William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

Posted on December 27, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918019-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	William P. Lee	Counsel	—
Respondent	Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association	Counsel	Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 33-1809
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 33-1809
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

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Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Case Overview

This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Roles

Party/Role

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

William P. Lee

A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.

Legal Counsel

Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.

Timeline of Key Events

June 16, 1986

Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.

July 2, 1999

Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.

July 6, 2018

Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.

September 12, 2018

William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 13, 2018

The original hearing on the petition was conducted.

February 11, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.

April 1, 2019

The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

April 22, 2019

The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.

The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations

The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).

• Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.

• Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.

• Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.

• Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.

• Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.

• No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.

• Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

• No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

• Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.

• Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.

• Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

• Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”

• Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.

• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

The Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:

1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.

2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.

3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.

5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.

1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?

2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?

4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?

5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?

6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?

8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?

9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.

2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.

4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.

5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”

6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.

8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.

9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.

10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?

3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?

5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.

• Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.

• Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.

• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.

• Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.

• Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.

• Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.

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19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

1 source

This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between William P. Lee, a homeowner, and Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two, his Homeowners Association. The central issue revolved around the Greenlaw HOA’s implementation of a comprehensive ban on street parking and its contracting with a towing company to enforce the rule, which Mr. Lee contended violated the association’s governing documents, specifically amendments to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the proper notification procedures for revised rules. The findings of fact detail the history of the parking rules, the homeowner’s receipt of the electronic notification of the revised rules, and Mr. Lee’s arguments that the association failed to use the required postal mail or personal delivery methods for notice. The Conclusions of Law determined that the controlling rules were the revised July 2018 Rules and Regulations and that Mr. Lee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated either the CC&Rs or relevant Arizona statutes. Consequently, the Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

William P. Lee (petitioner)
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association member
Testified on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Timothy D. Butterfield (HOA attorney)
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
Barbara (board member)
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
Contended by Lee to be the reason for the parking ban

Neutral Parties

Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate

John W. Gray vs. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

Posted on November 30, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918004-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-11-30
Administrative Law Judge	Kay Abramsohn
Outcome	The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	John W. Gray	Counsel	—
Respondent	Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association	Counsel	Austin Baillio, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to enforce parking rules (vehicle limits, garage use, inoperable vehicles)

Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.

Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1258
MCIII Rules and Regulations #2 and #3
MCIII CC&Rs 4.12
MCIII CC&Rs 4.13
MCIII CC&Rs 4.14

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Enforcement, Parking Rules, Filing Fee Refund, Inoperable Vehicle, CC&R Violation

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1258
A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:17 (139.6 KB)

19F-H1918004-REL Decision – 674057.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:52 (139.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.

The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

• Parties Involved:

◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.

◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.

• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.

• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.

• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.

Background and Timeline of the Dispute

The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).

• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):

◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.

◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.

◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.

◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.

• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:

◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.

◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.

◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.

• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.

• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.

• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.

• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.

• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.

Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)

The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”

• Specific Violations Alleged:

◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.

◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.

◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.

• Evidence Presented at Hearing:

◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.

◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).

◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.

◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.

Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)

The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.

• Core Arguments:

◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.

◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.

◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.

• Actions Taken by MCIII:

◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.

◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.

◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.

◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.

◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.

Governing Rules and CC&Rs

The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.

Document

Article/Rule

Provision

Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)

Rule 3

Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.12

Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.13

States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.

CC&Rs (Jan 1999)

Art. 4.14

Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.

• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.

• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.

◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.

◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”

◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.

◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.

• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.

Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?

3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?

4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.

5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?

6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?

7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?

9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.

2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.

3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.

4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.

5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.

6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.

7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.

8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.

9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.

10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.

1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.

2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?

3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.

4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?

5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.

Common Elements

Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.

Community Manager

An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.

Inoperable Vehicle

A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.

A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.

Prevailing Party

The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.

He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.

Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking

For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.

This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.

The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.

1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work

The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.

The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.

The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:

MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.

2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon

John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:

• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.

• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.

• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.

The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.

3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures

In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.

The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.

This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.

4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis

Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.

Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.

The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:

Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.

The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.

5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient

Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:

• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.

• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.

The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.

For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.

Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One

The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

John W. Gray (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Austin Baillio (attorney)
Maxwell & Morgan PC
Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
Andrea Lacombe (community manager)
Curtiss Management
Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
Transmitted decision electronically

Charles P Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of

Posted on November 6, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	none
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Charles P. Mandela	Counsel	—
Respondent	Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association	Counsel	Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
CC&R § 3.1(a)
Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
CC&R § 3.1(a)
Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:26 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL Decision – 669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:30 (91.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the dispute was Blue Ridge’s repeated denial of Mr. Mandela’s requests to construct a 150-square-foot cedar patio structure on his property.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied Mr. Mandela’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation of the association’s governing documents. The ALJ’s decisions affirmed that Blue Ridge acted within its authority and correctly applied its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and architectural regulations.

Key takeaways from the rulings include:

• Violation of Detached Structure Limit: Mr. Mandela’s request for a detached patio was denied because he already had a tool shed, and the HOA rules explicitly permit only one detached structure per property.

• Improper “Play Structure” Request: An initial request framing the patio as a “play structure” was correctly denied as its proposed 150 sq. ft. size exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit for certain play structures.

• Insufficient Plans for Attached Structure: A separate request to attach the structure to his home was denied due to Mr. Mandela’s failure to provide the required detailed architectural plans and construction drawings, which the HOA deemed necessary for approval.

• Arguments Found Lacking: Mr. Mandela’s arguments—including claims of selective enforcement, discrimination against homeowners without children, and misinterpretation of the term “temporary structure”—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded the structure would be a prohibited temporary structure as the proposed concrete pavers do not constitute a permanent foundation under the HOA’s definition.

Case Overview

Parties Involved

Description

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

A homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

The governing homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Timeline of Key Events

c. Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request for a 150 sq. ft. patio, using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form. Blue Ridge denies it for exceeding the size limit.

c. Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits a second request, this time to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans and materials.

c. Mar 8, 2018

Blue Ridge denies the request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information,” instructing Mr. Mandela to provide formal drawings as per CC&R guidelines.

c. Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an internal appeal with Blue Ridge, which is subsequently denied for the same reason of incomplete construction information.

Post-Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits a third request for a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. Blue Ridge denies it because he already has a detached tool shed.

c. Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a) by denying his request while allowing another member a Tuff Shed.

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues the initial decision, denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Arizona Department of Real Estate orders a rehearing of the matter.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held before the same ALJ.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues the final decision, again finding in favor of Blue Ridge and denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Analysis of Construction Requests and Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure, each of which was denied for different reasons based on the HOA’s governing documents.

Request 1: Detached “Play Structure”

Mr. Mandela’s initial application on February 1, 2018, was submitted using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form.

• HOA Rule: The form, based on modified Rules and Regulations from April 6, 2016, states: “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”

• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied the request because the proposed 150 sq. ft. size of the structure exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit specified for this type of structure.

Request 2: Attached Cedar Patio Shade

On March 2, 2018, Mr. Mandela submitted a new request to attach the structure to his home.

• HOA Action: The committee chairman, John Hart, requested documents showing the structure would not be free-standing, such as plans and material specifications.

• Mandela’s Response: In a March 3 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof.” He asserted that photos of other attached structures were sufficient.

• Denial Rationale: The request was denied on March 8 due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter explicitly instructed Mr. Mandela to submit all required documents, including drawings that “match exactly what you are going to build,” per CC&R Section 10.3. His subsequent appeal was also denied, with Blue Ridge noting that a manufacturer’s representative stated they would not warranty the product if the design was altered and reiterating the need for detailed elevation drawings.

Request 3: Detached Cedar Patio Structure

Following the denial of his appeal, Mr. Mandela submitted a third request for a detached version of the patio.

• HOA Rule: According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D), “One detached structure may… be constructed on a property.”

• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied this request because Mr. Mandela already had one detached structure—a tool shed—on his property. The rules permit only one such structure.

Key Arguments and Rulings from Administrative Hearings

At the initial hearing and subsequent rehearing, both parties presented arguments regarding the application of the HOA’s rules. The ALJ systematically addressed and ruled on each point, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Petitioner’s Core Arguments (Charles P. Mandela)

• Definition of “Detached Structure”: He argued that his proposed patio was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, based on his misinterpretation of a prior administrative ruling, a detached structure is one that can be easily converted into a second residence.

• Selective Enforcement: He alleged that Blue Ridge approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member and was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. play structure size limit against other homeowners, thus discriminating against him.

• Discriminatory Rules: He contended that the rule allowing a second detached structure if it is a “play structure” violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people without children. He stated he wanted the patio for his mother.

• Definition of “Temporary Structure”: He asserted the structure was not a prohibited temporary structure because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he claimed constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules, and the materials had a 5-year warranty.

Respondent’s Core Arguments (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)

• One Detached Structure Rule: The rules unambiguously limit homeowners to one detached structure, and Mr. Mandela already had one.

• Incomplete Submissions: The request for an attached structure lacked the necessary architectural details to ensure it was properly and safely constructed, as required by the CC&Rs. Joseph Hancock, Vice President of Blue Ridge and a former contractor, testified that Mr. Mandela failed to consider critical factors like height and width differentials.

• Temporary Structure Violation: Mr. Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.” Therefore, the proposed structure would be a prohibited temporary structure under the CC&Rs.

• No Selective Enforcement: Mr. Hancock refuted Mr. Mandela’s claims of selective enforcement, testifying that the lots Mr. Mandela cited either had structures built before 2003 (predating certain rules) or had no detached structures at all.

Administrative Law Judge’s Final Conclusions

The ALJ found that Mr. Mandela failed to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The final order denied his petition based on the following conclusions of law:

• Burden of Proof: The petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that Blue Ridge violated CC&R Article III, Section 3.1(a).

• Second Detached Structure: It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela had a shed on his property. The proposed 150 sq. ft. patio therefore constituted a barred second detached structure.

• Prior Rulings Not Precedent: The ALJ noted that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior administrative decision he cited and, furthermore, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.”

• Temporary Structure: The preponderance of the evidence showed the proposed structure is a temporary structure under the CC&Rs because “concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

• Denial of Attached Structure: The denial of the request to attach the structure was proper, as the “Petitioner failed to provide sufficient details to illustrate how he would attach the cedar patio structure to his home.”

• No Evidence of Discrimination: The petitioner failed to establish that Blue Ridge approved other oversized play structures or that the denial of his requests was discriminatory. The ALJ also noted the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over potential constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Relevant HOA Governing Documents

Document/Section

Key Provision / Definition

CC&R § 3.1

Permitted Uses and Restrictions – Single Family: “No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage…”

Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Detached Structures: “One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property.”

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Standard

Temporary Structures: Prohibits temporary structures. A temporary structure is defined as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

Modified Rules and Regulations (April 6, 2016)

Play Structures: Allows up to two play structures but specifies they “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”

CC&R § 3.24

Architectural Approval: “No building, fence, wall, screen, residence or other structure shall be commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered… without the prior written approval of the… Architectural Committee.”

CC&R § 10.3

Architectural Submission Guidelines: Specifies the format and information required for submittals to the architectural committee.

CC&R § 12.2

Declaration Amendments: Requires an affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least 75% of all lots to amend the Declaration.

Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. The case revolves around Mr. Mandela’s multiple attempts to gain approval for a patio structure on his property and the subsequent legal proceedings. The material is drawn from two Administrative Law Judge Decisions, dated November 6, 2018, and February 28, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing your information directly from the provided case documents.

1. What were the three distinct requests Mr. Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA, and what was the outcome of each?

2. Explain the HOA’s rule regarding detached structures and why Mr. Mandela’s third request for a detached patio was denied under this rule.

3. On what grounds did the HOA deny Mr. Mandela’s second request to attach a cedar patio shade to his home?

4. What was Mr. Mandela’s primary allegation in his initial petition filed with the Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

5. How do the Blue Ridge rules define a “temporary structure,” and why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude Mr. Mandela’s proposed patio fell into this category?

6. Describe Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s policy on play structures.

7. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this case, and what does this standard mean?

8. Mr. Mandela cited a prior administrative law judge decision to support his case. What was his interpretation of that decision, and how did the presiding judge respond to this line of argument?

9. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key pieces of testimony did he provide on behalf of the HOA during the rehearing?

10. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the Declaration (the CC&Rs themselves) versus adopting new “Rules and Regulations”?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot size limit for such structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied due to incomplete information and a lack of adequate plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio structure, which was denied because he already had another detached structure on his property.

2. According to CC&Rs § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), a property is permitted to have only one detached structure. Mr. Mandela’s third request was denied because it was undisputed that he already had a tool shed on his property. The proposed detached patio would have constituted a prohibited second detached structure.

3. The HOA denied the request to attach the patio shade because Mr. Mandela submitted incomplete information and failed to provide sufficient plans. The HOA requested detailed elevation drawings showing construction methods, dimensions, foundation details, and attachment methods, which Mr. Mandela did not provide.

4. In his petition of July 31, 2018, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a). His specific claim was that the HOA discriminated against him by denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

5. The Architectural Committee rules define a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” The judge concluded the proposed patio was a temporary structure because Mr. Mandela planned to use concrete pavers, which, according to the credible testimony of Joseph Hancock, are not the equivalent of a permanent cement or block foundation.

6. Mr. Mandela argued that the modified rule allowing a second detached play structure (up to 80 sq ft) violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people who do not have children. He asserted the policy was unfair because he wanted to build the structure for his mother to rest outside, not for children’s play.

7. The petitioner, Mr. Mandela, had the burden of proof to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.

8. Mr. Mandela argued that a prior administrative law judge decision had found that a “detached structure” under Blue Ridge CC&Rs is a structure that can be easily converted into a second residence, which his patio could not. The presiding judge dismissed this by stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future decisions.

9. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of the Blue Ridge HOA and a former general, electrical, and HVAC contractor. He testified that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or block foundation, that Mr. Mandela’s plans for attaching the structure were insufficient, and that he had investigated lots Mr. Mandela cited for alleged violations and found none.

10. According to the CC&Rs, adopting, amending, or repealing “Rules and Regulations” can be done by a majority vote of the Board (§ 4.2). In contrast, amending the Declaration of CC&Rs themselves is a much more stringent process, requiring the affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all lots (§ 12.2).

