Patricia Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918028-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-01
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski Counsel
Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied and dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The documents requested (an email string among Board members) were informal communications and were not considered official records of the association because the Board never took formal action on the incident.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Board created or possessed any official documents related to the incident that they failed to produce, as the emails were deemed private, informal communications rather than official records.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to produce association records (un-redacted email string)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents, specifically an un-redacted email string among Board members concerning an incident where Petitioner's husband allegedly harassed potential property buyers.

Orders: Petition dismissed because the documents sought (un-redacted emails) were informal communications, not official records of the association required to be produced under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: homeowner records request, association records, informal communications, board quorum, records disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – 705044.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:46 (136.8 KB)

19F-H1918028-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918028-REL/684134.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:50:03 (149.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Briefing: Wiercincthe ki v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s demand for association records related to a June 19, 2017, incident where her husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly accosted and verbally abused potential buyers of a neighboring property, causing the sale to fail.

The Petitioner filed a claim alleging the Respondent violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce documents related to the Board of Directors’ handling of the incident. The case evolved through two distinct phases:

1. Initial Hearing (January 2019): The Petitioner argued that because a quorum of the Board discussed the incident via email, they were required to create official records (e.g., minutes of a formal decision), which were not produced. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied this petition, ruling that informal email discussions among volunteer board members do not constitute “official Board business” requiring formal action or record-keeping.

2. Rehearing (April 2019): After being granted a rehearing, the Petitioner changed her legal theory. She argued that the email chain itself constituted an official association record and demanded that the Respondent produce a fully un-redacted version. The Respondent maintained the emails were private communications provided as a courtesy and that names were redacted due to Mr. Coates’ documented history of “bullying and intimidating people.”

Conclusion: The ALJ dismissed the petition again, affirming the initial ruling. The Judge concluded that the email chain was not an official “record of the association.” Consequently, the Respondent was under no statutory obligation to produce it, let alone provide an un-redacted copy. The Judge found the Respondent’s decision to redact names was “not unreasonable” given the circumstances.

Case Background and Procedural History

The Parties

Name/Entity

Patricia Wiercinski

Petitioner; homeowner and member of the Respondent association.

Wayne Coates

Petitioner’s husband; central figure in the alleged incident.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA, Inc.

Respondent; the Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for the development.

Michael “Mike” Olson

President of the Respondent’s Board of Directors.

Gregg Arthur

Director on the Respondent’s Board; also a realtor.

Joe Zielinski

Director on the Respondent’s Board.

Kathy Andrews

Community Manager for the Respondent, employed by Hoamco.

John Allen

An HOA member who was attempting to sell his lot in June 2017.

Diane Mihalsky

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Office of Administrative Hearings.

Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq.

Counsel for the Respondent, Goodman Law Group.

The Precipitating Incident (June 19, 2017)

On or about June 19, 2017, potential buyers, along with their builder, architect, and son, were visiting a lot for sale on Puntenney Rd. owned by John Allen. The lot was located across the street from the residence of Patricia Wiercinski and Wayne Coates. An incident occurred where Mr. Coates allegedly emerged from his home and confronted the visitors. According to emails later provided, Mr. Coates was “belligerent and cursing,” “verbally abusive,” and exhibited “extreme aggressive behavior,” telling the party that nothing was for sale and they needed to leave immediately. The potential buyers subsequently withdrew their interest in the lot, explicitly citing the confrontation.

Legal Proceedings

October 18, 2018: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce records of its deliberations and actions regarding the June 2017 incident.

January 10, 2019: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Diane Mihalsky.

January 22, 2019: The ALJ issues a decision denying the petition.

Post-January 2019: Petitioner requests a rehearing, alleging misconduct by the judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grants the request.

April 22, 2019: A rehearing is conducted.

May 1, 2019: The ALJ issues a final decision, again dismissing the petition.

The Central Evidence: The Email Communications

The primary evidence in the case was an email chain from June 2017 that the Respondent voluntarily produced to the Petitioner, with the names of non-members (the potential buyers and their real estate agent) redacted. The communications reveal the immediate aftermath and concern surrounding the incident.

Key Excerpts from the Emails

From a Potential Purchaser (June 19, 2017):

Formal Account from Potential Purchasers (June 20, 2017):

From the Real Estate Agent (June 20, 2017):

From Board Director Gregg Arthur (June 20, 2017):

From Board Director Joe Zielinski (June 20, 2017):

Analysis of Legal Arguments and Rulings

Petitioner’s Arguments

1. Initial Argument: The Petitioner contended that the email discussion among a quorum of the Board legally constituted an informal meeting to discuss association business. As such, the Board was required to memorialize its decision, even a decision to take no action, in official records like meeting minutes. The failure to produce such records was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.

2. Rehearing Argument: Shifting her legal theory, the Petitioner argued that the email chain itself was an “official record of the association.” She claimed a right to an un-redacted copy, stating that she and Mr. Coates “had a right to know who was accusing Mr. Coates of belligerence.”

Respondent’s Defense

Nature of Communications: The Respondent argued the emails were informal, private communications on personal servers between volunteer board members who are also neighbors. They were not official records kept in the course of association business.

Lack of Formal Action: The Board never voted, met in an executive or open session, or took any official action regarding the incident. Testimony confirmed that only two of the board members replied to the initial email.

Absence of Authority: The Respondent’s position was that the incident, while serious, was a personal dispute between neighbors and did not violate the association’s CC&Rs or bylaws. Therefore, the Board had no authority or jurisdiction to take official enforcement action.

Justification for Redactions: Board President Mike Olson testified that names were redacted because “Mr. Coates had a history of bullying and intimidating people.” This was done to protect the potential buyers and their agent from potential harassment.

Administrative Law Judge’s Determinations

The ALJ’s conclusions were consistent across both decisions, finding decisively in favor of the Respondent.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805.

“Official Records” Defined: The ALJ drew a clear distinction between informal discussion and official business. The ruling stated: “…the mere fact that a quorum of Board members may discuss a topic does not make it official Board business, especially if they do not end up taking any action to make a matter board business.”

No Obligation to Create Records: The Judge found no statute requiring an HOA board to create a formal written record about topics they discuss informally but ultimately take no action on, calling such a requirement an “unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers.”

Ruling on Redacted Emails: In the rehearing decision, the ALJ concluded that because the email string was not an official record, the statute did not require the Respondent to provide it at all. Therefore, the Respondent was not obligated to provide an un-redacted version. The judge also noted the reason for the redaction “does not appear unreasonable.”

Final Order: Both petitions were denied and dismissed.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Wiercinski v. Long Meadow Ranch East POA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Petitioner Patricia Wiercinski and Respondent Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. It includes a quiz with an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms, all based on the provided Administrative Law Judge Decisions.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided case documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what are their roles?

2. What specific event on June 19, 2017, initiated the conflict that led to this case?

3. What was the core allegation made by the Petitioner in her original petition filed on October 18, 2018?

4. Why did the Respondent’s Board President, Mike Olson, state that the names in the email string were redacted?

5. In the initial hearing, what did the Petitioner argue the Board was required to do after discussing the incident, even if it chose not to act?

6. What was the legal conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge following the first hearing on January 10, 2019?

7. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing of the case?

8. How did the Petitioner’s primary legal argument change between the first hearing and the rehearing?

9. According to the testimony of community manager Kathy Andrews, what types of documents are considered official records of the Association?

10. What was the final determination regarding the status of the email string and the Respondent’s obligation to produce an un-redacted version?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Patricia Wiercinski (“Petitioner”) and the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc. (“Respondent”). The Petitioner is a homeowner and member of the Respondent association who filed a complaint alleging the association violated state law. The Respondent is the homeowners’ association defending against the petition.

2. The initiating event was an incident where the Petitioner’s husband, Wayne Coates, allegedly acted belligerent, cursed at, and was verbally abusive to a potential buyer, their family, and their architect who were viewing a property for sale across the street from the Petitioner’s home. The potential buyers were so disturbed by the encounter that they decided to remove the lot from their list of considerations.

3. The Petitioner’s core allegation was that the Respondent had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to produce official documents related to the Board’s deliberations, decisions, and actions concerning the June 19, 2017 incident involving her husband.

4. Mike Olson testified that the names of the potential purchasers and their real estate agent were redacted from the email string because Mr. Coates has a documented history of bullying, intimidating, and threatening people. The redaction was done to protect these individuals from potential harassment.

5. In the initial hearing, the Petitioner argued that if the Board decided not to take action against her husband over the incident, it was required to make a formal motion and arrive at a formal, written decision to that effect. She claimed she never received such a document or evidence that the Board addressed it in an official meeting.

6. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that any official documents regarding the incident existed that the Respondent had failed to produce, as the email discussions were informal and did not constitute official Board business.

7. The Petitioner requested a rehearing by alleging misconduct on the part of the Administrative Law Judge. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted the request, though the decision noted the Commissioner did not specify what the misconduct was or how it should have changed the outcome.

8. In the rehearing, the Petitioner changed her argument from claiming the Board failed to produce a formal decision to arguing that the email string itself constituted an official record of the Association’s business. Consequently, she contended that A.R.S. § 33-1805 required the Respondent to produce a fully un-redacted copy of it.

9. Kathy Andrews testified that official records include matters of record regarding the Association’s business, such as governing documents, architectural guidelines, Board and general meeting minutes, and anything submitted to the Board for action. Because the Board took no action on the June 19, 2017 incident, the email was not included in the Association’s archived records.

10. The final determination was that the email string was not an official record of the association but rather an informal communication. Therefore, A.R.S. § 33-1805 did not require the Respondent to provide an un-redacted version, and the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-format response for each.

1. Analyze the legal distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between informal discussions among board members and official association business. How was A.R.S. § 33-1805 applied in this context, and what precedent might this set for volunteer HOA board members?

2. Discuss the evolution of Patricia Wiercinski’s legal argument from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each argument and explain why the second argument was also ultimately unsuccessful.

3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it applies to this case. Explain what the Petitioner was required to prove and detail the specific evidence (or lack thereof) that led the judge to conclude she had not met this burden in either hearing.

4. The Respondent voluntarily provided the redacted email string after the petition was filed. Discuss the strategic implications of this action and how it influenced the proceedings. Furthermore, analyze the justification provided for the redactions and the judge’s assessment of its reasonableness.

5. Based on the testimony from individuals like Mike Olson, Gregg Arthur, and Kathy Andrews, construct a comprehensive narrative of the events and communications following the June 19, 2017 incident from the perspective of the HOA Board. How did their collective testimony undermine the Petitioner’s claim that official records were being withheld or that the emails constituted official business?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge, Diane Mihalsky, from the Office of Administrative Hearings who heard the evidence and issued the legal decisions.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

The Arizona Revised Statute cited by the Petitioner, which stipulates that all financial and other records of a homeowners’ association must be made reasonably available for examination by any member.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(E)(4)

An Arizona Revised Statute stating that a quorum of a board of directors meeting informally to discuss association business must comply with open meeting and notice provisions, regardless of whether a vote is taken.

Department, The

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and adjudicate petitions from and about homeowners’ associations.

Hoamco

The property management company employed by the Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association. Kathy Andrews is an employee of this company.

June 19, 2017 Incident

An altercation where Wayne Coates allegedly engaged in belligerent, cursing, and verbally abusive behavior towards potential property buyers, causing them to lose interest in the property.

Long Meadow Ranch East POA

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners’ association for the Long Meadow Ranch East development in Prescott, Arizona.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

Patricia Wiercinski, a homeowner in Long Meadow Ranch East and a member of the Respondent association who filed the legal petition.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard the Petitioner was required to meet. It is defined as proof that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The Long Meadow Ranch East Property Owners Association, Inc., which was the defendant in the petition filed by Patricia Wiercinski.

Wayne Coates

The husband of the Petitioner, Patricia Wiercinski. His alleged actions during the June 19, 2017 incident are the central subject of the dispute.

An acronym for the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, mentioned in an email as a potential agency to file charges for disorderly conduct/harassment.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918028-REL-RHG


4 Shocking Lessons from One Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA

Introduction: The Perils of Neighbor Disputes

Most people who live in a planned community harbor a quiet fear of two things: a “neighbor from hell” and a legal dispute with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA). For one Arizona homeowner, those fears collided in a dramatic fashion. When her husband was involved in an incident with prospective buyers of a neighboring lot, she took her HOA to court to demand records of the board’s discussions. The resulting public legal documents provide a masterclass in community association law, revealing several shocking and counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living under an HOA.

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1. Takeaway 1: A “Neighbor from Hell” Can Literally Destroy a Real Estate Deal

The case began with a single incident on June 19, 2017. According to court filings, the homeowner’s husband, Wayne Coates, first confronted the wife and son of a builder viewing a vacant lot across the street. The prospective buyers described Mr. Coates’ behavior as “belligerent and cursing,” telling them that “nothing was for sale around here and they shouldn’t be snooping around.” The wife and son then drove up to inform the builder and architect of the hostile encounter.

The confrontation was so severe that it directly caused the potential buyers to walk away from the deal. They documented their experience in an email that eventually became part of the court record.

In closing when we returned one thing that stands out is would we want to live next to this type of behavior of [a] neighbor? The answer is no, this lot was one that we had in our top 2 Lots as a consideration for purchase but due to the volatile potential of this man, we have decided at this point to remove it from our list.

