Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John R Ashley
Counsel
—
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Counsel
Wendy Erlich
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article III, Section 4
Outcome Summary
The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.
The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
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Case Background and Procedural History
Parties Involved
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
John R. Ashley
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Attorney for Respondent
Wendy Erlich, Esq.
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Oversight Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Core Allegation
The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.
Procedural Timeline
• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.
• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.
• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.
• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.
• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.
• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.
• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.
Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation
The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.
Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)
• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.
• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.
• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.
Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)
• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.
• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.
Controlling Bylaw Provisions
Article
Pertinent Text / Description
Article III, Section 4
Meetings of Members; Quorum
“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”
Article VI, Section 3
Meetings of Directors; Quorum
Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.
Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)
In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:
• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.
• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”
• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.
Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)
The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:
• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.
• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.
• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:
◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.
◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”
• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?
2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?
3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?
4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?
5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?
6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?
7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?
8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?
9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?
10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.
3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.
4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.
5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.
6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.
7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.
8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.
9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.
10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.
1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.
2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?
3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?
4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?
5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.
Bylaws
A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).
Motion to Dismiss
A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Prevailing Party
The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.
Quorum
The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association
Introduction: The Rules We All Live By
If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.
But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.
A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.
The Takeaways
Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.
The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:
and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.
A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.
Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”
A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.
In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.
However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.
Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.
During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.
The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.
Conclusion: Read the Fine Print
The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.
When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John R Ashley(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Wendy Erlich(respondent attorney) Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
djones(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
ncano(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
Other Participants
A. Leverette(clerical staff) Signed document transmission in initial order
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John R Ashley
Counsel
—
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Counsel
Wendy Erlich
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article III, Section 4
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because the provision does not require a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof, as Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws was found to be unambiguous in not requiring a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.
The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
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Case Background and Procedural History
Parties Involved
Entity / Individual
Petitioner
John R. Ashley
Respondent
Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Attorney for Respondent
Wendy Erlich, Esq.
Tribunal
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Oversight Agency
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Core Allegation
The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.
Procedural Timeline
• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.
• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.
• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.
• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.
• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.
• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.
• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.
Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation
The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.
Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)
• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.
• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.
• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.
Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)
• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.
• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.
Controlling Bylaw Provisions
Article
Pertinent Text / Description
Article III, Section 4
Meetings of Members; Quorum
“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”
Article VI, Section 3
Meetings of Directors; Quorum
Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.
Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)
In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:
• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.
• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”
• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.
Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)
The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:
• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.
• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.
• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:
◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.
◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”
• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL
This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?
2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?
3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?
4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?
5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?
6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?
7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?
8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?
9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?
10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.
3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.
4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.
5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.
6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.
7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.
8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.
9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.
10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.
1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.
2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?
3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?
4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?
5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.
Bylaws
A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).
Motion to Dismiss
A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Prevailing Party
The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.
Quorum
The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association
Introduction: The Rules We All Live By
If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.
But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.
A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.
The Takeaways
Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.
The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.
This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:
and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.
A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.
Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”
A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.
In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.
However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.
Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.
During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.
The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.
Conclusion: Read the Fine Print
The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.
When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John R Ashley(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Wendy Erlich(respondent attorney) Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
AHansen(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
djones(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
DGardner(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
ncano(ADRE staff recipient) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of final order transmission
Other Participants
A. Leverette(clerical staff) Signed document transmission in initial order
The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Section 14.8. The provision was determined to be inapplicable, governing the Association’s obligation to provide notice, not the methods homeowners must use to send payments.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. CC&Rs Section 14.8 was inapplicable, and Petitioner's chosen restricted delivery method for assessment payments caused delays, which were not the responsibility of the Respondent.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 concerning notice obligations.
Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 by improperly handling or failing to receive his monthly assessment payments, which he sent via restricted delivery to a board member despite receiving instructions to mail payments to the Association's designated P.O. Box address.
Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied because he failed to sustain his burden of proof that the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8.
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Section 14.8. The provision was determined to be inapplicable, governing the Association’s obligation to provide notice, not the methods homeowners must use to send payments.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. CC&Rs Section 14.8 was inapplicable, and Petitioner's chosen restricted delivery method for assessment payments caused delays, which were not the responsibility of the Respondent.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 concerning notice obligations.
Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8 by improperly handling or failing to receive his monthly assessment payments, which he sent via restricted delivery to a board member despite receiving instructions to mail payments to the Association's designated P.O. Box address.
Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied because he failed to sustain his burden of proof that the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8.
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020049-REL Decision – 811290.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:01 (131.7 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020049-REL
Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro HOA: Case Analysis and Legal Findings
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the administrative legal case Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020049-REL). The central dispute arose when Mr. Stoltenberg, a homeowner, was assessed late fees on his monthly dues after unilaterally altering his payment method. He began sending payments via restricted U.S. Postal Service delivery to a specific volunteer board member, which resulted in significant processing delays and non-deliveries.
The petitioner alleged the Association was acting in “bad faith” and violating Section 14.8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclusively found that Section 14.8, which governs notices sent from the Association to its members, was entirely inapplicable to payments sent by a member to the Association. The ALJ determined that the petitioner’s own “volitionally took” actions were the direct cause of the payment delays and subsequent late fees.
The petitioner’s initial petition was denied. A subsequent request for rehearing was granted, but the rehearing affirmed the original decision. The ALJ reiterated that the cited CC&R section was inapplicable, noted a lack of jurisdiction over other statutes the petitioner raised, and concluded that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof in either proceeding.
Case Background and Procedural History
Parties and Governing Documents
• Petitioner: Michael J. Stoltenberg, a condominium owner within the Rancho Del Oro development and a member of the homeowners’ association.
• Respondent: Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (“the Association”), a condominium association in Yuma, Arizona, governed by its CC&Rs and overseen by a Board of Directors.
• Governing Authority: The CC&Rs form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner. The specific provision at the center of the dispute is Section 14.8 of the Bylaws, titled “Notices.” This section has remained unamended since the original CC&Rs were recorded on August 30, 1985.
Initial Petition and Jurisdictional Scope
On March 2, 2020, Mr. Stoltenberg filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.” The petition cited violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, as well as Section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Mr. Stoltenberg sought an order compelling the Association to comply with these regulations and the issuance of a civil penalty.
Upon filing, the Department advised the petitioner that the HOA Dispute Process lacks jurisdiction over disputes arising from Title 10 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. Consequently, the case was narrowed to a single issue, and the petitioner was assessed a $500 filing fee. The sole issue for the hearing was formally defined as: “Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8.”
Chronology of Legal Proceedings
Outcome
March 2, 2020
Petition filed by Michael Stoltenberg.
The case is initiated.
July 14, 2020
Initial evidentiary hearing is held.
Both parties present arguments.
August 3, 2020
Amended ALJ Decision is issued.
The petitioner’s petition is denied.
August 28, 2020
Petitioner submits a rehearing request.
Grounds cited: errors of law and an arbitrary decision.
September 9, 2020
Rehearing request is granted.
A new hearing is scheduled.
February 16, 2021
Rehearing is held.
The same issue is re-examined.
March 8, 2021
Final ALJ Decision is issued.
The petitioner’s petition is denied again; the order is binding.
Factual Analysis of the Dispute
Payment Instructions and Petitioner’s Actions
On January 4, 2016, the petitioner was advised that the Association’s “primary address for receiving all correspondence and all assessment payments from its members” was PO Box 4333, Yuma, Arizona 85366. The correspondence explicitly stated, “Please send your payments to the above address.”
Despite these clear instructions, beginning in November 2019, the petitioner began sending his monthly assessment payments to this P.O. Box via restricted delivery through the United States Postal Service (USPS), designated for pickup by board member Rhea Carlisle only.
The petitioner’s stated rationale for this change was a belief that an agent of the Association’s property management company (PMC) had previously thrown away one of his mailed payments. However, the petitioner was aware of several key facts:
• The Association employed a PMC to pick up its mail.
• Ms. Carlisle was an unpaid volunteer board member, not an employee of the PMC.
• Diana Crites was the Association’s listed Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020.
Consequences of Restricted Delivery
The petitioner’s unilateral decision to restrict delivery caused significant disruption to the receipt of his payments. This led to his assessments being recorded as untimely, which in turn resulted in the Association assessing late fees against his account. Additionally, each late payment occurrence placed his residence “in danger of foreclosure by the Association.”
A timeline of payment delivery issues presented as evidence includes:
Payment Period
USPS Action
December 2019
Picked up.
January 25, 2020
Returned to petitioner by USPS.
January 30, 2020
Picked up.
February 26, 2020
Picked up.
April 17, 2020
Picked up.
June 8, 2020
Returned to petitioner by USPS.
