Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
21F-H2120001-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2021-03-17
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
partial
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Debra K. Morin
Counsel
—
Respondent
Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc.
Counsel
Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1804 A.R.S. § 33-1804
Outcome Summary
Petitioner's petition was affirmed in part and denied in part. Petitioner prevailed on Complaint #1 (improper use of email/unanimous written consent for non-privileged business), but lost on Complaint #2 (alleged improper emergency executive session). Respondent was ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1804 and reimburse the $500 filing fee.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the violation related to the emergency executive session (Complaint #2).
Key Issues & Findings
Non-privileged Association Business Conducted in Closed Session (Complaint #1)
The HOA used unanimous written consents obtained via individual emails from board members to approve association business (such as approving repairs, replacement of equipment, and pruning) outside of open meetings, violating the requirement that all meetings of the board of directors must be open to members.
Orders: Respondent ordered to reimburse the $500.00 filing fee and comply with A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward. No civil penalty assessed due to the COVID-19 pandemic circumstances.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 10-3821
Association Business Conducted in an Emergency Executive Session (Complaint #2)
Petitioner alleged misuse of emergency executive sessions. Respondent represented that the sessions only addressed issues under statutory exceptions. Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that this violation occurred.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Open Meeting Law, Unanimous Written Consent, Executive Session, COVID-19
Administrative Hearing Brief: Morin vs. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative case (No. 21F-H2120001-REL) involving homeowner Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent). The core issue revolved around the association’s adherence to Arizona’s open meeting laws for planned communities, as stipulated in A.R.S. § 33-1804.
The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that the Solera Chandler HOA violated this statute by conducting non-privileged association business without an open meeting. The Board of Directors made numerous decisions between March and July 2020—including approving contracts for repairs, appointing committee members, and changing design guidelines—through a process of “unanimous written consent” executed via individual emails. This method circumvented statutory requirements for 48-hour notice to members, published agendas, and the opportunity for homeowners to speak before a vote.
The HOA defended its actions by citing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and a separate statute, A.R.S. § 10-3821, which permits non-profit corporations to act without a meeting. However, the Judge ruled that the specific requirements of the HOA open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) take precedence, emphasizing the state’s explicit policy in favor of transparency and open meetings for homeowners’ associations.
While the petitioner’s primary complaint was affirmed, a second allegation regarding the misuse of emergency executive sessions was denied due to insufficient evidence. The final order directed the HOA to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1804 in the future and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500 filing fee. No civil penalty was assessed, with the judge acknowledging the “unprecedented global pandemic” as a mitigating circumstance.
Case Overview
Case Number
21F-H2120001-REL
Petitioner
Debra K. Morin
Respondent
Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Jurisdiction
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Timeline of Adjudication
• July 10, 2020: Debra Morin files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• October 29, 2020: The initial administrative hearing is held.
• November 18, 2020: The first Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued.
• February 25, 2021: A rehearing is held at the Respondent’s request to clarify a finding of fact.
• March 17, 2021: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, affirming the original conclusion with a factual correction.
Petitioner’s Allegations
The petitioner, Debra K. Morin, focused her case on two specific complaints alleging violations of Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs (A.R.S. § 33-1804).
Complaint #1: Improper Use of Closed Sessions and Unanimous Written Consent
The petitioner alleged that the Solera HOA Board of Directors conducted non-privileged association business in closed sessions without proper procedure. Specifically, the Board was accused of:
• Failing to provide members with 48-hour notice of meetings.
• Failing to provide agendas for the business being conducted.
• Denying members the opportunity to speak prior to the Board taking action on key issues.
• Using “unanimous written consent” to bypass open meeting requirements.
Complaint #2: Misuse of “Emergency Executive Sessions”
The petitioner further alleged that the Board conducted privileged association business under the guise of “emergency executive sessions” improperly by:
• Failing to identify the specific statutory exception to the open meeting law that permitted the closed session.
• Failing to provide an agenda and 48-hour notice where possible.
• Failing to produce minutes stating the reason for the emergency and submitting them at the next board meeting.
Respondent’s Actions and Defense
The Solera Chandler HOA acknowledged using unanimous written consents but argued its actions were a necessary response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented in-person meetings. The Board asserted its actions were legally authorized under A.R.S. § 10-3821, a statute governing non-profit corporations.
Use of Unanimous Written Consent
Evidence presented at the rehearing established the Board’s procedure. For each action, an individual from the community management company would email each Board member individually to solicit a “yes” or “no” vote. If all members voted “yes,” the action was considered passed by unanimous consent, and the Board President would sign the formal consent document. The HOA stated it had not used this method before the pandemic and did not intend to continue its use.
The following actions were taken by the Board using this method and were later ratified at the August 5, 2020, open Board meeting:
Action Taken via Unanimous Written Consent
March 30, 2020
Approve repair and replacement of sidewalk and community center entrance.
March 30, 2020
Approve repair and replacement of cool decking around both pools.
April 30, 2020
Approve Kirk Sandquist as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.
April 30, 2020
Approve Tom Dusbabek as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.
May 5, 2020
Approve Gilbert Road retention basin project, related irrigation replacement, and addition of 420 tons of granite.
May 8, 2020
Approve replacement of a Carrier 6-ton heat pump.
May 8, 2020
Approve replacement of two Carrier 5-ton heat pumps.
May 27, 2020
Approve hiring Ken Eller to draft architectural drawings.
June 4, 2020
Approve a change to the Design Guidelines at the request of the Architectural Review Committee.
July 1, 2020
Approve the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.
Chronology of Executive Sessions
In addition to the actions taken by written consent, the Board held numerous executive (closed) sessions between March and August 2020, citing specific exceptions in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A). Minutes for these meetings were approved at the August 5, 2020 executive session but were redacted to conceal the substance of the discussions.
Date of Session
Cited Statutory Exceptions for Closed Session (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A))
(2) Pending litigation, (3) Personal/health/financial information
August 5, 2020
(1) Legal advice, (2) Pending litigation, (3) Personal/health/financial information
*Designated an “emergency executive session.”
Adjudication and Legal Rulings
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision rested on the interpretation and primacy of Arizona’s statutes governing homeowners’ associations.
Statutory Conflict and Interpretation
The central legal question was the conflict between two state laws:
• A.R.S. § 33-1804: Specifically requires all HOA Board meetings to be open to all members, with limited exceptions for closed executive sessions. It explicitly states a policy that statutes should be construed “in favor of open meetings.”
• A.R.S. § 10-3821: A general corporate law that allows boards of non-profit corporations to take action “without a meeting” if there is unanimous written consent from all directors.
The Judge concluded that while A.R.S. § 10-3821 may apply to non-profits generally, the more specific statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, governs the conduct of HOA boards. The requirement for open meetings in the HOA statute overrides the provision allowing for action without a meeting in the general non-profit statute.
Ruling on Complaint #1 (Improper Closed Business)
Finding: In favor of the Petitioner.
• The Judge ruled that the Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent committed the violation.
• The decision states, “Respondent improperly conducted association business in closed sessions via email rather than in meetings open to the members.”
• An initial finding that the business was conducted via “conference calls” was corrected after the rehearing to specify the method was individual emails, but this did not change the outcome.
• The Judge gave “consideration to the fact that Respondent was faced with an unprecedented global pandemic” and found that no civil penalty was appropriate under the circumstances.
Ruling on Complaint #2 (Misuse of Executive Sessions)
Finding: In favor of the Respondent.
• The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for this allegation.
• The decision notes, “Nothing in the record suggested the Board discussed other issues that did not fall under the exceptions listed and/or that the May 12, 2020 executive session was not an emergency.”
Final Order and Directives
The Administrative Law Judge’s final, binding order issued on March 17, 2021, included the following directives:
1. Petition Affirmed in Part: The petitioner’s petition was affirmed on the issue of Complaint #1 and denied on the issue of Complaint #2.
2. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: Respondent (Solera Chandler HOA) was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner (Debra Morin) her $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed.
3. Compliance Mandate: Respondent was directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case involving Debra K. Morin and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. It includes short-answer questions with an answer key, essay questions for further analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms based on the provided legal decisions.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information from the source documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main complaints filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent’s Board of Directors?
3. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) did the Petitioner allege the Respondent violated, and what is the general policy purpose of this statute?
4. How did the Respondent justify its use of unanimous written consents and its decision to forgo open meetings from March to July 2020?
5. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final ruling on Complaint #1, which concerned conducting non-privileged association business?
6. What was the ruling on Complaint #2, which concerned the use of emergency executive sessions, and what was the reason for this outcome?
7. A rehearing was granted after the initial decision. What specific factual conclusion from the first decision was the focus of this rehearing?
8. How did the evidence presented at the rehearing clarify the method used by the Board of Directors to pass unanimous written consents?
9. Despite finding the Respondent in violation of state law, why did the Administrative Law Judge decide not to impose a civil penalty?
10. What two actions was the Respondent ordered to take as a result of the final ruling?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Debra K. Morin, the Petitioner, and Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging statutory violations by the Respondent homeowners’ association.
2. The Petitioner’s first complaint alleged that the Respondent conducted non-privileged business in closed sessions using unanimous written consent, without providing proper notice, agendas, or an opportunity for members to speak. The second complaint alleged the Respondent conducted privileged business under the guise of “emergency executive sessions” without proper justification or documentation.
3. The Petitioner alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The stated policy of this statute is that all meetings of a planned community should be conducted openly, with notices and agendas provided to reasonably inform members and ensure they have the ability to speak before a vote is taken.
4. The Respondent argued that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, its Board of Directors was unable to meet in person to protect the health of its members and directors. The Respondent asserted that taking action via unanimous written consents was authorized under a different statute, A.R.S. § 10-3821, which applies to non-profit corporations.
5. The Judge affirmed the Petitioner’s first complaint, finding that she had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent improperly conducted association business. The Judge ruled that while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows for action without a meeting, A.R.S. § 33-1804 specifically requires that HOA board meetings be open to members.
6. The Judge denied the Petitioner’s second complaint. The ruling stated that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the executive sessions were improper, as nothing in the record suggested the Board discussed issues outside of the legally permitted exceptions or that the May 12, 2020 session was not a true emergency.
7. The rehearing focused on Conclusion of Law 8 from the initial decision, which stated that the “Respondent improperly conducted association business in closed sessions via conference calls.” The Respondent disputed that the business related to the unanimous written consents was conducted via conference call.
8. Evidence at the rehearing established that an individual from the community management company would email each Board member individually to request a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all members voted “yes,” the action was considered passed by unanimous consent, which the Judge still found to be a violation of the open meeting law.
9. The Judge gave consideration to the fact that the Respondent was “faced with an unprecedented global pandemic while balancing the need to comply with the applicable statutes.” Because of these unique circumstances, the Judge found that no civil penalty was appropriate.
10. The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner her $500.00 filing fee for the complaint on which she prevailed. The Respondent was also directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the statutory conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1804 (HOA open meetings) and A.R.S. § 10-3821 (non-profit action without a meeting) as presented in this case. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to determine that the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 took precedence for a homeowners’ association.
2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” How did the Petitioner successfully meet this evidentiary burden for Complaint #1 but fail to meet it for Complaint #2?
3. Evaluate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the actions of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association and the final judgment of the Administrative Law Judge. How did this external event influence both the violation itself and the penalty phase of the ruling?
4. According to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), what is the stated public policy of Arizona regarding meetings of planned communities? How did this explicit policy statement likely influence the judge’s interpretation of the law and the final decision regarding Complaint #1?
5. Describe the full procedural history of this case, from the initial petition through the rehearing and final order. What does the granting of a rehearing to correct a factual finding demonstrate about the legal process and the importance of accuracy in judicial decisions?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
A judge who presides over administrative hearings, in this case within the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ hears evidence and issues a decision based on the applicable laws and facts.
A.R.S. § 10-3821
An Arizona Revised Statute pertaining to non-profit corporations. It allows a corporation’s board of directors to take action without a meeting if the action is approved by a unanimous written consent signed by every director.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
An Arizona Revised Statute specifically governing planned communities (homeowners’ associations). It mandates that all board of directors meetings be open to association members, requires 48-hour notice and an agenda, and allows members to speak.
Executive Session
A portion of a board meeting that is closed to association members. A.R.S. § 33-1804 strictly limits these sessions to specific topics, such as receiving legal advice, discussing pending litigation, or reviewing confidential personal, health, or financial information of an individual.
Hearing
A formal proceeding before an Administrative Law Judge where parties present evidence and arguments related to a legal dispute. In this case, hearings were held on October 29, 2020, and February 25, 2021.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this matter, the Arizona Department of Real Estate had jurisdiction to hear disputes between a property owner and a homeowners’ association.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Debra K. Morin was the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative case. It means the evidence presented must be more convincing and probable than the evidence offered in opposition, showing the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”
Rehearing
A second hearing granted to re-examine an issue from an initial hearing. In this case, a rehearing was granted at the Respondent’s request to address the factual finding of how it conducted business (conference calls vs. email).
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., was the Respondent.
Statutory Construction
The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, beginning with the plain text of the statute.
Unanimous Written Consent
A procedure, authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821, where an action is approved in writing by all members of a board of directors without a formal meeting. The Respondent used this method for actions such as approving repairs, appointing committee members, and changing design guidelines.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Legal Battle with Her HOA
Introduction: When Your HOA Goes Dark
In the chaos of early 2020, as the world shut down, many Homeowners’ Association boards faced a critical challenge: how to govern when gathering in person was impossible? For residents of the Solera Chandler community, the answer was alarming—their board went dark. Citing the global crisis, the board began making major community decisions in secret, bypassing open meetings entirely. This raised a crucial legal question for every homeowner in the state: can an HOA board use a pandemic as justification to govern by private email? The legal battle launched by one determined resident, Debra K. Morin, provides a fascinating and unexpected answer.
1. Your HOA Board Can’t Govern by Email—Even in a Pandemic
At first glance, the Solera Chandler HOA board’s actions seemed like a practical response to an unprecedented crisis. To keep community business moving, the board began approving actions through a series of votes conducted via email. Using this process, the board made several significant decisions, including:
• Approving repairs for sidewalks and the community center entrance.
• Approving the replacement of cool decking around both pools.
• Appointing two new members to the Architectural Review Committee.
• Approving a major retention basin project, including irrigation replacement and the addition of 420 tons of granite.
• Hiring an architect to draft drawings.
The board’s defense rested on a clever, but ultimately flawed, legal argument. They cited Arizona statute A.R.S. § 10-3821, which allows general non-profit corporations to take action via “unanimous written consent” without a formal meeting. It was a reasonable assumption. However, an Administrative Law Judge ruled their actions were a clear violation of state law.
The legal reasoning is a vital lesson in statutory interpretation. The judge affirmed that when two laws conflict, the more specific statute prevails. In this case, the highly specific HOA Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804), which explicitly requires board meetings to be open to all members, overrides the more general rule for non-profits. The ruling provided a clear interpretation of the law: even a global pandemic does not grant an HOA board the power to circumvent its duty of transparency. In fact, a rehearing in the case clarified the board was making decisions through a series of individual emails—a method that completely prevented any form of an open meeting.
2. The Law Prioritizes Transparency Above All Else
The judge’s decision was not a mere technicality. It was a firm defense of the core policy undergirding Arizona’s HOA laws. The statute itself contains a powerful mission statement that leaves no room for ambiguity. A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) declares:
It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly and that notices and agendas be provided for those meetings that contain the information that is reasonably necessary to inform the members of the matters to be discussed or decided and to ensure that members have the ability to speak after discussion of agenda items, but before a vote of the board of directors or members is taken.
This principle is the bedrock of community governance. It ensures that homeowners can observe deliberations and have their say before a final decision is made. This right to be heard is lost when a board approves a costly pool deck repair or appoints a new committee member through a series of private emails, with homeowners only finding out after the fact. The court affirmed that this right is not a suggestion; it is a non-negotiable legal requirement.
