Joan A. Tober, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

Posted on January 16, 2020 by [email protected]

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918042-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge	Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Joan A. Tober	Counsel	—
Respondent	Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association	Counsel	Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – 764197.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:27 (187.4 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/714863.pdf

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19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/725808.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:37 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”

The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.

The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.

Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.

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Case Overview

This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Name

Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1918042-REL

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Kay A. Abramsohn

Core Issue

Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.

Initial Hearing Date

June 5, 2019

Initial Decision Date

July 29, 2019

Rehearing Date

December 11, 2019

Final Decision Date

January 15, 2020

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Key Parties and Individuals

• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober

◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.

◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.

◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.

◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.

◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.

• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)

◦ The governing body for the planned community.

◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn

◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Chronology of the Dispute

Nov 20, 2018

At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.

Nov 26, 2018

Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.

Nov 27, 2018

Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.

Nov 29, 2018

At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

Nov 29, 2018

At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.

Dec 13, 2018

Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”

Dec 26, 2018

Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jan 15-16, 2019

The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.

June 5, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

July 29, 2019

Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.

Aug 5, 2019

Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”

Aug 23, 2019

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

Dec 11, 2019

The rehearing is conducted.

Jan 15, 2020

Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.

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Core Dispute and Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)

1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”

2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.

3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)

1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.

4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.

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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence

The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.

• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”

• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.

• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:

◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.

◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”

◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”

◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.

• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.

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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law

Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)

• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.

• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”

• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.

Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)

• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.

• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”

• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”

• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”

• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”

• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.

Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?

2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?

3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?

6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?

7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?

8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?

9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.

10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?

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Answer Key

1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.

4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.

6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.

8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.

9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.

10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?

5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.

Attorney-Client Privilege

A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.

Executive Session

A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.

Petition

The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

The Letter

The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.

She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.

Introduction: The Fight for Information

Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.

This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.

1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.

The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.

The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.

2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.

Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.

After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”

In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:

An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.

The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.

3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.

What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.

But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:

Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.

Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.

Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort

The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.

This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Joan A. Tober (petitioner)
Former Board member; current Finance Committee member

Respondent Side

Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Mr. Mastrosimone (Board President)
Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
Testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
c. serrano (Clerk)
Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
AHansen (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
DGardner (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal

Jerry Wheeler vs. Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Posted on September 6, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1717036-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-09-06
Administrative Law Judge	Suzanne Marwil
Outcome	The Petitioner's petition was granted. The Administrative Law Judge found that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the required annual meeting for several years. The Respondent was ordered to hold a meeting, refund the filing fee to the Petitioner, and pay a $250.00 civil penalty.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$250.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Jerry Wheeler	Counsel	—
Respondent	Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association	Counsel	—

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The Administrative Law Judge found that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the required annual meeting for several years. The Respondent was ordered to hold a meeting, refund the filing fee to the Petitioner, and pay a $250.00 civil penalty.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to hold required annual meeting

Petitioner, a homeowner, alleged the HOA had not held an annual meeting since April 1, 2014, violating A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). The unconverted evidence established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the statutorily required annual meeting for several years.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was granted. Respondent was ordered to hold a meeting in accordance with the planned community statutes as currently scheduled on December 28, 2017. Respondent was ordered to pay the filing fee to the Petitioner pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), and pay a $250.00 civil penalty to the planned community hearing office fund.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $250.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA annual meeting violation, statutory requirement, default judgment

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1717036-REL Decision – 586602.pdf

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18F-H1717036-REL Decision – 588549.pdf

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Administrative Hearing Briefing: Wheeler v. Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and orders from the case of Jerry Wheeler versus the Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association (HOA). The central issue was the HOA’s failure to conduct annual meetings as legally required by Arizona state law. The petitioner, Jerry Wheeler, provided uncontested evidence that the HOA had not held a meeting for several years, specifically since his tenure began on April 1, 2014.

The case was complicated by the death of the HOA’s president prior to the hearing and the association’s subsequent failure to appoint a new representative or appear at the proceedings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted the hearing in the respondent’s absence and ruled decisively in favor of the petitioner.

The final judgment, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate, found the Beaver Dam Estates HOA in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). The HOA was ordered to hold a meeting on a specified date, reimburse the petitioner’s filing fee, and pay a civil penalty of $250.00 for the violation.

Case Overview

The matter was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and was subsequently referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing and decision.

Case Detail

Information

Petitioner

Jerry Wheeler

Respondent

Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Case Number (OAH)

18F-H1717036-REL

Case Number (Dept. of Real Estate)

HO 17-17/036

Petition Filed

June 8, 2017

Hearing Date

September 5, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

September 6, 2017

Final Order Date

September 13, 2017

Presiding Judge

Suzanne Marwil, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Adopting Authority

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence

The petitioner’s case was built on the central allegation that the Beaver Dam Estates HOA had failed to comply with its statutory duty to hold annual meetings.

• Core Allegation: The HOA was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(B), which mandates that a members’ association meeting “shall be held at least once each year.”

• Petitioner Testimony: Jerry Wheeler testified that since moving into the community on April 1, 2014, the HOA had not held a single meeting. He also testified regarding his numerous efforts to compel the HOA president, Randy Hawk, to convene a meeting for the purpose of reviewing the association’s financial statements with homeowners.

• Supporting Evidence: The petitioner submitted numerous written statements from other homeowners within the Beaver Dam Estates community. These statements corroborated his testimony, confirming that no HOA meeting had been held for several years. This evidence was referred to as “Exhibit B” in the proceedings.

Respondent’s Actions and Procedural Failures

The respondent’s engagement with the legal process was minimal and ultimately ceased, leading to a judgment in its absence.

• Initial Response: The HOA’s then-president, Randy Hawk, initially responded to the petition by agreeing to hold a meeting.

• First Meeting Attempt: A meeting was scheduled for July 18, 2017. However, only about ten people attended, prompting Hawk to reschedule for December 28, 2017. A letter was sent to all members notifying them of the new date and the intent to hold an election for a new president and vice president.

• Death of Representative: The petitioner subsequently informed the Tribunal that Randy Hawk had passed away, leaving the HOA without a clear representative for the legal matter.

• Failure to Appoint New Representative: On August 16, 2017, the Tribunal issued an order, mailed to the respondent’s address of record, requesting that the HOA name a new representative. The HOA failed to do so.

• Failure to Appear: The respondent did not appear for the scheduled hearing on September 5, 2017, nor did it request to appear telephonically. After a 20-minute grace period, the ALJ proceeded with the hearing in the respondent’s absence.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

The ALJ’s decision was based on a clear statutory requirement and the uncontested evidence presented by the petitioner. The burden of proof was on the petitioner, with the standard of proof being a preponderance of the evidence.

• Statutory Violation: The central finding was that the respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). The pertinent text of the statute states:

• Key Conclusion: The ALJ determined that “The unconverted evidence established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the statutorily required annual meeting of Respondent for several years prior to the filing of the petition.”

• Recommended Action: Based on this conclusion, the ALJ stated that the respondent “should hold an annual meeting in accordance with the planned community statutes.”

Final Order and Penalties

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, making it a binding Final Order. The order mandated several actions by the respondent.

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. The respondent must hold a meeting in accordance with planned community statutes as scheduled on December 28, 2017.

3. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), the respondent shall pay the petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

4. The respondent shall pay to the planned community hearing office fund a civil penalty of $250.00 for the violation.

This Final Order was declared a final administrative action, effective immediately upon service on September 13, 2017. The parties were notified of their right to apply for a rehearing within thirty days or to appeal the decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide for Wheeler v. Beaver Dam Estates HOA

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.

1. Who were the primary parties in the case Wheeler v. Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association, and what were their roles?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent?

3. According to the Findings of Fact, how long had the Petitioner lived in the community, and why is this duration significant?

4. What specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) did the Respondent violate, and what does this statute require?

5. What event involving the Respondent’s president, Randy Hawk, complicated the case proceedings?

6. What was the outcome of the hearing held on September 5, 2017, regarding the Respondent’s attendance?

7. What standard of proof was required in this matter, and which party had the burden of proof?

8. Describe the key components of the Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge.

9. What two monetary penalties were imposed on the Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association?

10. According to the Final Order, what steps could an aggrieved party take after the decision was issued?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry Wheeler, the Petitioner, and the Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association, the Respondent. As the Petitioner, Mr. Wheeler initiated the legal action by filing a petition, while the Homeowners Association was the entity required to respond to the allegations.

2. The central allegation was that the Respondent had violated state law by failing to hold a meeting of the members’ association for several years. The Petitioner specifically sought to have the association convene a meeting to review financial statements.

3. The Petitioner, Jerry Wheeler, testified that he had moved into the community on April 1, 2014. This duration is significant because he stated that no meeting of the association had been held during his entire tenure, providing a multi-year timeframe for the alleged violation.

4. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). This statute mandates that, notwithstanding any provisions in community documents, a meeting of the members’ association must be held at least once each year within the state of Arizona.

5. After responding to the petition and scheduling a future meeting, the Respondent’s president, Randy Hawk, passed away. The Petitioner informed the Tribunal of this event, which created uncertainty about who could serve as the Respondent’s representative in the matter.

6. The Respondent, Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association, failed to appear for the hearing on September 5, 2017. After a 20-minute grace period, the Administrative Law Judge proceeded with the hearing in the Respondent’s absence.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” as stated in A.A.C. R2-19-119(A). Pursuant to A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner, Jerry Wheeler, had the burden of proving his case.

8. The Order granted the Petitioner’s petition and mandated that the Respondent hold a meeting on the currently scheduled date of December 28, 2017. It also imposed financial penalties on the Respondent and affirmed that the order was binding on the parties unless a rehearing was granted.

9. The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee required by section 32-2199.01. Additionally, the Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the planned community hearing office fund.

10. A person aggrieved by the decision could apply for a rehearing by filing a petition with the Commissioner within thirty (30) days. The Final Order is also considered a final administrative action, which a party may appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-style response for each.

1. Trace the procedural history of case No. 18F-H1717036-REL from the initial petition filing to the issuance of the Final Order. Discuss the key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Tribunal, and the legal significance of each step.

2. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Explain how the “Findings of Fact” supported the “Conclusions of Law,” with a specific focus on the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and the application of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Discuss the role and authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in this dispute. How do the statutes cited (e.g., A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.) empower these bodies to adjudicate disputes and enforce compliance among homeowners associations?

4. Evaluate the impact of the Respondent’s failure to appear at the September 5, 2017 hearing. How did this absence affect the proceedings and the evidence presented, and in what way did it likely influence the final outcome?

5. Examine the remedies and enforcement mechanisms outlined in the Final Order. Discuss the specific purpose of ordering a meeting, reimbursing the filing fee, and imposing a civil penalty, and explain the legal process for appealing the decision.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, Suzanne Marwil served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. The case frequently cites statutes within Title 32 and Title 33, such as A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), which governs HOA meetings.

A.A.C. (Arizona Administrative Code)

The official compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. A.A.C. R2-19-119 established the burden and standard of proof for the hearing.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner.

Civil Penalty

A monetary fine imposed by a government agency for a violation of a law or regulation. The Respondent was ordered to pay a $250.00 civil penalty.

Conclusions of Law

The section of a legal decision that applies the relevant laws and legal principles to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Final Administrative Action

A final decision by an administrative agency that is legally binding and can be appealed to a court through a process of judicial review.

Findings of Fact

The section of a legal decision that details the factual circumstances of the case as determined by the judge based on the evidence presented.

A formal directive from a judge or administrative body that requires a party to perform a specific act or refrain from doing so. The final decision in this case included an Order for the Respondent to hold a meeting and pay penalties.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Jerry Wheeler.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, which requires that the evidence presented by one side is more convincing and likely to be true than the evidence of the opposing side.

Rehearing

A request to have a case heard again by the same administrative body or court, typically based on new evidence or an error in the original proceeding. A party had 30 days to petition for a rehearing.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Respondent was the Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association.

Tribunal

A general term for a body, including a court or administrative hearing office, that has the authority to judge or determine claims and disputes.

4 Key Lessons from One Homeowner’s Winning Fight Against His HOA

Introduction: When Your HOA Becomes Dysfunctional

For many homeowners, a Homeowners Association (HOA) is a background presence, collecting dues and ensuring community standards. But what happens when the HOA itself fails in its duties? When legally required meetings stop, financial transparency disappears, and the leadership becomes unresponsive, residents can feel powerless. It’s a common frustration that leaves homeowners wondering what recourse they have when the very organization meant to maintain order violates its own governing laws.

This was the exact situation faced by Jerry Wheeler, a resident of Beaver Dam Estates in Arizona. After years of his HOA failing to hold its legally required annual meeting, he decided he had enough. Instead of letting his frustration simmer, he took formal action, setting in motion a legal process that offers powerful lessons for any homeowner living in a planned community. His story is a clear example of how one determined individual can hold an association accountable.

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1. One Determined Homeowner Can Hold an Entire HOA Accountable

It can feel daunting to challenge an organization, but Jerry Wheeler’s case proves that a single person can be the catalyst for change. The core of his dispute extended beyond procedure into a fundamental issue of financial transparency. On June 8, 2017, Wheeler filed a petition because since moving in on April 1, 2014, no annual meeting had been held. His stated goal was clear: he wanted the HOA to convene a meeting to “review Respondent’s financial statements with the homeowners.”

Initially, the HOA president, Randy Hawk, responded to the petition by agreeing to hold a meeting. However, the execution faltered. A meeting scheduled for July 18, 2017, failed when only about ten people attended. Hawk then rescheduled for December 28, 2017. While Wheeler initiated the petition alone, he strengthened his case by presenting numerous written statements from other homeowners confirming no annual meetings had been held for several years. This demonstrates that one person’s courageous action, aimed at securing accountability and supported by the community, can successfully trigger the legal mechanisms designed to protect homeowners’ rights.

2. Annual Meetings Aren’t Just a Suggestion—They’re the Law

The core of Jerry Wheeler’s complaint wasn’t based on a simple grievance; it was rooted in a specific violation of Arizona state law. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision found that the Beaver Dam Estates HOA was in direct violation of a statute requiring annual meetings. This law is not a guideline or a best practice—it is a legal mandate.

For any homeowner in Arizona, the relevant section of the law is crystal clear:

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)

Notwithstanding any provision in the community documents, all meetings of the members’ association and the board shall be held in this state. A meeting of the members’ association shall be held at least once each year…

This statute is a cornerstone of transparency and accountability for planned communities. It ensures that residents have a regular, guaranteed opportunity to hear from the board, review financials, elect new leadership, and have their voices heard. Understanding that this is a legal requirement—not just a courtesy—is critical knowledge for any homeowner.

3. Ignoring the Process Has Financial Consequences

The Beaver Dam Estates HOA’s strategy of inaction ultimately backfired, resulting in financial penalties. The association’s failure to appear at its own hearing on September 5, 2017, meant that Wheeler’s evidence was uncontested, leading directly to a default judgment and the resulting financial penalties. The judge’s final order wasn’t just a request to do better; it was a binding decision with specific consequences.

Because the judge granted the petitioner’s petition, the HOA was ordered to take three specific actions:

• Hold the legally required meeting as scheduled on December 28, 2017.

• Pay the Petitioner (Jerry Wheeler) back for his filing fee.

• Pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the planned community hearing office fund.

This outcome makes it clear that avoiding legal and administrative responsibilities is not a viable strategy. The process is designed to proceed with or without the respondent’s participation, and ignoring it leads directly to mandated actions and financial penalties.

4. The System Can Work, Even Under Strange Circumstances

The proceedings in this case were complicated by unusual and unfortunate events, yet the legal framework proved resilient. After attempting to schedule the required meetings, the HOA’s president, Randy Hawk, passed away. The tribunal ordered the association to name a new representative, but it failed to do so. Compounding the issue, no one from the HOA showed up for the scheduled hearing.

Despite these significant obstacles—the death of the board’s president and the association’s complete failure to participate—the process did not grind to a halt. The Administrative Law Judge was able to conduct the hearing, review the uncontested evidence presented by Jerry Wheeler, make official Findings of Fact, and issue a final, binding order. This remarkable persistence shows that the administrative system is robust and designed to deliver a resolution, ensuring that a petitioner’s rights are upheld even when a respondent organization is in disarray.

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Conclusion: Know Your Rights

The case of Jerry Wheeler vs. Beaver Dam Estates is a powerful reminder that community living is governed by rules that apply to everyone—including the association itself. An HOA cannot simply cease to function or ignore its legal obligations without consequence. The systems in place, from state statutes to administrative hearings, are designed to provide a path for homeowners to seek and achieve recourse.

This case serves as an empowering example of how knowledge and determination can lead to accountability. It underscores the importance of understanding the specific laws that govern your community association. This case was in Arizona, but it raises a universal question: Do you know the specific laws that govern your own HOA, and is your board in compliance?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Jerry Wheeler (petitioner)

Respondent Side

Randy Hawk (president)
Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)

James and Shawna Larson vs. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Posted on August 24, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge	Thomas Shedden
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	James and Shawna Larson	Counsel	Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent	Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation	Counsel	Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).

Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.

Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 605540.pdf

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17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 583987.pdf

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17F-H1717038-REL Decision – 585505.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:53 (385.9 KB)

Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.

The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.

In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.

Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings

Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation

On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.

Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.

This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:

• Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”

• Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.

• Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.

• Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing

On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”

• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.

• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”

• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”

• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute

The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.

Respondent’s (HOA) Case

The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:

• Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

• Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.

◦ Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).

◦ Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.

◦ Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.

◦ Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case

The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.

• Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.

• Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:

◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.

◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.

• Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.

• Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Key Findings and Conclusions of Law

Finding/Conclusion

Details

Standard of Review

The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.

Reasonableness of HOA Action

Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.

HOA Authority

CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

Patio Cover Classification

The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

Cost Responsibility

The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”

The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.

Study Guide: Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What was the initial reason given by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil for recommending the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition?

3. Why did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, reject the initial recommendation for dismissal?

4. What was the central dispute that was ultimately decided in the November 20, 2017, hearing?

5. According to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision, what is the legal classification of the petitioners’ patio cover?

6. Which specific sections of the CC&Rs did the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, cite as the basis for its authority?

7. What key reasons did project manager Wayne King provide to justify the necessity of removing the patio covers for the painting project?

8. Describe the significant difference in the cost estimates for removing and replacing the patio cover as presented by the Petitioners versus the Respondent’s project manager.

9. What was the final ruling regarding who was financially responsible for the removal and potential reinstallation of the patio cover?

10. What was the ultimate outcome of the Larsons’ petition following the final hearing, and which party was deemed the “prevailing party”?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners James and Shawna Larson, and the Respondent, the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which is their homeowner’s association (HOA). The dispute arose from the HOA’s plan to repair and paint the building exteriors.

2. ALJ Marwil initially recommended dismissal due to a “lack of justiciable controversy.” She found that the Petitioners had failed to cite any provision of the CC&Rs that the Respondent had currently violated, as the threatened action to remove the patio cover was speculative and had not yet occurred.

3. Commissioner Lowe rejected the dismissal because she found the matter was “ripe for adjudication.” Her decision was based on a June 1, 2017 letter from the Respondent that questioned whether “the presence of the awning [is] a violation of the Association’s governing documents,” which she interpreted as the Respondent alleging a violation.

4. The central dispute was whether the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation had the authority to mandate that homeowners, specifically the Larsons, remove their patio covers at their own expense to facilitate a building repair and painting project.

5. The final decision classifies the Petitioners’ patio cover as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4). This classification was crucial to determining financial responsibility.

6. The Respondent cited sections 9 and 9(b) of the CC&Rs. Section 9(b) makes the Respondent responsible for maintaining building exteriors, and section 9 grants it the authority to take “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep” of those exteriors.

7. Wayne King testified that removal was necessary to properly and safely complete the work using scaffolding, as required by modern safety laws. He also stated that removal was needed to repair improperly flashed areas behind the covers and to ensure the painting contractor would provide a warranty for the project.

8. The Petitioners presented bids showing the cost to remove and rebuild the cover would be between $3,980 and $5,975. In contrast, Mr. King opined these estimates were very high and that the cost should be closer to $1,000 if existing materials were reused.

9. The final ruling, based on ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), was that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, if they choose, the cost of reinstalling it. This is because the patio cover is a limited common element assigned specifically to their unit.

10. The final outcome was the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition. The Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis. Use the provided documents to construct a detailed, evidence-based response.

1. Trace the procedural history of this case from the initial filing to the final decision. Discuss the key turning points, including the initial recommendation for dismissal, its rejection by the Commissioner, and the reasoning behind the final judgment.

2. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioners and the Respondent in the November 2017 hearing. On what specific statutes and CC&R provisions did each side rely, and how did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately interpret these documents?

3. Evaluate the role of expert testimony in this case, specifically focusing on the evidence provided by project manager Wayne King. How did his testimony regarding safety, project requirements, and cost estimates influence the Administrative Law Judge’s findings on the reasonableness of the Respondent’s actions?

4. Discuss the legal concept of a “limited common element” as defined and applied in the source documents. Explain how this classification was central to the final decision regarding financial responsibility for the patio cover’s removal and reinstallation.

5. The initial Administrative Law Judge found no “justiciable controversy,” while the Commissioner later found the matter “ripe for adjudication.” Based on the details in all three documents, explain the arguments for both positions and analyze why the case ultimately proceeded to a full hearing.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official in the Office of Administrative Hearings who adjudicates complaints regarding condominium and planned community documents and ensures compliance with relevant statutes.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The documents that govern the community and are described as a contract between the homeowner’s association and the homeowners.

Justiciable Controversy

A real dispute that a tribunal has the authority to resolve. The initial petition was recommended for dismissal for a lack of a justiciable controversy because the Respondent’s threatened actions were deemed speculative.

Limited Common Element

A legal classification for property defined under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4). In this case, the Petitioners’ patio cover was classified as such, meaning any common expense associated with its maintenance, repair, or replacement is assessed against the unit to which it is assigned.

Petition

The formal document filed with the Department of Real Estate to initiate a complaint against a homeowner’s association.

Petitioner

The party that files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowners James and Shawna Larson.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this matter, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party that is successful in a legal dispute. In the final order, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Ripe for Adjudication

A term used by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate to indicate that a dispute is ready to be formally heard and decided by the Administrative Law Judge.

Select all sources

583987.pdf

585505.pdf

605540.pdf

No emoji found

17F-H1717038-REL-RHG

3 sources

These documents chronicle the legal dispute between James and Shawna Larson (Petitioners) and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (Respondent) concerning the removal of the Larsons’ patio cover for building maintenance. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissal because the Petitioners did not allege a current violation of the governing documents, thus lacking a justiciable controversy since the association had only threatened action. However, the Department of Real Estate Commissioner rejected this recommendation, asserting that a violation of the governing documents was alleged by the Respondent, making the matter ripe for adjudication. Following a rehearing, a different ALJ issued a final decision finding that the Respondent acted reasonably in requiring the patio cover removal for safe and proper painting and repairs, concluding that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation as the cover is a limited common element.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

James Larson (petitioner)
Shawna Larson (petitioner)
Lisa M. Hanger (attorney)
Counsel for Petitioners

Respondent Side

Nathan Tennyson (attorney)
Brown Alcott PLLC
Counsel for Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Wayne King (witness)
Project manager hired by Respondent for the painting project; provided testimony

Neutral Parties

Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Authored Recommended Order Dismissal dated August 25, 2017
Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Authored Administrative Law Judge Decision dated December 11, 2017
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Rejected Recommendation of Dismissal
Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)
Transmitted documents (Order Rejecting Recommendation of Dismissal)

Other Participants

Chris Morga (contractor)
Jacob and Co.
Mentioned as a vendor who could remove patio covers

Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Posted on August 16, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1717033-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-08-14
Administrative Law Judge	Dorinda M. Lang
Outcome	The ALJ found that the Petitioner did not establish a violation of the Respondent's CC&Rs and recommended the petition be denied. The ALJ specifically noted the lack of proof that fees were inappropriate and that Petitioner failed to provide legal authority requiring equal benefit. The petition was denied, and the Respondent was not ordered to pay the Petitioner's filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Jay Janicek	Counsel	—
Respondent	Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA	Counsel	Evan Thompson

Alleged Violations

Article 11. Section 11.5 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The ALJ found that the Petitioner did not establish a violation of the Respondent's CC&Rs and recommended the petition be denied. The ALJ specifically noted the lack of proof that fees were inappropriate and that Petitioner failed to provide legal authority requiring equal benefit. The petition was denied, and the Respondent was not ordered to pay the Petitioner's filing fee.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs regarding disproportionate assessment fees

Petitioner alleged Respondent was in violation of its CC&Rs because Master HOA fees were disproportionately borne by existing homeowners and did not benefit the whole development equally. Petitioner failed to establish a violation because required evidentiary documents (plat attached as 'Exhibit B') were missing, and Petitioner offered no legal authority requiring fees to be equally beneficial or even-handed.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied. Respondent shall not pay the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01 to the Petitioner.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&Rs, Master HOA, Assessment Fees, Common Areas, Burden of Proof, Rule Against Perpetuities

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717033-REL Decision – 575166.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:21 (39.1 KB)

17F-H1717033-REL Decision – 582189.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:24 (69.4 KB)

17F-H1717033-REL Decision – 584918.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:27 (674.1 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key findings and legal proceedings in case number 17F-H1717033-REL, wherein Petitioner Jay Janicek filed a complaint against Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA. The petition was ultimately denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), a decision formally adopted and finalized by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

The core of the dispute centered on the Petitioner’s allegation that the HOA’s fee structure violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, Janicek argued that payments made by his first-level association to a master association for common area expenses—most egregiously for a roadway loan—were improper because the benefits were not distributed equally among all homeowners.

