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Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Lanye C. and Devin E. Wilkey

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919044-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Pointe Tapatio Community Association Counsel Lauren Vie
Respondent Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey Counsel Joseph Velez

Alleged Violations

CC&R Article 3, section 3.1

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business

The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.

Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Business Use, Home Business, Parking, Traffic, Civil Penalty
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706518.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:04 (36.5 KB)

19F-H1919044-REL Decision – 706560.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:04 (108.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919044-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pointe Tapatio Community Association vs. Wilkey

Executive Summary

This document details the findings and decision of an administrative law judge in the case of Pointe Tapatio Community Association versus residents Layne C. and Devin E. Wilkey. The core issue was the operation of a payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, from the Wilkeys’ residential unit. The Association alleged this violated community CC&Rs, which prohibit non-residential uses that create traffic or parking. The Wilkeys admitted that two employees commuted to the unit daily but argued they had received permission from a former property manager.

The judge found in favor of the Association, concluding that the daily commute of two employees constituted the creation of “traffic and parking,” a direct and unambiguous violation of the CC&Rs. The judge deemed the residents’ claims of verbal permission to be unsubstantiated and irrelevant, as the covenant’s language was clear. Consequently, the judge ordered the Wilkeys to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days and imposed a civil penalty of $500.

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Case Overview

Case Name

Pointe Tapatio Community Association, Petitioner, vs. Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1919044-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)

Hearing Date

April 26, 2019

Decision Date

May 7, 2019

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Petitioner’s Counsel

Lauren Vie, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Joseph Velez, Esq.

——————————————————————————–

Central Allegation and Governing Covenant

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) alleged that Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondents) violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by using their residential unit as an office for their business.

The specific provision at issue is Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs, which states:

“Residential. Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

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Key Findings of Fact

The Business Operation

• Respondents: Layne C. Wilkey (mother) and Devin E. Wilkey (son) are co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50).

• Company: They own and operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from this unit. The business also operates from a second, commercial site in Tempe.

• History: The business was moved into the residential unit from a commercial location in late 2009.

• Public Presence: Devau’s website and Google Maps both list the 720 E. North Lane address as an office location, with stated office hours from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The website notes it is a “mailing address only.”

• Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.

Employee Activity and Impact

• The Wilkeys acknowledged that two Devau employees commute to the unit to work.

• One employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.

• A second employee works from 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday.

• These employees at times park their vehicles on the community’s streets.

• The business does not have clients or customers who visit the unit.

The Dispute Over Permission

• Respondents’ Claim: The Wilkeys asserted they had permission to operate the business from Howard Flisser, a former property manager. They admitted they had no written confirmation and had never spoken to Mr. Flisser directly about it.

◦ Ms. Wilkey testified that in 2009, she asked her husband, who asked a salesperson, who then allegedly asked Mr. Flisser and relayed that it was permissible.

◦ Mr. Wilkey testified that his now-deceased father would not have taken the risk of moving the business without permission.

• Petitioner’s Rebuttal: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that Mr. Flisser stated a few days before the hearing that he could not recall giving permission and, on two occasions during the conversation, volunteered that he had never given permission.

• Authority: Ms. Duistermars also testified that Mr. Flisser lacked the authority to grant such permission; only the Board of Directors could do so.

Association’s Stance and Actions

• Notification: Through a letter dated August 8, 2018, the Association informed the Wilkeys of the violation and required compliance by August 31, 2018.

• Petition: The Association filed the petition that initiated the hearing on or about January 17, 2019.

• Other Businesses: The Association permits certain home-based businesses that do not generate traffic or parking, such as telecommuting and online teaching, without requiring Board permission.

• Complaints: Ms. Duistermars acknowledged she was unaware of any specific complaints regarding traffic, parking, or noise from the Wilkeys’ unit. However, she testified that the Board was first made aware of the business operation when another resident brought the issue to its attention.

——————————————————————————–

Legal Analysis and Conclusions

• Standard of Proof: The judge determined all issues based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force.

• CC&Rs as Contract: The CC&Rs are a legally binding contract between the Association and the residents.

• Unambiguous Language: The judge found the language in CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1 to be clear and unambiguous. Such covenants must be enforced to give effect to the parties’ original intent.

• Direct Violation: The judge concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly showed the Wilkeys were operating a business from their unit. The admission that two employees drive to the unit and park on the street proves that the business creates both traffic and parking.

• Violation Trigger: The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to constitute a violation. The CC&R does not require that the traffic or parking cause a secondary violation or generate resident complaints. Therefore, the lack of other complaints was deemed to have little probative value.

• Final Conclusion: Based on the facts, the Wilkeys are in clear violation of CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1.

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Penalties

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:

1. Compliance Order: Respondent Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey must cease all business operations at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1 (Lot 50) within thirty-five (35) days of the Order’s effective date.

2. Civil Penalty: The Respondents must pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty (60) days of the Order’s effective date. Payment must be made by cashier’s check or money order.

3. Filing Fee: The Petitioner’s request for a refund of its filing fee was denied, as the judge found no legal authority to grant it.

The Order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919044-REL


Study Guide:Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey

This guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Pointe Tapatio Community Association v. Wilkey, Case No. 19F-H1919044-REL, heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It details the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the legal standards applied, and the final judgment.

Case Summary

The Pointe Tapatio Community Association (Petitioner) filed a complaint against homeowners Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey (Respondent), alleging that they were violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by operating a business, Devau Human Resources, from their residential unit. The Association argued that the business, which employed two individuals who commuted to the property, generated traffic and parking, explicitly prohibited by the CC&Rs for non-residential activities. The Wilkeys contended they had received verbal permission years prior and that the business was not disruptive. The Administrative Law Judge found in favor of the Association, ruling that the Wilkeys were in clear violation of the community’s governing documents.

Key Parties & Entities

Name / Entity

Key Actions & Involvement

Pointe Tapatio Community Association

Petitioner

The homeowners’ association that filed the petition alleging a CC&R violation. Represented by Lauren Vie, Esq.

Layne C. Wilkey & Devin E. Wilkey

Respondent

Mother and son, co-owners of the unit at 720 E. North Lane, Unit 1. Operators of Devau Human Resources. Represented by Joseph Velez, Esq.

Thomas Shedden

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Presided over the hearing, made findings of fact, drew conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Regulatory Body

Issued the initial Notice of Hearing and has legal authority over such disputes under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Paula Duistermars

Board Member, Pointe Tapatio

Testified on behalf of the Association, detailing the Board’s position and interactions regarding the violation.

Howard Flisser

Property Manager (Former or Current)

Named by the Wilkeys as the source of verbal permission to operate their business; Flisser denied recalling this.

Devau Human Resources

Business Entity

A payroll processing company owned by the Wilkeys, operating out of the residential unit and a commercial site in Tempe.

Office of Administrative Hearings

Adjudicative Body

The venue for the hearing, located at 1740 West Adams Street, Lower Level, in Phoenix, Arizona.

Case Timeline

• Late 2009: The Wilkeys move their business, Devau Human Resources, from a commercial location into their unit at Pointe Tapatio.

• August 8, 2018: Pointe Tapatio sends a letter informing the Wilkeys they are out of compliance with the CC&Rs and must comply by August 31, 2018.

• January 17, 2019 (approx.): Pointe Tapatio files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• February 28, 2019: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

• April 26, 2019: The administrative hearing is held before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

• May 7, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issues the final decision and order.

Central Conflict: CC&R Article 3, Section 3.1

The core of the dispute revolved around the interpretation and enforcement of a specific restrictive covenant within the community’s governing documents.

• The Allegation: Pointe Tapatio alleged that the Wilkeys were using their unit as an office for a “gainful occupation,” which is not a “first class residential use.”

• The Specific Provision: Article 3, Section 3.1 of the CC&Rs states:

• The Triggering Condition: The prohibition is not absolute. It applies specifically to non-residential uses that create traffic or parking.

Arguments and Evidence

Arguments & Evidence Presented

Petitioner (Pointe Tapatio)

  • Employee Activity: The Wilkeys acknowledged two employees drive to the unit to work Monday through Friday, creating traffic and parking on community streets.
  • Public Information: Devau’s website and Google Maps listed the residential unit as an office address with set business hours (9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.).
  • Owner Admission: Ms. Wilkey acknowledged during testimony that they consider the unit to be an office.
  • Lack of Authority: Board member Paula Duistermars testified that property manager Howard Flisser did not have the authority to grant permission for a business; only the Board could. She also testified that Flisser could not recall giving permission and had volunteered that he never did.

Respondent (The Wilkeys)

  • Verbal Permission: The Wilkeys claimed they received verbal permission from property manager Howard Flisser in 2009. They admitted they never spoke to him directly and had nothing in writing.
  • Implied Permission: Mr. Wilkey argued his father would not have taken the risk of moving the payroll business without permission, implying it must have been granted.
  • No Direct Complaints: It was acknowledged that the Association was not aware of specific complaints filed against the Wilkeys for traffic, parking, or noise issues.
  • Residential Use: Mr. Wilkey testified that he considers the unit one of his two primary residences, though he did not provide a responsive answer when asked how often he stayed there.

The Judge’s Decision & Legal Reasoning

ALJ Thomas Shedden concluded that the Wilkeys were in violation of the CC&Rs based on a “preponderance of the evidence.”

• The Wilkeys operate Devau Human Resources, a payroll processing company, from the unit.

• Two employees commute to the unit for work and sometimes park on community streets.

• The business is publicly listed at the residential address.

• The Wilkeys’ claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser was not substantiated. Testimony from Paula Duistermars indicated Flisser could not recall, and in fact denied, giving such permission.

• The Association does permit some home businesses (e.g., telecommuting, online teaching) that do not create traffic or parking and do not require Board permission.

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowners and the Association.

2. Unambiguous Language: The language in Article 3, section 3.1 is clear and unambiguous. It prohibits businesses that create traffic or parking.

3. Violation Proven: The evidence clearly showed the Wilkeys’ business created both traffic and parking due to its two commuting employees. This is a direct violation of the unambiguous terms of the CC&R.

4. No Other Violation Needed: The fact that no other rules (e.g., specific parking ordinances) were broken is irrelevant. The creation of any traffic or parking by the business is sufficient to trigger the violation as written.

1. Cease Operations: The Wilkeys were ordered to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1 by ceasing business operations at the unit within 35 days.

2. Civil Penalty: The Wilkeys were ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

3. Filing Fee Request Denied: The Association’s request to have its filing fee refunded was denied because it cited no legal authority showing the judge had the power to grant it.

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Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information in the case file.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondents in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific activity led the petitioner to claim the respondents were violating the CC&Rs?

3. According to Article 3, section 3.1, what condition makes a non-residential use of a property a violation?

4. What was the respondents’ primary defense for operating their business from the unit?

5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondents’ primary defense unconvincing?

6. What two specific pieces of evidence demonstrated that the business created traffic and parking?

7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this type of administrative hearing, and what does it mean?

8. What two penalties were imposed on the Wilkeys in the final order?

9. Does the Pointe Tapatio Community Association prohibit all home-based businesses? Explain.

10. Who was Howard Flisser, and what was his significance to the respondents’ case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was the Pointe Tapatio Community Association. The respondents were Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey, who were homeowners within the community and co-owners of the unit in question.

2. The Wilkeys were operating their payroll processing company, Devau Human Resources, out of their residential unit. This included having two employees commute to the property to work during business hours.

3. A non-residential use becomes a violation if it “creates traffic [or] parking.” The rule does not require a certain amount of traffic or parking, only that it is created by the business activity.

4. The respondents’ primary defense was that they had received verbal permission to operate the business from the community’s property manager, Howard Flisser, back in 2009.