This case is a rare and powerful illustration of tortious interference with a business relationship in a community association context, providing unambiguous, written proof—from the aggrieved party themselves—that a single resident’s conduct directly caused a quantifiable financial loss to a neighbor.

2. Takeaway 2: Your HOA Board’s Private Emails Aren’t Always “Official Records”

The homeowner, Patricia Wiercinski, filed the lawsuit because she believed an email discussion about the incident among a quorum of the HOA board members constituted official business. Therefore, she argued, those emails were “official records” of the association that she had a legal right to inspect.

In a surprising decision, the court disagreed. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that just because board members informally discuss a topic via email does not automatically make it official HOA business or create an official record. This is especially true if the board never takes any formal action on the matter.

The judge’s reasoning was grounded in the practical realities of volunteer-run corporations. To treat every informal chat as official, recordable business would impose “an unnecessary and burdensome requirement on volunteers who are not compensated for their time who are may be neighbors and who may also be friends, in addition to being Board members.” This ruling reinforces a crucial legal boundary between governance and informal communication. It protects a board’s ability to “think out loud” and explore issues before committing to a formal course of action, an essential function for effective volunteer leadership.

3. Takeaway 3: An HOA’s Power Isn’t Unlimited

After learning that Mr. Coates’ actions had killed a property sale, some board members were immediately and deeply alarmed. They recognized the potential damage to property values for everyone in the community. Board member Gregg Arthur expressed this urgency in an email to his colleagues:

Wayne thru his actions appears to have interfered with and destroyed a property sale. We need to meet and take action on this matter as it will have a broad and chilling effect amongst the realtor community… action needs to be taken and quickly to prevent this from happening again.

Despite this initial alarm, the board ultimately took no formal action against Mr. Coates. Why? Because after reviewing the situation, they determined that the incident was a personal dispute between neighbors. Critically, his conduct did not violate any specific provision of the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), bylaws, or other governing documents.

This decision underscores a vital legal principle: an HOA’s authority is fundamentally contractual, derived solely from the powers granted to it in its governing documents. It is not a governmental body with general police powers. Its authority is strictly limited to enforcing the community’s written rules, not policing all neighborhood conduct.

4. Takeaway 4: A Lawsuit Can Create a Devastating—and Public—Record

The petitioner’s goal was straightforward: to force the HOA to produce an un-redacted copy of the board’s private email chain. The result of her legal action, however, was a textbook example of the “Streisand Effect,” where an attempt to suppress information leads to it being publicized far more widely. In her attempt to access a private record, she created a permanent, public legal record that contained far more damaging information about her husband than the emails she sought.

Because of the lawsuit, the following details about Mr. Coates are now cemented in publicly accessible court documents:

• The full, detailed account from the potential buyers describing his “verbally abusive and extremely confrontational” behavior.

• A statement from a board member, Joe Zielinski, referencing Mr. Coates’ “arrest record and prison term and criminal history.”

• Sworn testimony from the HOA President, Mike Olson, explaining that names were redacted from the original email because Mr. Coates has a “history of bullying and intimidating people.”

The irony is devastating. In her quest to unmask the identities of her husband’s accusers in a private email, the petitioner inadvertently created a permanent, public, and deeply unflattering legal record that now constitutes a matter adjudicated by a court.

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Conclusion: The High Cost of Conflict

This single, unfortunate neighborhood dispute offers powerful lessons for anyone living in a planned community. It clarifies the real-world impact of resident behavior on property rights, sets a clear boundary on what constitutes an “official” HOA record, demonstrates the legal limits of an HOA’s power, and serves as a sobering warning about the unforeseen consequences of litigation. It leaves us with a final, critical question to ponder: When conflict arises in a community, what is the true cost of escalating it, and is the official record you might create worth the price?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Patricia Wiercinski (petitioner)
  • Wayne Coates (petitioner's husband)
    Involved in the June 19, 2017 incident

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
  • Michael Olson (board member)
    President of Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Gregg Arthur (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board; testified as witness
  • Kathy Andrews (property manager)
    HOAMCO
    Community Manager; testified as witness
  • Jim Robertson (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Joe Zielinski (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board
  • Boris Biloskirka (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board (identified as former in one source)
  • Tom Reid (board member)
    Director on Respondent's board

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Decision transmittal clerk

Other Participants

  • John Allen (HOA member)
    Property owner attempting to sell lot (also spelled Allan)
  • [Redacted Name] (potential purchaser/witness)
    Includes potential buyers, builder, builder's wife, son, and architect involved in the incident
  • [Redacted Name] (real estate agent/witness)
    Real estate agent(s) associated with John Allen's property

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Administrative Law Judge determined that the alleged violations of the HOA's website and policy manual did not involve 'community documents' as defined by statute, meaning the matter did not fall within the tribunal's jurisdiction under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Why this result: The petition was dismissed because the initial claims did not meet the requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), as the alleged violations involved documents (website and policy BC-3) that are not considered 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy BC-3 concerning the provision of pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its website and Policy Manual (BC-3) regarding the provision of pickleball courts. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the Department lacked jurisdiction because neither the website nor Policy BC-3 are defined as 'community documents' under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2). The ALJ agreed, finding the claim failed to meet the jurisdictional requirements of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • Walker v. Scottsdale
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:41 (89.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

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4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

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Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

Tom J Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom J Martin Counsel
Respondent SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Carolyn B. Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the dismissal of the petition on rehearing, ruling that the HOA's website and policy manual are not 'community documents' as defined by statute, and therefore the Department has no jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes regarding them. Additionally, the requested financial relief was outside the ALJ's authority.

Why this result: Lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or rules of the planned community.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of HOA website and Policy Manual (Policy BC-3) regarding pickleball courts

Petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its website and policy manual by failing to provide pickleball courts as marketed. The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing these documents are not community documents. The ALJ affirmed the dismissal, finding that policies and website statements do not fall under the statutory definition of community documents in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), thus the Department lacked jurisdiction.

Orders: Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: jurisdiction, community documents, policy manual, pickleball courts, dismissal, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-213
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904
  • Walker v. Scottsdale, 163 Ariz. 206, 786 P.2d 1057 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG Decision – 704322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:17 (89.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (Case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin versus SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which resulted in the dismissal of the petitioner’s case. The decision, issued on May 10, 2019, centered on a critical jurisdictional question: whether an HOA’s website content and internal policy manual constitute “community documents” under Arizona state law.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded they do not. The petitioner’s claim, which alleged the HOA failed to provide pickleball courts as promised on its website and in its “Policy Number BC-3,” was dismissed because it did not allege a violation of a legally recognized “community document.” According to Arizona Revised Statutes, such documents are strictly defined as the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, and formally adopted rules. As the petitioner’s initial filing cited only the website and a policy not adopted as a rule, the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked the statutory jurisdiction to hear the case. Furthermore, the ALJ determined that the petitioner’s requested relief—a financial award of $463,112 or the construction of eight new courts—was beyond the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Case Overview

Case Name

Tom J. Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Case Number

19F-H1918022-REL-RHG

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Tom J. Martin

Respondent

SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden

Date of Decision

May 10, 2019

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Requested Relief

The petition filed by Tom J. Martin on September 28, 2018, was founded on the central allegation that the SaddleBrooke HOA violated its own website content and its internal policy manual, specifically “Policy Number BC-3.”

Primary Allegation: The HOA failed to fulfill its advertised and marketed promise to provide pickleball courts.

Cited Violations: In the initial petition, Martin explicitly alleged violations of the HOA’s website and policy manual. While he checked boxes on the petition form indicating violations of the CC&Rs and Bylaws, he failed to identify any specific provisions from those documents.

Requested Relief: The petitioner sought a significant remedy from the HOA, requesting one of the following:

1. Financial support in the amount of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

2. The provision of eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year.

3. A commitment from the HOA to be financially responsible for the maintenance of pickleball courts in an amount equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

Procedural History and Key Arguments

The case progressed through several key stages, culminating in a rehearing and a final dismissal.

1. Initial Petition (September 28, 2018): Mr. Martin filed his single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (November 30, 2018): The HOA argued that the Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Its core argument was that hearings under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01 are limited to violations of “community documents,” and that a website and an internal policy do not meet the legal definition of such documents. The HOA also contended the requested relief was outside the tribunal’s authority.

3. Petitioner’s Response (December 4, 2018): In his response, Mr. Martin argued that a “policy” should be interpreted as a “rule” under its ordinary meaning. He further asserted that another HOA policy (CE-3) defined “governing documents” to include “Rules and Regulations,” and therefore Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

4. Initial Dismissal (December 12, 2018): The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that it had not alleged a violation meeting the statutory requirements.

5. Request for Rehearing (December 31, 2018): Mr. Martin requested a rehearing, reasserting that a “policy” is a “rule.” In this request, he newly alleged that the HOA had violated specific provisions: Bylaws article 4, section 6(3) and Articles of Incorporation Article XII, by failing to implement policy BC-3.

6. Rehearing (April 16, 2019): A rehearing was conducted where both parties presented their cases. The respondent renewed its argument regarding lack of jurisdiction.

Central Legal Dispute: The Definition of “Community Documents”

The determinative issue of the case was the precise legal definition of “community documents” and whether the petitioner’s claims fell within that scope.

Statutory Definition: The court’s decision was anchored in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(2), which defines community documents as:

◦ The declaration (CC&Rs)

◦ Bylaws

◦ Articles of incorporation, if any

◦ Rules, if any

The Court’s Finding: The ALJ concluded that this legislative definition is exclusive and does not include “a planned community’s statements of policy, statements on its website, or advertising and marketing material.”

Petitioner’s Argument Rejected: Mr. Martin’s argument that Policy BC-3 should be considered a rule was found to be “not persuasive.” A critical finding of fact was that the “Respondent has not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule” under the authority granted in its CC&Rs (section 4.5). The tribunal must follow the legislature’s explicit definition.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The ALJ’s conclusions of law led directly to the dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds.

Lack of Jurisdiction: Because Mr. Martin’s original petition only alleged that the respondent violated its website and policy manual—neither of which are “community documents” under Arizona law—the petition failed to meet the foundational requirements for a hearing under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A).

Improper Relief Requested: The ALJ also concluded that the relief Mr. Martin sought was not within the tribunal’s authority. Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02, an ALJ may order a party to abide by statutes or community documents and may levy civil penalties. The statute does not grant the authority to order large financial payments for construction or to mandate specific capital improvement projects.

Final Order: Based on these conclusions, the petition was dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Tom J. Martin’s petition is dismissed.

The decision, having been issued as the result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of the order’s service.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Martin v. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Tom J. Martin vs. SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc. (No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG). It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and final outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner in his initial petition filed on or about September 28, 2018?

3. Describe the two alternative forms of relief the Petitioner requested in his petition.

4. On what primary legal grounds did the Respondent file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. According to Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2), what are the four types of documents that constitute “community documents”?

6. Explain the two main arguments the Petitioner made in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss for why Policy BC-3 should be considered a governing document.

7. What new violation did the Petitioner allege in his request for a rehearing on December 31, 2019?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what was the final outcome of the Petitioner’s petition and the primary reason for this decision?

9. According to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, what powers does an administrative law judge have if a violation of community documents is found?

10. What is the process and time frame for a party wishing to appeal this Administrative Law Judge order?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Tom J. Martin, who appeared on his own behalf. The Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc., which was represented by Carolyn B. Goldschmidt, Esq.

2. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin’s single-issue allegation was that the Respondent violated its website and its policy manual, specifically Policy Number BC-3. He included printouts from the website and a copy of the policy with his petition.

3. The Petitioner requested financial support in the sum of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon. Alternatively, he requested that the Respondent provide eight pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, and be financially responsible for their maintenance at a level equal to its spending on eight tennis courts.

4. The Respondent argued that the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction over the matter. This was because hearings are limited to disputes over “community documents,” and neither the website nor Policy BC-3 qualified as such under the definition provided in ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1802(2).

5. Arizona Revised Statute section 33-1802(2) defines “community documents” as “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.”

6. First, Mr. Martin argued that based on A.R.S. § 1-213, the word “policy” should be given its ordinary meaning, which is a rule. Second, he asserted that because the Respondent’s own policy CE-3 defines “governing documents” to include Rules and Regulations, then BC-3 must be a governing document.

7. In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Martin alleged for the first time that the Respondent had violated its bylaws, specifically article 4, section 6(3), by failing to implement policy BC-3. He also alleged a violation of Articles of Incorporation Article XII.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Martin’s petition be dismissed. The dismissal was based on the finding that the petition did not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A) because it alleged violations of a website and a policy manual, which are not legally defined as “community documents.”

9. If a violation is found, an administrative law judge may order any party to abide by the statute or document at issue. The judge may also levy a civil penalty for each violation and, if the petitioner prevails, order the respondent to pay the petitioner’s filing fee.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date a copy of the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by A.R.S. section 12-904(A).

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each question based on the facts and legal principles presented in the decision.

1. Analyze the concept of jurisdiction as it applies to this case. Why was the distinction between “community documents” and other materials like websites or policy manuals the central factor in the judge’s jurisdictional decision?

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, from Mr. Martin’s initial petition to the final order of dismissal. Identify the key filings, arguments, and decisions at each stage of the process.

3. Evaluate the legal arguments presented by Mr. Martin. Explain his reasoning for equating a “policy” with a “rule” and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found this argument unpersuasive, citing relevant statutes and case law mentioned in the decision.