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate your answers in a standard essay format, using specific evidence from the source documents to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the progression of Mr. Mandela’s three distinct requests to the HOA. How did the denial of his first request (as a “Play Structure”) appear to influence his subsequent applications and legal arguments?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies in this case. Explain why Mr. Mandela ultimately failed to convince the Administrative Law Judge that the HOA violated its own rules, citing specific examples of his failed arguments (e.g., the temporary structure definition, claims of selective enforcement, and the adequacy of his submitted plans).

3. Examine the distinction made in the Blue Ridge Estates governing documents between the core CC&Rs and the “Rules and Regulations” adopted by the Board. How did this distinction allow the HOA to have a rule permitting a second “play structure” while the main CC&Rs seem to limit properties to a single residence and one other detached structure (a garage)?

4. The HOA denied Mr. Mandela’s request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information.” Based on the evidence presented in the decisions, evaluate the reasonableness of the HOA’s request for detailed plans versus Mr. Mandela’s assertion that he had provided sufficient information for approval.

5. Trace Mr. Mandela’s various claims of unfair treatment, including selective enforcement (the Tuff Shed), discrimination (the play structure rule), and his interpretation of key terms like “detached structure.” For each claim, explain the HOA’s counter-position or the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings for state agencies, such as the one between Mr. Mandela and the HOA. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the HOA granted authority by CC&R § 10.2 to approve or deny proposed construction and promulgate regulations aligned with the CC&Rs. It denied all of Mr. Mandela’s requests.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Mandela) bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the primary governing documents for the Blue Ridge Estates community, outlining land use, permitted structures, and rules members must follow.

Detached Structure

A building or structure on a property that is separate from the main single-family residence. According to Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one such structure is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela is the petitioner.

Play Structure

A structure defined by the HOA’s modified rules to include items like Swing Sets, Jungle Gyms, Tree Houses, and Ground Placed Play Houses/Forts. Play Houses/Forts and Tree Houses are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association is the respondent.

Rules and Regulations

Rules that can be adopted, amended, or repealed by a majority vote of the HOA Board, as distinct from the CC&Rs which require a 75% vote of all lot owners to amend. The “Play Structure” rules are an example.

Temporary Structure

As defined by the Architectural Committee regulations, a structure “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” Such structures are prohibited by CC&R § 3.6.

Select all sources

669528.pdf

692294.pdf

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19F-H1918006-REL-RHG

2 sources

These sources document two decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association (HOA). The first document presents the initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision which denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, finding he failed to prove the HOA violated its governing documents by denying his request to build a patio structure. The second document is the ALJ Decision following a rehearing, which reaffirms the initial denial, concluding that Mr. Mandela’s proposed structure was either a prohibited second detached structure or a temporary structure lacking a proper foundation, and that he failed to provide sufficient plans for an attached structure. Both sources establish that Mr. Mandela did not meet his burden of proof to show the HOA discriminated against him or otherwise violated the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

What were the specific reasons the HOA denied Charles Mandela’s requests?

How did the HOA Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions govern detached structures?

What was the ultimate outcome of Charles Mandela’s petition and subsequent rehearing?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)

Respondent Side

Paul Frame (HOA attorney)
FRAME LAW PLLC
John Hart (HOA Chairman)
Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association
Reviewed petitioner's requests
Joseph Hancock (HOA Vice President, witness)
Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association
Presented testimony

Neutral Parties

Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
OAH
Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of transmitted decision

Other Participants

Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
Transmitted decision electronically

Brent J Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Posted on October 9, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818050-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-10-11
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Brent J. Mathews	Counsel	—
Respondent	American Ranch Community Association	Counsel	Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik

Alleged Violations

American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.

Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).

Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:13:46 (112.4 KB)

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:56 (112.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.

The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.

1. Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1818050-REL

Petitioner

Brent J. Mathews

Respondent

American Ranch Community Association

Hearing Date

September 21, 2018

Decision Date

October 11, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.

2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation

After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:

“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”

The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.

3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events

The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.

A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.

June 2011

The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.

November 23, 2013

Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.

July 30, 2016

Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.

August 2016

Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.

August 9, 2016

The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.

4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning

The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.

A. Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.

B. Variance vs. Amendment

The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.

• Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.

• Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”

The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.

C. The Board’s Delegated Authority

The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:

1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.

2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”

3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.

5. Final Order

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:

• Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.

• Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”

The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.

Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?

3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?

4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?

5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?

6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?

7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?

8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?

9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.

2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.

3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.

4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.

5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.

6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.

7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.

8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.

9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.

10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.

2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?

4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.

5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.

Architectural Review Committee

A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.

Bylaws

The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.

Petition

The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.

Variance

An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.

Well Agreement 1

A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.

Well Agreement 2

An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.

Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown

1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome

It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.

That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.

The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.

2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone

Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.

However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.

3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees

This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.

This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.

According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.

“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”

This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.

4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution

While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.

The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.

When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”

The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them

The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.

This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Brent J. Mathews (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Lynn Krupnik (attorney)
Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
Represented Respondent
Timothy Krupnik (attorney)
Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
Represented Respondent
Tiffany Taylor (community manager)
American Ranch Community Association
Testified for Respondent
Brad Baker (board member)
American Ranch Community Association
Respondent Vice President; testified at hearing

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
OAH
Judy Lowe (commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
Signed transmission page
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient
AHansen (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient
DGardner (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Decision recipient

Other Participants

Mark Kaplan (owner)
Lot 2
Executed Well Agreement 2
Diane Kaplan (owner)
Lot 2
Executed Well Agreement 2
Steven Galliano (former owner)
Lot 2
Frances Galliano (former owner)
Lot 2

Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Posted on September 25, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-01-31
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Travis Prall	Counsel	—
Respondent	Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association	Counsel	Lydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.

Key Issues & Findings

Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 686236.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:58 (116.2 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:00 (107.3 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 686236.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:18 (116.2 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:14:22 (107.3 KB)

Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”

The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”

The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.

Case Overview

This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Petitioner

Travis Prall

Respondent

Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Initial Hearing

September 4, 2018

Initial Decision

September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)

Rehearing

January 11, 2019

Final Decision

January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)

Timeline of Key Events

• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.

• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.

• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.

• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.

• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.

Central Allegation and Dispute

The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.

• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.

• Inferences about Original Landscaping:

◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.

◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.

◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.

• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.

• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.

• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.

• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.

◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.

◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.

◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”

Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections

The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Provision

Significance in the Case

The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“

This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”

“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…

This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.

“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…

This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.

Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)

• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”

• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.

• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”

• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”

• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”

• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.

Study Guide: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal decisions. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition?

3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing.

4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request?

5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent.

6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?

9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles? The Petitioner was Travis Prall, the homeowner who filed the dispute. The Respondent was the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association (HOA), which was defending against the Petitioner’s claims. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition? The Petitioner alleged a violation of Section 7.1.4 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). His central claim was that the HOA violated this section by neglecting its duty to perform yard maintenance in his backyard, which he argued was a “visible public yard.”

3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing. The exterior homes feature six to seven-foot-tall block wall fences enclosing their backyards. In contrast, the interior homes, including the Petitioner’s, have a shorter back wall consisting of a two-foot block wall topped with a two-foot aluminum fence, making the total height approximately four feet and more visible from a common walkway.

4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request? In 2018, the HOA had a “pony wall” in the Petitioner’s backyard repaired and was informed by the repair company, Sun King Fencing & Gates, that the wall had buckled due to tree roots. Consequently, the HOA issued a Courtesy Letter on May 3, 2018, requesting that the Petitioner “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent. The Respondent argued that a yard is considered a “Private Yard” if it is enclosed or shielded from view, meaning any enclosed yard qualified. The Petitioner argued that the definition should be read to mean a yard is private only if it is enclosed so that it is not generally visible from neighboring property, implying visibility was the key factor.

6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion? The Petitioner testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA had provided landscaping maintenance for his backyard. The Respondent denied this claim, stating that it had never provided any landscaping maintenance to any backyards in the community and raised liability concerns about entering residents’ enclosed yards.

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision? The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case? The judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to present evidence proving that the tree in his backyard was “originally installed by the Declarant” (the developer). According to Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs, the HOA’s maintenance responsibility only applied to landscaping and improvements installed by the original community developer.

9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter? Maureen Karpinski testified that none of the homes in the community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards and that they were “just dirt” at the time of purchase. Her testimony was considered credible because she was a real estate agent involved in the initial sales, had walked the community with many buyers during construction, and was herself an original buyer.

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019? In both the initial decision issued on September 24, 2018, and the final decision issued after the rehearing on January 31, 2019, the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated the CC&Rs.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style answers. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard” as defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found it unnecessary to rule on this specific issue to reach a decision.

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard shape the proceedings, and what specific types of evidence (or lack thereof) were most influential in the judge’s final decision?

3. Trace the timeline of the dispute over the tree in Travis Prall’s backyard, from the 2014 storm to the final legal decision in 2019. How did each key event contribute to the escalation of the conflict and the arguments presented at the hearings?

4. Compare the evidence presented by Travis Prall with the evidence presented by the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA at the rehearing. Why did the judge characterize Prall’s evidence as “suppositions and inferences” while deeming the HOA’s evidence “credible”?

5. Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs contains the phrase “as originally installed by Declarant.” Explain the critical importance of this phrase to the outcome of the case and how it became the dispositive legal issue, overshadowing all other arguments.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community.

Common Area

Areas within the community maintained by the HOA for the benefit of all residents. The HOA provides landscaping for these areas.

Courtesy Letter

A formal notice sent by the HOA to a homeowner regarding a potential violation or required action. In this case, it requested the removal of a tree causing damage.

Declarant

The original developer of the planned community who installed the initial infrastructure and landscaping.

HOA Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal hearing regarding an alleged violation by their HOA.

Improvements

A term used in the CC&Rs referring to any additions to a lot other than the main residential dwelling, including landscaping.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the homeowner Travis Prall.

Pony Wall

A term used to describe the short, two-foot-tall block wall in the backyards of the interior homes, which was buckling due to tree roots.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention “more probably true than not.”

Private Yard

As defined in the CC&Rs, a portion of a yard “which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property.” The interpretation of this definition was a point of contention.

Public Yard

As defined in the CC&Rs, the portion of a yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property,” regardless of its location on the lot. The HOA is responsible for maintaining landscaping originally installed by the Declarant in Public Yards.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the claims. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA.

Visible from Neighboring Property

A term defined in the CC&Rs to mean an object that would be visible to a six-foot-tall person standing on a neighboring property. It includes a specific exception for objects visible only through a wrought iron fence.

As defined in the CC&Rs, “the portion of the Lot devoted to Improvements other than the Residential Dwelling.”

⚖️

18F-H1818053-REL-RHG

2 sources

These documents are two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Travis Prall, the Petitioner, and the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, the Respondent. The first document outlines the initial decision, dated September 24, 2018, which dismissed Mr. Prall’s petition arguing the HOA violated their Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements (CC&Rs) by neglecting yard maintenance. The second document is the decision following a rehearing requested by the Petitioner, dated January 31, 2019, which reaffirmed the initial dismissal, concluding that Mr. Prall failed to prove that the landscaping in question was originally installed by the Declarant, a prerequisite for the HOA’s maintenance responsibility under the CC&Rs. Both decisions rely heavily on interpreting sections of the CC&Rs, particularly the definitions of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard,” to determine the HOA’s obligation. Ultimately, both rulings found that the Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Travis Prall (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

Lydia Pierce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Maureen Karpinski (board member)
Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
President of the Board; testified
Frank Peake (property manager)
Pride Community Management
Owner of Pride Community Management; testified
Rebecca Stowers (community manager)
Community Manager; testified at initial hearing

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Patricia Davies-Brown vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Posted on September 14, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818039-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-09-14
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Patricia Davies-Brown, Individually and as Trustee of the Trust; BART A. BROWN, JR.; SCOTT R. DAVIES	Counsel	—
Respondent	Starwood Estates Homeowners Association	Counsel	Daniel Campbell & Kristopher L. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs; Bylaws; Architectural Guidelines

Outcome Summary

The Petitioners' request alleging that the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association violated community documents by approving a copper-colored metal roof was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioners failed to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence, noting that the guidelines prohibiting reflective surfaces applied primarily to windows and doors, not roofs.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Exterior Appearance and Colors provisions regarding copper-colored metal roof approval

Petitioners alleged that the HOA improperly approved a copper-colored metal roof because it constituted a reflective surface and did not blend with the natural surroundings, violating the community documents. The ALJ denied the petition, finding Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its documents, noting the reflective surfaces ban applied to windows and doors, not roofs, and the roof's appearance was acceptable.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: architectural control, CC&Rs enforcement, metal roof approval, reflective surfaces, burden of proof

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 653217.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:12:08 (41.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 659968.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:12:20 (104.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 653217.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:55 (41.6 KB)

18F-H1818039-REL Decision – 659968.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:00 (104.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the administrative hearing and decision in case No. 18F-H1818039-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowners Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies (the “Petitioners”) and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association (the “Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the HOA Board of Directors’ 2013 approval of a copper-colored metal roof for homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin.

The Petitioners alleged this approval violated the community’s CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Architectural Guidelines. Their primary arguments were that the roof was an impermissible “reflective surface,” that it did not “blend with the natural surrounding and landscape,” and that the Board lacked the authority to approve it without prior review by the Architectural Committee (ACC) and without viewing a physical sample.

The Respondent defended the Board’s decision, arguing that the Board possessed the authority to grant such approvals. They contended the prohibition on reflective surfaces in the community guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not roofing. Furthermore, they asserted that the roof was aesthetically compliant and that other reflective metal roofs exist within the community.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision, issued on September 14, 2018, denied the petition, concluding that the Petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof. The ALJ found that the Board had the authority to approve the roof, the ban on reflective surfaces did not apply to roofing, and the Petitioners did not establish that the roof failed to blend with its natural surroundings.

