Carlos J Sanchez & Marinda K Minch, vs. Tempe Villages Homeowners

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-09
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch Counsel
Respondent Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Ashley Moscarello

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article 4 Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.

Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?

Short Answer

Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.

Alj Quote

In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Elections
  • Bylaws

Question

Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?

Short Answer

Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.

Alj Quote

The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Board Vacancies
  • Timelines
  • Bylaws

Question

Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?

Short Answer

No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.

Detailed Answer

The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.

Legal Basis

Testimony / Findings of Fact

Topic Tags

  • Community Manager
  • Authority
  • Board Composition

Question

What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Burden of Proof
  • Evidence

Question

Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?

Short Answer

Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.

Alj Quote

Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.

Legal Basis

Findings of Fact / Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • Elections
  • Board Terms
  • Voting

Question

Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?

Short Answer

Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.

Alj Quote

Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.

Legal Basis

Conclusions of Law

Topic Tags

  • Discrimination/Bias
  • Enforcement
  • Board Conduct

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carlos J. Sanchez (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Marinda K. Minch (petitioner)
    Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified

Respondent Side

  • Ashley Moscarello (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Lawgroup
  • Bradley Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    President of the Board; testified as witness
  • Shawn Nurse (community manager)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Testified as witness; received ballots for election
  • William Skanadore (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Will Terrick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Incumbent candidate; elected
  • Wendelyn Neal (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
  • Joel Krick (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Kathy Hudson (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
  • Christiane Pieraggi (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Appointed to fill vacancy

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    ADRE

Other Participants

  • John Neelsen (unknown)
    Candidate for Board election
  • Tania Almonte (board member)
    Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
    Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
  • Ruby (witness assistant)
    Aided in counting votes

Lee & Kim Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120028-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lee & Kim Edwards Counsel Terry Foster, Esq.
Respondent Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or A.R.S. § 33-1255, ruling that the statute was inapplicable due to the specific provisions in the Declaration regarding the 1/26 assessment calculation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the ALJ determined A.R.S. § 33-1255 was superseded by the Declaration, which mandated assessments based on the undivided 1/26 interest in the common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

Assessment calculation based on undivided interest in common areas

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to change assessments from a historical square footage basis to a 1/26 interest calculation, arguing that this method violates A.R.S. § 33-1255 by charging for limited common elements (patios/parking).

Orders: The petition of Lee & Kim Edwards is dismissed; Respondent is deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • Declaration Article I, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 7
  • Declaration Article IV, Section 4
  • Declaration Article VI, Section 9

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, assessment, cc&r, statutory interpretation, common elements, limited common elements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 856603.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:06:35 (98.1 KB)

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 899379.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:36:38 (123.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120028-REL


Assessment Methodology Dispute: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between homeowners Lee & Kim Edwards (Petitioners) and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association (Respondent) concerning a change in the methodology for calculating homeowner assessments. The core of the conflict was the Association’s decision to shift from a historical practice of assessments based on unit square footage to a uniform rate where each of the 26 units pays an equal 1/26 share of the common expenses.

The dispute was adjudicated by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in two separate hearings. In both instances, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing the petitions filed by the Edwards.

Key Takeaways:

Change in Methodology: The Association’s Board, acting on legal advice received in January 2020, concluded that its 40-year practice of using a square-footage-based assessment violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Board subsequently implemented a 1/26 equal-share assessment method after a majority of homeowners selected this option.

Initial Ruling on “Uniform Rate”: In the first hearing in February 2021, the Petitioners argued that the historical square footage method was a “uniform rate” and that the Association had waived its right to change the long-standing practice. The ALJ rejected this, finding that the new 1/26 rate complied with the CC&Rs’ requirement for a “uniform rate” (Article VI, Section 9) and aligned with each unit’s specified 1/26 undivided interest in the common elements (Article VI, Section 4(d)).

Rehearing Ruling on State Statute: The Petitioners were granted a rehearing in July 2021, where they argued that the 1/26 method violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1255 by improperly charging all owners for “limited common elements” like patios and parking spaces. The ALJ again ruled against the Petitioners, concluding that the state statute did not apply. The ruling was based on a key provision in the statute: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” The judge found that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise by defining patios and parking as general common elements and explicitly mandating that costs be shared based on each unit’s 1/26 interest.

Final Outcome: The petition was definitively dismissed after the rehearing, making the ALJ’s order binding. The Association’s adoption of the 1/26 assessment rate was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.

——————————————————————————–

Background of the Dispute

The legal conflict originated from a single-issue petition filed on November 20, 2020, by Lee and Kim Edwards, owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development. The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged that the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association had violated its CC&Rs, specifically Article VI, Section 9, and Article IV, Section 1.

The central issue was the Association Board’s decision to change the long-standing method of calculating homeowner assessments. For over 40 years, assessments had been based on the square footage of each unit. In 2020, the Board implemented a new system where the Association’s annual budget was divided equally among the 26 units, with each owner paying a 1/26 share. The Petitioners sought to enforce the historical calculation method unless and until the CC&Rs were properly amended.

Chronology of the Assessment Change

Historical Practice: For more than four decades, the Association calculated and charged member assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit.

Legal Consultation (January 2020): Two members of the Association’s Board consulted with an attorney regarding the legality of the historical assessment method.

Attorney Recommendation (January 24, 2020): The attorney advised the Association that, to ensure compliance with the CC&Rs, it should calculate assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas. The attorney’s letter stated:

Homeowner Consultation: Following the legal advice, the Board informed homeowners that the prior square-footage method violated the CC&Rs. The Board sought input on three potential assessment methods: the 1/26 rate, a variable blended rate, or continuing with the square footage rate. A majority of homeowners selected the 1/26 rate. The Board noted that any method other than the 1/26 rate would require a formal amendment to the CC&Rs.

Implementation (September 26, 2020): The Board officially notified homeowners that it would begin charging assessments based on the 1/26 rate and that an amendment to the CC&Rs was not necessary to implement this change.

Initial Hearing and Decision (February 2021)

An evidentiary hearing was held on February 9, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

Arguments Presented

Petitioners (Edwards)

1. The historical square footage rate qualified as a “uniform rate” and was compliant with the CC&Rs.
2. By using the square footage rate for over 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different method like the 1/26 rate.

Respondent (Association)

1. The plain language of the CC&Rs requires that each homeowner pay an assessment based on the 1/26 rate.
2. It is not legally possible to waive a mandatory CC&R requirement through past practice.

On February 19, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the petition. The judge’s conclusions of law were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs:

Uniform Rate Compliance: The ALJ determined that the “preponderance of the evidence” showed that the Association’s 1/26 rate was a uniform rate that complied with Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioners failed to meet their burden to prove that the Association had violated its governing documents.

Outcome: The Association was deemed the prevailing party, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing and Final Decision (July 2021)

The Petitioners filed a request for a rehearing on March 30, 2021, which was granted. The rehearing was held on July 8, 2021. The Respondent did not appear at this hearing, as its counsel had withdrawn from representation without formally notifying the tribunal.

In the rehearing, the Petitioners introduced a new argument, alleging that the 1/26 assessment method violated Arizona state law, specifically A.R.S. § 33-1255.

• The core of this argument was that the 1/26 rate improperly included charges for “limited common elements,” such as patios and assigned parking spaces.

• The Petitioners contended that this forced all homeowners to pay for the maintenance of elements that were assigned to and benefited fewer than all units, in direct violation of the statute.

On July 28, 2021, the ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition. The ruling hinged on the precise wording of both the state statute and the Association’s Declaration.

Applicability of A.R.S. § 33-1255: The judge found that the statute did not apply to this matter. The relevant section of the law, A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), begins with the critical phrase: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

Supremacy of the Declaration: The ALJ concluded that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise. The CC&Rs explicitly:

◦ Define “Common Elements” broadly to include patios and parking areas (Article I, Section 3).

◦ Establish that each unit has an “undivided interest in the general common areas” of 1/26 (Article I, Section 5).

◦ Mandate that each unit’s share of costs for repair and maintenance of common areas is the “same as its undivided interest in the common elements” (Article IV, Section 4(d)).

Final Outcome: Because the Declaration’s specific provisions overrode the general terms of the state statute, the Association was found to be in compliance. The petition was dismissed, and the order was deemed binding on the parties.

Key Legal Principles and Definitions

Concept

Definition / Application in Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioners were required to establish their claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The ALJ found the Petitioners failed to meet this standard in both hearings.

Restrictive Covenants

Arizona law requires that unambiguous restrictive covenants be enforced to give effect to the parties’ intent and be interpreted as a whole. The ALJ’s decisions were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs’ language.

Common Elements (per CC&Rs)

A broad definition including multifamily structures, land, roofs, ceilings, foundations, storage spaces, patios, parking areas, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and conduits.

Unit (per CC&Rs)

A freehold estate consisting of the interior space of an apartment. The definition explicitly states that common elements are not part of the unit.

Undivided Interest (per CC&Rs)

Article I, Section 5 clearly establishes that “The undivided interest in the general common areas… which shall be conveyed with each respective units shall be 1/26.” This provision was central to the final ruling.






Study Guide – 21F-H2120028-REL


Study Guide: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Lee & Kim Edwards and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association, based on the provided legal decisions. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a detailed glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central conflict between the Petitioners (Lee & Kim Edwards) and the Respondent (Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association)?

2. For over 40 years, how did the Association historically calculate assessments for homeowners?

3. What specific event in January 2020 prompted the Association’s Board to change the assessment method?

4. In the first hearing on February 9, 2021, what were the two main arguments presented by Mr. Edwards?

5. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the “uniform rate” requirement from CC&Rs Article VI, Section 9 in the initial decision?

6. Upon what new legal grounds did the Petitioners base their March 30, 2021, request for a re-hearing?

7. According to the CC&Rs, what is the defined undivided interest in the general common areas for each unit?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately conclude that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255 did not apply in this case?

9. What legal standard of proof did the Petitioners need to meet to successfully prove their case?

10. What was the final, binding outcome of the re-hearing held on July 8, 2021?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The central conflict concerned the method for calculating homeowner assessments. The Petitioners argued for the historical method based on unit square footage, while the Respondent implemented a new method where each of the 26 units paid an equal share (1/26 rate) of the Association’s costs.

2. For over 40 years, the Association historically calculated assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit. This practice was changed by the Board in 2020.

3. In January 2020, two Board members met with an attorney who advised that to comply with the CC&Rs, the Association should charge assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas, not on square footage.

4. Mr. Edwards argued that the historical square footage rate was a “uniform rate” that complied with the CC&Rs. He also contended that by using this method for 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different assessment method like the 1/26 rate.

5. The Judge concluded that the Respondent’s assessment method, based on a uniform rate of 1/26 of the Association’s costs for each unit, did comply with Article VI, Section 9. Therefore, the Petitioners failed to prove the Association had violated the CC&Rs.

6. The Petitioners based their request for a re-hearing on the new allegation that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255. They argued the 1/26 rate improperly required members to pay for limited common elements, such as patios and parking spaces, not assigned to them.

7. According to Article I, Section 5 of the Declaration (CC&Rs), the undivided interest in the general common areas established and conveyed with each respective unit is 1/26.

8. The Judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1255 did not apply because the statute itself contains an exception: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” In this case, the Association’s Declaration explicitly required that each member be charged an assessment equivalent to their 1/26 interest in the total costs, which included patios and parking areas.

9. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

10. Following the re-hearing, the Administrative Law Judge again ordered that the petition of Lee & Kim Edwards be dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party, and the order was declared binding on the parties.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Answers are not provided.

1. Trace the evolution of the Petitioners’ legal strategy from the initial petition filed on November 20, 2020, to the arguments made during the re-hearing on July 8, 2021. How did their core arguments change, and what new evidence or legal statutes were introduced?

2. Analyze the concept of a “uniform rate” as required by Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs. Discuss how both the Petitioners and the Respondent interpreted this phrase to support their respective assessment methods (square footage vs. 1/26 rate).

3. Explain in detail the role of A.R.S. § 33-1255 in the re-hearing. Why did the Petitioners believe it supported their case, and what specific language in both the statute and the Association’s Declaration led the Administrative Law Judge to rule that it did not apply?