5. The judge found the defense unconvincing because the Wilkeys had no written proof, had not spoken to Mr. Flisser directly, and testimony from a board member indicated Mr. Flisser could not recall—and later denied—ever giving such permission. Furthermore, the property manager likely lacked the authority to grant it.

6. The evidence was the Wilkeys’ own acknowledgement that two of their employees drive to the unit to work on a weekly basis. This commuting by non-resident employees necessarily creates traffic and, at times, requires them to park on community streets.

7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” This means the greater weight of the evidence must be sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other, even if it does not remove all reasonable doubt.

8. The Wilkeys were ordered to cease all business operations at the unit within 35 days. They were also ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within 60 days.

9. No, the association does not prohibit all home-based businesses. It allows for activities like telecommuting and teaching online classes, which do not require board permission because they do not create traffic or parking.

10. Howard Flisser was the property manager whom the Wilkeys claimed gave them verbal permission to run their business. His significance was central to their defense, but his alleged permission was unsubstantiated and contradicted by later testimony.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as applied in this case. How did the evidence presented by Pointe Tapatio meet this standard, while the Wilkeys’ evidence did not?

2. Discuss the legal principle that CC&Rs are treated as contracts. Explain how Judge Shedden applied contract law principles, particularly regarding “unambiguous” language, to reach his conclusion.

3. Evaluate the Wilkeys’ defense strategy, focusing on their claim of verbal permission from Howard Flisser. Why was this argument legally insufficient? What kind of evidence would have been necessary to make it successful?

4. Examine the distinction the Pointe Tapatio Community Association makes between permissible home-based businesses (like telecommuting) and impermissible ones (like Devau Human Resources). What is the key factor in this distinction according to the CC&Rs, and how does it relate to the core purpose of residential covenants?

5. Based on the judge’s order, discuss the remedies available to a homeowner’s association in Arizona when a CC&R violation is proven. What penalties were imposed, and what penalty was requested but denied?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): A judge and trier of fact who presides over administrative hearings, such as disputes handled by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ renders decisions, called orders, based on evidence and legal arguments.

• CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or subdivision. In this case, they are treated as a legally binding contract between the association and the homeowners.

• Civil Penalty: A monetary fine levied by a government agency or administrative court for a violation of a statute or rule. In this case, a $500 penalty was imposed on the Wilkeys for violating the community documents.

• Conclusions of Law: The section of a judicial decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

• Findings of Fact: The section of a judicial decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

• Order: The final ruling or judgment issued by an Administrative Law Judge that directs the parties on what actions they must take.

• Petitioner: The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the Pointe Tapatio Community Association.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the trier of fact to believe that it is more likely than not that a claim is true, based on the evidence presented.

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, Layne C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919044-REL


4 Surprising Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Shut Down a 10-Year-Old Home Business

Introduction: The Rise of the Home Office and the Rules You Didn’t Know Existed

In an age where the line between the living room and the corner office has all but vanished, millions of us have embraced working from home. But as we settle into our home-based routines, a critical question often goes unasked: Are you truly familiar with your homeowner’s association (HOA) rules regarding home-based businesses?

For the Wilkey family, owners of Devau Human Resources, the answer to that question proved to be a costly one. After operating their payroll processing company from their home for nearly a decade without a single complaint, they found themselves in a legal battle that ultimately shut them down. Their case serves as a powerful cautionary tale about what can happen when long-standing home businesses collide with the fine print of HOA rules.

1. It’s Not About Complaints, It’s About the Contract

One of the most chilling lessons from the Wilkey case is that the HOA’s action wasn’t triggered by angry neighbors complaining about noise or traffic. In fact, Board member Paula Duistermars testified that she was unaware of any such complaints. The issue arose simply because “a resident brought the issue to [the Board’s] attention.”

This reveals a crucial legal reality: your business’s existence, not its impact, can be the sole trigger for enforcement. It doesn’t take a chorus of angry neighbors—just one person notifying the Board of a potential rule violation is enough. The Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are a legally binding contract, and the court’s decision was not based on whether the business was a nuisance, but simply whether it complied with the contract’s terms. Your takeaway: You must operate as if the rulebook will be enforced literally, because it can be.

2. The Deciding Factor: A Single Clause About “Traffic and Parking”

The entire legal dispute hinged on the precise wording of one specific rule. The HOA wasn’t enforcing a vague, blanket ban on all home businesses; its power came from a single, carefully worded clause in the CC&Rs.

The relevant section, Article 3, section 3.1, stated:

“Each Residence shall be used, improved, and devoted exclusively to first class residential use, and no gainful occupation, profession, trade, business, religion, or other non-residential use which creates traffic [or] parking … shall be conducted from any Residence [or part thereof.]”

As a legal analyst, I can tell you why this clause was so powerful: its focus on a tangible impact (“creates traffic [or] parking”) made it highly defensible. A blanket prohibition on “all businesses” might be open to challenge, but this specific, impact-based rule was nearly impossible to argue against once the facts were established. The Wilkeys’ business was found in violation specifically because it created traffic and parking, which is also why the HOA permitted other home businesses, like telecommuting, that did not.

3. Your Two-Person TeamIsa Traffic Problem

Many homeowners assume that business traffic rules are meant to prevent a steady stream of clients visiting a residential property. The Wilkeys had no clients come to their unit. However, this did not protect them.

The undisputed fact that proved decisive was that two of the company’s employees commuted to the home to work—one from Monday to Thursday and the other from Monday to Friday. The judge concluded that this daily employee commute constituted the creation of “traffic and parking” as prohibited by the CC&Rs. The employees at times parking on the community’s common streets provided concrete, undeniable evidence of this. This case sets a precedent that a micro-business with just one or two employees commuting to the home can be deemed in violation—a scenario many entrepreneurs wouldn’t even consider a “traffic” issue.

4. “He Said We Could” Is Not a Legal Defense

The Wilkeys asserted that they had received verbal permission to operate their business from the property manager back in 2009. This defense completely fell apart under legal scrutiny.

Courts prioritize written agreements and official board actions over “he said/she said” accounts, especially when they involve multi-level hearsay (in this case, a husband asking a salesperson who asked the manager). The defense failed for several clear reasons: the Wilkeys had no written proof, the manager denied recalling or ever giving such permission, and most importantly, a Board member testified that the manager lacked the authority to grant this permission anyway. Only the Board could.

The takeaway is unambiguous: Never rely on verbal assurances. Get all permissions from your HOA Board in writing, or they do not legally exist.

Conclusion: Know Your Rules Before You Unpack Your Desk

The story of the Wilkey family is a stark reminder that HOA documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts where every word matters. The Wilkeys’ experience is a costly lesson for every home-based professional. Proactive compliance is your only true protection. The final outcome was an order for them to cease all business operations from their home within 35 days and pay a $500 civil penalty.

You might have been working from home for years without a problem, but have you ever read the fine print on what your community actually allows?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lauren Vie (HOA attorney)
    Attorney for Petitioner
  • Paula Duistermars (board member)
    Pointe Tapatio Community Association
    Presented testimony for Petitioner
  • Beth Mulchay (HOA attorney)
    Mulchay Law Firm, P.C.
    Listed on transmission list

Respondent Side

  • Layne C. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Devin E. Wilkey (respondent)
  • Joseph A Velez (respondent attorney)
    For Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Howard Flisser (property manager)
    Statements regarding alleged business permission were discussed
  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel —
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:17 (89.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

• Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

• Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

• Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

• Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

• The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

• Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

• Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

• Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

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4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

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Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel —
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Administrative Law Judge determined that the alleged violations of the HOA's website and policy manual did not involve 'community documents' as defined by statute, meaning the matter did not fall within the tribunal's jurisdiction under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Why this result: The petition was dismissed because the initial claims did not meet the requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), as the alleged violations involved documents (website and policy BC-3) that are not considered 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy BC-3 concerning the provision of pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its website and Policy Manual (BC-3) regarding the provision of pickleball courts. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the Department lacked jurisdiction because neither the website nor Policy BC-3 are defined as 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2). The ALJ agreed, finding the claim failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • Walker v. Scottsdale
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:41 (89.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

• Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

• Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

• Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

• Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

• The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

• Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

• Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

• Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

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4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

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Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel —
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled partially in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown, finding that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by imposing a $25 late payment fee, and ordered the fee rescinded and the $500 filing fee refunded,,,. The ALJ ruled against both Petitioners (Brown and Stevens) regarding the challenge to the $325 assessment increase, dismissing those petitions because they failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,,.

Why this result: Petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined $325 assessment increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) because their definition of 'regular assessment' as encompassing all assessments enacted through proper procedures was not supported by statutory construction principles,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Brown Docket 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG)

Petitioner Brown alleged the combined $325 increase, consisting of a $116 regular increase and a $209 special assessment, violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) because 'regular assessment' refers to the creation process, making the total increase subject to the 20% cap,,,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. deemed the prevailing party in the 029 matter,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 4
  • 6
  • 32
  • 33
  • 35
  • 36
  • 73
  • 74
  • 76
  • 77

Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Stevens Docket 18F-H1818054-REL)

Petitioner Stevens alleged the total $325 assessment increase violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and raised accompanying allegations of deceptive accounting and lack of authority to impose special assessments,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party in the 054 matter,,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 7
  • 20
  • 32
  • 33
  • 35
  • 36
  • 38
  • 61
  • 73
  • 74
  • 76
  • 77
  • 79
  • 94
  • 99
  • 101

Challenge to late payment charges (Brown Docket 18F-H1818045-REL)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late fee and 18% interest charged by Mogollon violated the statutory limits set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,. The ALJ found the $25 late charge violated the statute because the limit applies to all 'assessments',.

Orders: Petitioner Warren R. Brown deemed the prevailing party. Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 5
  • 7
  • 32
  • 34
  • 37
  • 46
  • 47
  • 59
  • 73
  • 75
  • 78

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment cap, Late fee violation, Statutory construction, Regular assessment definition, Special assessment, Filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:09 (102.8 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818054-REL/666285.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:01 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818054-REL/672623.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:48:02 (144.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from a consolidated administrative law case involving petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The central dispute concerned a 2018 assessment increase of $325, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year, and the imposition of a new $25 late fee.

The petitioners argued that the entire assessment increase violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1803(A), which limits annual regular assessment increases to 20%. They contended that the term “regular” describes the procedural enactment of an assessment, making the entire 325increaseasingleregularassessment.Conversely,theHOAassertedthatithadbifurcatedtheincreaseintoacompliant14.1116) regular assessment increase and a separate $209 special assessment, which is not subject to the 20% statutory cap.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately sided with Mogollon Airpark on the assessment increase, dismissing the petitions of both Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens. The ALJ’s rationale, based on principles of statutory construction, was that “regular assessment” refers to a type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that to rule otherwise would render the word “regular” meaningless in the statute. A subsequent rehearing requested by Mr. Stevens was also denied on the same grounds.

However, the ALJ ruled in favor of Mr. Brown on the matter of the late fee. The decision found that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all “assessments,” not just regular ones, making the HOA’s $25 fee a clear violation. Underlying the legal challenges were substantial allegations by the petitioners of deceptive accounting and financial mismanagement by the HOA to create a “fabricated shortfall,” though the ALJ noted these issues were outside the narrow scope of the administrative hearing and better suited for civil court.

Case Overview and Parties Involved

This matter consolidates three separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which were heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Petitioners:

◦ Warren R. Brown (Docket Nos. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818045-REL)

◦ Brad W. Stevens (Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL)

• Respondent:

◦ Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

• Venue and Adjudication:

◦ Tribunal: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

◦ Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

◦ Hearing Date (Consolidated Matters): September 28, 2018

◦ Rehearing Date (Stevens Matter): February 11, 2019

Key Financial Figures

Amount/Rate

Calculation/Note

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017)

The baseline for calculating the increase percentage.