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Case Overview

• Case Name: Patricia Davies-Brown, et al. vs. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

• Case Number: 18F-H1818039-REL

• Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Velva Moses-Thompson, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Dates: July 10, 2018, and August 13, 2018

• Final Decision Date: September 14, 2018

Key Parties and Representatives

Name(s)

Representation / Contact

Petitioners

Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., Scott R. Davies

Appeared on behalf of themselves
9777 E Dreyfus Ave., Scottsdale, AZ 85260
[email protected]

Respondent

Starwood Estates Homeowners Association

Kristopher L. Smith, Esq.
O’Connor & Campbell, P.C.
7955 S Priest Dr., Tempe, AZ 85284
[email protected]

Homeowners

Jeff and Karen Martin

Owners of the property with the disputed roof at 8500 Skywood Drive, Pinetop, Arizona (Lot 40 of Starwood Estates).

Core Dispute: The Martin Residence Roof

The central conflict originated in the summer of 2013 when the Starwood Estates Board of Directors approved a request from Jeff and Karen Martin to install a copper-colored metal roof on their home. The approval was passed by a 5-1 vote. Petitioner Scott R. Davies was the sole board member who voted against the approval at that time.

The Board reviewed a brochure containing the roof’s color before granting approval but did not observe a physical sample. However, one Board member, Pat Knight, was reportedly familiar with the appearance of such roofs from a previous home she owned nearby. The petition challenging this 2013 decision was filed on or about March 26, 2018.

Petitioners’ Allegations and Arguments

The Petitioners filed their petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the HOA violated community governing documents. Their case was built on three central questions:

1. Does the exterior appearance of the Martins’ aluminum copper-colored metal roof blend with the “natural surrounding and landscape” of Starwood Estates?

2. Does such roof constitute a “reflective surface”?

3. If the answer to (1) above is no and/or the answer to (2) above is yes, did the ACC and the Board of Starwood Estates erroneously violate the provisions of the CC&R’s and GUIDELINES in permitting the Martins to install such aluminum copper-colored metal roof…?

During the hearing, the Petitioners expanded on these points, arguing:

• Reflective Surface: The copper-colored roof was a prohibited reflective surface under the Architectural Guidelines.

• Aesthetic Incompatibility: The roof did not blend with the natural surroundings as required.

• Procedural Violations:

◦ The Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample of the material.

◦ The approval was invalid because it should have first been granted by the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) appointed by the Board.

Respondent’s Defense and Arguments

The Starwood Estates HOA maintained that its approval of the Martin roof was proper and compliant with all governing documents. Their key arguments were:

• Board Authority: The HOA asserted that either the Board of Directors or the Architectural Committee had the authority to approve the roof.

• Interpretation of “Reflective Surfaces”: The Respondent argued that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” within the Architectural Guidelines applies specifically to windows and doors, not to roofing, which is addressed in a separate section of the guidelines.

• Aesthetic Compliance: They contended the roof, while having a “shine,” was not a barred reflective surface and did blend in with the natural surroundings.

• Precedent: The HOA noted that several other metal roofs that are reflective had been previously approved in Starwood Estates. They submitted images of reflective green and red roofs in the Pinetop Country Club area as evidence.

Referenced Governing Documents

The decision cited specific sections from the HOA’s governing documents to adjudicate the dispute.

• Section 3.1.4: Requires prior written approval from the Architectural Committee for any work that alters the exterior appearance of a Lot.

• Section 5.2: States that approvals or actions to be taken by the Association “shall be valid if given or taken by the Board.”

• Article VII, Section A(2): Grants the Board authority to exercise all powers and duties vested in the Association unless reserved to the membership.

• Article VII, Section B: Empowers the Board to “Review and approve any architectural plan for the building of any improvements on any Lots.”

• Exterior Appearance and Colors: Mandates that exterior appearance “shall blend with the natural surroundings and landscape.” It also states, “Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.” A note requires the owner to submit samples of materials for ACC approval.

• Roofs, Materials, and Pitches: Stipulates that “Metal roofs are permitted only with ACC approval” and that all pitched roof materials “shall promote a continuity of texture and color.”

Evidence Presented

• Petitioner’s Exhibit 13: A photograph of the Martins’ copper-colored roof. The ALJ’s decision noted that while the image showed a reflection, the photograph itself was “blurred.”

• Respondent’s Exhibit 26: The brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof that the Board reviewed before its 2013 approval.

• Respondent’s Exhibit 7: Images of other reflective green and red metal roofs located in the Pinetop Country Club area, which were previously approved.

• Testimony: Board member Pat Knight’s familiarity with the appearance of copper-colored roofs was noted.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The petition was denied. The ALJ found that the Petitioners failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or Architectural Guidelines.

Conclusions of Law

1. Burden of Proof: The Petitioners bore the burden of proving their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not. They failed to meet this standard.

2. Board Authority: The ALJ concluded that the governing documents allowed for the roof to be approved by either the Architectural Committee or the Board of Directors. The Board’s action was therefore valid.

3. Interpretation of Reflective Surfaces: The evidence established that the prohibition on “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines applies to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines. The existence of other approved shiny metal roofs further supported this interpretation.

4. Aesthetic Compliance: The Petitioners did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the copper-colored roof failed to blend in with the natural surroundings.

Final Order

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because Petitioners have not established that Respondent violated the Community Bylaws, Community CC&Rs, and the Community Architectural Guidelines when Respondent approved the Martins’ request to install the copper-colored roof.

The order was made binding unless a rehearing was requested within 30 days of service.

Study Guide: Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing case between Patricia Davies-Brown, et al., and the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined within the context of the provided legal documents.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information presented in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in Case No. 18F-H1818039-REL?

2. What specific architectural feature was the central point of the dispute?

3. What were the three main questions the Petitioners raised in their petition filed on March 26, 2018?

4. How did the Respondent (Starwood Estates HOA) justify the approval of other reflective metal roofs in the community?

5. According to the Petitioners, which two procedural errors did the Board of Directors commit when approving the Martins’ roof?

6. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the prohibition of “reflective surfaces” in the Architectural Guidelines?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioners were required to meet, and did they succeed?

8. Which governing documents grant the Board of Directors the authority to approve architectural plans?

9. When was the disputed roof originally approved by the Board, and what was the vote count?

10. What evidence did the Board review before its initial approval, and what evidence was not reviewed at that time?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioners were Patricia Davies-Brown (Individually and as Trustee of the Trust), Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies. The Respondent was the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association.

2. The central dispute was an aluminum, “copper-colored metal roof” installed by homeowners Jeff and Karen Martin on their property at Lot 40 of Starwood Estates. The Petitioners challenged the HOA Board’s approval of this roof.

3. The Petitioners’ petition questioned whether the roof blended with the “natural surrounding and landscape,” whether it constituted a “reflective surface,” and if so, whether the Board and ACC violated the CC&Rs and Guidelines by permitting it.

4. The Respondent submitted evidence of other reflective green and red metal roofs within the Pinetop Country Club area that had been previously approved by the Board. This was used to argue that roofs with a shine were not explicitly barred.

5. The Petitioners contended the Board violated the CC&Rs by approving the roof without first viewing a physical sample. They also argued that the roof required approval from the two-person Architectural Committee (ACC) and could not be approved by the Board alone.

6. The Judge concluded that the bar on reflective surfaces, as written in the Architectural Guidelines, applies specifically to windows and doors. Roofs are addressed in a separate section of the guidelines that does not contain the same prohibition.

7. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means showing their contention is more probably true than not. The Judge ruled that they failed to meet this standard.

8. Section 5.2 of the CC&Rs states that actions taken by the Board are valid, and Article VII of the Starwood Bylaws grants the Board the power to exercise Association authority and to review and approve architectural plans. The Judge found this authority allowed the Board to approve the roof.

9. The roof was approved by the Board of Directors in the summer of 2013. The approval passed with a 5-1 vote, with Petitioner Scott R. Davies being the sole board member who voted against it.

10. Before approving the roof, the Board reviewed a brochure containing the color of the copper-colored roof. However, the Board did not observe a physical sample of the actual roofing material.

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Essay Questions for Further Study

The following questions are designed for deeper, analytical consideration of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between CC&Rs Section 3.1.4 (requiring ACC approval) and other governing documents (like CC&Rs Section 5.2 and Bylaws Article VII) that grant broad authority to the Board. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent contradiction in the final decision?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and detail why the Petitioners failed to meet this standard with respect to their claims about the roof’s reflective nature and its harmony with the natural surroundings.

3. Examine the interpretation of the Architectural Guidelines regarding “reflective surfaces.” How did the Respondent and the Administrative Law Judge construe this rule, and what evidence and reasoning supported their interpretation over the Petitioners’ broader application?

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioners and the Respondent. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s evidence (e.g., the blurred photograph vs. the brochure and photos of other roofs) and explain how this likely influenced the outcome of the case.

5. Based on the issues raised in this case, what specific changes or clarifications could be made to the community’s CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines to prevent similar disputes in the future?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition in Context

ACC (Architectural Committee)

A committee, as referenced in the CC&Rs and Architectural Guidelines, responsible for approving exterior alterations and ensuring all building materials and colors conform to community standards.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding official (Velva Moses-Thompson) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who conducts hearings, evaluates evidence, and issues a binding decision on the matter.

Architectural Guidelines

A set of community documents establishing goals and specific rules for exterior appearance, colors, materials, and site development to retain the character of Starwood Estates.

Board of Directors (Board)

The governing body of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which is empowered by the CC&Rs and Bylaws to conduct the affairs of the Association and approve architectural plans.

Bylaws

The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, including the powers and duties of the Board of Directors.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Legally binding rules recorded with the property deeds in the Starwood Estates community that govern what homeowners may or may not do with their property.

Conclusions of Law

The section of the ALJ’s decision that applies legal principles, statutes, and case law to the established facts of the case to reach a final judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of the ALJ’s decision that formally lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented at the hearing.

Petitioner

The party that initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Patricia Davies-Brown, Bart A. Brown, Jr., and Scott R. Davies, who brought the complaint against the HOA.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has a greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, persuading the fact-finder that a contention is more likely true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, which had to defend its decision to approve the roof.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or community document (like a CC&R) that limits the use of the property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

This Copper Roof Caused a Legal Battle: 3 Surprising Lessons Every Homeowner Should Learn

Introduction: The Neighborhood Dispute That Went to Court

The relationship between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) can be a delicate balance. Architectural rules, designed to maintain a community’s aesthetic, often become a source of friction. But what happens when a disagreement over design choices escalates?

In the case of Davies-Brown v. Starwood Estates Homeowners Association, a dispute over Jeff and Karen Martin’s new copper-colored metal roof didn’t just cause whispers over the fence—it went all the way to a formal administrative hearing. When the HOA board approved the roof in a 5-1 vote, the lone dissenting board member, Scott R. Davies, joined two other homeowners to formally challenge the decision.

This seemingly simple disagreement over a roofing material reveals several powerful, and often counter-intuitive, lessons for anyone living in a planned community. From the structural placement of a single sentence to the evidentiary power of a blurry photograph, this case offers a masterclass in HOA law. Here are three surprising lessons every homeowner should learn.

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1. The Devil in the Document: How a Single Sentence Can Decide Everything

The first major lesson from this case is that the hyper-specific wording and structure of your community guidelines are paramount. The location and context of a rule can be just as important as the rule itself.

The petitioners’ core argument was that the copper-colored roof violated the Architectural Guidelines because it was a “reflective surface,” which they believed was forbidden. On the surface, this seems like a straightforward complaint.

However, the HOA mounted a successful counter-argument based on document structure. The Administrative Law Judge agreed with the HOA’s interpretation. The rules for roofs were addressed in a distinct section titled “Roofs, Materials, and Pitches.” The ban on “reflective surfaces,” meanwhile, was located in an entirely separate section, “Exterior Appearance and Colors,” which also contained rules for windows and doors. This seemingly minor structural detail was the deciding factor on this point.

The exact rule the petitioners cited, found in the “Exterior Appearance and Colors” section, illustrates the point perfectly:

Clear aluminum window and doorframes are not permitted, nor are reflective surfaces.

Because this prohibition was not located in the roofing section, the judge concluded it applied only to windows, doors, and general exterior surfaces—not roofs. This case highlights that homeowners must read their community documents with extreme care. A prohibition you think is universal might, in fact, be limited to a very specific context by its placement in the text.

2. The Power of Precedent: What Your Neighbors Did Years Ago Matters Today

The second key takeaway is that an HOA board’s decisions can be heavily influenced by the character of the surrounding area, not just by what has been approved inside the development’s gates.

During the hearing, the HOA presented evidence of other reflective metal roofs, including green and red ones, that existed in the broader Pinetop Country Club area. Starwood Estates is part of this larger community, and the judge’s official findings noted this evidence, which significantly supported the HOA’s position to approve the Martins’ copper-colored roof.

This reveals a nuanced lesson: an HOA doesn’t exist in a vacuum. Once a certain style or material becomes common in the surrounding region, it can establish a de facto community standard. This makes it significantly more difficult for other homeowners to argue against a similar request, as the board can point to the broader neighborhood aesthetic to justify its decision. Before you challenge a project, it’s crucial to look not only at what has been approved within your HOA, but also at the character of the community at large.

3. The Burden of Proof: Your Complaint Is Only as Good as Your Evidence

The third critical lesson is that in any formal dispute, the quality of your evidence is non-negotiable. A subjective feeling or personal opinion holds little weight without objective proof.

The petitioners attempted to prove the roof was overly reflective by submitting a photograph as evidence. However, the judge’s official findings delivered a devastating blow, noting with precise and revealing language: “Although the image showed a reflective the image, the photograph was blurred.”

This detail underscores a vital point: in a legal or formal setting, a complaint must be backed by clear, objective proof. Weak or poor-quality evidence, like a blurred photo, can completely undermine an otherwise valid concern. Even though the image hinted at the issue, its poor quality rendered it useless. If you are going to make a claim, the burden is on you to prove it with convincing, high-quality evidence. Without it, your case is likely to be dismissed.

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Conclusion: Before You Build or Battle, Do Your Homework

The Starwood Estates case serves as a powerful reminder that navigating HOA rules requires diligence. From this single dispute over a copper roof, we learn to read the fine print—and the structure—of governing documents, understand the power of aesthetic standards in the broader community, and ensure any complaint is backed by strong, clear evidence.