3. A Legal “Win” Doesn’t Always Mean Punishment
After proving a clear violation of state law, the homeowner won… but the HOA received no punishment. Here’s why that isn’t a contradiction. Although Debra K. Morin successfully demonstrated that the board had broken the law, the Administrative Law Judge decided against imposing any civil penalty.
The judge’s reasoning highlights the law’s capacity for context. “Consideration is given to the fact that Respondent was faced with an unprecedented global pandemic while balancing the need to comply with the applicable statutes and conduct association business,” the decision stated.
Instead of a punitive fine, the consequences were corrective. The board was formally ordered to comply with the open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) going forward, and the association was required to reimburse Ms. Morin for her $500 filing fee. This outcome reveals a surprising nuance in administrative law: a judgment can simultaneously vindicate a petitioner and uphold the law while acknowledging mitigating circumstances, focusing on future compliance rather than past punishment.
4. One Determined Homeowner Can Make a Difference
This entire legal challenge was initiated by a single resident: Debra K. Morin. Her story, however, is a realistic and therefore more empowering example of homeowner advocacy. Ms. Morin actually filed two separate complaints. While she won her landmark case regarding secret email voting, she did not prevail on a second, unrelated claim concerning the board’s use of “emergency executive sessions.”
This partial victory makes her success on the transparency issue even more significant. It shows that the legal system carefully parsed her arguments, affirming the one with the broadest implications for community governance. By filing her petition, she secured a formal order compelling her HOA to follow the law and was refunded the costs she incurred.
Morin’s petition demonstrates that community governance is not a spectator sport. It proves that one homeowner with a grasp of the rules and the determination to see them enforced can successfully realign a board with its fundamental duty of transparency.
Conclusion: Is Your HOA Playing by the Rules?
The case of Morin vs. Solera Chandler HOA delivers a sharp, unambiguous message: the legal requirement for transparency is absolute, even in the face of extraordinary circumstances. While the board’s pandemic-related pressures earned it leniency from fines, the foundational principle of open governance was decisively upheld. This case serves as a powerful reminder of the rights of homeowners and the duties of their elected boards. It sets a clear standard for openness—does your own HOA’s process for making decisions live up to it?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Debra K. Morin(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf,
Respondent Side
Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Also cited as Lydia Linsmeier,,,
Joshua M. Bolen(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Gail Ryan(board member (President)) Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Resigned August 5, 2020
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
f. del sol(clerk/staff) Signed transmission notice,
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
Other Participants
Kirk Sandquist(committee member (ARC)) Approved to Architectural Review Committee
Tom Dusbabek(committee member (ARC)) Approved to Architectural Review Committee
Ken Eller(consultant) Approved to draft architectural drawings
The petition was affirmed in part (Complaint #1) and denied in part (Complaint #2). The Respondent HOA was found to have improperly conducted non-privileged business via email/unanimous written consent in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the $500 filing fee and comply with the statute, but no civil penalty was imposed.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the alleged violation concerning the improper use of emergency executive sessions (Complaint #2).
Key Issues & Findings
Non-privileged Association Business Conducted in Closed Session
The HOA improperly conducted association business, which should have been open to members, through unanimous written consent solicited via individual emails during the COVID-19 shutdown, violating the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
Orders: Respondent was ordered to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward and to reimburse Petitioner her $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. 33-1804
A.R.S. 10-3821
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Open Meetings, HOA Governance, Unanimous Written Consent, COVID-19, Executive Session
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. 33-1804
A.R.S. 10-3821
A.R.S. 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2120001-REL Decision – 838004.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:04 (125.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120001-REL
Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Morin vs. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative law case involving a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (HOA). The central issue was whether the HOA Board of Directors violated Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) by conducting association business and making decisions without open meetings accessible to its members.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner on her primary complaint. The investigation and subsequent hearings revealed that the HOA Board, citing the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, utilized a process of “unanimous written consent” to approve numerous actions. This process, facilitated through individual emails to board members, was found to be an improper substitute for the open meetings required by law. The ALJ concluded that the specific transparency requirements for homeowners’ associations in A.R.S. § 33-1804 supersede the more general provisions for non-profit corporations in A.R.S. § 10-3821, which the HOA had cited as justification.
While the violation was established, no civil penalty was assessed due to the “unprecedented global pandemic.” The HOA was ordered to comply with the open meeting law moving forward and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500 filing fee. A second complaint from the petitioner, alleging the improper use of emergency executive sessions, was not proven and was therefore denied. A rehearing clarified the precise method of the violation—email voting rather than conference calls—but did not alter the final judgment.
Case Background and Allegations
This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed on July 10, 2020. The case centered on the actions of the Solera Chandler HOA’s Board of Directors between March and August 2020.
• Petitioner: Debra K. Morin
• Respondent: Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
• Case Number: 21F-H2120001-REL
• Key Dates:
◦ Initial Hearing: October 29, 2020
◦ Initial Decision: November 18, 2020
◦ Rehearing: February 25, 2021
◦ Final Decision After Rehearing: March 17, 2021
Petitioner’s Formal Complaints
After being ordered to clarify her initial filing, the petitioner proceeded with two specific alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1804:
1. Complaint #1: Non-Privileged Business in Closed Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted non-privileged association business in closed sessions by using unanimous written consent. This practice circumvented statutory requirements for providing members with agendas, giving 48-hour notice, and allowing them an opportunity to speak on key issues before the Board took action.
2. Complaint #2: Improper Emergency Executive Sessions: The petitioner alleged that the HOA Board conducted privileged business under the guise of “emergency executive sessions.” This was done without properly identifying the legal exception to the open meeting law, providing an agenda or 48-hour notice, or submitting minutes at the next board meeting that stated the reason for the emergency.
Key Evidence and Factual Findings
The evidence presented centered on the HOA’s governance practices during the initial months of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Respondent’s Justification
The HOA’s defense rested on two main arguments:
• The COVID-19 pandemic made it impossible for the Board to meet in person, necessitating alternative methods to conduct business while protecting the health of directors and members.
• The use of unanimous written consents was authorized under A.R.S. § 10-3821, a statute that permits non-profit corporations to take action without a formal meeting if all directors consent in writing. The HOA acknowledged it had not used this method before the pandemic and did not intend to continue its use.
Unanimous Written Consents
At an open Board of Directors meeting on August 5, 2020, the Board formally ratified a series of actions taken via unanimous written consent during the “Covid 19 Shutdown.” A rehearing clarified the precise mechanism: a community management company would email each board member individually to solicit a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all votes were “yes,” the Board President would sign the written consent on behalf of the Board.
The actions taken through this process included:
Action Taken by Unanimous Written Consent
March 30, 2020
Approve repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.
March 30, 2020
Approve repair and replacement of cool decking surrounding both pools.
April 30, 2020
Approve Kirk Sandquist as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.
April 30, 2020
Approve Tom Dusbabek as a member of the Architectural Review Committee.
May 5, 2020
Approve the Gilbert Road retention basin project, related irrigation replacement, and the addition of 420 tons of granite.
May 8, 2020
Approve replacement of a Carrier 6-ton heat pump.
May 8, 2020
Approve replacement of two Carrier 5-ton heat pumps.
May 27, 2020
Approve hiring Ken Eller to draft architectural drawings.
June 4, 2020
Approve a change to the Design Guidelines at the request of the Architectural Review Committee.
July 1, 2020
Approve the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.
Executive Sessions
The Board held numerous executive (closed) sessions during this period, including on March 13, March 16, March 19, March 24, April 6, April 10, May 4, May 15, May 27, June 24, and August 5, 2020. An “emergency executive session” was held on May 12, 2020. The agendas for these meetings cited specific legal exceptions under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) as justification for the closure.
Legal Analysis and Rulings
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the interpretation and primacy of two competing Arizona statutes.
The Core Statutory Conflict
• A.R.S. § 33-1804 (HOA Open Meeting Law): This statute establishes a strong state policy that all HOA board and member meetings “be conducted openly.” It mandates that members receive at least 48-hours’ notice, be provided with agendas, and be permitted to “attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The statute explicitly directs that any interpretation of its provisions must be construed “in favor of open meetings.”
• A.R.S. § 10-3821 (Action Without Meeting for Non-Profits): This statute, which applies more broadly to non-profit corporations, allows a board of directors to take action without a meeting if the action is approved by one or more written consents signed by all directors.
Ruling on Complaint #1 (Violation Established)
The ALJ concluded that the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the open meeting law. The core of the ruling is that the specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 for homeowners’ associations must be followed, even if A.R.S. § 10-3821 provides a different mechanism for general non-profits.
The final decision states: “Respondent improperly conducted association business in closed sessions via email rather than in meetings open to the members.” The use of email voting to achieve unanimous consent was deemed a violation because it denied members the notice, agenda, and opportunity to speak that are guaranteed by the HOA open meeting law.
However, the ALJ gave “consideration to the fact that Respondent was faced with an unprecedented global pandemic” and found that “no civil penalty is appropriate given the circumstances.”
Ruling on Complaint #2 (Violation Not Established)
The ALJ found that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board conducted improper emergency executive sessions. The decision notes that there was “nothing in the record” to suggest the Board discussed topics outside the legally permitted exceptions for closed sessions, nor was there evidence to suggest the May 12, 2020, meeting was not a genuine emergency.
Final Order and Disposition
The final judgment, issued after the rehearing, is binding on both parties.
• Outcome: The petitioner’s petition was affirmed in part (regarding Complaint #1) and denied in part (regarding Complaint #2).
• Directives to Respondent (HOA):
1. The HOA is ordered to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.
2. The HOA is directed to comply with the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.
• Appeal: Any appeal of the final order must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within 35 days from the date of service.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120001-REL
Study Guide: Morin v. Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case between Debra K. Morin (Petitioner) and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (Respondent), as detailed in Administrative Law Judge Decisions No. 21F-H2120001-REL and No. 21F-H2120001-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and outcomes.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based only on the information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the central accusation in the Petitioner’s first complaint against the Respondent?
3. What two primary justifications did the Respondent provide for its actions during the COVID-19 pandemic?
4. According to the findings of the rehearing, what specific procedure did the Respondent use to obtain “unanimous written consents”?
5. Identify the two main Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that were central to the legal dispute and briefly describe the function of each.
6. What was the final ruling on Complaint #1, and what was the judge’s reasoning?
7. Why did the Petitioner fail to prove the allegations in Complaint #2?
8. What specific factual error in the first Administrative Law Judge Decision prompted the Respondent to request a rehearing?
9. What two orders were issued against the Respondent in the final decision?
10. What specific circumstance did the Administrative Law Judge cite as a reason for not imposing a civil penalty on the Respondent?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Debra K. Morin, the Petitioner and homeowner, and the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Respondent violated state law, while the Respondent defended its actions before an Administrative Law Judge.
2. The Petitioner’s first complaint accused the Solera Homeowners’ Association Board of Directors of conducting non-privileged association business in closed sessions. Specifically, she alleged they used unanimous written consent to take action without providing agendas, giving 48-hour notice, or allowing members an opportunity to speak on key issues.
3. The Respondent argued that the COVID-19 pandemic prevented the Board of Directors from meeting in person to protect the health of members and directors. The Respondent also asserted that its use of unanimous written consents was legally authorized for non-profit corporations under A.R.S. § 10-3821.
4. The rehearing established that an individual from the community management company would email each Board member individually to request a “yes” or “no” vote on a proposal. If all members replied “yes,” the item was considered passed by unanimous consent, and the Board President would sign the formal consent document.
5. The central statutes were A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821. A.R.S. § 33-1804 is the state’s open meeting law for homeowners’ associations, requiring meetings to be open to members with proper notice, while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows the board of a non-profit corporation to take action without a meeting if all directors provide written consent.
6. The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner on Complaint #1, affirming the violation. The judge reasoned that while A.R.S. § 10-3821 allows for action without a meeting, the more specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 mandate that all HOA board meetings be open to members, a requirement the Respondent violated by conducting business via email.
7. The Petitioner failed to prove Complaint #2 because she did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent’s executive sessions were improper. The judge found nothing in the record to suggest the Board discussed issues outside the legal exceptions listed in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) or that the May 12, 2020, session was not a genuine emergency.
8. The Respondent requested a rehearing to correct a finding in Conclusion of Law 8 of the initial decision, which incorrectly stated that the association business at issue was conducted in closed sessions via “conference calls.” The Respondent acknowledged using conference calls for executive sessions but denied using them for the actions taken by unanimous written consent.
9. The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee for the issue on which she prevailed. Additionally, the Respondent was directed to comply with all requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 in the future.
10. The Administrative Law Judge gave consideration to the fact that the Respondent was “faced with an unprecedented global pandemic while balancing the need to comply with the applicable statutes and conduct association business.” Because of these unique circumstances, the judge found that no civil penalty was appropriate.
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Suggested Essay Questions
1. Discuss the conflict between A.R.S. § 33-1804 and A.R.S. § 10-3821 as it relates to the actions of the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this imply about the hierarchy of state laws governing specific entities versus general corporations?
2. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that the COVID-19 pandemic justified their actions. To what extent did the Administrative Law Judge accept this argument, and how did it influence the final order?
3. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” and detail how it was applied to both Complaint #1 and Complaint #2. Why did the Petitioner meet this burden for the first complaint but not the second?
4. Trace the evolution of the case from the initial hearing to the rehearing. What specific finding of fact was corrected, and why was this correction significant for the legal record, even though it did not change the ultimate outcome for either complaint?
5. Based on the text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), discuss the stated policy of the state of Arizona regarding homeowner association meetings. How did the Respondent’s actions, specifically the use of email for unanimous consents, contravene this policy?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer served as the ALJ.
A.R.S. § 10-3821
An Arizona Revised Statute that allows the board of directors of a non-profit corporation to take action without a formal meeting, provided the action is taken by all directors and evidenced by one or more written consents.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
An Arizona Revised Statute, also known as the open meeting law for planned communities, which mandates that all meetings of an HOA board of directors must be open to all members. It requires 48-hour notice and allows for closed “executive sessions” only for specific, limited purposes.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving her claims.
Executive Session
A portion of a meeting that is closed to association members. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), executive sessions are only permitted for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, discussing pending litigation, or addressing confidential personal or financial information.
Open Meeting
A meeting of an HOA’s board of directors that, according to A.R.S. § 33-1804, must be open to all members of the association, who must be permitted to attend and speak.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Debra K. Morin.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than opposing evidence, showing that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to re-examine specific issues or correct errors from an initial decision. A rehearing was granted in this case to clarify how the unanimous written consents were executed.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association, Inc.
Statutory Construction
The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge noted that the primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the statute’s plain language.
Unanimous Written Consent
A procedure, authorized by A.R.S. § 10-3821, where a board takes action without a meeting through written consents signed by all directors. The HOA used this method via individual emails to approve business, which was found to be a violation of HOA open meeting laws.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120001-REL
She Sued Her HOA Over Secret Pandemic Votes—And Won. Here’s What Every Homeowner Needs to Know.
Introduction: The Closed Doors of Your HOA
For many homeowners, it can feel like their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) board makes its most important decisions behind closed doors. You see the results—a new rule, a major repair project, a change in vendors—but the discussion and the vote happen out of sight. While the COVID-19 pandemic forced many organizations to find new ways to operate, for one Arizona HOA, their adaptation to remote work crossed a legal line, sparking a legal challenge from a resident.
The central conflict was straightforward: a homeowner, Debra K. Morin, filed a petition against the Solera Chandler Homeowners’ Association. She alleged they were making official decisions in secret through email, violating state law that guarantees homeowners the right to open meetings. While not all of her claims were affirmed, her primary complaint—that the board was conducting business in secret—led to a landmark decision for homeowner rights. The outcome of her case reveals several surprising and crucial lessons for every person living in an HOA community.