Total 2018 Assessment Increase

The total amount disputed by the petitioners.

Total Increase Percentage

($325 / $825)

“Regular Assessment” Increase

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (14.1% increase).

“Special Assessment”

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

New Late Fee

Challenged as exceeding statutory limits.

New Interest Rate

For past-due accounts.

Statutory Late Fee Limit

Greater of $15 or 10%

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Statutory Assessment Increase Limit

20% over prior year

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies to regular assessments.

Analysis of Core Legal Disputes

The hearings focused on two primary violations of Arizona statute alleged by the petitioners.

The 2018 Assessment Increase (39.4%)

The crux of the case in dockets 029 and 054 was the interpretation of the term “regular assessment” within ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

• Petitioners’ Position (Brown & Stevens):

◦ The total $325 increase, constituting a 39.4% hike, is a clear violation of the 20% statutory cap.

◦ The term “regular assessment” as used in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote). As the entire $325 was passed via this standard procedure, it constitutes a single regular assessment.

◦ They further argued that Mogollon Airpark, Inc.’s governing documents (Bylaws and CC&Rs) do not provide any explicit authority to impose “special assessments,” meaning any assessment levied must be a regular one.

• Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The assessment was properly bifurcated into two distinct parts: a $116 increase to the regular assessment (a 14.1% increase, well within the 20% limit) and a $209 special assessment.

◦ “Regular assessment” and “special assessment” are established terms of art in the HOA industry, denoting different types of assessments, not the process of their creation.

◦ The existence of both terms in other parts of Arizona law, such as § 33-1806, demonstrates the legislature’s intent to treat them as separate categories.

Late Fees and Interest Charges

In docket 045, Mr. Brown challenged the legality of the newly instituted penalties for late payments.

• Petitioner’s Position (Brown):

◦ The statute explicitly limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.”

◦ The HOA’s imposition of a flat $25 late fee is a direct violation of this provision. An invoice provided as evidence showed Mr. Brown was charged this $25 fee plus $1.57 in interest.

• Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The HOA argued that the statutory limitation on late fees applied only to regular assessments, not to special assessments. This argument was explicitly rejected by the ALJ.

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

While the administrative hearings were limited to the specific statutory violations, the petitions were motivated by deep-seated concerns over the HOA’s financial management. These allegations were not adjudicated but were noted by the ALJ.

• Core Allegation: The petitioners claimed the HOA treasurer and others engaged in “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods” to manufacture a financial crisis and justify the assessment increase.

• Specific Claims:

◦ Mr. Brown alleged that the accounting was “deliberately misleading” to obscure the fact that the 2016 board left the treasury approximately “$200,000 better off.”

◦ Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged improprieties, including “keeping two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall.” He testified that he believed the HOA possessed over $1 million and did not need an increase.

• Judicial Comment: The ALJ noted that these complex financial allegations were not addressed in the hearing and suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Judicial Decisions and Rationale

The ALJ issued separate findings and orders for each docket, culminating in a split decision. The rulings on the assessment increase were further solidified in a subsequent rehearing.

Summary of Outcomes

Docket No.

Petitioner

Core Issue

Ruling

Prevailing Party

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

$25 Late Fee

Violation Found

Warren R. Brown

Rationale for Initial Decision (October 18, 2018)

• On the Assessment Increase: The ALJ found that the petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The ruling rested on statutory interpretation:

◦ The petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment” as a process was rejected because it would render the word “regular” in the statute “trivial or void,” as all assessments are presumed to follow a regular process.

◦ The only “fair and sensible result” that gives meaning to every word in the statute is to interpret “regular” and “special” as distinct types of assessments.

• On the Late Fees: The ALJ found that Mr. Brown successfully proved a violation.

◦ The statutory text on late fees applies to “assessments” generally, without the qualifier “regular.”

◦ Mogollon’s argument required adding the word “regular” where the legislature did not use it, which violates principles of statutory construction.

◦ Order: Mogollon was ordered to rescind the $25 fee assessed against Mr. Brown and reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Rationale for Rehearing Decision (March 1, 2019)

Mr. Stevens’s request for a rehearing on his dismissed petition was granted but ultimately denied again.

• Mr. Stevens’s Rehearing Arguments: He argued the ALJ erred by not applying a definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona and reasserted that an assessment unauthorized by the HOA’s documents must logically be a regular one.

• ALJ’s Rejection:

◦ The reliance on Northwest Fire District was “misplaced” because that case applies to special taxing districts created under a different state title, not private HOAs.

◦ The argument that an unauthorized special assessment becomes a regular one was deemed “nonsensical.” The ALJ noted, “More reasonably, if Mogollon has no authority to issue a special assessment, any such assessment would be void.”

◦ The core statutory interpretation from the initial hearing was affirmed. The petition was dismissed a final time.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided legal documents.

1. Identify the petitioners and the respondent in this consolidated legal matter and describe their relationship.

2. What specific financial changes did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. implement in 2018 that led to the legal dispute?

3. What was the central legal argument presented by petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens regarding the assessment increase?

4. How did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. justify its total assessment increase of $325 in the face of the legal challenge?

5. Explain the Administrative Law Judge’s primary reason for dismissing the petitions concerning the assessment increase (the 029 and 054 matters).

6. What was the specific subject of the petition in the 045 matter, and what was the final ruling in that case?

7. What was the judge’s legal reasoning for finding Mogollon’s $25 late fee to be in violation of the statute?

8. Why did the hearing not address the petitioners’ underlying allegations of deceptive accounting and financial impropriety?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which parties were responsible for meeting it?

10. In the rehearing for the 054 matter, what was Brad Stevens’s argument regarding the definition of “special assessment,” and why did the judge find his reliance on the Northwest Fire District case to be misplaced?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The petitioners were Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens, who were members of the homeowners’ association (HOA). The respondent was Mogollon Airpark, Inc., the HOA itself. The dispute arose from actions taken by the HOA board that the petitioners, as members, believed to be unlawful.

2. In 2018, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its total annual assessment by $325 over the previous year’s $825. Additionally, the HOA instituted a new late payment fee of $25 and began charging 18% interest on past-due accounts.

3. The petitioners’ central argument was that the total $325 assessment increase, representing a 39.4% hike over the prior year, violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A). This statute prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment” that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s assessment without member approval.

4. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. argued that the $325 increase was composed of two separate parts: a $116 increase to the “regular assessment” (14.1%) and a $209 “special assessment.” They contended that the 20% statutory limit in section 33-1803(A) applies only to regular assessments, not special assessments, and therefore their actions were lawful.

5. The judge dismissed the petitions based on principles of statutory construction. He concluded that “regular assessment” is a specific type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that if “regular” merely referred to the process of passing an assessment (motion, second, vote), the word would be redundant and meaningless in the statute. Since the regular assessment portion of the increase was below the 20% threshold, no violation occurred.

6. The 045 matter, filed by Warren R. Brown, specifically challenged Mogollon’s new $25 late fee and 18% interest charge. The judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown, deeming him the prevailing party, and ordered Mogollon to rescind the $25 late fee and refund his $500 filing fee.

7. The judge found the $25 late fee violated the statute because the section of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) limiting late charges applies to “assessments” generally, not just “regular assessments.” Unlike the clause on assessment increases, the legislature did not use the limiting word “regular,” so applying that limitation would violate principles of statutory construction.

8. The hearing did not address the allegations of deceptive accounting because the petitions filed by Mr. Brown (029) and Mr. Stevens (054) were “single-issue petitions.” This limited the scope of the hearing strictly to the question of whether Mogollon violated the specific statute, section 33-1803(A). The judge noted that civil courts may be a more suitable venue for the financial allegations.

9. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioners, Messrs. Brown and Stevens, to prove their respective allegations against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

10. Mr. Stevens argued that the definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona should be applied, which it failed to meet. The judge found this reliance misplaced because that case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is an HOA, not such a taxing district.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-format response. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of the term “regular assessment” as presented by the petitioners and the respondent. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation and the principles of statutory construction used to arrive at that conclusion.

2. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision distinguishes between the legality of the assessment increase and the legality of the late fee. Explain the legal reasoning behind this split decision, focusing on the specific wording of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) and the different statutory construction applied to each clause.

3. Discuss the procedural limitations of the hearings as described in the legal decision, specifically referencing the concept of a “single-issue petition.” How did this limitation affect the scope of the case and prevent the judge from ruling on certain serious allegations made by Brown and Stevens?

4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the background allegations of financial misconduct made by the petitioners against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. Although not ruled upon, explain how these allegations served as the primary motivation for their legal challenges regarding the assessment and fee increases.

5. Trace the procedural history of the “029 matter,” from its original petition and dismissal to the eventual rehearing and final order. What does this process reveal about the requirements for filing a successful petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions, in this case, Judge Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

The specific Arizona statute at the heart of the dispute. It limits HOA regular assessment increases to 20% over the prior year and caps late payment charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Assessment

A fee or charge levied by a homeowners’ association on its members to cover operating expenses, reserve funds, and other costs.

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, like an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Part of the governing documents.

Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legal obligations recorded in the deed of a property, governing its use and maintenance. Part of the governing documents.

Consolidated Matter

A legal procedure where multiple separate cases or petitions involving common questions of law or fact are combined into a single hearing to promote efficiency.

Docket Number

A unique number assigned by a court or administrative office to identify a specific case. The matters in this case were identified as 029, 045, and 054.

Governing Documents

The collection of legal documents, including CC&Rs and Bylaws, that establish the rules and authority of a homeowners’ association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action in an administrative or court proceeding. In this case, Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. It means the greater weight of the evidence shows that a fact is more likely than not to be true.

Regular Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a specific type of recurring annual assessment for an HOA’s general operating budget, subject to the 20% increase limit in section 33-1803(A).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Single-Issue Petition

A petition that limits the scope of the administrative hearing to a single, specific legal question or alleged violation, as was the case for the 029 and 054 matters.

Special Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a one-time or non-recurring assessment levied for a specific purpose (e.g., replenishing a reserve fund). The ALJ found it is not subject to the 20% annual increase cap that applies to regular assessments.

Statutory Construction

The process and principles used by judges to interpret and apply legislation. The judge used these principles to determine the meaning of “regular” and “assessment” in the statute.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


How One Word Let an HOA Raise Dues by 40%—And 4 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner

Imagine opening your annual bill from your Homeowner’s Association (HOA) and discovering your dues have skyrocketed by nearly 40% overnight. This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s precisely what happened to homeowners in the Mogollon Airpark community in Arizona when their HOA board raised the annual assessment by $325, from $825 to $1,150—a staggering 39.4% increase.

But the homeowners weren’t just angry about the amount; they alleged the increase was justified by a “fabricated shortfall” created through “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods.” At first glance, the hike also seemed legally impossible. Arizona state law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), clearly states that an HOA cannot impose a regular assessment that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s. So how did the Mogollon Airpark board legally circumvent this cap? The answer, found in the fine print of an administrative law judge’s decision, reveals critical lessons for every homeowner about the power of language, legal strategy, and reading the fine print.

1. The Power of a Name: The “Special Assessment” Loophole

The HOA’s strategy was deceptively simple. Instead of raising the annual assessment by the full $325, the Mogollon Airpark board split the increase into two distinct parts. First, it raised the “regular assessment” by $116. This amounted to a 14.1% increase over the previous year’s $825, keeping it well within the 20% legal limit. The remaining $209 was then levied as a separate fee, which the board classified as a “special assessment.”