The next time you plan a home project or question a neighbor’s, ask yourself: have you really done your homework on the rules, the history, and the facts?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Patricia Davies-Brown (petitioner)
Appeared on behalf of petitioners
Bart A. Brown, Jr. (petitioner)
Scott R. Davies (petitioner, board member)
Starwood Estates HOA Board
Voted against the roof approval

Respondent Side

Kristopher L. Smith (HOA attorney)
O'Connor & Campbell, P.C.
Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Daniel Campbell (HOA attorney)
O'Connor & Campbell, P.C.
Pat Knight (board member)
Starwood Estates HOA Board

Neutral Parties

Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
L Dettorre (ADRE Staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
A Hansen (ADRE Staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
D Jones (ADRE Staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
D Gardner (ADRE Staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
N Cano (ADRE Staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
C Serrano (OAH Staff)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Transmitted the order

Other Participants

Jeff Martin (Starwood Estates resident)
Starwood Estates
Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute
Karen Martin (Starwood Estates resident)
Starwood Estates
Property owner whose roof was subject of the dispute

Debbie Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes

Posted on April 26, 2018 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1818028-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-04-26
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Debbie Westerman	Counsel	—
Respondent	Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. aka Bridgewood Townhomes	Counsel	Mark E. Lines and R. Patrick Whelan

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 5(G)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding the Respondent HOA did not unreasonably deny the Petitioner's architectural request. The HOA's standard specification requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks for courtyard walls was found to be reasonable for maintaining architectural continuity consistent with the original Al Beadle design of the community.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the HOA's denial was unreasonable or that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU block was inferior to the 8” x 8” x 16” CMU block she requested, and compliance with the HOA's reasonable specifications was required.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable denial of architectural request to build a courtyard wall

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks, which did not comply with the HOA's Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions requiring 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner failed to establish that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request which did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
CC&R § 5(G)
CC&R § 7(B)
CC&R § 5(J)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Review, Wall Construction, CMU block, Architectural Standard

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818028-REL Decision – 631265.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T09:57:11 (161.6 KB)

18F-H1818028-REL Decision – 631265.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:15 (161.6 KB)

Briefing Document: Westerman v. Bridgewood Townhomes HOA (Case No. 18F-H1818028-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Debbie Westerman versus the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (HOA). The central conflict involved the HOA’s denial of Ms. Westerman’s architectural request to construct a courtyard wall using 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) blocks, which deviated from the association’s established standard of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petitioner’s claim, ruling in favor of the HOA. The decision rested on the finding that the HOA’s architectural standards were reasonable and established to maintain the community’s original design integrity. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to show that the HOA’s denial was unreasonable or that the specified building materials were in any significant way inferior. The HOA successfully argued that its “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions,” in place since 2005, were created to preserve the architectural continuity of the original “Al Beadle design” and have been consistently applied to numerous other homeowner projects.

1. Case Overview and Core Dispute

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Debbie Westerman, owner of condominium unit 31 in Bridgewood Townhomes.

◦ Respondent: Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc. (also known as Bridgewood Townhomes).

• Jurisdiction: The case was heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on January 23, 2018.

• Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request to build a courtyard wall with 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks. The HOA’s established specification required the use of 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks.

2. Chronology of the Dispute

The key events leading to the administrative hearing occurred between October 2017 and January 2018.

Oct 25, 2017

Michael Brubaker, the HOA Board President, emailed the petitioner with the association’s “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

Oct 25, 2017

The petitioner submitted an Architectural Request to build a wall with 8″ x 8″ x 16″ CMU blocks, acknowledging the deviation from specifications.

Oct 25, 2017

Mr. Brubaker sent a follow-up email cautioning the petitioner not to pre-order non-conforming materials as her request was not yet approved.

Nov 29, 2017

Mr. Brubaker emailed the petitioner, acknowledging her request as “extraordinary” and stating the Board would need to meet to consider it.

Dec 28, 2017

The petitioner was formally notified of a Board meeting scheduled for January 2, 2018, to review her request.

Jan 2, 2018

The petitioner attended the Board meeting. The Board unanimously rejected her request because it was contrary to the established specifications and “the historical aspects of our compliance structure.” The Board noted its willingness to approve a compliant wall, but the petitioner “stated that she [was] unwilling to comply.”

Jan 8, 2018

The HOA’s attorney sent a letter to the petitioner summarizing the legal basis for the denial.

Jan 23, 2018

The petitioner filed her formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Petitioner’s Arguments and Evidence (Debbie Westerman)

The petitioner’s case was built on three main arguments: the superiority of her proposed materials, the inconsistency of community standards, and the questionable validity of the HOA’s rules.

• Material Superiority: The petitioner claimed her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” blocks were stronger, less expensive, and visually identical to the required blocks.

◦ Evidence: She testified that three different contractors advised her that the larger blocks would be cheaper due to needing fewer units and less mortar.

◦ Evidence: Her subcontractor, Richard Ross, testified that using twice as many blocks (as required by the 4″ specification) “doubles the chance of the wall failing.”

• Inconsistent Community Standards: The petitioner argued that the HOA did not enforce a uniform aesthetic, negating the need for strict adherence to the block size specification.

◦ Evidence: She submitted photographs (Exhibits A5, A6) of walls at units 34 and 38, owned by Board President Michael Brubaker, which she claimed were built with larger blocks visible through stucco.

◦ Evidence: She submitted a photograph (Exhibit A11) showing courtyard walls of different heights, although wall height was not the subject of her dispute.

• Questionable Rule Authenticity: At the hearing, the petitioner challenged the validity of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” document itself.

◦ Argument: She argued the document was not authentic because the HOA did not produce the official Board meeting minutes from 2005 when the rules were allegedly adopted. This challenge was raised for the first time at the hearing.

4. Respondent’s Arguments and Evidence (Bridgewood HOA)

The HOA’s defense was centered on its legal authority, the reasonableness of its established architectural standards, and the consistent enforcement of its rules.

• Adherence to Established Architectural Standards: The HOA’s primary defense was that its denial was based on a reasonable and long-standing architectural rule.

◦ Authority: The HOA cited CC&R § 5(J), which grants the Board the authority to adopt reasonable rules concerning the use of common elements. Rule 7(a) requires Board approval for any exterior alterations.

◦ Evidence: The HOA submitted the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” (Exhibit 3), which Mr. Brubaker credibly testified was adopted by the Board on March 22, 2005.

◦ Purpose of the Rule: Mr. Brubaker stated the rule’s purpose was to ensure architectural continuity. An email to the petitioner (Exhibit 7) explained:

• Consistent Enforcement: The HOA demonstrated that the rule was not arbitrary but had been consistently applied.

◦ Evidence: Mr. Brubaker testified that since the program’s adoption, “twenty-nine homeowners have had applications approved and constructed courtyard walls to specification.” Four additional compliant applications were approved since the petitioner’s submission. A photograph of a recently completed, compliant wall (Ms. Warren’s) was submitted as Exhibit 16.

• Rebuttal of Petitioner’s Claims: The HOA directly countered the petitioner’s key arguments.

◦ On Inconsistency: Mr. Brubaker testified that the non-conforming walls at units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980 by the original developer, prior to the HOA assuming control of the property (Exhibit 14).

◦ On Structural Integrity: The HOA submitted two technical bulletins from the National Concrete Masonry Association (Exhibits 19 and 20). These documents stated that 4″ high (“half-high”) units can be considered “structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-in. (203-mm) high unit” as long as the cross-section is the same.

◦ On Cost: The HOA submitted a bid from J E Bowen Construction for $6,165.00 to build a compliant wall for the petitioner’s unit (Exhibit 17). It also noted that another homeowner’s recent compliant wall cost only $4,268.23 (Exhibit 15).

5. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found comprehensively in favor of the Respondent (HOA), denying the Petitioner’s petition.

• Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that the petitioner bore the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence” and failed to do so.

• Reasonableness of HOA Standards: The decision affirmed the HOA’s right to establish and enforce aesthetic standards.

• Validity of Specifications: The petitioner’s challenge to the authenticity of the HOA’s rules was dismissed. The ALJ found that she “did not establish that Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions was fraudulent or improperly adopted.”

• Materiality of Block Type: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to prove her central claim that the larger blocks were superior.

• Aesthetic Impact: The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s proposed wall would violate the community’s aesthetic standards, noting that a wall using the larger blocks “would be noticeably different from walls that were constructed in compliance with the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions and other Al Beadle design elements.”

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied because she has not established that CC&R § 5(G) required the Respondent to approve her Architectural Request to build a block wall around her patio that did not comply with Respondent’s Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.”

The order, issued on April 26, 2018, is binding unless a rehearing is requested within 30 days of service.

Study Guide: Westerman v. Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 18F-H1818028-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific action by the Respondent was the Petitioner challenging in her petition?

3. According to the Respondent, what was the primary purpose of the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions”?

4. What were the three main arguments the Petitioner presented in favor of using 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks instead of the specified size?

5. How did the Petitioner attempt to demonstrate that the Respondent’s enforcement of wall specifications was inconsistent?

6. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the non-conforming walls cited by the Petitioner?

7. What evidence did the Respondent present to counter the Petitioner’s claim that the specified 4” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were structurally inferior?

8. Which party bore the “burden of proof” in this case, and what did that require them to establish?

9. On what date did the Respondent’s Board of Directors originally adopt the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions?

10. What was the final ruling in this case, and what was the judge’s primary reason for the decision?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Debbie Westerman, the Petitioner, and the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc., the Respondent. Ms. Westerman owns condominium unit 31 in the Bridgewood Townhomes development and is therefore a member of the Respondent homeowners’ association.

2. The Petitioner was challenging the Respondent’s denial of her Architectural Request to build a wall around her patio. Specifically, she alleged that the Respondent had unreasonably denied her request to use 8” x 8” x 16” concrete masonry unit (CMU) block, which violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

3. The “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions” were developed to provide architectural continuity and standards for courtyard walls. They were intended to ensure that any new walls conformed to the original Al Beadle design represented by other structures on the property, such as the perimeter wall and pool enclosure.

4. The Petitioner argued that her proposed 8” x 8” x 16” CMU blocks were stronger, less expensive (requiring fewer blocks and less mortar), and looked the same as the specified blocks. This information was based on advice she received from three different contractors.

5. The Petitioner submitted photographs of courtyard walls at unit nos. 34 and 38, which she testified had larger blocks visible through stucco. She used these examples to argue that walls within the community were not consistent.

6. The Respondent’s Board president, Michael Brubaker, testified that the walls for units 34 and 38 were constructed before 1980. This was before the original developer turned the property over to the Respondent homeowners’ association, and therefore before the current specifications were in place.

7. The Respondent submitted two technical documents (TEK 5-15 and TEK 2-2B) from the National Concrete Masonry Association. These documents stated that 4-inch high (“half-high”) units are structurally equivalent to their corresponding 8-inch high counterparts, provided the face shell and web thicknesses are the same.

8. The Petitioner, Ms. Westerman, bore the burden of proof. This required her to establish by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated CC&R § 5(G) by unreasonably denying her request.

9. Michael Brubaker, the Respondent’s Board president, credibly testified that the Board adopted the Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions on March 22, 2005.

10. The final ruling was that the Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish that the Respondent’s Board acted unreasonably in denying her request, as the Board’s decision to maintain architectural consistency with the original Al Beadle design was reasonable.

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition (as used in the source document)

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge (Diane Mihalsky) who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, an agency separate from the Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Request

A formal application submitted by a homeowner to the homeowners’ association for approval of any alterations or additions to the exterior of a unit.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. A set of rules recorded with the county that governs the rights and obligations of property owners within a planned community or condominium development.

Concrete Masonry Unit. A standard-size rectangular block used in construction. In this case, the dispute centered on two sizes: 4” x 8” x 16” and 8” x 8” x 16”.

Common Area

Areas within the development owned by the Homeowners’ Association in trust for the benefit and use of all lot owners.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium development that makes and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

Limited Common Elements

Areas, such as the patios or courtyards adjacent to individual units, that are part of the common area but are reserved for the exclusive use of a specific owner.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowner, Debbie Westerman.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this civil case. It is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the homeowners’ association, Bridgewood Nine 30 Property Owners Association, Inc.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of the property. The judge notes that if unambiguous, these are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Subpoena Duces Tecum

A legal order requiring a person to appear and bring specified documents or evidence with them. The decision notes the Petitioner did not request one for the Board meeting minutes.

TEK 2-2B & TEK 5-15

Titles of technical publications from the National Concrete Masonry Association, submitted as evidence by the Respondent to demonstrate the structural equivalence of different-sized CMU blocks.

Why Your HOA Cares About Your Bricks: A Real-Life Legal Battle, Deconstructed

For many homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is a source of quiet frustration. It often involves rules that seem arbitrary, overly specific, or just plain unreasonable. You want to make a practical improvement to your property, but the HOA’s governing documents stand in the way, citing regulations you never knew existed. This friction between individual desire and community standards is common, but rarely does it escalate into a formal legal dispute.

When it does, however, the results can be surprisingly illuminating. Such is the case of Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA in Arizona. Their legal battle wasn’t over a major renovation or a loud party; it was about the specific size of concrete blocks for a new patio wall. On the surface, it seems like a minor disagreement. But a closer look at the administrative law judge’s decision reveals powerful, practical lessons for every homeowner about the hidden legal realities of community governance.

By deconstructing the judge’s final decision, we can uncover four critical lessons that reveal how HOAs wield power and how homeowners can protect themselves.

Takeaway 1: Aesthetic Vision Can Legally Outweigh Practicality

At the heart of the dispute was a simple disagreement over materials. The petitioner, Debbie Westerman, wanted to build her patio wall using 8″x8″x16″ concrete blocks. Her reasoning was entirely practical: a licensed contractor advised her that the larger blocks were “stronger, less expensive, and looks the same.” From a homeowner’s perspective, this seems like an open-and-shut case for approval.

The HOA, however, denied the request. Their position was based not on practicality, but on a specific design vision. The association’s rules, established back in 2005, explicitly required the use of 4″x8″x16″ blocks. The reason? To maintain “architectural continuity” with the property’s original “Al Beadle design.” This wasn’t a vague preference; it was a documented standard intended to conform new construction to the existing visual language of the community, as seen in the “property’s perimeter wall, the original block buildings, the pool area enclosure and buildings, the parking structures, and the walls around the parking areas.”