Takeaway 1: An HOA’s Open Meeting Law Trumps General Non-Profit Rules
1. Even a Pandemic Doesn’t Suspend a Homeowner’s Right to an Open Meeting
The Solera Chandler HOA board believed it was acting within the law. They argued that because they were a non-profit corporation, they could make decisions using “unanimous written consents” without a formal meeting. This practice is allowed for many non-profits under a general Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 10-3821). During the pandemic, this seemed like a practical way to conduct business without meeting in person.
However, the Administrative Law Judge ruled against the HOA. The judge’s key finding was that a more specific law takes precedence. The statute governing planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804, explicitly requires that all meetings of the board must be open to all members of the association. This is a critical legal lesson: when a specific law exists to govern a specific entity (like the Open Meeting Law for HOAs), it almost always overrides a more general law (like the one for all non-profits).
While the judge acknowledged the challenges of the “unprecedented global pandemic,” this did not excuse the violation, though it was cited as a reason not to issue a civil penalty.
Takeaway 2: “Meeting” by Email Is Still a Secret Meeting
2. A String of Individual Emails Can Constitute an Illegal Meeting
In the initial ruling, the judge found the board conducted business improperly, believing it was done via conference calls. Seizing on this factual error, the HOA challenged the decision and requested a rehearing, arguing their method was different and therefore permissible. In the rehearing, they clarified their actual process: the community management company would email each board member individually to request a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. The HOA argued that because there was no simultaneous group discussion, this process wasn’t technically a “meeting.”
The challenge backfired. The judge’s final decision made it clear that this distinction didn’t matter. Whether by conference call or a series of individual emails, the result was the same: an illegal secret meeting. The method effectively prevented homeowners from observing the board’s process and speaking on agenda items before a vote was taken, as required by law. The HOA won their technical correction but lost the war, as the judge affirmed that the principle of transparency is more important than the specific technology used to circumvent it.
These weren’t minor housekeeping issues. The board was making substantial financial and operational decisions entirely out of public view, including:
• Repair and replacement of the sidewalk and community center entrance.
• Repair and replacement of the cool decking around both pools.
• Appointing new members to the Architectural Review Committee.
• Approving a retention basin project and the purchase of 420 tons of granite.
• Approving the 2020 summer hardwood pruning and removal of trees.
Takeaway 3: The Law Is Built to Favor Transparency
3. The Law Itself Has a Built-in Bias for Openness
The judge’s decision wasn’t just a narrow interpretation; it was guided by a powerful policy statement built directly into the Arizona statute for planned communities. The law itself tells judges, board members, and community managers exactly how it should be interpreted.
The text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) leaves no room for doubt:
It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly and that notices and agendas be provided for those meetings that contain the information that is reasonably necessary to inform the members of the matters to be discussed or decided and to ensure that members have the ability to speak after discussion of agenda items, but before a vote of the board of directors or members is taken. Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions…shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.
This is a critical point. The law explicitly directs anyone interpreting it—including an HOA board—to resolve any ambiguity in favor of transparency and homeowner access. The default position is openness.
Takeaway 4: A Single Homeowner Can Force a Change
4. One Determined Homeowner Can Win
This case serves as an empowering lesson for homeowners who feel their board is operating in the shadows. Morin’s persistence paid off, proving that a single homeowner can successfully force a board to follow the law.
Her victory was clear and decisive. The court orders resulted in three key outcomes:
• The judge affirmed her petition, officially recognizing that the HOA had violated the law.
• The HOA was formally ordered to comply with the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 going forward.
• The HOA was ordered to reimburse Ms. Morin her $500.00 filing fee.
This outcome demonstrates that the system can work. An individual homeowner with a valid complaint can navigate the process and achieve a binding legal victory that forces their HOA board to operate correctly.
Conclusion: Is Your Board Operating in the Open?
The lesson from the Solera Chandler HOA case is simple: transparency in HOA governance is not optional. It is a legal requirement designed to protect the rights of every homeowner to observe and participate in the governance of their community. The convenience of an email vote cannot replace the legal mandate for an open meeting.
Don’t assume your board is operating correctly. Review your meeting minutes. Ask questions about decisions that seem to appear without public discussion. Remember, the law explicitly favors openness, and as Debra Morin proved, it’s an enforceable right.
This case was about secret votes via email, but it highlights a larger principle of transparency. Does your HOA board make it easy for you to know what is being decided and to have your voice heard?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Debra K. Morin(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Also cited as Lydia Linsmeier
Joshua M. Bolen(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Gail Ryan(board member) Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. President of Board, resigned August 5, 2020
Kirk Sandquist(ARC member) Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Appointment approved April 30, 2020
Tom Dusbabek(ARC member) Solera Chandler Homeowners' Association, Inc. Appointment approved April 30, 2020
Ken Eller(contractor) Approved to be hired to draft architectural drawings
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Granted Request for Rehearing
The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.
Why this result: Issues 2 and 3 were moot. Issues 1 and 4 failed on the merits because the evidence did not prove the HOA violated the cited statute or rule.
Key Issues & Findings
Board conducted interviews of candidates in closed executive session.
Petitioner alleged the Board improperly conducted interviews for Board vacancies in closed sessions. The Board admitted to the practice but asserted they did so to elicit personal, health, or financial information, which is a statutory exception to the open meeting law.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Discriminately penalized homeowners/members (Italian American Club).
Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully penalized and denied use of facilities to the Italian American Club (IAC). This issue was based on a specific one-year prohibition on facility use imposed after the IAC violated rules regarding moving furniture.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Article V, Section C of the CC&Rs
Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A
Refusal of homeowners' use of facilities without authorization by rule.
Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully denied the Italian American Club use of facilities following an incident where club members moved tables against HOA rules, resulting in a one-year ban on facility use.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
Article IV, Section C.23 of the CC&Rs
Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A
Refusal to place written requests for Board action on the agenda.
Petitioner argued that Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to include every single written request from members on the next upcoming Board meeting agenda, which the Board had failed to do.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Executive Session, Mootness, Facility Use Suspension, Agenda Setting
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws
Article 5, Section C of the CC&Rs
Article IV, Section C(23) of the CC&Rs
Article XII, Section B of the CC&Rs
Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
Ventana Lake Rules 8.3.B
Ventana Lake Rules 8.4.A
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020046-REL Decision – 809207.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:59 (157.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020046-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision: Alandar vs. Ventana Lakes POA
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, involving a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association (the “Respondent” or “Board”). The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged multiple violations of state statutes and the Association’s governing documents. The ALJ ultimately denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence for any of her claims.
The key takeaways from the decision are as follows:
• Board Candidate Interviews: The Board’s practice of interviewing candidates for board vacancies in closed executive sessions was deemed permissible. The ALJ found that these sessions were appropriately used to elicit personal, health, or financial information relevant to a candidate’s ability to serve, which is an exception to Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804).
• Sanctions Against a Club: The Petitioner’s challenge to a one-year ban on facility use imposed upon the Italian American Club (IAC) was dismissed as moot. Because the one-year penalty had expired before the hearing date, the ALJ concluded there was no active issue to rule on or remedy to order.
• Agenda Setting Authority: The ALJ determined that the Board president possesses broad, inherent authority in setting the agenda for Board meetings. The governing rules do not require the president to place every written request from an Association member onto the agenda for the next meeting.
• Burden of Proof: Across all issues, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to convince the judge that her contentions were “more probably true than not.” The decision repeatedly highlights the lack of evidence to support the claims of improper conduct.
Case Overview
On February 3, 2020, Petitioner Susan L. Alandar filed a petition alleging that the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association violated Arizona state law and several provisions of its own Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs), Bylaws, and Rules. After paying an additional filing fee, the Petitioner presented four distinct issues for the hearing held on June 11, 2020. The final decision was issued on July 23, 2020.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
20F-H2020046-REL
Petitioner
Susan L. Alandar
Respondent
Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Hearing Date
June 11, 2020
Decision Date
July 23, 2020
Final Disposition
Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Detailed Analysis of Allegations and Rulings
Issue 1: Board Candidate Interviews in Executive Session
• Allegation: The Petitioner contended that the Board of Directors violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs) by interviewing candidates for Board appointments in closed executive sessions.
• Factual Background: The Respondent acknowledged that prior to June 2019, its practice was to conduct interviews, discussions, and votes to fill Board vacancies entirely within executive session, announcing the result in an open meeting. After this practice was questioned, the Board changed its procedure. Since June 2019, the Board has conducted candidate interviews in executive session specifically to “elicit private information that may impact the candidate’s ability to perform the duties of a Board member.” An example provided was a candidate who revealed his wife’s dementia diagnosis, which would take priority over Board duties. Under this revised process, the final vote on candidates is cast in an open session, and candidates also participate in an open forum where members can ask questions.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the uncontroverted evidence showed the executive sessions were used for the purpose of discussing “personal, health, or financial information,” which is a specific exception allowed under A.R.S. § 33-1804. The decision states, “While Petitioner may believe the interviews were being conducted in executive session for nefarious purposes, no evidence was presented to establish such motives existed.” Consequently, the Petitioner failed to establish a violation.
Issues 2 & 3: Penalties and Facility Use Denial for the Italian American Club
• Allegation: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent wrongfully penalized the Italian American Club (IAC) and denied its members use of facilities, asserting that this action was discriminatory and not authorized by rule, in violation of CC&R’s Article V Section C and other community documents.
• Factual Background:
◦ In January 2018, the Board met with the IAC regarding non-compliance with rules and warned that failure to comply could result in the loss of privileges to use the Yacht Club.
◦ On April 4, 2019, an incident occurred where IAC members, after their last-minute request for more tables and chairs was denied, were observed on security cameras moving furniture from a storage area themselves. This was against Association rules, reportedly due to insurance policy limitations on volunteers moving tables.
◦ The situation escalated into a verbal altercation. Even after staff agreed to set up the requested tables, IAC members were again seen moving more furniture.
◦ On April 17, 2019, after reviewing video and audio recordings of the incident, the Board revoked the IAC’s right to use all Association facilities for a one-year period, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had expired on April 30, 2020, prior to the June 11, 2020 hearing. As no evidence was presented that the revocation was still in effect, the matter was declared moot. The decision notes that even if the judge had found the revocation improper, she could not order any action because the penalty was no longer active. The ALJ did not rule on the merits of whether the Board’s action was initially justified.
Issue 4: Refusal to Place Member Items on Board Meeting Agenda
• Allegation: The Petitioner claimed the Board violated Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b by refusing to place homeowners’ written requests for Board action on the agenda for upcoming Board meetings. The Petitioner’s position was that the rule required the Board president to place any such item on the agenda.
• Factual Background: Both parties agreed that the Board president had received written requests from members that were not subsequently included on a meeting agenda. The Petitioner herself acknowledged during the hearing that it would be impractical for the president to include every single request if, for example, hundreds were received for a single meeting.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that the “plain language” of the rule does not mandate that all requests must be placed on the agenda. The judge used the Petitioner’s own hypothetical concession to demonstrate that the Board president must have “inherent authority to limit the number of items to be included.” The ruling concluded that the president’s authority in setting the agenda is “broad” and that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the rule.
Key Referenced Authority
The decision was based on an interpretation of the following Arizona statutes and Ventana Lakes governing documents:
Document
Provision
Relevance to the Case
Arizona Revised Statutes
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Open Meetings: Allows meetings to be closed for specific reasons, including discussion of “Personal, health or financial information about an individual member.”
Article III, Section A
Easements of Enjoyment: Gives the Board the right to suspend any Resident from using Common Areas and to regulate their use through rules.
Article IV, Section C
Health, Safety and Welfare: Allows the Board to make rules restricting activities deemed a nuisance or to adversely affect the health, safety, or welfare of residents.
Article V, Section C
Ventana Lakes Rules: Grants the Association power to adopt and repeal rules governing the use of Common Areas, provided they are not discriminatory or inconsistent.
Bylaws
Article IV.E.8
Board Powers: Grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and enforce rules covering the operation and use of all property.
Ventana Lakes Rules
Rule 8.3.B
Board President Duties: States the president shall prepare agendas and “ensure that written requests for Board action…are placed on the agenda.” (Interpreted by ALJ).
Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge concluded the hearing with a definitive ruling:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”
This order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020046-REL
Study Guide: Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. What were the initial steps Susan L. Alandar took to begin the HOA dispute process, and when did she file her petition?
2. What was the Ventana Lakes Board’s practice regarding interviewing candidates for Board vacancies both before and after June 2019?
3. What was the core of the dispute regarding the Italian American Club (IAC), and what specific action by the club led to the conflict on April 4, 2019?
4. What penalty did the Board of Directors impose on the Italian American Club, and for what duration?
5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss Issues 2 and 3 (concerning the IAC) as moot?
6. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding the Board President’s responsibility for setting the meeting agenda under Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b?
7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the Board President’s authority and discretion in setting the agenda?
8. Which party bears the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?
9. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, when is it permissible for a Board of Directors to hold a closed or executive session?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Answer Key
1. On or about February 3, 2020, Susan L. Alandar filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. She initially indicated two issues would be presented and paid a $1000.00 filing fee.
2. Prior to June 2019, the Board conducted candidate interviews, discussions, and votes in closed executive sessions. After June 2019, the Board conducted interviews in executive session to elicit private information but held the final vote in an open session.
3. The dispute centered on the IAC’s non-compliance with association rules. The conflict on April 4, 2019, was triggered when IAC members were observed on security cameras moving tables and chairs from a storage area against the instructions of the facilities manager.
4. In an executive session on April 17, 2019, the Board revoked the Italian American Club’s ability to use all of the association’s facilities. The penalty was for a period of one year, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.
5. The Judge dismissed these issues as moot because the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had already expired at the time of the hearing. Since the penalty was no longer in effect, the Judge could not order the Respondent to take any corrective action.
6. The Petitioner argued that Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to place any written request for Board action from an association member onto the agenda for the next meeting. She contended this was a mandatory duty, regardless of the nature or number of requests.
7. The Judge concluded that the rule’s plain language does not require every request to be placed on the agenda. Citing the impracticality of including hundreds of hypothetical requests, the Judge found that the Board President has broad, inherent authority to limit the items on the agenda.
8. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations. The required standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.”
9. A.R.S. § 33-1804 allows a portion of a meeting to be closed to consider specific matters, including personal, health, or financial information about an individual member or employee of the association. The Board used this exception to justify holding candidate interviews in executive session.
10. The final order issued on July 23, 2020, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. Formulate comprehensive answers based on the facts and legal reasoning presented in the decision.
1. Analyze the Board of Directors’ evolving practice for interviewing candidates for board vacancies (Issue 1). Discuss how their pre- and post-June 2019 methods relate to the specific language and exceptions outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804.
2. Explain the legal concept of “mootness” as it was applied to the sanctions against the Italian American Club (Issues 2 and 3). Why was the Administrative Law Judge unable to rule on the propriety of the Board’s actions, and what does this imply about the timing of legal challenges in HOA disputes?
3. Compare and contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b with the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation (Issue 4). Discuss the Judge’s reasoning for concluding that the Board President has “inherent authority” to limit agenda items.
4. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Using examples from at least two of the four issues raised in the petition, explain how the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.
5. Based on the referenced community documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws), describe the scope of the Ventana Lakes Board of Directors’ power to regulate Common Areas, suspend resident privileges, and enforce rules. How do these documents grant authority that was relevant to the Board’s actions against the Italian American Club?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues decisions based on the evidence and applicable law. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Bylaws
A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws addresses the Board’s powers and duties.
Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in a planned community, governing property use and the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the HOA.
Common Areas
Property within a planned community owned by the HOA for the common use and enjoyment of all residents, such as the Yacht Club and recreational facilities mentioned in the case.
Executive Session
A closed portion of a meeting of a deliberative body, such as an HOA board, which is not open to the general membership. A.R.S. § 33-1804 specifies the limited circumstances under which such a session can be held.