4. Evaluate the actions taken by the Association’s Board of Directors in 2020. Consider their consultation with an attorney, their communication with homeowners, and their final decision to implement the 1/26 rate. Discuss whether these actions were consistent with the powers and obligations outlined in the CC&Rs.

5. Discuss the legal argument of “waiver” raised by Mr. Edwards in the first hearing. Explain what he meant by this and why the Association’s 40-year history of using a square-footage-based assessment was central to this claim. Why did this argument ultimately fail?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

1/26 Rate

The assessment method where the Association’s annual budget is divided 26 ways, with each unit responsible for paying an equal portion. This is based on each unit’s 1/26 undivided interest in the common areas as specified in the CC&Rs.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The independent judicial officer who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)

The Arizona Revised Statute that permits a condominium unit owner to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing regarding alleged violations of the Condominium Act.

A.R.S. § 33-1255

The Arizona Revised Statute concerning common expenses. It states that unless the declaration provides otherwise, expenses for a limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which it is assigned, and expenses benefitting fewer than all units shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of condominium associations in Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to establish its claims by a required standard of evidence. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. Also referred to as the “Declaration” in the provided documents.

Common Area / Common Elements

As defined in Article I, Section 3 of the CC&Rs, this includes the multifamily structure (except for the units), land, air space, bearing walls, roofs, storage spaces, patios, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and other premises designed for common use.

Declaration

Another term for the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Lee & Kim Edwards

The Petitioners in the case and owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for evidentiary hearings.

Petitioners

The party that initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Lee & Kim Edwards.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to be met by the Petitioners. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association.

Restricted Common Area

As defined in Article I, Section 3(b) of the CC&Rs, this refers to a separately designed and exclusive parking area for each unit as assigned by the Board of Directors.

Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case; the condominium unit owners’ association for the development.

Square Footage Rate

The historical method of calculating assessments for over 40 years, where each unit’s assessment was based on its square footage.

Uniform Rate

A requirement from Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs that states both regular and special assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units. The interpretation of this term was central to the dispute.

As defined in Article I, Section 4 of the CC&Rs, a separately designated freehold estate consisting of the space bounded by the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows, and floors of each apartment. It does not include common elements.

Waiver

A legal argument made by the Petitioners that because the Association had charged assessments based on square footage for 40 years, it had relinquished or “waived” its right to enforce a different method.






Blog Post – 21F-H2120028-REL


4 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Could Upend How You See Your Fees

Introduction: The 40-Year Mistake

If you live in a condominium or a community governed by a Homeowners Association (HOA), you likely operate under a simple assumption: the way things have always been done is the correct and legal way. Monthly fees, maintenance schedules, and community rules that have been in place for decades feel permanent and unassailable. But what if they aren’t?

This was the central question in the case of Lee & Kim Edwards versus the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association. For over 40 years, the Association calculated homeowner fees based on the square footage of each unit—a practice that seemed fair and logical, and one that was never questioned by residents.

Then came the twist. In January 2020, after consulting with an attorney, the HOA board announced a shocking revelation: their 40-year-old assessment method was a direct violation of the community’s own governing documents. The board presented the legal findings to the community and sought their input on how to proceed. After being given the choice between the old method, a blended rate, or a new flat-rate fee that complied with the rules, most homeowners voted for the compliant flat-rate system for every single unit, regardless of its size.

Homeowners sued to keep the old method, sparking a legal battle that went all the way to an administrative court. The resulting decisions offer surprising and crucial lessons for every homeowner paying HOA dues. Here are the four most impactful takeaways from the case that could change how you view your own community’s rules.

1. “Past Practice” Means Nothing if It Violates the Rules

The primary argument made by the petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Edwards, was that the Association had “waived its right” to change the assessment method. After all, by using the square-footage calculation for four decades, hadn’t they established an unbreakable precedent? It seemed like a common-sense argument rooted in history and consistency.

The court, however, completely rejected this line of reasoning. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was not based on historical practice but on the clear, written rules found in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association argued that it’s “not possible to waive the CC&R requirement,” and the court agreed.

The Lesson: This case powerfully demonstrates that tradition or “how things have always been done” cannot override the explicit language of an HOA’s governing documents. The CC&Rs are a contract. The lesson is clear: if your HOA’s practice contradicts its documents, the practice is invalid. The board has a fiduciary duty to follow the written rules, not a 40-year-old mistake.

2. Your CC&Rs Are a Binding Contract—Read Them

Throughout the legal proceedings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently referred back to the specific text of the CC&Rs to make a final decision. The entire case ultimately hinged on the interpretation of a few key sentences written decades ago.

The most critical passage, which decided the outcome, was from Article VI, Section 4(d) of the community’s governing documents:

“Each unit’s share shall be the same as its undivided interest in the common elements of the total amount determined under the subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.” —Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association CC&Rs, Article VI, Section 4(d)

This single sentence was the linchpin. It explicitly linked each unit’s assessment share to its “undivided interest in the common elements.” Another section of the document, Article I, Section 5, had already established that interest as an equal 1/26 for all 26 units.

The Lesson: This is a classic example of legal cross-referencing in a contract. Section 4(d) provided the instruction (base fees on “undivided interest”), while Article I, Section 5 provided the specific value (1/26). With both parts present and unambiguous, the court had no choice but to enforce them exactly as written, leaving no room for interpretations based on fairness or history. The contract was the contract.

3. A “Uniform Rate” Might Not Mean What You Think

One of the central points of contention was the term “uniform rate.” Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs required that all assessments “must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units.”

The homeowners argued that the square footage rate was, in fact, a “uniform rate”—a consistent price per square foot applied to every unit. It’s an interpretation many of us might find reasonable.

However, the HOA Board and the court had a different interpretation. The judge found that the flat 1/26 rate was the correct interpretation of a “uniform rate” because it was uniformly applied to every unit’s established 1/26 interest in the common areas. In the court’s view, the “rate” being applied uniformly was the 1/26 fraction of the total budget. The fact that this resulted in different dollar amounts for square-footage fees was irrelevant; the legal share was what had to be uniform.

The Lesson: Common-sense terms like “uniform” can have very specific legal meanings within the context of your governing documents. The true definition is found not in a dictionary, but in how the term is defined and applied by the rest of the document’s provisions.

4. Your HOA’s Rules Can Sometimes Override State Law

In a final attempt to overturn the decision, the petitioners filed for a re-hearing. This time, they cited a specific Arizona state law, A.R.S. 33-1255. This statute says that expenses for “limited common elements”—things like assigned patios or parking spaces that only benefit specific units—should be assessed only against those units that benefit from them. The homeowners argued that the new 1/26 flat fee unfairly forced them to pay for their neighbors’ patios and parking spots, a direct violation of state law.

Surprisingly, this argument also failed. The reason is found in the crucial introductory clause of the state law itself: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

Because the Scottsdale Embassy’s Declaration did provide otherwise—by explicitly rolling all general and restricted common area costs into the total budget before calculating each unit’s 1/26 share—the community’s own rules legally superseded the default state statute. The judge concluded that the state law “does not apply to this matter because the Declaration requires” a different method.

The Lesson: This is perhaps the most counter-intuitive lesson of all. This demonstrates a key principle of contract law and planned community governance: state statutes often provide a “default” rule for situations a community’s documents don’t address. However, they also grant communities the power to create their own specific rules, which, if legally permissible, will take precedence. Homeowners cannot assume that a state law automatically protects them if their community’s own governing documents have a more specific rule in place.

Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What You Agreed To?

The central message from the Scottsdale Embassy case is undeniable: in an HOA, the written word is law. The CC&Rs and other governing documents are a binding contract that dictates the rules, regardless of 40 years of history, common-sense assumptions, or even some default state laws. What you believe is fair or standard practice is irrelevant if the document you agreed to upon purchase says otherwise.

This case was decided by a few sentences written decades ago. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from cover to cover?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lee Edwards (petitioner, witness)
  • Kim Edwards (petitioner)
  • Teresa H. Foster (petitioner attorney)
    Ellis & Baker, P.C.
    Also referred to as Terri Foster and Terry Foster

Respondent Side

  • Lauren Vie (respondent attorney)
    Appeared for initial hearing; later noted as withdrawn
  • Caleb Koch (board president, witness)
    Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
  • Mary Edinburgh (board member, witness)
    Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
  • Beth Mulcahy (respondent attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Recipient of transmission; noted as withdrawn counsel prior to rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient

Other Participants

  • Miranda Alvarez (unknown)
    Associated with transmission for petitioner's attorney

Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC), v. Montelena Master

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120024-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-16
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) Counsel
Respondent Montelena Master Community Association Counsel Troy Stratman

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-442, A.R.S. § 33-1806

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Montelena Master Community Association violated A.R.S. § 33-442 or its CC&Rs regarding the imposition of a transfer fee. The ALJ found that the use of the fee to fund operating expenses and/or reserves was an acceptable purpose under the relevant statute.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish Respondent acted in violation of the community documents and A.R.S. § 33-442.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to unauthorized/unlawful transfer fees charged by HOA

Petitioner alleged that the $2500.00 transfer fee charged to the purchaser was an unlawful transfer fee in violation of A.R.S. § 33-442 and specific CC&R provisions, arguing that the authorized use of the fee (Master Association’s operating expenses and/or reserves) was not specific enough to meet the statutory exception under A.R.S. § 33-442(C).

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA transfer fee, A.R.S. 33-442, CC&R violation, Operating expenses, Reserves
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 33-442
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120024-REL Decision – 855401.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:12 (95.8 KB)

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?

Short Answer

Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.

Alj Quote

Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-442(C)

Topic Tags

  • transfer fees
  • operating expenses
  • financial management

Question

Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.

Detailed Answer

If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.

Alj Quote

The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • CC&Rs
  • fees

Question

Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.

Alj Quote

This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.

Legal Basis

Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)

Topic Tags

  • reserve contribution
  • transfer fees
  • closing costs

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence § 5

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence
  • standard of proof

Question

Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.

Detailed Answer

The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'

Alj Quote

Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • bankruptcy
  • property transfer
  • exemptions

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
Decision Date
2021-02-16
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal procedure
  • evidence

Question

Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?

Short Answer

Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.

Alj Quote

Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-442(C)

Topic Tags

  • transfer fees
  • operating expenses
  • financial management

Question

Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.

Detailed Answer

If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.

Alj Quote

The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • board authority
  • CC&Rs
  • fees

Question

Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?

Short Answer

Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.

Alj Quote

This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.

Legal Basis

Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)

Topic Tags

  • reserve contribution
  • transfer fees
  • closing costs

Question

What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.

Detailed Answer

This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence § 5

Topic Tags

  • legal definitions
  • evidence
  • standard of proof

Question

Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?

Short Answer

Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.

Detailed Answer

The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'

Alj Quote

Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Section 7.15

Topic Tags

  • bankruptcy
  • property transfer
  • exemptions

Case

Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
Decision Date
2021-02-16
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Aaron Ricks (petitioner)
    Somerstone Properties, LLC

Respondent Side

  • Troy Stratman (HOA attorney)
    Stratman Law Firm, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

MICHAEL J. STOLTENBERG v. RANCHO DEL ORO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020059-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-12
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 5.1; A.R.S. § 10-3842

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed after rehearing because Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner continually refused Respondent access to his locked back yard for landscaping maintenance, and the CC&Rs requiring landscaping do not mandate pool maintenance.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation due to refusal of access to the back yard and misinterpretation of CC&R obligations regarding pool maintenance.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain landscaping and acting in bad faith

Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs by failing to maintain landscaping in 2020 and acting in bad faith, asserting that pool/hardscape maintenance was included in landscaping duties, and requesting the maximum fine. Respondent countered that they consistently maintained the front yard but were denied access to the locked backyard due to Petitioner's pool liability concerns.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition was dismissed/denied as Petitioner failed to establish a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. However, Respondent was ordered, going forward, to communicate the days and times they will be performing back yard landscaping so Petitioner can provide access.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-1122(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Duties, Landscaping, Pool Maintenance, CC&Rs, Access Refusal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • CC&Rs § 5.1(a)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-1122(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020059-REL-RHG Decision – 855028.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:28 (139.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2020059-REL/815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:31 (124.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG


Briefing on Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from two administrative hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its governing documents by failing to maintain landscaping at his property. The case was ultimately dismissed after an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

The core of the dispute centered on two key issues: the scope of “landscaping” services required by the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the Petitioner’s denial of access to his backyard. The Petitioner argued that the undefined term “landscaping” in the CC&Rs should be interpreted broadly to include maintenance of his private swimming pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.” Concurrently, he acknowledged keeping his backyard gate locked for liability reasons related to the pool, preventing the HOA’s contractor from performing any work.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The judge concluded that the HOA had made repeated, documented attempts to perform its duties, but was actively prevented from doing so by the Petitioner. Critically, the judge ruled that a reasonable interpretation of “landscaping,” supported by dictionary definitions and the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ distinct licensing classifications for landscaping and swimming pool services, does not include the maintenance of a private pool and its associated mechanical equipment.

I. Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

20F-H2020059-REL and 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg (Homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Yuma, AZ)

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA)

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella

Hearing Dates

August 3, 2020 (Initial Hearing) and February 2, 2021 (Rehearing)

Final Disposition

Petition Dismissed (February 12, 2021)

II. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about April 21, 2020, alleging the HOA acted in “bad faith” and failed to perform its duties in 2020. The core of his case was built on the following claims:

Violation of CC&Rs: The Petitioner alleged a violation of § 5.1 of the HOA’s CC&Rs, which mandates that the “Association shall maintain… landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” He also alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 10-3842, although this was not addressed at the hearing.

Broad Interpretation of “Landscaping”: The Petitioner contended that since the CC&Rs do not define “landscaping,” the term should encompass all features on his lot. He specifically asserted that the HOA was responsible for maintaining:

◦ His swimming pool (referred to as a “water feature”), including the pump, filter, and chemicals.

◦ His unique xeriscape with geometric patterns.

◦ Walking paths that required staining.

◦ Replenishing decorative rock when it wears thin.

◦ The patio and all hardscape.

Denial of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that the gate to his backyard was “always locked for liability reasons” due to the pool. At the rehearing, he argued that the HOA failed to communicate the landscaping schedule, which would have afforded him an opportunity to unlock the gate.

Rehearing Claims: In his request for a rehearing, the Petitioner cited several grounds, including an abuse of discretion by the judge, errors in evidence, and issues related to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming hearing loss put him at a “severe disadvantage.” At the rehearing itself, he also asserted that the Respondent was “falsely representing themselves as an HOA” and did not have an elected Board.

III. Respondent’s Defense and Evidence

The HOA, represented by Nicole Payne, Esq., argued that it had fulfilled its obligations and that any failure to maintain the Petitioner’s backyard was due to his own actions.

Consistent Maintenance of Front Yard: The HOA established that its contractor, Mowtown Landscape, had continuously maintained the Petitioner’s front yard since their contract began in January 2020.

Denied Access to Backyard: The central defense was that the HOA’s contractor was repeatedly and deliberately denied access to the backyard. This was supported by substantial evidence:

Testimony of Rian Baas (Mowtown Landscape): Mr. Baas testified that his crews were at the community every Wednesday and Thursday. He stated they knocked on the Petitioner’s door and left notes or business cards four or five times between January and March 2020.

Testimony of Diana Crites (Property Manager): Ms. Crites presented a text message from Mr. Baas dated March 24, 2020, which read:

Documentary Evidence: A photograph of the locked gate was submitted, along with a letter from Mr. Baas stating, “There is a lock on the gate going to the back yard and we were trying to see if they [sic] people inside the house wanted us to maintenance the back yard. No one ever answered or came to the door.”

Scope of HOA Services: Ms. Crites testified that the HOA provides uniform services (front yard maintenance, mowing and blowing of back yards, sprinkler system maintenance) and does not offer “concierge” services like maintaining potted plants or private pools. The community pool, she noted, is maintained by a different company entirely (Crystal Clear Pool Maintenance).

IV. Judicial Findings and Legal Rulings

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella found in favor of the Respondent in both the initial decision and the rehearing, ultimately dismissing the petition.

Initial Decision (August 17, 2020)

The initial petition was denied because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The judge’s reasoning was:

1. Denial of Access: The Petitioner’s own admission, coupled with “credible, probative, and substantial evidence,” established that he had refused to allow the HOA access to his backyard since January 2020.

2. HOA Attempts: The evidence demonstrated that the HOA had attempted to access the yard on multiple occasions and was “specifically instructed in March 2020, that Respondent was not permitted to access Petitioner’s back yard.”

3. Scope of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that while § 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs requires the HOA to maintain yards, “nothing therein requires Respondent to maintain an individual member’s pool.”

Rehearing Decision (February 12, 2021)

After the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted a rehearing, Judge Vanella again dismissed the petition, providing a more detailed legal analysis of the term “landscaping.”

1. Burden of Proof: The judge reiterated that the Petitioner bore the burden to establish that the HOA was legally obligated to maintain his pool, but “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent must do so.”

2. Definition of “Landscaping”: The judge found that the definitions of “landscaping” from various sources, including dictionaries, “cannot reasonably be read to include a swimming pool and the associated mechanical equipment.”

3. State Licensing as Key Differentiator: The most definitive part of the ruling relied on the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing classifications, which treat landscaping and pool maintenance as two separate and distinct services.

License Classification

Description & Relevance

R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems (Formerly Landscaping and Irrigation Systems)

Allows for installation and repair of non-loadbearing concrete, patios, decorative walls, irrigation systems, and water features not attached to swimming pools. The classification specifically precludes the licensee from contracting for work on “swimming pools, pool deck coatings.”

R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair

A separate license required “to service and perform minor repair of residential pools and accessories.”

The judge concluded: “The Registrar’s licensing scheme supports a conclusion that landscaping maintenance and pool maintenance are two separate and distinct services… the CC&Rs cannot reasonably be interpreted to include pool maintenance when it required Respondent to maintain landscaping.”

Judicial Recommendation

While ruling against the Petitioner, the judge offered a forward-looking, non-binding recommendation:

“…given that Petitioner is required to keep his gate secured due to having a pool, it is reasonable, going forward, for Respondent to communicate the days and times that it will be performing the landscaping of Petitioner’s back yard so that Petitioner can provide access for that service while maintaining safety precautions.”






Study Guide – 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2020059-REL

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the Petitioner and Respondent in this case and describe the core issue of their dispute.

2. What specific provision of the governing documents did the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, claim the Respondent violated?

3. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, what unique features did his property’s landscaping include, and what services did he believe the HOA was responsible for?

4. What was the primary reason the Respondent’s landscaping contractor, Mowtown Landscape, was unable to perform maintenance in the Petitioner’s backyard?

5. What was the testimony of Diana Crites, the property manager, regarding the scope of standard landscaping services provided by the HOA?

6. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge deny the Petitioner’s initial petition in the decision dated August 17, 2020?

7. For what primary reasons did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grant the Petitioner a rehearing?

8. In the rehearing, what external sources did the Administrative Law Judge consult to determine the definition of “landscaping”?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and who bears the responsibility for meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued after the rehearing on February 12, 2021, and what reasonable suggestion did the judge offer for future interactions?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg. The Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core dispute concerned the HOA’s alleged failure to maintain the landscaping on the Petitioner’s property as required by the community’s CC&Rs, specifically whether this obligation included maintaining the Petitioner’s private pool.

2. The Petitioner claimed the Respondent violated Section 5.1 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section outlines the Association’s duties, including the maintenance of landscaping on individual lots outside of structures. The Petitioner also initially alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 10-3842.

3. The Petitioner testified that his landscaping was unique, including xeriscape with geometric patterns, “water features” (a pool), and walking paths that needed staining. He contended that the HOA should be responsible for maintaining these features, including replenishing the rock in his front yard when it wore thin.

4. The landscaping contractor was unable to perform maintenance because the gate to the backyard was always locked. The Petitioner acknowledged he kept it locked for liability reasons due to the pool, and evidence showed that in March 2020, a woman at the residence explicitly told the landscapers she did not want anyone in the backyard.

5. Diana Crites testified that the HOA provides uniform services, not “concierge” services. This includes front yard maintenance and mowing and blowing of backyards, but not maintaining potted plants, driveways, property-dividing walls, or individual homeowners’ pools.

6. The judge denied the petition because the evidence, including the Petitioner’s own admission, established that he had refused to allow the Respondent access to his backyard since January 2020. The decision noted the Respondent had made multiple attempts to access the yard and had consistently maintained the front yard.

7. The rehearing was granted for reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s rehearing request. These included claims of irregularity in the proceedings, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the original decision was not supported by evidence or was contrary to law. The Petitioner also cited ADA and privacy issues.

8. The Administrative Law Judge consulted various online dictionary definitions (Oxford English Dictionary, Dictionary.com, Merriam-Webster, Law Insider). She also analyzed the license classifications from the Arizona Registrar of Contractors, specifically the R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems license and the R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair license.

9. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the proof must convince the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the governing documents.

10. The final order dismissed the Petitioner’s petition again, finding he failed to prove the HOA was obligated to maintain his pool. However, the judge suggested that it would be reasonable for the Respondent to communicate the days and times of its landscaping services going forward so the Petitioner could provide access while maintaining safety precautions.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt.

1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain who held the burden, what they were required to prove, and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that they failed to meet this burden in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

2. Discuss the role of access in the dispute between Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro HOA. How did the issue of the locked gate impact the initial ruling, and how did the Petitioner attempt to reframe this issue in the rehearing?

3. The interpretation of the word “landscaping” was central to the rehearing. Detail the Petitioner’s interpretation versus the conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge. What evidence and legal reasoning did the Judge use to support her conclusion that pool maintenance is not included in landscaping?

4. Trace the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filing on April 21, 2020, to the final order after the rehearing. Identify the key events, the specific reasons cited for the rehearing, and the legal basis for the final dismissal.

5. Based on the testimony of Diana Crites and Rian Baas, describe the standard landscaping services provided by the Rancho Del Oro HOA and its contractor. How does this standard practice contrast with the specific and unique services the Petitioner demanded for his property?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE), the state agency with jurisdiction over HOA dispute resolution petitions.

Homeowners’ Association. An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro HOA.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Petition

A formal written request filed with a court or administrative body to initiate a legal proceeding. Mr. Stoltenberg filed a petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof to convince the fact-finder that their claim is more likely to be true than not true.

Registrar of Contractors

The Arizona state agency responsible for licensing and regulating contractors. The ALJ referenced its license classifications for landscaping (R-21) and swimming pools (R-6) to help define the scope of services.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG


Briefing on Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from two administrative hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its governing documents by failing to maintain landscaping at his property. The case was ultimately dismissed after an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

The core of the dispute centered on two key issues: the scope of “landscaping” services required by the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the Petitioner’s denial of access to his backyard. The Petitioner argued that the undefined term “landscaping” in the CC&Rs should be interpreted broadly to include maintenance of his private swimming pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.” Concurrently, he acknowledged keeping his backyard gate locked for liability reasons related to the pool, preventing the HOA’s contractor from performing any work.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The judge concluded that the HOA had made repeated, documented attempts to perform its duties, but was actively prevented from doing so by the Petitioner. Critically, the judge ruled that a reasonable interpretation of “landscaping,” supported by dictionary definitions and the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ distinct licensing classifications for landscaping and swimming pool services, does not include the maintenance of a private pool and its associated mechanical equipment.

I. Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

20F-H2020059-REL and 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg (Homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Yuma, AZ)

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA)

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella

Hearing Dates

August 3, 2020 (Initial Hearing) and February 2, 2021 (Rehearing)

Final Disposition

Petition Dismissed (February 12, 2021)

II. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about April 21, 2020, alleging the HOA acted in “bad faith” and failed to perform its duties in 2020. The core of his case was built on the following claims:

Violation of CC&Rs: The Petitioner alleged a violation of § 5.1 of the HOA’s CC&Rs, which mandates that the “Association shall maintain… landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” He also alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 10-3842, although this was not addressed at the hearing.

Broad Interpretation of “Landscaping”: The Petitioner contended that since the CC&Rs do not define “landscaping,” the term should encompass all features on his lot. He specifically asserted that the HOA was responsible for maintaining:

◦ His swimming pool (referred to as a “water feature”), including the pump, filter, and chemicals.

◦ His unique xeriscape with geometric patterns.

◦ Walking paths that required staining.

◦ Replenishing decorative rock when it wears thin.