4. Discuss the limitations on the relief an Administrative Law Judge can grant in disputes involving planned communities, as outlined in A.R.S. § 32-2199.02. How did Mr. Martin’s requested relief fall outside the scope of the judge’s authority?

5. Explain the legal principle that when a legislature defines a word or term, a tribunal must follow that definition. How did this principle, as cited in Walker v. Scottsdale, directly influence the outcome of Mr. Martin’s petition?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the State of Arizona.

Articles of Incorporation

A set of formal documents filed with a government body to legally document the creation of a corporation. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Defined in A.R.S. § 33-1802(2) as one of the “community documents.”

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

Rules governing the use of land within a particular planned community. Section 4.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs sets out its authority to adopt rules.

Community Documents

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(2), these are “the declaration, bylaws, articles of incorporation, if any, and rules, if any.” The central legal issue of the case was whether the Respondent’s website and policy manual qualified as community documents.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Respondent argued, and the ALJ agreed, that the Office of Administrative Hearings did not have jurisdiction because the alleged violations did not involve “community documents.”

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request by a party for a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on November 30, 2018, arguing a lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner was Tom J. Martin.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues and arguments, granted in this instance after the initial dismissal. The rehearing was conducted on April 16, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent was SaddleBrooke Home Owners Association #1, Inc.

Regulations adopted by a planned community association. The decision notes that while the Respondent has the authority to adopt rules, it had not adopted policy BC-3 as a rule.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918022-REL-RHG


4 Harsh Lessons from a Homeowner’s Failed Lawsuit Against His HOA

Introduction: The Promise vs. The Paperwork

Imagine finding the perfect community. Its website advertises fantastic amenities, including the pickleball courts you’ve been dreaming of. The association’s own policy manual seems to confirm this commitment. But what happens when the courts are never built and the homeowner association (HOA) doesn’t deliver on these perceived promises?

This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s the central conflict in the case of Tom J. Martin versus the SaddleBrooke HOA in Arizona. Mr. Martin believed his HOA was legally obligated to provide pickleball courts based on its policies and marketing materials. His subsequent lawsuit, however, failed spectacularly, revealing some surprising truths about HOA disputes. This case provides several critical, counter-intuitive lessons for any current or future homeowner about the difference between a promise and a legally enforceable contract.

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1. A “Policy” Isn’t Always a Legally Binding “Rule”

Mr. Martin’s argument was straightforward: he believed the HOA violated its own “policy manual,” specifically a section referred to as Policy BC-3, by not providing pickleball courts. He contended that, in the ordinary sense of the word, a “policy” is a rule that must be followed.

The judge, however, dismissed the case based on a harsh legal reality. According to Arizona law, the court’s jurisdiction in this type of hearing is limited to violations of official “community documents.” The judge was bound by the statute’s specific definition of what constitutes these documents.

Based on Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1802(2), “community documents” are strictly defined as:

• The declaration (often called CC&Rs)

• Bylaws

• Articles of incorporation

• Rules

Crucially, the HOA’s own CC&Rs specified the exact procedure for how to adopt an enforceable rule, and the association had never subjected Policy BC-3 to that formal process. It wasn’t just a legal technicality; the HOA was following its own governing documents about how to create—or not create—a binding rule. Because the pickleball policy had not been formally adopted, it was legally unenforceable in this hearing.

Key Takeaway Analysis: In a legal dispute, the common-sense meaning of a word can be overruled by a specific statutory definition. It’s not enough to read an HOA’s policy manual. As a homeowner, you must cross-reference that policy with the CC&Rs or Bylaws to confirm the HOA has followed its own stated procedure for adopting it as a formal, legally binding rule.

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2. Marketing Materials Are Not Governing Documents

To support his case, Mr. Martin presented printouts from the HOA’s website. He felt these materials advertised and marketed the availability of pickleball courts, stating in a legal filing that “the Association is in violation for not providing pickleball courts as advertised and marketed….”

The judge’s conclusion was unequivocal: advertising and marketing materials, just like the internal policy manual, do not qualify as “community documents.” The legal definition is exclusive, and an HOA’s website is not on the list. Therefore, promises or suggestions made on a website carry no legal weight in a dispute over violations of governing documents.

Key Takeaway Analysis: There is a significant gap between marketing promises and legally enforceable obligations. For potential buyers, this is a critical warning. The glossy brochure, the community website, and the sales pitch might paint a picture of community life, but that picture is not guaranteed by the legally binding documents you sign at closing.

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3. You Must Allege a Violation of theRightDocument

The case also reveals a crucial lesson in legal procedure. In his initial petition, Mr. Martin only alleged violations of the HOA’s website and its policy manual. While his petition form indicated alleged violations of the “CC&Rs and Bylaws,” he failed to identify any specific provisions within those official documents that the HOA had actually violated.

It was only after his case was first dismissed that he attempted to specify violations of the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation in his request for a rehearing. By then, it was too late. The initial petition failed to allege a violation of a legitimate community document.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Precision is paramount. To successfully challenge an HOA in an administrative hearing, a homeowner cannot just have a general grievance. You must be able to pinpoint the exact article, section, and provision of an official “community document” (like the CC&Rs or Bylaws) that was violated and state it clearly in your initial complaint.

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4. The Court May Not Have the Power to Grant Your Request

Mr. Martin was clear about what he wanted the court to do. He requested one of two specific forms of relief:

• Provide financial support of $463,112.00 for the expansion of pickleball courts in Bobcat Canyon.

• Alternatively, construct eight new pickleball courts within a two-mile radius of the community within one year, with the HOA being financially responsible for their maintenance.

The judge noted a final, critical problem with the case: the requested relief was “not within the scope of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority.” The law governing these hearings simply did not give the judge the power to order an HOA to undertake a massive, six-figure construction project.

Key Takeaway Analysis: Even if you have a valid case and prove the HOA violated a rule, the court or tribunal you are in has limits. An administrative hearing might only be empowered to levy a civil penalty or issue an order for the HOA to abide by an existing rule. It likely cannot force the HOA to build new facilities or make large capital expenditures. This highlights the need to research the legal venue before you file to ensure it has the authority to grant the specific outcome you are seeking.

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Conclusion: Read Before You Litigate

The outcome of Mr. Martin’s lawsuit underscores the critical difference between a homeowner’s reasonable expectations and an HOA’s legally enforceable covenants. For homeowners, disputes are won or lost based on the precise wording of official governing documents—the CC&Rs, bylaws, and formal rules.

Before you challenge your HOA, have you read the fine print to see if their promise is written in the one place that truly matters?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom J. Martin (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (respondent attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
  • Michael S. Shupe (attorney)
    Goldschmidt, Shupe, PLLC
    Recipient of transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal (Identified by email handle portion)

Other Participants

  • JS (Unknown staff)
    Transmittal initials

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:39 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:49:25 (118.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.

Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.

Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.

Case Overview

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner

William P. Lee

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)

Key Dates

Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
Rehearing: April 1, 2019
Final Decision: April 22, 2019

Core Allegation

The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”

Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.

Amendment

Provision

Amendment #1

Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.

Amendment #2

Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.

Amendment #3

Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.

Rules and Regulations

2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.

May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:

Association Bylaws (1986)

Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.

Key Arguments Presented

Petitioner (William P. Lee)

Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.

Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.

Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.

Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.

Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.

Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)

Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.

Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.

No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.

Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.

Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.

Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.

Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”

Final Disposition

Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?

4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?

6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?

7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?

8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?

9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.

2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.

3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.

4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.

5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.

6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.

7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.

8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.

9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.

10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?

4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.

5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Answer (Legal)

A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.

Bylaws

The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.

Common Area

Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.

Petition

A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rules and Regulations

A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?

William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.

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1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned

Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.

The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.

The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.

2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations

Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.

The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”

The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.

3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment

Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.

The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.

The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.

4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns

The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:

Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.

The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.

The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.

5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence

In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”

He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.

The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.

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Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner

The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.

This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,

William P Lee v vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Notice, Towing, Booting, A.R.S. 33-1803, A.R.S. 33-1809
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – 703187.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:10 (110.8 KB)

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918019-REL/678471.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:27:11 (118.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses HOA Parking Dispute

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”). The core of the dispute was Greenlaw’s 2018 implementation of a complete ban on street parking within the community and its subsequent contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles in violation.

Mr. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, alleged that this parking ban violated specific amendments to the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and was enacted through an invalid revision of the community’s Rules and Regulations.

Following an initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and a subsequent rehearing on April 1, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The final decision, issued on April 22, 2019, determined that Mr. Lee failed to meet his burden of proof. The ALJ found that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which explicitly ban all street parking, were the controlling authority. Furthermore, the decision established that these rules do not conflict with the CC&R amendments, as the amendments only prohibit parking in specific, limited scenarios (e.g., fire lanes, snow removal) and do not grant a general right to park on association streets.

Case Overview

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (referred by the Department of Real Estate)

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner

William P. Lee

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (“Greenlaw”)

Key Dates

Petition Filed: September 12, 2018
Initial Hearing: December 13, 2018
Rehearing: April 1, 2019
Final Decision: April 22, 2019

Core Allegation

The central issue, as defined in the Notice of Hearing, was Mr. Lee’s single-issue petition alleging that Greenlaw “violated Community Document CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3 and Association Rules and Regulations… when it banned all parking on the association streets and contracted with a towing service to boot vehicles.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between Greenlaw’s CC&Rs, its Rules and Regulations, and its Bylaws.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

Association Authority: Section (I)(b) of the CC&Rs grants Greenlaw ownership of the common areas, which include the streets in question (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops). It specifies that the “maintenance and use shall be controlled by the Association.”

Parking Amendments: Amendments 1, 2, and 3 were central to Mr. Lee’s argument. These amendments add specific parking prohibitions to the CC&Rs under Article II, PERMITTED USES.

Amendment

Provision

Amendment #1

Prohibits parking in designated fire lanes, which are to be marked with signs and red-painted curbs after consultation with the Flagstaff Fire Marshal.

Amendment #2

Prohibits residents or visitors from parking on association roads during periods of snow removal. Violators may be towed at the vehicle owner’s expense.

Amendment #3

Prohibits parking vehicles at the curb side in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours. Such vehicles are considered abandoned and may be towed.

Rules and Regulations

2003 Revised Rules and Regulations: Mr. Lee contended that this was the controlling document and that it allowed for parking on association streets. He argued that Greenlaw’s booting of vehicles in 2017 was a violation of these rules.

May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations: Greenlaw asserted that this was the new, controlling document, effective July 2018. Section 8 of these rules institutes a complete ban on street parking:

Association Bylaws (1986)

Notice Requirement: Mr. Lee cited Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws, which states that notices to lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.” This formed the basis of his argument that the email distribution of the 2018 rules was improper.

Key Arguments Presented

Petitioner (William P. Lee)

Violation of CC&Rs: The general parking ban enacted in the 2018 Rules contradicted the CC&R amendments, which only banned parking in specific situations.

Invalidity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revision as required by the 1986 Bylaws, instead sending an email which he contended was insufficient and unclear.

Controlling Document: The 2003 Rules, which he claimed permitted street parking, should be considered the controlling authority.

Improper Motivation: The parking ban was enacted solely to appease a board member, Barbara, who did not want cars parked behind her property.

Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted and that the Greenlaw manager’s response to his inquiry confirmed the association’s policy.

Respondent (Greenlaw HOA)

Authority Over Common Areas: The CC&Rs grant Greenlaw the authority to control the use of association streets.

Validity of 2018 Rules: The May 2018 Rules and Regulations were properly adopted and represent the current, controlling regulations.

No Conflict with CC&Rs: The CC&R amendments do not authorize parking; they are a list of specific prohibitions. A general ban on parking does not conflict with these specific restrictions.

Notice Sufficiency: Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or postal mail delivery only applies to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs, not to amendments to the Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive the revised rules via email on July 6, 2018.

Cure of Prior Violations: Any alleged violation of the prior (2003) rules was rendered moot and “cured” by the valid enactment of the May 2018 revised rules.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The ALJ’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were consistent, leading to the denial of Mr. Lee’s petition.

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Lee, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” In both decisions, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Lee failed to meet this standard. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Controlling Authority: The “weight of the evidence presented at hearing” showed that the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were the controlling rules at the time the petition was filed. Mr. Lee failed to establish that the 2003 Rules were still in effect.

Interpretation of CC&Rs: The ALJ found the restrictive covenants in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 to be unambiguous. The ruling states, “Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs do not allow parking on the streets, but rather, provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” Therefore, Greenlaw’s decision to ban all street parking did not violate these amendments.

Lack of Evidence for Harm: The ALJ noted that Mr. Lee “did not even allege that Greenlaw booted or towed one of his vehicles.” Furthermore, regarding the booted jeep he observed, “there was no evidence provided that the Greenlaw manager stated that Greenlaw was responsible for booting the jeep. Moreover, Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.”

Final Disposition

Petition Denied: The final order, issued April 22, 2019, following the rehearing, states: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

The decision concluded that Mr. Lee failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or its Rules and Regulations when it banned parking and contracted with a towing company. This order is final and binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case between Petitioner William P. Lee and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 19F-H1918019-REL and No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central dispute?

2. What was Petitioner William P. Lee’s main argument regarding the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

3. On what grounds did the Greenlaw HOA claim it had the authority to ban all parking on its streets?

4. What three specific parking prohibitions were explicitly listed in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

5. What was the significance of the May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations in the judge’s final decisions?