HOA (Homeowners Association)
An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.
A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The ALJ declared the issues regarding the Italian American Club moot because the one-year penalty had already expired.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action or administrative proceeding. In this case, Susan L. Alandar.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases, which requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner had the burden to meet this standard.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020046-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning a dispute between Susan L. Alandar, the Petitioner, and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging four violations of statute and community documents by the HOA, requiring her to pay additional filing fees to pursue all four issues. The judge systematically addressed each of the four allegations, which included improper closed-door interviews for board candidates, discriminatory penalizing and facility denial against an Italian American Club, and the refusal to place all member-requested items on the board agenda. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition, finding that she failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence, and further determined that the facilities denial issue was moot as the one-year prohibition had expired.
What were the specific allegations and outcomes across the four distinct issues presented?
How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret governing documents regarding Board authority and rules?
What legal standards and statutes primarily governed the resolution of this HOA dispute petition?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Susan L. Alandar(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf.
The Petitioner's petition alleging violations of statute and community documents was denied in its entirety. Two issues were found moot because the prohibited action had already concluded, and the other two issues failed because the Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish a violation.
Why this result: Issues 2 and 3 were moot. Issues 1 and 4 failed on the merits because the evidence did not prove the HOA violated the cited statute or rule.
Key Issues & Findings
Board conducted interviews of candidates in closed executive session.
Petitioner alleged the Board improperly conducted interviews for Board vacancies in closed sessions. The Board admitted to the practice but asserted they did so to elicit personal, health, or financial information, which is a statutory exception to the open meeting law.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Discriminately penalized homeowners/members (Italian American Club).
Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully penalized and denied use of facilities to the Italian American Club (IAC). This issue was based on a specific one-year prohibition on facility use imposed after the IAC violated rules regarding moving furniture.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Article V, Section C of the CC&Rs
Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A
Refusal of homeowners' use of facilities without authorization by rule.
Petitioner alleged the HOA wrongfully denied the Italian American Club use of facilities following an incident where club members moved tables against HOA rules, resulting in a one-year ban on facility use.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
Article IV, Section C.23 of the CC&Rs
Article IV.E.8 of the Bylaws
Ventana Lakes Rules 8.4.A
Refusal to place written requests for Board action on the agenda.
Petitioner argued that Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to include every single written request from members on the next upcoming Board meeting agenda, which the Board had failed to do.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Executive Session, Mootness, Facility Use Suspension, Agenda Setting
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws
Article 5, Section C of the CC&Rs
Article IV, Section C(23) of the CC&Rs
Article XII, Section B of the CC&Rs
Article III, Section A of the CC&Rs
Ventana Lake Rules 8.3.B
Ventana Lake Rules 8.4.A
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020046-REL Decision – 809207.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:55 (157.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020046-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision: Alandar vs. Ventana Lakes POA
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, involving a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association (the “Respondent” or “Board”). The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged multiple violations of state statutes and the Association’s governing documents. The ALJ ultimately denied the petition in its entirety, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence for any of her claims.
The key takeaways from the decision are as follows:
• Board Candidate Interviews: The Board’s practice of interviewing candidates for board vacancies in closed executive sessions was deemed permissible. The ALJ found that these sessions were appropriately used to elicit personal, health, or financial information relevant to a candidate’s ability to serve, which is an exception to Arizona’s open meeting law (A.R.S. § 33-1804).
• Sanctions Against a Club: The Petitioner’s challenge to a one-year ban on facility use imposed upon the Italian American Club (IAC) was dismissed as moot. Because the one-year penalty had expired before the hearing date, the ALJ concluded there was no active issue to rule on or remedy to order.
• Agenda Setting Authority: The ALJ determined that the Board president possesses broad, inherent authority in setting the agenda for Board meetings. The governing rules do not require the president to place every written request from an Association member onto the agenda for the next meeting.
• Burden of Proof: Across all issues, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to convince the judge that her contentions were “more probably true than not.” The decision repeatedly highlights the lack of evidence to support the claims of improper conduct.
Case Overview
On February 3, 2020, Petitioner Susan L. Alandar filed a petition alleging that the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association violated Arizona state law and several provisions of its own Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions (CC&Rs), Bylaws, and Rules. After paying an additional filing fee, the Petitioner presented four distinct issues for the hearing held on June 11, 2020. The final decision was issued on July 23, 2020.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
20F-H2020046-REL
Petitioner
Susan L. Alandar
Respondent
Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Hearing Date
June 11, 2020
Decision Date
July 23, 2020
Final Disposition
Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Detailed Analysis of Allegations and Rulings
Issue 1: Board Candidate Interviews in Executive Session
• Allegation: The Petitioner contended that the Board of Directors violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Arizona’s open meeting law for HOAs) by interviewing candidates for Board appointments in closed executive sessions.
• Factual Background: The Respondent acknowledged that prior to June 2019, its practice was to conduct interviews, discussions, and votes to fill Board vacancies entirely within executive session, announcing the result in an open meeting. After this practice was questioned, the Board changed its procedure. Since June 2019, the Board has conducted candidate interviews in executive session specifically to “elicit private information that may impact the candidate’s ability to perform the duties of a Board member.” An example provided was a candidate who revealed his wife’s dementia diagnosis, which would take priority over Board duties. Under this revised process, the final vote on candidates is cast in an open session, and candidates also participate in an open forum where members can ask questions.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the uncontroverted evidence showed the executive sessions were used for the purpose of discussing “personal, health, or financial information,” which is a specific exception allowed under A.R.S. § 33-1804. The decision states, “While Petitioner may believe the interviews were being conducted in executive session for nefarious purposes, no evidence was presented to establish such motives existed.” Consequently, the Petitioner failed to establish a violation.
Issues 2 & 3: Penalties and Facility Use Denial for the Italian American Club
• Allegation: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent wrongfully penalized the Italian American Club (IAC) and denied its members use of facilities, asserting that this action was discriminatory and not authorized by rule, in violation of CC&R’s Article V Section C and other community documents.
• Factual Background:
◦ In January 2018, the Board met with the IAC regarding non-compliance with rules and warned that failure to comply could result in the loss of privileges to use the Yacht Club.
◦ On April 4, 2019, an incident occurred where IAC members, after their last-minute request for more tables and chairs was denied, were observed on security cameras moving furniture from a storage area themselves. This was against Association rules, reportedly due to insurance policy limitations on volunteers moving tables.
◦ The situation escalated into a verbal altercation. Even after staff agreed to set up the requested tables, IAC members were again seen moving more furniture.
◦ On April 17, 2019, after reviewing video and audio recordings of the incident, the Board revoked the IAC’s right to use all Association facilities for a one-year period, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ found that the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had expired on April 30, 2020, prior to the June 11, 2020 hearing. As no evidence was presented that the revocation was still in effect, the matter was declared moot. The decision notes that even if the judge had found the revocation improper, she could not order any action because the penalty was no longer active. The ALJ did not rule on the merits of whether the Board’s action was initially justified.
Issue 4: Refusal to Place Member Items on Board Meeting Agenda
• Allegation: The Petitioner claimed the Board violated Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b by refusing to place homeowners’ written requests for Board action on the agenda for upcoming Board meetings. The Petitioner’s position was that the rule required the Board president to place any such item on the agenda.
• Factual Background: Both parties agreed that the Board president had received written requests from members that were not subsequently included on a meeting agenda. The Petitioner herself acknowledged during the hearing that it would be impractical for the president to include every single request if, for example, hundreds were received for a single meeting.
• Conclusion of Law: The ALJ determined that the “plain language” of the rule does not mandate that all requests must be placed on the agenda. The judge used the Petitioner’s own hypothetical concession to demonstrate that the Board president must have “inherent authority to limit the number of items to be included.” The ruling concluded that the president’s authority in setting the agenda is “broad” and that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the rule.
Key Referenced Authority
The decision was based on an interpretation of the following Arizona statutes and Ventana Lakes governing documents:
Document
Provision
Relevance to the Case
Arizona Revised Statutes
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Open Meetings: Allows meetings to be closed for specific reasons, including discussion of “Personal, health or financial information about an individual member.”
Article III, Section A
Easements of Enjoyment: Gives the Board the right to suspend any Resident from using Common Areas and to regulate their use through rules.
Article IV, Section C
Health, Safety and Welfare: Allows the Board to make rules restricting activities deemed a nuisance or to adversely affect the health, safety, or welfare of residents.
Article V, Section C
Ventana Lakes Rules: Grants the Association power to adopt and repeal rules governing the use of Common Areas, provided they are not discriminatory or inconsistent.
Bylaws
Article IV.E.8
Board Powers: Grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and enforce rules covering the operation and use of all property.
Ventana Lakes Rules
Rule 8.3.B
Board President Duties: States the president shall prepare agendas and “ensure that written requests for Board action…are placed on the agenda.” (Interpreted by ALJ).
Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge concluded the hearing with a definitive ruling:
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”
This order is binding unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020046-REL
Study Guide: Alandar v. Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020046-REL, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Susan L. Alandar and Respondent Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association. The guide includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. What were the initial steps Susan L. Alandar took to begin the HOA dispute process, and when did she file her petition?
2. What was the Ventana Lakes Board’s practice regarding interviewing candidates for Board vacancies both before and after June 2019?
3. What was the core of the dispute regarding the Italian American Club (IAC), and what specific action by the club led to the conflict on April 4, 2019?
4. What penalty did the Board of Directors impose on the Italian American Club, and for what duration?
5. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismiss Issues 2 and 3 (concerning the IAC) as moot?
6. What was the Petitioner’s argument regarding the Board President’s responsibility for setting the meeting agenda under Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b?
7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the Board President’s authority and discretion in setting the agenda?
8. Which party bears the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing, and what is the standard of proof required?
9. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, when is it permissible for a Board of Directors to hold a closed or executive session?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Answer Key
1. On or about February 3, 2020, Susan L. Alandar filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. She initially indicated two issues would be presented and paid a $1000.00 filing fee.
2. Prior to June 2019, the Board conducted candidate interviews, discussions, and votes in closed executive sessions. After June 2019, the Board conducted interviews in executive session to elicit private information but held the final vote in an open session.
3. The dispute centered on the IAC’s non-compliance with association rules. The conflict on April 4, 2019, was triggered when IAC members were observed on security cameras moving tables and chairs from a storage area against the instructions of the facilities manager.
4. In an executive session on April 17, 2019, the Board revoked the Italian American Club’s ability to use all of the association’s facilities. The penalty was for a period of one year, from May 1, 2019, to April 30, 2020.
5. The Judge dismissed these issues as moot because the one-year prohibition on the IAC’s use of facilities had already expired at the time of the hearing. Since the penalty was no longer in effect, the Judge could not order the Respondent to take any corrective action.
6. The Petitioner argued that Rule 8.3.B.1.b required the Board president to place any written request for Board action from an association member onto the agenda for the next meeting. She contended this was a mandatory duty, regardless of the nature or number of requests.
7. The Judge concluded that the rule’s plain language does not require every request to be placed on the agenda. Citing the impracticality of including hundreds of hypothetical requests, the Judge found that the Board President has broad, inherent authority to limit the items on the agenda.
8. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations. The required standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.”
9. A.R.S. § 33-1804 allows a portion of a meeting to be closed to consider specific matters, including personal, health, or financial information about an individual member or employee of the association. The Board used this exception to justify holding candidate interviews in executive session.
10. The final order issued on July 23, 2020, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. Formulate comprehensive answers based on the facts and legal reasoning presented in the decision.
1. Analyze the Board of Directors’ evolving practice for interviewing candidates for board vacancies (Issue 1). Discuss how their pre- and post-June 2019 methods relate to the specific language and exceptions outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804.
2. Explain the legal concept of “mootness” as it was applied to the sanctions against the Italian American Club (Issues 2 and 3). Why was the Administrative Law Judge unable to rule on the propriety of the Board’s actions, and what does this imply about the timing of legal challenges in HOA disputes?
3. Compare and contrast the Petitioner’s interpretation of Ventana Lakes Rule 8.3.B.1.b with the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation (Issue 4). Discuss the Judge’s reasoning for concluding that the Board President has “inherent authority” to limit agenda items.
4. Define the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Using examples from at least two of the four issues raised in the petition, explain how the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.
5. Based on the referenced community documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws), describe the scope of the Ventana Lakes Board of Directors’ power to regulate Common Areas, suspend resident privileges, and enforce rules. How do these documents grant authority that was relevant to the Board’s actions against the Italian American Club?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues decisions based on the evidence and applicable law. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Bylaws
A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Article IV, Section E of the Bylaws addresses the Board’s powers and duties.
Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in a planned community, governing property use and the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the HOA.
Common Areas
Property within a planned community owned by the HOA for the common use and enjoyment of all residents, such as the Yacht Club and recreational facilities mentioned in the case.
Executive Session
A closed portion of a meeting of a deliberative body, such as an HOA board, which is not open to the general membership. A.R.S. § 33-1804 specifies the limited circumstances under which such a session can be held.
HOA (Homeowners Association)
An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.
A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The ALJ declared the issues regarding the Italian American Club moot because the one-year penalty had already expired.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action or administrative proceeding. In this case, Susan L. Alandar.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases, which requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner had the burden to meet this standard.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020046-REL
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20F-H2020046-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning a dispute between Susan L. Alandar, the Petitioner, and the Ventana Lakes Property Owners’ Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging four violations of statute and community documents by the HOA, requiring her to pay additional filing fees to pursue all four issues. The judge systematically addressed each of the four allegations, which included improper closed-door interviews for board candidates, discriminatory penalizing and facility denial against an Italian American Club, and the refusal to place all member-requested items on the board agenda. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition, finding that she failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence, and further determined that the facilities denial issue was moot as the one-year prohibition had expired.
What were the specific allegations and outcomes across the four distinct issues presented?
How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret governing documents regarding Board authority and rules?
What legal standards and statutes primarily governed the resolution of this HOA dispute petition?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Susan L. Alandar(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf.
Queen Creek Ranchettes Homeowners Association, Inc.
Counsel
—
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Outcome Summary
The ALJ denied the petition, finding that the HOA complied with requirements to hold annual meetings and the Petitioner did not sustain the burden of proof regarding alleged violations involving closed meetings.
Why this result: Burden of proof not met; Petitioner provided no evidence that specific private meetings violated A.R.S. § 33-1804.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Open Meeting Law
Petitioner alleged the Association violated open meeting laws by holding closed meetings that should have been public and failing to properly notice meetings.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner's petition be denied.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Decision Documents
20F-H2019035-REL Decision – 785528.pdf
Uploaded 2026-02-11T06:44:59 (146.6 KB)
**Case Summary: Kassa v. Queen Creek Ranchettes Homeowners Association, Inc.**
**Case Number:** 20F-H2019035-REL
**Forum:** Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
**Presiding Judge:** Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
**Decision Date:** April 28, 2020
**Parties**
* **Petitioner:** Kenneth E. Kassa
* **Respondent:** Queen Creek Ranchettes Homeowners Association, Inc.
**Procedural Background**
On December 16, 2019, the Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Respondent violated state statutes governing homeowners' associations. The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on April 8, 2020.
**Key Facts**
* The Respondent is governed by CC&Rs and Bylaws, which constitute a contract between the Association and property owners.
* The Bylaws require the Association to hold an annual meeting of the Members.
* From 2017 through 2019, the Association held exactly one public annual meeting each year. All other meetings were conducted privately by the Board.
* The Association provided notice of meetings by posting flyers in common areas and made minutes available to Members upon written request.
**Main Legal Issue**
The primary issue was whether the Respondent violated **A.R.S. § 33-1804**, which governs open meetings for planned communities. This statute generally requires meetings of the association and board of directors to be open to all members, with specific statutory exceptions for closed sessions (e.g., legal advice, pending litigation, or personal information).
