of time.”
In this legal gray area, the underlying intent—the “why” behind the rule—proved more powerful than the technical arguments about the “what.” The judge determined that an interpretation creating 10-year term limits could not possibly align with the members’ vote to prevent people from serving for long periods. The surprising lesson is that even when the text is debatable, the spirit of a rule can become the most decisive factor in its application.
——————————————————————————–
Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What Your Rules Mean?
The Val Vista Lakes case is a powerful reminder that the words in bylaws are not just suggestions; they have real-world power to shape communities, define rights, and launch costly legal battles. Bylaws are “living documents” in the sense that they have a daily impact, but they are dangerously “dead documents” if members don’t understand them. The consequences are not just financial. At the hearing, former president Bill Sutell gave a poignant final statement explaining his departure from the community he had worked so hard to serve: “I sold my home that this was more than I needed in my retirement.”
This case is a cautionary tale about the human cost of ambiguity. It leaves every HOA member with a final, thought-provoking challenge: When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and are you willing to actively question ambiguity and push for clarity before a conflict arises?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Sharon M. Maiden(petitioner) Val Vista Lakes Community Association Former board member/candidate
William Sutel(witness) Val Vista Lakes Community Association Former board president; bylaw committee member
Douglas Keats(witness) Val Vista Lakes Community Association Board member; bylaw committee member; requested subpoena for him
Jeremy Whitaker(petitioner) Val Vista Lakes Community Association Filed ADR complaint
Respondent Side
Josh Bolen(HOA attorney) CHDB Law LLP Counsel for Val Vista Lakes Community Association; requested subpoena for him
Jill Brown(board member) Val Vista Lakes Community Association Bylaw committee chair; respondent witness
Bryan Patterson(board president) Val Vista Lakes Community Association Respondent witness; Also listed as subpoenaed witness
Chuck Oldham(HOA attorney) CHDB Law LLP
Mel McDonald(board president) Val Vista Lakes Community Association Requested subpoena; board member
Vicki Goslin(attorney staff) CHDB Law LLP
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) OAH
Susan Nicolson(Commissioner) ADRE
Kay A. Abramsohn(ALJ) OAH
Ashley Turner(attorney) Goodman Law Group Wrote 2016 legal opinion; Also listed as subpoenaed witness
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association violated Article 2.1 of the Bylaws by not holding elections. The Bylaw states the annual meeting is for the purpose of 'electing or announcing the results of the election of Directors' and transacting 'other business' (which included dissolution), and the HOA was not required to hold elections if results could have been announced or if dissolution proceedings were underway.
Why this result: The Bylaws did not strictly require elections be held, and Petitioner failed to object to the board remaining in place to oversee the dissolution.
Key Issues & Findings
Annual meeting
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Article 2.1 of the Bylaws by failing to hold Board of Directors elections at the 2021 annual meeting. Respondent argued the language ('for the purpose of electing or announcing the results') did not require elections and that the dissolution vote superseded the immediate need for elections, especially since no one objected at the meeting.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition was denied.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Decision Documents
23F-H031-REL Decision – 1035344.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:49 (51.8 KB)
23F-H031-REL Decision – 1049021.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:53:51 (114.7 KB)
Study Guide – 23F-H031-REL
Select all sources
1035344.pdf
1045278.aac
1049021.pdf
No emoji found
Loading
23F-H031-REL
3 sources
These sources document a legal dispute between Clifford S. Burnes and the Saguaro Crest Homeowners’ Association regarding an alleged violation of community bylaws. The conflict centers on a December 2021 annual meeting where the association voted to dissolve the organization but did not hold new elections for its leadership. Burnes argued that Article 2.1 of the bylaws mandated an election, while the association maintained that the dissolution vote rendered new elections unnecessary. An administrative hearing transcript captures the testimony of both parties, highlighting disagreements over meeting procedures and the legal interpretation of governing documents. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the association, concluding that no mandatory election requirement was violated. The final decision emphasizes that the petitioner failed to object during the meeting and did not meet the burden of proof for his claims.
What are the legal arguments for and against dissolving the HOA?
How did the judge interpret the ‘purpose’ of the annual meeting?
Explain the role of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
Thursday, February 12
Save to note
Today • 2:17 PM
Video Overview
Mind Map
Reports
Flashcards
Quiz
Infographic
Slide Deck
Data Table
Blog Post – 23F-H031-REL
Select all sources
1035344.pdf
1045278.aac
1049021.pdf
No emoji found
Loading
23F-H031-REL
3 sources
These sources document a legal dispute between Clifford S. Burnes and the Saguaro Crest Homeowners’ Association regarding an alleged violation of community bylaws. The conflict centers on a December 2021 annual meeting where the association voted to dissolve the organization but did not hold new elections for its leadership. Burnes argued that Article 2.1 of the bylaws mandated an election, while the association maintained that the dissolution vote rendered new elections unnecessary. An administrative hearing transcript captures the testimony of both parties, highlighting disagreements over meeting procedures and the legal interpretation of governing documents. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the association, concluding that no mandatory election requirement was violated. The final decision emphasizes that the petitioner failed to object during the meeting and did not meet the burden of proof for his claims.
What are the legal arguments for and against dissolving the HOA?
How did the judge interpret the ‘purpose’ of the annual meeting?
Explain the role of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
Thursday, February 12
Save to note
Today • 2:17 PM
Video Overview
Mind Map
Reports
Flashcards
Quiz
Infographic
Slide Deck
Data Table
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Clifford S. Burnes(petitioner) Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association Member Also referred to as Clifford (Norm) Burnes.
Respondent Side
John T. Crotty(HOA attorney) Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
Esmerina Martinez(board member) Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association President; referred to as Serena Martinez or Esmerelda Martinez in sources.
Dave Madill(board member) Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association Vice President; referred to as Dave Matt or Dave Mel in testimony.
Joseph Martinez(board member) Saguaro Crest Homeowners' Association
Neutral Parties
Adam D. Stone(ALJ) OAH
Susan Nicolson(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official transmittal.
vnunez(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official transmittal.
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official transmittal.
labril(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official transmittal.
The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.
Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment
Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.
Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)
Questions
Question
If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?
Short Answer
Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.
Detailed Answer
In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.
Alj Quote
In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
Topic Tags
Board Vacancies
Elections
Bylaws
Question
Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?
Short Answer
Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.
Alj Quote
The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Interpretation
Topic Tags
Board Vacancies
Timelines
Bylaws
Question
Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?
Short Answer
No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.
Detailed Answer
The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.
Alj Quote
Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.
Legal Basis
Testimony / Findings of Fact
Topic Tags
Community Manager
Authority
Board Composition
Question
What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?
Short Answer
The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.
Detailed Answer
This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
Topic Tags
Legal Standards
Burden of Proof
Evidence
Question
Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?
Short Answer
Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.
Alj Quote
Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.
Legal Basis
Findings of Fact / Bylaws
Topic Tags
Elections
Board Terms
Voting
Question
Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?
Short Answer
Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.
Detailed Answer
Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.
Alj Quote
Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.
Legal Basis
Conclusions of Law
Topic Tags
Discrimination/Bias
Enforcement
Board Conduct
Case
Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Questions
Question
If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?
Short Answer
Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.
Detailed Answer
In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.
Alj Quote
In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
Topic Tags
Board Vacancies
Elections
Bylaws
Question
Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?
Short Answer
Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.
Alj Quote
The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Interpretation
Topic Tags
Board Vacancies
Timelines
Bylaws
Question
Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?
Short Answer
No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.
Detailed Answer
The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.
Alj Quote
Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.
Legal Basis
Testimony / Findings of Fact
Topic Tags
Community Manager
Authority
Board Composition
Question
What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?
Short Answer
The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.
Detailed Answer
This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
Topic Tags
Legal Standards
Burden of Proof
Evidence
Question
Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?
Short Answer
Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.
Alj Quote
Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.
Legal Basis
Findings of Fact / Bylaws
Topic Tags
Elections
Board Terms
Voting
Question
Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?
Short Answer
Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.
Detailed Answer
Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.
Alj Quote
Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.
Legal Basis
Conclusions of Law
Topic Tags
Discrimination/Bias
Enforcement
Board Conduct
Case
Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Carlos J. Sanchez(petitioner) Candidate for Board election
Marinda K. Minch(petitioner) Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified
Respondent Side
Ashley Moscarello(HOA attorney) Goodman Lawgroup
Bradley Hudson(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board President of the Board; testified as witness
Shawn Nurse(community manager) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Testified as witness; received ballots for election
William Skanadore(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Incumbent candidate; elected
Will Terrick(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Incumbent candidate; elected
Wendelyn Neal(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
Joel Krick(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
Kathy Hudson(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
Christiane Pieraggi(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Appointed to fill vacancy
Neutral Parties
Sondra J. Vanella(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) ADRE
Other Participants
John Neelsen(unknown) Candidate for Board election
Tania Almonte(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1804(A), 33-1804(B), 33-1804(F), and Association bylaws 2.3, 2.7, and 3.1
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA acted within the scope of its statutory authority during its April 02, 2020, annual meeting and elections, and denied the Petitioner's petition for failure to sustain the burden of proof regarding alleged statutory and bylaw violations.