◦ The patio and all hardscape.

Denial of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that the gate to his backyard was “always locked for liability reasons” due to the pool. At the rehearing, he argued that the HOA failed to communicate the landscaping schedule, which would have afforded him an opportunity to unlock the gate.

Rehearing Claims: In his request for a rehearing, the Petitioner cited several grounds, including an abuse of discretion by the judge, errors in evidence, and issues related to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming hearing loss put him at a “severe disadvantage.” At the rehearing itself, he also asserted that the Respondent was “falsely representing themselves as an HOA” and did not have an elected Board.

III. Respondent’s Defense and Evidence

The HOA, represented by Nicole Payne, Esq., argued that it had fulfilled its obligations and that any failure to maintain the Petitioner’s backyard was due to his own actions.

Consistent Maintenance of Front Yard: The HOA established that its contractor, Mowtown Landscape, had continuously maintained the Petitioner’s front yard since their contract began in January 2020.

Denied Access to Backyard: The central defense was that the HOA’s contractor was repeatedly and deliberately denied access to the backyard. This was supported by substantial evidence:

Testimony of Rian Baas (Mowtown Landscape): Mr. Baas testified that his crews were at the community every Wednesday and Thursday. He stated they knocked on the Petitioner’s door and left notes or business cards four or five times between January and March 2020.

Testimony of Diana Crites (Property Manager): Ms. Crites presented a text message from Mr. Baas dated March 24, 2020, which read:

Documentary Evidence: A photograph of the locked gate was submitted, along with a letter from Mr. Baas stating, “There is a lock on the gate going to the back yard and we were trying to see if they [sic] people inside the house wanted us to maintenance the back yard. No one ever answered or came to the door.”

Scope of HOA Services: Ms. Crites testified that the HOA provides uniform services (front yard maintenance, mowing and blowing of back yards, sprinkler system maintenance) and does not offer “concierge” services like maintaining potted plants or private pools. The community pool, she noted, is maintained by a different company entirely (Crystal Clear Pool Maintenance).

IV. Judicial Findings and Legal Rulings

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella found in favor of the Respondent in both the initial decision and the rehearing, ultimately dismissing the petition.

Initial Decision (August 17, 2020)

The initial petition was denied because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The judge’s reasoning was:

1. Denial of Access: The Petitioner’s own admission, coupled with “credible, probative, and substantial evidence,” established that he had refused to allow the HOA access to his backyard since January 2020.

2. HOA Attempts: The evidence demonstrated that the HOA had attempted to access the yard on multiple occasions and was “specifically instructed in March 2020, that Respondent was not permitted to access Petitioner’s back yard.”

3. Scope of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that while § 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs requires the HOA to maintain yards, “nothing therein requires Respondent to maintain an individual member’s pool.”

Rehearing Decision (February 12, 2021)

After the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted a rehearing, Judge Vanella again dismissed the petition, providing a more detailed legal analysis of the term “landscaping.”

1. Burden of Proof: The judge reiterated that the Petitioner bore the burden to establish that the HOA was legally obligated to maintain his pool, but “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent must do so.”

2. Definition of “Landscaping”: The judge found that the definitions of “landscaping” from various sources, including dictionaries, “cannot reasonably be read to include a swimming pool and the associated mechanical equipment.”

3. State Licensing as Key Differentiator: The most definitive part of the ruling relied on the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing classifications, which treat landscaping and pool maintenance as two separate and distinct services.

License Classification

Description & Relevance

R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems (Formerly Landscaping and Irrigation Systems)

Allows for installation and repair of non-loadbearing concrete, patios, decorative walls, irrigation systems, and water features not attached to swimming pools. The classification specifically precludes the licensee from contracting for work on “swimming pools, pool deck coatings.”

R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair

A separate license required “to service and perform minor repair of residential pools and accessories.”

The judge concluded: “The Registrar’s licensing scheme supports a conclusion that landscaping maintenance and pool maintenance are two separate and distinct services… the CC&Rs cannot reasonably be interpreted to include pool maintenance when it required Respondent to maintain landscaping.”

Judicial Recommendation

While ruling against the Petitioner, the judge offered a forward-looking, non-binding recommendation:

“…given that Petitioner is required to keep his gate secured due to having a pool, it is reasonable, going forward, for Respondent to communicate the days and times that it will be performing the landscaping of Petitioner’s back yard so that Petitioner can provide access for that service while maintaining safety precautions.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
  • Diana Crites (property manager/witness)
    Crites and Associates
    Owner of Respondent's property management company; licensed broker
  • Rian Baas (witness/contractor owner)
    Mowtown Landscape
    Owner of landscaping company contracted by Respondent
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Luis (landscaping staff)
    Staff member mentioned in text regarding access attempts
  • Jill (staff/employee)
    Staff member mentioned printing paper for Luis regarding access attempts

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

MICHAEL J. STOLTENBERG v. RANCHO DEL ORO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-12
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J. Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 5.1; A.R.S. § 10-3842

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show that the HOA violated the governing documents, primarily because the Petitioner refused access to his back yard, and the CC&Rs were not interpreted to include maintenance of an individual homeowner’s swimming pool.

Why this result: Petitioner refused to allow the HOA access to his back yard to perform landscape services, and failed to establish that pool maintenance was included in the HOA’s landscaping responsibility under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to maintain landscaping and acting in bad faith

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs § 5.1 and A.R.S. § 10-3842 by failing to maintain landscaping in 2020. The dispute centered on whether landscaping duties included Petitioner's private pool/hardscape and Petitioner's refusal to grant access to his locked backyard for maintenance services.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent was required to communicate the days and times for performing back yard landscaping so Petitioner could provide access while maintaining safety precautions.

Filing fee: $0.00

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Landscaping, Pool Maintenance, Access Denial, CC&R Enforcement, A.R.S. § 10-3842
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • CC&Rs § 5.1
  • A.R.S. § 10-3842

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020059-REL-RHG Decision – 855028.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:25 (139.1 KB)

20F-H2020059-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2020059-REL/815480.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:57:27 (124.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG


Briefing on Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from two administrative hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its governing documents by failing to maintain landscaping at his property. The case was ultimately dismissed after an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

The core of the dispute centered on two key issues: the scope of “landscaping” services required by the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the Petitioner’s denial of access to his backyard. The Petitioner argued that the undefined term “landscaping” in the CC&Rs should be interpreted broadly to include maintenance of his private swimming pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.” Concurrently, he acknowledged keeping his backyard gate locked for liability reasons related to the pool, preventing the HOA’s contractor from performing any work.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The judge concluded that the HOA had made repeated, documented attempts to perform its duties, but was actively prevented from doing so by the Petitioner. Critically, the judge ruled that a reasonable interpretation of “landscaping,” supported by dictionary definitions and the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ distinct licensing classifications for landscaping and swimming pool services, does not include the maintenance of a private pool and its associated mechanical equipment.

I. Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

20F-H2020059-REL and 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg (Homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Yuma, AZ)

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA)

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella

Hearing Dates

August 3, 2020 (Initial Hearing) and February 2, 2021 (Rehearing)

Final Disposition

Petition Dismissed (February 12, 2021)

II. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about April 21, 2020, alleging the HOA acted in “bad faith” and failed to perform its duties in 2020. The core of his case was built on the following claims:

Violation of CC&Rs: The Petitioner alleged a violation of § 5.1 of the HOA’s CC&Rs, which mandates that the “Association shall maintain… landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” He also alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 10-3842, although this was not addressed at the hearing.

Broad Interpretation of “Landscaping”: The Petitioner contended that since the CC&Rs do not define “landscaping,” the term should encompass all features on his lot. He specifically asserted that the HOA was responsible for maintaining:

◦ His swimming pool (referred to as a “water feature”), including the pump, filter, and chemicals.

◦ His unique xeriscape with geometric patterns.

◦ Walking paths that required staining.

◦ Replenishing decorative rock when it wears thin.

◦ The patio and all hardscape.

Denial of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that the gate to his backyard was “always locked for liability reasons” due to the pool. At the rehearing, he argued that the HOA failed to communicate the landscaping schedule, which would have afforded him an opportunity to unlock the gate.

Rehearing Claims: In his request for a rehearing, the Petitioner cited several grounds, including an abuse of discretion by the judge, errors in evidence, and issues related to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming hearing loss put him at a “severe disadvantage.” At the rehearing itself, he also asserted that the Respondent was “falsely representing themselves as an HOA” and did not have an elected Board.

III. Respondent’s Defense and Evidence

The HOA, represented by Nicole Payne, Esq., argued that it had fulfilled its obligations and that any failure to maintain the Petitioner’s backyard was due to his own actions.

Consistent Maintenance of Front Yard: The HOA established that its contractor, Mowtown Landscape, had continuously maintained the Petitioner’s front yard since their contract began in January 2020.

Denied Access to Backyard: The central defense was that the HOA’s contractor was repeatedly and deliberately denied access to the backyard. This was supported by substantial evidence:

Testimony of Rian Baas (Mowtown Landscape): Mr. Baas testified that his crews were at the community every Wednesday and Thursday. He stated they knocked on the Petitioner’s door and left notes or business cards four or five times between January and March 2020.

Testimony of Diana Crites (Property Manager): Ms. Crites presented a text message from Mr. Baas dated March 24, 2020, which read:

Documentary Evidence: A photograph of the locked gate was submitted, along with a letter from Mr. Baas stating, “There is a lock on the gate going to the back yard and we were trying to see if they [sic] people inside the house wanted us to maintenance the back yard. No one ever answered or came to the door.”

Scope of HOA Services: Ms. Crites testified that the HOA provides uniform services (front yard maintenance, mowing and blowing of back yards, sprinkler system maintenance) and does not offer “concierge” services like maintaining potted plants or private pools. The community pool, she noted, is maintained by a different company entirely (Crystal Clear Pool Maintenance).

IV. Judicial Findings and Legal Rulings

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella found in favor of the Respondent in both the initial decision and the rehearing, ultimately dismissing the petition.

Initial Decision (August 17, 2020)

The initial petition was denied because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The judge’s reasoning was:

1. Denial of Access: The Petitioner’s own admission, coupled with “credible, probative, and substantial evidence,” established that he had refused to allow the HOA access to his backyard since January 2020.

2. HOA Attempts: The evidence demonstrated that the HOA had attempted to access the yard on multiple occasions and was “specifically instructed in March 2020, that Respondent was not permitted to access Petitioner’s back yard.”

3. Scope of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that while § 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs requires the HOA to maintain yards, “nothing therein requires Respondent to maintain an individual member’s pool.”

Rehearing Decision (February 12, 2021)

After the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted a rehearing, Judge Vanella again dismissed the petition, providing a more detailed legal analysis of the term “landscaping.”

1. Burden of Proof: The judge reiterated that the Petitioner bore the burden to establish that the HOA was legally obligated to maintain his pool, but “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent must do so.”

2. Definition of “Landscaping”: The judge found that the definitions of “landscaping” from various sources, including dictionaries, “cannot reasonably be read to include a swimming pool and the associated mechanical equipment.”

3. State Licensing as Key Differentiator: The most definitive part of the ruling relied on the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing classifications, which treat landscaping and pool maintenance as two separate and distinct services.

License Classification

Description & Relevance

R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems (Formerly Landscaping and Irrigation Systems)

Allows for installation and repair of non-loadbearing concrete, patios, decorative walls, irrigation systems, and water features not attached to swimming pools. The classification specifically precludes the licensee from contracting for work on “swimming pools, pool deck coatings.”

R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair

A separate license required “to service and perform minor repair of residential pools and accessories.”

The judge concluded: “The Registrar’s licensing scheme supports a conclusion that landscaping maintenance and pool maintenance are two separate and distinct services… the CC&Rs cannot reasonably be interpreted to include pool maintenance when it required Respondent to maintain landscaping.”

Judicial Recommendation

While ruling against the Petitioner, the judge offered a forward-looking, non-binding recommendation:

“…given that Petitioner is required to keep his gate secured due to having a pool, it is reasonable, going forward, for Respondent to communicate the days and times that it will be performing the landscaping of Petitioner’s back yard so that Petitioner can provide access for that service while maintaining safety precautions.”