The denial of the petition hinged on a critical failure of proof by the Petitioner. The CC&Rs define “Common Areas” by referencing a plat map (“Exhibit B”) that was not submitted into evidence by the Petitioner. Without this crucial document, it was impossible to prove that the fees collected by the HOA were for purposes outside the scope of the CC&Rs. Furthermore, the Petitioner failed to provide any legal authority or provision within the governing documents requiring that association fees be “even-handed or equally beneficial to all homeowners.” A secondary argument regarding the “rule against perpetuities,” introduced post-hearing, was also addressed and dismissed by the ALJ as legally inapplicable to the matter.

Case Overview

The following table outlines the principal parties and details of the administrative hearing.

Case Detail

Information

Petitioner

Jay Janicek

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Respondent’s Counsel

Evan Thompson, Thompson Krone PLC

Respondent’s Representative

Steve Russo

Case Number

17F-H1717033-REL

Docket Number

17F-H1717033-REL

Hearing Date

July 12, 2017

Presiding Judge

Dorinda M. Lang, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Observers

John Shields, Margery and Mathew Janicek

Petitioner’s Allegations

The petition filed by Jay Janicek alleged that Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA was in violation of its governing CC&Rs. The central arguments presented were:

• Unequal Distribution of Costs and Benefits: The Petitioner contended that expenses paid by the Respondent association to the Sycamore Vista Master Home Owner’s Association (“Master HOA”) did not benefit all homeowners equally. The most “egregious” example cited was the payment toward a loan for a roadway within the master development.

• Violation of CC&Rs: The Petitioner argued that this unequal cost burden was a direct violation of Article 11, Section 11.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs. This section stipulates:

• Discrepancy Among Associations: The Petitioner asserted that another first-level association within the master development receives more benefit from the common areas but does not pay into the Master HOA.

• Rule Against Perpetuities: In a post-hearing submission, the Petitioner introduced a new argument that a “rule against perpetuities” was at stake in the matter.

Adjudication and Findings of Fact

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was based on the Petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof through a preponderance of the evidence.

Evidentiary Failure

The Petitioner’s case failed primarily due to a lack of sufficient evidence to prove a violation of the CC&Rs.

• Missing ‘Exhibit B’: The definition of “Common Areas” was essential to the case. According to Article 1, Section 1.6 of the CC&Rs, these areas are delineated on a plat that was supposed to be attached as “Exhibit B.”

• Critical Finding: The ALJ noted, “Unfortunately, there was no plat attached to the document that was offered into evidence and it was not to be found among the other exhibits. Therefore, Petitioner was unable to establish that Respondent’s fees pay for anything that is not provided for in the CC&Rs.”

• Petitioner’s Concession: The Petitioner did not dispute the Respondent’s argument that the Master HOA fees, including those for roads, were for Common Areas.

Lack of Legal Authority

The Petitioner’s core premise—that fees must be proportional to benefits received—was not substantiated by legal or documentary support.

• The ALJ found that the “Petitioner offered no legal authority that requires that all first level associations must pay the same into a master association or that all homeowners must receive the same benefit from or contribute the same amount (or even a proportionate share) to the common areas.”

• The argument that association fees were “disproportionately heavy” was not established to be a violation of any provision in the CC&Rs.

Post-Hearing Submissions

The record was held open until August 1, 2017, allowing for additional documentation from both parties.

• Petitioner (Exhibit 6): Submitted financial documentation, emails, and the argument concerning the rule against perpetuities.

• Respondent (Exhibit H): Submitted a Notice of Lien and attachments. This exhibit demonstrated that, regarding a lien for water services on properties not part of the Respondent HOA, the “Respondent’s homeowners are not responsible for it.”

Conclusions of Law and Final Decision

Based on the evidence and arguments presented, the ALJ denied the petition, a decision later finalized by the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Denial of Petition

• The primary conclusion of law was that the “Petitioner has not established that Respondent is in violation of its CC&Rs.”

• The payment for Common Areas was found to be in comportment with the CC&Rs.

Rejection of Key Arguments

• Equal Benefit: The ALJ explicitly concluded: “Petitioner has offered no legal authority or provision of the CC&Rs that requires the association fees to be even-handed or equally beneficial to all homeowners.”

• Rule Against Perpetuities: While this argument was not part of the original petition, the ALJ addressed it to “lay a concern to rest.” The judge explained that the rule, which states that property ownership must vest within a lifetime plus 21 years, evolved from estate law and does not apply to HOA property sales where ownership vests immediately in the developer or a new owner. The judge concluded, “the rule against perpetuities does not apply to a homeowner’s association and it clearly does not apply in this matter.”

Timeline of Orders

1. July 12, 2017: An “Order Holding Record Open” was issued by ALJ Dorinda M. Lang.

2. August 14, 2017: The “Administrative Law Judge Decision” was issued, ordering that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

3. August 21, 2017: A “Final Order” was issued by Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, adopting the ALJ’s decision and officially denying the petition.

Post-Decision Procedures

The Final Order, effective August 21, 2017, concluded the administrative action and outlined the subsequent options available to the parties.

• The order is binding unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed within 30 days of the service of the final order.

• A rehearing may be granted for the following causes:

1. Irregularity in the proceedings or any order or abuse of discretion that deprived a party of a fair hearing.

2. Misconduct by the Department, ALJ, or the prevailing party.

3. Accident or surprise that could not have been prevented by ordinary prudence.

4. Newly discovered material evidence that could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the original hearing.

5. Excessive or insufficient penalties.

6. Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.

7. The findings of fact or decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

8. The findings of fact or decision is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to law.

• Parties may appeal the final administrative action by filing a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing case No. 17F-H1717033-REL, Jay Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their designated roles?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent?

3. Which specific article and section of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) did the Petitioner claim the Respondent had violated?

4. Explain the key piece of evidence that was missing and why its absence was critical to the case’s outcome.

5. What was the Respondent’s main argument regarding the fees paid to the Master HOA?

6. According to the case documents, who held the burden of proof, and what was the required standard of proof?

7. What was the “rule against perpetuities,” and what reason did the Administrative Law Judge give for its inapplicability to this case?

8. What was the ultimate decision of the Administrative Law Judge, and on what date was it issued?

9. After the hearing, the record was held open. What was the purpose of this, and what types of materials were submitted by the parties during this period?

10. What action did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate take after receiving the Administrative Law Judge’s decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jay Janicek, designated as the Petitioner, and Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, designated as the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the party against whom the complaint was filed.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA was in violation of its CC&Rs. He argued that the fees his association paid to the Master HOA for a roadway loan did not benefit the whole development equally and were therefore inappropriate expenses for all homeowners to pay.

3. The Petitioner cited Article 11, Section 11.5 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs. This section, titled “Costs of Improvements,” details how the costs for improving Unimproved Lots and Common Areas in Phase 3 and Phase 4 are to be borne by the owners of lots within those specific phases.

4. The key missing evidence was a plat, referred to as “Exhibit B” in the CC&Rs. This plat was supposed to define the “Common Areas,” and without it, the Petitioner was unable to establish that the fees paid by the Respondent were for anything not provided for in the governing documents.

5. The Respondent argued that the Master HOA fees were used to pay for the development’s common areas. They maintained that the CC&Rs permit these payments and that there is no legal authority requiring all homeowners to receive the same benefit or for all first-level associations to contribute equally.

6. Pursuant to A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner, Jay Janicek, had the burden of proof in this matter. The standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, as established by A.A.C. R2-19-119(A).

7. The rule against perpetuities states that property ownership must vest within a time frame of an existing lifetime plus 21 years. The Judge ruled it did not apply because it evolved to handle estates bequeathed to a series of heirs and is not generally applicable to property sales where rights transfer at once; in the HOA’s case, ownership of undeveloped lots had already vested in the developer.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. This decision was made on August 14, 2017.

9. The record was held open until August 1, 2017, to allow the Respondent to submit additional documentation and for the Petitioner to submit written objections. During this time, the Petitioner submitted financial documentation, emails, and a new argument about the rule against perpetuities (admitted as Exhibit 6), while the Respondent submitted a Notice of Lien (admitted as Exhibit H).

10. The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This was formalized in a Final Order dated August 21, 2017, which accepted the ALJ’s recommendation and denied the Petitioner’s petition.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-style response for each.

1. Analyze the critical evidentiary failure that led to the denial of Jay Janicek’s petition. How did the absence of the plat referred to as “Exhibit B” directly impact his ability to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of proof?

2. Discuss the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that there is no requirement for HOA fees to be “even-handed or equally beneficial to all homeowners.” How does this principle relate to the hierarchical structure of Master and first-level associations described in the case?

3. Explain the concept of the “rule against perpetuities” as described in the legal decision. Detail why the Administrative Law Judge, despite noting the argument was outside the original petition, addressed it and ultimately found it inapplicable to the case of a homeowner’s association.

4. Trace the procedural path of this case from the initial hearing to the final binding order. Identify the key dates, decisions, and entities involved at each stage, including the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate.