6. How did Mr. Lee challenge the validity of the revised 2018 Rules and Regulations during the rehearing?

7. What legal standard of proof was required for Mr. Lee’s petition to succeed, and did the judge find that he met it?

8. According to the case findings, what evidence did Mr. Lee present to prove that Greenlaw was responsible for booting or towing member vehicles?

9. What was Greenlaw’s defense against the claim that it failed to provide proper notice of the new rules?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on December 13, 2018, and the rehearing on April 1, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner William P. Lee, a townhouse owner, and Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. The central dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s ban on all street parking and its contract with a towing company to “boot” vehicles violated the community’s governing documents.

2. Mr. Lee argued that because CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3 only banned parking in specific scenarios (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles), they implicitly permitted parking at all other times. He contended that a total ban therefore violated these amendments.

3. The Greenlaw HOA argued that Section (I)(b) of its CC&Rs grants it control over the maintenance and use of common areas, which include the association’s streets. They contended this authority was sufficient to ban parking and contract with a towing company.

4. The three amendments prohibited parking in designated fire lanes, on subdivision roads during periods of snow removal, and for vehicles parked at curbside in an obvious state of disrepair for more than 72 hours.

5. The May 2018 revised Rules and Regulations explicitly banned parking on any association street at any time. The judge found these to be the controlling rules, superseding any previous versions, and that they “cured” any purported violations that may have occurred under older rules.

6. During the rehearing, Mr. Lee argued that the 2018 rules were invalid because Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice. He contended that the association’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email as was done on July 6, 2018.

7. Mr. Lee was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Administrative Law Judge concluded in both decisions that Mr. Lee failed to meet this burden of proof.

8. Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep that had been booted but provided no evidence that Greenlaw was responsible for booting it or any other vehicles belonging to members. The judge found that he did not establish that Greenlaw had booted or towed any vehicles.

9. Greenlaw argued that the Bylaw’s requirement for notice by mail or personal delivery only applied to notices required by statute or the CC&Rs. The association contended it was not required by law or its CC&Rs to provide notice of an amendment to its Rules and Regulations in that specific manner.

10. The final outcome of both hearings was a denial of Mr. Lee’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge ordered in both the December 31, 2018 decision and the April 22, 2019 decision that the petition be denied because Mr. Lee failed to prove Greenlaw violated its CC&Rs or Rules and Regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Develop an essay-format response for each, drawing evidence and examples from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in determining that the CC&R amendments did not grant an affirmative right to park. How did the judge’s interpretation of “restrictive covenants” shape the outcome?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied to William P. Lee’s petition. Using specific examples from the hearings, explain why the judge concluded he failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Trace the evolution of Mr. Lee’s arguments from the initial petition to the rehearing. How did his focus shift, particularly regarding the notification method for the revised Rules and Regulations, and what impact did this shift have on the proceedings?

4. Examine the conflicting interpretations of Greenlaw’s Bylaws regarding the proper method for notifying homeowners of changes. Evaluate the arguments made by both Mr. Lee and Greenlaw on this point and discuss which interpretation the judge implicitly supported.

5. The judge in the initial hearing noted that Greenlaw “has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.” Discuss the legal implications of this finding for homeowners’ associations and their ability to amend rules to address ongoing disputes.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Answer (Legal)

A formal written response filed by the respondent to a petition, addressing the allegations made.

Bylaws

The formal rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. Greenlaw’s Bylaws were recorded on June 16, 1986.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A set of rules established by a developer or homeowners’ association that govern a planned community. All owners are legally bound by these rules.

Common Area

Property within a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association for the benefit and use of all lot owners. In this case, the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) are considered common areas.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence (such as testimony and exhibits) before a judge to resolve a factual dispute.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties and their residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct evidentiary hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, William P. Lee.

Petition

A formal written request to a court or administrative body, asking for a specific action or decision on a matter.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning the evidence must show that a claim is more likely to be true than not true. This was the burden of proof placed on Mr. Lee.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to allow for reconsideration of the initial decision, often based on new evidence or arguments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The principle is that such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Rules and Regulations

A set of operational rules created by an HOA’s board that provide specific details on how to follow the broader principles outlined in the CC&Rs and Bylaws.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG


5 Surprising Truths About HOA Power: Lessons from a Homeowner’s Losing Battle Over Parking

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is a delicate balance, and nowhere is this more apparent than with parking rules. A single violation notice can escalate into a years-long conflict. But what happens when a homeowner, convinced the HOA has overstepped its authority, decides to fight back?

William P. Lee believed his HOA’s governing documents were his shield. The court, however, ruled they were a blank check for the board’s authority. Mr. Lee took his HOA to court over a newly enacted, total ban on street parking, contending the rule was not only unreasonable but enacted merely to appease a board member who didn’t want cars parked behind her property. He lost his case, requested a rehearing, and lost again. His determined but ultimately failed battle provides a masterclass in the surprising and often counter-intuitive extent of an HOA’s power, revealing five critical lessons for every homeowner.

——————————————————————————–

1. What Isn’t Forbidden Can Still Be Banned

Mr. Lee’s primary argument was rooted in the community’s founding documents, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He pointed out that the CC&Rs only prohibited parking in a few specific situations: in designated fire lanes, during snow removal, or for vehicles that were obviously abandoned. By his logic, if parking wasn’t explicitly forbidden at other times, it must be allowed.

The judge’s decision, however, hinged on a critical legal distinction. The ruling concluded that the CC&Rs did not grant an affirmative right to park on the streets; they only listed a few specific prohibitions. This legal gray area gave the HOA Board the authority to create new, more restrictive rules to fill in the gaps.

The Takeaway: This case is a stark warning about “permissive silence.” Homeowners should treat their CC&Rs not as a list of guaranteed rights, but as a minimum set of restrictions. The absence of a specific prohibition does not guarantee a right, and a future board can—and likely will—build upon those foundational rules to enact stricter policies.

2. The Board Can Retroactively ‘Cure’ Its Own Violations

Part of Mr. Lee’s case was that the HOA had been improperly booting vehicles back in 2017, under the old, more permissive rules. He argued that these past actions were a violation, regardless of any later changes.

The judge found that the HOA’s new rule effectively neutralized this argument. The decision explicitly states that even if the association had acted improperly in the past, “Greenlaw has in effect cured any purported previous violation through the enactment of the May 2018 Revised Rules and Regulations.”

The Takeaway: This finding sets a sobering precedent, revealing an HOA’s power to “move the goalposts” retroactively. By codifying its desired policy into a new rule, a board can effectively legitimize its past actions. This makes it incredibly difficult for homeowners to win disputes over actions that, while questionable at the time, are now sanctioned by current regulations.

3. The “Fine Print” Is Now a PDF Attachment

Mr. Lee also argued that the rule change itself was invalid because he was never properly notified. He cited the association’s 1986 Bylaws, which required official notices to be delivered personally or by postal mail.

The court rejected this argument. The HOA successfully contended—and the judge agreed—that the old bylaw for mail delivery was narrow in scope. It only applied to notices that were required to be sent to homeowners under statute or the CC&Rs, and there was no such underlying requirement for a simple rule change. Therefore, the court found that an email sent in early July 2018 with a PDF attachment titled “Greenlaw II Townhomes Rules and Regulations – May 2018.pdf” constituted sufficient legal notice.

The Takeaway: This ruling underscores the shifting legal definition of “notice” in the digital age. It creates a vulnerability for less tech-savvy residents or those simply overwhelmed by digital clutter. A routine email from your HOA can carry the full weight of a formal legal notice, and the excuse “I didn’t see the email” is no longer a valid defense.

4. An HOA Can Ban Parking on Streets It Owns

The new rule implemented by the Greenlaw HOA was absolute. Its language leaves no room for interpretation:

Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time. Eva, Heidi and Jeffrey Loops are not city streets. They are owned and maintained solely by the HOA. Under city code, the streets are considered “Private Fire Access Lanes.” Consequently, cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.

The critical factor here is ownership. The streets within the Greenlaw community were not public city streets; they were private property, common areas owned and maintained by the HOA. This distinction gave the board sweeping authority to control them.

The Takeaway: If your community’s streets are private property owned by the HOA, the board’s power to regulate them is immense—far exceeding what would be possible on public roads. As this case demonstrates, that authority can extend to a complete and total ban on all street parking, at any time.

5. Suspicion Isn’t Proof: The High Bar of Evidence

In any legal hearing, the person bringing the complaint has the “burden of proof.” Mr. Lee had to convince the judge that his claims were “more probably true than not,” a standard known as a “preponderance of the evidence.”

He failed to meet this standard. The court decision notes that he “provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.” While he testified to seeing a booted Jeep, his case unraveled under questioning. When he inquired with the HOA manager, her response was non-committal and did not admit responsibility. In court, Mr. Lee admitted he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” Critically, his own vehicle had never been booted or towed.

The Takeaway: There is a vast difference between observing something you believe to be a violation and proving it in a formal hearing. For any homeowner considering legal action, this is a vital lesson. Without documented, concrete evidence—admissions in emails, dated photos, official violation notices, or direct witness testimony—a complaint built on suspicion alone is likely to fail.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The Vigilant Homeowner

The case of William P. Lee serves as a powerful illustration of the “presumption of board authority” that often prevails in community governance disputes. Courts tend to defer to the board’s interpretation of its own rules and its authority to act, unless there is an explicit, unambiguous violation of the law or the governing documents themselves. His story demonstrates that winning a dispute requires more than a sense of injustice; it demands a deep understanding that an HOA’s power is often broader and more flexible than many residents assume. For the modern homeowner, vigilance is not just a good idea—it is an essential practice.

This homeowner scrutinized the rules and bylaws, yet the board’s power expanded beyond them. Are you prepared for the rules you follow today to change tomorrow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Testified on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (respondent attorney)
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Board member who Petitioner alleged influenced policy

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge for the initial hearing and rehearing,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate,

Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 700566.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:55 (149.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918037-REL


Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918037-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was the Association’s failure to fully comply with a request for records under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The case is notable for its complete reversal upon rehearing. An initial ruling on April 10, 2019, favored the Association, finding that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request by not emailing all Board members. However, this decision was overturned in a final, binding order on September 12, 2019. In the rehearing, the Petitioner presented new evidence demonstrating he was following the Association’s own prior written instructions for submitting such requests.

The ALJ ultimately concluded that the Association did violate A.R.S. § 33-1805 by providing only a summary document instead of making the full records available for examination. Consequently, the final order granted the Petitioner’s petition, mandated the full reimbursement of his $500 filing fee, and levied an additional $500 civil penalty against the Association. The case underscores the critical importance of procedural compliance and the weight of documented instructions in governing interactions between homeowners and their associations.

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I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (“the Association”).

Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark.

Core Allegation: Whether the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner.

Case Numbers:

◦ 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)

◦ 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

II. Chronology of the Dispute

Jul. 19, 2017

Association President Catherine Overby appoints Environmental Design Committee (EDC) Director Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s primary contact for records requests.

Jul. 18, 2018

Ms. Overby instructs the Petitioner to direct all requests to the Association’s management company, Associated Asset Management (AAM), specifically to Lori Lock-Lee.

Nov. 1, 2018

Petitioner submits the records request at issue via email to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee.

Nov. 2, 2018

Ms. Loch-Lee acknowledges the request, states she will forward it to all Board members, and clarifies that AAM is only the Association’s accounting firm.

Nov. 18, 2018

Mr. Schoeffler responds on behalf of the Association, providing a summary table of EDC actions but not the full records. He also advises the Petitioner that all Board members must be copied on future requests.

Dec. 17, 2018

Petitioner files a single-issue petition against the Association with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, paying a $500 fee.

Mar. 6, 2019

Petitioner sends a follow-up email specifying the exact documents he is seeking, referencing items listed in the summary table he received.

Mar. 11, 2019

Mr. Schoeffler replies, asserting the request was already fulfilled and instructing the Petitioner to submit a new request for the additional items.

Mar. 17, 2019

Mr. Schoeffler emails again, claiming the original request was improperly submitted to only two of four Board members and that providing more documents could be seen as an “admission of guilt.”

Mar. 21, 2019

The first evidentiary hearing is held at the OAH.

Apr. 10, 2019

The initial ALJ Decision is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Jun. 10, 2019

Petitioner submits an appeal to the Department, which is granted.

Aug. 27, 2019

A rehearing is held at the OAH.

Sep. 12, 2019

The final ALJ Decision is issued, reversing the initial ruling and granting the Petitioner’s petition.

III. The Records Request and Response

Petitioner’s Request (November 1, 2018)

The Petitioner submitted a clear and direct request for specific records via email, citing the relevant statute:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

Association’s Response (November 18, 2018)

The Association did not provide the requested documents (e.g., letters, emails, applications). Instead, it provided a “summary table listing of some, not all, EDC actions.” As of the August 27, 2019, rehearing, the Petitioner had still not received the full documentation he originally requested.

Petitioner’s Clarification (March 6, 2019)

In an attempt to resolve the issue, the Petitioner sent a detailed follow-up email outlining the specific missing records by referencing the line items in the Association’s own summary table. This demonstrated that his request was not for a vague “list of actions” but for the underlying correspondence. This included requests for:

• Copies of violation notices and “Full Compliance” correspondence.

• Complaint correspondence from homeowners regarding shrubs and subsequent citations.

• Submittal correspondence for a project from Mr. Schoeffler himself, along with approvals.