**Arguments**
* **Petitioner’s Position:** The Petitioner argued that the Association violated Open Meeting Law because many of the Board’s closed meetings should have been open to the public. He contended that the single annual meeting was unlawful because it served only to report on business already discussed behind closed doors throughout the year.
* **Respondent’s Position:** The Respondent denied the allegations, arguing that the Bylaws empowered the Board to hold one annual meeting, a requirement they strictly followed from 2017 to 2019.
**Findings and Conclusions of Law**
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the petition based on the following findings:
1. **Burden of Proof:** The Petitioner bore the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
2. **Lack of Evidence:** While the Petitioner believed the private meetings should have been public, he provided no evidence to show that the subject matter of those meetings failed to qualify for the statutory exceptions allowing for closed sessions.
3. **Undisputed Compliance:** It was undisputed that the Respondent held at least one public annual meeting as required.
4. **Scope of Review:** The ALJ noted that the Tribunal could not address the Petitioner's secondary arguments regarding the general appropriateness or lawfulness of the noticed private meetings, or lack thereof.
**Final Decision**
The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof. No violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 was found, and the petition was **denied**.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Kenneth E. Kassa(petitioner) Queen Creek Ranchettes Phase I subdivision property owner Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Jody Augustin(board member) Queen Creek Ranchettes Homeowners Association, Inc. Represented the Association; called as a witness
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Administrative Law Judge
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of the transmitted order
Other Participants
Dean McDaniels(observer) Listed under Appearances as observing
Kelly Kassa(observer) Listed under Appearances as observing
Kimberly Timm(observer) Listed under Appearances as observing
Sonya Foster(observer) Listed under Appearances as observing
Colleen Kaul(observer) Listed under Appearances as observing
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding both the DRC's restriction on speaking during specific deliberations and the use of email communications for non-regularly scheduled committee business.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically because the DRC's restrictions on speaking were deemed reasonable, and email communications were not considered 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' requiring public access.
Key Issues & Findings
Open Meetings and Member Right to Speak (DRC and Email Meetings)
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by denying her the ability to speak at DRC meetings on other members’ requests, and by conducting deliberations and making decisions via email outside of regularly scheduled meetings.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Design Review Committee, Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Email Meetings, A.R.S. 33-1804
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919046-REL Decision – 712028.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:06 (94.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919046-REL
Briefing Document: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (Case No. 19F-H1919046-REL)
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Vicky Glover versus the Foothills Community Association (FCA), where the petitioner’s claims were denied. The petitioner alleged that the FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) violated Arizona’s open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on two fronts: first, by conducting unannounced “email meetings” to vote on non-emergency matters, and second, by preventing members from speaking at appropriate times during regularly scheduled DRC meetings.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Tammy L. Eigenheer, concluded that the petitioner failed to prove any statutory violation. The decision rested on a strict textual interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. Regarding speaking rights, the ALJ determined that while members have a right to speak at an “appropriate time” in committee meetings, the more specific right to speak on an agenda item before a formal vote applies exclusively to Board of Directors meetings, not committee meetings. The judge found it was reasonable for the DRC to rule that a member speaking on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”
Concerning the email communications, the ALJ ruled that they do not constitute “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as defined by the statute. Because the email discussions and decisions did not occur at a set weekly, monthly, or quarterly time, they are not subject to the open meeting requirements. The general state policy favoring open meetings was found to be subordinate to the specific statutory language. The petition was therefore denied in its entirety.
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Case Overview
This case involved a dispute between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the application of Arizona’s open meeting laws to a committee of the association.
Name / Entity
Representation / Title
Petitioner
Vicky Glover
Appeared on her own behalf
Respondent
Foothills Community Association (FCA)
B. Austin Baillio (Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.)
Adjudicator
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Administrative Law Judge
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings
Phoenix, Arizona
Case Timeline
• December 13, 2018 & January 9, 2019: Petitioner attends and records DRC meetings where the alleged violations occurred.
• January 23, 2019: Vicky Glover files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• January 28, 2019: The Department issues a notice to the FCA regarding the petition.
• May 10, 2019: An administrative hearing is held.
• May 30, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.
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Petitioner’s Allegations
The petitioner, Vicky Glover, alleged that the Foothills Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804 in two specific ways:
1. Improper Email Meetings: The FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) held unannounced meetings via email to vote on non-emergency matters, which should have been handled in open, public meetings.
2. Denial of Speaking Rights: The DRC refused to allow community members, including the petitioner, to speak at an appropriate time during its regularly scheduled meetings, specifically when she wished to speak on other members’ pending requests.
Key Factual Findings
The facts underlying the petition were not in dispute by the parties during the hearing. The key findings of fact established were:
• Organizational Structure:
◦ The FCA Board of Directors is comprised of seven members and meets on the fourth Wednesday of the month at 6:00 p.m.
◦ The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, is comprised of five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets on the second Wednesday of the month at 2:00 p.m.
• Events at DRC Meetings:
◦ On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Vicky Glover attended and recorded DRC meetings.
◦ During these meetings, she was not permitted to speak on issues being discussed related to other members’ pending requests.
• Use of Email by the DRC:
◦ During meetings, DRC members mentioned that additional information for certain requests would be shared via email after the meeting.
◦ Based on this emailed information, DRC members would approve or deny the request.
◦ Decisions made via email between meetings were formally “ratified” at the subsequent DRC meeting.
◦ FCA Manager Pat Wontor testified, denying that the DRC took initial action via email, asserting instead that emails were only used to gather additional information on matters that had already been discussed in an open meeting.
• DRC Policies: A request submitted to the DRC is deemed approved if it is not denied within 60 days.
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Legal Analysis and Judge’s Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on a strict interpretation of the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The petitioner bore the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so on both counts.
I. Member Speaking Rights at Committee Meetings
The judge analyzed the petitioner’s claim that she was wrongfully denied the right to speak at DRC meetings.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) states that at “any regularly scheduled committee meetings… all members… shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”
• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge found a critical distinction within the statute’s text. A later clause specifies that “the board… shall permit a member… to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item.”
• Conclusion: The judge ruled that this specific right to speak on an item before a vote applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors, not to committee meetings. For committee meetings, the standard is the more general “appropriate time.” The ALJ concluded it was reasonable for the DRC to determine that having one member speak on another member’s private application was not an “appropriate time.” Therefore, the DRC’s refusal to allow the petitioner to speak did not violate the statute.
II. Email Deliberations and “Meetings”
The judge next addressed the claim that email communications constituted illegal, non-public meetings.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) mandates that open meeting rules apply to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.”
• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge concluded that the email discussions, deliberations, and decisions among DRC members did not meet the definition of “regularly scheduled.” These communications did not occur at a set time on a recurring basis (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly). While they could be considered a form of meeting, they were not regularly scheduled ones.
• Effect of State Policy: The judge acknowledged the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which expresses a legislative preference for open meetings. However, the judge ruled that this general policy “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”
• Conclusion: Because the email communications were not regularly scheduled, they did not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, and no violation occurred.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the legal analysis, the Administrative Law Judge found that the petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
• Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties. A party may file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919046-REL
Study Guide: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (No. 19F-H1919046-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Vicky Glover (Petitioner) and the Foothills Community Association (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the source document.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions based on the provided legal decision. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two specific violations of state statutes that the Petitioner alleged?
3. Describe the composition and meeting schedules of the Board of Directors and the Design Review Committee (DRC).
4. What specific action did the Petitioner take during the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019?
5. According to the decision, what was the DRC’s practice regarding decisions made via email between meetings?
6. What is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how does the decision define it?
7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statutory phrase “an appropriate time” for a member to speak during a committee meeting?
8. Why did the Judge conclude that the DRC’s email communications did not violate the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804?
9. What was the final ruling, or Order, issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
10. What recourse did the parties have if they disagreed with the Judge’s order?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Vicky Glover, the Petitioner who filed the complaint, and the Foothills Community Association (FCA), the Respondent homeowners association. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer in the Office of Administrative Hearings.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated state statutes by holding unannounced email meetings to vote on non-emergency matters. She also alleged that the Respondent would not allow community members to speak at appropriate times during Design Review Committee (DRC) meetings.
3. The Board of Directors has seven members and meets at 6:00 p.m. on the fourth Wednesday of the month. The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, has five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets at 2:00 p.m. on the second Wednesday of the month.
4. During the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, the Petitioner attended and recorded the proceedings. She was not allowed to speak on other members’ pending requests during these meetings.
5. The DRC would gather additional information via email after a meeting and members would then approve or deny the request via email. Any decisions made via email between DRC meetings were then “ratified” at the next formal DRC meeting.
6. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
7. The Judge determined that the statute does not define what constitutes “an appropriate time” to speak at a committee meeting. Therefore, it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that the deliberation regarding a different member’s request was not an appropriate time for the Petitioner to speak.
8. The Judge concluded that email communications are not “regularly scheduled committee meetings” because they do not occur at a set time on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Since A.R.S. § 33-1804 only requires regularly scheduled committee meetings to be open, the email discussions were not a violation.
9. The final Order was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), the order is binding unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer-form essay responses to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case details and legal reasoning. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s statutory construction of A.R.S. § 33-1804. How does the judge distinguish between the open meeting requirements for Board of Directors meetings versus committee meetings, and what role does the “plain language” of the statute play in this interpretation?
2. Discuss the two central allegations made by Vicky Glover. For each allegation, detail the undisputed facts of the events and explain the specific legal reasoning the judge used to conclude that no statutory violation occurred.
3. Examine the conflict between the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)) and the specific statutory language governing committee meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)). How did the judge resolve this apparent conflict in her final decision?
4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the operational procedures of the Design Review Committee, including its use of email for decision-making and subsequent ratification. How did these procedures become central to the legal dispute?
5. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the standard of “preponderance of the evidence” shape the proceedings, and why was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Petitioner “did not establish” a violation critical to the final order?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer, the judge who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
The Arizona Revised Statute that the Petitioner alleged was violated. It governs open meetings for planned communities, including member associations, boards of directors, and regularly scheduled committees.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the Petitioner filed her petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the Foothills Community Association, comprised of seven members. It appoints the Design Review Committee.
Design Review Committee (DRC)
A five-member committee appointed by the Board of Directors. Two of its members are also on the Board. The DRC’s meetings were the subject of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Foothills Community Association (FCA)
The Respondent in the case. An association of homeowners located in Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
Vicky Glover, who filed a petition on January 23, 2019, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Foothills Community Association.
Preponderance of the evidence
The burden of proof required of the Petitioner. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”
Ratified
The term used to describe the process where decisions made by the DRC via email between meetings were formally approved at the next DRC meeting.
Regularly scheduled committee meetings
The specific type of meeting subject to the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that email communications do not meet this definition as they do not occur at a set time.
Respondent
The Foothills Community Association (FCA), against which the petition was filed. Represented in the hearing by B. Austin Baillio.
Statutory Construction
The process of interpreting a statute. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the plain text of the statute.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919046-REL
3 Shocking Loopholes in HOA ‘Open Meeting’ Laws This Homeowner Discovered the Hard Way
Introduction: The Illusion of Transparency
For anyone living in a homeowner’s association (HOA), there’s a fundamental expectation: the business of the community is conducted in the open. We assume that as members, we have a right to attend meetings, understand the decisions being made, and voice our opinions before our board takes action.
But a startling court decision from an Arizona Administrative Law Judge throws a wrench in that assumption. One homeowner’s legal challenge against her association didn’t just fail—it inadvertently created a roadmap for how HOAs can legally operate behind closed doors, affecting millions of residents in planned communities.
This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from this legal battle, revealing how the specific wording of the law can create major gaps in transparency and challenge everything you thought you knew about your rights as a homeowner.
1. Your Right to Speak is Weaker Than You Think—Especially in Committee Meetings
Most homeowners believe they have a protected right to speak on any agenda item at any official HOA meeting. The case of petitioner Vicky Glover shows this is a dangerous assumption.
On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Ms. Glover attended meetings of her community’s Design Review Committee (DRC) and was not permitted to speak about other members’ pending architectural requests. She argued this violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities (A.R.S. § 33-1804).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), however, pointed out a critical distinction in the law’s text. The statute explicitly guarantees a member the right “to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action.” This specific right, the ALJ concluded, applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors.
For committee meetings, the law sets a much vaguer standard, requiring only that members “be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The ALJ found it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that having Ms. Glover speak on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”
This is a crucial distinction because committees—like architectural, design, or finance committees—often make the decisions that most directly impact homeowners’ property and daily lives. Yet, this ruling clarifies that the guaranteed right to be heard before a vote is taken is significantly weaker in those very forums.
2. “Email Meetings” Can Be a Legal Way to Sidestep Open Meeting Rules
The common understanding of open meeting laws is that they exist to prevent boards and committees from deliberating and making decisions in private. But what if the meeting doesn’t happen in a room, but in an email chain?
Ms. Glover’s second claim was that the DRC was conducting business and making decisions via email between its official meetings. Evidence showed that after a meeting, additional information would be shared with committee members who could then “approve or deny the request… via email.” The association’s manager, Pat Wontor, denied this, claiming emails were only used to gather information on matters already discussed in a meeting.
The ALJ’s conclusion on this matter was stunning and sidestepped the conflicting testimony entirely. The Arizona open meeting law in question only applies to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” Because email exchanges do not occur at a set, scheduled time—like the second Wednesday of the month—the judge ruled they do not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, regardless of their content.
The implication of this loophole is profound. It allows a committee to conduct significant deliberation and decision-making entirely outside of public view. This practice can turn the open meeting into a hollow formality. A committee can present a “done deal” for public ratification, rendering the member’s right to observe and speak effectively meaningless. The public meeting becomes a theatrical rubber stamp for a decision already made in secret.
3. The “Spirit of the Law” Doesn’t Beat the Letter of the Law
Many laws contain a policy statement that outlines their overarching goal—the “spirit of the law.” Arizona’s statute on HOA meetings has an exceptionally strong one, stating that all meetings should be open and that the law should be interpreted to favor transparency. The text explicitly declares:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.” (from A.R.S. § 33-1804(F))
Ms. Glover and many homeowners would read this and assume it guarantees broad transparency. The ALJ, however, ruled that this powerful policy statement “does not override the specific provisions” of the law.
In other words, the literal, specific text—like the distinction between “board” and “committee” meetings, or the “regularly scheduled” requirement—takes precedence over the law’s general intent.
This is perhaps the most important lesson for all homeowners. Relying on the assumed purpose or “spirit” of a rule is not enough. In a legal dispute, the precise, technical wording is what matters most. It highlights the critical importance for homeowners to read and understand the exact text of state statutes and their own governing documents, because the loopholes are often found in the fine print.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense
While Vicky Glover lost her petition, her case provides an invaluable education for every member of a community association. It is a stark warning that transparency in an HOA is not a guaranteed principle but a legal standard with specific, and at times counter-intuitive, boundaries that can be exploited.
The loopholes her case exposed reveal a sobering reality: your right to speak is conditional, “meetings” can legally occur out of sight in an email chain, and the stated “spirit” of the law can be rendered toothless by its literal text. HOA governance is not guided by general principles of fairness, but by very specific legal language.
Given these loopholes, it’s worth asking: How many of the most important decisions in your community are happening in an inbox instead of the boardroom?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Vicky Glover(petitioner)
Respondent Side
B. Austin Baillio(respondent attorney) Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Pat Wontor(manager) Manager for DRC/Foothills Community Association
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding both the DRC's restriction on speaking during specific deliberations and the use of email communications for non-regularly scheduled committee business.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically because the DRC's restrictions on speaking were deemed reasonable, and email communications were not considered 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' requiring public access.