Why this result: The ALJ found that notice of the meeting modification (to an online platform due to COVID-19) was timely and proper, and Petitioner's claimed denial of the right to speak was the result of user error of the online platform, not action by the Association. Furthermore, the decision to hold elections for all five open Board positions was deemed appropriate due to carryover vacancies resulting from a lack of quorum in the prior year (2019).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violations regarding Annual Meeting notice (change in venue), right to speak, proper call to order, and staggered board voting.
Petitioner filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging the Association violated statutes and bylaws concerning the April 02, 2020, annual meeting, specifically regarding insufficient notice for the venue change (due to COVID-19), denial of the right to speak (via online chat), improper chair delegation, and failure to stagger Board elections.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $2,000.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
Analytics Highlights
Topics: COVID-19, Virtual Meeting, Notice, Right to Speak, Elections, Bylaws, Quorum, User Error
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020061-REL Decision – 819907.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:45 (149.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020061-REL
Briefing Document: Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020061-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Samuel T. Paparazzo versus the Coronado Ranch Community Association. The central conclusion of the proceeding is the denial of the Petitioner’s claims. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Arizona state statutes or its own governing bylaws in the conduct of its April 2, 2020, annual meeting.
The critical takeaways from the decision are as follows:
• Meeting Format and Notice: The Association’s decision to move its annual meeting to a virtual platform (ClickMeeting) was deemed a lawful and appropriate response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Arizona Governor’s related executive orders. The notification methods, which included physical signs and multiple emails, were found to be sufficient.
• Right to Speak: The Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the right to speak because he was “blocked” from the online chat feature was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the issue stemmed from “user error”—the Petitioner typed messages but failed to transmit them by pressing ‘enter’ or ‘send’. The fact that 26 other members successfully used the chat feature demonstrated its functionality.
• Meeting Conduct: The Association’s president properly called the meeting to order before delegating chairing responsibilities to the Association’s Managing Agent, an action the Petitioner conceded was within the president’s authority.
• Board Elections: The election of all five Board of Director positions simultaneously, rather than in staggered terms, was justified by unique circumstances. The Association’s 2019 annual meeting failed to achieve a quorum, preventing an election and resulting in a “carryover of open seats,” which necessitated filling all positions in the 2020 election.
Ultimately, the ALJ found that the Association and its Board acted within the scope of their statutory authority and that the challenges raised by the Petitioner were without merit.
I. Case Overview
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on September 3, 2020, following an evidentiary hearing held on August 18, 2020.
• Case Number: 20F-H2020061-REL
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
• Petitioner: Samuel T. Paparazzo (Homeowner and Association Member)
• Respondent: Coronado Ranch Community Association (HOA)
• Central Issue: The core of the dispute was whether the Coronado Ranch Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes and specific sections of its own bylaws during its annual meeting on April 2, 2020.
II. Petitioner’s Allegations
On May 15, 2020, Samuel Paparazzo filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging that the Association committed the following violations:
1. Improper Notice of Meeting: Providing less than 10-days’ notice regarding a “change in venue” for the annual meeting to only a small portion of the membership, in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and Association Bylaw 2.3.
2. Denial of Right to Speak: Preventing the Petitioner from exercising his right to speak by “blocking” or otherwise disabling his use of the online “chat feature” during the virtual meeting, in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A).
3. Improper Meeting Conduct: Failing to properly call the annual meeting to order, in violation of Association Bylaw 2.7.
4. Improper Board Election: Conducting the Board of Directors election without the “staggered” terms required by the bylaws, in violation of Association Bylaw 3.1.
III. Factual Chronology and Key Evidence
The decision outlines a clear sequence of events, heavily influenced by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Feb. 20, 2020
The Association issues its initial notice for the annual meeting, scheduled for April 2, 2020, at Coronado Elementary School.
Mar. 12, 2020
The Association mails election ballots to all Members.
Mar. 19, 2020
Arizona Governor Douglas Ducey issues Executive Order 2020-09, limiting certain business operations to slow the spread of COVID-19.
~Mar. 25, 2020
The Association’s President, Bob Hicks, officially moves the meeting to the virtual ClickMeeting platform.
Mar. 25 – Apr. 1
The Association notifies Members of the change via 12 signs at 6 community entrances and three separate email blasts to approximately 750 Members, which had an average open rate of 63.53%.
Mar. 30, 2020
Governor Ducey issues Executive Order 2020-18, the “Stay Home, Stay Healthy, Stay Connected” order.
Apr. 1, 2020
Two signs are placed at the entrance to the original meeting location, Coronado Elementary School, informing of the change.
Apr. 2, 2020
The Annual Meeting is held via ClickMeeting. • President Hicks calls the meeting to order and then appoints Managing Agent Kevin Bishop to chair the remainder of the meeting. • A quorum is achieved based on attendees and absentee ballots. • An election is held for all 5 open Board positions due to a lack of quorum at the 2019 meeting. • The Petitioner types messages in the chat window but fails to hit “enter” or click “send” to transmit them. He receives no response to an email for help sent during the meeting. • At least 26 other Members successfully use the chat feature.
IV. Analysis of Key Issues and Legal Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge systematically addressed and dismissed each of the Petitioner’s four allegations, concluding that the Board acted lawfully and within its authority.
A. Meeting Notice and Venue Change
• Alleged Violation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 2.3 (Notice of Meetings).
• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The ALJ concluded that the notice of the Association’s 2020 annual meeting was “timely and properly noticed.” The move to an online platform was not an arbitrary venue change but a necessary and reasonable measure to comply with the Governor’s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Supporting Evidence:
◦ The Association made a multi-faceted effort to inform Members through physical signs and repeated emails.
◦ The Petitioner received notice of the modification and, crucially, “failed to raise an objection prior to or during the meeting at issue.”
◦ A Member’s attendance at a meeting waives objections to defective notice, as stated in Bylaw 2.3.
B. Right to Speak
• Alleged Violation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) (Open Meetings and Member Participation).
• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The ALJ determined the Petitioner’s inability to communicate during the meeting was the result of “user error” and not a deliberate act by the Association to silence him.
• Supporting Evidence:
◦ The Petitioner wrote messages but never finalized the action by hitting the “enter” key or clicking the “send” button.
◦ The chat feature was demonstrably functional, as it was “successfully used by no less than 26 other Members during the annual meeting.”
◦ The decision explicitly states, “The Association is not responsible for Petitioner’s lack of ClickMeeting proficiency.”
C. Conduct of Meeting
• Alleged Violation: Bylaw 2.7 (Organization and Conduct of Meeting).
• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The meeting was lawfully conducted.
• Supporting Evidence:
◦ The Association President, Bob Hicks, called the meeting to order and took roll before appointing Managing Agent Kevin Bishop to chair the rest of the meeting.
◦ The Petitioner “conceded during cross-examination that President Hicks had the authority task Agent Bishop with chairing the annual meeting.”
D. Board of Directors Election
• Alleged Violation: Bylaw 3.1 (Number and Terms of Office).
• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The election for all five Board seats was deemed “lawful and appropriate given the circumstances.”
• Supporting Evidence:
◦ The bylaw’s provision for staggered terms could not be implemented because the 2019 annual meeting lacked a quorum, which meant no election took place that year.
◦ This lack of a 2019 vote “resulted in a carryover of open seats,” necessitating a vote for all five Board positions in 2020.
◦ The Petitioner “admitted that it had not been possible for the Association to stagger Board electees in the 2020 vote because no quorum had been reached to vote in 2019.”
V. Final Order and Disposition
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.”
• Legal Standard: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded that the record did not establish any violations and that the Petitioner “failed to sustain his burden of proof in this matter.”
• Date of Order: The decision was issued on September 3, 2020.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020061-REL
Study Guide: Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 20F-H2020061-REL, Samuel T Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?
2. What were the four specific allegations the Petitioner made against the Association regarding its Annual Meeting?
3. How did the Association notify its members of the change from an in-person meeting to a virtual one?
4. What was the legal justification for the Association’s decision to move the Annual Meeting to an online platform?
5. What evidence was presented to counter the Petitioner’s claim that he was “blocked” from using the online chat feature?
6. According to the Association’s bylaws, who has the authority to chair the annual meeting and delegate that responsibility?
7. Why did the 2020 Board of Directors election involve voting for all five open positions instead of being staggered?
8. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this hearing?
9. What two key Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) relate to member meeting notices and the right to speak?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core reasoning behind it?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Samuel T. Paparazzo, the Petitioner, who is a property owner and member of the Association, and the Coronado Ranch Community Association, the Respondent, which is the homeowners’ association for the subdivision. The Petitioner brought the complaint, and the Respondent defended its actions.
2. The Petitioner alleged that: (i) inadequate notice of the “change in venue” was given; (ii) he was denied his right to speak by being blocked from the online chat feature; (iii) the meeting was not properly called to order; and (iv) the Board of Directors vote was not properly “staggered.”
3. The Association notified members of the move to the ClickMeeting platform by placing 12 signs at 6 common entrances, sending three separate emails to approximately 750 members, and placing 2 signs at the entrance of the originally scheduled location, Coronado Elementary School.
4. The legal justification was the need to comply with executive orders issued by Arizona Governor Douglas Ducey (2020-09, 2020-12, and 2020-18) to slow the spread of COVID-19. The online platform was adopted to allow homeowners to safely access the meeting while adhering to physical distancing mandates.
5. The evidence showed that the Petitioner wrote messages but never hit the “enter” key or “send” button to transmit them. Furthermore, the record indicates that no less than 26 other members successfully used the chat feature during the meeting.