• Original submittals and approvals for a garage remodel and septic install.

IV. Analysis of the Two Administrative Rulings

The opposite outcomes of the two hearings hinged entirely on the validity of the Petitioner’s original email submission.

A. Initial ALJ Decision (April 10, 2019) – In Favor of Respondent (HOA)

Central Finding: The Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request because he sent it to only two Board members, not the entire Board.

Reasoning: The ALJ concluded that because the request was improperly submitted, the Association was not obligated to fulfill it under A.R.S. § 33-1805. Therefore, its failure to provide the full records did not constitute a violation. The decision noted, “Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation…”

Outcome: The petition was denied. The Association was not required to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee, and his request for a civil penalty was denied.

B. Rehearing ALJ Decision (September 12, 2019) – In Favor of Petitioner (Barrs)

Central Finding: The Petitioner did properly submit his records request by emailing the designated contacts.

Key New Evidence: The Petitioner introduced two exhibits proving he had received explicit instructions from the Association President on where to direct his requests:

1. A July 19, 2017 communication appointing EDC Chairman Brian Schoeffler as his primary records request contact.

2. A July 18, 2018 communication instructing him to direct requests to the management company (AAM).

Reasoning: The ALJ found this evidence dispositive, stating, “Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.” With the submission deemed proper, the focus shifted to the response. The ALJ concluded that providing a summary table was not compliant with the statute’s requirement to make records “reasonably available for examination.”

Outcome: The initial decision was reversed, and the Petitioner’s petition was granted.

V. Key Arguments and Testimonies

Petitioner (Tom Barrs):

◦ Argued his dispute was with the adequacy of the Association’s response, not its timeliness.

◦ Alleged the Association acted in bad faith and willfully withheld records, citing a previous OAH adjudication over a similar request.

◦ Successfully demonstrated he had followed the Association’s own prior instructions for submitting requests.

Respondent (via Brian Schoeffler):

◦ Maintained that the request was invalid because it was not sent to all four Board members, an argument that collapsed during the rehearing.

◦ Admitted the Association’s governing documents do not contain a requirement that all Board members be copied on records requests.

◦ Justified the incomplete response by stating that providing additional documents after the petition was filed could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

◦ Reasoned that the Association acted as it did because a previous, similar dispute had been decided in its favor.

VI. Final Order and Penalties

The binding order issued on September 12, 2019, following the rehearing, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted in its entirety.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Association was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate for its violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918037-REL


Study Guide: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal case between petitioner Tom Barrs and respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, covering the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing. It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. Who are the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what are their respective roles?

2. What specific Arizona Revised Statute was the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association accused of violating, and what does this statute generally require?

3. What was the exact nature of the records request Tom Barrs submitted on November 1, 2018?

4. In the initial hearing, what was the key reason the Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Association?

5. What was the Association’s initial response to Barrs’ records request, and why did Barrs consider it incomplete?

6. Upon what grounds was a rehearing of the case granted?

7. What crucial new evidence presented at the rehearing changed the outcome of the case?

8. How did the Association’s own bylaws and concessions during the rehearing weaken its defense?

9. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision after the rehearing?

10. What financial penalties were imposed on the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association in the final order?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Tom Barrs, the Petitioner, and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. Barrs, a homeowner and member of the Association, filed a petition alleging the Association failed to comply with a records request. The Association, represented in the hearings by Brian Schoeffler, defended its actions against this claim.

2. The Association was accused of violating A.R.S. § 33-1805. This statute requires a homeowners’ association to make its financial and other records reasonably available for examination by a member within ten business days of a request. It also allows the association to charge a fee of not more than fifteen cents per page for copies.

3. On November 1, 2018, Tom Barrs requested “a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018.” He specified that electronic copies were preferable but that he was also willing to pick up hard copies.

4. In the initial hearing, the judge ruled for the Association because the evidence indicated Barrs had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board. This procedural error meant Barrs failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of the statute.

5. The Association responded on November 18, 2018, by providing Barrs with a summary table of Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions. Barrs considered this incomplete because his request was for the underlying communications, including all written requests and approvals, not just a summary list of actions.

6. A rehearing was granted after Petitioner Tom Barrs submitted an appeal to the Arizona Department of Real Estate on June 10, 2019. The Department granted the appeal and referred the matter back to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a new evidentiary hearing.

7. The crucial new evidence showed that the Association’s President had previously appointed Brian Schoeffler as Barrs’ primary contact for records requests. This evidence demonstrated that Barrs had, in fact, followed the specific instructions given to him and was not required to send his request to all board members, directly contradicting the basis for the initial ruling.

8. The Association conceded that its governing documents do not require members to copy all Board members on records requests. It also admitted that its own bylaws regarding the submission of forms for such requests were not adhered to or enforced, which undermined its argument that Barrs had failed to follow proper procedure.

9. The final ruling, issued September 12, 2019, granted the Petitioner’s petition. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Association’s conduct violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 because it did not fully comply with Barrs’ specific and properly submitted request.

10. The Association was ordered to reimburse Petitioner Tom Barrs’ $500.00 filing fee. Additionally, a civil penalty of $500.00 was levied against the Association, payable to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-format answers that require critical thinking and synthesis of information from the case documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Compare and contrast the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the initial decision (April 10, 2019) with those in the rehearing decision (September 12, 2019). Analyze how specific factual clarifications led to a complete reversal of the legal conclusion.

2. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decisions. Detail why the petitioner initially failed to meet this burden and what specific evidence allowed him to successfully meet it in the rehearing.

3. Analyze the testimony and arguments presented by Brian Schoeffler on behalf of the Association across both hearings. Discuss the consistency of his defense, his reasoning based on prior OAH decisions, and his stated fear that providing more documents could be interpreted as an “admission of guilt.”

4. Trace the complete procedural timeline of case No. 19F-H1918037-REL, from the filing of the initial petition on December 17, 2018, to the final, binding order on September 12, 2019. Highlight the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

5. Using the details of this case, write an analysis of the function and importance of A.R.S. § 33-1805 in regulating the relationship between a homeowner and a homeowners’ association. Discuss the statute’s requirements for both parties and the consequences of non-compliance.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies like the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The section of the Arizona Revised Statutes that governs a homeowner’s right to access the records of a homeowners’ association. It mandates that an association must make records available for examination within ten business days of a request.

Associated Asset Management (AAM)

The management company that served as the accounting firm for the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association. Petitioner was instructed at one point to direct requests to Lori Lock-Lee at AAM.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The governing body that oversees the operations of the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision. The Desert Ranch HOA is governed by its CC&Rs.

Environmental Design Committee (EDC)

A committee within the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association responsible for reviewing and approving architectural and landscaping changes. Brian Schoeffler was the Chairman of the EDC.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Tom Barrs is the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue over the other.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted upon appeal, to re-examine the issues and evidence. The rehearing in this case took place on August 27, 2019, and resulted in the reversal of the initial decision.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association is the Respondent.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, providing a neutral forum for resolving disputes like the one between Barrs and the Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918037-REL


Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918037-REL)

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute was the Association’s failure to fully comply with a request for records under Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1805.

The case is notable for its complete reversal upon rehearing. An initial ruling on April 10, 2019, favored the Association, finding that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request by not emailing all Board members. However, this decision was overturned in a final, binding order on September 12, 2019. In the rehearing, the Petitioner presented new evidence demonstrating he was following the Association’s own prior written instructions for submitting such requests.

The ALJ ultimately concluded that the Association did violate A.R.S. § 33-1805 by providing only a summary document instead of making the full records available for examination. Consequently, the final order granted the Petitioner’s petition, mandated the full reimbursement of his $500 filing fee, and levied an additional $500 civil penalty against the Association. The case underscores the critical importance of procedural compliance and the weight of documented instructions in governing interactions between homeowners and their associations.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent: Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (“the Association”).

Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jenna Clark.

Core Allegation: Whether the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner.

Case Numbers:

◦ 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)

◦ 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

II. Chronology of the Dispute

Jul. 19, 2017

Association President Catherine Overby appoints Environmental Design Committee (EDC) Director Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s primary contact for records requests.

Jul. 18, 2018

Ms. Overby instructs the Petitioner to direct all requests to the Association’s management company, Associated Asset Management (AAM), specifically to Lori Lock-Lee.

Nov. 1, 2018

Petitioner submits the records request at issue via email to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee.

Nov. 2, 2018

Ms. Loch-Lee acknowledges the request, states she will forward it to all Board members, and clarifies that AAM is only the Association’s accounting firm.

Nov. 18, 2018

Mr. Schoeffler responds on behalf of the Association, providing a summary table of EDC actions but not the full records. He also advises the Petitioner that all Board members must be copied on future requests.

Dec. 17, 2018

Petitioner files a single-issue petition against the Association with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, paying a $500 fee.

Mar. 6, 2019

Petitioner sends a follow-up email specifying the exact documents he is seeking, referencing items listed in the summary table he received.

Mar. 11, 2019

Mr. Schoeffler replies, asserting the request was already fulfilled and instructing the Petitioner to submit a new request for the additional items.

Mar. 17, 2019

Mr. Schoeffler emails again, claiming the original request was improperly submitted to only two of four Board members and that providing more documents could be seen as an “admission of guilt.”

Mar. 21, 2019

The first evidentiary hearing is held at the OAH.

Apr. 10, 2019

The initial ALJ Decision is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Jun. 10, 2019

Petitioner submits an appeal to the Department, which is granted.

Aug. 27, 2019

A rehearing is held at the OAH.

Sep. 12, 2019

The final ALJ Decision is issued, reversing the initial ruling and granting the Petitioner’s petition.

III. The Records Request and Response

Petitioner’s Request (November 1, 2018)

The Petitioner submitted a clear and direct request for specific records via email, citing the relevant statute:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

Association’s Response (November 18, 2018)

The Association did not provide the requested documents (e.g., letters, emails, applications). Instead, it provided a “summary table listing of some, not all, EDC actions.” As of the August 27, 2019, rehearing, the Petitioner had still not received the full documentation he originally requested.

Petitioner’s Clarification (March 6, 2019)

In an attempt to resolve the issue, the Petitioner sent a detailed follow-up email outlining the specific missing records by referencing the line items in the Association’s own summary table. This demonstrated that his request was not for a vague “list of actions” but for the underlying correspondence. This included requests for:

• Copies of violation notices and “Full Compliance” correspondence.

• Complaint correspondence from homeowners regarding shrubs and subsequent citations.

• Submittal correspondence for a project from Mr. Schoeffler himself, along with approvals.

• Original submittals and approvals for a garage remodel and septic install.

IV. Analysis of the Two Administrative Rulings

The opposite outcomes of the two hearings hinged entirely on the validity of the Petitioner’s original email submission.

A. Initial ALJ Decision (April 10, 2019) – In Favor of Respondent (HOA)

Central Finding: The Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request because he sent it to only two Board members, not the entire Board.

Reasoning: The ALJ concluded that because the request was improperly submitted, the Association was not obligated to fulfill it under A.R.S. § 33-1805. Therefore, its failure to provide the full records did not constitute a violation. The decision noted, “Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation…”

Outcome: The petition was denied. The Association was not required to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee, and his request for a civil penalty was denied.

B. Rehearing ALJ Decision (September 12, 2019) – In Favor of Petitioner (Barrs)

Central Finding: The Petitioner did properly submit his records request by emailing the designated contacts.

Key New Evidence: The Petitioner introduced two exhibits proving he had received explicit instructions from the Association President on where to direct his requests:

1. A July 19, 2017 communication appointing EDC Chairman Brian Schoeffler as his primary records request contact.

2. A July 18, 2018 communication instructing him to direct requests to the management company (AAM).

Reasoning: The ALJ found this evidence dispositive, stating, “Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.” With the submission deemed proper, the focus shifted to the response. The ALJ concluded that providing a summary table was not compliant with the statute’s requirement to make records “reasonably available for examination.”

Outcome: The initial decision was reversed, and the Petitioner’s petition was granted.

V. Key Arguments and Testimonies

Petitioner (Tom Barrs):

◦ Argued his dispute was with the adequacy of the Association’s response, not its timeliness.

◦ Alleged the Association acted in bad faith and willfully withheld records, citing a previous OAH adjudication over a similar request.

◦ Successfully demonstrated he had followed the Association’s own prior instructions for submitting requests.

Respondent (via Brian Schoeffler):

◦ Maintained that the request was invalid because it was not sent to all four Board members, an argument that collapsed during the rehearing.

◦ Admitted the Association’s governing documents do not contain a requirement that all Board members be copied on records requests.

◦ Justified the incomplete response by stating that providing additional documents after the petition was filed could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

◦ Reasoned that the Association acted as it did because a previous, similar dispute had been decided in its favor.

VI. Final Order and Penalties

The binding order issued on September 12, 2019, following the rehearing, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted in its entirety.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Association was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate for its violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf in the initial hearing; appeared as a witness in the rehearing.
  • Jonathan Dessaules (petitioner attorney)
    Dessaules Law Group
    Appeared on behalf of Petitioner in the rehearing.

Respondent Side

  • Brian Schoeffler (respondent representative / EDC chairman / witness)
    Desert Ranch Homeowners Association
    Also identified as a Board Director.
  • Catherine Overby (HOA president / board member)
    Desert Ranch Homeowners Association
    Appointed Mr. Schoeffler as Petitioner’s primary records request contact.
  • Lori Loch-Lee (property manager)
    Associated Asset Management (AAM)
    Vice President of Client Services.
  • Amanda Shaw (property manager)
    AAM LLC
    Contact for Respondent.
  • B. Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Received electronic transmission of the rehearing decision.