Ultimately, the judge sided with the HOA. The decision found that the association’s requirement was reasonable because it was aimed at keeping new construction consistent with “significant elements of Bridgewood Townhomes.” This is a crucial lesson: a homeowner’s logical arguments about cost, strength, and appearance can be legally superseded by a community’s well-documented commitment to a specific, even if less tangible, design aesthetic.

Takeaway 2: The Power is in the Paper Trail

The HOA’s entire case rested on the strength of a single key document: the “Wall Construction Specifications & Conditions.” This document, which the board officially adopted on March 22, 2005, clearly outlined the requirement for the 4-inch blocks.

Crucially, the petitioner only challenged the authenticity of this document for the first time during the hearing itself, arguing the HOA had not produced the original meeting minutes that adopted it. The judge deemed this last-minute challenge inadmissible. Why? Crucially, the judge noted that the homeowner had failed to use the proper legal procedures to demand the HOA produce those records ahead of time, making her challenge too little, too late. The HOA, meanwhile, demonstrated a long history of consistent enforcement. Before Ms. Westerman’s request, the association had already approved 29 other courtyard walls, all built according to the 2005 specifications.

This highlights a critical lesson: an HOA’s power is codified in its paper trail. The governing documents—from the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) down to specific board-adopted rules—carry immense legal weight.

Pro Tip: Your HOA’s governing documents are more than just the CC&Rs you received at closing. Formally request and review all board-adopted rules, architectural guidelines, and meeting minutes related to your planned project hiring a contractor or submitting an application.

Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Is on the Homeowner

Many people might assume that in a dispute, the powerful organization (the HOA) has the responsibility to prove its rules are fair and justified. The legal reality is often the exact opposite.

The judge’s decision explicitly stated that the “burden of proof” was on Ms. Westerman to establish that the HOA had acted unreasonably. It was not the HOA’s job to prove their rule was perfect; it was the homeowner’s job to prove the denial was improper. To meet this high legal standard, defined as a “preponderance of the evidence,” you need convincing proof.

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

This case provides a masterclass in what constitutes convincing proof. Ms. Westerman’s evidence that the 8-inch blocks were superior came from the testimony of her contractor’s unlicensed subcontractor. In sharp contrast, the HOA submitted two technical documents from the National Concrete Masonry Association—a neutral, expert authority—which demonstrated that the required 4-inch blocks are “structurally equivalent” to their 8-inch counterparts. The homeowner brought an opinion to a legal fight; the HOA brought expert documentation.

Actionable Advice: If you choose to challenge an HOA decision, understand that personal testimony and contractor opinions are often insufficient. To meet the ‘burden of proof,’ you must be prepared to counter the HOA’s documented rules with equally strong evidence, such as independent engineering reports, surveys, or expert testimony.

Takeaway 4: An HOA Rule Can Be a “Win-Win Program”

While it’s easy to view HOA rules as purely restrictive, the association’s board president, Michael Brubaker, offered a completely different perspective. He framed the wall policy not as a limitation, but as a benefit designed to increase the value and security of the entire community.

In an email to the petitioner, he explained the board’s original thinking behind allowing the walls in the first place, calling it a “win win program.”

A courtyard wall allowed homeowners to expand their homes with an exclusive-use courtyard space, enhance privacy, and improve security, which resulted in an increased individual property value that subsequently raised all property values. Additionally, the Association reduced costs by reducing the common area to be maintained. This is a win win program.

This viewpoint is bolstered by another critical fact: the HOA assumes maintenance responsibility for the walls after they are built. This reinforces the logic behind the rule. Uniformity isn’t just about aesthetics; it’s about the long-term, collective cost and labor of maintaining these structures, making a consistent standard a practical and financial concern for the entire association.

Conclusion: Beyond the Bricks

The dispute between Debbie Westerman and the Bridgewood Townhomes HOA was, on its face, about the size of concrete blocks. But the legal decision reveals a much deeper story about community living. It’s a story about how a shared aesthetic vision, when properly documented, can become legally enforceable. It’s a confirmation of the immense power of written rules and the critical importance of bringing credible evidence to a dispute. And it’s a reminder that the legal burden often falls on the individual to challenge the collective.

This case demonstrates that behind a seemingly petty disagreement lies a complex reality of legal precedent, established processes, and a community’s right to define and defend its character. The next time you encounter a seemingly arbitrary HOA rule, will you see it as a simple restriction, or will you look for the deeper story of community standards and legal precedent behind it?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Debbie Westerman (petitioner)
Appeared on her own behalf
Kelly Zernich (witness)
Petitioner's realtor
Richard Ross (witness)
Petitioner's contractor's subcontractor

Respondent Side

Mark E. Lines (attorney)
Shaw & Lines, LLC
R. Patrick Whelan (attorney)
Shaw & Lines, LLC
Michael Brubaker (board member/witness)
Respondent's Board president

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

Barb Warren (homeowner/applicant)
Application approved by the Board (used for comparison)
Felicia Del Sol (unknown)
Transmitted the decision electronically

Charles Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association

Posted on December 6, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	18F-H1817006-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-12-06
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA did not violate its CC&Rs by allowing play structures on properties that already contained a detached garage or shed, because play structures are not easily convertible into a second residence, which was the underlying concern of the relevant CC&R section.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Charles Mandela	Counsel	—
Respondent	Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association	Counsel	Brian C. Axt, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a); Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition, finding that the HOA did not violate its CC&Rs by allowing play structures on properties that already contained a detached garage or shed, because play structures are not easily convertible into a second residence, which was the underlying concern of the relevant CC&R section.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated CC&R § 3.1. The ALJ determined that the HOA correctly clarified the status of play structures through an amendment to the Architectural Committee's regulations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) regarding allowing play structures (swing sets, treehouses) when another detached structure (garage or shed) is present.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D) by permitting members to construct play structures (swingsets, treehouses, etc.) on properties that already contained one detached structure (garage or shed), arguing that the rules allowed only one detached structure of any type.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied because he failed to establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances. All play structures that the Architectural Committee has previously approved are allowed to remain, and the Architectural Committee may consider and grant future Play Structure Approval Requests.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, CC&R interpretation, detached structures, play structures, Architectural Committee regulations, burden of proof

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1803
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817006-REL Decision – 604710.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:07:52 (155.4 KB)

18F-H1817006-REL Decision – 604710.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:47 (155.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision regarding a dispute between a homeowner, Charles Mandela (“Petitioner”), and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (“Respondent”). The core issue was whether the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by permitting homeowners to install play structures (e.g., swing sets, treehouses) on lots that already contained another detached structure, such as a garage or shed.

The Petitioner argued that the HOA had historically enforced a strict “one detached structure” rule and that its recent allowance of play structures constituted a violation of CC&R § 3.1. In contrast, the Respondent contended that the underlying intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent secondary residential dwellings, not to prohibit recreational structures consistent with a family-oriented community. The HOA asserted it had properly amended its Architectural Committee regulations, not the CC&Rs, to clarify this distinction.

The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of the Respondent HOA. The central finding was that the intent of the restrictive covenant was to maintain the single-family residential character of the community. Because play structures cannot be easily converted into secondary residences, they are not inconsistent with this intent. The ALJ concluded that the HOA was not required to amend the CC&Rs (which requires a 75% member vote) but acted within its authority to amend its rules and regulations via a simple board vote. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Overview

• Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Charles Mandela

◦ Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association

• Hearing Date: November 28, 2017

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D) by allowing members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on properties that already had another detached structure like a garage or shed.

Central Arguments and Presented Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.

• Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.

• Evidence and Testimony:

◦ Historical Enforcement: Testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA enforced this rule by removing nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo, a playhouse, an observation deck, and a zipline structure.

◦ 2006 Legal Opinion: Submitted a February 7, 2006, letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, PLC, which opined on the ambiguity of CC&R § 3.1. The letter stated, “It still appears that only one structure (garage or shed) is permitted,” and supported the HOA’s ability to “enforce the ‘one detached structure’ requirement.” The letter did not specifically mention play structures.

◦ Invalid Approval Form: Presented a “Play Structure Approval Request” form he had drafted while on the board. This form incorrectly stated that the Board of Directors had voted on June 25, 2016, “to adopt changes to the CCR’s [sic], which will allow play structures.” Petitioner argued this was invalid because changing the CC&Rs requires a 75% vote of the membership, which was not obtained.

◦ Ancillary Documents: Submitted documents related to a housing discrimination claim filed by the HOA’s current president, Joseph Hancock, and a letter concerning another member. Petitioner testified these matters involved play structures, though the documents themselves did not mention CC&R § 3.1.

Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)

The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.

• Core Argument: The HOA did not violate the CC&Rs because the intent of the relevant articles is to prohibit secondary residential dwellings, not recreational structures suitable for a community intended to be a “uniquely planned recreation property.”

• Evidence and Testimony:

◦ Community Status: There are currently 16 swingsets or play structures within the 193-lot development. The HOA president, Joseph Hancock, testified he has a swingset used by his children, grandchildren, and neighbors.

◦ Legal Counsel: The HOA retained the firm of Poli & Ball, PLC, which opined that because the community is for recreation and family use, “[p]lay structures are perfectly consistent with recreation and family use.” The firm advised that the Architectural Committee’s regulations could be changed to reflect this without amending the CC&Rs. Another law firm, Carpenter Hazlewood, generally agreed with this opinion.

◦ Correction of Clerical Error: Mr. Hancock testified that the form submitted by the Petitioner contained a typographical error. The board’s intent in its June 25, 2016, vote was to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations, not the CC&Rs.

◦ Board Meeting Minutes: The HOA submitted minutes from board meetings in December 2016 and October 2017. These minutes document the board’s discovery of the error on the website form and subsequent votes to formally clarify that the change was to the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs, thereby ratifying its decision.

◦ Amended Approval Form: Respondent submitted the corrected “Play Structure Approval Request” form, which states, “Per the modified Rules and Regulations dated April 6, 2016, this form must be submitted to Architectural Committee for approval of any Play Structure.”

Governing Rules and Covenants

The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.

Document / Section

Key Provision

CC&R § 3.1

“No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage… No garage or shed shall be built prior to the issuance of a Coconino County building permit for the construction of a Single Family Residence.”

Architectural Regulation 3(D)

“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”

CC&R § 4.2

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”

CC&R § 12.2

Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale

The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.

• Intent of the Covenant: The Judge determined that CC&R Article III is fundamentally “concerned with keeping Respondent single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second residential dwelling on a lot.” This interpretation is supported by other rules in the article prohibiting mobile homes and clarifying that “If you can live/sleep in it, you cannot park it” in the development.

• Status of Play Structures: The decision concludes that a play structure “cannot be easily converted into a second residence.” Therefore, permitting a play structure in addition to a garage or shed is not inconsistent with the primary purpose of CC&R § 3.1.

• Board Authority vs. Member Vote: Because allowing play structures was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs, the Respondent was not required to amend the CC&Rs through a 75% member vote. Instead, the Board was empowered by CC&R § 4.2 to “amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to provide clarification on the status of play structures” through a majority vote of the Board.

• History of Enforcement: The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to establish a uniform history of enforcement against play structures. Rather, “it appears that the status of play structures, swingsets, and tree houses has been unsettled and the subject of some contention,” partly due to the Petitioner’s own advocacy.

• Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.

Final Order and Implications

• Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.

• Outcome for the Community:

1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.

2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.

3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.

Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision No. 18F-H1817006-REL

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties in case No. 18F-H1817006-REL, and what was their relationship?

2. What specific violation did the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, allege against the Respondent?

3. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bears the initial burden?

4. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the CC&Rs and amending the “Rules and Regulations”?

5. What was the Petitioner’s primary evidence to support his claim that the HOA historically enforced a “one detached structure” rule?

6. How did the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates HOA, legally justify its decision to permit play structures even on lots that already had a detached garage or shed?

7. How did the Respondent explain the document from its website which stated that the Board had voted to “adopt changes to the CCR’s”?

8. What did the law firm Poli & Ball conclude regarding the permissibility of play structures within the community?

9. What did Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky determine was the primary intent of Article III of the CC&Rs?

10. What was the final Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Charles Mandela, and the Respondent, Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association. Mr. Mandela is a homeowner within the Blue Ridge Estates development and a member of the homeowners’ association.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D). He claimed the HOA wrongly allowed members to build play structures, swing sets, or treehouses on their properties when another detached structure, such as a garage or shed, already existed.

3. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the evidence must convince the judge that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Charles Mandela, bears the initial burden of proof to establish that a violation occurred.

4. To amend the CC&Rs (the Declaration), an affirmative vote or written consent from members owning at least 75% of all lots is required. In contrast, the Board of Directors can adopt, amend, or repeal “Rules and Regulations” by a simple majority vote of the Board.

5. The Petitioner testified that between 2002 and 2016, the HOA removed nine non-compliant structures, including a gazebo and a playhouse. He also submitted a 2006 letter from the law firm Carpenter Hazlewood, which opined that the HOA could enforce a “one detached structure” requirement.

6. The Respondent argued that the intent of the CC&Rs was to prevent second residential dwellings on a lot, not to prohibit recreational items consistent with a family community. Therefore, the Board acted within its authority under CC&R § 4.2 to amend the Architectural Committee’s regulations to clarify that play structures are permitted.

7. The Respondent’s president, Joseph Hancock, testified that the wording was a typographical error made by the previous Chair of the Architectural Committee (the Petitioner). Board meeting minutes from December 2016 and October 2017 were submitted as evidence to show the Board’s actual intent was to modify the rules and regulations, not the CC&Rs.

8. The Poli & Ball law firm opined that play structures are “perfectly consistent with recreation and family use” in a community intended to be a planned recreation property. The firm concluded that the HOA could change the Architectural Committee’s regulations to allow them as long as the change was consistent with the CC&Rs.

9. The Judge concluded that the purpose of Article III is to keep the community single-family residential by prohibiting structures and vehicles that could be used as a second dwelling. Since a play structure cannot be easily converted into a second residence, allowing one did not violate the intent of the CC&Rs.

10. The Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge found that the Petitioner had not established that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances, and that the HOA had properly resolved the issue by amending its regulations.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon specific facts, arguments, and legal principles from the source document.