6. According to Bylaw Section 2.7, the President of the Association, Bob Hicks, has the authority to call the meeting to order and chair it. The Petitioner conceded during cross-examination that President Hicks had the authority to delegate the chairing of the meeting to the Association’s Managing Agent, Kevin Bishop.
7. The election involved all five positions because a quorum had not been achieved at the Association’s 2019 annual meeting. This lack of a quorum prevented a vote from taking place, resulting in a carryover of all open board seats to the 2020 election.
8. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof required, meaning the evidence must be more probably true than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Samuel Paparazzo, bore the burden of proving his allegations by this standard.
9. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) requires notice to be sent not fewer than 10 nor more than 50 days in advance of a meeting. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) ensures that all meetings are open to members and that members are permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.
10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge reasoned that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof, as the evidence showed the Association’s actions were lawful and appropriate responses to the circumstances, and the Petitioner’s inability to participate was due to user error.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the role of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated executive orders in the events of this case. How did these external factors influence the Association’s actions and the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?
2. The judge concluded that the Petitioner’s inability to use the chat function was due to “user error.” Discuss the evidence that supports this conclusion and explore the legal line between an association’s responsibility to provide access and a member’s responsibility to utilize the provided tools correctly.
3. Explain the relationship between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) and Arizona state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT.). How did the judge use both to evaluate the legality of the Association’s handling of the annual meeting and election?
4. The Petitioner argued that the online platform constituted a “change in venue” that required more extensive notice. Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the legal merits of this argument in the context of a virtual meeting necessitated by a public health crisis.
5. Discuss the concept of “quorum” as it applied to both the 2019 and 2020 annual meetings. How did the failure to achieve quorum in one year directly impact the procedures and outcome of the election in the following year?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judicial officer (Jenna Clark in this case) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducts evidentiary hearings and issues decisions on matters referred by state agencies like the Department of Real Estate.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the state of Arizona. Title 33, Chapter 16, Article 1 specifically regulates planned communities (homeowners’ associations).
Association
The Coronado Ranch Community Association, the homeowners’ association for the residential development in Gilbert, Arizona. It is governed by its CC&Rs and overseen by a Board of Directors.
Bylaws
The governing documents of the Association that detail the structure of day-to-day governance, including voting processes, quorum requirements, meeting provisions, and other operating guidelines.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use within the development.
Declarant Control Period
An initial period in an association’s history where the developer (the “Declarant”) controls the Board of Directors. In this case, this period ended for the Association in 2005.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.
The Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency that was referred this matter to conduct an evidentiary hearing and decide the case.
Petitioner
Samuel T. Paparazzo, the property owner and Association member who filed the petition with the Department, alleging violations by the Association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The burden of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.
Quorum
The minimum number of members required to be present or represented by ballot for a meeting to be valid and for votes to be taken. The failure to achieve quorum at the 2019 meeting resulted in a carryover of open board seats.
Respondent
The Coronado Ranch Community Association, the party against whom the petition was filed. The Respondent denied all allegations and was represented by legal counsel.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020061-REL
He Sued His HOA Over a Virtual Meeting—The Judge’s Ruling Contains 4 Critical Lessons for Every Homeowner
Introduction: The New Battlefield for Neighborhood Disputes
Cast your mind back to the chaotic spring of 2020. The world was locking down, businesses were scrambling to go remote, and the delicate social contracts of our neighborhoods were fraying. For millions living in Homeowners’ Associations, this meant the abrupt cancellation of in-person meetings, replaced by a frantic pivot to unfamiliar virtual platforms. In this pressure cooker of uncertainty and technical glitches, minor grievances quickly escalated into major legal battles.
The case of Paparazzo vs. Coronado Ranch Community Association is a quintessential legal drama of that era. A frustrated homeowner, believing he was silenced and his rights ignored during a virtual meeting, took his HOA to court. The judge’s decision, however, serves as a powerful cautionary tale. It distills four surprising and impactful lessons that every homeowner should understand as community governance becomes increasingly digital.
1. The Takeaway: You Can’t Claim You Were Silenced If You Forgot to Hit ‘Send’
The petitioner, Samuel Paparazzo, leveled a serious charge: that the HOA had denied his right to speak by “blocking” him from using the online chat feature during the annual meeting. In his view, this was an intentional act of suppression.
The digital evidence, however, told a very different story. While Mr. Paparazzo had typed several messages, he had never actually transmitted them by hitting the “enter” key or clicking the “send” button. While he did email for assistance during the meeting without receiving a timely response, the court found the chat feature was fully functional, proven by the fact that at least 26 other members used it successfully. The judge’s ruling was a stark lesson in digital accountability:
Petitioner’s inability to effectively communicate with the Association during the annual meeting was the result of user error. … The Association is not responsible for Petitioner’s lack of ClickMeeting proficiency.
This establishes a critical precedent for our digital age. The analysis here goes beyond simple “user error.” It suggests that a baseline of digital literacy is becoming a prerequisite for effective civic participation. Courts may have little sympathy for claims of disenfranchisement that stem from a failure to master the basic tools of modern communication.
2. The Takeaway: An Emergency Can Justify Last-Minute Changes
Next, the petitioner challenged the HOA on procedural grounds—a classic move in community disputes. He argued that the association failed to provide proper notice for the virtual meeting. The HOA had correctly noticed its in-person meeting for April 2, 2020, back on February 20. But by late March, holding that meeting had become impossible.
The judge’s response to this claim is a masterclass in how legal “reasonableness” can override rigid bylaws during a crisis. The court noted the rapidly evolving timeline of the pandemic: Governor Ducey issued executive orders limiting business operations on March 19, prohibiting the closure of essential services on March 23, and issuing the “Stay Home” order on March 30. Faced with these superseding government mandates, the HOA moved the meeting online on March 25.
Crucially, the HOA’s communication efforts were extensive and documented. They didn’t just send a single email. The board notified its members by:
• Placing 12 signs at 6 common entrances to the community.
• Sending three separate email blasts to approximately 750 members, which had an average open rate of 63.53%.
• Placing 2 additional signs at the entrance to the originally scheduled location, Coronado Elementary School.
The judge concluded that the HOA’s actions were a justifiable response to an unprecedented emergency. This wasn’t a board ignoring its rules; it was a board taking necessary steps to comply with government orders and protect its members, legally justifying the short-notice change in format.
3. The Takeaway: Just Showing Up Can Waive Your Right to Complain
This lesson hinges on a legal concept every homeowner must understand: waiver by attendance. Buried in the association’s bylaws was Section 2.3, which states: “A Member’s attendance at a meeting waives objection to the lack of notice or defective notice of the meeting.”
This is not mere legalese; it’s a common and powerful clause designed to ensure the finality of meetings. It prevents a member from strategically attending a meeting, remaining silent about a potential procedural flaw, and then launching a lawsuit later if they don’t like the outcome. The judge noted that the petitioner attended the virtual meeting but did not object to the notice “prior to or during” the event. By participating without raising a formal objection at the time, he legally accepted the meeting’s procedures and waived his right to challenge them later.
4. The Takeaway: The Past Can Haunt the Present
The petitioner’s final major complaint appeared to be a slam dunk: the election for the Board of Directors was not “staggered” as explicitly required by Bylaws Section 3.1. Instead of a mix of one- and two-year terms to ensure continuity, all five open board positions were elected at once. On its face, this was a clear violation.
But the reason for this anomaly demonstrates the domino effect of governance. The judge found that in the previous year, 2019, the association had failed to achieve a quorum for its annual meeting. Because there was no quorum, no vote could occur, creating a “carryover of open seats.” This failure in 2019 created a governance debt that had to be paid in 2020. The only lawful way to do so was to elect members to all five vacant positions. This shows that an HOA is a continuous legal entity; one year’s procedural failure doesn’t just disappear—it creates unusual but legally necessary circumstances the next.
Conclusion: A Final Thought for the Digital Neighborhood
The case of Paparazzo vs. Coronado Ranch Community Association offers a clear and compelling look at the collision between established community rules, the new realities of digital life, and the chaos of unforeseen global events. It shows that while bylaws and statutes provide a framework, their application can be shaped by emergencies, past events, and even a single user’s technical skills.
As our communities increasingly operate online, who bears the greater responsibility for ensuring effective communication—the organization hosting the meeting, or the individual attending it?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Samuel Paparazzo(petitioner) Also referred to as Samuel T Paparazzo
Respondent Side
Mark Stahl(HOA attorney) Coronado Ranch Community Association Also spelled Mark Sahl in source
Timothy Butterfield(HOA attorney) Coronado Ranch Community Association
Kevin Bishop(community manager) Coronado Ranch Community Association Appeared as a witness for Respondent; Also referred to as 'Agent Bishop' and chaired part of the annual meeting
Bob Hicks(HOA Board President) Coronado Ranch Community Association Delegated chairing of the annual meeting
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1804(A), 33-1804(B), 33-1804(F), and Association bylaws 2.3, 2.7, and 3.1
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent HOA acted within the scope of its statutory authority during its April 02, 2020, annual meeting and elections, and denied the Petitioner's petition for failure to sustain the burden of proof regarding alleged statutory and bylaw violations.