When homeowners challenged this, the Administrative Law Judge sided with the HOA. The judge’s ruling was based on a strict reading of the statute: the 20% cap applies only to “regular assessments,” not “special assessments.” By simply calling a portion of the increase a “special assessment,” the HOA legally circumvented the very law designed to protect homeowners from massive, sudden fee hikes.

Lesson 1 for Homeowners: The name of a fee is everything. State-mandated caps on “regular” assessments offer zero protection if your HOA can simply reclassify an increase as a “special” assessment.

2. Every Word Is a Battlefield: “Regular” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The homeowners, petitioners Warren Brown and Brad Stevens, built their case on a common-sense interpretation of the law. They argued that the term “regular assessment” in the statute referred to the process by which an assessment is created—that is, any fee approved through a regular motion, second, and vote by the board. By this logic, the entire $325 increase was a single “regular assessment” and therefore violated the 20% cap. They also argued that the HOA had no authority under its own governing documents to impose a special assessment in the first place.

The judge, however, rejected this definition. The judge reasoned that lawmakers don’t add words to statutes for no reason. If “regular” simply meant “voted on normally,” the word would be redundant, as all assessments are assumed to be passed this way. To give the word meaning, it must refer to a specific type of assessment. To support this interpretation, the judge pointed to another Arizona statute, 33-1806, which explicitly uses the distinct terms “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s].” This proved that the state legislature intended for them to be entirely different categories of fees, cementing the HOA’s victory on the main issue.

Lesson 2 for Homeowners: Every word in a statute has a purpose. Courts assume lawmakers don’t use words accidentally, and a layperson’s “common-sense” definition of a term can be easily defeated by established principles of legal interpretation.

3. A Small Victory on a Technicality: Why You Should Still Read the Fine Print

While the homeowners lost the battle over the 39.4% dues increase, one petitioner, Mr. Brown, secured a small but significant win on a separate issue: late fees. The Mogollon Airpark board had instituted a new $25 late fee, which Mr. Brown challenged.

Arizona law limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The HOA argued that this limit, like the 20% cap, only applied to regular assessments. This time, the judge disagreed. The judge’s logic was a textbook example of statutory interpretation: when lawmakers include a specific word in one part of a law but omit it from another, courts assume the omission was deliberate. In the section of the law governing late fees, the limit applies to “assessments” in general; the word “regular” is conspicuously absent.

Because the HOA’s $25 fee exceeded the legal limit, the judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown. The court ordered the HOA to rescind the illegal late fee and, importantly, to reimburse Mr. Brown for his $500 filing fee.

Lesson 3 for Homeowners: The fine print cuts both ways. While one word can create a loophole for an HOA, the absence of that same word elsewhere can be your most powerful weapon.

4. Fighting the Right Battle in the Right Place: The Allegations a Judge Couldn’t Hear

Underlying the dispute over the 20% cap were much more serious allegations. The homeowners’ petitions claimed the HOA board used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” including keeping “two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall” and justify the massive fee increase.

Yet, none of these explosive claims were ever addressed during the hearing. The reason was a crucial matter of legal procedure. The homeowners had filed what are known as “single-issue petitions,” which focused narrowly and exclusively on the violation of the 20% assessment cap in statute 33-1803(A). This strategic choice legally prevented the judge from considering the broader allegations of financial mismanagement, regardless of their merit.

In a pointed footnote, the judge highlighted the procedural constraints and suggested the homeowners had chosen the wrong legal venue for their most serious claims:

Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.

Lesson 4 for Homeowners: Your legal strategy is as important as your evidence. Choosing the right claims to file and the right venue to file them in can determine whether a judge is even allowed to hear your most compelling arguments.

Conclusion: Your Most Powerful Tool

The case of Mogollon Airpark is a powerful illustration of how legal battles are won and lost not on broad principles of fairness, but on the precise definitions of individual words. The presence of the word “regular” in one clause of the law cost the homeowners their central fight, allowing the HOA to circumvent the 20% cap. In a stunning contrast, the absence of that very same word in another clause handed them a clear victory on late fees.

This case is a stark reminder of the power hidden in legal definitions and fine print. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question: Do you really know what your governing documents—and the state laws that bind them—truly allow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se; presented testimony/evidence

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Spelled Mark K. Saul in some transmissions

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk/staff)
    Transmitting staff

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brad W. Stevens Counsel —
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:21 (102.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

◦ Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

• Timeline:

◦ June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

◦ September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

◦ January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

◦ February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

◦ March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

• Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

• Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

• Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

• Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

• Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

• Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

• Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

• Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

• Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918029-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nathan Brown Counsel —
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition
Additional Citations:

  • 33-1803(E)
  • 32-2199.01
  • 33-1803(C)
  • 33-1803(D)
  • R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:46 (88.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918029-REL


Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Background and Timeline of Events

• October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

• October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

• November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

• November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

• January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

• February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

——————————————————————————–

Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

• Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

• Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

• Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918029-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 19F-H1918029-REL)

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What specific statute did the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, allege that the Respondent violated?

3. What was the initial issue that prompted the Respondent to contact Mr. Brown on October 18, 2018?

4. What was Nathan Brown’s central legal argument concerning the “Notice of Non-Compliance”?

5. How did the Val Vista Lakes Community Association characterize the “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and why was this distinction critical to its defense?

6. According to the Findings of Fact, what procedural step did Mr. Brown fail to take after receiving the initial notice from the association?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party was responsible for meeting it?

8. What were the Administrative Law Judge’s two primary legal conclusions that led to the dismissal of the petition?

9. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 2019?

10. What recourse was available to the parties following the judge’s Order, and what was the specified time limit for that action?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Nathan Brown, who served as the Petitioner, and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was the Respondent. Mr. Brown brought the complaint against the association, which was defending its actions.

2. Nathan Brown alleged that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). This section concerns an association’s obligation to provide a member with written notice of their option to petition for an administrative hearing.

3. The Respondent contacted Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard, which was considered a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. The “Notice of Non-Compliance” requested that he remedy the situation by November 1, 2018.

4. Mr. Brown’s central argument was that the “Notice of Non-Compliance” was, in fact, a “Notice of Violation.” Therefore, he contended it should have included written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department, as required by statute.

5. The Association characterized the notice as a “courtesy letter,” which is a common practice for providing an initial warning before formal action. This distinction was critical because the Association argued that as a mere courtesy letter and not a formal “Notice of Violation,” it was not subject to the statutory disclosure requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803.

6. Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Respondent via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice. This response is an option provided to members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C).

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, to show that the Respondent had violated the statute.

8. First, the judge concluded that a reasonable reading of the document shows it was not a “Notice of Violation” because it explicitly threatened that one would be issued later. Second, the judge concluded that even if it were a “Notice of Violation,” the statute does not require the hearing disclosure to be in the initial notice, and since Mr. Brown did not follow the response procedure, the Respondent’s obligation to provide that disclosure had not yet been triggered.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition be dismissed. The judge also deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate comprehensive, evidence-based answers using only the information and legal reasoning presented in the case decision.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “Notice of Non-Compliance” (or “courtesy letter”) and a “Notice of Violation” as presented in this case. Discuss why this distinction was the central point of contention and how the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the document’s plain language resolved the issue.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Discuss how Nathan Brown’s failure to meet this standard, as the party with the burden of proof, was fundamental to the dismissal of his petition.

3. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the procedural requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C), (D), and (E). How does the judge’s “sensible reading” of the statute’s timeline and reciprocal obligations undermine the Petitioner’s claim, even setting aside the debate over the notice’s title?

4. Describe the complete procedural timeline of this case, from the initial notice sent by the association to the final order from the Administrative Law Judge. Identify the key dates and actions taken by each party and by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

5. Discuss the role of statutory interpretation in this legal decision. How did the judge apply established legal principles, such as aiming for a “fair and sensible result” and avoiding “absurd and unreasonable construction,” to support the final ruling against the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at the center of this case is section 33-1803.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The decision implies these are the governing community documents that Mr. Brown was accused of violating due to dead vegetation.

Courtesy Letter

A term used by the Respondent to describe the “Notice of Non-Compliance.” It is characterized as a common industry practice to inform a resident of an issue before issuing a formal Notice of Violation.

Notice of Non-Compliance

The specific document dated October 18, 2018, sent to Mr. Brown. It informed him of dead vegetation, requested a remedy, and warned that a “Notice of Violation” could follow.

Notice of Violation

A formal notification that a violation has occurred. The decision establishes this as a distinct and more serious step than a “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and one was issued to Mr. Brown on November 11, 2018.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Nathan Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A legal process to have a case heard again. The parties were notified of their right to request a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918029-REL



📔

19F-H1918029-REL

1 source

This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision for a case titled Nathan Brown vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on whether a Notice of Non-Compliance sent to Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard constitutes a Notice of Violation under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). Mr. Brown argued that the Association violated this statute by failing to include written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing in the initial notice. However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the initial document was merely a courtesy letter and not a formal Notice of Violation, and further concluded that the statute does not require the disclosure of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate within the initial violation notice. Ultimately, the judge determined that the Association was not required to provide Mr. Brown with the notice of his right to petition at any relevant time and dismissed Mr. Brown’s petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nathan Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Clint Goodman (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Appeared for the Respondent
  • Simone McGinnis (general manager)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Presented testimony
  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission
  • Clint Brown (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission (listed separately from Clint Goodman)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • F Del Sol (admin staff)
    Transmitted document

Nathan Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918029-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-04
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nathan Brown Counsel —
Respondent Val Vista Lakes Community Association Counsel Clint Goodman, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's claim that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) was dismissed, as the notice issued was determined to be a Notice of Non-Compliance (courtesy letter) and not a Notice of Violation required to carry the specific disclosure.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) by failing to include notice of the option to petition for an administrative hearing in a Notice of Non-Compliance.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent's Notice of Non-Compliance regarding dead vegetation was actually a Notice of Violation and lacked the statutory disclosure required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(E). The ALJ found the document was a courtesy letter and not a Notice of Violation, and even if it were, the statute did not require the disclosure in this context because the Petitioner filed the petition before Respondent took enforcement action or completed the statutory response exchange.

Orders: Petitioner Nathan Brown's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(D)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: statutory interpretation, violation notice, non-compliance, courtesy letter, right to petition
Additional Citations:

  • 33-1803(E)
  • 32-2199.01
  • 33-1803(C)
  • 33-1803(D)
  • R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918029-REL Decision – 686796.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:49 (88.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918029-REL


Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, wherein Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition against the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was dismissed. The central issue was whether an initial “Notice of Non-Compliance” sent by the Association constituted a formal “Notice of Violation” under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 33-1803(E), thereby requiring immediate disclosure of the member’s right to an administrative hearing.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent Association. The decision rested on two primary conclusions: First, a reasonable reading of the document in question showed it to be a preliminary “courtesy letter” and not a formal Notice of Violation, as it explicitly warned that a Notice of Violation would be issued later if the issue was not remedied. Second, the ALJ determined that even if the document were considered a Notice of Violation, a plain reading of the statute does not require the disclosure of hearing rights to be included in the initial notice itself. The statute allows for this information to be provided at a later stage in the process, specifically after the member has submitted a formal response. The Petitioner’s failure to follow the statutory response procedure was a key factor in the ruling that the Association had not yet been required to provide the disclosure. Ultimately, the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and his petition was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1918029-REL

Parties

Petitioner: Nathan Brown
Respondent: Val Vista Lakes Community Association

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Hearing Date

January 16, 2019

Decision Date

February 4, 2019

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed; Respondent deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Background and Timeline of Events

• October 18, 2018: The Val Vista Lakes Community Association mailed a “Notice of Non-Compliance” to Nathan Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard. The notice requested that the situation be remedied by November 1, 2018, and warned that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a “Notice of Violation that may involve fines.”