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
  • Dan Gardner (ADRE staff)
    ADRE
    HOA Coordinator.

Other Participants

  • Gerard Manieri (observer)
    Listed as 'G. Mangiero' in initial hearing source.
  • Peter Ashkin (observer)
    Observed initial hearing.
  • Stephen Banks (observer)
    Observed initial hearing.
  • Noah Banks (observer)
    Observed initial hearing.
  • Stephen Barrs (observer)
    Observed rehearing.
  • Abraham Barrs (observer)
    Observed rehearing.

Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-09-12
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $500.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel Jonathan A. Dessaules
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to provide the full requested documentation relating to EDC actions and communications. The Petitioner's request for relief was granted, resulting in the reimbursement of the $500 filing fee and the imposition of a $500 civil penalty against the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request.

The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with Petitioner's specific request for EDC records (submissions, requests, and approvals) by providing only a summary table instead of the totality of requested communications within the statutory deadline.

Orders: Petitioner's petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01) and tender a $500.00 civil penalty to the Department (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $500.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, HOA Violation, Civil Penalty, Filing Fee Reimbursement
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-107
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918037-REL Decision – 700566.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:08:27 (149.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918037-REL


Briefing Document: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decisions concerning a records request dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent). The central issue was whether the Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805 by failing to adequately fulfill a records request submitted by the Petitioner on November 1, 2018.

The initial hearing on March 21, 2019, resulted in an April 10, 2019, decision in favor of the Association. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request to all members of the Association’s Board, and thus the Association’s partial response (a summary table) did not constitute a statutory violation.

Following a successful appeal by the Petitioner, a rehearing was held on August 27, 2019. New evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner had followed prior express instructions from the Association regarding who to contact for records requests. Consequently, the ALJ issued a new decision on September 12, 2019, reversing the original order. The final ruling found the Association in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee and was assessed a civil penalty of $500.

Case Overview

Case Numbers

No. 19F-H1918037-REL (Initial Decision)
No. 19F-H1918037-REL-RHG (Rehearing Decision)

Petitioner

Tom Barrs, a property owner and member of the Association.

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners Association, Scottsdale, Arizona.

Central Issue

Whether the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill a records request for Environmental Design Committee (EDC) actions, requests, and approvals.

Initial Petition

Filed by Tom Barrs on December 17, 2018.

Initial Hearing

March 21, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Rehearing

August 27, 2019, before ALJ Jenna Clark.

Final Outcome

Petition granted in favor of Tom Barrs. The Association was found in violation of state law, ordered to reimburse the filing fee, and fined.

Key Individuals and Entities

Role / Affiliation

Tom Barrs

Petitioner; homeowner in the Desert Ranch subdivision.

Desert Ranch HOA

Respondent; homeowners’ association.

Jenna Clark

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Brian Schoeffler

Chairman of the Association’s Environmental Design Committee (EDC); appeared on behalf of the Association.

Catherine Overby

President of the Association’s Board of Directors.

Lori Loch-Lee

Vice President of Client Services at Associated Asset Management (AAM), the Association’s accounting/management company.

Jonathan Dessaules, Esq.

Attorney who appeared on behalf of the Petitioner at the rehearing.

The Records Request and Subsequent Dispute

The Initial Request

On November 1, 2018, at 9:40 p.m., Petitioner submitted an electronic records request to Catherine Overby, Brian Schoeffler, and Lori Loch-Lee. The text of the request was as follows:

“Pursuant to ARS 33-1805, I am requesting a copy of all EDC actions, written requests, and written approvals from October 2017 through October 2018. Soft copies via return email are preferable; otherwise, please let me know when hard copies are available for pickup.”

The Association’s Response and Petitioner’s Follow-Up

November 2, 2018: Lori Loch-Lee from AAM notified the Petitioner she would forward his request to all Board members, noting that AAM was only the Association’s accounting firm.

November 18, 2018: The Petitioner received a summary table listing some EDC actions, not the complete set of communications and documents requested. At this time, he was advised by Brian Schoeffler that he “needed to copy all Board members on records requests.”

March 6, 2019: The Petitioner sent a follow-up email, accusing the Association of willful failure and clarifying the specific records he sought beyond the summary table, including “copies of the communications (letters, emails, and application forms) relating to Environmental Design Review (EDC) submissions, requests, complaints and approvals (or denials).”

March 11, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler replied, arguing that the request had been complied with on November 18, 2018, and directed the Petitioner to “submit a new request” for the additional information.

March 17, 2019: Mr. Schoeffler reiterated that the original request was only sent to two of four Board members and stated that providing additional documents could be “interpreted as an admission of guilt.”

As of the rehearing date (August 27, 2019), the Petitioner had still not received all the documentation requested on November 1, 2018.

Legal Proceedings and Rulings

Initial Hearing and Decision (April 10, 2019)

In the first hearing, the dispute centered on the validity of the request submission and the adequacy of the Association’s response.

Arguments:

Petitioner (Barrs): Argued the Association acted in bad faith and willfully failed to fulfill the request, noting a similar dispute had been previously adjudicated. He was concerned with the completeness of the response, not its timeliness.

Respondent (HOA): Argued it had complied with the request by providing a summary table, consistent with its handling of a previous dispute with the Petitioner. Mr. Schoeffler testified that the response was untimely (provided on the 11th business day) but asserted it was otherwise sufficient.

ALJ Conclusion: The Judge ruled in favor of the Association, denying the Petitioner’s petition. The key finding was that the Petitioner had failed to properly submit his request.

“Because the credible evidence of record reflects that Petitioner failed to properly submit his records request to the Board, Petitioner has failed established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 for providing him with a summary table on November 18, 2018.”

The decision also noted that the statute does not legally obligate an HOA to email copies of records.

Rehearing and Final Decision (September 12, 2019)

After the Petitioner’s appeal was granted, a rehearing introduced new evidence that fundamentally changed the outcome.

New Evidence and Concessions:

July 19, 2017 Instruction: Evidence showed Association President Catherine Overby had previously appointed Brian Schoeffler as the Petitioner’s “primary records request contact.”

July 18, 2018 Instruction: Evidence showed Ms. Overby had also instructed the Petitioner to direct requests to the management company, AAM.

Association Concessions: The Respondent conceded that its governing documents do not require all Board members to be copied on records requests and that its own bylaws regarding submission forms are not adhered to or enforced.

ALJ’s Reversed Conclusion: The Judge reversed the prior decision and granted the Petitioner’s petition. The new evidence proved the Petitioner had followed express instructions from the Association.

“Petitioner’s November 01, 2018, records request was not required to be sent to all members of the Association’s Board, as Petitioner had expressly been instructed to only send his records requests to the Association’s EDC Chairman, Mr. Schoeffler, which he did.”

The Judge concluded that the partial response was a clear violation of the law.

“Petitioner is correct that the Association did not fully comply with his specific request, and has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the summary table provided by the Association was a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”

Final Order and Penalties

The Administrative Law Judge’s Final Order on September 12, 2019, which is binding on the parties, mandated the following:

1. Petition Granted: The Petitioner’s petition was granted.

2. Filing Fee Reimbursement: The Respondent (Desert Ranch HOA) was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

3. Civil Penalty: The Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.


James Dutton vs. Cielo Noche Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-05
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James Dutton Counsel Steven W. Cheifetz
Respondent Cielo Noche Community Association Counsel Lydia Linsmeier; Nicholas Nogami

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the petition, finding that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by failing to notice at least one meeting which was improperly held in closed session. The Tribunal noted that while some executive sessions regarding pending litigation were permissible, meetings regarding vendor changes (management and landscaping) required open session and notice. The filing fee was refunded, but no civil penalty was assessed as the conduct was not found to be intentional or in bad faith.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide notice of meetings and acting on results of secret meetings

Petitioner alleged the Association violated open meeting laws by failing to provide notice of meetings held between November 2017 and May 2018, specifically regarding the hiring of new management and landscaping companies in executive session without community input or proper notice.

Orders: The Tribunal found the Respondent held at least one closed meeting that should have been open/noticed. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 6
  • 7
  • 48
  • 49
  • 50

Decision Documents

19F-H1918014-REL Decision – 693361.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:15:40 (45.6 KB)

19F-H1918014-REL Decision – 699583.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:15:40 (194.0 KB)

**Case Summary: James Dutton vs. Cielo Noche Community Association**
**Case No.** 19F-H1918014-REL
**Forum:** Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)
**Administrative Law Judge:** Jenna Clark

**Overview and Main Issues**
This case involved a dispute between Petitioner James Dutton, a homeowner and former Board President, and the Respondent, Cielo Noche Community Association. The central legal issue was whether the Association violated **A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law)** by failing to provide notice of Board meetings and conducting business in secret executive sessions between November 2017 and May 2018,.

**Key Facts and Arguments**
* **Petitioner’s Position:** Dutton argued that the Board improperly utilized executive sessions to make significant financial and operational decisions without community input. Specifically, he presented evidence that the Board voted to replace the management company (Trestle with Tri-City) and the landscaping vendor (Peak) during closed sessions,,. Dutton noted that the new management contract cost the community 3% more than the previous one. He further alleged that the Board failed to read minutes from emergency meetings held in September and November 2018 at subsequent open meetings, as required by law,.
* **Respondent’s Position:** The Association contended that the closed sessions were necessary and privileged. Witnesses testified that discussions regarding the management company involved "employee performance" and that other closed sessions concerned pending litigation and settlement negotiations with the developer, K. Hovnanian Homes (KHOV), regarding construction defects,,.
* **Testimony on Compliance:** Kari Moyer, the community manager from Tri-City, admitted that a July 2018 meeting was not noticed due to a miscommunication. She also testified that she subsequently had to inform the Board that they were not permitted to hold executive sessions for the reasons they had been using and instructed them to hold such discussions in open session moving forward.

**Legal Analysis**
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) evaluated the evidence under **A.R.S. § 33-1804**. This statute mandates that all meetings of a planned community association be open to members, with limited exceptions for legal advice, pending litigation, and personnel matters,. The law also requires that minutes from emergency meetings be read and approved at the next regularly scheduled meeting.

The Tribunal found that while the Board claimed privilege regarding the developer negotiations, the Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent held at least one closed meeting that should have been open. Furthermore, the lack of proper notice for these meetings constituted a violation of the state's Open Meeting Law.

**Final Decision and Order**
* **Ruling:** The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by failing to properly notice meetings and holding discussions in closed sessions that required open deliberation,.
* **Financial Outcome:** The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00.
* **Civil Penalties:** The Tribunal declined to assess a civil penalty against the Association. The Judge determined that the record did not reflect that the Board’s conduct was intentional, negligent, or committed in bad faith.

**Date of Order:** April 05, 2019.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • James Dutton (petitioner)
    Cielo Noche subdivision
    Former Board President; property owner
  • Steven W. Cheifetz (attorney)
    Cheifetz Law, PLLC
    Counsel for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C. Nogami (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Lydia Linsmeier (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen PLC
    Counsel for Respondent
  • Kari Moyer (witness)
    Tri-City Property Management Services
    Community Manager
  • David Hibler (witness)
    Cielo Noche Community Association
    Board Treasurer

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Signed minute entries/transmission

Other Participants

  • Cindo Dutton (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Aaron Smith (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Bob Willis (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Thomas Pruit (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Kenny Shepherd (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Luke Clesceri (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Carol Clesceri (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Derek Zeigler (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Carole Cozzi (observer)
    Attended hearing
  • Anthony Cozzi (observer)
    Attended hearing

Michael Stoltenberg vs Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs §§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, as CC&R § 4.1 requires uniform assessment and no provision requires or allows Respondent to assess Petitioner less due to his rock yard and refusal of maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA Assessment Uniformity Requirement

Petitioner, who had rock landscaping and refused HOA maintenance, alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by assessing him uniform dues, arguing he should pay less since HOA expenditures on lawn maintenance were substantial and primarily benefited neighbors with grass yards.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 4.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Uniform Dues, CC&R Enforcement, Landscaping Maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:59 (141.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918038-REL


Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918038-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict centered on Mr. Stoltenberg’s claim that he should pay lower HOA assessments because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards requiring more costly maintenance by the HOA.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately denied the petition. The decision rested on an unambiguous interpretation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Judge found that the CC&Rs explicitly obligate the HOA to maintain landscaping on all individual lots and, crucially, require assessments to be uniform for all members to cover these “common expenses.” The petitioner’s argument for a reduced assessment was unsupported by any provision in the governing documents. Furthermore, evidence showed that Mr. Stoltenberg had actively refused the HOA access to his property to install a community irrigation system and to perform the very landscaping maintenance that is a central component of the assessments.

Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918038-REL

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Rancho Del Oro.

Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA).

Hearing Date: March 19, 2019

Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Core Allegation: On December 29, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition alleging the HOA violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs (§§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2) by levying the same assessment fees on his property as on neighboring properties with grass lawns.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Michael Stoltenberg)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the argument of fairness, contending that his assessment should be lower because his property does not utilize the HOA’s most expensive landscaping services.

Primary Argument: It is inequitable for the HOA to charge him the same amount as neighbors with grass yards, given that his front yard is rock and does not receive the same level of maintenance.