Key Issues & Findings
Open Meetings and Member Right to Speak (DRC and Email Meetings)
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by denying her the ability to speak at DRC meetings on other members’ requests, and by conducting deliberations and making decisions via email outside of regularly scheduled meetings.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Design Review Committee, Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Email Meetings, A.R.S. 33-1804
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919046-REL Decision – 712028.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:53 (94.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919046-REL
Briefing Document: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (Case No. 19F-H1919046-REL)
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Vicky Glover versus the Foothills Community Association (FCA), where the petitioner’s claims were denied. The petitioner alleged that the FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) violated Arizona’s open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on two fronts: first, by conducting unannounced “email meetings” to vote on non-emergency matters, and second, by preventing members from speaking at appropriate times during regularly scheduled DRC meetings.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Tammy L. Eigenheer, concluded that the petitioner failed to prove any statutory violation. The decision rested on a strict textual interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. Regarding speaking rights, the ALJ determined that while members have a right to speak at an “appropriate time” in committee meetings, the more specific right to speak on an agenda item before a formal vote applies exclusively to Board of Directors meetings, not committee meetings. The judge found it was reasonable for the DRC to rule that a member speaking on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”
Concerning the email communications, the ALJ ruled that they do not constitute “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as defined by the statute. Because the email discussions and decisions did not occur at a set weekly, monthly, or quarterly time, they are not subject to the open meeting requirements. The general state policy favoring open meetings was found to be subordinate to the specific statutory language. The petition was therefore denied in its entirety.
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Case Overview
This case involved a dispute between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the application of Arizona’s open meeting laws to a committee of the association.
Name / Entity
Representation / Title
Petitioner
Vicky Glover
Appeared on her own behalf
Respondent
Foothills Community Association (FCA)
B. Austin Baillio (Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.)
Adjudicator
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Administrative Law Judge
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings
Phoenix, Arizona
Case Timeline
• December 13, 2018 & January 9, 2019: Petitioner attends and records DRC meetings where the alleged violations occurred.
• January 23, 2019: Vicky Glover files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• January 28, 2019: The Department issues a notice to the FCA regarding the petition.
• May 10, 2019: An administrative hearing is held.
• May 30, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.
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Petitioner’s Allegations
The petitioner, Vicky Glover, alleged that the Foothills Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804 in two specific ways:
1. Improper Email Meetings: The FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) held unannounced meetings via email to vote on non-emergency matters, which should have been handled in open, public meetings.
2. Denial of Speaking Rights: The DRC refused to allow community members, including the petitioner, to speak at an appropriate time during its regularly scheduled meetings, specifically when she wished to speak on other members’ pending requests.
Key Factual Findings
The facts underlying the petition were not in dispute by the parties during the hearing. The key findings of fact established were:
• Organizational Structure:
◦ The FCA Board of Directors is comprised of seven members and meets on the fourth Wednesday of the month at 6:00 p.m.
◦ The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, is comprised of five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets on the second Wednesday of the month at 2:00 p.m.
• Events at DRC Meetings:
◦ On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Vicky Glover attended and recorded DRC meetings.
◦ During these meetings, she was not permitted to speak on issues being discussed related to other members’ pending requests.
• Use of Email by the DRC:
◦ During meetings, DRC members mentioned that additional information for certain requests would be shared via email after the meeting.
◦ Based on this emailed information, DRC members would approve or deny the request.
◦ Decisions made via email between meetings were formally “ratified” at the subsequent DRC meeting.
◦ FCA Manager Pat Wontor testified, denying that the DRC took initial action via email, asserting instead that emails were only used to gather additional information on matters that had already been discussed in an open meeting.
• DRC Policies: A request submitted to the DRC is deemed approved if it is not denied within 60 days.
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Legal Analysis and Judge’s Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on a strict interpretation of the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The petitioner bore the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so on both counts.
I. Member Speaking Rights at Committee Meetings
The judge analyzed the petitioner’s claim that she was wrongfully denied the right to speak at DRC meetings.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) states that at “any regularly scheduled committee meetings… all members… shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”
• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge found a critical distinction within the statute’s text. A later clause specifies that “the board… shall permit a member… to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item.”
• Conclusion: The judge ruled that this specific right to speak on an item before a vote applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors, not to committee meetings. For committee meetings, the standard is the more general “appropriate time.” The ALJ concluded it was reasonable for the DRC to determine that having one member speak on another member’s private application was not an “appropriate time.” Therefore, the DRC’s refusal to allow the petitioner to speak did not violate the statute.
II. Email Deliberations and “Meetings”
The judge next addressed the claim that email communications constituted illegal, non-public meetings.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) mandates that open meeting rules apply to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.”
• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge concluded that the email discussions, deliberations, and decisions among DRC members did not meet the definition of “regularly scheduled.” These communications did not occur at a set time on a recurring basis (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly). While they could be considered a form of meeting, they were not regularly scheduled ones.
• Effect of State Policy: The judge acknowledged the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which expresses a legislative preference for open meetings. However, the judge ruled that this general policy “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”
• Conclusion: Because the email communications were not regularly scheduled, they did not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, and no violation occurred.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the legal analysis, the Administrative Law Judge found that the petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
• Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties. A party may file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919046-REL
Study Guide: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (No. 19F-H1919046-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Vicky Glover (Petitioner) and the Foothills Community Association (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the source document.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions based on the provided legal decision. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two specific violations of state statutes that the Petitioner alleged?
3. Describe the composition and meeting schedules of the Board of Directors and the Design Review Committee (DRC).
4. What specific action did the Petitioner take during the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019?
5. According to the decision, what was the DRC’s practice regarding decisions made via email between meetings?
6. What is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how does the decision define it?
7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statutory phrase “an appropriate time” for a member to speak during a committee meeting?
8. Why did the Judge conclude that the DRC’s email communications did not violate the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804?
9. What was the final ruling, or Order, issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
10. What recourse did the parties have if they disagreed with the Judge’s order?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Vicky Glover, the Petitioner who filed the complaint, and the Foothills Community Association (FCA), the Respondent homeowners association. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer in the Office of Administrative Hearings.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated state statutes by holding unannounced email meetings to vote on non-emergency matters. She also alleged that the Respondent would not allow community members to speak at appropriate times during Design Review Committee (DRC) meetings.
3. The Board of Directors has seven members and meets at 6:00 p.m. on the fourth Wednesday of the month. The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, has five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets at 2:00 p.m. on the second Wednesday of the month.
4. During the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, the Petitioner attended and recorded the proceedings. She was not allowed to speak on other members’ pending requests during these meetings.
5. The DRC would gather additional information via email after a meeting and members would then approve or deny the request via email. Any decisions made via email between DRC meetings were then “ratified” at the next formal DRC meeting.
6. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
7. The Judge determined that the statute does not define what constitutes “an appropriate time” to speak at a committee meeting. Therefore, it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that the deliberation regarding a different member’s request was not an appropriate time for the Petitioner to speak.
8. The Judge concluded that email communications are not “regularly scheduled committee meetings” because they do not occur at a set time on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Since A.R.S. § 33-1804 only requires regularly scheduled committee meetings to be open, the email discussions were not a violation.
9. The final Order was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), the order is binding unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer-form essay responses to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case details and legal reasoning. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s statutory construction of A.R.S. § 33-1804. How does the judge distinguish between the open meeting requirements for Board of Directors meetings versus committee meetings, and what role does the “plain language” of the statute play in this interpretation?
2. Discuss the two central allegations made by Vicky Glover. For each allegation, detail the undisputed facts of the events and explain the specific legal reasoning the judge used to conclude that no statutory violation occurred.
3. Examine the conflict between the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)) and the specific statutory language governing committee meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)). How did the judge resolve this apparent conflict in her final decision?
4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the operational procedures of the Design Review Committee, including its use of email for decision-making and subsequent ratification. How did these procedures become central to the legal dispute?
5. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the standard of “preponderance of the evidence” shape the proceedings, and why was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Petitioner “did not establish” a violation critical to the final order?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer, the judge who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
The Arizona Revised Statute that the Petitioner alleged was violated. It governs open meetings for planned communities, including member associations, boards of directors, and regularly scheduled committees.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the Petitioner filed her petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the Foothills Community Association, comprised of seven members. It appoints the Design Review Committee.
Design Review Committee (DRC)
A five-member committee appointed by the Board of Directors. Two of its members are also on the Board. The DRC’s meetings were the subject of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Foothills Community Association (FCA)
The Respondent in the case. An association of homeowners located in Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
Vicky Glover, who filed a petition on January 23, 2019, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Foothills Community Association.
Preponderance of the evidence
The burden of proof required of the Petitioner. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”
Ratified
The term used to describe the process where decisions made by the DRC via email between meetings were formally approved at the next DRC meeting.
Regularly scheduled committee meetings
The specific type of meeting subject to the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that email communications do not meet this definition as they do not occur at a set time.
Respondent
The Foothills Community Association (FCA), against which the petition was filed. Represented in the hearing by B. Austin Baillio.
Statutory Construction
The process of interpreting a statute. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the plain text of the statute.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919046-REL
3 Shocking Loopholes in HOA ‘Open Meeting’ Laws This Homeowner Discovered the Hard Way
Introduction: The Illusion of Transparency
For anyone living in a homeowner’s association (HOA), there’s a fundamental expectation: the business of the community is conducted in the open. We assume that as members, we have a right to attend meetings, understand the decisions being made, and voice our opinions before our board takes action.
But a startling court decision from an Arizona Administrative Law Judge throws a wrench in that assumption. One homeowner’s legal challenge against her association didn’t just fail—it inadvertently created a roadmap for how HOAs can legally operate behind closed doors, affecting millions of residents in planned communities.
This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from this legal battle, revealing how the specific wording of the law can create major gaps in transparency and challenge everything you thought you knew about your rights as a homeowner.
1. Your Right to Speak is Weaker Than You Think—Especially in Committee Meetings
Most homeowners believe they have a protected right to speak on any agenda item at any official HOA meeting. The case of petitioner Vicky Glover shows this is a dangerous assumption.
On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Ms. Glover attended meetings of her community’s Design Review Committee (DRC) and was not permitted to speak about other members’ pending architectural requests. She argued this violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities (A.R.S. § 33-1804).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), however, pointed out a critical distinction in the law’s text. The statute explicitly guarantees a member the right “to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action.” This specific right, the ALJ concluded, applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors.
For committee meetings, the law sets a much vaguer standard, requiring only that members “be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The ALJ found it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that having Ms. Glover speak on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”
This is a crucial distinction because committees—like architectural, design, or finance committees—often make the decisions that most directly impact homeowners’ property and daily lives. Yet, this ruling clarifies that the guaranteed right to be heard before a vote is taken is significantly weaker in those very forums.
2. “Email Meetings” Can Be a Legal Way to Sidestep Open Meeting Rules
The common understanding of open meeting laws is that they exist to prevent boards and committees from deliberating and making decisions in private. But what if the meeting doesn’t happen in a room, but in an email chain?
Ms. Glover’s second claim was that the DRC was conducting business and making decisions via email between its official meetings. Evidence showed that after a meeting, additional information would be shared with committee members who could then “approve or deny the request… via email.” The association’s manager, Pat Wontor, denied this, claiming emails were only used to gather information on matters already discussed in a meeting.
The ALJ’s conclusion on this matter was stunning and sidestepped the conflicting testimony entirely. The Arizona open meeting law in question only applies to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” Because email exchanges do not occur at a set, scheduled time—like the second Wednesday of the month—the judge ruled they do not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, regardless of their content.
The implication of this loophole is profound. It allows a committee to conduct significant deliberation and decision-making entirely outside of public view. This practice can turn the open meeting into a hollow formality. A committee can present a “done deal” for public ratification, rendering the member’s right to observe and speak effectively meaningless. The public meeting becomes a theatrical rubber stamp for a decision already made in secret.
3. The “Spirit of the Law” Doesn’t Beat the Letter of the Law
Many laws contain a policy statement that outlines their overarching goal—the “spirit of the law.” Arizona’s statute on HOA meetings has an exceptionally strong one, stating that all meetings should be open and that the law should be interpreted to favor transparency. The text explicitly declares:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.” (from A.R.S. § 33-1804(F))
Ms. Glover and many homeowners would read this and assume it guarantees broad transparency. The ALJ, however, ruled that this powerful policy statement “does not override the specific provisions” of the law.
In other words, the literal, specific text—like the distinction between “board” and “committee” meetings, or the “regularly scheduled” requirement—takes precedence over the law’s general intent.
This is perhaps the most important lesson for all homeowners. Relying on the assumed purpose or “spirit” of a rule is not enough. In a legal dispute, the precise, technical wording is what matters most. It highlights the critical importance for homeowners to read and understand the exact text of state statutes and their own governing documents, because the loopholes are often found in the fine print.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense
While Vicky Glover lost her petition, her case provides an invaluable education for every member of a community association. It is a stark warning that transparency in an HOA is not a guaranteed principle but a legal standard with specific, and at times counter-intuitive, boundaries that can be exploited.
The loopholes her case exposed reveal a sobering reality: your right to speak is conditional, “meetings” can legally occur out of sight in an email chain, and the stated “spirit” of the law can be rendered toothless by its literal text. HOA governance is not guided by general principles of fairness, but by very specific legal language.
Given these loopholes, it’s worth asking: How many of the most important decisions in your community are happening in an inbox instead of the boardroom?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Vicky Glover(petitioner)
Respondent Side
B. Austin Baillio(respondent attorney) Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Pat Wontor(manager) Manager for DRC/Foothills Community Association
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge granted the petition, finding that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by failing to notice at least one meeting which was improperly held in closed session. The Tribunal noted that while some executive sessions regarding pending litigation were permissible, meetings regarding vendor changes (management and landscaping) required open session and notice. The filing fee was refunded, but no civil penalty was assessed as the conduct was not found to be intentional or in bad faith.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to provide notice of meetings and acting on results of secret meetings
Petitioner alleged the Association violated open meeting laws by failing to provide notice of meetings held between November 2017 and May 2018, specifically regarding the hiring of new management and landscaping companies in executive session without community input or proper notice.
Orders: The Tribunal found the Respondent held at least one closed meeting that should have been open/noticed. Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
6
7
48
49
50
Decision Documents
19F-H1918014-REL Decision – 693361.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:15:40 (45.6 KB)
19F-H1918014-REL Decision – 699583.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:15:40 (194.0 KB)
**Case Summary: James Dutton vs. Cielo Noche Community Association**
**Case No.** 19F-H1918014-REL
**Forum:** Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona Department of Real Estate)
**Administrative Law Judge:** Jenna Clark
**Overview and Main Issues**
This case involved a dispute between Petitioner James Dutton, a homeowner and former Board President, and the Respondent, Cielo Noche Community Association. The central legal issue was whether the Association violated **A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law)** by failing to provide notice of Board meetings and conducting business in secret executive sessions between November 2017 and May 2018,.
**Key Facts and Arguments**
* **Petitioner’s Position:** Dutton argued that the Board improperly utilized executive sessions to make significant financial and operational decisions without community input. Specifically, he presented evidence that the Board voted to replace the management company (Trestle with Tri-City) and the landscaping vendor (Peak) during closed sessions,,. Dutton noted that the new management contract cost the community 3% more than the previous one. He further alleged that the Board failed to read minutes from emergency meetings held in September and November 2018 at subsequent open meetings, as required by law,.
* **Respondent’s Position:** The Association contended that the closed sessions were necessary and privileged. Witnesses testified that discussions regarding the management company involved "employee performance" and that other closed sessions concerned pending litigation and settlement negotiations with the developer, K. Hovnanian Homes (KHOV), regarding construction defects,,.
* **Testimony on Compliance:** Kari Moyer, the community manager from Tri-City, admitted that a July 2018 meeting was not noticed due to a miscommunication. She also testified that she subsequently had to inform the Board that they were not permitted to hold executive sessions for the reasons they had been using and instructed them to hold such discussions in open session moving forward.