5. Based on the Final Order, outline the process and potential grounds for requesting a rehearing. What were the eight specific causes listed in the order that could materially affect a moving party’s rights and justify a rehearing or review?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, Dorinda M. Lang served as the ALJ.

A.A.C.

Abbreviation for Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of all the laws of the state of Arizona.

Areas of Association Responsibility

Locations that the Homeowner’s Association is responsible for maintaining, as defined within its governing documents.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision.

Common Areas

Areas within a housing development that are owned by the association for the use and benefit of all homeowners. The definition of these areas was a central issue in the case.

Commissioner

The head of a government department. In this context, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, who adopted the ALJ’s decision.

First Level Association

An individual homeowner’s association within a larger development that also has a master association. The Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, is a first level association.

Master HOA

The Sycamore Vista Master Home Owner’s Association. An overarching organization that governs expenses and common areas concerning an entire development composed of multiple first-level associations.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts administrative hearings for other state agencies. This case was referred to the OAH by the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings an action in a legal proceeding. In this case, Jay Janicek.

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The missing plat in this case was intended to show the “Common Areas.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires that the evidence shows a claim is more likely to be true than not true.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a legal action. In this case, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA.

Rule Against Perpetuities

A legal rule that prevents a property owner from controlling the disposition of their property for an indefinite period after their death. The ALJ found it did not apply in this HOA context.

Unimproved Lot Assessments

Fees imposed on the owners of undeveloped lots to pay for the costs of improving certain areas, as described in Section 6.13 of the CC&Rs.

Unimproved Lots

Parcels of land within the development that have not yet been built upon.

Select all sources

575166.pdf

582189.pdf

584918.pdf

No emoji found

17F-H1717033-REL

3 sources

These documents chronicle the legal proceedings of a dispute between Jay Janicek, the Petitioner, and Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, the Respondent, before the Office of Administrative Hearings. The first source is an “Order Holding Record Open,” dated July 12, 2017, which temporarily extends the deadline for submitting additional evidence. The subsequent sources contain the “Administrative Law Judge Decision” issued on August 14, 2017, which outlines the hearing details and the judge’s recommendation to deny the petition because Janicek failed to establish a violation of the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Finally, the third document presents the “Final Order” from the Department of Real Estate Commissioner on August 21, 2017, which accepts and affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to deny the petition. Janicek’s core claim argued that certain master association fees were disproportionately applied and did not benefit all homeowners equally, which the judge ultimately dismissed due to a lack of supporting legal authority or CC&R provisions.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Jay Janicek (petitioner)

Respondent Side

Evan Thompson (HOA attorney)
Thompson Krone PLC
Attorney for Respondent
Steve Russo (respondent representative)

Neutral Parties

Dorinda M. Lang (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Dan Gardner (HOA Coordinator)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Addressee for rehearing request

Other Participants

John Shields (observer)
Margery Janicek (observer)
Mathew Janicek (observer)
M. Aguirre (unknown)
Thompson Krone PLC
Listed on transmittal documents

Jay Janicek vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Posted on March 14, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716019-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-03-14
Administrative Law Judge	Suzanne Marwil
Outcome	The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Jay Janicek	Counsel	—
Respondent	Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA	Counsel	Evan Thomson, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by invalidly adopting the 'Declaration of Scrivener's Error' (Exhibit C) as an amendment without the required lot owner vote. However, the $10.00 annual increased assessment that Petitioner objected to was permitted to stand because the authority for differential assessments was established by the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, independent of the invalid Exhibit C. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500 filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner objected to the increased assessment resulting from Exhibit C, but the Tribunal determined that Respondent had the right to impose the increased assessment pursuant to the language of Section 6.8 in the valid First Amendment to the Declaration, regardless of the invalidity of Exhibit C.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Amendment of Declaration (Declaration of Scrivener's Error)

Petitioner claimed Respondent HOA improperly adopted a Declaration of Scrivener's Error (Exhibit C) to revise the definition of developed/undeveloped lots, arguing it was a substantive amendment requiring a 75% lot owner vote, which Respondent failed to obtain.

Orders: The Tribunal found that Exhibit C constituted an amendment and Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1817 by adopting it without a vote. Exhibit C was deemed invalid, but this invalidity did not nullify the subsequent assessment increase, which was authorized by a prior, valid declaration amendment. Respondent was ordered to refund the filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1817
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Declaration Amendment, Scrivener's Error, Assessments, Statutory Violation

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1817
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 33-1811

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:02:31 (83.7 KB)

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:02:41 (794.0 KB)

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 551057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:18:45 (83.7 KB)

17F-H1716019-REL Decision – 559875.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:18:51 (794.0 KB)

Briefing Document: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Jay Janicek and respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 Homeowners Association (HOA), culminating in the case No. 17F-H1716019-REL. The core of the conflict was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its governing Declaration via a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” without the required 75% vote from lot owners. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment and was followed by a $10 annual assessment increase on developed lots.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting his petition and invalidating the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” The judge found that the change was a substantive amendment, not a correction of a clerical error, and the Board’s unilateral action violated Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817). However, in a critical distinction, the ALJ ruled that the $10 assessment increase on developed lots was permissible and should stand, as the authority to set different rates for completed and uncompleted lots was already established in the valid 2009 First Amendment to the Declaration.

The judge also rejected the petitioner’s conflict of interest claim against three Board members with financial ties to the developer, deeming the petitioner’s interpretation of the relevant statute (A.R.S. § 33-1811) to be overbroad. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner, required the HOA to pay the petitioner’s $500 filing fee and to comply with state statutes regarding amendments and conflicts of interest in the future.

Case Details

Details

Case Name

Jay Janicek, Petitioner, vs. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, Respondent

Case Number

HO 17-16/019

Docket Number

17F-H1716019-REL

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings / Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner

Jay Janicek (appeared personally)

Respondent

Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (represented by Evan Thomson, Esq.)

Administrative Law Judge

Suzanne Marwil

Hearing Date

March 2, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

March 14, 2017

Final Order Date

March 16, 2017

Commissioner

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Background and Core Dispute

The conflict originated from changes to the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration).

• 2005 Declaration: The original “2005 Amended and Restated Declaration” contained Section 6.8, which established a uniform assessment rate for all lots. Crucially, it exempted the Declarant and Developer from payments on any property except for “Completed Lots.” This section provided a specific definition for “Completed Lots,” describing them as any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy.

• 2009 First Amendment: On December 4, 2008, after securing a vote from 75% of lot owners, the HOA adopted the “First Amendment to the 2005 Declaration.” This amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 in its entirety and replaced it with new language stating: “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.” This amendment, however, omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot” that was present in the 2005 version.

• Seven-Year Period: For seven years following the 2009 amendment, the revised Section 6.8 remained unchanged, without the specific definition.

The “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”

In June or July 2016, the HOA Board proposed a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” to address the omitted definition.

• Board’s Position: The Respondent, represented by its president Steven Russo, argued that the purpose of the declaration was simply to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of a developed versus undeveloped lot, which was “inadvertently omitted” from the 2009 First Amendment. The Board stated it was acting on the advice of its legal counsel.

• Petitioner’s Position: Mr. Janicek contended that this declaration was not a correction of a minor error but was a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he argued it required the approval of 75% of the lot owners, a process that was not followed.

• Adoption: On August 3, 2016, the Board adopted the Declaration of Scrivener’s Error by a 3-2 vote. Petitioner Janicek and another Board member representing developed lot owners voted against the measure.

• Immediate Consequence: Following the adoption, the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00, while the assessment for undeveloped lots remained unchanged. This action prompted Mr. Janicek to file his petition.

Allegations of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest

Petitioner Janicek accused the Respondent of a violation of its fiduciary duty and a conflict of interest. He noted that three members of the Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These lots directly benefited from the assessment structure that placed a higher burden on developed lots.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s decision, issued on March 14, 2017, contained three central conclusions of law that addressed the distinct issues raised in the petition.

1. The “Scrivener’s Error” was an Invalid Amendment

The judge found decisively in favor of the petitioner on the core issue of the amendment process.

• Substantive Change, Not Clerical Error: The Tribunal found that the change constituted an amendment to the Declaration, not a correction of a simple clerical error.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817: The judge ruled that the procedure for amending the Declaration requires a vote by the lot owners, as specified in the Declaration and state law. The HOA violated this statute by attempting to amend the document via a simple Board vote.

• Key Judicial Reasoning: The judge noted that the same section had been properly amended by a homeowner vote in 2009. The ruling states, “after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.”

• Conclusion: The Declaration of Scrivener’s Error (Exhibit C) was declared invalid and could not operate to amend the Declaration.

2. The Assessment Increase Was Valid

Despite invalidating the method used by the Board, the judge upheld the Board’s right to implement the assessment increase.