Study Guide – 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2020059-REL

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the Petitioner and Respondent in this case and describe the core issue of their dispute.

2. What specific provision of the governing documents did the Petitioner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, claim the Respondent violated?

3. According to the Petitioner’s testimony, what unique features did his property’s landscaping include, and what services did he believe the HOA was responsible for?

4. What was the primary reason the Respondent’s landscaping contractor, Mowtown Landscape, was unable to perform maintenance in the Petitioner’s backyard?

5. What was the testimony of Diana Crites, the property manager, regarding the scope of standard landscaping services provided by the HOA?

6. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge deny the Petitioner’s initial petition in the decision dated August 17, 2020?

7. For what primary reasons did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grant the Petitioner a rehearing?

8. In the rehearing, what external sources did the Administrative Law Judge consult to determine the definition of “landscaping”?

9. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and who bears the responsibility for meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued after the rehearing on February 12, 2021, and what reasonable suggestion did the judge offer for future interactions?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg. The Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA). The core dispute concerned the HOA’s alleged failure to maintain the landscaping on the Petitioner’s property as required by the community’s CC&Rs, specifically whether this obligation included maintaining the Petitioner’s private pool.

2. The Petitioner claimed the Respondent violated Section 5.1 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section outlines the Association’s duties, including the maintenance of landscaping on individual lots outside of structures. The Petitioner also initially alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 10-3842.

3. The Petitioner testified that his landscaping was unique, including xeriscape with geometric patterns, “water features” (a pool), and walking paths that needed staining. He contended that the HOA should be responsible for maintaining these features, including replenishing the rock in his front yard when it wore thin.

4. The landscaping contractor was unable to perform maintenance because the gate to the backyard was always locked. The Petitioner acknowledged he kept it locked for liability reasons due to the pool, and evidence showed that in March 2020, a woman at the residence explicitly told the landscapers she did not want anyone in the backyard.

5. Diana Crites testified that the HOA provides uniform services, not “concierge” services. This includes front yard maintenance and mowing and blowing of backyards, but not maintaining potted plants, driveways, property-dividing walls, or individual homeowners’ pools.

6. The judge denied the petition because the evidence, including the Petitioner’s own admission, established that he had refused to allow the Respondent access to his backyard since January 2020. The decision noted the Respondent had made multiple attempts to access the yard and had consistently maintained the front yard.

7. The rehearing was granted for reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s rehearing request. These included claims of irregularity in the proceedings, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the original decision was not supported by evidence or was contrary to law. The Petitioner also cited ADA and privacy issues.

8. The Administrative Law Judge consulted various online dictionary definitions (Oxford English Dictionary, Dictionary.com, Merriam-Webster, Law Insider). She also analyzed the license classifications from the Arizona Registrar of Contractors, specifically the R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems license and the R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair license.

9. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the proof must convince the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the governing documents.

10. The final order dismissed the Petitioner’s petition again, finding he failed to prove the HOA was obligated to maintain his pool. However, the judge suggested that it would be reasonable for the Respondent to communicate the days and times of its landscaping services going forward so the Petitioner could provide access while maintaining safety precautions.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt.

1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain who held the burden, what they were required to prove, and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that they failed to meet this burden in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

2. Discuss the role of access in the dispute between Michael J. Stoltenberg and the Rancho Del Oro HOA. How did the issue of the locked gate impact the initial ruling, and how did the Petitioner attempt to reframe this issue in the rehearing?

3. The interpretation of the word “landscaping” was central to the rehearing. Detail the Petitioner’s interpretation versus the conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge. What evidence and legal reasoning did the Judge use to support her conclusion that pool maintenance is not included in landscaping?

4. Trace the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filing on April 21, 2020, to the final order after the rehearing. Identify the key events, the specific reasons cited for the rehearing, and the legal basis for the final dismissal.

5. Based on the testimony of Diana Crites and Rian Baas, describe the standard landscaping services provided by the Rancho Del Oro HOA and its contractor. How does this standard practice contrast with the specific and unique services the Petitioner demanded for his property?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Sondra J. Vanella served as the ALJ.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE), the state agency with jurisdiction over HOA dispute resolution petitions.

Homeowners’ Association. An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Respondent was the Rancho Del Oro HOA.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg.

Petition

A formal written request filed with a court or administrative body to initiate a legal proceeding. Mr. Stoltenberg filed a petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof to convince the fact-finder that their claim is more likely to be true than not true.

Registrar of Contractors

The Arizona state agency responsible for licensing and regulating contractors. The ALJ referenced its license classifications for landscaping (R-21) and swimming pools (R-6) to help define the scope of services.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG


Briefing on Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from two administrative hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its governing documents by failing to maintain landscaping at his property. The case was ultimately dismissed after an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing.

The core of the dispute centered on two key issues: the scope of “landscaping” services required by the HOA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the Petitioner’s denial of access to his backyard. The Petitioner argued that the undefined term “landscaping” in the CC&Rs should be interpreted broadly to include maintenance of his private swimming pool, which he referred to as a “water feature.” Concurrently, he acknowledged keeping his backyard gate locked for liability reasons related to the pool, preventing the HOA’s contractor from performing any work.

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The judge concluded that the HOA had made repeated, documented attempts to perform its duties, but was actively prevented from doing so by the Petitioner. Critically, the judge ruled that a reasonable interpretation of “landscaping,” supported by dictionary definitions and the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ distinct licensing classifications for landscaping and swimming pool services, does not include the maintenance of a private pool and its associated mechanical equipment.

I. Case Overview

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

20F-H2020059-REL and 20F-H2020059-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg (Homeowner at 11777 E. Calle Gaudi, Yuma, AZ)

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (HOA)

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella

Hearing Dates

August 3, 2020 (Initial Hearing) and February 2, 2021 (Rehearing)

Final Disposition

Petition Dismissed (February 12, 2021)

II. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about April 21, 2020, alleging the HOA acted in “bad faith” and failed to perform its duties in 2020. The core of his case was built on the following claims:

Violation of CC&Rs: The Petitioner alleged a violation of § 5.1 of the HOA’s CC&Rs, which mandates that the “Association shall maintain… landscaping on individual Lots outside of structures.” He also alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 10-3842, although this was not addressed at the hearing.

Broad Interpretation of “Landscaping”: The Petitioner contended that since the CC&Rs do not define “landscaping,” the term should encompass all features on his lot. He specifically asserted that the HOA was responsible for maintaining:

◦ His swimming pool (referred to as a “water feature”), including the pump, filter, and chemicals.

◦ His unique xeriscape with geometric patterns.

◦ Walking paths that required staining.

◦ Replenishing decorative rock when it wears thin.

◦ The patio and all hardscape.

Denial of Access: The Petitioner acknowledged that the gate to his backyard was “always locked for liability reasons” due to the pool. At the rehearing, he argued that the HOA failed to communicate the landscaping schedule, which would have afforded him an opportunity to unlock the gate.

Rehearing Claims: In his request for a rehearing, the Petitioner cited several grounds, including an abuse of discretion by the judge, errors in evidence, and issues related to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming hearing loss put him at a “severe disadvantage.” At the rehearing itself, he also asserted that the Respondent was “falsely representing themselves as an HOA” and did not have an elected Board.

III. Respondent’s Defense and Evidence

The HOA, represented by Nicole Payne, Esq., argued that it had fulfilled its obligations and that any failure to maintain the Petitioner’s backyard was due to his own actions.

Consistent Maintenance of Front Yard: The HOA established that its contractor, Mowtown Landscape, had continuously maintained the Petitioner’s front yard since their contract began in January 2020.

Denied Access to Backyard: The central defense was that the HOA’s contractor was repeatedly and deliberately denied access to the backyard. This was supported by substantial evidence:

Testimony of Rian Baas (Mowtown Landscape): Mr. Baas testified that his crews were at the community every Wednesday and Thursday. He stated they knocked on the Petitioner’s door and left notes or business cards four or five times between January and March 2020.

Testimony of Diana Crites (Property Manager): Ms. Crites presented a text message from Mr. Baas dated March 24, 2020, which read:

Documentary Evidence: A photograph of the locked gate was submitted, along with a letter from Mr. Baas stating, “There is a lock on the gate going to the back yard and we were trying to see if they [sic] people inside the house wanted us to maintenance the back yard. No one ever answered or came to the door.”

Scope of HOA Services: Ms. Crites testified that the HOA provides uniform services (front yard maintenance, mowing and blowing of back yards, sprinkler system maintenance) and does not offer “concierge” services like maintaining potted plants or private pools. The community pool, she noted, is maintained by a different company entirely (Crystal Clear Pool Maintenance).

IV. Judicial Findings and Legal Rulings

Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella found in favor of the Respondent in both the initial decision and the rehearing, ultimately dismissing the petition.

Initial Decision (August 17, 2020)

The initial petition was denied because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The judge’s reasoning was:

1. Denial of Access: The Petitioner’s own admission, coupled with “credible, probative, and substantial evidence,” established that he had refused to allow the HOA access to his backyard since January 2020.

2. HOA Attempts: The evidence demonstrated that the HOA had attempted to access the yard on multiple occasions and was “specifically instructed in March 2020, that Respondent was not permitted to access Petitioner’s back yard.”

3. Scope of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that while § 5.1(a) of the CC&Rs requires the HOA to maintain yards, “nothing therein requires Respondent to maintain an individual member’s pool.”

Rehearing Decision (February 12, 2021)

After the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate granted a rehearing, Judge Vanella again dismissed the petition, providing a more detailed legal analysis of the term “landscaping.”

1. Burden of Proof: The judge reiterated that the Petitioner bore the burden to establish that the HOA was legally obligated to maintain his pool, but “failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent must do so.”

2. Definition of “Landscaping”: The judge found that the definitions of “landscaping” from various sources, including dictionaries, “cannot reasonably be read to include a swimming pool and the associated mechanical equipment.”

3. State Licensing as Key Differentiator: The most definitive part of the ruling relied on the Arizona Registrar of Contractors’ licensing classifications, which treat landscaping and pool maintenance as two separate and distinct services.

License Classification

Description & Relevance

R-21 Hardscaping and Irrigation Systems (Formerly Landscaping and Irrigation Systems)

Allows for installation and repair of non-loadbearing concrete, patios, decorative walls, irrigation systems, and water features not attached to swimming pools. The classification specifically precludes the licensee from contracting for work on “swimming pools, pool deck coatings.”

R-6 Swimming Pool Service and Repair

A separate license required “to service and perform minor repair of residential pools and accessories.”

The judge concluded: “The Registrar’s licensing scheme supports a conclusion that landscaping maintenance and pool maintenance are two separate and distinct services… the CC&Rs cannot reasonably be interpreted to include pool maintenance when it required Respondent to maintain landscaping.”

Judicial Recommendation

While ruling against the Petitioner, the judge offered a forward-looking, non-binding recommendation:

“…given that Petitioner is required to keep his gate secured due to having a pool, it is reasonable, going forward, for Respondent to communicate the days and times that it will be performing the landscaping of Petitioner’s back yard so that Petitioner can provide access for that service while maintaining safety precautions.”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J. Stoltenberg (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
  • Diana Crites (property manager/witness)
    Crites and Associates
    Owner of Respondent's property management company; licensed broker
  • Rian Baas (witness/contractor owner)
    Mowtown Landscape
    Owner of landscaping company contracted by Respondent
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Luis (landscaping staff)
    Staff member mentioned in text regarding access attempts
  • Jill (staff/employee)
    Staff member mentioned printing paper for Luis regarding access attempts

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Erik R. Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020053-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-10
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Erik R. Pierce Counsel James C. Frisch
Respondent Sierra Morado Community Association Counsel Nicholas C.S. Nogami and Heather M. Hampstead

Alleged Violations

Article 11, Section 11.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated CC&R Section 11.1, as the ALJ found the Board's decision to temporarily delay enforcement pending litigation and settlement discussions fell within the discretion granted by the CC&R.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure of HOA to Enforce Architectural Approval Conditions (Hot Tub Screening)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to enforce the mandatory installation of a pergola and screening around a neighbor's hot tub, a condition imposed by the Architectural Review Committee when retroactively approving the installation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Dispute, Architectural Control, Discretionary Enforcement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:29 (43.0 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:31 (7.1 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:32 (119.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020053-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and judicial decision in the administrative case of Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL. The petition, filed by homeowner Erik R. Pierce, was ultimately denied by the Administrative Law Judge on February 10, 2021.