**Legal Analysis**
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) evaluated the evidence under **A.R.S. § 33-1804**. This statute mandates that all meetings of a planned community association be open to members, with limited exceptions for legal advice, pending litigation, and personnel matters,. The law also requires that minutes from emergency meetings be read and approved at the next regularly scheduled meeting.
The Tribunal found that while the Board claimed privilege regarding the developer negotiations, the Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent held at least one closed meeting that should have been open. Furthermore, the lack of proper notice for these meetings constituted a violation of the state's Open Meeting Law.
**Final Decision and Order**
* **Ruling:** The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner, concluding that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by failing to properly notice meetings and holding discussions in closed sessions that required open deliberation,.
* **Financial Outcome:** The Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00.
* **Civil Penalties:** The Tribunal declined to assess a civil penalty against the Association. The Judge determined that the record did not reflect that the Board’s conduct was intentional, negligent, or committed in bad faith.
**Date of Order:** April 05, 2019.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
James Dutton(petitioner) Cielo Noche subdivision Former Board President; property owner
Steven W. Cheifetz(attorney) Cheifetz Law, PLLC Counsel for Petitioner
Respondent Side
Nicholas C. Nogami(attorney) Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen PLC Counsel for Respondent
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
partial
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Tom Barrs
Counsel
—
Respondent
Desert Ranch Homeowners' Association
Counsel
—
Alleged Violations
Bylaw 2.4
Outcome Summary
In the initial decision, Petitioner established violations of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (election materials disposal) and A.R.S. § 33-1804 (closed/improperly noticed meetings), but failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Issue 1). The rehearing only addressed Issue 1, which was ultimately dismissed.
Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 violation) because the ALJ found that while the Bylaw applied to Members, Petitioner failed to show it prohibited a Director from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned, and the investigation was initiated by a Board member immediately following the meeting.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Election Objection Waiver)
Whether Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on an objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting, given that the Bylaw requires members to object to irregularities 'at the meeting' to avoid waiver.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed as to Issue 1.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Dispute, Election Challenge, Bylaw Violation, Meeting Notice, Record Retention, Rehearing
This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative legal dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning the HOA’s board election of March 18, 2017. The core of the dispute involved the HOA board’s decision to investigate and ultimately overturn the initially announced election results, leading to a run-off election.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) overseeing the case and a subsequent rehearing issued a mixed final decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, successfully proved that the Desert Ranch HOA committed two statutory violations:
1. Destruction of Election Materials: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by destroying ballot envelopes shortly after the election, materials which are required to be retained for at least one year.
2. Improper Closed Meeting: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding a board meeting with its attorney at a private residence without providing the required notice to its members.
However, the Petitioner’s primary challenge—that the board violated its own Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned—was dismissed. The ALJ ruled that the bylaw’s waiver of claims applied to general “Members” but not to “Directors” acting in their official capacity. This ruling effectively upheld the board’s authority to investigate the election, which led to the discovery of invalid ballots and the eventual run-off election won by Brian Schoeffler.
As the prevailing party on two of the three issues, Mr. Barrs was awarded a reimbursement of his $1,000.00 filing fee. The judge, however, found that no civil penalty against the HOA was appropriate.
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I. Case Overview
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Tom Barrs
◦ Respondent: Desert Ranch HOA, represented by Catherine Overby (President) and Brian Schoeffler (Vice President)
• Case Number: 18F-H1818035-REL
• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
• Subject of Dispute: Alleged violations of Arizona statutes and HOA bylaws related to the handling and outcome of the March 18, 2017, annual board election.
II. Chronology of the Contested Election
The dispute originated from the following sequence of events surrounding the 2017 election for two vacant seats on the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors.
1. Pre-Election: Absentee ballots were distributed to members, listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates and providing a space for a write-in candidate.
2. March 18, 2017 (Annual Meeting): Ballots were submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger (a write-in) were announced as the winning candidates. No members present objected to the results before the meeting was adjourned.
3. Immediately Following the Meeting: Board member Patrick Rice gathered the ballots and “expressed his concerns with the election results.”
4. Circa March 18, 2017: All ballot envelopes from the election were destroyed.
5. March 19, 2017: Candidate Brian Schoeffler sent an email regarding the election, stating, “I’m asking you to review the situation and make a decision if there is enough concern that there should be a revote.”
6. March 20, 2017: Board President Catherine Overby emailed the members, announcing that the election had been “contested.” In the email, she asserted that the bylaws did not permit write-in candidates and declared that she and Mr. Schoeffler were the new directors.
7. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Ms. Overby and Mr. Rice, held an unannounced meeting with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s home. During this meeting, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot” had been improperly counted.
8. Post-March 29, 2017: After consulting the attorney, the board determined that the valid vote count resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board decided to hold a run-off election.
9. April 29, 2017: The run-off election was held, and Brian Schoeffler was announced as the winner.
10. May 10, 2017: The newly constituted Board of Directors held its organizational meeting.
III. Adjudicated Issues and Rulings
The petition, originally filed as a single issue, was converted to a multiple-issue case. At the hearing, the dispute was clarified into three distinct issues, each with a specific ruling from the ALJ.
Petitioner’s Allegation
Legal Basis
Final Ruling
The HOA improperly overturned the election results based on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned.
Bylaw 2.4
Dismissed
The HOA unlawfully discarded ballot envelopes and related election materials.
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
Violation Found
The HOA held closed board meetings without providing proper notice to the membership.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Violation Found
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A. Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Improperly Overturning Election)
• Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs contended that the board was barred from investigating or acting on any concerns about the election after the meeting had concluded. His argument was based on Bylaw 2.4, which states:
• ALJ Finding: The petition on this issue was dismissed. The judge’s finding was affirmed after a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.
• ALJ Rationale:
1. Initiation of Investigation: Testimony established that Board member Patrick Rice expressed concerns “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” Therefore, Mr. Schoeffler’s email the following day did not initiate the board’s investigation.
2. Distinction Between “Member” and “Director”: The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. The waiver in Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member,” and the Petitioner failed to prove that a “Director” was prohibited from raising questions about the validity of an election after a meeting.
B. Issue 2: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (Destruction of Election Materials)
• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law mandates that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… for at least one year after completion of the election.”
• Respondent’s Action: The HOA destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election.
• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.
• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” presented at the hearing that established the destruction of the materials.
C. Issue 3: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Improper Closed Meetings)
• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law requires all HOA board meetings to be open to all members. A meeting can only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must provide notice and cite the legal authority for entering a closed session.
• Respondent’s Action: Certain board members met with an attorney at a private residence on March 29, 2017, to discuss the election. No notice was provided to the membership regarding this meeting.
• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.
• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” that the meeting occurred and that the board “did not provide any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or provide notice that the meeting would be closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.”
IV. Final Order and Disposition
The final decision, issued on August 23, 2018, and upheld after a rehearing decision on December 26, 2018, ordered the following:
• Dismissal: The petition regarding Issue 1 (violation of Bylaw 2.4) was dismissed.
• Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Tom Barrs, was deemed the prevailing party as to Issue 2 and Issue 3.
• Monetary Award: The Respondent, Desert Ranch HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00.
• Civil Penalty: The judge determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”
• Finality: The decision after rehearing was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Study Guide:Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions issued on August 23, 2018, and December 26, 2018.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?
2. What were the initially announced results of the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors election on March 18, 2017?
3. What were the two primary procedural violations that the Desert Ranch HOA Board committed following the March 18, 2017 election?
4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the violation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4?
5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismiss the Petitioner’s claim regarding Bylaw 2.4?
6. Explain the violation related to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1812(A)(7) that the ALJ found the Respondent had committed.
7. Describe the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 concerning open meetings.
8. What was the final order from the initial hearing on August 23, 2018?
9. What was the specific focus of the rehearing held on December 6, 2018?
10. What was the ultimate outcome of the rehearing, and what legal recourse was available to the parties afterward?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Tom Barrs, who filed the dispute, and Respondent Desert Ranch HOA. The HOA was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
2. At the Annual Board Meeting on March 18, 2017, the ballots were counted and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates for the two vacant seats on the Board of Directors. No members present raised an objection before the meeting was adjourned.
3. The HOA Board committed two primary procedural violations. First, they destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election, and second, certain Board members met with an attorney without providing notice to the association members that a meeting was being held or that it would be a closed session.
4. The Petitioner argued that candidate Brian Schoeffler’s challenge to the election was invalid because it was raised the day after the meeting adjourned. According to Bylaw 2.4, any “Member” who fails to object to an irregularity at the meeting waives their claim, and the Petitioner argued this rule should also apply to Board members.
5. The ALJ dismissed the claim because the investigation was initiated by Board member Patrick Rice, who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting, not by Mr. Schoeffler’s later email. The judge also determined that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific, non-interchangeable meanings, and the Petitioner failed to show that a Director was barred from raising concerns after a meeting.
6. The ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) based on uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing. This statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related election materials be retained for at least one year after an election, but the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.
7. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when certain Board members met with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s house on March 29, 2017. The HOA failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the members and did not announce that the meeting would be closed to discuss legal advice, as required by the statute.
8. In the initial order, the ALJ dismissed the petition as to Issue 1 (the Bylaw 2.4 violation) but found the Petitioner to be the prevailing party on Issues 2 and 3 (the statutory violations). The judge ordered the Respondent HOA to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00 but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.
9. The rehearing focused exclusively on the first issue from the initial hearing: whether the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on objections to the election results after the Annual Meeting had adjourned. The Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the lack of penalties for the other two violations.
10. The rehearing upheld the original decision, dismissing the petition as to Issue 1. The decision from the rehearing was final and binding, and any party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing upon specific facts and legal arguments presented in the source documents.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4, specifically the distinction between a “Member” and a “Director.” Discuss the strength of the Petitioner’s counter-argument and why the judge’s reasoning ultimately prevailed.
2. Examine the series of actions taken by the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors following the March 18, 2017 election announcement. Evaluate whether their actions to investigate irregularities, consult an attorney, and hold a run-off election were ultimately justified, despite the procedural violations they committed.
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as the burden of proof in this case. For each of the three issues presented, explain how the Petitioner either met or failed to meet this standard, citing specific evidence mentioned in the decisions.
4. Based on the events described, from the initial election to the final administrative ruling, critique the effectiveness of the HOA’s internal governance and dispute resolution processes. What systemic failures are evident, and how did they lead to a formal administrative hearing?
5. Although the Petitioner was the “prevailing party” on two of the three issues, the remedy was limited to a refund of his filing fee, with no civil penalty imposed. Argue for or against the appropriateness of this remedy, considering the nature of the HOA’s violations and their impact on the integrity of the election process.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Statute
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on evidence and law. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all meetings of a homeowners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. A meeting may only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must state the statutory reason for closing the meeting.
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
An Arizona Revised Statute that mandates the retention of election materials, including ballots and envelopes, in either electronic or paper format for at least one year after the completion of an election for member inspection.
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
An Arizona statute that permits an owner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4
A provision in the HOA’s bylaws stating, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”
Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal proceeding against their HOA for alleged violations.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Tom Barrs.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to consider a decision that has already been made, typically granted if there are perceived errors of law, misconduct, or if the decision was not supported by the evidence.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch HOA.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
A Homeowner Sued His HOA Over a Botched Election—Here Are 3 Lessons Every Board Should Learn
Friction between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) board is a common feature of community living, and nowhere is that friction more apparent than in disputes over elections and rule enforcement. But what happens when a board, trying to correct an error, makes the situation exponentially worse?
This article is a deep dive into the real administrative law case of Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, a seemingly straightforward dispute that reveals surprising and practical lessons for anyone living in or governing a planned community. It’s a story of a cascade of errors, where initial election confusion led to a panicked and procedurally flawed response, compounded by a pre-existing failure in record-keeping. As we’ll see, the outcome wasn’t what anyone expected, and the board’s biggest mistakes weren’t the ones they thought they were fighting.
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1. You Can Lose the Main Argument But Still Win the Case
The dispute began at the Desert Ranch HOA’s annual meeting, where election results were announced. The trouble started immediately after the meeting adjourned when a board Director, Patrick Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed concerns about irregularities. A day later, a losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, echoed those concerns via email. Citing the Director’s objection, the board overturned the initial results, prompting homeowner Tom Barrs to file a petition arguing this was a violation of the HOA’s own rules.
Barrs’ case hinged on Bylaw 2.4, which stated that any “Member” must object to irregularities during the meeting itself, or else they waive their right to complain. Barrs argued that since no one objected before adjournment, the results should stand. However, the judge disagreed, pointing to two critical distinctions in the evidence. First, the investigation was triggered by the concerns of a “Director,” not the losing candidate’s later email. Second, a close reading of the bylaws showed that the terms “Member” and “Director” were used as distinct categories and were not interchangeable. Since the bylaw only restricted “Members,” it did not prevent a Director from raising concerns after the meeting. Barrs lost his primary argument.
Despite this, in a counter-intuitive twist, the judge declared Barrs the “prevailing party” in the overall case and ordered the HOA to repay his $1,000 filing fee. Why? Because while investigating the petitioner’s main claim, the judge found the board had committed other clear violations of state law while trying to “fix” the election. This outcome underscores a critical principle for all boards: procedural integrity is paramount. The HOA won the battle over its right to review the election but lost the war because of its flawed process.
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2. Your Records (or Lack Thereof) Will Be Your Downfall
One of the board’s most significant errors was a simple but critical failure of administrative duty: they destroyed election materials in direct violation of state law. The HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), which is unambiguous about an HOA’s responsibility.
According to A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), “Ballots, envelopes and related materials…shall be retained…for at least one year after completion of the election.”
The legal decision states the evidence was “uncontroverted” that the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. Because the HOA could not dispute this fact, it was an easy violation for the petitioner to prove.
This wasn’t just a minor administrative oversight; it was a catastrophic error. By destroying the envelopes, the board not only violated the law but also eliminated any possibility of independently verifying the vote count after their own director discovered irregularities. This single failure trapped them in a procedural corner of their own making. It made a definitive resolution of the election challenge impossible, leading to the messy and expensive situation of declaring a tie and holding a run-off, all of which could have been avoided if the primary evidence had been preserved as required by law.
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3. “Private” Board Business Can Be an Illegal Secret Meeting
In an attempt to resolve the election dispute correctly, the board took what it likely considered a responsible step: seeking legal advice. After the election was contested, certain board members met with an attorney at a board member’s house to figure out how to proceed. However, the way they did it constituted another clear violation of state law.
This private meeting violated Arizona’s open meeting law, A.R.S. § 33-1804. While the statute does allow a board to enter a closed session to receive legal advice, it has strict procedural requirements. The board must first provide notice of the meeting to all members and then, at that public meeting, officially vote to enter the closed session for that specific, legally permissible reason. The evidence was “uncontroverted” that the board failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the association members.
The board’s desire for confidential legal advice was understandable, but their method created an unforced legal error. The correct procedure—notifying members of a meeting and then voting to enter a closed session—protects the board by demonstrating procedural propriety. The shortcut they took exposed them to a clear-cut violation that was impossible to defend. For an HOA board, transparency is the default, and secrecy is a narrow, legally defined exception. The process of going private matters as much as the reason for doing so.
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Conclusion: It’s Not Just What You Do, It’s How You Do It
The Desert Ranch HOA board, in its attempt to correct a perceived election error, committed two clear statutory violations. In their haste, they held an illegal secret meeting and were hamstrung by their prior failure to properly retain election records—the very evidence needed for a clean resolution. These procedural missteps ultimately cost them the case.