• Existing Authority: The ruling stated that the invalidity of Exhibit C “does not implicate Respondent’s right to impose an increased assessment on the developed lots.”

• Basis in 2009 Amendment: The judge found that the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment—which expressly states that “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots”—provided the Board with sufficient authority to set differential rates.

• Conclusion: The raised assessment was allowed to stand.

3. Conflict of Interest Claim Rejected

The Tribunal rejected the petitioner’s argument that Board members with ties to NT Properties had a conflict of interest under A.R.S. § 33-1811.

• “Overbroad” Interpretation: The judge found the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict-of-interest statute to be “overbroad.”

• Rationale: The ruling stated that this interpretation “ignores that make-up of the Board as outlined in the Declaration and disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

• Conclusion: The Board members were not required to declare a conflict of interest and were permitted to vote on the issue.

Final Order

The petition filed by Jay Janicek was granted. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was officially adopted by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate in a Final Order dated March 16, 2017. The final order mandated the following:

• The Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA must pay the petitioner, Jay Janicek, the $500.00 filing fee.

• The HOA must comply with the applicable provisions of Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1817 (regarding the proper procedure for amending a declaration) and § 33-1811 (regarding conflicts of interest) in the future.

Study Guide: Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA

This study guide provides a review of the administrative law case Janicek v. Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA (No. 17F-H1716019-REL). It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to aid in understanding the facts, arguments, and legal conclusions of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What was the central action taken by the Respondent’s Board that led to this legal dispute?

3. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument against the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”?

4. How did the Respondent justify its use of a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” instead of a full vote by lot owners?

5. Describe the conflict of interest alleged by the Petitioner against the Respondent’s Board.

6. How did the 2009 First Amendment alter Section 6.8 of the HOA’s 2005 Declaration?

7. What was the direct financial consequence for developed lot owners following the Board’s actions in 2016?

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final ruling regarding the validity of the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error”?

9. Despite invalidating the Board’s action, what did the Judge decide regarding the increased assessment on developed lots?

10. What was the final order issued in the case, and what was the Respondent required to do?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Jay Janicek and Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA. Janicek, a lot owner, brought the petition against the Homeowner’s Association to challenge a decision made by its Board of Directors.

2. The Respondent’s Board, by a 3-2 vote, adopted a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” on August 3, 2016. This action was intended to reinsert a definition of “Completed Lots” that had been omitted from a 2009 amendment to the HOA’s governing documents.

3. The Petitioner argued that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was not a simple correction but a substantive change to the Declaration. As such, he contended it was an amendment that required approval by a vote of seventy-five percent of the lot owners, not just a Board vote.

4. The Respondent argued that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was merely intended to correct a clerical error by reinserting the definition of developed versus undeveloped lots, which was inadvertently deleted from the 2009 revision. The Board’s President, Steven Russo, testified that they acted on the recommendation of their legal counsel.

5. The Petitioner alleged a conflict of interest because three members of the Respondent’s Board had a financial interest in NT Properties, the company that owns the undeveloped lots. The Petitioner argued that these members stood to benefit from assessment changes that favored undeveloped lots.

6. The 2009 First Amendment deleted the original Section 6.8 and replaced it with new language. This new language explicitly allowed annual dues to be assessed at different uniform rates for “Completed Lots” and “Uncompleted Lots,” a distinction not present in the original uniform rate structure.

7. Following the adoption of the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error,” the Board voted to increase the annual assessment for developed lot owners by $10.00. The assessment for undeveloped lots was left unchanged.

8. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” was an invalid amendment to the Declaration. The Judge found that it was a substantive change that required a vote of the lot owners as specified in A.R.S. §33-1817, and that calling it a correction of a clerical error after seven years “defies logic.”

9. The Judge ruled that the increased assessment on developed lots could stand. The ruling was based on the language of the valid 2009 First Amendment, which expressly permitted the HOA to assess different rates for completed and uncompleted lots, independent of the invalidated “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.”

10. The final order granted the Petitioner’s petition. The Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate a comprehensive response drawing upon the specific facts, legal arguments, and conclusions presented in the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to invalidate the “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error” while simultaneously upholding the increased assessment on developed lots. Explain how both parts of this ruling were supported by different governing documents.

2. Discuss the conflict of interest allegation raised by Jay Janicek under A.R.S. § 33-1811. Why did the Tribunal ultimately reject this argument, and what does this rejection imply about the Board’s authority to set assessments under the Declaration?

3. Trace the evolution of Section 6.8 of the Declaration from the original 2005 version, through the 2009 First Amendment, to the attempted 2016 change. Explain the significance of the “Completed Lots” definition and how its omission and attempted reinsertion became the central point of the dispute.

4. Evaluate the Respondent’s argument that it was simply correcting an inadvertent clerical error. What evidence and reasoning did the Administrative Law Judge use to conclude that this was, in fact, an improper amendment?

5. Describe the legal requirements for amending an HOA declaration as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1817. Explain precisely how the actions of the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA Board violated this statute.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding judge in the administrative hearing, in this case, Suzanne Marwil. The ALJ hears evidence and issues a decision based on the facts and applicable laws.

A.R.S. § 33-1811

An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case that addresses conflicts of interest for members of an HOA board of directors. The Tribunal found the Petitioner’s interpretation of this statute to be overbroad.

A.R.S. § 33-1817

An Arizona Revised Statute cited in the case that outlines the legal requirements and procedures for amending an HOA’s declaration. The ALJ found the Respondent violated this statute.

Completed Lots

As defined in the original 2005 Declaration, this refers to any lot with a dwelling unit ready for occupancy, including installed carpets, cabinets, plumbing, etc. This definition was central to the dispute.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (Declaration)

The primary governing legal document of the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA, which outlines the rules, assessments, and rights of the property owners.

Declaration of Scrivener’s Error

The legal instrument adopted by the Respondent’s Board in a 3-2 vote on August 3, 2016. It was purported to correct a clerical error but was ruled to be an invalid substantive amendment to the Declaration.

First Amendment

The amendment to the 2005 Declaration adopted on December 4, 2008, after a vote of 75% of the lot owners. It changed Section 6.8 to allow for different assessment rates for completed and uncompleted lots but inadvertently omitted the definition of a “Completed Lot.”

NT Properties

A company with a financial interest in the undeveloped lots within the HOA. Three members of the Respondent’s Board also had a financial interest in this company, forming the basis of a conflict of interest allegation.

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Jay Janicek.

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA.

Tribunal

A term used within the decision to refer to the adjudicating body, specifically the Office of Administrative Hearings and the presiding Administrative Law Judge.

Uniform Rate of Assessment

A principle laid out in the 2005 Declaration requiring that annual and special assessments be fixed at a uniform rate for all lots. This was modified by the 2009 First Amendment.

He Sued His HOA and Won. Here’s Why He Still Had to Pay.

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath of Neighborhood Disputes

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant source of tension. It’s a world of rules, fees, and board decisions that can seem arbitrary or unfair. So when a single homeowner decides to take on their entire HOA in a legal battle, it feels like a classic David vs. Goliath story. This is one of those stories—about a homeowner who challenged an improper rule change and an unexpected fee increase. He took his HOA to court and, on paper, he won. But as he discovered, the outcome was far more surprising and nuanced than a simple victory.

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1. You Can’t Fix a Seven-Year-Old “Mistake” with a Simple Board Vote.

The core of the dispute began when the Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA tried to amend its governing documents with a “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error.” Their goal was to reinsert definitions of “Completed Lots” versus “Undeveloped Lots” that they claimed had been “inadvertently deleted” from a revision seven years prior.

Instead of seeking approval from the homeowners, the Board of Directors passed this “correction” on August 3, 2016, with a simple 3-2 vote. This procedural shortcut triggered the legal challenge.

The Administrative Law Judge unequivocally rejected the HOA’s move. The judge’s reasoning was sharp and logical: the seven-year gap since the original amendment was a critical factor. The sheer passage of time had transformed what the HOA called a clerical correction into what the law considered a substantive change. As such, it required a vote by 75% of the lot owners, not a simple board action.

The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful rebuke:

…after a period of seven years, it defies logic to suggest that a further change to section was simply a clerical error.

This finding was a crucial victory for the homeowner. It affirmed that HOAs must follow the proper procedures outlined in their own governing documents and cannot use shortcuts to rewrite history, no matter how they frame their intentions.

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2. A Legal “Win” Doesn’t Always Mean You Get the Financial Outcome You Want.

Even though the judge invalidated the HOA’s “Declaration of Scrivener’s Error,” she made another, more surprising ruling: the $10.00 annual assessment increase on developed lots—the very fee that sparked the lawsuit—was valid and would stand.