Why this result: The ALJ found that notice of the meeting modification (to an online platform due to COVID-19) was timely and proper, and Petitioner's claimed denial of the right to speak was the result of user error of the online platform, not action by the Association. Furthermore, the decision to hold elections for all five open Board positions was deemed appropriate due to carryover vacancies resulting from a lack of quorum in the prior year (2019).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violations regarding Annual Meeting notice (change in venue), right to speak, proper call to order, and staggered board voting.
Petitioner filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging the Association violated statutes and bylaws concerning the April 02, 2020, annual meeting, specifically regarding insufficient notice for the venue change (due to COVID-19), denial of the right to speak (via online chat), improper chair delegation, and failure to stagger Board elections.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $2,000.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
Analytics Highlights
Topics: COVID-19, Virtual Meeting, Notice, Right to Speak, Elections, Bylaws, Quorum, User Error
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(F)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-9-117
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020061-REL Decision – 819907.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:29 (149.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020061-REL
Briefing Document: Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020061-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Samuel T. Paparazzo versus the Coronado Ranch Community Association. The central conclusion of the proceeding is the denial of the Petitioner’s claims. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Arizona state statutes or its own governing bylaws in the conduct of its April 2, 2020, annual meeting.
The critical takeaways from the decision are as follows:
• Meeting Format and Notice: The Association’s decision to move its annual meeting to a virtual platform (ClickMeeting) was deemed a lawful and appropriate response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Arizona Governor’s related executive orders. The notification methods, which included physical signs and multiple emails, were found to be sufficient.
• Right to Speak: The Petitioner’s claim that he was denied the right to speak because he was “blocked” from the online chat feature was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the issue stemmed from “user error”—the Petitioner typed messages but failed to transmit them by pressing ‘enter’ or ‘send’. The fact that 26 other members successfully used the chat feature demonstrated its functionality.
• Meeting Conduct: The Association’s president properly called the meeting to order before delegating chairing responsibilities to the Association’s Managing Agent, an action the Petitioner conceded was within the president’s authority.
• Board Elections: The election of all five Board of Director positions simultaneously, rather than in staggered terms, was justified by unique circumstances. The Association’s 2019 annual meeting failed to achieve a quorum, preventing an election and resulting in a “carryover of open seats,” which necessitated filling all positions in the 2020 election.
Ultimately, the ALJ found that the Association and its Board acted within the scope of their statutory authority and that the challenges raised by the Petitioner were without merit.
I. Case Overview
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on September 3, 2020, following an evidentiary hearing held on August 18, 2020.
• Case Number: 20F-H2020061-REL
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
• Petitioner: Samuel T. Paparazzo (Homeowner and Association Member)
• Respondent: Coronado Ranch Community Association (HOA)
• Central Issue: The core of the dispute was whether the Coronado Ranch Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes and specific sections of its own bylaws during its annual meeting on April 2, 2020.
II. Petitioner’s Allegations
On May 15, 2020, Samuel Paparazzo filed a quadruple-issue petition alleging that the Association committed the following violations:
1. Improper Notice of Meeting: Providing less than 10-days’ notice regarding a “change in venue” for the annual meeting to only a small portion of the membership, in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and Association Bylaw 2.3.
2. Denial of Right to Speak: Preventing the Petitioner from exercising his right to speak by “blocking” or otherwise disabling his use of the online “chat feature” during the virtual meeting, in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A).
3. Improper Meeting Conduct: Failing to properly call the annual meeting to order, in violation of Association Bylaw 2.7.
4. Improper Board Election: Conducting the Board of Directors election without the “staggered” terms required by the bylaws, in violation of Association Bylaw 3.1.
III. Factual Chronology and Key Evidence
The decision outlines a clear sequence of events, heavily influenced by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Feb. 20, 2020
The Association issues its initial notice for the annual meeting, scheduled for April 2, 2020, at Coronado Elementary School.
Mar. 12, 2020
The Association mails election ballots to all Members.
Mar. 19, 2020
Arizona Governor Douglas Ducey issues Executive Order 2020-09, limiting certain business operations to slow the spread of COVID-19.
~Mar. 25, 2020
The Association’s President, Bob Hicks, officially moves the meeting to the virtual ClickMeeting platform.
Mar. 25 – Apr. 1
The Association notifies Members of the change via 12 signs at 6 community entrances and three separate email blasts to approximately 750 Members, which had an average open rate of 63.53%.
Mar. 30, 2020
Governor Ducey issues Executive Order 2020-18, the “Stay Home, Stay Healthy, Stay Connected” order.
Apr. 1, 2020
Two signs are placed at the entrance to the original meeting location, Coronado Elementary School, informing of the change.
Apr. 2, 2020
The Annual Meeting is held via ClickMeeting. • President Hicks calls the meeting to order and then appoints Managing Agent Kevin Bishop to chair the remainder of the meeting. • A quorum is achieved based on attendees and absentee ballots. • An election is held for all 5 open Board positions due to a lack of quorum at the 2019 meeting. • The Petitioner types messages in the chat window but fails to hit “enter” or click “send” to transmit them. He receives no response to an email for help sent during the meeting. • At least 26 other Members successfully use the chat feature.
IV. Analysis of Key Issues and Legal Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge systematically addressed and dismissed each of the Petitioner’s four allegations, concluding that the Board acted lawfully and within its authority.
A. Meeting Notice and Venue Change
• Alleged Violation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 2.3 (Notice of Meetings).
• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The ALJ concluded that the notice of the Association’s 2020 annual meeting was “timely and properly noticed.” The move to an online platform was not an arbitrary venue change but a necessary and reasonable measure to comply with the Governor’s executive orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Supporting Evidence:
◦ The Association made a multi-faceted effort to inform Members through physical signs and repeated emails.
◦ The Petitioner received notice of the modification and, crucially, “failed to raise an objection prior to or during the meeting at issue.”
◦ A Member’s attendance at a meeting waives objections to defective notice, as stated in Bylaw 2.3.
B. Right to Speak
• Alleged Violation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) (Open Meetings and Member Participation).
• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The ALJ determined the Petitioner’s inability to communicate during the meeting was the result of “user error” and not a deliberate act by the Association to silence him.
• Supporting Evidence:
◦ The Petitioner wrote messages but never finalized the action by hitting the “enter” key or clicking the “send” button.
◦ The chat feature was demonstrably functional, as it was “successfully used by no less than 26 other Members during the annual meeting.”
◦ The decision explicitly states, “The Association is not responsible for Petitioner’s lack of ClickMeeting proficiency.”
C. Conduct of Meeting
• Alleged Violation: Bylaw 2.7 (Organization and Conduct of Meeting).
• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The meeting was lawfully conducted.
• Supporting Evidence:
◦ The Association President, Bob Hicks, called the meeting to order and took roll before appointing Managing Agent Kevin Bishop to chair the rest of the meeting.
◦ The Petitioner “conceded during cross-examination that President Hicks had the authority task Agent Bishop with chairing the annual meeting.”
D. Board of Directors Election
• Alleged Violation: Bylaw 3.1 (Number and Terms of Office).
• Finding: The petition was denied on this point. The election for all five Board seats was deemed “lawful and appropriate given the circumstances.”
• Supporting Evidence:
◦ The bylaw’s provision for staggered terms could not be implemented because the 2019 annual meeting lacked a quorum, which meant no election took place that year.
◦ This lack of a 2019 vote “resulted in a carryover of open seats,” necessitating a vote for all five Board positions in 2020.
◦ The Petitioner “admitted that it had not been possible for the Association to stagger Board electees in the 2020 vote because no quorum had been reached to vote in 2019.”
V. Final Order and Disposition
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.”
• Legal Standard: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The ALJ concluded that the record did not establish any violations and that the Petitioner “failed to sustain his burden of proof in this matter.”
• Date of Order: The decision was issued on September 3, 2020.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020061-REL
Study Guide: Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 20F-H2020061-REL, Samuel T Paparazzo v. Coronado Ranch Community Association.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?
2. What were the four specific allegations the Petitioner made against the Association regarding its Annual Meeting?
3. How did the Association notify its members of the change from an in-person meeting to a virtual one?
4. What was the legal justification for the Association’s decision to move the Annual Meeting to an online platform?
5. What evidence was presented to counter the Petitioner’s claim that he was “blocked” from using the online chat feature?
6. According to the Association’s bylaws, who has the authority to chair the annual meeting and delegate that responsibility?
7. Why did the 2020 Board of Directors election involve voting for all five open positions instead of being staggered?
8. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this hearing?
9. What two key Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) relate to member meeting notices and the right to speak?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core reasoning behind it?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Samuel T. Paparazzo, the Petitioner, who is a property owner and member of the Association, and the Coronado Ranch Community Association, the Respondent, which is the homeowners’ association for the subdivision. The Petitioner brought the complaint, and the Respondent defended its actions.
2. The Petitioner alleged that: (i) inadequate notice of the “change in venue” was given; (ii) he was denied his right to speak by being blocked from the online chat feature; (iii) the meeting was not properly called to order; and (iv) the Board of Directors vote was not properly “staggered.”
3. The Association notified members of the move to the ClickMeeting platform by placing 12 signs at 6 common entrances, sending three separate emails to approximately 750 members, and placing 2 signs at the entrance of the originally scheduled location, Coronado Elementary School.
4. The legal justification was the need to comply with executive orders issued by Arizona Governor Douglas Ducey (2020-09, 2020-12, and 2020-18) to slow the spread of COVID-19. The online platform was adopted to allow homeowners to safely access the meeting while adhering to physical distancing mandates.