1. Discuss the critical distinction between amending the community’s CC&Rs and amending the Architectural Committee’s regulations. Explain how this distinction became the central pivot upon which the entire case turned.

2. Analyze the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s exhibits and testimony, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Respondent’s evidence more persuasive.

3. The “Conclusions of Law” section discusses the legal principle of interpreting restrictive covenants based on the “intent of the parties.” How did Judge Mihalsky apply this principle to CC&R § 3.1, and how did the community’s stated purpose as a “uniquely planned recreation property” influence this interpretation?

4. Charles Mandela, the Petitioner, was a former board member and president of the Architectural Committee who drafted one of the key documents in question. Discuss how his past involvement in HOA governance may have shaped his legal position and the evidence he presented.

5. Trace the timeline of the “play structure” controversy as detailed in the hearing evidence, from the 2015 discrimination claim to the “clarification vote” in October 2017. How does this sequence of events illustrate the challenges of community governance and rule interpretation within a homeowners’ association?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent, impartial judge who presides over administrative hearings at government agencies. In this case, the ALJ from the Office of Administrative Hearings heard the dispute between the homeowner and the HOA.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for approving any construction, alteration, or improvement to the exterior of any property to ensure it complies with community standards.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this hearing, the Petitioner had the burden to prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

A legally binding document that governs a planned community or subdivision. It outlines the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the homeowners’ association.

Declaration

The formal legal document that creates the homeowners’ association and its CC&Rs. In this case, amending the Declaration required a 75% vote of the members.

Detached Structure

A building on a property that is separate from the main residence. The dispute centered on whether play structures counted as the “one detached structure” permitted by the CC&Rs.

Improvements

A broad term defined in the CC&Rs (§ 1.17) to include buildings, garages, fences, walls, landscaping, and all other structures of every type and kind on a property.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The judge noted that if Title 33 did not apply, the Office of Administrative Hearings would lack jurisdiction to hear the case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, homeowner Charles Mandela.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It requires the trier of fact (the judge) to be convinced that a claim is more probably true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or CC&Rs that limits the use of the property. The “one detached structure” rule is an example of a restrictive covenant.

Single Family Residential Use

The designated purpose of the properties in Blue Ridge Estates, meaning they are to be used exclusively as private homes for single families, not for commercial or multi-family dwelling purposes.

Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association (No. 18F-H1817006-REL)

Executive Summary

Case Overview

• Case Number: 18F-H1817006-REL

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: Charles Mandela

◦ Respondent: Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association

• Hearing Date: November 28, 2017

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky

Central Arguments and Presented Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Charles Mandela)

The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise of a long-standing, strict interpretation of the “one detached structure” rule.

• Core Argument: For 18 years, the Respondent interpreted CC&R § 3.1 to permit only one detached structure on any given lot, regardless of its type.

• Evidence and Testimony:

Respondent’s Position (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)

The Respondent’s defense centered on the purpose of the CC&Rs and its authority as a board to clarify and amend its own rules and regulations.

• Evidence and Testimony:

Governing Rules and Covenants

The dispute hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key provisions in the community’s governing documents.

Document / Section

Key Provision

CC&R § 3.1

Architectural Regulation 3(D)

“One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property. The residence must be constructed and completed before the detached structure is built.”

CC&R § 4.2

“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may, from time to time… adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations to be known as the ‘Rules and Regulations.’”

CC&R § 12.2

Amending the Declaration of CC&Rs requires “the affirmative vote… or written consent of Members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all Lots.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Rationale

The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that the Respondent acted properly within its authority.

• Conclusion: The Respondent properly resolved the ambiguity by amending its regulations.

Final Order and Implications

• Decision: The petition was denied because the Petitioner did not establish that CC&R § 3.1 prohibits play structures under any circumstances.

• Outcome for the Community:

1. The HOA’s amendment of its rules to explicitly permit play structures was deemed valid.

2. All play structures previously approved by the Architectural Committee are allowed to remain on members’ properties.

3. The Architectural Committee is authorized to consider and approve future Play Structure Approval Requests that are submitted in accordance with the established regulations.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Charles Mandela (petitioner)
Appeared and testified on his own behalf; previously served as president of the Architectural Committee.

Respondent Side

Brian C. Axt (attorney)
Resnick & Louis, P.C.
Represented Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association.
Joseph Hancock (board member)
Blue Ridge Estates Homeowner Association
Board's president; presented testimony/witness for Respondent.
Jason Miller (counsel)
Carpenter Hazlewood
Provided an email opinion supporting the Respondent's position.

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate

John Shields vs. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch

Posted on October 11, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2018-02-26
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	John L. Shields	Counsel	—
Respondent	Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch	Counsel	Maria R. Kupillas

Alleged Violations

CC&R § 6.2(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated its CC&Rs by approving the wall extension, as the HOA’s approval duties were limited to aesthetic considerations under CC&R § 7.2 and did not extend to enforcing or ensuring adjoining owner approval required by CC&R § 6.2(A).

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent erroneously approved the proposal, as Respondent's duties under CC&R § 7.2 did not require considering adjoining neighbor approval specified in CC&R § 6.2(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs by HOA improperly approving a neighbor's block wall extension without adjoining owner's approval.

Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving a neighbor's block wall extension that served as a party wall because Petitioner, the adjoining owner, had not approved the wall. Respondent argued their approval duties under CC&R § 7.2 only concerned aesthetics, not ensuring neighbor approval.

Orders: The petition is dismissed and no action is required of Respondent.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
CC&R § 6.2(A)
CC&R § 7.2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&R, Architectural Control Committee, Fence, Party Wall, Rehearing, Burden of Proof

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717034-REL Decision – 619560.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:20 (90.8 KB)

17F-H1717034-REL Decision – 592935.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:24 (115.2 KB)

Briefing Document: Analysis of Administrative Law Judge Decision in Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in Case No. 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG, dated February 26, 2018. The central issue was a petition filed by homeowner John L. Shields against the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Homeowners’ Association (HOA), alleging the HOA improperly approved a wall extension built by his neighbor, Joe Johnson, without Mr. Shields’ required consent.

The petition was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Shields, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The decision rests on a critical distinction between the responsibilities of a homeowner and the responsibilities of the HOA under separate articles of the CC&Rs. The ALJ determined that the obligation to secure an adjoining neighbor’s approval for a wall alteration (under CC&R § 6.2) falls exclusively on the homeowner undertaking the project. In contrast, the HOA’s duty (under CC&R § 7.2) is limited to an aesthetic review of the proposed alteration, which it conducted appropriately. The HOA had no legal obligation to enforce or verify neighbor-to-neighbor approval.

I. Case Overview

Case Name

John L. Shields (Petitioner) vs. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch (Respondent)

Case Number

17F-H1717034-REL-RHG

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Date of Decision

February 26, 2018

Core Dispute

The petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving a neighbor’s approximately 5’ x 6’ block wall extension without the petitioner’s consent.

Final Outcome

The petition was dismissed, with no action required of the respondent HOA.

II. Petitioner’s Claim and Arguments

John L. Shields, a homeowner at 20431 E. Bronco Drive within the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch development, filed a petition against the HOA concerning a wall extension built by his next-door neighbor, Joe Johnson.

• Core Allegation: After vacillating on the specifics of his complaint during the hearing, Mr. Shields firmly asserted that his single issue was that the HOA improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal to build a block wall extension and move his gate forward.

• Basis of Claim: The petitioner argued that under CC&R § 6.2, the HOA should have withheld its approval because Mr. Johnson had not demonstrated that he had first obtained Mr. Shields’ approval for the wall extension between their properties.

• Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Shields denied ever having approved the wall. He submitted a photograph he had taken from his front porch and testified that the block wall extension “was an eyesore.”

III. Respondent’s Position and Evidence

The Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA, represented by board president Kristi Hancock, denied all complaint items and argued its actions were consistent with the governing CC&Rs.

• Basis of Approval: The HOA contended that its approval was based solely on the criteria outlined in CC&R § 7.2. The board, acting as the Architectural Control Committee, reviewed Mr. Johnson’s proposal for its aesthetic qualities and consistency with other properties in the development.

• Aesthetic Review: Ms. Hancock testified that the board inspected other wall extensions and gates and found Mr. Johnson’s proposal to be “aesthetically pleasing and consistent with the other properties.”

• Neighbor Consent Issue: The HOA acknowledged its awareness of Mr. Shields’ objection to the wall after it was built. However, Ms. Hancock testified that the board’s understanding of whether Mr. Shields had approved the wall before construction was unclear. She stated that “at least four witnesses had stated that they heard Petitioner either actually approve of or fail to state an objection to the block wall extension while, in Petitioner’s presence, Mr. Johnson discussed having the block wall extension built.”

• Separation of Duties: The HOA’s position was that its duty under § 7.2 was distinct from the homeowner’s duty under § 6.2. The HOA was not responsible for obtaining or verifying neighbor approval.

IV. Chronology of Key Events

1. October 13, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Johnson has the block wall extension built without first obtaining approval from the HOA’s board or committee.

2. October 16, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Shields expresses his disapproval of the newly built wall to Mr. and Mrs. Johnson.

3. November 2, 2016 (approx.): Mr. Johnson retroactively submits his proposal for the wall extension and a plan to move his gate forward to the Architectural Control Committee for approval.

4. November 2016: The HOA’s newly elected board meets as the Committee and verbally approves Mr. Johnson’s wall but advises him that “he will need to seek neighboring property owner’s approval.”

5. January 2017: The board formally approves Mr. Johnson’s proposal for the wall extension and gate move.

6. May 3, 2017 (approx.): Mr. Shields files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

7. September 27, 2017: An initial hearing is held, and Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky dismisses the petition.

8. December 5, 2017: The Real Estate Commissioner grants Mr. Shields’ request for a rehearing based on his claims of legal errors and judicial misconduct.

9. February 5, 2018: A rehearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

V. Analysis of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The judge’s decision hinged on the distinct and separate functions of two key CC&R sections.

This section governs alterations to shared fences and walls.

Such Party Walls and Fences shall not be altered, or changed in design, color, material or construction from the original installation made by the Developer without [the] approval of the adjoining Owner(s), if any, and the [Architectural Control] Committee.

• Interpretation: The ALJ interpreted this section as creating two separate approval requirements for the homeowner making the alteration: one from the adjoining owner and one from the Committee. It does not obligate the Committee to enforce the adjoining owner’s approval.

This section defines the scope and limits of the Architectural Control Committee’s power.

No . . . fences . . . shall be commenced [or] erected . . . until the plans and specifications showing the same shall have been submitted to and approved by the Committee. Approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. However, the Committee shall have the right to refuse to approve any Alteration which is not suitable or desirable in their opinion for aesthetic or other reasons…

• Interpretation: The ALJ found that this section limits the Committee’s review to specific criteria, including aesthetics, harmony with surroundings, and effect on neighboring property. It explicitly states that approval “shall not be unreasonably withheld” and does not require the Committee to verify compliance with other CC&Rs or city ordinances.

VI. Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale for Dismissal

The ALJ’s decision to dismiss the petition was based on a clear legal interpretation of the CC&Rs and the petitioner’s failure to meet the burden of proof.

• Distinct and Separate Obligations: The core of the ruling is that the CC&Rs create parallel but separate responsibilities.

1. Homeowner’s Responsibility: The duty to obtain an adjoining neighbor’s approval for a shared wall alteration under § 6.2(A) rests solely with the homeowner performing the work (Mr. Johnson).

2. HOA’s Responsibility: The HOA’s duty under § 7.2 is limited to reviewing the project on its aesthetic merits and consistency within the community.

• Key Legal Finding: The decision explicitly states the separation of these duties:

• Scope of HOA Review: The ALJ affirmed that the HOA’s scope of review was properly limited.

• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Because the HOA acted within the authority and limitations defined by CC&R § 7.2, the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its governing documents.

• Other Responsibilities: The decision also noted that the responsibility for ensuring compliance with City of Queen Creek ordinances (related to the gate move) ultimately rested with Mr. Johnson, not the HOA.

VII. Final Order

Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be dismissed.

• No action is required of the Respondent, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA.

• The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

• Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG, involving John L. Shields and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, an answer key for verification, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the context of the legal decision.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?

2. What was the specific, single-issue claim that the Petitioner, John L. Shields, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on May 3, 2017?

3. What is a “party wall” according to CC&R § 6.2(A), and what specific approval is required to alter one?

4. What was the timeline of the wall extension’s construction and Mr. Johnson’s subsequent submission for approval to the Committee?

5. On what grounds did the Respondent’s board, acting as the Architectural Control Committee, approve Mr. Johnson’s proposal?

6. What was the Petitioner’s central argument for why the Respondent should not have approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal?

7. Why was a rehearing granted after the initial hearing on September 27, 2017?

8. What contradictory evidence did the Respondent’s board consider regarding whether the Petitioner had approved the wall extension before it was built?

9. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this case?

10. What was the final recommended order from Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer, and what was the core legal reasoning for this decision?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner is John L. Shields, who owns a home at 20431 E. Bronco Drive. The Respondent is the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch, a homeowners’ association in Queen Creek, Arizona. Mr. Shields is a member of the Respondent association.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated § 6.2(A) of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The violation claim was based on the Respondent approving a common block wall extension built by his neighbor, Joe Johnson, without the Petitioner’s required approval.

3. According to CC&R § 6.2(A), a “party wall” is a fence constructed upon the back of a lot. To alter or change the design, color, material, or construction of such a wall, approval is required from both the adjoining owner(s) and the Architectural Control Committee.

4. Mr. Johnson had the wall extension built on or about October 13, 2016, without prior approval. He subsequently submitted his proposal to the Committee for approval on or about November 2, 2016.

5. The board approved the proposal based on the criteria in CC&R § 7.2, which required it to consider if the alteration was aesthetically pleasing and harmonious with its surroundings. The board inspected other extensions in the development and found Mr. Johnson’s proposal to be consistent with them.

6. The Petitioner argued that the Respondent’s approval was improper because Mr. Johnson had not demonstrated that he had first obtained the Petitioner’s approval for the block wall extension, which is a stated requirement in CC&R § 6.2.

7. A rehearing was granted by Commissioner Judy Lowe on December 5, 2017. The Petitioner requested it based on claims of errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, other errors of law, and alleged misconduct by the initial Administrative Law Judge that deprived him of a fair hearing.