The ultimate lesson from Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA is that for any governing body, procedural correctness is just as important as substantive correctness. This case serves as a stark reminder that good intentions are no defense against procedural law. When a crisis hits, does your board have the discipline to follow procedure, or will the rush to find a solution lead you to commit unforced errors that are far worse than the original problem?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Tom Barrs(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Stephen Barrs(witness) Testified for Petitioner
Respondent Side
Catherine Overby(board president, witness) Desert Ranch HOA Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Brian Schoeffler(board vice president, witness) Desert Ranch HOA Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Patrick Rice(board member) Desert Ranch HOA Board member who expressed concerns with election results
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Jerome Klinger(board member) Desert Ranch HOA Director elected in disputed election
Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party on Issues 2 (retention of election materials) and 3 (open meetings violation). Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 objection rule) was dismissed. Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner $1,000.00, representing the filing fee.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 as the evidence did not show that a Director was restricted by the Member waiver clause from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned.
Key Issues & Findings
Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on Mr. Schoeffler’s objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Bylaw 2.4 by investigating or acting upon an objection to election results that was raised by a Director after the Annual Meeting adjourned, thereby waiving the claim according to the bylaw.
Orders: Petition dismissed as to Issue 1.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4
Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) when it discarded the ballot envelopes at or about the time of the election.
The HOA discarded the ballot envelopes at or about the time of the election, which violated the statutory mandate to retain ballots, envelopes, and related materials for at least one year.
Orders: Petitioner established violation and was deemed the prevailing party regarding this issue. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate. The initial order included an order for Respondent to pay Petitioner the $1,000.00 filing fee.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when it held meetings that were closed and/or without proper notice.
The HOA Board members met with an attorney following the Annual Meeting without providing any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or failing to provide notice that the meeting was closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.
Orders: Petitioner established violation and was deemed the prevailing party regarding this issue. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate. The initial order included an order for Respondent to pay Petitioner the $1,000.00 filing fee.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Election Dispute, Records Retention, Open Meeting Violation, Filing Fee Refund
This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative legal dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning the HOA’s board election of March 18, 2017. The core of the dispute involved the HOA board’s decision to investigate and ultimately overturn the initially announced election results, leading to a run-off election.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) overseeing the case and a subsequent rehearing issued a mixed final decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, successfully proved that the Desert Ranch HOA committed two statutory violations:
1. Destruction of Election Materials: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by destroying ballot envelopes shortly after the election, materials which are required to be retained for at least one year.
2. Improper Closed Meeting: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding a board meeting with its attorney at a private residence without providing the required notice to its members.
However, the Petitioner’s primary challenge—that the board violated its own Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned—was dismissed. The ALJ ruled that the bylaw’s waiver of claims applied to general “Members” but not to “Directors” acting in their official capacity. This ruling effectively upheld the board’s authority to investigate the election, which led to the discovery of invalid ballots and the eventual run-off election won by Brian Schoeffler.
As the prevailing party on two of the three issues, Mr. Barrs was awarded a reimbursement of his $1,000.00 filing fee. The judge, however, found that no civil penalty against the HOA was appropriate.
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I. Case Overview
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Tom Barrs
◦ Respondent: Desert Ranch HOA, represented by Catherine Overby (President) and Brian Schoeffler (Vice President)
• Case Number: 18F-H1818035-REL
• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
• Subject of Dispute: Alleged violations of Arizona statutes and HOA bylaws related to the handling and outcome of the March 18, 2017, annual board election.
II. Chronology of the Contested Election
The dispute originated from the following sequence of events surrounding the 2017 election for two vacant seats on the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors.
1. Pre-Election: Absentee ballots were distributed to members, listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates and providing a space for a write-in candidate.
2. March 18, 2017 (Annual Meeting): Ballots were submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger (a write-in) were announced as the winning candidates. No members present objected to the results before the meeting was adjourned.
3. Immediately Following the Meeting: Board member Patrick Rice gathered the ballots and “expressed his concerns with the election results.”
4. Circa March 18, 2017: All ballot envelopes from the election were destroyed.
5. March 19, 2017: Candidate Brian Schoeffler sent an email regarding the election, stating, “I’m asking you to review the situation and make a decision if there is enough concern that there should be a revote.”
6. March 20, 2017: Board President Catherine Overby emailed the members, announcing that the election had been “contested.” In the email, she asserted that the bylaws did not permit write-in candidates and declared that she and Mr. Schoeffler were the new directors.
7. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Ms. Overby and Mr. Rice, held an unannounced meeting with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s home. During this meeting, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot” had been improperly counted.
8. Post-March 29, 2017: After consulting the attorney, the board determined that the valid vote count resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board decided to hold a run-off election.
9. April 29, 2017: The run-off election was held, and Brian Schoeffler was announced as the winner.
10. May 10, 2017: The newly constituted Board of Directors held its organizational meeting.
III. Adjudicated Issues and Rulings
The petition, originally filed as a single issue, was converted to a multiple-issue case. At the hearing, the dispute was clarified into three distinct issues, each with a specific ruling from the ALJ.
Petitioner’s Allegation
Legal Basis
Final Ruling
The HOA improperly overturned the election results based on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned.
Bylaw 2.4
Dismissed
The HOA unlawfully discarded ballot envelopes and related election materials.
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
Violation Found
The HOA held closed board meetings without providing proper notice to the membership.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Violation Found
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A. Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Improperly Overturning Election)
• Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs contended that the board was barred from investigating or acting on any concerns about the election after the meeting had concluded. His argument was based on Bylaw 2.4, which states:
• ALJ Finding: The petition on this issue was dismissed. The judge’s finding was affirmed after a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.
• ALJ Rationale:
1. Initiation of Investigation: Testimony established that Board member Patrick Rice expressed concerns “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” Therefore, Mr. Schoeffler’s email the following day did not initiate the board’s investigation.
2. Distinction Between “Member” and “Director”: The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. The waiver in Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member,” and the Petitioner failed to prove that a “Director” was prohibited from raising questions about the validity of an election after a meeting.
B. Issue 2: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (Destruction of Election Materials)
• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law mandates that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… for at least one year after completion of the election.”
• Respondent’s Action: The HOA destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election.
• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.
• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” presented at the hearing that established the destruction of the materials.
C. Issue 3: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Improper Closed Meetings)
• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law requires all HOA board meetings to be open to all members. A meeting can only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must provide notice and cite the legal authority for entering a closed session.
• Respondent’s Action: Certain board members met with an attorney at a private residence on March 29, 2017, to discuss the election. No notice was provided to the membership regarding this meeting.
• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.
• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” that the meeting occurred and that the board “did not provide any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or provide notice that the meeting would be closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.”
IV. Final Order and Disposition
The final decision, issued on August 23, 2018, and upheld after a rehearing decision on December 26, 2018, ordered the following:
• Dismissal: The petition regarding Issue 1 (violation of Bylaw 2.4) was dismissed.
• Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Tom Barrs, was deemed the prevailing party as to Issue 2 and Issue 3.
• Monetary Award: The Respondent, Desert Ranch HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00.
• Civil Penalty: The judge determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”
• Finality: The decision after rehearing was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Study Guide:Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions issued on August 23, 2018, and December 26, 2018.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?
2. What were the initially announced results of the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors election on March 18, 2017?
3. What were the two primary procedural violations that the Desert Ranch HOA Board committed following the March 18, 2017 election?
4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the violation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4?
5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismiss the Petitioner’s claim regarding Bylaw 2.4?
6. Explain the violation related to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1812(A)(7) that the ALJ found the Respondent had committed.
7. Describe the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 concerning open meetings.
8. What was the final order from the initial hearing on August 23, 2018?
9. What was the specific focus of the rehearing held on December 6, 2018?
10. What was the ultimate outcome of the rehearing, and what legal recourse was available to the parties afterward?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Tom Barrs, who filed the dispute, and Respondent Desert Ranch HOA. The HOA was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
2. At the Annual Board Meeting on March 18, 2017, the ballots were counted and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates for the two vacant seats on the Board of Directors. No members present raised an objection before the meeting was adjourned.
3. The HOA Board committed two primary procedural violations. First, they destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election, and second, certain Board members met with an attorney without providing notice to the association members that a meeting was being held or that it would be a closed session.
4. The Petitioner argued that candidate Brian Schoeffler’s challenge to the election was invalid because it was raised the day after the meeting adjourned. According to Bylaw 2.4, any “Member” who fails to object to an irregularity at the meeting waives their claim, and the Petitioner argued this rule should also apply to Board members.
5. The ALJ dismissed the claim because the investigation was initiated by Board member Patrick Rice, who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting, not by Mr. Schoeffler’s later email. The judge also determined that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific, non-interchangeable meanings, and the Petitioner failed to show that a Director was barred from raising concerns after a meeting.
6. The ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) based on uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing. This statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related election materials be retained for at least one year after an election, but the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.
7. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when certain Board members met with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s house on March 29, 2017. The HOA failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the members and did not announce that the meeting would be closed to discuss legal advice, as required by the statute.
8. In the initial order, the ALJ dismissed the petition as to Issue 1 (the Bylaw 2.4 violation) but found the Petitioner to be the prevailing party on Issues 2 and 3 (the statutory violations). The judge ordered the Respondent HOA to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00 but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.
9. The rehearing focused exclusively on the first issue from the initial hearing: whether the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on objections to the election results after the Annual Meeting had adjourned. The Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the lack of penalties for the other two violations.
10. The rehearing upheld the original decision, dismissing the petition as to Issue 1. The decision from the rehearing was final and binding, and any party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing upon specific facts and legal arguments presented in the source documents.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4, specifically the distinction between a “Member” and a “Director.” Discuss the strength of the Petitioner’s counter-argument and why the judge’s reasoning ultimately prevailed.
2. Examine the series of actions taken by the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors following the March 18, 2017 election announcement. Evaluate whether their actions to investigate irregularities, consult an attorney, and hold a run-off election were ultimately justified, despite the procedural violations they committed.
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as the burden of proof in this case. For each of the three issues presented, explain how the Petitioner either met or failed to meet this standard, citing specific evidence mentioned in the decisions.
4. Based on the events described, from the initial election to the final administrative ruling, critique the effectiveness of the HOA’s internal governance and dispute resolution processes. What systemic failures are evident, and how did they lead to a formal administrative hearing?
5. Although the Petitioner was the “prevailing party” on two of the three issues, the remedy was limited to a refund of his filing fee, with no civil penalty imposed. Argue for or against the appropriateness of this remedy, considering the nature of the HOA’s violations and their impact on the integrity of the election process.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Statute
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on evidence and law. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all meetings of a homeowners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. A meeting may only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must state the statutory reason for closing the meeting.
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
An Arizona Revised Statute that mandates the retention of election materials, including ballots and envelopes, in either electronic or paper format for at least one year after the completion of an election for member inspection.
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
An Arizona statute that permits an owner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4
A provision in the HOA’s bylaws stating, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”
Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal proceeding against their HOA for alleged violations.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Tom Barrs.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to consider a decision that has already been made, typically granted if there are perceived errors of law, misconduct, or if the decision was not supported by the evidence.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch HOA.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
A Homeowner Sued His HOA Over a Botched Election—Here Are 3 Lessons Every Board Should Learn
Friction between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) board is a common feature of community living, and nowhere is that friction more apparent than in disputes over elections and rule enforcement. But what happens when a board, trying to correct an error, makes the situation exponentially worse?
This article is a deep dive into the real administrative law case of Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, a seemingly straightforward dispute that reveals surprising and practical lessons for anyone living in or governing a planned community. It’s a story of a cascade of errors, where initial election confusion led to a panicked and procedurally flawed response, compounded by a pre-existing failure in record-keeping. As we’ll see, the outcome wasn’t what anyone expected, and the board’s biggest mistakes weren’t the ones they thought they were fighting.
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1. You Can Lose the Main Argument But Still Win the Case
The dispute began at the Desert Ranch HOA’s annual meeting, where election results were announced. The trouble started immediately after the meeting adjourned when a board Director, Patrick Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed concerns about irregularities. A day later, a losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, echoed those concerns via email. Citing the Director’s objection, the board overturned the initial results, prompting homeowner Tom Barrs to file a petition arguing this was a violation of the HOA’s own rules.
Barrs’ case hinged on Bylaw 2.4, which stated that any “Member” must object to irregularities during the meeting itself, or else they waive their right to complain. Barrs argued that since no one objected before adjournment, the results should stand. However, the judge disagreed, pointing to two critical distinctions in the evidence. First, the investigation was triggered by the concerns of a “Director,” not the losing candidate’s later email. Second, a close reading of the bylaws showed that the terms “Member” and “Director” were used as distinct categories and were not interchangeable. Since the bylaw only restricted “Members,” it did not prevent a Director from raising concerns after the meeting. Barrs lost his primary argument.
Despite this, in a counter-intuitive twist, the judge declared Barrs the “prevailing party” in the overall case and ordered the HOA to repay his $1,000 filing fee. Why? Because while investigating the petitioner’s main claim, the judge found the board had committed other clear violations of state law while trying to “fix” the election. This outcome underscores a critical principle for all boards: procedural integrity is paramount. The HOA won the battle over its right to review the election but lost the war because of its flawed process.
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2. Your Records (or Lack Thereof) Will Be Your Downfall
One of the board’s most significant errors was a simple but critical failure of administrative duty: they destroyed election materials in direct violation of state law. The HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), which is unambiguous about an HOA’s responsibility.
According to A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), “Ballots, envelopes and related materials…shall be retained…for at least one year after completion of the election.”
The legal decision states the evidence was “uncontroverted” that the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. Because the HOA could not dispute this fact, it was an easy violation for the petitioner to prove.
This wasn’t just a minor administrative oversight; it was a catastrophic error. By destroying the envelopes, the board not only violated the law but also eliminated any possibility of independently verifying the vote count after their own director discovered irregularities. This single failure trapped them in a procedural corner of their own making. It made a definitive resolution of the election challenge impossible, leading to the messy and expensive situation of declaring a tie and holding a run-off, all of which could have been avoided if the primary evidence had been preserved as required by law.
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3. “Private” Board Business Can Be an Illegal Secret Meeting
In an attempt to resolve the election dispute correctly, the board took what it likely considered a responsible step: seeking legal advice. After the election was contested, certain board members met with an attorney at a board member’s house to figure out how to proceed. However, the way they did it constituted another clear violation of state law.
This private meeting violated Arizona’s open meeting law, A.R.S. § 33-1804. While the statute does allow a board to enter a closed session to receive legal advice, it has strict procedural requirements. The board must first provide notice of the meeting to all members and then, at that public meeting, officially vote to enter the closed session for that specific, legally permissible reason. The evidence was “uncontroverted” that the board failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the association members.
The board’s desire for confidential legal advice was understandable, but their method created an unforced legal error. The correct procedure—notifying members of a meeting and then voting to enter a closed session—protects the board by demonstrating procedural propriety. The shortcut they took exposed them to a clear-cut violation that was impossible to defend. For an HOA board, transparency is the default, and secrecy is a narrow, legally defined exception. The process of going private matters as much as the reason for doing so.
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Conclusion: It’s Not Just What You Do, It’s How You Do It
The Desert Ranch HOA board, in its attempt to correct a perceived election error, committed two clear statutory violations. In their haste, they held an illegal secret meeting and were hamstrung by their prior failure to properly retain election records—the very evidence needed for a clean resolution. These procedural missteps ultimately cost them the case.
The ultimate lesson from Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA is that for any governing body, procedural correctness is just as important as substantive correctness. This case serves as a stark reminder that good intentions are no defense against procedural law. When a crisis hits, does your board have the discipline to follow procedure, or will the rush to find a solution lead you to commit unforced errors that are far worse than the original problem?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Tom Barrs(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Stephen Barrs(witness) Testified for Petitioner
Respondent Side
Catherine Overby(board president, witness) Desert Ranch HOA Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Brian Schoeffler(board vice president, witness) Desert Ranch HOA Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Patrick Rice(board member) Desert Ranch HOA Board member who expressed concerns with election results
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Jerome Klinger(board member) Desert Ranch HOA Director elected in disputed election