• October 24, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Brown filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal matter.

• November 11, 2018: The Association issued a formal “Notice of Violation” to Mr. Brown concerning the same issue raised in the initial notice.

• November 27, 2018: The Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing.

• January 16, 2019: An administrative hearing was held, with Mr. Brown representing himself and Clint Goodman, Esq. representing the Association. Testimony was heard from Mr. Brown and Simone McGinnis, the Association’s general manager.

• February 4, 2019: ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a decision dismissing Mr. Brown’s petition.

——————————————————————————–

Core Legal Dispute and Arguments

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs the process for notifying homeowners of violations of community documents.

Petitioner’s Position (Nathan Brown)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” received on October 18, 2018, was functionally and legally a “Notice of Violation.”

• Alleged Violation: The notice violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(E) because it failed to include “written notice of the member’s option to petition for an administrative hearing on the matter in the state real estate department.”

Respondent’s Position (Val Vista Lakes Community Association)

• Central Claim: The “Notice of Non-Compliance” was not a formal “Notice of Violation” but rather a “courtesy letter,” which is a common industry practice permitted by the Association’s governing documents.

• Defense: Because the initial letter was not a statutory Notice of Violation, the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1803 were not applicable to that specific communication.

——————————————————————————–

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner, Mr. Brown, bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to meet that standard. The decision was based on a series of factual findings and legal conclusions drawn from a “fair and sensible” interpretation of the statute.

Key Findings of Fact

• The Association mailed Mr. Brown a Notice of Non-Compliance on October 18, 2018.

• This notice informed Mr. Brown of a CC&R violation (dead vegetation) and stated that a failure to remedy the issue would result in a subsequent “Notice of Violation” with potential fines.

• Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Association regarding the Notice of Non-Compliance, a step outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1803(C).

• Mr. Brown was later issued a formal Notice of Violation on November 11, 2018.

Conclusions of Law (Legal Rationale)

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was founded on three distinct legal interpretations:

1. Distinction Between Notices: The judge ruled that the initial communication was not a statutory Notice of Violation.

◦ The ruling states, “a reasonable reading of the Notice of Non-Compliance shows that it is not a Notice of Violation, because it informs Mr. Brown that a Notice of Violation would be issued if he did not appropriately address the ‘situation.'”

◦ This established the letter as a preliminary courtesy notice, distinct from the formal enforcement action that triggers statutory requirements.

2. Statutory Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1803: The judge concluded that even if the initial notice was a Notice of Violation, the Association still did not violate the statute.

◦ The decision notes, “a plain reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803 shows that a Notice of Violation is not required to include notice of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate because subsections D and E both show that any required notice can be given at other times.”

◦ The statute outlines a process where the member can respond via certified mail, and the Association’s duty to provide information about contesting the notice (including the right to a hearing) arises from that exchange.

3. Petitioner’s Procedural Failure: The judge found that the Association’s obligations under the statute were never triggered because Mr. Brown bypassed the prescribed process.

◦ The decision highlights that Mr. Brown did not file a written response with the Association but instead filed his petition with the Department just a few days after receiving the initial notice.

◦ The ruling concludes, “a sensible reading of the statute shows that the Respondent was not required to provide Mr. Brown with notice of a right to petition the Department at any time pertinent to this matter.”

——————————————————————————–

Final Order and Implications

• Order: The ALJ ordered that “Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Val Vista Lakes Community Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Further Action: The decision is binding unless a party files for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02(B), 32-2199.04, and 41-1092.09.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918029-REL


Study Guide: Brown v. Val Vista Lakes Community Association (No. 19F-H1918029-REL)

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information from the provided case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 19F-H1918029-REL, and what were their roles?

2. What specific statute did the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, allege that the Respondent violated?

3. What was the initial issue that prompted the Respondent to contact Mr. Brown on October 18, 2018?

4. What was Nathan Brown’s central legal argument concerning the “Notice of Non-Compliance”?

5. How did the Val Vista Lakes Community Association characterize the “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and why was this distinction critical to its defense?

6. According to the Findings of Fact, what procedural step did Mr. Brown fail to take after receiving the initial notice from the association?

7. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party was responsible for meeting it?

8. What were the Administrative Law Judge’s two primary legal conclusions that led to the dismissal of the petition?

9. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 2019?

10. What recourse was available to the parties following the judge’s Order, and what was the specified time limit for that action?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Nathan Brown, who served as the Petitioner, and the Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was the Respondent. Mr. Brown brought the complaint against the association, which was defending its actions.

2. Nathan Brown alleged that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). This section concerns an association’s obligation to provide a member with written notice of their option to petition for an administrative hearing.

3. The Respondent contacted Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard, which was considered a violation of the community’s CC&Rs. The “Notice of Non-Compliance” requested that he remedy the situation by November 1, 2018.

4. Mr. Brown’s central argument was that the “Notice of Non-Compliance” was, in fact, a “Notice of Violation.” Therefore, he contended it should have included written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department, as required by statute.

5. The Association characterized the notice as a “courtesy letter,” which is a common practice for providing an initial warning before formal action. This distinction was critical because the Association argued that as a mere courtesy letter and not a formal “Notice of Violation,” it was not subject to the statutory disclosure requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803.

6. Mr. Brown did not send a written response to the Respondent via certified mail within 21 calendar days of the notice. This response is an option provided to members under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C).

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown, to show that the Respondent had violated the statute.

8. First, the judge concluded that a reasonable reading of the document shows it was not a “Notice of Violation” because it explicitly threatened that one would be issued later. Second, the judge concluded that even if it were a “Notice of Violation,” the statute does not require the hearing disclosure to be in the initial notice, and since Mr. Brown did not follow the response procedure, the Respondent’s obligation to provide that disclosure had not yet been triggered.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Nathan Brown’s petition be dismissed. The judge also deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09, this request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate comprehensive, evidence-based answers using only the information and legal reasoning presented in the case decision.

1. Analyze the distinction between a “Notice of Non-Compliance” (or “courtesy letter”) and a “Notice of Violation” as presented in this case. Discuss why this distinction was the central point of contention and how the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the document’s plain language resolved the issue.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Discuss how Nathan Brown’s failure to meet this standard, as the party with the burden of proof, was fundamental to the dismissal of his petition.

3. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the procedural requirements outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(C), (D), and (E). How does the judge’s “sensible reading” of the statute’s timeline and reciprocal obligations undermine the Petitioner’s claim, even setting aside the debate over the notice’s title?

4. Describe the complete procedural timeline of this case, from the initial notice sent by the association to the final order from the Administrative Law Judge. Identify the key dates and actions taken by each party and by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

5. Discuss the role of statutory interpretation in this legal decision. How did the judge apply established legal principles, such as aiming for a “fair and sensible result” and avoiding “absurd and unreasonable construction,” to support the final ruling against the Petitioner?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings and makes legal decisions.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at the center of this case is section 33-1803.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Nathan Brown.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The decision implies these are the governing community documents that Mr. Brown was accused of violating due to dead vegetation.

Courtesy Letter

A term used by the Respondent to describe the “Notice of Non-Compliance.” It is characterized as a common industry practice to inform a resident of an issue before issuing a formal Notice of Violation.

Notice of Non-Compliance

The specific document dated October 18, 2018, sent to Mr. Brown. It informed him of dead vegetation, requested a remedy, and warned that a “Notice of Violation” could follow.

Notice of Violation

A formal notification that a violation has occurred. The decision establishes this as a distinct and more serious step than a “Notice of Non-Compliance,” and one was issued to Mr. Brown on November 11, 2018.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Nathan Brown was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A legal process to have a case heard again. The parties were notified of their right to request a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Val Vista Lakes Community Association was the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918029-REL



📔

19F-H1918029-REL

1 source

This source is the Administrative Law Judge Decision for a case titled Nathan Brown vs. Val Vista Lakes Community Association, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The dispute centers on whether a Notice of Non-Compliance sent to Mr. Brown regarding dead vegetation in his yard constitutes a Notice of Violation under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(E). Mr. Brown argued that the Association violated this statute by failing to include written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing in the initial notice. However, the Administrative Law Judge found that the initial document was merely a courtesy letter and not a formal Notice of Violation, and further concluded that the statute does not require the disclosure of the right to petition the Department of Real Estate within the initial violation notice. Ultimately, the judge determined that the Association was not required to provide Mr. Brown with the notice of his right to petition at any relevant time and dismissed Mr. Brown’s petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nathan Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Clint Goodman (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Appeared for the Respondent
  • Simone McGinnis (general manager)
    Val Vista Lakes Community Association
    Presented testimony
  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission
  • Clint Brown (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Recipient of transmission (listed separately from Clint Goodman)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • F Del Sol (admin staff)
    Transmitted document

Lawrence Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart Counsel —
Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel Nicolas C. S. Nogami

Alleged Violations

Association Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes

Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 683622.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:03 (95.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 694095.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:06 (90.8 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818052-REL/660026.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:10 (91.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818052-REL/720468.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:12 (103.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from an administrative legal case involving Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart and Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute revolves around Mr. Stewart’s unauthorized modifications to a common area, for which the Association’s Board of Directors denied a retroactive variance. Mr. Stewart alleged the Board violated its bylaws by acting in bad faith, that a specific Board member was biased against him, and that he was subjected to unfair treatment compared to other homeowners.

The Administrative Law Judge, in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, consistently ruled against Mr. Stewart. The judge determined that the specific bylaw cited (Section 5.4) was an indemnification clause that shields the Board from liability and does not impose a duty of action. Crucially, Mr. Stewart failed to meet the legal burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Board’s rationale for the denial—to avoid setting a precedent, or “opening a Pandora’s Box”—was deemed a reasonable position for a condominium association. Evidence presented to support claims of bias and unequal treatment was found to be insufficient or not probative. Ultimately, Mr. Stewart’s petition was dismissed in its entirety.

Case Overview

This matter, designated as No. 18F-H1818052-REL, was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings under the authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case centered on a petition filed by Mr. Stewart on May 21, 2018, alleging a violation of the Association’s Bylaws by the Board of Directors.

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation

Petitioner

Lawrence M. Stewart

On his own behalf

Respondent

Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Mark K. Sahl, Esq. & Nichols C. S. Nogami, Esq.

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Case Chronology

• November 15, 2017: The Association’s counsel informs Mr. Stewart in a letter that he is in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes to a common/limited common area.

• Post-November 15, 2017: Mr. Stewart, then a member of the Board, requests a variance for the changes.

• December 27, 2017: The Association’s attorney sends a letter stating an understanding that Mr. Stewart had recused himself and that the other two Board members (Sandra Fernandez and David Larson) had required the area to be restored.

• January 4, 2018: Mr. Stewart writes to the other Board members, refuting that he had agreed to recuse himself and requesting a formal meeting to consider his variance request.

• February 18, 2018: At a Board meeting, Mr. Stewart resigns from the Board. The remaining two members vote to deny his variance request and require him to restore the area to its original condition.

• May 21, 2018: Mr. Stewart files his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• September 6, 2018: The initial administrative hearing is conducted.

• September 14, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues a decision dismissing Mr. Stewart’s petition.

• January 2, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

• January 17, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision following the rehearing, again dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Central Allegations

Mr. Stewart’s case rested on four primary claims against the Association’s Board.

1. Violation of Bylaws Section 5.4

The formal petition alleged a violation of Association Bylaws Article V, Section 5.4 (Liability), which states in part:

“So long as he/she has acted in good faith on the basis of information actually possessed, neither the Board nor any member of the Board nor any officer of the ASSOCIATION shall be liable to the ASSOCIATION, any OWNER, or to any other party for any damage, loss, or prejudice suffered or claimed on account of: (i) the approval or disapproval of any plans, drawings, or specifications, whether or not defective…or (v) any act or failure to act by the ASSOCIATION, or Board.”