8. The board knew the Petitioner objected to the wall after it was built. However, the board was also aware of at least four witnesses who stated they heard the Petitioner either actually approve of the extension or fail to object while Mr. Johnson discussed building it in his presence.

9. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the Petitioner, John L. Shields, bore the burden of proof to establish his claim by this standard.

10. The judge ordered that the petition be dismissed and that no action was required of the Respondent. The reasoning was that under CC&R § 6.2(A), the responsibility to get an adjoining neighbor’s approval lies with the property owner (Mr. Johnson), not the Respondent, and CC&R § 7.2 only required the Respondent to consider aesthetic factors, which it did.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to provoke deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, structuring your answer in a standard essay format.

1. Analyze the distinct responsibilities assigned to the homeowner (Mr. Johnson) and the homeowners’ association (Respondent) by CC&R § 6.2(A) and § 7.2. How did the separation of these duties form the crux of the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision?

2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined in the decision. Explain why the evidence presented by the Petitioner, including his testimony and photograph of the wall, failed to meet this burden of proof against the Respondent.

3. Examine the role and limitations of the Architectural Control Committee as described in CC&R § 7.2. In your analysis, consider what the committee is required to evaluate, what it is explicitly not responsible for, and the provision that its approval “shall not be unreasonably withheld.”

4. Trace the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filing to the final order after the rehearing. What does this progression reveal about the administrative hearing process and the grounds upon which a rehearing can be granted?

5. Although the petition was dismissed, the facts indicate that Mr. Johnson built the wall extension before receiving any approval and that the City of Queen Creek later found his plan to move the gate violated city codes. Argue whether the Respondent (the HOA) bears any ethical, if not legal, responsibility in a situation where its approval process is disconnected from neighbor consent and municipal law compliance.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition in Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presides over evidentiary hearings and issues decisions on matters referred by state agencies like the Department of Real Estate.

Architectural Control Committee (“the Committee”)

A body within the homeowners’ association, in this case comprised of the board members, responsible for reviewing and approving or denying proposed alterations to properties, such as fences, based on aesthetic and other specified criteria.

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

The Arizona Revised Statute that permits an owner in a planned community to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate concerning violations of community documents.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide evidence that proves its claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for a planned community. This case centers on the interpretation of § 6.2(A) and § 7.2 of the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch CC&Rs.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Respondent, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch, is an HOA.

Party Wall

As defined in CC&R § 6.2(A), a fence constructed upon the back of any lot that is shared between adjoining properties. Alterations require approval from the adjoining owner and the Committee.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John L. Shields, a homeowner and member of the Respondent association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this civil administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, making it more probable that a contention is true than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this instance because the Petitioner claimed there were errors of law and misconduct by the judge in the first proceeding that deprived him of a fair hearing.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association.

4 Surprising Lessons From a Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against His HOA

It’s a scenario many homeowners can imagine: a neighbor erects a new wall along the property line without your consent. Your first instinct is to escalate the issue to your Homeowners’ Association (HOA), assuming it’s their job to enforce the community’s rules. This common assumption—that the HOA is the ultimate authority responsible for mediating all disputes between neighbors—is powerful, but is it always correct?

A real-life administrative court case, Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch, provides a valuable case study in the delineation of duties within a planned community, revealing that the answer can be a surprising “no.” This case offers critical insights into the true roles and responsibilities of an HOA. Here are the top four counter-intuitive takeaways from this legal decision that every homeowner should understand.

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1. Your HOA Isn’t a Referee for Neighbor-to-Neighbor Agreements

Mr. Shields sued his HOA because it approved a neighbor’s wall extension that he, the adjoining owner, had not approved. He believed this violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), specifically § 6.2(A), which requires approval from the adjoining owner for such changes.

The Administrative Law Judge, however, found the HOA had no legal duty to enforce this particular rule. The responsibility to secure the neighbor’s approval fell solely on the property owner making the change, not the HOA. The judge’s finding on this point was direct and unambiguous:

CC&R § 6.2(A) required that the property owner, Mr. Johnson, obtain the adjoining property owner’s, Petitioner’s, approval before he built the block wall extension. Respondent [the HOA] had no obligation under CC&R § 6.2(A) to obtain or ensure Petitioner approved the block wall extension.

This ruling clarifies that an HOA’s role is not that of a quasi-judicial body for resolving all private disputes; its enforcement powers are limited to the specific duties enumerated in its governing documents. CC&R § 6.2(A) effectively creates a private right of action between neighbors, which the HOA is not a party to. The HOA’s role is to enforce rules that obligate the homeowner to the association, not necessarily to other homeowners.

2. The Architectural Committee’s Job Is Narrower Than You Think

In its defense, the HOA’s board, acting as the Architectural Control Committee, argued that its review was based on a different rule entirely: CC&R § 7.2. The judge agreed, highlighting the Committee’s very narrow scope of responsibility.

According to the case findings, the Committee’s only legal obligation was to determine if the proposed wall was “aesthetically pleasing and consistent” with other properties in the development. Its review under § 7.2 did not require it to confirm whether the neighbor had obtained Mr. Shields’ approval as mandated by the separate rule. This legal structure isolates the two duties, and the homeowner’s error was conflating them. The HOA’s limited aesthetic review reinforces the conclusion from our first lesson: it is not responsible for policing the separate neighbor-approval requirement. An architectural green light is often purely about community harmony, not a verification of compliance with every other covenant.

3. Building First and Asking Permission Later Creates Confusion

The sequence of events in this case was disorderly, which ultimately clouded the legal issues. From the outset, the petitioner himself “vacillated on whether his issue with Respondent was that it improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal… or that it failed to enforce the requirement that Mr. Johnson had to obtain Petitioner’s approval,” foreshadowing the difficulty in proving a specific violation.

The timeline further illustrates the breakdown in process:

• October 13, 2016: The neighbor, Mr. Johnson, built the wall extension before seeking any approval.

• October 16, 2016: Mr. Shields expressed his disapproval directly to the neighbor.

• November 2, 2016: The neighbor submitted his proposal to the HOA for approval—weeks after the wall was already built.

• November 2016: The HOA Board verbally approved the wall but astutely “advised him that ‘he will need to seek neighboring property owner’s approval.’”

This retroactive process, combined with a dispute clouded by conflicting testimony—four witnesses claimed they heard Mr. Shields either approve of the wall or fail to object—muddied the waters, making it impossible for the petitioner to meet his burden of proof regarding the HOA’s actions. The messiness of the facts directly contributed to the legal failure.

4. The Burden of Proof Rests Entirely on You

In a legal dispute with an HOA, the “burden of proof” falls on the petitioner. Mr. Shields had to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court defines simply as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Crucially, he had to prove that the HOA specifically violated a statute or a rule within the CC&Rs. It wasn’t enough to demonstrate that his neighbor violated a rule or that the situation felt unjust. He had to prove the HOA failed to perform a duty for which it was explicitly responsible.

The judge ultimately dismissed the petition because Mr. Shields could not meet this burden. He failed to prove the HOA had a duty to deny the application based on his lack of approval. A subjective sense of unfairness is insufficient to meet the legal standard; a petitioner must prove a direct breach of a specified duty by the association.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Know Your Rules, Not Just Your Rights

The overarching lesson from the Shields case is that CC&Rs are a legal contract with a precise, and sometimes non-obvious, allocation of responsibilities among the homeowner, their neighbors, and the association itself. The HOA is not an all-powerful enforcer but an organization with a defined, and sometimes surprisingly limited, set of duties. Homeowners, in turn, have their own responsibilities—including, at times, enforcing certain rights directly with their neighbors.

Before escalating your next neighborhood issue, have you read the fine print to see who is truly responsible for what?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

John Shields (petitioner)

Respondent Side

Maria R. Kupillas (HOA attorney)
Law Offices of Farley Choate & Bergin
Represented Respondent Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Joe Johnson (neighbor/member)
Lot owner who built the wall extension; Husband of Sandy Johnson
Sandy Johnson (neighbor/witness)
Wife of Joe Johnson; next-door neighbor to Petitioner; testified in initial hearing
Dean Kabanuk (board member/witness)
Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Board
Respondent’s board president; testified in initial hearing
Kristi Hancock (board member/witness)
Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Board
Attorney; served as VP (Nov 2016-Nov 2017) and President (since Nov 2017); testified in both hearings
Brenda Campbell (property manager/witness)
Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Respondent’s community manager; testified in initial hearing
A.J. Denardo (witness)
Lives near Petitioner; testified in initial hearing regarding Petitioner's tacit approval

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Issued the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision (October 11, 2017)
Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Issued the Administrative Law Judge Decision following rehearing (February 26, 2018)
Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Granted Petitioner's request for rehearing; decision transmitted to Commissioner
Felicia Del Sol (OAH staff)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Transmitted the rehearing decision

Richard Long vs. Pebble Creek Resort Community

Posted on September 6, 2017 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	17F-H1717037-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2017-09-06
Administrative Law Judge	Diane Mihalsky
Outcome	The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof demonstrating the HOA violated community documents by refusing the requested block wall. The wall was prohibited by CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines because it was planned for just inside the property line and excluded the adjacent owner from use, potentially leading to prohibited parallel walls.
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Richard Long	Counsel	—
Respondent	Pebble Creek Resort Community	Counsel	—

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01; CC&Rs § 1(Hh), 2(P)(i); ALC Guideline SS(4)(a)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, concluding that the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof demonstrating the HOA violated community documents by refusing the requested block wall. The wall was prohibited by CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines because it was planned for just inside the property line and excluded the adjacent owner from use, potentially leading to prohibited parallel walls.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated the CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines.

Key Issues & Findings

Refusal to approve construction of a 10’ long, 6’ high block wall for privacy

Petitioner sought approval for a 10’ long, 6’ high block wall for privacy, built a foot or so inside his property line, designed to prevent adjacent neighbors (the Rohlmans) from using it. Respondent denied the wall based on community documents restricting such constructions to avoid parallel walls and requiring party walls to be on or immediately adjacent to the property line, granting contiguous owners the right to use them.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
CC&R § 1(Hh)
CC&R § 2(P)(i)
ALC Guideline SS(4)(a)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Block Wall, Privacy Wall, CC&Rs, ALC Guidelines, Party Wall

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
CC&R § 1(Hh)
CC&R § 2(P)(i)
ALC Guideline SS(4)(a)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717037-REL Decision – 586501.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:05:32 (117.9 KB)

17F-H1717037-REL Decision – 588547.pdf

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Briefing: Case No. 17F-H1717037-REL, Long v. Pebble Creek Resort Community

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative hearing and final decision concerning a dispute between homeowner Richard Long (“Petitioner”) and the Pebble Creek Resort Community homeowners’ association (“Respondent”). The core of the dispute was the Petitioner’s request to build a 10-foot long, 6-foot high block privacy wall approximately one foot inside his property line, which the Respondent’s Architectural Landscape Committee (ALC) denied.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the petition, a decision that was subsequently adopted as a Final Order by the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The central finding was that the Respondent’s governing documents—specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and ALC Guidelines—unequivocally prohibit the proposed wall. The ALJ concluded that a wall built so close to a property line is defined as a “Party Wall,” which must be constructed “on or immediately adjacent to” the boundary and be usable by both property owners. The Petitioner’s proposal violated these foundational rules by being set back from the property line with the explicit intent of preventing neighbor access and use.

The Respondent had offered a conditional variance for a wall to be built directly on the property line, but this required a mutual “Party Wall/Fence Agreement” with the adjacent neighbor, who refused to sign, citing concerns over property value and the legal complexity of a perpetual easement. The final ruling affirmed the Respondent’s authority to enforce its governing documents as written.

Case Overview

The matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by the Petitioner with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA had violated its own governing documents by refusing to approve his proposed wall.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Richard Long, Petitioner, v. Pebble Creek Resort Community, Respondent

Case Number

No. 17F-H1717037-REL / HO 17-17/037

Office of Administrative Hearings (Phoenix, Arizona)

Petitioner

Richard Long (Appeared on his own behalf)

Respondent

Pebble Creek Resort Community (Represented by Jack Sarsam, SVP for Robson Communities)

Administrative Law Judge

Diane Mihalsky

Real Estate Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Hearing Date

August 30, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

September 6, 2017

Final Order Date

September 14, 2017

Core Dispute and Party Positions

Petitioner’s Proposal and Argument (Richard Long)

• Project: A 10-foot long, 6-foot high block wall intended to provide privacy between his patio and the patio of his adjacent neighbors, the Rohlmans.

• Proposed Location: “A foot or so inside his side of the property line.”

• Stated Intent: To construct a wall to which his neighbors could not attach or otherwise use. The Petitioner testified that if the Rohlmans later wanted their own wall (e.g., for a pool or pet), they could build a separate, parallel wall on their property.

• Rejection of Alternatives: The Petitioner acknowledged that the ALC would approve a “privacy panel wall” made of alumawood or lattice, but he rejected this option, deeming it “unsightly and flimsy.”

• Core Claim: The Petitioner argued that the Respondent’s CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines did not explicitly prohibit the construction of his proposed block wall at its intended location inside his property line.

Respondent’s Position and Actions (Pebble Creek HOA)

• Initial Action: The ALC denied the Petitioner’s request.

• Rationale for Denial: The Respondent explained that walls near lot lines can become problematic, particularly if they result in “two parallel walls.” This situation can create a narrow, inaccessible space between the walls that is difficult to maintain and “becomes filled with refuse, leaves, insects, nests and rodents.”

• Conditional Variance: On May 1, 2017, the Respondent offered to approve a variance with several key conditions:

1. The wall must be constructed directly on the property line.

2. Both the Petitioner and the Rohlmans must sign a written “Party Wall/Fence Agreement” (Form ALC 48).

3. This agreement must grant current and future owners permission to “extend/complete the wall” and must be disclosed upon the sale of either home.

4. The signed agreement would be kept in the ALC files for both properties.

Neighbor’s Position (The Rohlmans)

• The Rohlmans declined to sign the Party Wall/Fence Agreement proposed by the Respondent.

• In an email submitted as evidence, they outlined their reasons for refusal:

◦ Property Value: They believed a wall on the property line would negatively affect the “current and future value” of both properties.