The legal reasoning was buried in the fine print of the HOA’s own documents. A different amendment, one legally passed with a 75% homeowner vote on December 4, 2008, already gave the Board the explicit authority to set different assessment rates. The key language in that valid amendment stated, “annual dues may be assessed at one uniform rate for Completed Lots and a different uniform rate for Uncompleted Lots.”

This created the central irony of the case: the HOA took a legally improper path to arrive at a destination they already had a legal right to reach. Interestingly, the HOA board president testified they were acting on the advice of their counsel, suggesting this was less a malicious act and more of a costly legal misstep.

The petitioner, Jay Janicek, won his case on principle. The judge’s order granted his petition and even awarded him his $500.00 filing fee. But he lost on the practical financial issue that started the dispute. The $10 increase remained. It’s a stark illustration of how complex legal documents can be, where one legally sound clause can override a victory on another front.

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3. Proving a Conflict of Interest Is Harder Than It Looks.

The homeowner also accused the board of a conflict of interest. He pointed out that three members of the five-person board had a financial stake in NT Properties, the company that owned the community’s undeveloped lots. These were the very lots that benefited from the new assessment structure, as their fees remained unchanged while only the developed lots saw the $10 increase. On the surface, it appeared to be a clear-cut case of self-dealing.

However, the judge rejected this claim, ruling that the petitioner’s interpretation of the conflict of interest statute was “overbroad.” The judge’s analysis provided a crucial distinction: the board members were not inventing a new power for their own benefit; they were exercising a power explicitly granted to the Board by the homeowners themselves in the 2009 Declaration. The ruling noted that the petitioner’s argument “disregards the express language permitting the Board to assess annual dues.”

This takeaway is a sobering one for homeowners. It demonstrates that what might look like a glaring conflict of interest to a layperson may not meet the specific legal standard required to invalidate a board’s actions, especially when those actions fall within the powers already granted by the community’s governing documents.

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Conclusion: A Victory of Principle

In the end, the homeowner walked away with a strange and dual outcome. He successfully proved his HOA acted improperly by trying to amend its rules without a proper vote, yet he could not reverse the financial consequence that drove him to file the suit. The case stands as a powerful reminder for all homeowners: understanding both the procedural rules your HOA must follow and the precise wording hidden deep within its governing documents is absolutely critical. This ruling created a clear divide between procedural justice and financial reality.

This case was a victory of principle over practice—how much is a principle worth when the bottom line doesn’t change?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Jay Janicek (petitioner)

Respondent Side

Evan Thomson (attorney)
Represented Respondent
Steven Russo (board member)
Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA
President of Respondent; testified
Dane Dehler (attorney)
Thompson Kron, P.L.C.
Received copy of final order
Whitney Cunningham (HOA contact)
Sycamore Vista No. 8 HOA
Received copy of final order c/o

Neutral Parties

Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
Recipient for rehearing request

Paul Gounder vs. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Posted on October 18, 2016 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1716002-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-06-12
Administrative Law Judge	Suzanne Marwil
Outcome	partial
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Paul Gounder	Counsel	—
Respondent	Royal Riviera Condominium Association	Counsel	Mark Kristopher Sahl

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge found Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) by using two substantively different ballots during the 2016 board election,. Respondent was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee,. The Administrative Law Judge concluded Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4),.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4), which specifies timing requirements for ballots; the ALJ noted that a meeting ballot did not need to contain a received-by date or be mailed seven days in advance if it had been substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot,,,.

Key Issues & Findings

Ballot must provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.

The use of two substantively different ballots in the March 2016 election violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) because members who did not attend the meeting were unaware of an additional candidate (Eric Thompson) listed on the meeting ballot, thereby denying those members the opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot,. This finding does not require ballots to be identical, but substantive changes must be presented to all members,,.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was granted, and Respondent was ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00,. No other relief was available.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Condominium, Board Election, Absentee Ballot, Statutory Violation, Filing Fee Reimbursement

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4)
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Article VII CC&Rs

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 564851.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:59:29 (44.2 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 567887.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:59:37 (79.0 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 575055.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:59:43 (689.5 KB)

17F-H1716002-REL Decision – 523915.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T10:59:47 (103.0 KB)

Briefing Document: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key events, arguments, and legal conclusions from the administrative case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association (Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG). The central issue revolved around the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots for its March 14, 2016, board member election.

The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the use of a separate mail-in ballot and an in-person meeting ballot, which contained different candidate lists, violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Specifically, the ballot distributed at the meeting included the name of a seventh candidate, Eric Thompson, who was not listed on the mail-in ballot, thereby denying absentee voters the opportunity to vote for all candidates.

After an initial hearing resulted in a recommended dismissal, a rehearing was granted. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil ultimately concluded that the Association’s actions constituted a statutory violation. The Judge found that because members voting by mail were not informed of Mr. Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote “for or against each proposed action.” The Respondent’s argument that the matter was moot due to a subsequent election was rejected.

The Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order on June 12, 2017. The Order granted the petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse Mr. Gounder’s $500.00 filing fee. The ruling establishes that while election ballots are not required to be identical, any substantive changes must be presented to all members to ensure an equal opportunity to vote.

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I. Case Overview and Background

This matter was brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Petitioner: Paul Gounder, a condominium owner and member of the Association.

• Respondent: Royal Riviera Condominium Association, a homeowners’ association for a development of approximately 32 condominiums.

• Initial Petition: Filed on or about June 23, 2016.

• Core Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs by using two substantively different ballots to elect Board members at its March 14, 2016, annual meeting.

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Hearing (October 17, 2016): A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

2. Recommended Dismissal (October 18, 2016): Judge Mihalsky recommended the petition be dismissed, concluding:

3. Rehearing Granted (February 17, 2017): The Petitioner requested a rehearing, which the Department of Real Estate granted. The Department’s order specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, with a focus on subsection (C)(4).

4. Rehearing (May 17, 2017): A rehearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. At this hearing, the Respondent raised a procedural question regarding the correct statutory subsection for review, leading to a temporary order holding the record open until May 24, 2017, for clarification.

5. ALJ Decision (June 2, 2017): Judge Marwil issued a decision finding that the Respondent had committed a statutory violation.

6. Final Order (June 12, 2017): The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, Judy Lowe, accepted the ALJ’s decision and issued a Final Order making the decision binding.

III. The Core Dispute: The Two-Ballot System

The parties stipulated that two different ballots were used for the March 14, 2016, board election, which had seven open positions. The key differences are outlined below.

Feature

Mail Ballot (Absentee)

Meeting Ballot (In-Person)

“Mail Ballot”

“Ballot”

Candidates Listed

Six names

Seven names (added Eric Thompson)

Write-in Option

Included a blank line for a write-in candidate

No space provided for write-in candidates

Distribution

Distributed at least seven days before the meeting

Handed out to members attending the meeting

Return Deadline

Specified the date by which it had to be returned

Did not specify when it needed to be returned

IV. Arguments of the Parties

A. Petitioner’s Position (Paul Gounder)

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2): The addition of Eric Thompson’s name to the meeting ballot deprived members who voted by mail of their right “to vote for or against each proposed action,” as they had no opportunity to vote for Mr. Thompson.

• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4): The meeting ballot violated this subsection because it was not mailed to all members at least seven days in advance of the meeting and did not provide a date by which it had to be received to be counted.

B. Respondent’s Position (Royal Riviera Condominium Association)

• No Violation: The statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots for an election.

• Common Practice: It is a common practice for homeowners’ associations to use a different absentee ballot and meeting ballot.

• Mootness: The issue is moot because the Association had already held another election in 2017 and seated a new board, which included the Petitioner’s wife as a member.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

In her June 2, 2017 decision, ALJ Suzanne Marwil made the following key legal conclusions:

The ALJ found that the Association’s use of two substantively different ballots did violate this statute.

• Reasoning: Members who did not attend the meeting in person were not notified of Mr. Thompson’s willingness to run for the board. As a result, “these members did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

• Clarification: The ruling explicitly states that this finding does not impose a requirement that all ballots must be identical; however, it establishes that “substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.”

The ALJ concluded that no violation of this subsection occurred.

• Reasoning: The Petitioner conceded that the absentee ballot itself complied with the statutory requirements (e.g., being mailed seven days in advance with a return-by date). The judge reasoned that a meeting ballot handed out in person would not need to contain this information if it were “substantively the same as the absentee ballot.” The legal problem arose not from a failure to mail the second ballot, but from the substantive difference between the two.

The ALJ determined that the matter was not rendered moot by the 2017 election and the seating of a new board. The Judge affirmed that the tribunal “can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.”

VI. Final Order and Outcome

• ALJ Recommended Order (June 2, 2017):

◦ The Petitioner’s petition should be granted.

◦ The Respondent must reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee.

◦ No other relief was available to the Petitioner.

• Department of Real Estate Final Order (June 12, 2017):

◦ The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision.