5. The evidence showed that the Petitioner wrote messages but never hit the “enter” key or “send” button to transmit them. Furthermore, the record indicates that no less than 26 other members successfully used the chat feature during the meeting.
6. According to Bylaw Section 2.7, the President of the Association, Bob Hicks, has the authority to call the meeting to order and chair it. The Petitioner conceded during cross-examination that President Hicks had the authority to delegate the chairing of the meeting to the Association’s Managing Agent, Kevin Bishop.
7. The election involved all five positions because a quorum had not been achieved at the Association’s 2019 annual meeting. This lack of a quorum prevented a vote from taking place, resulting in a carryover of all open board seats to the 2020 election.
8. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof required, meaning the evidence must be more probably true than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Samuel Paparazzo, bore the burden of proving his allegations by this standard.
9. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(B) requires notice to be sent not fewer than 10 nor more than 50 days in advance of a meeting. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) ensures that all meetings are open to members and that members are permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.
10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge reasoned that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof, as the evidence showed the Association’s actions were lawful and appropriate responses to the circumstances, and the Petitioner’s inability to participate was due to user error.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for deeper analysis of the case. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the role of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated executive orders in the events of this case. How did these external factors influence the Association’s actions and the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?
2. The judge concluded that the Petitioner’s inability to use the chat function was due to “user error.” Discuss the evidence that supports this conclusion and explore the legal line between an association’s responsibility to provide access and a member’s responsibility to utilize the provided tools correctly.
3. Explain the relationship between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) and Arizona state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT.). How did the judge use both to evaluate the legality of the Association’s handling of the annual meeting and election?
4. The Petitioner argued that the online platform constituted a “change in venue” that required more extensive notice. Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the legal merits of this argument in the context of a virtual meeting necessitated by a public health crisis.
5. Discuss the concept of “quorum” as it applied to both the 2019 and 2020 annual meetings. How did the failure to achieve quorum in one year directly impact the procedures and outcome of the election in the following year?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judicial officer (Jenna Clark in this case) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducts evidentiary hearings and issues decisions on matters referred by state agencies like the Department of Real Estate.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the state of Arizona. Title 33, Chapter 16, Article 1 specifically regulates planned communities (homeowners’ associations).
Association
The Coronado Ranch Community Association, the homeowners’ association for the residential development in Gilbert, Arizona. It is governed by its CC&Rs and overseen by a Board of Directors.
Bylaws
The governing documents of the Association that detail the structure of day-to-day governance, including voting processes, quorum requirements, meeting provisions, and other operating guidelines.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use within the development.
Declarant Control Period
An initial period in an association’s history where the developer (the “Declarant”) controls the Board of Directors. In this case, this period ended for the Association in 2005.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.
The Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency that was referred this matter to conduct an evidentiary hearing and decide the case.
Petitioner
Samuel T. Paparazzo, the property owner and Association member who filed the petition with the Department, alleging violations by the Association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The burden of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.
Quorum
The minimum number of members required to be present or represented by ballot for a meeting to be valid and for votes to be taken. The failure to achieve quorum at the 2019 meeting resulted in a carryover of open board seats.
Respondent
The Coronado Ranch Community Association, the party against whom the petition was filed. The Respondent denied all allegations and was represented by legal counsel.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020061-REL
He Sued His HOA Over a Virtual Meeting—The Judge’s Ruling Contains 4 Critical Lessons for Every Homeowner
Introduction: The New Battlefield for Neighborhood Disputes
Cast your mind back to the chaotic spring of 2020. The world was locking down, businesses were scrambling to go remote, and the delicate social contracts of our neighborhoods were fraying. For millions living in Homeowners’ Associations, this meant the abrupt cancellation of in-person meetings, replaced by a frantic pivot to unfamiliar virtual platforms. In this pressure cooker of uncertainty and technical glitches, minor grievances quickly escalated into major legal battles.
The case of Paparazzo vs. Coronado Ranch Community Association is a quintessential legal drama of that era. A frustrated homeowner, believing he was silenced and his rights ignored during a virtual meeting, took his HOA to court. The judge’s decision, however, serves as a powerful cautionary tale. It distills four surprising and impactful lessons that every homeowner should understand as community governance becomes increasingly digital.
1. The Takeaway: You Can’t Claim You Were Silenced If You Forgot to Hit ‘Send’
The petitioner, Samuel Paparazzo, leveled a serious charge: that the HOA had denied his right to speak by “blocking” him from using the online chat feature during the annual meeting. In his view, this was an intentional act of suppression.
The digital evidence, however, told a very different story. While Mr. Paparazzo had typed several messages, he had never actually transmitted them by hitting the “enter” key or clicking the “send” button. While he did email for assistance during the meeting without receiving a timely response, the court found the chat feature was fully functional, proven by the fact that at least 26 other members used it successfully. The judge’s ruling was a stark lesson in digital accountability:
Petitioner’s inability to effectively communicate with the Association during the annual meeting was the result of user error. … The Association is not responsible for Petitioner’s lack of ClickMeeting proficiency.
This establishes a critical precedent for our digital age. The analysis here goes beyond simple “user error.” It suggests that a baseline of digital literacy is becoming a prerequisite for effective civic participation. Courts may have little sympathy for claims of disenfranchisement that stem from a failure to master the basic tools of modern communication.
2. The Takeaway: An Emergency Can Justify Last-Minute Changes
Next, the petitioner challenged the HOA on procedural grounds—a classic move in community disputes. He argued that the association failed to provide proper notice for the virtual meeting. The HOA had correctly noticed its in-person meeting for April 2, 2020, back on February 20. But by late March, holding that meeting had become impossible.
The judge’s response to this claim is a masterclass in how legal “reasonableness” can override rigid bylaws during a crisis. The court noted the rapidly evolving timeline of the pandemic: Governor Ducey issued executive orders limiting business operations on March 19, prohibiting the closure of essential services on March 23, and issuing the “Stay Home” order on March 30. Faced with these superseding government mandates, the HOA moved the meeting online on March 25.
Crucially, the HOA’s communication efforts were extensive and documented. They didn’t just send a single email. The board notified its members by:
• Placing 12 signs at 6 common entrances to the community.
• Sending three separate email blasts to approximately 750 members, which had an average open rate of 63.53%.
• Placing 2 additional signs at the entrance to the originally scheduled location, Coronado Elementary School.
The judge concluded that the HOA’s actions were a justifiable response to an unprecedented emergency. This wasn’t a board ignoring its rules; it was a board taking necessary steps to comply with government orders and protect its members, legally justifying the short-notice change in format.
3. The Takeaway: Just Showing Up Can Waive Your Right to Complain
This lesson hinges on a legal concept every homeowner must understand: waiver by attendance. Buried in the association’s bylaws was Section 2.3, which states: “A Member’s attendance at a meeting waives objection to the lack of notice or defective notice of the meeting.”
This is not mere legalese; it’s a common and powerful clause designed to ensure the finality of meetings. It prevents a member from strategically attending a meeting, remaining silent about a potential procedural flaw, and then launching a lawsuit later if they don’t like the outcome. The judge noted that the petitioner attended the virtual meeting but did not object to the notice “prior to or during” the event. By participating without raising a formal objection at the time, he legally accepted the meeting’s procedures and waived his right to challenge them later.
4. The Takeaway: The Past Can Haunt the Present
The petitioner’s final major complaint appeared to be a slam dunk: the election for the Board of Directors was not “staggered” as explicitly required by Bylaws Section 3.1. Instead of a mix of one- and two-year terms to ensure continuity, all five open board positions were elected at once. On its face, this was a clear violation.
But the reason for this anomaly demonstrates the domino effect of governance. The judge found that in the previous year, 2019, the association had failed to achieve a quorum for its annual meeting. Because there was no quorum, no vote could occur, creating a “carryover of open seats.” This failure in 2019 created a governance debt that had to be paid in 2020. The only lawful way to do so was to elect members to all five vacant positions. This shows that an HOA is a continuous legal entity; one year’s procedural failure doesn’t just disappear—it creates unusual but legally necessary circumstances the next.
Conclusion: A Final Thought for the Digital Neighborhood
The case of Paparazzo vs. Coronado Ranch Community Association offers a clear and compelling look at the collision between established community rules, the new realities of digital life, and the chaos of unforeseen global events. It shows that while bylaws and statutes provide a framework, their application can be shaped by emergencies, past events, and even a single user’s technical skills.
As our communities increasingly operate online, who bears the greater responsibility for ensuring effective communication—the organization hosting the meeting, or the individual attending it?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Samuel Paparazzo(petitioner) Also referred to as Samuel T Paparazzo
Respondent Side
Mark Stahl(HOA attorney) Coronado Ranch Community Association Also spelled Mark Sahl in source
Timothy Butterfield(HOA attorney) Coronado Ranch Community Association
Kevin Bishop(community manager) Coronado Ranch Community Association Appeared as a witness for Respondent; Also referred to as 'Agent Bishop' and chaired part of the annual meeting
Bob Hicks(HOA Board President) Coronado Ranch Community Association Delegated chairing of the annual meeting
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John R Ashley
Counsel
—
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Counsel
Wendy Erlich
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article III, Section 4
Outcome Summary
The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.