◦ Legal Complexity: The agreement would require granting a perpetual easement, which they identified as a legal document entailing legal expenses.

◦ Disclosure upon Sale: The easement would have to be disclosed to future buyers, which they argued “lowers the value of the property.”

◦ Future Construction: A wall on the property line could be extended by either party or future owners “without the agreement of the other party.”

◦ They concluded that “All of these requirements are onerous.”

Analysis of Governing Documents

The ALJ’s decision rested on a direct interpretation of four key sections of the community’s CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines.

• CC&R § 1(Hh) – Definition of “Party Walls”

◦ This section defines a party wall as: “a wall constructed on or immediately adjacent to the common boundary of Lots, Parcels, Common Areas or other areas in PebbleCreek Golf Resort.”

◦ The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s proposal for a wall “a foot or so inside” the property line did not meet this definition.

• CC&R § 2(P)(i) – Use of Party Walls

◦ This rule states: “Each Owner shall have the right to use the Party Wall, provided that such use does not interfere with the other Owner’s use and enjoyment thereof.”

◦ This directly contradicted the Petitioner’s goal of building a wall that his neighbors would be prohibited from using.

• ALC Guideline SS(4)(a) – Parallel Walls

◦ This guideline explicitly states: “An existing party wall along a joint property line precludes any adjacent parallel party wall, i.e. Two walls cannot be built side by side.”

◦ The Petitioner’s own testimony acknowledged the possibility of his neighbor building a parallel wall in the future, a scenario the guidelines are designed to prevent.

• ALC Guideline JJ – “Privacy Panel Wall”

◦ This section details the pre-approved alternative for privacy screening. Such a wall must be:

▪ Free-standing alumawood.

▪ Six feet in height and no more than sixteen feet in length.

▪ Located “at least three (3) feet from the property line.”

◦ This demonstrates a clear distinction in the rules between a shared “Party Wall” near the boundary and a private “Privacy Panel” set significantly back from it.

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ, Diane Mihalsky, concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to establish that the Respondent had violated its governing documents.

• Key Findings of Law:

1. A block wall built “a foot inside the property line” does not conform to CC&R § 1(Hh), which requires a party wall to be “on or immediately adjacent to” the boundary.

2. The Petitioner’s intent to deny his neighbor the use of the wall violates CC&R § 2(P)(i), which grants both owners rights to use a party wall.

3. The Petitioner’s proposal creates the potential for prohibited parallel walls, violating ALC Guideline SS(4)(a).

• Conclusion: The ALJ stated that the community’s documents “unequivocally prohibit Respondent from building a 6’ high, 10’ long block wall a foot from his property line that the Rohlmans are not permitted to use.”

• Recommended Order: On September 6, 2017, the ALJ issued a recommended order that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Final Order and Subsequent Actions

• Adoption of Decision: On September 14, 2017, Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, issued a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.

• Effect of Order: The denial of the petition became final, binding, and effective immediately.

• Conditions for Rehearing: The Final Order stipulated that a rehearing could be granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04, but only for one of the following reasons:

1. Irregularity in proceedings or abuse of discretion by the ALJ.

2. Misconduct by the Department, ALJ, or prevailing party.

3. Accident or surprise that could not have been prevented.

4. Newly discovered material evidence.

5. Excessive or insufficient penalties.

6. Error in the admission or rejection of evidence.

7. The decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

8. The findings of fact are not supported by the evidence or are contrary to law.

• Judicial Review: The order is subject to judicial review through the filing of a complaint pursuant to state law.

Study Guide: Long v. Pebble Creek Resort Community (Case No. 17F-H1717037-REL)

This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing decision concerning a dispute between homeowner Richard Long and the Pebble Creek Resort Community homeowners’ association. It covers the facts of the case, the arguments presented, the relevant community rules, and the final legal outcome.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the specific structure that the Petitioner, Richard Long, proposed to build, and what was its intended purpose?

2. On what grounds did the Respondent, Pebble Creek Resort Community, justify its restrictions against the type of wall the Petitioner proposed?

3. What conditional variance did the Respondent offer to the Petitioner on May 1, 2017?

4. What were the primary concerns expressed by the Petitioner’s neighbors, the Rohlmans, which led them to decline the proposed wall agreement?

5. According to ALC Guideline JJ, what alternative structure could the Petitioner have built for privacy, and what were its key requirements?

6. How do the CC&Rs define a “Party Wall,” and what right does CC&R § 2(P)(i) grant to contiguous property owners regarding such a wall?

7. What rule from the ALC Guidelines prohibits the construction of two parallel walls side-by-side, and why is this rule in place?

8. What is the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the hearing decision?

9. Who held the burden of proof to establish that the homeowners’ association violated its governing documents?

10. What was the final, binding outcome of the case after the Administrative Law Judge’s decision was reviewed?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner proposed to build a 10-foot long, 6-foot high block wall for privacy between his patio and his neighbor’s patio. The wall was to be located a foot or so inside his side of the property line, so his neighbors could not attach to it.

2. The Respondent explained that walls built near, but not on, the property line can lead to problems. This can result in two parallel walls being built, creating an unmaintainable space between them that collects refuse, leaves, insects, nests, and rodents.

3. The Respondent approved a variance on the condition that the wall be built on the property line. Both the Petitioner and his neighbors (the Rohlmans) had to agree in writing that current or future owners could extend the wall, with this agreement being disclosed upon sale of either house.

4. The Rohlmans declined because they believed a wall on the property line would negatively affect their property’s value. They were also concerned about the legal expense and perpetual nature of an easement, and the possibility that future owners could lengthen the wall without consent.

5. ALC Guideline JJ permits a “privacy panel wall,” which is a free-standing alumawood wall. This wall must be 6 feet high, no longer than 16 feet, and located at least 3 feet from the property line. The Petitioner rejected this option, feeling it was “unsightly and flimsy.”

6. CC&R § 1(Hh) defines a “Party Wall” as a wall constructed on or immediately adjacent to the common boundary of lots. CC&R § 2(P)(i) states that each owner of a contiguous property has the right to use the Party Wall, provided it does not interfere with the other owner’s use.

7. ALC Guideline SS(4)(a) states that an existing party wall along a joint property line “precludes any adjacent parallel party wall.” This rule is in place to prevent the negative situation described by the Respondent where a difficult-to-maintain space is created between two walls.

8. A “preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is also described as “the greater weight of the evidence” that is sufficient to incline a fair mind to one side of an issue over the other.

9. The Petitioner, Richard Long, bore the burden of proof. He had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines.

10. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the Petitioner’s petition, and this decision was adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, becoming a Final Order. The Order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-style response. Use the case documents to formulate a comprehensive answer supported by specific facts and citations to the community’s governing documents.

1. Analyze the conflict between the Petitioner’s desire for a specific type of privacy structure and the Respondent’s interpretation of the community’s CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines. How did the governing documents prioritize community standards and potential future problems over an individual homeowner’s preference?

2. Discuss the role and reasoning of the Petitioner’s neighbors, the Rohlmans. Evaluate their concerns regarding property value, easements, and future modifications as presented in their email, and explain how their refusal to sign the agreement was a critical factor in the dispute.

3. Explain the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky to reach her decision. Detail which specific sections of the CC&Rs and ALC Guidelines were most influential and how she applied them to unequivocally deny the Petitioner’s request.

4. Compare and contrast the two types of structures discussed for ensuring privacy: the block wall proposed by the Petitioner and the “privacy panel wall” permitted by ALC Guideline JJ. What are the key differences in their material, specifications, placement, and the implications of those differences within the community’s rules?

5. Trace the procedural path of this dispute, from the initial petition to the Final Order. Describe the distinct roles and authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Architectural Landscape Committee (ALC), the Office of Administrative Hearings, the Administrative Law Judge, and the Commissioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes decisions on disputes. In this case, the ALJ was Diane Mihalsky.

Architectural Landscape Committee (ALC)

The committee within the homeowners’ association responsible for reviewing and approving or denying proposed changes to properties, such as walls and fences, based on the community’s guidelines.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the community documents.

Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the guidelines for a planned community or homeowners’ association.

The Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, which is authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The organization that creates and enforces rules for the properties within its jurisdiction. In this case, the Pebble Creek Resort Community homeowners’ association was the Respondent.

Party Wall

As defined in CC&R § 1(Hh), “a wall constructed on or immediately adjacent to the common boundary of Lots, Parcels, Common Areas or other areas in PebbleCreek Golf Resort.” CC&R § 2(P)(i) grants each owner the right to use the Party Wall.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the homeowner Richard Long.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and “[t]he greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Pebble Creek Resort Community homeowners’ association.

Why Your HOA Can Control a Wall Built Entirely on Your Property

Introduction: The Privacy Paradox

Imagine you want a bit more privacy from your next-door neighbor. The solution seems simple: build a wall. To avoid any disputes, you decide to build it entirely on your land, a good foot inside your property line. It’s your property, your wall, your right. But what if your Homeowners’ Association (HOA) tells you that you can’t? This is not a hypothetical scenario; it’s precisely what happened to homeowner Richard Long when he tried to build a 10’ long, 6’ high block wall.

Mr. Long proposed building the wall just one foot inside his property line, believing this would make it a private structure, free from the shared-property rules that often complicate neighborly relations. The HOA denied his request, sparking a legal dispute. The outcome of this case provides surprising and counter-intuitive lessons that every homeowner in a planned community should understand about property rights, community rules, and the hidden logic that governs them.

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1. The Hidden Logic: Preventing the “Rodent Run”

At first glance, the HOA’s rule might seem like arbitrary overreach. Why should they care if a wall is on the property line or one foot away from it? The answer reveals a practical, long-term logic designed to prevent a specific, unpleasant problem: two parallel walls built side-by-side.

The HOA’s governing documents were written to avoid a scenario where a small, unmaintainable gap is created between two separate walls on adjacent properties. If Mr. Long built his wall a foot inside his line, and his neighbor later decided to do the same, a narrow dead space would be created between the homes. In its official written answer, the HOA vividly described the issue this creates:

This is not a good situation in that there often isn’t room between the walls to properly maintain either wall, and the area in between the two walls becomes filled with refuse, leaves, insects, nests and rodents.

This reveals a core principle of planned community management: rules are often designed not to restrict current owners, but to mitigate future risks and liabilities for the entire community. This preventative governance aims to protect the community from future blight, sanitation issues, and pest infestations.

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2. The “Immediately Adjacent” Rule: Your Property Isn’t an Island

The homeowner’s central argument was that by building the wall a foot inside his property, it was his private wall, not a shared “party wall” subject to joint rules. It was a clever attempt to circumvent the regulations, but it failed because of the precise wording in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Here, the dispute hinged on two seemingly innocuous words. The community’s CC&Rs define a “Party Wall” as a wall constructed “on or immediately adjacent to the common boundary.” The Administrative Law Judge interpreted a wall built only a foot away as falling under the definition of “immediately adjacent.” This single phrase effectively negated the homeowner’s entire strategy.

The judge’s determination that the wall qualified as “immediately adjacent” was critical. By legally defining it as a Party Wall, another rule from the CC&Rs automatically kicked in: the adjoining neighbor’s explicit right to use it. This completely undermined the homeowner’s central goal of creating a purely private structure.

As if that weren’t definitive enough, another, even more explicit rule served as the final nail in the coffin. ALC Guideline SS(4)(a) states: “An existing party wall along a joint property line precludes any adjacent parallel party wall, i.e. Two walls cannot be built side by side.” This rule directly forbids the exact “rodent run” scenario, showing that the governing documents had multiple, overlapping prohibitions against his plan.

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3. The Neighbor’s Veto: It’s a Three-Party Problem

In an attempt to find a middle ground, the HOA offered a potential compromise. They would approve the wall, but only if it were built directly on the property line and if both Mr. Long and his neighbors, the Rohlmans, signed a formal “Party Wall/Fence Agreement.” This solution, however, revealed another layer of complexity. The neighbors refused to sign.

The Rohlmans explained their reasoning in an email, highlighting concerns that went beyond simple aesthetics. They worried about the financial and legal implications of a shared wall on the property line.

[We] declined to have a wall built on the property line between our homes because it affects the current and future value of our property – and yours. Furthermore, each of us would have to grant the other an easement in perpetuity, which is a legal document… Upon the sale of our home, we would have to inform the purchaser of the easement, which lowers the value of the property.

This demonstrates a common blind spot for homeowners: disputes are rarely bilateral. The rights and financial interests of adjacent property owners create a complex, multi-party dynamic. More often than not, an HOA dispute is a three-party negotiation, and a neighbor’s consent—or lack thereof—can be the deciding factor.

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Conclusion: The Rules You Don’t Know Can Hurt You

The final outcome was decisive. The Administrative Law Judge upheld the HOA’s decision, and the homeowner’s petition was denied. The judge concluded that the community’s governing documents “unequivocally prohibit” the proposed wall. However, this was not a total denial of privacy. Mr. Long did have an approved option: a free-standing “alumawood” privacy panel, provided it was located three feet from the property line. He rejected this alternative because he felt it was “unsightly and flimsy.”

This case serves as a powerful reminder that an HOA’s governing documents are not mere suggestions; they are legally binding contracts. The conflict was ultimately not between a homeowner’s right to privacy and the HOA, but between the homeowner’s specific aesthetic preference and the community’s established architectural standards. What you can do on your own land is deeply intertwined with the collective rules you agreed to when you purchased your home.

Before your next home improvement project, does your plan align not just with your vision, but also with the shared vision encoded in your community’s rules?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Richard Long (petitioner)
Appeared on his own behalf
Petitioner's wife (interested party)
Required, along with Petitioner, to agree in writing to the wall conditions for variance approval (Unit 39 Lot 12)

Respondent Side

Jack Sarsam (executive/witness)
Robson Communities
Senior Vice President for Robson Communities, overseeing Respondent's operations; testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
Administrative Law Judge who issued the decision
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Commissioner who adopted the ALJ decision in the Final Order
Dan Gardner (HOA Coordinator)
Contact for rehearing requests; listed as HOA Coordinator

Other Participants

The Rohlmans (neighbor/interested party)
Adjacent neighbors (Unit 39 lot 11) whose refusal to sign the party wall agreement was central to the dispute