Mr. Stewart cited this section because it was the only part of the governing documents he could find that included a “good faith” requirement.

2. Lack of Good Faith by the Board

Mr. Stewart asserted that the Board did not act in good faith when it denied his variance request. He based this claim on several points:

• He resigned from the Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting because he “got the sense ‘right away’ that the other Board members’ minds were made up and that they would not approve his request.”

• He presented unrebutted testimony that the Board members were unwilling to physically look at the changes he had made and only gave a “cursory look” at photographs he provided.

• The Board’s decision appeared to have been made prior to the meeting, as evidenced by the attorney’s December 27, 2017 letter which erroneously stated he had recused himself.

3. Bias of Board Member David Larson

A significant portion of Mr. Stewart’s argument was that Board member David Larson was personally biased against him. The evidence presented to support this included:

• Initial Hearing Evidence:

◦ A biography of Mr. Larson prepared by the property manager. When questioned, Mr. Stewart could not identify specific information showing bias but stated the “entire document coupled with the other statements shows a bias.”

◦ Notes from a November 28, 2017 Board meeting where Mr. Larson informed members that enforcement actions (towing, violation notices) would begin immediately and that he was “too busy to talk to people about Board business in driveways.”

• Rehearing Evidence:

◦ A letter dated October 3, 2018, from Mr. Larson to Association members urging them not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

4. Unfair and Unequal Treatment

Mr. Stewart claimed he was treated unfairly because other units in the condominium were also not in conformity with the CC&Rs.

• He presented photos of units he believed were out of compliance.

• He testified that he had verified with the Association that none of these units had received a variance in the last two years.

• However, he acknowledged he did not know if variances had been granted more than two years prior or if the changes had received pre-approval, which would not require a variance.

Respondent’s Position and Legal Arguments

The Canyon Gate Condominium Association, represented by counsel, did not present witnesses but argued on legal grounds.

• Inapplicability of Bylaws Section 5.4: The Association’s core argument was that Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s complaint. They contended the section is an indemnification clause designed to act as a “shield” to protect Board members from liability when they act in good faith, not a “sword” that imposes an affirmative duty on them that can be violated.

• Reasonableness of Board Decision: The Association maintained that the Board’s decision was reasonable. According to Mr. Stewart’s own testimony, the Board’s basis for denial was the fear that granting his variance would “open a Pandora’s Box where other unit owners would request variances.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ultimately finding in favor of the Respondent.

Legal Framework

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Stewart, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is sufficient “to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

• Board’s Duty: The judge noted that while the Bylaws are a contract, the Association, in exercising its authority, must “act reasonably.”

Analysis of Bylaws Section 5.4

• The judge agreed entirely with the Association’s interpretation, concluding that Section 5.4 “does not impose any duty on the Board members, but rather merely shields them from liability if they act in good faith.”

• In the initial hearing, the judge noted Mr. Stewart “appeared to acknowledge that section 5.4 acts as a ‘shield’ and not a ‘sword.'”

• By the rehearing, this was solidified, with the finding that “Mr. Stewart acknowledges that the Association has not violated Bylaws Section 5.4.”

Assessment of ‘Good Faith’ and Bias Claims

• The ALJ concluded that even if Section 5.4 were applicable, Mr. Stewart “has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board did not act in good faith, that it had a bias against him, or that it treated him unfairly.”

• The judge found the Board’s reasoning for the denial—the “Pandora’s Box” concern—was “not an unreasonable position for the Board of a condominium association.”

• Given this reasoning, the judge stated that “the specifics of the changes Mr. Stewart made would not be germane to the decision,” thereby neutralizing the claim that the Board failed to properly inspect the modifications.

Evaluation of Unfair Treatment Claim

• The evidence of other non-compliant units was deemed “not probative of the issue at hand.”

• The judge reasoned that there was “no evidence to show that they had requested that the Board grant variances,” meaning their situations were not comparable to Mr. Stewart’s, who had made unapproved changes and was subsequently denied a variance.

Final Disposition

• Initial Decision (September 14, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. This order was subject to a request for rehearing within 30 days.

• Rehearing Decision (January 17, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. This final order was noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

This guide provides a review of the administrative case Lawrence M. Stewart, Petitioner, vs. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent (No. 18F-H1818052-REL), including the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided case documents.

1. What action by Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart initiated the dispute with the Canyon Gate Condominium Association?

2. What specific provision of the Association Bylaws did Mr. Stewart allege was violated in his petition?

3. Why did Mr. Stewart resign from the Association’s Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting?

4. What was the Board’s stated reason for denying Mr. Stewart’s request for a variance?

5. Explain the legal interpretation of Bylaws Section 5.4 as a “shield” and not a “sword.”

6. List two pieces of evidence Mr. Stewart presented at the initial hearing to support his claim that Board member David Larson was biased against him.

7. What was the legal standard of proof in this case, and which party was required to meet it?

8. How did Mr. Stewart attempt to prove he was being treated unfairly in comparison to other unit owners, and why did the judge find this evidence unconvincing?

9. At the rehearing, what new evidence did Mr. Stewart present regarding Mr. Larson’s alleged bias?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial administrative hearing and the subsequent rehearing?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Stewart initiated the dispute by making changes to the common area and/or limited common area around his unit without first receiving permission from the Association. The Association informed him in a letter dated November 15, 2017, that this was a violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs.

2. Mr. Stewart alleged in his petition that the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4. He later acknowledged this section was not technically violated but cited it because it was the only provision in the governing documents he could find that included a “good faith” requirement.

3. Mr. Stewart resigned from the Board because he “got the sense ‘right away’ that the other Board members’ minds were made up” and that they would not approve his request for a variance, regardless of the details.

4. The Board denied Mr. Stewart’s request on the basis that approving it would “open a Pandora’s Box” where other unit owners would then also request variances. The Administrative Law Judge found this was not an unreasonable position for a condominium association board to take.

5. The interpretation of Section 5.4 is that it acts as a “shield” to protect, or indemnify, Board members from liability for damages, loss, or prejudice, provided they have acted in good faith. It is not a “sword” that imposes an affirmative duty on the Board that Mr. Stewart could use to compel a certain action or claim a violation.

6. At the initial hearing, Mr. Stewart presented two of the following: (1) a biography of Mr. Larson; (2) notes from a November 28, 2017 meeting where Mr. Larson stated that enforcement actions would begin immediately; and (3) a letter from the Association’s attorney that erroneously stated Mr. Stewart had recused himself, suggesting the matter was decided without him.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Stewart, to show that the Association had acted improperly.

8. Mr. Stewart presented testimony and photos of other units that he believed were not in conformity with the CC&Rs. The judge found this evidence was not probative because Mr. Stewart provided no evidence that those owners had requested and been denied variances, and he acknowledged he did not know if they had received variances more than two years prior or had received preapproval.

9. At the rehearing, Mr. Stewart entered into evidence an October 3, 2018 letter from Mr. Larson to the Association’s members. In this letter, Mr. Larson urged the members not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

10. In both the initial decision (September 14, 2018) and the decision following the rehearing (January 17, 2019), the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stewart’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each prompt, citing specific facts and legal conclusions from the case documents.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Bylaws Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s petition. How did Mr. Stewart’s own testimony during the legal proceedings support this conclusion?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Evaluate the evidence Mr. Stewart presented across both hearings and explain why the judge found it insufficient to meet this standard regarding his claims of bias, bad faith, and unfair treatment.

3. Examine the Canyon Gate Board’s justification for denying the variance request (the “Pandora’s Box” argument). Based on the legal principles cited in the decisions, why was this considered a reasonable position for a condominium association board to take, and why did it render the specifics of Mr. Stewart’s changes non-germane?

4. Trace the procedural timeline of this case from the Association’s initial notice of violation on November 15, 2017, to the final binding order issued on January 17, 2019. Identify the key events, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the administrative process.

5. Mr. Stewart argued that he was treated unfairly because other units were also out of compliance with the CC&Rs. Deconstruct this argument and explain why the judge dismissed this line of reasoning as not being probative to the issue at hand in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

Association

The Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., the entity responsible for enforcing the Bylaws and CC&Rs. In this case, it is the Respondent.

The governing body of the Association, which at the time of the variance request included Lawrence M. Stewart, Sandra Fernandez, and David Larson.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stewart.

Bylaws

A contract between the Association and its members. The parties are required to comply with its terms, and the Association must act reasonably in exercising its authority under them.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Mr. Stewart was found to be in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes.

Common Area / Limited Common Area

The property around a condominium unit that is shared or has restricted use. Mr. Stewart made unauthorized changes to this area.

Good Faith

A standard of conduct mentioned in Bylaws Section 5.4. It protects Board members from liability so long as they act in good faith based on information they possess. Mr. Stewart claimed the Board failed to meet this standard.

Indemnification

The act of compensating for loss or damage. Bylaws Article V, which contains Section 5.4, pertains to indemnification.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was Lawrence M. Stewart.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted in a legal matter. A rehearing was conducted on January 2, 2019, after which the judge issued a final, binding order.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the respondent was Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Variance

An official exception or deviation from a rule. Mr. Stewart requested a variance to allow the unapproved changes he had made, which the Board denied.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


A Homeowner Sued His HOA and Lost—The Surprising Reasons Why Might Save You Thousands

Introduction: The Perennial Battle Between Homeowner and HOA

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant source of friction. From landscaping rules to paint colors, the potential for disputes is endless. But what happens when a homeowner feels so strongly wronged that they take the ultimate step of suing their association? More importantly, what happens when they lose?

This is the story of a homeowner who was also a board member. After making unauthorized changes to his property, he was denied his request for a variance to approve the changes he had already made. Believing the Board had acted in bad faith, he sued the association. His case failed, not on a minor technicality, but due to fundamental misunderstandings of how HOA law and governing documents function.

This outcome highlights a common, and costly, misconception about HOA governance. We will explore the surprising legal realities revealed in the case of Lawrence M. Stewart vs. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., offering several crucial takeaways for any homeowner before they decide to challenge their HOA.

1. A “Good Faith” Clause Can Be a Shield, Not a Sword

Mr. Stewart based his entire case on the claim that the Board violated Section 5.4 of the bylaws by not acting in “good faith,” as this was the only section in the governing documents he could find that mentioned the phrase.

This is where the case pivots on a crucial legal distinction. The court found that this clause was not intended to impose a duty on the board that a homeowner could sue over (a “sword”). Instead, its function was to protect board members from liability if they acted in good faith (a “shield”). Legally, this is an indemnification clause. Think of it as a form of insurance, designed to protect volunteer board members from being personally sued for making reasonable decisions, not a weapon for homeowners to attack those decisions.

In his testimony, Mr. Stewart even acknowledged this “shield” versus “sword” distinction but proceeded with the argument anyway. The lesson for homeowners is unequivocal: you must understand the precise legal function of a clause within your governing documents, not just its keywords.

2. The “Pandora’s Box” Defense Is a Powerful Argument

The Board’s primary reason for denying Mr. Stewart’s variance request was its fear that approval “would open a Pandora’s Box where other unit owners would request variances.” While a homeowner might hear “Pandora’s Box” and think it’s a lazy excuse, the court viewed it as the board performing its fundamental duty.

The judge stated this reasoning “was not an unreasonable position for the Board of a condominium association.” This validation is incredibly impactful because it shifts the focus from the merits of one homeowner’s request to the Board’s overarching fiduciary duty to uphold the rules consistently for the entire community. It shows that an HOA’s duty to maintain consistent enforcement and avoid setting a messy precedent is a legally sound basis for a decision, making the specific details of one homeowner’s changes irrelevant.