The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Case Background and Procedural History
Parties Involved
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
John R. Ashley
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Attorney for Respondent
Wendy Erlich, Esq.
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Oversight Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Core Allegation
The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.
Procedural Timeline
• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.
• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.
• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.
• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.
• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.
• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.
• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.
Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation
The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.
Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)
• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.
• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.
• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.
Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)
• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.
• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.
Controlling Bylaw Provisions
Article
Pertinent Text / Description
Article III, Section 4
Meetings of Members; Quorum
“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”
Article VI, Section 3
Meetings of Directors; Quorum
Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.
Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)
In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:
• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.
• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”
• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.
Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)
The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:
• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.
• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.
• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:
◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.
◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”
• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?
2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?
3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?
4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?
5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?
6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?
7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?
8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?
9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?
10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.
3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.
4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.
5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.
6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.
7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.
8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.
9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.
10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.
1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.
2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?
3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?
4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?
5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.
Bylaws
A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).
Motion to Dismiss
A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Prevailing Party
The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.
Quorum
The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association
Introduction: The Rules We All Live By
If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.
But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.
A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.
The Takeaways
Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.
The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:
and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.
A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.
Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”
A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.
In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.
However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.
Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.
During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.
The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.
Conclusion: Read the Fine Print
The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.
When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John R Ashley(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Wendy Erlich(respondent attorney) Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
djones(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
ncano(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
Other Participants
A. Leverette(clerical staff) Signed document transmission in initial order
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John R Ashley
Counsel
—
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Counsel
Wendy Erlich
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article III, Section 4
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because the provision does not require a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof, as Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws was found to be unambiguous in not requiring a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.
The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Case Background and Procedural History
Parties Involved
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
John R. Ashley
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Attorney for Respondent
Wendy Erlich, Esq.
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Oversight Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Core Allegation
The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.
Procedural Timeline
• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.
• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.
• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.
• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.
• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.
• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.
• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.
Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation
The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.
Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)
• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.
• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.
• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.
Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)
• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.
• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.
Controlling Bylaw Provisions
Article
Pertinent Text / Description
Article III, Section 4
Meetings of Members; Quorum
“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”
Article VI, Section 3
Meetings of Directors; Quorum
Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.
Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)
In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:
• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.
• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”
• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.
Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)
The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:
• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.
• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.
• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:
◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.
◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”
• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?
2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?
3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?
4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?
5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?
6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?
7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?
8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?
9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?
10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.
3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.
4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.
5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.
6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.
7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.
8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.
9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.
10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.
1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.
2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?
3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?
4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?
5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.
Bylaws
A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).
Motion to Dismiss
A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Prevailing Party
The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.
Quorum
The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association
Introduction: The Rules We All Live By
If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.
But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.
A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.
The Takeaways
Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.
The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:
and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.
A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.
Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”
A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.
In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.
However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.
Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.
During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.
The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.
Conclusion: Read the Fine Print
The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.
When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John R Ashley(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Wendy Erlich(respondent attorney) Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
djones(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
ncano(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
Other Participants
A. Leverette(clerical staff) Signed document transmission in initial order
The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Mary J Bartle
Counsel
—
Respondent
Saguaro West Owner's Association
Counsel
Nicole Payne, Esq.
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions
The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.
Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG Decision – 767041.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:24 (94.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association (Case No. 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG)
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Mary J. Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association. The final order, issued on January 30, 2020, dismissed the petition brought by Ms. Bartle. The core of the case revolved around a financial transaction where $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018, and redeposited on November 30, 2018.
The petitioner, Ms. Bartle, alleged this transaction violated a specific provision of the Association’s bylaws—Article VIII, section 8(d)—which outlines the duties of the Treasurer. Despite two hearings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently concluded that Ms. Bartle failed to meet her burden of proof. The central finding was that while evidence suggested the transaction “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper,” the petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, how this transaction specifically violated any of the enumerated duties of the Treasurer as set forth in the cited bylaw. The decision underscores a critical legal distinction between a potentially improper act and a proven violation of the specific bylaw under which the complaint was filed.
Case Overview
Case Name
Mary J. Bartle, Petitioner, vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association, Respondent
Case Number
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Petitioner
Mary J. Bartle (representing herself)
Respondent
Saguaro West Owner’s Association (represented by Nicole Payne, Esq.)
Rehearing Date
January 14, 2020
Final Decision Date
January 30, 2020
Procedural History and Core Allegation
The case proceeded through an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, following a specific timeline of events:
• April 22, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed the initial petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• August 29, 2019: The first hearing was held. At the outset, a discussion was held to narrow the scope of the hearing. Ms. Bartle agreed to limit her petition to a single issue.
• The Single Issue: Whether the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) through a withdrawal of $49,000.50 on October 22, 2018, and a redeposit of the same amount on November 30, 2018.
• September 18, 2019: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing Ms. Bartle’s petition.
• October 23, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed a request for a rehearing, asserting an error in the admission of evidence.
• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.
• January 14, 2020: The rehearing was convened. Ms. Bartle testified, while the Respondent presented no witnesses.
• January 30, 2020: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, reaffirming the dismissal of the petition.
At the rehearing, Ms. Bartle testified “to the effect that laws must have been violated by the withdrawal and redepositing of the $49,000.50 without the Association’s members being provided any notice of these transactions.”
Analysis of Bylaw and Judicial Findings
Bylaw Article VIII, Section 8(d): The Treasurer’s Duties
The entirety of the petitioner’s case rested on proving a violation of the specific duties outlined for the Treasurer in the Association’s bylaws. The text of the bylaw is as follows:
The Treasurer shall receive and deposit in the Association’s bank accounts all monies received by the Association and shall disburse such funds as directed by resolution [of] the Board of Directors; shall properly prepare and sign all checks before presenting them to be co-signed; keep proper books of account; cause an annual audit of the Association’s books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year; and shall prepare an annual budget to be presented to the membership at the annual meeting; to cause all Federal and State reports to be prepared; and shall prepare all monthly statements of finance for the Board of Directors.
Key Judicial Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the petitioner’s failure to connect the disputed financial transaction to a specific violation of the duties listed above. The judge made a clear distinction between the potential impropriety of the transaction and the narrow scope of the legal claim.
• Initial Hearing Conclusion: The decision from the first hearing, which the judge took notice of in the rehearing, established the core finding:
• Rehearing Conclusion: The final decision after the rehearing reinforced this exact point, stating:
Ultimately, the case was dismissed because Ms. Bartle did not meet the legal standard required to prove her specific claim.
Legal Framework and Final Order
Applicable Legal Standards
The decision was grounded in several key legal principles cited by the Administrative Law Judge:
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate possesses authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
• Burden of Proof: Ms. Bartle, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof on all issues.
• Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
• Contractual Nature of Bylaws: Citing McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., the decision notes that “The Bylaws are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”
Final Order and Implications
Based on the failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with the following key points:
1. Dismissal: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed.
2. Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, is deemed the prevailing party.
3. Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served, as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 12-904(A) and Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Bartle v. Saguaro West Owner’s Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the legal matter.
——————————————————————————–
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific financial transaction was the central subject of the petitioner’s complaint?
3. Which specific article and section of the Association’s Bylaws did the petitioner claim was violated?
4. What was the legal standard of proof that the petitioner was required to meet, and who had the burden of proof?
5. On what grounds did Ms. Bartle file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision?
6. According to the judge’s decision, what was the key failure in the petitioner’s argument regarding the financial transaction?
7. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on January 30, 2020?
8. Although the judge dismissed the petition, what did the decision state about the nature of the financial transactions?
9. Which government department granted the request for a rehearing and has authority over this type of matter?
10. What options does a party have if they wish to appeal the final administrative law judge order?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Mary J. Bartle, and the Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association. Ms. Bartle brought the petition against the Association, alleging a violation of its bylaws.
2. The central subject was the withdrawal of $49,000.50 from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018. The same amount was subsequently redeposited into the account on November 30, 2018.
3. The petitioner claimed the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). This section outlines the specific duties and responsibilities of the Association’s Treasurer.
4. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioner, Ms. Bartle, to demonstrate that the Association had violated the bylaw.
5. Ms. Bartle filed her Rehearing Request on the grounds that there was an error in the admission of evidence. She specifically referenced documents dated July 5, August 6, and September 13, 2019, in her request.
6. The key failure was that Ms. Bartle did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the withdrawal and redeposit specifically violated any of the treasurer’s duties as explicitly listed in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Her claim was too narrow for the evidence she presented.
7. The final order was that Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, was deemed to be the prevailing party in the matter.
8. The decision stated that there was evidence to suggest that the withdrawal and redeposit of the $49,000.50 “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper.” However, this was not sufficient to prove a violation of the specific bylaw in question.
9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing on November 18, 2019. This department has authority over the matter as established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information provided in the source document.
1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain why Mary J. Bartle failed to meet this standard, despite the judge’s acknowledgment that the transaction may have been “improper” or in “violation of the law.”
2. Discuss the procedural significance of limiting the hearing to the single issue of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). How might the case’s outcome have differed if the scope of the hearing had been broader?
3. Trace the complete timeline of the case from the initial petition filing in April 2019 to the final order in January 2020. What do the key events and dates reveal about the process of administrative hearings and rehearings?
4. Based on the full text of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d), what specific types of evidence would the petitioner have needed to present to successfully prove that the treasurer’s duties were violated by the $49,000.50 transaction?