Financial Evidence: The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the HOA spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which constituted 39% of its total budget.

Refusal of Services: The Petitioner acknowledged that he refused to allow the HOA access to his property for two key purposes:

1. To install irrigation pipes connecting his lot to a new community well.

2. To perform any landscape maintenance on his front yard.

Justification for Refusal: The Petitioner accused the HOA of previously killing his trees during maintenance activities and stated that he now undertakes all maintenance of his own yard.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Rancho Del Oro HOA)

The HOA’s defense was grounded in its adherence to the plain language of its governing documents, arguing that its actions were not only permissible but mandated by the CC&Rs.

Primary Argument: The HOA is legally bound by its CC&Rs to levy uniform assessments on all members and is simultaneously obligated to maintain the landscaping on every individual lot.

Key Testimony (Diana Crites, Property Manager):

◦ CC&R § 5.1(a) explicitly requires the HOA to maintain the yards of its members.

◦ CC&R § 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly, without regard to the type of landscaping they have chosen or whether they permit the HOA to perform its maintenance duties.

◦ The Petitioner’s property is one of eight constructed by a different developer, who did not originally install grass or an irrigation system.

◦ The HOA has since drilled a community well to address water costs and has offered to remove rock and install grass for these properties, an offer the Petitioner could accept.

Supporting Evidence (Letter from Dawn Simpson, former bookkeeper):

◦ A 2013 HOA project was initiated to install a community well for landscaping and to connect all homes, including the Petitioner’s.

◦ The letter details an incident where the Petitioner “became very heated with [the] contractor” and “declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose.”

◦ This action directly halted all construction to connect his property to the irrigation system and ceased all landscaping services provided by the HOA.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision centered on the clear, unambiguous language of specific articles within the CC&Rs. The petitioner failed to identify any language that would permit or require a non-uniform assessment.

CC&R Section

Key Language

Implication & Ruling

Article IV, Section 4.1

Assessments “shall be used for the… common benefit… of the Owners” and “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

This establishes the principle of uniform, shared liability for common expenses, regardless of an individual owner’s specific use of a particular service.

Article V, Section 5.1(a)

“The Association shall maintain… landscaping… It shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.”

This article imposes a direct obligation on the HOA to maintain all members’ landscaping, not merely an optional service.

Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, held the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

Interpretation of Covenants: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The judge found the CC&Rs to be unambiguous, requiring a holistic interpretation. The documents clearly mandate that the HOA must maintain all yards and must assess all members equally to fund that maintenance.

Final Ruling: The Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. He failed to point to any provision within the CC&Rs that “allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard.”

Order: The petition was denied. The HOA’s practice of charging uniform assessments was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918038-REL


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 19F-H1918038-REL, Michael Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Short-Answer Quiz Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this case, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation in the petition filed by Michael Stoltenberg with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, what was the financial basis for his claim of unfair assessment?

4. Describe the history of the water and irrigation system issue at the Petitioner’s property prior to 2013, as detailed in Dawn Simpson’s letter.

5. What action did the Petitioner take during the 2013 well construction project, and what were the consequences of this action?

6. According to Article V, Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs, what specific maintenance obligation does the homeowners’ association have regarding individual lots?

7. How did Diana Crites, the HOA’s property manager, justify the uniform assessment for all homeowners based on the CC&Rs?

8. What reason did Ms. Crites provide for why eight units, including the Petitioner’s, were originally landscaped with rock instead of grass?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this hearing, and on which party does the burden of proof rest?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core legal reasoning for this decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” Mr. Stoltenberg is a homeowner and member of the HOA who filed a complaint against the association. The Respondent is the governing HOA for the Rancho Del Oro community in Yuma, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated multiple sections of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). His central claim was that it was unfair for the HOA to charge him the same assessment fees as his neighbors because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards that require more maintenance.

3. The financial basis for his claim was the HOA’s budget. The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the Respondent spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which accounted for 39% of the total budget.

4. Prior to 2013, the Petitioner made several complaints that his home was not connected to the community water system. The HOA Board’s position was that the Petitioner knew his home was not connected to the system when he purchased it.

5. During the 2013 construction to install a well and connect all homes to an irrigation system, the Petitioner became “very heated” with the contractor. He declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose, which halted all construction in his backyard and all landscaping provided by the HOA for his front yard.

6. Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping even on privately owned lots.

7. Diana Crites testified that CC&R Section 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly. She stated this uniformity applies regardless of the type of landscaping an owner has chosen or whether they permit the HOA onto their property to perform maintenance.

8. Ms. Crites testified that the eight units were built by a different developer after the original construction and were not equipped with an irrigation system or grass. She believed rock was used in the front yards of these lots due to the high cost of water, an issue later resolved by the installation of a community well.

9. The legal standard is “a preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must be convincing enough to make the contention more probably true than not. The burden of proof to establish a CC&R violation rests on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The reasoning was that the Petitioner failed to bear his burden of proof because he could not point to any provision in the CC&Rs that allows or requires the HOA to assess him less than his neighbors based on his landscaping choice or his refusal to allow maintenance.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a detailed response for each, citing specific evidence and CC&R provisions from the case document.

1. Analyze the central conflict between the Petitioner’s concept of fairness and the Respondent’s interpretation of the CC&Rs. Use specific clauses from the CC&Rs (e.g., Articles IV and V) to support the analysis of each party’s position.

2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. How did the evidence presented by both the Petitioner (e.g., budget figures) and the Respondent (e.g., witness testimony and CC&Rs) contribute to the judge’s final decision regarding this standard?

3. Trace the history of the water and irrigation issue at the Petitioner’s property, from his initial complaints to his refusal to allow construction access. How did these past events impact the central issue of the 2019 hearing?

4. Explain the legal principle that “restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole.” How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this principle by referencing both Section 4.1 (Assessments) and Section 5.1(a) (Maintenance) of the CC&Rs to reach her conclusion?

5. Evaluate the actions of the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg. Based on the evidence presented, did his own actions—specifically, denying the HOA access to his property—undermine his legal argument for a reduced assessment? Explain your reasoning using facts from the hearing evidence.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency, and makes decisions in matters referred by state departments like the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Assessments

Charges levied by the homeowners’ association on its members. According to CC&R § 4.1, they are used for promoting the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of owners, including property maintenance, and are to be proportioned to each owner’s respective common interests.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to establish their claim. In this matter, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

Common Area

Defined in CC&R § 1.8 as “those portions of the Project to which title is held by the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the Owners and excepting the individual units.”

Common Expenses

Defined in CC&R § 1.9 as the “actual and estimated expenses of operating the association,” including any reasonable reserves and all sums designated as Common Expense by project documents.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents for a planned community that outline the rules, obligations, and rights of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.

Easements

A right of use over the property of another. CC&R § 2.1 grants every owner a “non-exclusive easement and equitable right of use and enjoyment in, to, and throughout the Common Area.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing body for a planned community (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) whose members are the property owners within that community. It is responsible for managing common areas and enforcing the CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Rancho Del Oro.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case. The source defines it as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The source notes that in Arizona, an unambiguous restrictive covenant is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be construed as a whole.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918038-REL


He Sued His HOA Over an ‘Unfair’ Fee—The Reason He Lost Is a Warning for Every Homeowner

Introduction: The HOA Fee Frustration

For many homeowners, the monthly or annual bill from the Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a source of constant frustration. It’s easy to look at the line items—landscaping, pool maintenance, common area repairs—and wonder if you’re truly getting your money’s worth, especially when you feel you aren’t using a particular service.

This was exactly the position of Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Arizona who believed he had an open-and-shut case to lower his HOA fees. His argument seemed logical, fair, and simple. But the ultimate ruling in his case, Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, reveals some surprising and crucial truths about how HOA rules actually work and serves as a powerful lesson for every person living in a planned community.

Takeaway 1: You Pay for the Service, Even If You Actively Refuse It

Michael Stoltenberg’s argument was straightforward: his front yard was landscaped with rocks, while his neighbors had grass. He pointed out that in 2016, lawn maintenance accounted for a significant 39% of the HOA’s total budget. He argued it was fundamentally unfair for him to pay the same assessment as his neighbors when he wasn’t consuming this costly service.

His sense of unfairness was rooted in the history of the development. His home was one of eight built by a different developer than the rest of the community. Likely due to high water costs at the time, these eight lots were constructed without irrigation systems or grass. From the very beginning, his property was different. This context makes the crucial twist in the case all the more telling. In 2013, the HOA undertook a community-wide project to drill a new well and install an irrigation system, an effort designed to rectify the inconsistency and bring these outlier properties up to the community standard. When the construction reached Stoltenberg’s property, he refused the workers access.

Testimony from the HOA’s former bookkeeper laid this fact bare:

At this time, [Petitioner] declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose. This was also to include his front yard. This halted all construction that was currently in place in his back yard, and all landscaping being provided by the HOA for the front yard.

Legally, this transformed the situation. Stoltenberg’s complaint was no longer about a service he didn’t need, but about a service he actively rejected. This case establishes a critical principle: HOA assessments are tied to your property ownership and membership in the community, not your individual consumption of services. By refusing the service, Mr. Stoltenberg did not absolve himself of the cost associated with its availability to the community.

Takeaway 2: “Common Benefit” Isn’t the Same as “Your Personal Benefit”

The legal foundation for the HOA’s position rested in the language of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Section 4.1 states that assessments are to be used for the “common benefit, and enjoyment of the Owners.”

In an HOA context, “common benefit” is a broad concept. It means that well-maintained landscaping throughout the entire neighborhood enhances curb appeal, creates a cohesive community aesthetic, and supports the property values of all residents. This includes Mr. Stoltenberg, whose home value is supported by the beautiful, uniform appearance of the neighborhood, regardless of whether his specific yard has grass. It’s the same reason a homeowner without children still pays for the upkeep of a community playground; the amenity benefits the community as a whole.

Further testimony reinforced this point. The HOA’s property manager stated that the association was still willing to remove the rock and install grass on his property, just as they had already done for two other homeowners in a similar situation. The benefit was available to him; he simply continued to refuse it.

Takeaway 3: The Rules Are a Package Deal, Not an A La Carte Menu

Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge’s role was not to rule on a general sense of fairness but to enforce the community’s governing documents as written. When examined together, two key clauses in the CC&Rs created a contractual vise, leaving the judge with no other legal option. The two clauses created a perfect, inescapable loop.

Section 5.1(a): This clause states the HOA has an obligation that “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” The HOA wasn’t just permitted to do the work; it was contractually required to.

Section 4.1: This clause, which also defines assessments as being for the “common benefit,” requires that they “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

The documents legally obligated the HOA to maintain all yards and to charge every owner the same proportional amount for doing so. The CC&Rs provided no mechanism for a homeowner to opt-out of a service and receive a corresponding discount. The judge’s final ruling was decisive, emphasizing the absolute nature of this contractual obligation:

Because Petitioner has not pointed to any CC&R that allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard, Petitioner has not borne his burden in this matter.

Conclusion: The Contract You Live In

The case of Michael Stoltenberg is a powerful reminder that an HOA’s CC&Rs are not just a set of neighborhood rules; they are restrictive covenants that run with the land. When you buy the property, you are irrevocably buying into the contract that governs it. These documents are designed to prioritize the uniform application of standards for the collective good, and they supersede an individual’s personal preferences or interpretation of what seems “fair.”

This case forces every potential buyer to ask a critical question: Are you simply purchasing a dwelling, or are you prepared to become a party to the binding legal contract that governs the entire community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael Stoltenberg (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent Entity)
    Entity, not human
  • Nicole D. Payne (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Diana Crites (Property Manager/Witness)
    Property manager for Respondent; testified
  • Dawn Simpson (Former Bookkeeper/Witness)
    Former bookkeeper for Respondent; provided a letter/testimony regarding history
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Received transmission of the Order

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received transmission of the Order
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Transmitted the decision

Michael Stoltenberg vs Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918038-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-03
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole D. Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs §§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the HOA acted in accordance with its governing documents (CC&Rs § 4.1) by imposing uniform assessments. The CC&Rs did not provide an exception for reduced assessments based on an owner's choice of landscaping (rock yard) or refusal of HOA maintenance services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, as CC&R § 4.1 requires uniform assessment and no provision requires or allows Respondent to assess Petitioner less due to his rock yard and refusal of maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA Assessment Uniformity Requirement

Petitioner, who had rock landscaping and refused HOA maintenance, alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by assessing him uniform dues, arguing he should pay less since HOA expenditures on lawn maintenance were substantial and primarily benefited neighbors with grass yards.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 4.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Uniform Dues, CC&R Enforcement, Landscaping Maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918038-REL Decision – 698869.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:18 (141.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918038-REL


Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918038-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict centered on Mr. Stoltenberg’s claim that he should pay lower HOA assessments because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards requiring more costly maintenance by the HOA.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately denied the petition. The decision rested on an unambiguous interpretation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Judge found that the CC&Rs explicitly obligate the HOA to maintain landscaping on all individual lots and, crucially, require assessments to be uniform for all members to cover these “common expenses.” The petitioner’s argument for a reduced assessment was unsupported by any provision in the governing documents. Furthermore, evidence showed that Mr. Stoltenberg had actively refused the HOA access to his property to install a community irrigation system and to perform the very landscaping maintenance that is a central component of the assessments.

Case Overview

Case Number: 19F-H1918038-REL

Parties Involved:

Petitioner: Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Rancho Del Oro.

Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA).

Hearing Date: March 19, 2019

Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky, Administrative Law Judge

Core Allegation: On December 29, 2018, the Petitioner filed a petition alleging the HOA violated multiple sections of its CC&Rs (§§ 1.8, 1.9, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, and 14.2) by levying the same assessment fees on his property as on neighboring properties with grass lawns.

Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Michael Stoltenberg)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the argument of fairness, contending that his assessment should be lower because his property does not utilize the HOA’s most expensive landscaping services.

Primary Argument: It is inequitable for the HOA to charge him the same amount as neighbors with grass yards, given that his front yard is rock and does not receive the same level of maintenance.

Financial Evidence: The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the HOA spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which constituted 39% of its total budget.

Refusal of Services: The Petitioner acknowledged that he refused to allow the HOA access to his property for two key purposes:

1. To install irrigation pipes connecting his lot to a new community well.

2. To perform any landscape maintenance on his front yard.

Justification for Refusal: The Petitioner accused the HOA of previously killing his trees during maintenance activities and stated that he now undertakes all maintenance of his own yard.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Rancho Del Oro HOA)

The HOA’s defense was grounded in its adherence to the plain language of its governing documents, arguing that its actions were not only permissible but mandated by the CC&Rs.

Primary Argument: The HOA is legally bound by its CC&Rs to levy uniform assessments on all members and is simultaneously obligated to maintain the landscaping on every individual lot.

Key Testimony (Diana Crites, Property Manager):

◦ CC&R § 5.1(a) explicitly requires the HOA to maintain the yards of its members.

◦ CC&R § 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly, without regard to the type of landscaping they have chosen or whether they permit the HOA to perform its maintenance duties.

◦ The Petitioner’s property is one of eight constructed by a different developer, who did not originally install grass or an irrigation system.

◦ The HOA has since drilled a community well to address water costs and has offered to remove rock and install grass for these properties, an offer the Petitioner could accept.

Supporting Evidence (Letter from Dawn Simpson, former bookkeeper):

◦ A 2013 HOA project was initiated to install a community well for landscaping and to connect all homes, including the Petitioner’s.

◦ The letter details an incident where the Petitioner “became very heated with [the] contractor” and “declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose.”

◦ This action directly halted all construction to connect his property to the irrigation system and ceased all landscaping services provided by the HOA.

Analysis of Governing Documents (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision centered on the clear, unambiguous language of specific articles within the CC&Rs. The petitioner failed to identify any language that would permit or require a non-uniform assessment.

CC&R Section

Key Language

Implication & Ruling

Article IV, Section 4.1

Assessments “shall be used for the… common benefit… of the Owners” and “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

This establishes the principle of uniform, shared liability for common expenses, regardless of an individual owner’s specific use of a particular service.

Article V, Section 5.1(a)

“The Association shall maintain… landscaping… It shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.”

This article imposes a direct obligation on the HOA to maintain all members’ landscaping, not merely an optional service.

Legal Conclusions and Final Order

Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg, held the burden to prove by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated its CC&Rs.

Interpretation of Covenants: In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The judge found the CC&Rs to be unambiguous, requiring a holistic interpretation. The documents clearly mandate that the HOA must maintain all yards and must assess all members equally to fund that maintenance.

Final Ruling: The Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof. He failed to point to any provision within the CC&Rs that “allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard.”

Order: The petition was denied. The HOA’s practice of charging uniform assessments was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918038-REL


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the Administrative Law Judge Decision for case number 19F-H1918038-REL, Michael Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Short-Answer Quiz Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this case, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the central allegation in the petition filed by Michael Stoltenberg with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, what was the financial basis for his claim of unfair assessment?

4. Describe the history of the water and irrigation system issue at the Petitioner’s property prior to 2013, as detailed in Dawn Simpson’s letter.

5. What action did the Petitioner take during the 2013 well construction project, and what were the consequences of this action?

6. According to Article V, Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs, what specific maintenance obligation does the homeowners’ association have regarding individual lots?

7. How did Diana Crites, the HOA’s property manager, justify the uniform assessment for all homeowners based on the CC&Rs?

8. What reason did Ms. Crites provide for why eight units, including the Petitioner’s, were originally landscaped with rock instead of grass?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this hearing, and on which party does the burden of proof rest?

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the core legal reasoning for this decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” Mr. Stoltenberg is a homeowner and member of the HOA who filed a complaint against the association. The Respondent is the governing HOA for the Rancho Del Oro community in Yuma, Arizona.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated multiple sections of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). His central claim was that it was unfair for the HOA to charge him the same assessment fees as his neighbors because his property has rock landscaping, while his neighbors have grass yards that require more maintenance.

3. The financial basis for his claim was the HOA’s budget. The Petitioner testified that in 2016, the Respondent spent $54,000 on lawn maintenance and landscaping, which accounted for 39% of the total budget.

4. Prior to 2013, the Petitioner made several complaints that his home was not connected to the community water system. The HOA Board’s position was that the Petitioner knew his home was not connected to the system when he purchased it.

5. During the 2013 construction to install a well and connect all homes to an irrigation system, the Petitioner became “very heated” with the contractor. He declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose, which halted all construction in his backyard and all landscaping provided by the HOA for his front yard.

6. Section 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs states that the Association’s maintenance duties “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” This obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping even on privately owned lots.

7. Diana Crites testified that CC&R Section 4.1 requires all owners to be assessed uniformly. She stated this uniformity applies regardless of the type of landscaping an owner has chosen or whether they permit the HOA onto their property to perform maintenance.

8. Ms. Crites testified that the eight units were built by a different developer after the original construction and were not equipped with an irrigation system or grass. She believed rock was used in the front yards of these lots due to the high cost of water, an issue later resolved by the installation of a community well.

9. The legal standard is “a preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must be convincing enough to make the contention more probably true than not. The burden of proof to establish a CC&R violation rests on the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg.

10. The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The reasoning was that the Petitioner failed to bear his burden of proof because he could not point to any provision in the CC&Rs that allows or requires the HOA to assess him less than his neighbors based on his landscaping choice or his refusal to allow maintenance.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate a detailed response for each, citing specific evidence and CC&R provisions from the case document.

1. Analyze the central conflict between the Petitioner’s concept of fairness and the Respondent’s interpretation of the CC&Rs. Use specific clauses from the CC&Rs (e.g., Articles IV and V) to support the analysis of each party’s position.

2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. How did the evidence presented by both the Petitioner (e.g., budget figures) and the Respondent (e.g., witness testimony and CC&Rs) contribute to the judge’s final decision regarding this standard?

3. Trace the history of the water and irrigation issue at the Petitioner’s property, from his initial complaints to his refusal to allow construction access. How did these past events impact the central issue of the 2019 hearing?

4. Explain the legal principle that “restrictive covenants must be construed as a whole.” How did the Administrative Law Judge apply this principle by referencing both Section 4.1 (Assessments) and Section 5.1(a) (Maintenance) of the CC&Rs to reach her conclusion?

5. Evaluate the actions of the Petitioner, Mr. Stoltenberg. Based on the evidence presented, did his own actions—specifically, denying the HOA access to his property—undermine his legal argument for a reduced assessment? Explain your reasoning using facts from the hearing evidence.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an independent state agency, and makes decisions in matters referred by state departments like the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Assessments

Charges levied by the homeowners’ association on its members. According to CC&R § 4.1, they are used for promoting the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of owners, including property maintenance, and are to be proportioned to each owner’s respective common interests.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to establish their claim. In this matter, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs.

Common Area

Defined in CC&R § 1.8 as “those portions of the Project to which title is held by the Association for the common use and enjoyment of the Owners and excepting the individual units.”

Common Expenses

Defined in CC&R § 1.9 as the “actual and estimated expenses of operating the association,” including any reasonable reserves and all sums designated as Common Expense by project documents.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing documents for a planned community that outline the rules, obligations, and rights of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.

Easements

A right of use over the property of another. CC&R § 2.1 grants every owner a “non-exclusive easement and equitable right of use and enjoyment in, to, and throughout the Common Area.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The governing body for a planned community (Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association) whose members are the property owners within that community. It is responsible for managing common areas and enforcing the CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Rancho Del Oro.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case. The source defines it as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document that limits the use of the property. The source notes that in Arizona, an unambiguous restrictive covenant is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be construed as a whole.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918038-REL


He Sued His HOA Over an ‘Unfair’ Fee—The Reason He Lost Is a Warning for Every Homeowner

Introduction: The HOA Fee Frustration

For many homeowners, the monthly or annual bill from the Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a source of constant frustration. It’s easy to look at the line items—landscaping, pool maintenance, common area repairs—and wonder if you’re truly getting your money’s worth, especially when you feel you aren’t using a particular service.

This was exactly the position of Michael Stoltenberg, a homeowner in Arizona who believed he had an open-and-shut case to lower his HOA fees. His argument seemed logical, fair, and simple. But the ultimate ruling in his case, Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, reveals some surprising and crucial truths about how HOA rules actually work and serves as a powerful lesson for every person living in a planned community.

Takeaway 1: You Pay for the Service, Even If You Actively Refuse It

Michael Stoltenberg’s argument was straightforward: his front yard was landscaped with rocks, while his neighbors had grass. He pointed out that in 2016, lawn maintenance accounted for a significant 39% of the HOA’s total budget. He argued it was fundamentally unfair for him to pay the same assessment as his neighbors when he wasn’t consuming this costly service.

His sense of unfairness was rooted in the history of the development. His home was one of eight built by a different developer than the rest of the community. Likely due to high water costs at the time, these eight lots were constructed without irrigation systems or grass. From the very beginning, his property was different. This context makes the crucial twist in the case all the more telling. In 2013, the HOA undertook a community-wide project to drill a new well and install an irrigation system, an effort designed to rectify the inconsistency and bring these outlier properties up to the community standard. When the construction reached Stoltenberg’s property, he refused the workers access.

Testimony from the HOA’s former bookkeeper laid this fact bare:

At this time, [Petitioner] declared that no one was to enter his yard for any purpose. This was also to include his front yard. This halted all construction that was currently in place in his back yard, and all landscaping being provided by the HOA for the front yard.

Legally, this transformed the situation. Stoltenberg’s complaint was no longer about a service he didn’t need, but about a service he actively rejected. This case establishes a critical principle: HOA assessments are tied to your property ownership and membership in the community, not your individual consumption of services. By refusing the service, Mr. Stoltenberg did not absolve himself of the cost associated with its availability to the community.

Takeaway 2: “Common Benefit” Isn’t the Same as “Your Personal Benefit”

The legal foundation for the HOA’s position rested in the language of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Section 4.1 states that assessments are to be used for the “common benefit, and enjoyment of the Owners.”

In an HOA context, “common benefit” is a broad concept. It means that well-maintained landscaping throughout the entire neighborhood enhances curb appeal, creates a cohesive community aesthetic, and supports the property values of all residents. This includes Mr. Stoltenberg, whose home value is supported by the beautiful, uniform appearance of the neighborhood, regardless of whether his specific yard has grass. It’s the same reason a homeowner without children still pays for the upkeep of a community playground; the amenity benefits the community as a whole.

Further testimony reinforced this point. The HOA’s property manager stated that the association was still willing to remove the rock and install grass on his property, just as they had already done for two other homeowners in a similar situation. The benefit was available to him; he simply continued to refuse it.

Takeaway 3: The Rules Are a Package Deal, Not an A La Carte Menu

Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge’s role was not to rule on a general sense of fairness but to enforce the community’s governing documents as written. When examined together, two key clauses in the CC&Rs created a contractual vise, leaving the judge with no other legal option. The two clauses created a perfect, inescapable loop.

Section 5.1(a): This clause states the HOA has an obligation that “shall also include maintenance of the landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” The HOA wasn’t just permitted to do the work; it was contractually required to.

Section 4.1: This clause, which also defines assessments as being for the “common benefit,” requires that they “shall constitute common expenses for which the apartment owners shall be severally liable in proportion to their respective common interests.”

The documents legally obligated the HOA to maintain all yards and to charge every owner the same proportional amount for doing so. The CC&Rs provided no mechanism for a homeowner to opt-out of a service and receive a corresponding discount. The judge’s final ruling was decisive, emphasizing the absolute nature of this contractual obligation:

Because Petitioner has not pointed to any CC&R that allows, much less requires, Respondent to assess Petitioner less because he has a rock yard and will not allow Respondent to maintain his yard, Petitioner has not borne his burden in this matter.

Conclusion: The Contract You Live In

The case of Michael Stoltenberg is a powerful reminder that an HOA’s CC&Rs are not just a set of neighborhood rules; they are restrictive covenants that run with the land. When you buy the property, you are irrevocably buying into the contract that governs it. These documents are designed to prioritize the uniform application of standards for the collective good, and they supersede an individual’s personal preferences or interpretation of what seems “fair.”

This case forces every potential buyer to ask a critical question: Are you simply purchasing a dwelling, or are you prepared to become a party to the binding legal contract that governs the entire community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael Stoltenberg (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent Entity)
    Entity, not human
  • Nicole D. Payne (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Respondent
  • Diana Crites (Property Manager/Witness)
    Property manager for Respondent; testified
  • Dawn Simpson (Former Bookkeeper/Witness)
    Former bookkeeper for Respondent; provided a letter/testimony regarding history
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Received transmission of the Order

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received transmission of the Order
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Transmitted the decision