The core of the dispute was Pierce’s allegation that the SMCA failed to enforce its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) against his neighbors, the Kinstles, who installed a hot tub visible from Pierce’s property, creating a privacy violation. While the SMCA Board retroactively approved the hot tub, it did so with the explicit condition that a pergola and screening be installed to mitigate the visibility issue. The Kinstles subsequently failed to install the required screening.

The judge concluded that the SMCA’s conditional approval resolved the initial violation claim under CC&R Section 4.27. The central issue then became whether the SMCA’s subsequent failure to compel the installation of the screening constituted a violation of its enforcement duty under CC&R Section 11.1. The judge ruled that it did not, finding that the CC&Rs grant the Association a discretionary right to enforce its rules, not an absolute obligation. The judge found persuasive the SMCA’s testimony that it delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation and in an attempt to foster a settlement between the neighbors. This exercise of discretion was deemed permissible under the Association’s governing documents.

1. Case Overview

Parties and Legal Representation

Entity

Legal Counsel

Petitioner

Erik R. Pierce

James C. Frisch, Esq. & Michael Resare, Esq. (King & Frisch, P.C.)

Respondent

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

Heather M. Hampstead, Esq. & Nicholas C.S. Nogami, Esq. (Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP)

Key Case Details

Case Number: 20F-H2020053-REL

Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: January 25, 2021 (conducted via Google Meet)

Decision Date: February 10, 2021

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) is statutorily authorized to hear petitions from homeowners’ association members. This case was referred by the ADRE to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.

2. Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Complaint

On March 23, 2020, Erik R. Pierce filed a complaint with the ADRE alleging that the SMCA was in violation of its own CC&Rs, specifically Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

The dispute originated with the installation of a hot tub by Pierce’s neighbors, the Kinstles. Pierce testified that the hot tub and its occupants were visible from inside his house, and that occupants of the hot tub could look directly into his home, violating his right to privacy.

Timeline of Key Events

September 4, 2019: Pierce submits his initial complaint to the SMCA, noting the hot tub’s visibility and asserting that the Kinstles had failed to obtain prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

Post-September 2019: The SMCA informs the Kinstles that they installed the hot tub without approval and directs them to submit plans for the proper approval process.

February 10, 2020: After several rejections, the SMCA Board approves the Kinstles’ hot tub installation on the condition that a pergola and screening are installed.

March 3, 2020: Pierce receives a letter from the property management company, AAM, LLC, stating that the installation was approved with the screening requirement and that the complaint was closed.

January 25, 2021: At the time of the hearing, the Kinstles had still not installed the required pergola and screening.

3. Analysis of Key Testimonies

The decision was informed by testimony from four witnesses presented by the Petitioner.

Erik R. Pierce (Petitioner): Outlined the timeline of the dispute, the visibility of the neighbors’ hot tub, the resulting privacy violation, and the SMCA Board’s failure to enforce its own conditional approval requiring a pergola and screening.

Bill Oliver (Former SMCA President, Fall 2019 – April 2020): Confirmed that the Board approved the hot tub retroactively with the stipulation for a pergola and screening. He stated the Board had a “rigorous process of enforcement” but could not recall if a specific violation letter was sent to the Kinstles after the conditional approval was granted.

Jodie Cervantes (Former Community Manager, 2019 – June 2020): Testified that she believed the CC&Rs were enforced and the matter was closed. She suggested the Kinstles had a six-month period to comply with the screening requirement, which she believed was in the Design Guidelines, but could not point to the specific language.

Martin Douglas (Current SMCA President, from April 2020): Stated he had been to the Pierce residence for another matter and the hot tub was not visible to him. He attributed the lack of enforcement action to the “ongoing litigation and multiple settlement offers which were being exchanged.” He testified that upon resolution of the case, the Board “will follow through with enforcement actions should the Kinstle’s fail to comply.”

4. Judicial Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of the SMCA’s CC&Rs and the discretionary power of its Board.

Governing CC&R Provisions

The ruling rested on the specific language of two sections of the SMCA CC&Rs:

Section 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas): This section permits the installation of a hot tub only if it is “properly screened… if neither it nor its occupants are Visible from Neighboring Property, and with the prior written approval of the Architectural Review Committee.”

Section 11.1 (Enforcement): This section states that “The Association or any Owner shall have the right to enforce the Project Documents… The failure of the Association or an Owner to take enforcement action with respect to a violation of the Project Documents shall not constitute or be deemed a waiver of the right of the Association or any Owner to enforce the Project Documents in the future.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions

1. Resolution of the Section 4.27 Claim: The judge determined that the initial issue regarding the unapproved hot tub “was essentially resolved by the Board instructing the Kinstle’s erect a pergola and install screening.” By making its approval conditional on a privacy solution, the Board addressed the core requirement of the section.

2. The “Heart of the Matter” – Section 11.1 Enforcement: The judge identified the central question as whether the SMCA violated Section 11.1 by failing to enforce the screening requirement against the Kinstles.

3. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Enforcement: The judge concluded that the language of Section 11.1 grants the Board a “right to enforce, not an absolute obligation.”

4. Rationale for Delayed Enforcement: The judge found the testimony of the current SMCA President, Martin Douglas, to be “more persuasive.” Douglas’s explanation—that the Board delayed enforcement to “foster an agreement with the neighbors” amid ongoing litigation—was accepted as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion.

5. Final Ruling: The judge stated, “Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.” Consequently, the judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

The order was issued on February 10, 2021, and is binding unless a rehearing is granted.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020053-REL


Study Guide: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL)

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing concerning the dispute between Erik R. Pierce and the Sierra Morado Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms and entities involved in the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial reason for Mr. Pierce’s complaint against his neighbors, the Kinstles?

3. Which two sections of the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA) CC&Rs did Mr. Pierce allege were violated?

4. What action did the SMCA Board take after being informed that the Kinstles had installed a hot tub without prior approval?

5. What specific conditions did the SMCA Board require for the retroactive approval of the Kinstles’ hot tub installation?

6. According to former Board President Bill Oliver’s testimony, what was the Board’s common practice regarding architectural requests made after an installation?

7. What reason did Community Manager Jodie Cervantes give for her belief that no further enforcement action could be taken against the Kinstles?

8. According to current SMCA Board President Martin Douglas, why had the Board delayed enforcement actions against the Kinstles?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision regarding the alleged violation of CC&R Section 11.1?

10. How did the judge interpret the Board’s enforcement power as described in Section 11.1 of the CC&Rs?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Erik R. Pierce, who was the Petitioner filing the complaint, and the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), which was the Respondent. Mr. Pierce is a homeowner and member of the SMCA.

2. Mr. Pierce’s complaint originated because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his backyard. He testified that occupants in the hot tub were visible from inside his house, violating his privacy.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Pierce, alleged that the Respondent, SMCA, was in violation of sections 4.27 and 11.1 of the SMCA CC&Rs. Section 4.27 pertains to the installation of spas, and Section 11.1 addresses the enforcement of project documents.

4. After Mr. Pierce filed his complaint, the SMCA informed the Kinstles that they had installed the hot tub without approval. The Board then directed the Kinstles to submit their plans and go through the proper architectural approval process.

5. The Kinstles’ hot tub was approved retroactively on February 10, 2020, on the condition that they install a pergola and screening. This was intended to address the visibility of the hot tub from Mr. Pierce’s property.

6. Bill Oliver, the SMCA President from fall 2019 to April 2020, testified that the Board would approve architectural requests retroactively. He confirmed that this is what occurred in the case of the Kinstles’ hot tub.

7. Jodie Cervantes, the Community Manager, testified that she believed the matter was closed because the Kinstles had six months to comply with the pergola and screening requirements. She believed this six-month deadline was outlined in the Design Guidelines, though she could not locate the specific language.

8. Martin Douglas, who became Board President in April 2020, testified that the Board delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation. He stated that multiple settlement offers were being exchanged in an effort to foster an agreement between the neighbors.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that Mr. Pierce did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the SMCA had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

10. The judge determined that Section 11.1 grants the Board a right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This interpretation means the Board has the discretion to delay enforcement, which it did in this case to facilitate a potential settlement.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Use evidence and testimony from the case documents to construct a thorough analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Analyze why the Petitioner, Erik R. Pierce, failed to meet this burden of proof concerning the violation of CC&R Section 11.1.

2. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Pierce’s initial complaint on September 4, 2019, to the final decision on February 10, 2021. Discuss the key actions, delays, and decisions made by the SMCA Board during this period.

3. Compare and contrast the testimonies of Bill Oliver, Jodie Cervantes, and Martin Douglas. How do their different roles and timeframes with the SMCA shape their perspectives on the association’s enforcement process and the specific handling of the Kinstle case?

4. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of CC&R Section 11.1. Discuss the distinction made between a “right to enforce” and an “absolute obligation,” and explain how this interpretation was central to the final ruling.

5. Based on the judge’s findings and the testimony of Martin Douglas, what are the likely next steps for the SMCA regarding the Kinstles’ non-compliance with the pergola and screening requirement? Evaluate the potential for future conflict or resolution between the parties involved.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

AAM, LLC

The property management company that employed Community Manager Jodie Cervantes and managed the Sierra Morado Community Association during the period of the dispute.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Architectural Committee (ARC)

The committee within the SMCA responsible for approving construction, installations, and alterations to properties, as referenced in CC&R Section 4.27.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearing from members of homeowners’ associations. Mr. Pierce filed his initial complaint with this department.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents or rules of a planned community. The dispute centered on alleged violations of Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

Hearing

The formal proceeding held on January 25, 2021, where the parties presented exhibits and witness testimony to the Administrative Law Judge.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or complaint to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Erik R. Pierce.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA).

Retroactive Approval

The act of approving an architectural installation (such as a hot tub) after it has already been completed, which the SMCA Board did in this case.

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

The homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, of which Erik R. Pierce and the Kinstles are members.

Stipulation

An agreement between the parties in a legal proceeding. In this case, the parties stipulated to enter all submitted exhibits into the record.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020053-REL


Your HOA Can Ignore Its Own Rules? A Surprising Legal Case Every Homeowner Needs to Understand

Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma

Most homeowners in a planned community operate under a simple assumption: if a neighbor violates a clear rule, you can file a complaint, and the Homeowners Association (HOA) is required to take action. It’s the fundamental promise of an HOA—consistent enforcement to protect property values and quality of life.

But what happens when the HOA agrees a violation has occurred, demands a fix, and then… does nothing to enforce it?

A real-world legal case, Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association, provides a surprising and cautionary answer. The final court decision reveals a critical loophole that may exist in your own HOA agreement. This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from that case that every homeowner should understand.

Takeaway 1: “A Right to Enforce” Isn’t an “Obligation to Enforce”

The core of the dispute was straightforward. Homeowner Erik Pierce filed a complaint because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his property, a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—the legally binding rules that govern the community. The HOA’s Architectural Committee retroactively approved the hot tub, but only on the condition that the neighbors install a pergola and screening to shield it from view.

The neighbors never installed the required screening, yet the HOA took no further enforcement action. This inaction led Mr. Pierce to sue the HOA.

The judge’s decision hinged on a crucial interpretation of the HOA’s governing documents. The judge ruled in favor of the HOA because the documents gave the Board the right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This distinction granted the HOA discretion to choose its strategy. The judge found the board’s reasoning for the delay persuasive: it was deliberately choosing negotiation over immediate punitive action to resolve the conflict. The board’s discretion wasn’t just a right to do nothing; it was a right to choose a different path to compliance.

The key phrase here is “shall have the right to enforce.” Had the documents stated the board “shall enforce,” the outcome would likely have been entirely different. This single phrase transforms enforcement from a mandate into a strategic option for the board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlights this critical point:

“…Section 11.1 only gives the Board a right to enforce, not an absolute obligation. While Petitioner is understandably upset that there has yet to be any follow through on enforcement of the screening requirements, this tribunal finds the testimony of Mr. Douglas more persuasive, namely that the Board has delayed in enforcing because it was trying to foster an agreement with the neighbors. Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.”

This finding is shocking for most homeowners, who reasonably assume that the rules laid out in their CC&Rs are mandates for the board, not a menu of discretionary options.