5. Evaluate the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between a transaction that is potentially illegal or improper and a transaction that specifically violates the duties enumerated in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Why is this distinction critical to the final order of dismissal?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues decisions on matters under the jurisdiction of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona’s state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited to establish jurisdiction and the appeals process.
Bylaws
A set of rules established by an organization, such as a homeowners’ association, to regulate itself. In this case, the bylaws are treated as a binding contract between the parties.
Conclusion of Law
The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case.
Finding of Fact
The section of a legal decision that lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented during the hearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a court of law reviews the decision of a lower court or an administrative agency to determine if the decision was legally sound.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
A state agency that provides a neutral forum for conducting administrative hearings for other state agencies. The hearings in this matter were held at the OAH.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the petitioner was Mary J. Bartle.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is met when the evidence presented has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Prevailing Party
The party in a legal dispute who is successful and in whose favor the judgment is rendered. In this case, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to consider new evidence or to argue against the original decision on the basis of an error. Ms. Bartle’s request for a rehearing was granted.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Saguaro West Owner’s Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
A Homeowner Found a Mysterious $49,000 Transaction in Her HOA’s Books. The Reason She Lost in Court Is a Lesson for Everyone.
Introduction: The David-vs-Goliath Fight That Didn’t Go as Planned
For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant battle for transparency and fairness. It’s a common story: a resident raises concerns about financial decisions made behind closed doors, only to be met with resistance or silence. But what happens when a homeowner pushes back and takes that fight to an administrative hearing?
After an initial hearing and a persistent request for a rehearing, the final decision in Mary J. Bartle’s case against the Saguaro West Owner’s Association seemed, on the surface, like a clear-cut quest for accountability. The dispute centered on a single, alarming event: the withdrawal and subsequent redeposit of $49,000.50 from the association’s operating account without any notice to the members. It appeared to be a straightforward case of a concerned resident demanding answers.
However, the ruling from the administrative hearing offers a surprising and crucial lesson in how the legal system operates. The outcome reveals that suspicion, no matter how justified, is not enough to win. This article breaks down the top counter-intuitive takeaways from the judge’s decision and what they mean for any homeowner considering a legal challenge against their HOA.
Takeaway 1: A “Suspicious” Act Isn’t a Guaranteed Win
Feeling Something Is Wrong Isn’t the Same as Proving It.
The core facts of the case were not in dispute. On October 22, 2018, $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Saguaro West Owner’s Association’s operating account. On November 30, 2018, the exact same amount was redeposited. Members were not notified of these transactions. To any reasonable observer, this activity raises immediate questions.
Even the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case acknowledged the questionable nature of the transaction. In his final decision, he validated Ms. Bartle’s initial concerns with a striking statement:
The evidence shows that $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s account in October 2018 and the same amount was deposited in November 2018, and there is evidence to suggest that the transactions may have been in violation of the law.
This is the most stunning part of the case: the judge agreed that the transaction looked suspicious and might have broken the law, yet Ms. Bartle still lost. This reveals a critical distinction in legal proceedings. A judge is not an arbiter of general fairness but an interpreter of specific laws and rules. The judge’s comment shows he understood the spirit of Ms. Bartle’s complaint, but his hands were tied by the letter of her petition. The legal system requires more than a gut feeling; it demands specific proof that a specific rule was violated, which leads directly to the next critical lesson.
Takeaway 2: You Must Prove theExactRule Was Broken
Specificity Is Your Only Weapon.
Ms. Bartle’s case was ultimately narrowed to a single, highly specific issue: whether the $49,000.50 transaction violated Article VIII, section 8(d) of the association’s bylaws. This is a crucial detail because courts and administrative bodies require this rigid specificity to ensure fairness, prevent “moving goalposts,” and keep proceedings focused on the actual claims filed, not a general feeling of grievance.
Her entire case hinged on proving a violation of that specific section and no other. The rule in question outlines the treasurer’s duties, which include the power to: “receive and deposit…all monies,” “disburse such funds as directed,” “sign all checks,” and “keep proper books of account.”
The judge’s conclusion was brutally precise. He found that Ms. Bartle had “not shown by a preponderance of the evidence” that the transaction violated any of those specific, listed duties. She couldn’t prove the treasurer failed to deposit money or keep proper books; she could only prove a strange transaction occurred that wasn’t explicitly forbidden by the rule she cited. This is a critical lesson: it doesn’t matter if an HOA’s action feels wrong; what matters is whether you can prove it violated the precise rule you cited in your petition.
Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Rests Entirely on the Accuser
It’s Your Job to Build the Case, Not Theirs to Disprove It.
In a civil administrative hearing like this, the petitioner—Ms. Bartle—carries the “burden of proof.” The standard she had to meet was the “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal definition for this is:
“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
In simple terms, she had to present enough convincing evidence to make the judge believe that her version of events was more likely true than not. The judge’s decision explicitly states that Ms. Bartle bore this burden and ultimately failed to meet it.
One of the most powerful details from the case file illustrates this point perfectly: the Saguaro West Owner’s Association, though represented by legal counsel, “presented no witnesses.” They didn’t have to. They didn’t need to explain the transaction or justify their actions because Ms. Bartle failed to build a strong enough case to prove her specific claim. The onus was completely on her to prove her argument, and when it fell short, the case was dismissed.
Conclusion: A Sobering Reminder for Homeowners
The case of Mary Bartle is a sobering reminder that winning a legal fight against a well-resourced entity like an HOA is less about moral rightness and more about meticulous legal strategy and precision.
While the judge acknowledged that Ms. Bartle’s concerns about the $49,000.50 transaction were potentially valid, her petition was dismissed not on a simple technicality, but because of a core principle of law: the failure to prove that the specific rule cited had actually been broken. Her case highlights the immense challenge for individual homeowners seeking transparency. It leaves us asking, if the legal bar is this specific, what practical recourse do residents have when they feel something is fundamentally wrong?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Mary J Bartle(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf and testified
Respondent Side
Nicole Payne(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
Edith Rudder(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Mary J Bartle
Counsel
—
Respondent
Saguaro West Owner's Association
Counsel
Nicole Payne, Esq.
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition, concluding that she failed to meet the burden of proof to demonstrate that the Saguaro West Owner's Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to show that the $49,000.50 transaction violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions
The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account without adequate notification or justification, but failed to prove a violation of the specific duties listed in that section by a preponderance of the evidence.
Orders: Petition dismissed and Respondent deemed the prevailing party.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG Decision – 767041.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:15 (94.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association (Case No. 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG)
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Mary J. Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association. The final order, issued on January 30, 2020, dismissed the petition brought by Ms. Bartle. The core of the case revolved around a financial transaction where $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018, and redeposited on November 30, 2018.
The petitioner, Ms. Bartle, alleged this transaction violated a specific provision of the Association’s bylaws—Article VIII, section 8(d)—which outlines the duties of the Treasurer. Despite two hearings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently concluded that Ms. Bartle failed to meet her burden of proof. The central finding was that while evidence suggested the transaction “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper,” the petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, how this transaction specifically violated any of the enumerated duties of the Treasurer as set forth in the cited bylaw. The decision underscores a critical legal distinction between a potentially improper act and a proven violation of the specific bylaw under which the complaint was filed.
Case Overview
Case Name
Mary J. Bartle, Petitioner, vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association, Respondent
Case Number
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Petitioner
Mary J. Bartle (representing herself)
Respondent
Saguaro West Owner’s Association (represented by Nicole Payne, Esq.)
Rehearing Date
January 14, 2020
Final Decision Date
January 30, 2020
Procedural History and Core Allegation
The case proceeded through an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, following a specific timeline of events:
• April 22, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed the initial petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• August 29, 2019: The first hearing was held. At the outset, a discussion was held to narrow the scope of the hearing. Ms. Bartle agreed to limit her petition to a single issue.
• The Single Issue: Whether the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) through a withdrawal of $49,000.50 on October 22, 2018, and a redeposit of the same amount on November 30, 2018.
• September 18, 2019: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing Ms. Bartle’s petition.
• October 23, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed a request for a rehearing, asserting an error in the admission of evidence.
• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.
• January 14, 2020: The rehearing was convened. Ms. Bartle testified, while the Respondent presented no witnesses.
• January 30, 2020: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, reaffirming the dismissal of the petition.
At the rehearing, Ms. Bartle testified “to the effect that laws must have been violated by the withdrawal and redepositing of the $49,000.50 without the Association’s members being provided any notice of these transactions.”
Analysis of Bylaw and Judicial Findings
Bylaw Article VIII, Section 8(d): The Treasurer’s Duties
The entirety of the petitioner’s case rested on proving a violation of the specific duties outlined for the Treasurer in the Association’s bylaws. The text of the bylaw is as follows:
The Treasurer shall receive and deposit in the Association’s bank accounts all monies received by the Association and shall disburse such funds as directed by resolution [of] the Board of Directors; shall properly prepare and sign all checks before presenting them to be co-signed; keep proper books of account; cause an annual audit of the Association’s books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year; and shall prepare an annual budget to be presented to the membership at the annual meeting; to cause all Federal and State reports to be prepared; and shall prepare all monthly statements of finance for the Board of Directors.