3. Being on the Board Won’t Give You a Pass

In a surprising twist, Mr. Stewart was a member of the HOA Board at the very time he made the unauthorized changes and requested the variance. This created a clear conflict of interest and ultimately did not help his case.

The situation culminated in Mr. Stewart resigning from the Board during the meeting where his request was considered. He stated he resigned because he felt “the other Board members’ minds were made up” and they would not approve his request. This incident serves as a stark reminder: holding a position on the board does not grant special privileges or exceptions to the rules. In fact, it can complicate personal matters and highlight a direct conflict between a board member’s duties to the association and their personal interests.

4. “Whataboutism” Is Not a Legal Strategy

Like many homeowners in a dispute, Mr. Stewart argued that he was being treated unfairly because other units in the community were also out of compliance with the CC&Rs. This is a common defense, but its legal failure in this case is a masterclass in what courts actually require for proof.

Mr. Stewart’s effort was commendable but legally insufficient. He presented photos of other non-conforming units and even “verified with the Association that none of these units had received a variance in the last two years.” However, his evidence collapsed under cross-examination when he “acknowledged… he did not know if any of these units had received variances more than two years ago or whether preapproval for the changes had been granted.”

The judge dismissed his evidence entirely. This transforms the lesson from a simple “don’t point fingers” to a much more sophisticated legal principle: to prove selective enforcement, you must prove others in the identical procedural situation were treated differently, and incomplete evidence is no evidence at all.

5. The Burden of Proof Is Everything

Perhaps the most stunning fact from the case is that the Association “presented no witnesses” at either the initial hearing or the subsequent rehearing. They won the case without putting a single person on the stand to testify.

They could do this because the legal system placed the “burden of proof” squarely on Mr. Stewart. As the petitioner, it was his job to prove his claims of bad faith, bias, and unfair treatment by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Association didn’t have to prove it acted in good faith; Mr. Stewart had to prove it acted in bad faith. He failed to meet this standard. In other words, he had to prove that his claims were more likely to be true than not—even if only by a 51% to 49% margin.

The court document formally defines this legal standard as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In a legal dispute with your HOA, the case is not about who is morally right or wrong. It’s about who can meet their required burden of proof with convincing, relevant evidence.

Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Fight the Rulers

The case of Lawrence M. Stewart is a cautionary tale that every homeowner should internalize. His failed lawsuit, which likely became a five-figure mistake when factoring in legal fees for both sides, underscores that HOA governing documents are a binding contract. Challenging the Board requires more than a sense of unfairness. It demands a precise, evidence-backed legal argument that aligns with the specific terms of that contract and the applicable legal standards.

Before you declare war on your HOA, ask yourself: are you prepared to prove your case with irrefutable evidence, or are you just banking on a feeling of being wronged?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lawrence M. Stewart (petitioner)
    Also served as a Board member for Respondent until resigning during the variance request consideration.

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent in the initial hearing.
  • Nicolas C. S. Nogami (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent in both the initial hearing (listed as 'Nichols C. S. Nogami') and the rehearing.
  • Sandra Fernandez (board member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
    Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request.
  • David Larson (board member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
    Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request; Petitioner alleged he was biased.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the decision copies.
  • F. Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed the transmission of the decision copies.

Lawrence Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-17
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart Counsel —
Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel Nicolas C. S. Nogami, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws section 5.4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition filed by homeowner Lawrence M. Stewart against Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated its Bylaws concerning good faith in denying his request for a variance.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as Bylaws Section 5.4 was determined to be a shield protecting the Board from liability rather than a provision imposing a duty of good faith that could be violated by denying a variance.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged failure of the HOA Board to act in good faith when denying a variance request

Petitioner alleged the Board failed to act in good faith when denying his request for a variance to changes he made, and asserted bias and unfair treatment. The ALJ concluded that Section 5.4 acts as a shield from liability for Board members, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, bylaw violation, good faith, variance denial, board liability
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 683622.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:04 (95.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – 694095.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:04 (90.8 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818052-REL/660026.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:47:49 (91.5 KB)

18F-H1818052-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818052-REL/720468.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:47:51 (103.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from an administrative legal case involving Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart and Respondent Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute revolves around Mr. Stewart’s unauthorized modifications to a common area, for which the Association’s Board of Directors denied a retroactive variance. Mr. Stewart alleged the Board violated its bylaws by acting in bad faith, that a specific Board member was biased against him, and that he was subjected to unfair treatment compared to other homeowners.

The Administrative Law Judge, in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, consistently ruled against Mr. Stewart. The judge determined that the specific bylaw cited (Section 5.4) was an indemnification clause that shields the Board from liability and does not impose a duty of action. Crucially, Mr. Stewart failed to meet the legal burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Board’s rationale for the denial—to avoid setting a precedent, or “opening a Pandora’s Box”—was deemed a reasonable position for a condominium association. Evidence presented to support claims of bias and unequal treatment was found to be insufficient or not probative. Ultimately, Mr. Stewart’s petition was dismissed in its entirety.

Case Overview

This matter, designated as No. 18F-H1818052-REL, was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings under the authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case centered on a petition filed by Mr. Stewart on May 21, 2018, alleging a violation of the Association’s Bylaws by the Board of Directors.

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Representation

Petitioner

Lawrence M. Stewart

On his own behalf

Respondent

Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Mark K. Sahl, Esq. & Nichols C. S. Nogami, Esq.

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Case Chronology

• November 15, 2017: The Association’s counsel informs Mr. Stewart in a letter that he is in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes to a common/limited common area.

• Post-November 15, 2017: Mr. Stewart, then a member of the Board, requests a variance for the changes.

• December 27, 2017: The Association’s attorney sends a letter stating an understanding that Mr. Stewart had recused himself and that the other two Board members (Sandra Fernandez and David Larson) had required the area to be restored.

• January 4, 2018: Mr. Stewart writes to the other Board members, refuting that he had agreed to recuse himself and requesting a formal meeting to consider his variance request.

• February 18, 2018: At a Board meeting, Mr. Stewart resigns from the Board. The remaining two members vote to deny his variance request and require him to restore the area to its original condition.

• May 21, 2018: Mr. Stewart files his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• September 6, 2018: The initial administrative hearing is conducted.

• September 14, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issues a decision dismissing Mr. Stewart’s petition.

• January 2, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

• January 17, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision following the rehearing, again dismissing the petition.

Petitioner’s Central Allegations

Mr. Stewart’s case rested on four primary claims against the Association’s Board.

1. Violation of Bylaws Section 5.4

The formal petition alleged a violation of Association Bylaws Article V, Section 5.4 (Liability), which states in part:

“So long as he/she has acted in good faith on the basis of information actually possessed, neither the Board nor any member of the Board nor any officer of the ASSOCIATION shall be liable to the ASSOCIATION, any OWNER, or to any other party for any damage, loss, or prejudice suffered or claimed on account of: (i) the approval or disapproval of any plans, drawings, or specifications, whether or not defective…or (v) any act or failure to act by the ASSOCIATION, or Board.”

Mr. Stewart cited this section because it was the only part of the governing documents he could find that included a “good faith” requirement.

2. Lack of Good Faith by the Board

Mr. Stewart asserted that the Board did not act in good faith when it denied his variance request. He based this claim on several points:

• He resigned from the Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting because he “got the sense ‘right away’ that the other Board members’ minds were made up and that they would not approve his request.”

• He presented unrebutted testimony that the Board members were unwilling to physically look at the changes he had made and only gave a “cursory look” at photographs he provided.

• The Board’s decision appeared to have been made prior to the meeting, as evidenced by the attorney’s December 27, 2017 letter which erroneously stated he had recused himself.

3. Bias of Board Member David Larson

A significant portion of Mr. Stewart’s argument was that Board member David Larson was personally biased against him. The evidence presented to support this included:

• Initial Hearing Evidence:

◦ A biography of Mr. Larson prepared by the property manager. When questioned, Mr. Stewart could not identify specific information showing bias but stated the “entire document coupled with the other statements shows a bias.”

◦ Notes from a November 28, 2017 Board meeting where Mr. Larson informed members that enforcement actions (towing, violation notices) would begin immediately and that he was “too busy to talk to people about Board business in driveways.”

• Rehearing Evidence:

◦ A letter dated October 3, 2018, from Mr. Larson to Association members urging them not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

4. Unfair and Unequal Treatment

Mr. Stewart claimed he was treated unfairly because other units in the condominium were also not in conformity with the CC&Rs.

• He presented photos of units he believed were out of compliance.

• He testified that he had verified with the Association that none of these units had received a variance in the last two years.

• However, he acknowledged he did not know if variances had been granted more than two years prior or if the changes had received pre-approval, which would not require a variance.

Respondent’s Position and Legal Arguments

The Canyon Gate Condominium Association, represented by counsel, did not present witnesses but argued on legal grounds.

• Inapplicability of Bylaws Section 5.4: The Association’s core argument was that Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s complaint. They contended the section is an indemnification clause designed to act as a “shield” to protect Board members from liability when they act in good faith, not a “sword” that imposes an affirmative duty on them that can be violated.

• Reasonableness of Board Decision: The Association maintained that the Board’s decision was reasonable. According to Mr. Stewart’s own testimony, the Board’s basis for denial was the fear that granting his variance would “open a Pandora’s Box where other unit owners would request variances.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, ultimately finding in favor of the Respondent.

Legal Framework

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Stewart, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is sufficient “to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

• Board’s Duty: The judge noted that while the Bylaws are a contract, the Association, in exercising its authority, must “act reasonably.”

Analysis of Bylaws Section 5.4

• The judge agreed entirely with the Association’s interpretation, concluding that Section 5.4 “does not impose any duty on the Board members, but rather merely shields them from liability if they act in good faith.”

• In the initial hearing, the judge noted Mr. Stewart “appeared to acknowledge that section 5.4 acts as a ‘shield’ and not a ‘sword.'”

• By the rehearing, this was solidified, with the finding that “Mr. Stewart acknowledges that the Association has not violated Bylaws Section 5.4.”

Assessment of ‘Good Faith’ and Bias Claims

• The ALJ concluded that even if Section 5.4 were applicable, Mr. Stewart “has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board did not act in good faith, that it had a bias against him, or that it treated him unfairly.”

• The judge found the Board’s reasoning for the denial—the “Pandora’s Box” concern—was “not an unreasonable position for the Board of a condominium association.”

• Given this reasoning, the judge stated that “the specifics of the changes Mr. Stewart made would not be germane to the decision,” thereby neutralizing the claim that the Board failed to properly inspect the modifications.

Evaluation of Unfair Treatment Claim

• The evidence of other non-compliant units was deemed “not probative of the issue at hand.”

• The judge reasoned that there was “no evidence to show that they had requested that the Board grant variances,” meaning their situations were not comparable to Mr. Stewart’s, who had made unapproved changes and was subsequently denied a variance.

Final Disposition

• Initial Decision (September 14, 2018): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. This order was subject to a request for rehearing within 30 days.

• Rehearing Decision (January 17, 2019): IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. This final order was noted as binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review filed with the superior court within 35 days.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

This guide provides a review of the administrative case Lawrence M. Stewart, Petitioner, vs. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent (No. 18F-H1818052-REL), including the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided case documents.

1. What action by Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart initiated the dispute with the Canyon Gate Condominium Association?

2. What specific provision of the Association Bylaws did Mr. Stewart allege was violated in his petition?

3. Why did Mr. Stewart resign from the Association’s Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting?

4. What was the Board’s stated reason for denying Mr. Stewart’s request for a variance?

5. Explain the legal interpretation of Bylaws Section 5.4 as a “shield” and not a “sword.”

6. List two pieces of evidence Mr. Stewart presented at the initial hearing to support his claim that Board member David Larson was biased against him.