Takeaway 2: Suing Your HOA Can Ironically Pause Enforcement

The board’s discretionary power was put on full display when Mr. Pierce filed his lawsuit, creating a legal Catch-22. The current SMCA Board President, Martin Douglas, testified that the board deliberately paused formal enforcement actions against the neighbors who had violated the architectural requirement.

The judge ultimately found that the board’s rationale for this pause was a valid exercise of its discretion. The decision to delay was framed not as inaction, but as a strategic choice “to foster an agreement with the neighbors” amidst the complexities of litigation.

This reveals a deep irony: by filing a petition to force the HOA’s hand, the homeowner inadvertently provided the context for the HOA to justify a delay. The judge accepted that the board’s attempt to find a negotiated solution instead of escalating fines and penalties during an active lawsuit was a reasonable use of its discretionary authority. This case demonstrates how legal action, intended to accelerate a resolution, can sometimes be used by an HOA board to justify a different, slower approach.

Takeaway 3: A Clear Rule Violation Doesn’t Guarantee a Win in Court

One of the most surprising aspects of this case is that the facts of the violation were not in dispute. The judge explicitly acknowledged that the neighbors were in violation of the Architectural Review Committee’s requirement. The official decision states:

“Based upon the evidence provided, the Kinstle’s are in violation of the requirement the ARC Committee imposed on them.”

Despite this clear violation by the neighbor, the homeowner, Mr. Pierce, still lost his case against the HOA.

The case was lost on a critical legal distinction: the lawsuit was not about the neighbor’s violation, but about the HOA’s alleged failure to act. Since the judge determined the HOA had the discretionary right—not the mandatory obligation—to enforce the rule, its choice to pursue negotiation rather than immediate punitive action was not considered a violation of its duties.

The lesson here is profound: proving a neighbor is breaking the rules is only the first step. To win a case against your HOA for non-enforcement, you must also prove that its response (or lack thereof) constitutes a breach of its specific duties as outlined in your community’s governing documents.

Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Temper Your Expectations

The case of Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association serves as a stark reminder that HOA governance is often more complex than it appears. The precise wording of your community’s CC&Rs is critically important, as a single phrase can be the difference between a mandatory duty and a discretionary power. This case illustrates that the gap between a rule existing on paper and the board’s power to enforce it can be vast.

As a homeowner, your first step should be to obtain a copy of your community’s most recent CC&Rs and search for the enforcement clause—does it say your board “shall” enforce the rules, or does it say they have the “right” to?

This case forces every homeowner to ask: If your governing documents give your board the ‘right’ to act, what leverage do you truly have to ensure they actually will?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Erik R. Pierce (petitioner)
  • James C. Frisch (petitioner attorney)
    King & Frisch, P.C.
  • Michael Resare (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C.S. Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Heather M. Hampstead (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Jodie Cervantes (property manager/witness)
    AAM, LLC
    Community Manager for Respondent SMCA
  • Bill Oliver (board member/witness)
    Former SMCA President (Fall 2019 to April 2020)
  • Martin Douglas (board member/witness)
    Current SMCA Board President (since April 2020)

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • AHansen (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • djones (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • DGardner (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • ncano (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Signed document transmission

Erik R. Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020053-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-10
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Erik R. Pierce Counsel James C. Frisch
Respondent Sierra Morado Community Association Counsel Nicholas C.S. Nogami and Heather M. Hampstead

Alleged Violations

Article 11, Section 11.1

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated CC&R Section 11.1, as the ALJ found the Board's decision to temporarily delay enforcement pending litigation and settlement discussions fell within the discretion granted by the CC&R.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure of HOA to Enforce Architectural Approval Conditions (Hot Tub Screening)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to enforce the mandatory installation of a pergola and screening around a neighbor's hot tub, a condition imposed by the Architectural Review Committee when retroactively approving the installation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Dispute, Architectural Control, Discretionary Enforcement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
  • CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:12 (43.0 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:12 (7.1 KB)

20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:12 (119.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020053-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the key findings and judicial decision in the administrative case of Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL. The petition, filed by homeowner Erik R. Pierce, was ultimately denied by the Administrative Law Judge on February 10, 2021.

The core of the dispute was Pierce’s allegation that the SMCA failed to enforce its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) against his neighbors, the Kinstles, who installed a hot tub visible from Pierce’s property, creating a privacy violation. While the SMCA Board retroactively approved the hot tub, it did so with the explicit condition that a pergola and screening be installed to mitigate the visibility issue. The Kinstles subsequently failed to install the required screening.

The judge concluded that the SMCA’s conditional approval resolved the initial violation claim under CC&R Section 4.27. The central issue then became whether the SMCA’s subsequent failure to compel the installation of the screening constituted a violation of its enforcement duty under CC&R Section 11.1. The judge ruled that it did not, finding that the CC&Rs grant the Association a discretionary right to enforce its rules, not an absolute obligation. The judge found persuasive the SMCA’s testimony that it delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation and in an attempt to foster a settlement between the neighbors. This exercise of discretion was deemed permissible under the Association’s governing documents.

1. Case Overview

Parties and Legal Representation

Entity

Legal Counsel

Petitioner

Erik R. Pierce

James C. Frisch, Esq. & Michael Resare, Esq. (King & Frisch, P.C.)

Respondent

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

Heather M. Hampstead, Esq. & Nicholas C.S. Nogami, Esq. (Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP)

Key Case Details

Case Number: 20F-H2020053-REL

Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: January 25, 2021 (conducted via Google Meet)

Decision Date: February 10, 2021

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) is statutorily authorized to hear petitions from homeowners’ association members. This case was referred by the ADRE to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.

2. Core Dispute and Allegations

Petitioner’s Complaint

On March 23, 2020, Erik R. Pierce filed a complaint with the ADRE alleging that the SMCA was in violation of its own CC&Rs, specifically Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

The dispute originated with the installation of a hot tub by Pierce’s neighbors, the Kinstles. Pierce testified that the hot tub and its occupants were visible from inside his house, and that occupants of the hot tub could look directly into his home, violating his right to privacy.

Timeline of Key Events

September 4, 2019: Pierce submits his initial complaint to the SMCA, noting the hot tub’s visibility and asserting that the Kinstles had failed to obtain prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).

Post-September 2019: The SMCA informs the Kinstles that they installed the hot tub without approval and directs them to submit plans for the proper approval process.

February 10, 2020: After several rejections, the SMCA Board approves the Kinstles’ hot tub installation on the condition that a pergola and screening are installed.

March 3, 2020: Pierce receives a letter from the property management company, AAM, LLC, stating that the installation was approved with the screening requirement and that the complaint was closed.

January 25, 2021: At the time of the hearing, the Kinstles had still not installed the required pergola and screening.

3. Analysis of Key Testimonies

The decision was informed by testimony from four witnesses presented by the Petitioner.

Erik R. Pierce (Petitioner): Outlined the timeline of the dispute, the visibility of the neighbors’ hot tub, the resulting privacy violation, and the SMCA Board’s failure to enforce its own conditional approval requiring a pergola and screening.

Bill Oliver (Former SMCA President, Fall 2019 – April 2020): Confirmed that the Board approved the hot tub retroactively with the stipulation for a pergola and screening. He stated the Board had a “rigorous process of enforcement” but could not recall if a specific violation letter was sent to the Kinstles after the conditional approval was granted.

Jodie Cervantes (Former Community Manager, 2019 – June 2020): Testified that she believed the CC&Rs were enforced and the matter was closed. She suggested the Kinstles had a six-month period to comply with the screening requirement, which she believed was in the Design Guidelines, but could not point to the specific language.

Martin Douglas (Current SMCA President, from April 2020): Stated he had been to the Pierce residence for another matter and the hot tub was not visible to him. He attributed the lack of enforcement action to the “ongoing litigation and multiple settlement offers which were being exchanged.” He testified that upon resolution of the case, the Board “will follow through with enforcement actions should the Kinstle’s fail to comply.”

4. Judicial Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of the SMCA’s CC&Rs and the discretionary power of its Board.

Governing CC&R Provisions

The ruling rested on the specific language of two sections of the SMCA CC&Rs:

Section 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas): This section permits the installation of a hot tub only if it is “properly screened… if neither it nor its occupants are Visible from Neighboring Property, and with the prior written approval of the Architectural Review Committee.”

Section 11.1 (Enforcement): This section states that “The Association or any Owner shall have the right to enforce the Project Documents… The failure of the Association or an Owner to take enforcement action with respect to a violation of the Project Documents shall not constitute or be deemed a waiver of the right of the Association or any Owner to enforce the Project Documents in the future.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions

1. Resolution of the Section 4.27 Claim: The judge determined that the initial issue regarding the unapproved hot tub “was essentially resolved by the Board instructing the Kinstle’s erect a pergola and install screening.” By making its approval conditional on a privacy solution, the Board addressed the core requirement of the section.

2. The “Heart of the Matter” – Section 11.1 Enforcement: The judge identified the central question as whether the SMCA violated Section 11.1 by failing to enforce the screening requirement against the Kinstles.

3. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Enforcement: The judge concluded that the language of Section 11.1 grants the Board a “right to enforce, not an absolute obligation.”

4. Rationale for Delayed Enforcement: The judge found the testimony of the current SMCA President, Martin Douglas, to be “more persuasive.” Douglas’s explanation—that the Board delayed enforcement to “foster an agreement with the neighbors” amid ongoing litigation—was accepted as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion.

5. Final Ruling: The judge stated, “Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.” Consequently, the judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.

The order was issued on February 10, 2021, and is binding unless a rehearing is granted.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020053-REL


Study Guide: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL)

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing concerning the dispute between Erik R. Pierce and the Sierra Morado Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms and entities involved in the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial reason for Mr. Pierce’s complaint against his neighbors, the Kinstles?

3. Which two sections of the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA) CC&Rs did Mr. Pierce allege were violated?

4. What action did the SMCA Board take after being informed that the Kinstles had installed a hot tub without prior approval?

5. What specific conditions did the SMCA Board require for the retroactive approval of the Kinstles’ hot tub installation?

6. According to former Board President Bill Oliver’s testimony, what was the Board’s common practice regarding architectural requests made after an installation?

7. What reason did Community Manager Jodie Cervantes give for her belief that no further enforcement action could be taken against the Kinstles?

8. According to current SMCA Board President Martin Douglas, why had the Board delayed enforcement actions against the Kinstles?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision regarding the alleged violation of CC&R Section 11.1?

10. How did the judge interpret the Board’s enforcement power as described in Section 11.1 of the CC&Rs?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Erik R. Pierce, who was the Petitioner filing the complaint, and the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), which was the Respondent. Mr. Pierce is a homeowner and member of the SMCA.

2. Mr. Pierce’s complaint originated because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his backyard. He testified that occupants in the hot tub were visible from inside his house, violating his privacy.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Pierce, alleged that the Respondent, SMCA, was in violation of sections 4.27 and 11.1 of the SMCA CC&Rs. Section 4.27 pertains to the installation of spas, and Section 11.1 addresses the enforcement of project documents.

4. After Mr. Pierce filed his complaint, the SMCA informed the Kinstles that they had installed the hot tub without approval. The Board then directed the Kinstles to submit their plans and go through the proper architectural approval process.

5. The Kinstles’ hot tub was approved retroactively on February 10, 2020, on the condition that they install a pergola and screening. This was intended to address the visibility of the hot tub from Mr. Pierce’s property.

6. Bill Oliver, the SMCA President from fall 2019 to April 2020, testified that the Board would approve architectural requests retroactively. He confirmed that this is what occurred in the case of the Kinstles’ hot tub.

7. Jodie Cervantes, the Community Manager, testified that she believed the matter was closed because the Kinstles had six months to comply with the pergola and screening requirements. She believed this six-month deadline was outlined in the Design Guidelines, though she could not locate the specific language.

8. Martin Douglas, who became Board President in April 2020, testified that the Board delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation. He stated that multiple settlement offers were being exchanged in an effort to foster an agreement between the neighbors.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that Mr. Pierce did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the SMCA had violated CC&R Section 11.1.

10. The judge determined that Section 11.1 grants the Board a right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This interpretation means the Board has the discretion to delay enforcement, which it did in this case to facilitate a potential settlement.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Use evidence and testimony from the case documents to construct a thorough analysis. No answers are provided.

1. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Analyze why the Petitioner, Erik R. Pierce, failed to meet this burden of proof concerning the violation of CC&R Section 11.1.

2. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Pierce’s initial complaint on September 4, 2019, to the final decision on February 10, 2021. Discuss the key actions, delays, and decisions made by the SMCA Board during this period.

3. Compare and contrast the testimonies of Bill Oliver, Jodie Cervantes, and Martin Douglas. How do their different roles and timeframes with the SMCA shape their perspectives on the association’s enforcement process and the specific handling of the Kinstle case?

4. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of CC&R Section 11.1. Discuss the distinction made between a “right to enforce” and an “absolute obligation,” and explain how this interpretation was central to the final ruling.

5. Based on the judge’s findings and the testimony of Martin Douglas, what are the likely next steps for the SMCA regarding the Kinstles’ non-compliance with the pergola and screening requirement? Evaluate the potential for future conflict or resolution between the parties involved.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Entity

Definition

AAM, LLC

The property management company that employed Community Manager Jodie Cervantes and managed the Sierra Morado Community Association during the period of the dispute.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Architectural Committee (ARC)

The committee within the SMCA responsible for approving construction, installations, and alterations to properties, as referenced in CC&R Section 4.27.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearing from members of homeowners’ associations. Mr. Pierce filed his initial complaint with this department.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents or rules of a planned community. The dispute centered on alleged violations of Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).

Hearing

The formal proceeding held on January 25, 2021, where the parties presented exhibits and witness testimony to the Administrative Law Judge.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or complaint to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Erik R. Pierce.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA).

Retroactive Approval

The act of approving an architectural installation (such as a hot tub) after it has already been completed, which the SMCA Board did in this case.

Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)

The homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, of which Erik R. Pierce and the Kinstles are members.

Stipulation

An agreement between the parties in a legal proceeding. In this case, the parties stipulated to enter all submitted exhibits into the record.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020053-REL


Your HOA Can Ignore Its Own Rules? A Surprising Legal Case Every Homeowner Needs to Understand

Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma

Most homeowners in a planned community operate under a simple assumption: if a neighbor violates a clear rule, you can file a complaint, and the Homeowners Association (HOA) is required to take action. It’s the fundamental promise of an HOA—consistent enforcement to protect property values and quality of life.

But what happens when the HOA agrees a violation has occurred, demands a fix, and then… does nothing to enforce it?

A real-world legal case, Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association, provides a surprising and cautionary answer. The final court decision reveals a critical loophole that may exist in your own HOA agreement. This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from that case that every homeowner should understand.

Takeaway 1: “A Right to Enforce” Isn’t an “Obligation to Enforce”

The core of the dispute was straightforward. Homeowner Erik Pierce filed a complaint because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his property, a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—the legally binding rules that govern the community. The HOA’s Architectural Committee retroactively approved the hot tub, but only on the condition that the neighbors install a pergola and screening to shield it from view.

The neighbors never installed the required screening, yet the HOA took no further enforcement action. This inaction led Mr. Pierce to sue the HOA.

The judge’s decision hinged on a crucial interpretation of the HOA’s governing documents. The judge ruled in favor of the HOA because the documents gave the Board the right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This distinction granted the HOA discretion to choose its strategy. The judge found the board’s reasoning for the delay persuasive: it was deliberately choosing negotiation over immediate punitive action to resolve the conflict. The board’s discretion wasn’t just a right to do nothing; it was a right to choose a different path to compliance.

The key phrase here is “shall have the right to enforce.” Had the documents stated the board “shall enforce,” the outcome would likely have been entirely different. This single phrase transforms enforcement from a mandate into a strategic option for the board.

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlights this critical point:

“…Section 11.1 only gives the Board a right to enforce, not an absolute obligation. While Petitioner is understandably upset that there has yet to be any follow through on enforcement of the screening requirements, this tribunal finds the testimony of Mr. Douglas more persuasive, namely that the Board has delayed in enforcing because it was trying to foster an agreement with the neighbors. Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.”

This finding is shocking for most homeowners, who reasonably assume that the rules laid out in their CC&Rs are mandates for the board, not a menu of discretionary options.

Takeaway 2: Suing Your HOA Can Ironically Pause Enforcement

The board’s discretionary power was put on full display when Mr. Pierce filed his lawsuit, creating a legal Catch-22. The current SMCA Board President, Martin Douglas, testified that the board deliberately paused formal enforcement actions against the neighbors who had violated the architectural requirement.

The judge ultimately found that the board’s rationale for this pause was a valid exercise of its discretion. The decision to delay was framed not as inaction, but as a strategic choice “to foster an agreement with the neighbors” amidst the complexities of litigation.

This reveals a deep irony: by filing a petition to force the HOA’s hand, the homeowner inadvertently provided the context for the HOA to justify a delay. The judge accepted that the board’s attempt to find a negotiated solution instead of escalating fines and penalties during an active lawsuit was a reasonable use of its discretionary authority. This case demonstrates how legal action, intended to accelerate a resolution, can sometimes be used by an HOA board to justify a different, slower approach.

Takeaway 3: A Clear Rule Violation Doesn’t Guarantee a Win in Court

One of the most surprising aspects of this case is that the facts of the violation were not in dispute. The judge explicitly acknowledged that the neighbors were in violation of the Architectural Review Committee’s requirement. The official decision states:

“Based upon the evidence provided, the Kinstle’s are in violation of the requirement the ARC Committee imposed on them.”

Despite this clear violation by the neighbor, the homeowner, Mr. Pierce, still lost his case against the HOA.

The case was lost on a critical legal distinction: the lawsuit was not about the neighbor’s violation, but about the HOA’s alleged failure to act. Since the judge determined the HOA had the discretionary right—not the mandatory obligation—to enforce the rule, its choice to pursue negotiation rather than immediate punitive action was not considered a violation of its duties.

The lesson here is profound: proving a neighbor is breaking the rules is only the first step. To win a case against your HOA for non-enforcement, you must also prove that its response (or lack thereof) constitutes a breach of its specific duties as outlined in your community’s governing documents.

Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Temper Your Expectations

The case of Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association serves as a stark reminder that HOA governance is often more complex than it appears. The precise wording of your community’s CC&Rs is critically important, as a single phrase can be the difference between a mandatory duty and a discretionary power. This case illustrates that the gap between a rule existing on paper and the board’s power to enforce it can be vast.

As a homeowner, your first step should be to obtain a copy of your community’s most recent CC&Rs and search for the enforcement clause—does it say your board “shall” enforce the rules, or does it say they have the “right” to?

This case forces every homeowner to ask: If your governing documents give your board the ‘right’ to act, what leverage do you truly have to ensure they actually will?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Erik R. Pierce (petitioner)
  • James C. Frisch (petitioner attorney)
    King & Frisch, P.C.
  • Michael Resare (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nicholas C.S. Nogami (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Heather M. Hampstead (respondent attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Jodie Cervantes (property manager/witness)
    AAM, LLC
    Community Manager for Respondent SMCA
  • Bill Oliver (board member/witness)
    Former SMCA President (Fall 2019 to April 2020)
  • Martin Douglas (board member/witness)
    Current SMCA Board President (since April 2020)

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • AHansen (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • djones (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • DGardner (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • ncano (unknown)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Transmission recipient
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Signed document transmission

Thomas W Sweeney v. Warner Ranch Landing Association

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120027-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-02-04
Administrative Law Judge Sondra J. Vanella
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas W. Sweeney Counsel
Respondent Warner Ranch Landing Association Counsel Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Article 8, Section 8.1.5

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that the HOA did not violate the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs allowed the Association to increase the annual assessment by either the CPI or 5%, and the disputed 10% increase was below the maximum allowable assessment calculated over the years.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof due to an incorrect interpretation of the CC&Rs regarding maximum annual assessment calculations.

Key Issues & Findings

Improper Assessment Increase

Petitioner alleged the Association increased annual assessments in violation of Article VIII Section 8.1.5 of the CC&Rs.

Orders: IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas W. Sweeney's Petition be dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)

Decision Documents

21F-H2120027-REL Decision – 852845.pdf

Uploaded 2026-02-28T18:23:29 (102.5 KB)

**Case Title:** No. 21F-H2120027-REL
**Parties:** Thomas W. Sweeney (Petitioner) v. Warner Ranch Landing Association (Respondent)
**Forum:** Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

**Main Issue**
The central issue in this hearing was whether the Respondent homeowners association (HOA) increased its 2021 annual assessments in violation of Article VIII, Section 8.1.5 of the community's Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

**Key Facts and Arguments**
* **Petitioner’s Argument:** The Petitioner contested a 10% increase in the 2021 annual assessments, arguing that it violated Section 8.1.5 of the CC&Rs. He interpreted the governing documents to mean that a 5% maximum allowable annual increase applies only if the Consumer Price Index (CPI) no longer exists. The Petitioner did not submit supplementary evidence to support his claim, relying solely on his personal interpretation of the CC&Rs.
* **Respondent’s Argument:** Representatives for the HOA testified that Section 8.1.5 allows the maximum annual assessment to increase automatically each year by the *greater* of the CPI or 5%. Because the board elected not to raise dues to the absolute maximum in prior years, the cumulative permitted maximum assessment for 2021 would theoretically be over $4,200. Therefore, the 2021 assessment, even with the 10% year-over-year increase, remained more than $2,300 below the maximum amount allowed under the CC&Rs. Additionally, the Respondent noted that Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)) permits an HOA to increase regular assessments up to 20% over the preceding year without a member vote.

**Legal Analysis**
The Administrative Law Judge evaluated the case based on the plain language of Section 8.1.5 of the CC&Rs. The judge found that the CC&Rs explicitly permit the HOA to increase the maximum annual assessment by the greater of the CPI percentage increase *or* 5%, directly contradicting the Petitioner's interpretation. By law, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents.

**Final Decision and Outcome**
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs. As a result, the Petition was officially dismissed.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas W. Sweeney (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Warner Ranch Landing Association
    Also listed as B. Austin Bailio in mailing section
  • Christopher Reynolds (property manager)
    Warner Ranch Landing Association
    Community Manager for Respondent; provided testimony
  • Michael Goldberg (board member)
    Warner Ranch Landing Association
    Vice-president of the Board; provided testimony

Neutral Parties

  • Sondra J. Vanella (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-16
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura B Ganer Counsel
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners Association Counsel Mark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:33:39 (108.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020060-REL


Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

Parties:

Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020060-REL


Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

——————————————————————————–

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020060-REL


3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

——————————————————————————–

3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.

Laura B Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020060-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-09-16
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome total_loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura B Ganer Counsel
Respondent Vincenz Homeowners Association Counsel Mark B. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

VHA CC&Rs Article 10 § 11, Article 7 § 3, and Article 12 § 2

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption

Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Parking Policy, CC&Rs, Board Authority, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020060-REL Decision – 822882.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:27 (108.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020060-REL


Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.

Background of the Dispute

The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.

Parties:

Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.

Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).

Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.

Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.

Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.

The Contested 2020 Parking Policy

The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.

Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.

Designated Parking Areas:

1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.

2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.

3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).

Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs

The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.

Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)

Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.

Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.

Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.

Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.

Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)

The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.

Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.

No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.

Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.

Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs

Article

Section

Provision Text

Article 10

§ 10.11.1

“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

Article 10

§ 10.11.2

Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.

Article 7

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”

Article 12

“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.

Legal Standard and Burden of Proof

• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.

• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.

Conclusions of Law

1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”

2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.

3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.

4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”

Final Order

“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”

The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020060-REL


Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?

2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?

3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.

4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?

5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?

6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?

7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.

8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?

9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.

2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.

3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.

4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.

5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.

6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.

9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.

10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.

3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?

4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?

5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Allowed Vehicles

A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.

Common Area

Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.

Notice of Hearing

A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.

An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.

Petition

The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.

Planned Community

A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020060-REL


3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules

For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.

But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.

The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.

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1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip

At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.

The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:

“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”

For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.

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2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)

Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.

The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.

Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.

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3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner

Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.

The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:

“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.

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Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print

This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.

Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.

This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura B Ganer (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of herself.

Respondent Side

  • Mark B. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Vincenz Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Nicole Payne (recipient)
    Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.