Key Judicial Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the petitioner’s failure to connect the disputed financial transaction to a specific violation of the duties listed above. The judge made a clear distinction between the potential impropriety of the transaction and the narrow scope of the legal claim.
• Initial Hearing Conclusion: The decision from the first hearing, which the judge took notice of in the rehearing, established the core finding:
• Rehearing Conclusion: The final decision after the rehearing reinforced this exact point, stating:
Ultimately, the case was dismissed because Ms. Bartle did not meet the legal standard required to prove her specific claim.
Legal Framework and Final Order
Applicable Legal Standards
The decision was grounded in several key legal principles cited by the Administrative Law Judge:
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate possesses authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
• Burden of Proof: Ms. Bartle, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof on all issues.
• Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
• Contractual Nature of Bylaws: Citing McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., the decision notes that “The Bylaws are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”
Final Order and Implications
Based on the failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with the following key points:
1. Dismissal: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed.
2. Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, is deemed the prevailing party.
3. Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served, as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 12-904(A) and Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Bartle v. Saguaro West Owner’s Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the legal matter.
——————————————————————————–
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific financial transaction was the central subject of the petitioner’s complaint?
3. Which specific article and section of the Association’s Bylaws did the petitioner claim was violated?
4. What was the legal standard of proof that the petitioner was required to meet, and who had the burden of proof?
5. On what grounds did Ms. Bartle file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision?
6. According to the judge’s decision, what was the key failure in the petitioner’s argument regarding the financial transaction?
7. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on January 30, 2020?
8. Although the judge dismissed the petition, what did the decision state about the nature of the financial transactions?
9. Which government department granted the request for a rehearing and has authority over this type of matter?
10. What options does a party have if they wish to appeal the final administrative law judge order?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Mary J. Bartle, and the Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association. Ms. Bartle brought the petition against the Association, alleging a violation of its bylaws.
2. The central subject was the withdrawal of $49,000.50 from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018. The same amount was subsequently redeposited into the account on November 30, 2018.
3. The petitioner claimed the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). This section outlines the specific duties and responsibilities of the Association’s Treasurer.
4. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioner, Ms. Bartle, to demonstrate that the Association had violated the bylaw.
5. Ms. Bartle filed her Rehearing Request on the grounds that there was an error in the admission of evidence. She specifically referenced documents dated July 5, August 6, and September 13, 2019, in her request.
6. The key failure was that Ms. Bartle did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the withdrawal and redeposit specifically violated any of the treasurer’s duties as explicitly listed in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Her claim was too narrow for the evidence she presented.
7. The final order was that Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, was deemed to be the prevailing party in the matter.
8. The decision stated that there was evidence to suggest that the withdrawal and redeposit of the $49,000.50 “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper.” However, this was not sufficient to prove a violation of the specific bylaw in question.
9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing on November 18, 2019. This department has authority over the matter as established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information provided in the source document.
1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain why Mary J. Bartle failed to meet this standard, despite the judge’s acknowledgment that the transaction may have been “improper” or in “violation of the law.”
2. Discuss the procedural significance of limiting the hearing to the single issue of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). How might the case’s outcome have differed if the scope of the hearing had been broader?
3. Trace the complete timeline of the case from the initial petition filing in April 2019 to the final order in January 2020. What do the key events and dates reveal about the process of administrative hearings and rehearings?
4. Based on the full text of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d), what specific types of evidence would the petitioner have needed to present to successfully prove that the treasurer’s duties were violated by the $49,000.50 transaction?
5. Evaluate the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between a transaction that is potentially illegal or improper and a transaction that specifically violates the duties enumerated in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Why is this distinction critical to the final order of dismissal?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues decisions on matters under the jurisdiction of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona’s state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited to establish jurisdiction and the appeals process.
Bylaws
A set of rules established by an organization, such as a homeowners’ association, to regulate itself. In this case, the bylaws are treated as a binding contract between the parties.
Conclusion of Law
The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case.
Finding of Fact
The section of a legal decision that lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented during the hearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a court of law reviews the decision of a lower court or an administrative agency to determine if the decision was legally sound.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
A state agency that provides a neutral forum for conducting administrative hearings for other state agencies. The hearings in this matter were held at the OAH.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the petitioner was Mary J. Bartle.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is met when the evidence presented has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Prevailing Party
The party in a legal dispute who is successful and in whose favor the judgment is rendered. In this case, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to consider new evidence or to argue against the original decision on the basis of an error. Ms. Bartle’s request for a rehearing was granted.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Saguaro West Owner’s Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
A Homeowner Found a Mysterious $49,000 Transaction in Her HOA’s Books. The Reason She Lost in Court Is a Lesson for Everyone.
Introduction: The David-vs-Goliath Fight That Didn’t Go as Planned
For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant battle for transparency and fairness. It’s a common story: a resident raises concerns about financial decisions made behind closed doors, only to be met with resistance or silence. But what happens when a homeowner pushes back and takes that fight to an administrative hearing?
After an initial hearing and a persistent request for a rehearing, the final decision in Mary J. Bartle’s case against the Saguaro West Owner’s Association seemed, on the surface, like a clear-cut quest for accountability. The dispute centered on a single, alarming event: the withdrawal and subsequent redeposit of $49,000.50 from the association’s operating account without any notice to the members. It appeared to be a straightforward case of a concerned resident demanding answers.
However, the ruling from the administrative hearing offers a surprising and crucial lesson in how the legal system operates. The outcome reveals that suspicion, no matter how justified, is not enough to win. This article breaks down the top counter-intuitive takeaways from the judge’s decision and what they mean for any homeowner considering a legal challenge against their HOA.
Takeaway 1: A “Suspicious” Act Isn’t a Guaranteed Win
Feeling Something Is Wrong Isn’t the Same as Proving It.
The core facts of the case were not in dispute. On October 22, 2018, $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Saguaro West Owner’s Association’s operating account. On November 30, 2018, the exact same amount was redeposited. Members were not notified of these transactions. To any reasonable observer, this activity raises immediate questions.
Even the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case acknowledged the questionable nature of the transaction. In his final decision, he validated Ms. Bartle’s initial concerns with a striking statement:
The evidence shows that $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s account in October 2018 and the same amount was deposited in November 2018, and there is evidence to suggest that the transactions may have been in violation of the law.
This is the most stunning part of the case: the judge agreed that the transaction looked suspicious and might have broken the law, yet Ms. Bartle still lost. This reveals a critical distinction in legal proceedings. A judge is not an arbiter of general fairness but an interpreter of specific laws and rules. The judge’s comment shows he understood the spirit of Ms. Bartle’s complaint, but his hands were tied by the letter of her petition. The legal system requires more than a gut feeling; it demands specific proof that a specific rule was violated, which leads directly to the next critical lesson.
Takeaway 2: You Must Prove theExactRule Was Broken
Specificity Is Your Only Weapon.
Ms. Bartle’s case was ultimately narrowed to a single, highly specific issue: whether the $49,000.50 transaction violated Article VIII, section 8(d) of the association’s bylaws. This is a crucial detail because courts and administrative bodies require this rigid specificity to ensure fairness, prevent “moving goalposts,” and keep proceedings focused on the actual claims filed, not a general feeling of grievance.
Her entire case hinged on proving a violation of that specific section and no other. The rule in question outlines the treasurer’s duties, which include the power to: “receive and deposit…all monies,” “disburse such funds as directed,” “sign all checks,” and “keep proper books of account.”
The judge’s conclusion was brutally precise. He found that Ms. Bartle had “not shown by a preponderance of the evidence” that the transaction violated any of those specific, listed duties. She couldn’t prove the treasurer failed to deposit money or keep proper books; she could only prove a strange transaction occurred that wasn’t explicitly forbidden by the rule she cited. This is a critical lesson: it doesn’t matter if an HOA’s action feels wrong; what matters is whether you can prove it violated the precise rule you cited in your petition.
Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Rests Entirely on the Accuser
It’s Your Job to Build the Case, Not Theirs to Disprove It.
In a civil administrative hearing like this, the petitioner—Ms. Bartle—carries the “burden of proof.” The standard she had to meet was the “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal definition for this is:
“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
In simple terms, she had to present enough convincing evidence to make the judge believe that her version of events was more likely true than not. The judge’s decision explicitly states that Ms. Bartle bore this burden and ultimately failed to meet it.
One of the most powerful details from the case file illustrates this point perfectly: the Saguaro West Owner’s Association, though represented by legal counsel, “presented no witnesses.” They didn’t have to. They didn’t need to explain the transaction or justify their actions because Ms. Bartle failed to build a strong enough case to prove her specific claim. The onus was completely on her to prove her argument, and when it fell short, the case was dismissed.
Conclusion: A Sobering Reminder for Homeowners
The case of Mary Bartle is a sobering reminder that winning a legal fight against a well-resourced entity like an HOA is less about moral rightness and more about meticulous legal strategy and precision.
While the judge acknowledged that Ms. Bartle’s concerns about the $49,000.50 transaction were potentially valid, her petition was dismissed not on a simple technicality, but because of a core principle of law: the failure to prove that the specific rule cited had actually been broken. Her case highlights the immense challenge for individual homeowners seeking transparency. It leaves us asking, if the legal bar is this specific, what practical recourse do residents have when they feel something is fundamentally wrong?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Mary J Bartle(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf and testified
Respondent Side
Nicole Payne(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
Edith Rudder(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