◦ The Order is a final administrative action, effective immediately.

◦ The Royal Riviera Condominium Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

◦ The parties were notified that the Order could be appealed via a complaint for judicial review.

Study Guide: Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case Paul Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association, Case No. 17F-H1716002-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms based on the provided legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information in the case documents.

1. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner, Paul Gounder, in his initial petition?

2. Describe the two different ballots used by the Royal Riviera Condominium Association for its March 14, 2016, board election.

3. What were the two primary legal arguments made by the Respondent, Royal Riviera Condominium Association, to defend its actions?

4. What was the initial outcome of the hearing held on October 17, 2016, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky?

5. What was Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil’s final conclusion regarding the alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2)?

6. How did Judge Marwil explain her finding that A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4), which deals with ballot delivery timelines, was not violated?

7. How did the Respondent argue that the case was moot, and why did Judge Marwil reject this argument?

8. According to the Final Order issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, what specific relief was granted to the Petitioner?

9. What is the standard of proof in this matter, and which party has the burden of proof?

10. What specific action did the Department of Real Estate request be reviewed when it granted the request for a rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner, Paul Gounder, alleged that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2) and its own CC&Rs. The violation occurred by using two substantively different ballots for the election of Board members at the annual meeting on March 14, 2016.

2. The first ballot was an absentee “Mail Ballot” with six candidate names and a blank line for a write-in. The second ballot, handed out at the meeting, was titled “Ballot” and included the names of seven candidates (adding Eric Thompson) but had no space for a write-in candidate.

3. The Respondent argued that it committed no violation because the statutes do not explicitly require the use of identical ballots and that using different absentee and meeting ballots is common practice. It also maintained that the matter was moot because a new election had already occurred in 2017.

4. Following the initial hearing, Judge Diane Mihalsky recommended the dismissal of the Petition on October 18, 2016. She concluded that no statute or bylaw prevented the Respondent from adding the names of willing members to the ballot used at the annual election.

5. Judge Suzanne Marwil found that the use of two substantively different ballots did violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). Because members voting by mail were not informed of Eric Thompson’s candidacy, they were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action.

6. Judge Marwil concluded A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4) was not violated because the absentee ballot itself complied with the statute’s requirements for delivery timelines. She reasoned that a meeting ballot would not need to meet these requirements if it were substantively the same as the compliant absentee ballot; the problem arose only because the ballots were different.

7. The Respondent argued the case was moot because a new board had been seated in a 2017 election. Judge Marwil rejected this, stating that the fact a new board is seated does not prevent an Administrative Law Judge from finding that a statutory violation occurred in a past election.

8. The Final Order, issued by Commissioner Judy Lowe on June 12, 2017, granted the Petitioner’s petition. It ordered the Respondent to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

9. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” as stated in A.A.C. R2-19-119(A). Pursuant to A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner has the burden of proof in the matter.

10. In its February 17, 2017, Order Granting Request for Rehearing, the Department of Real Estate specifically requested a review of A.R.S. § 33-1250, and in particular, A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(4).

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and recommendations. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Suzanne Marwil served as ALJs.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. This case centered on the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1250.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (the Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona. It granted the rehearing and accepted the final ALJ decision.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated Article VII of its CC&Rs.

Final Order

The concluding and binding decision in an administrative case. In this matter, the Final Order was issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate on June 12, 2017, accepting the ALJ’s decision.

A legal term for a matter that is no longer in controversy or has become irrelevant. The Respondent unsuccessfully argued the case was moot because a subsequent election had been held.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency that conducts administrative hearings for other state agencies. The Department of Real Estate referred this case to the OAH for a hearing.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, the Petitioner was Paul Gounder.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means the party with the burden of proof must convince the judge that there is a greater than 50% chance that their claim is true.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to review the decision made in the first hearing. The Petitioner requested and was granted a rehearing after the initial recommendation to dismiss his petition.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Royal Riviera Condominium Association.

Your HOA’s Election Rules Might Be Unfair. This Court Case Explains Why.

Introduction: The Devil in the Details

Living in a community governed by a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex web of rules, regulations, and procedures. While most are designed to maintain property values and community standards, the enforcement of these rules can sometimes feel arbitrary. But what happens when the very process for electing the board that enforces those rules is flawed?

A fascinating legal challenge demonstrates that even a single, seemingly minor discrepancy in an HOA election can have significant consequences. But the victory was anything but certain. In the case of Paul Gounder versus the Royal Riviera Condominium Association, the homeowner’s initial petition was actually recommended for dismissal by the first judge. It was only through persistence—requesting a rehearing—that the homeowner ultimately prevailed. This case serves as a powerful real-world example of why procedural fairness in community governance is not just important—it’s legally required—and reveals several surprising lessons for any homeowner who values a fair and transparent election process.

Takeaway 1: “Common Practice” Isn’t a Legal Defense

When challenged on its election procedures, the Royal Riviera Condominium Association’s defense was simple: it was merely following “common practice.” The board argued that many HOAs use a different absentee and in-person ballot, so they had done nothing wrong. However, the Administrative Law Judge disregarded this argument entirely, focusing instead on the explicit requirements of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)(2). This decision provides a crucial lesson for all homeowners: an association’s internal habits or traditions do not override clear legal statutes. If a state law or the community’s own governing documents dictate a specific procedure, the HOA must follow it, regardless of what other associations might be doing. This empowers homeowners by showing that the law, not just internal tradition, is the ultimate authority governing their association’s actions.

Takeaway 2: A “Small” Change Can Invalidate an Election

The dispute in the March 14, 2016 election centered on two different ballots used for the same board election. The mail-in ballot, sent to members voting absentee, listed six names and included a blank line for a write-in candidate. The in-person ballot, distributed to members at the meeting, listed seven names—adding candidate Eric Thompson—and provided no space for write-ins. This difference was not seen as a minor error but as a “substantive” change that fundamentally altered the election. The judge reasoned that members who voted by mail “did not have the opportunity to vote for him and hence were denied their right to vote for or against each proposed action contained in the meeting ballot.”

The judge made a critical distinction about what constitutes a fair process, clarifying that the issue wasn’t about perfection, but equality of opportunity.

Finding this violation does not impose a requirement that ballots be identical; it simply states that substantive changes to ballots must be presented to all members.

This point is not about minor cosmetic differences like fonts or paper color. It’s about ensuring every single voting member has the exact same set of choices. Adding or removing a candidate on one version of a ballot creates two different elections, disenfranchising one group of voters. This ruling affirms that a fair election requires that all members have an equal opportunity to vote on all candidates and measures.

Takeaway 3: Accountability Matters, Even After the Fact

The association attempted to have the case dismissed by arguing that the issue was “moot.” Because a new election had already been held in 2017 and a new board was in place, the HOA claimed the flawed 2016 election no longer mattered. The Administrative Law Judge explicitly rejected this argument. The decision stated that “the fact that a new board is currently seated does not render the matter moot as the Administrative Law Judge can and does find that Respondent committed a statutory violation in the course of holding its 2016 election.” The final order granted the homeowner’s petition and required the Royal Riviera Condominium Association to reimburse his $500.00 filing fee. This is an impactful takeaway for any homeowner who feels it’s too late to act. It demonstrates that an HOA can be held legally accountable for past procedural violations, establishing an important precedent for the community and putting the board on notice for future conduct.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

The case of Gounder v. Royal Riviera Condominium Association is a powerful reminder that procedural fairness, strict adherence to legal statutes, and the vigilance of individual homeowners are essential checks on the power of an HOA board. The core lesson is clear: seemingly small details in an election process can have major legal consequences. Homeowners who take the time to understand the specific laws and bylaws governing their community can successfully challenge their associations. But this case also teaches a deeper lesson about perseverance. Faced with an initial recommendation for dismissal, the homeowner could have given up. Instead, he challenged the ruling and won on rehearing, proving that knowledge combined with conviction is a powerful force for ensuring the principles of fairness and equality are upheld.

Does your own community’s voting process ensure every member has an equal voice, and would it stand up to this kind of scrutiny?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Paul Gounder (petitioner)
Frederick C. Zehm (witness)
Royal Riviera Condominium Association member
Testified for Petitioner
Marlys Kleck (witness)
Royal Riviera Condominium Association member
Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

Mark Kristopher Sahl (HOA attorney)
Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen PLC
Dan Peterson (property manager)
Owner of Respondent's management company

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
Presided over initial hearing
Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
Presided over rehearing
Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Abby Hansen (ADRE staff/HOA Coordinator)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Also listed as AHansen
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
jmarshall (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
M. Aguirre (staff)
Transmitted order

Other Participants

Eric Thompson (member/candidate)
Candidate added to meeting ballot
Al DeFalco (member/candidate)
Nominated from the floor