7. What was the legal standard of proof in this case, and which party was required to meet it?

8. How did Mr. Stewart attempt to prove he was being treated unfairly in comparison to other unit owners, and why did the judge find this evidence unconvincing?

9. At the rehearing, what new evidence did Mr. Stewart present regarding Mr. Larson’s alleged bias?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial administrative hearing and the subsequent rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Stewart initiated the dispute by making changes to the common area and/or limited common area around his unit without first receiving permission from the Association. The Association informed him in a letter dated November 15, 2017, that this was a violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs.

2. Mr. Stewart alleged in his petition that the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4. He later acknowledged this section was not technically violated but cited it because it was the only provision in the governing documents he could find that included a “good faith” requirement.

3. Mr. Stewart resigned from the Board because he “got the sense ‘right away’ that the other Board members’ minds were made up” and that they would not approve his request for a variance, regardless of the details.

4. The Board denied Mr. Stewart’s request on the basis that approving it would “open a Pandora’s Box” where other unit owners would then also request variances. The Administrative Law Judge found this was not an unreasonable position for a condominium association board to take.

5. The interpretation of Section 5.4 is that it acts as a “shield” to protect, or indemnify, Board members from liability for damages, loss, or prejudice, provided they have acted in good faith. It is not a “sword” that imposes an affirmative duty on the Board that Mr. Stewart could use to compel a certain action or claim a violation.

6. At the initial hearing, Mr. Stewart presented two of the following: (1) a biography of Mr. Larson; (2) notes from a November 28, 2017 meeting where Mr. Larson stated that enforcement actions would begin immediately; and (3) a letter from the Association’s attorney that erroneously stated Mr. Stewart had recused himself, suggesting the matter was decided without him.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Stewart, to show that the Association had acted improperly.

8. Mr. Stewart presented testimony and photos of other units that he believed were not in conformity with the CC&Rs. The judge found this evidence was not probative because Mr. Stewart provided no evidence that those owners had requested and been denied variances, and he acknowledged he did not know if they had received variances more than two years prior or had received preapproval.

9. At the rehearing, Mr. Stewart entered into evidence an October 3, 2018 letter from Mr. Larson to the Association’s members. In this letter, Mr. Larson urged the members not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.

10. In both the initial decision (September 14, 2018) and the decision following the rehearing (January 17, 2019), the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stewart’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each prompt, citing specific facts and legal conclusions from the case documents.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Bylaws Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s petition. How did Mr. Stewart’s own testimony during the legal proceedings support this conclusion?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Evaluate the evidence Mr. Stewart presented across both hearings and explain why the judge found it insufficient to meet this standard regarding his claims of bias, bad faith, and unfair treatment.

3. Examine the Canyon Gate Board’s justification for denying the variance request (the “Pandora’s Box” argument). Based on the legal principles cited in the decisions, why was this considered a reasonable position for a condominium association board to take, and why did it render the specifics of Mr. Stewart’s changes non-germane?

4. Trace the procedural timeline of this case from the Association’s initial notice of violation on November 15, 2017, to the final binding order issued on January 17, 2019. Identify the key events, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the administrative process.

5. Mr. Stewart argued that he was treated unfairly because other units were also out of compliance with the CC&Rs. Deconstruct this argument and explain why the judge dismissed this line of reasoning as not being probative to the issue at hand in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official (Thomas Shedden) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

Association

The Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., the entity responsible for enforcing the Bylaws and CC&Rs. In this case, it is the Respondent.

The governing body of the Association, which at the time of the variance request included Lawrence M. Stewart, Sandra Fernandez, and David Larson.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Stewart.

Bylaws

A contract between the Association and its members. The parties are required to comply with its terms, and the Association must act reasonably in exercising its authority under them.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Mr. Stewart was found to be in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes.

Common Area / Limited Common Area

The property around a condominium unit that is shared or has restricted use. Mr. Stewart made unauthorized changes to this area.

Good Faith

A standard of conduct mentioned in Bylaws Section 5.4. It protects Board members from liability so long as they act in good faith based on information they possess. Mr. Stewart claimed the Board failed to meet this standard.

Indemnification

The act of compensating for loss or damage. Bylaws Article V, which contains Section 5.4, pertains to indemnification.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was Lawrence M. Stewart.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted in a legal matter. A rehearing was conducted on January 2, 2019, after which the judge issued a final, binding order.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the respondent was Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.

Variance

An official exception or deviation from a rule. Mr. Stewart requested a variance to allow the unapproved changes he had made, which the Board denied.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818052-REL-RHG


A Homeowner Sued His HOA and Lost—The Surprising Reasons Why Might Save You Thousands

Introduction: The Perennial Battle Between Homeowner and HOA

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant source of friction. From landscaping rules to paint colors, the potential for disputes is endless. But what happens when a homeowner feels so strongly wronged that they take the ultimate step of suing their association? More importantly, what happens when they lose?

This is the story of a homeowner who was also a board member. After making unauthorized changes to his property, he was denied his request for a variance to approve the changes he had already made. Believing the Board had acted in bad faith, he sued the association. His case failed, not on a minor technicality, but due to fundamental misunderstandings of how HOA law and governing documents function.

This outcome highlights a common, and costly, misconception about HOA governance. We will explore the surprising legal realities revealed in the case of Lawrence M. Stewart vs. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., offering several crucial takeaways for any homeowner before they decide to challenge their HOA.

1. A “Good Faith” Clause Can Be a Shield, Not a Sword

Mr. Stewart based his entire case on the claim that the Board violated Section 5.4 of the bylaws by not acting in “good faith,” as this was the only section in the governing documents he could find that mentioned the phrase.

This is where the case pivots on a crucial legal distinction. The court found that this clause was not intended to impose a duty on the board that a homeowner could sue over (a “sword”). Instead, its function was to protect board members from liability if they acted in good faith (a “shield”). Legally, this is an indemnification clause. Think of it as a form of insurance, designed to protect volunteer board members from being personally sued for making reasonable decisions, not a weapon for homeowners to attack those decisions.

In his testimony, Mr. Stewart even acknowledged this “shield” versus “sword” distinction but proceeded with the argument anyway. The lesson for homeowners is unequivocal: you must understand the precise legal function of a clause within your governing documents, not just its keywords.

2. The “Pandora’s Box” Defense Is a Powerful Argument

The Board’s primary reason for denying Mr. Stewart’s variance request was its fear that approval “would open a Pandora’s Box where other unit owners would request variances.” While a homeowner might hear “Pandora’s Box” and think it’s a lazy excuse, the court viewed it as the board performing its fundamental duty.

The judge stated this reasoning “was not an unreasonable position for the Board of a condominium association.” This validation is incredibly impactful because it shifts the focus from the merits of one homeowner’s request to the Board’s overarching fiduciary duty to uphold the rules consistently for the entire community. It shows that an HOA’s duty to maintain consistent enforcement and avoid setting a messy precedent is a legally sound basis for a decision, making the specific details of one homeowner’s changes irrelevant.

3. Being on the Board Won’t Give You a Pass

In a surprising twist, Mr. Stewart was a member of the HOA Board at the very time he made the unauthorized changes and requested the variance. This created a clear conflict of interest and ultimately did not help his case.

The situation culminated in Mr. Stewart resigning from the Board during the meeting where his request was considered. He stated he resigned because he felt “the other Board members’ minds were made up” and they would not approve his request. This incident serves as a stark reminder: holding a position on the board does not grant special privileges or exceptions to the rules. In fact, it can complicate personal matters and highlight a direct conflict between a board member’s duties to the association and their personal interests.

4. “Whataboutism” Is Not a Legal Strategy

Like many homeowners in a dispute, Mr. Stewart argued that he was being treated unfairly because other units in the community were also out of compliance with the CC&Rs. This is a common defense, but its legal failure in this case is a masterclass in what courts actually require for proof.

Mr. Stewart’s effort was commendable but legally insufficient. He presented photos of other non-conforming units and even “verified with the Association that none of these units had received a variance in the last two years.” However, his evidence collapsed under cross-examination when he “acknowledged… he did not know if any of these units had received variances more than two years ago or whether preapproval for the changes had been granted.”

The judge dismissed his evidence entirely. This transforms the lesson from a simple “don’t point fingers” to a much more sophisticated legal principle: to prove selective enforcement, you must prove others in the identical procedural situation were treated differently, and incomplete evidence is no evidence at all.

5. The Burden of Proof Is Everything

Perhaps the most stunning fact from the case is that the Association “presented no witnesses” at either the initial hearing or the subsequent rehearing. They won the case without putting a single person on the stand to testify.

They could do this because the legal system placed the “burden of proof” squarely on Mr. Stewart. As the petitioner, it was his job to prove his claims of bad faith, bias, and unfair treatment by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Association didn’t have to prove it acted in good faith; Mr. Stewart had to prove it acted in bad faith. He failed to meet this standard. In other words, he had to prove that his claims were more likely to be true than not—even if only by a 51% to 49% margin.

The court document formally defines this legal standard as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In a legal dispute with your HOA, the case is not about who is morally right or wrong. It’s about who can meet their required burden of proof with convincing, relevant evidence.

Conclusion: Know the Rules Before You Fight the Rulers

The case of Lawrence M. Stewart is a cautionary tale that every homeowner should internalize. His failed lawsuit, which likely became a five-figure mistake when factoring in legal fees for both sides, underscores that HOA governing documents are a binding contract. Challenging the Board requires more than a sense of unfairness. It demands a precise, evidence-backed legal argument that aligns with the specific terms of that contract and the applicable legal standards.

Before you declare war on your HOA, ask yourself: are you prepared to prove your case with irrefutable evidence, or are you just banking on a feeling of being wronged?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lawrence M. Stewart (petitioner)
    Also served as a Board member for Respondent until resigning during the variance request consideration.

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent in the initial hearing.
  • Nicolas C. S. Nogami (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Represented Respondent in both the initial hearing (listed as 'Nichols C. S. Nogami') and the rehearing.
  • Sandra Fernandez (board member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
    Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request.
  • David Larson (board member)
    Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
    Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request; Petitioner alleged he was biased.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the decision copies.
  • F. Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed the transmission of the decision copies.

Jerry R. Collis vs. Laveen Meadows Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H18020-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-20
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry R. Collis Counsel —
Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services Counsel Chad Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules

Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.

Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:11 (97.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL


Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.

The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.

The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.

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1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

• Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)

◦ Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)

• Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Date: December 4, 2018

• Decision Date: December 20, 2018

The Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.

At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.

The Respondent’s Position

The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

2. Relevant CC&R Provisions

The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.

Section

Title / Subject

Description

10.11.4

Inoperable Vehicles

Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”

10.11.2

Street Parking

Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.

Nuisances

Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”

3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline

Violation Notices and Fines

Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.

The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:

• September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.

• October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.

• December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.

• January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.

• April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

• June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.

For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.

Competing Testimonies

• Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.

• Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:

◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.

◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.

◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”

4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof

The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Judge’s Rationale

The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:

1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.

2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).

3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.

The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).






Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL


Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?

2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?

3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?

4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?

5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?

6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.

7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?

8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?

9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.

2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.

3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.

4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.

5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.

6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.

7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.

8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.

9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?

2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.

3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?

4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.

5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.

Appearances

A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.

The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.

Community Manager

An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Nuisance

A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.

Operating Condition

A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.

The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.






Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL



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19F-H18020-REL

1 source

The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.



Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry R. Collis (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Chad Gallacher (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
  • Lisa Riesland (community manager)
    Laveen Meadows HOA
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • f del sol (admin support)
    Signed copy distribution notice