Legal Rulings and Core Arguments
Central Legal Text: CC&Rs Section 14.8 (“Notices”)
The entire case hinged on the interpretation of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Bylaws. The text reads:
“Any notice permitted or required by this Declaration or the Bylaws may be delivered either personally or by mail. If delivery is by mail, it shall be deemed to have been delivered seventy-two (72) hours after a copy of the same has been deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to each person at the current address given by such person to the secretary of the Board or addressed to the Unit of such person if no address has been given to the secretary.”
ALJ’s Interpretation: In both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, the ALJ found the language of Section 14.8 to be clear, “neither vague nor ambiguous,” and definitively inapplicable to the case. The ruling stated that the “language of Section 14.8 speaks specifically to the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information. Section 14.8 has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.”
Arguments Presented
• He had always technically mailed his monthly payments on time to the correct P.O. Box.
• He filed the petition out of concern over incurring late fees and the potential loss of his home.
• During the rehearing, he argued that the initial decision failed to properly interpret Section 14.8 and should have also applied ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842 (concerning standards of conduct for nonprofit officers).
• Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs was entirely inapplicable to the facts presented, as it governs the Association’s outbound notice obligations, not a member’s inbound payments.
• The Department and the Office of Administrative Hearings lack jurisdiction under Title 10 of the ARIZ. REV. STAT.
• The petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof required to show a violation.
Final Conclusions and Order
The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in both the initial hearing and the rehearing were definitive. The core conclusions of law were as follows:
1. Burden of Proof: The petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the CC&Rs and failed to meet this burden.
2. Inapplicability of CC&Rs Section 14.8: The provision cited by the petitioner was found to be wholly irrelevant to the matter of a homeowner mailing payments to the Association.
3. Assignment of Responsibility: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner’s own choices were the cause of the issue. The decision states, “By restricting the delivery of his monthly assessment payments, Petitioner inadvertently caused delay in their ability to be picked up by the Association.” There was “no credible evidence in the record to suggest that the action(s) Petitioner volitionally took are Respondent’s responsibility.”
4. Rehearing Findings: In the final decision, the ALJ noted that the petitioner “did not introduce any evidence tending to suggest that there was an ‘error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law…'” or that the prior decision was arbitrary or capricious.
Final Order: Based on the foregoing, the ALJ ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied. The order issued on March 8, 2021, was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court within 35 days.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020049-REL
Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, including the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, procedures, and outcomes presented in the official decisions.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing information exclusively from the provided legal documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what was their relationship to one another?
2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?
3. What specific action did the Petitioner take regarding his monthly assessment payments starting in November 2019?
4. According to the Association, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs not applicable to the Petitioner’s complaint?
5. What were the negative consequences the Petitioner faced as a result of his payments being received late by the Association?
6. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and did the judge find he had met it?
7. What were the two grounds upon which the Petitioner requested a rehearing after the initial decision?
8. Why was the Petitioner’s citation of Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.) § 10-3842 dismissed during the proceedings?
9. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on March 08, 2021, following the rehearing?
10. After the final order was issued, what was the Petitioner’s sole remaining avenue for appeal?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Michael J Stoltenberg, the Petitioner, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the Respondent. Mr. Stoltenberg was a condominium owner and a member of the Association, which governed the residential development where he lived.
2. In his petition filed on March 2, 2020, Stoltenberg alleged the Association violated Section 14.8 of its CC&Rs and Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801. He specifically claimed the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”
3. Beginning in November 2019, the Petitioner began sending his monthly assessment payments to the Association’s P.O. Box via restricted delivery from the United States Postal Service. He specified that the mail was for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only, despite knowing she was a volunteer and not an employee of the property management company that handled mail.
4. The Association argued that Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs was inapplicable because it governs the Association’s notice obligations to its members. The judge agreed, stating the section has no binding authority over how homeowners send mail to the Association.
5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence placed his residence in danger of foreclosure.
6. The Petitioner bore the burden of proving his case by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means showing the contention is more probably true than not. The judge concluded in both decisions that the Petitioner failed to sustain this burden of proof.
7. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding” and because “[t]he findings of fact or decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”
8. The citation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers of nonprofit corporations, was dismissed because it falls outside the jurisdiction of the Arizona Department of Real Estate’s HOA Dispute Process. The Petitioner was advised of these jurisdictional limitations when he filed his petition.
9. The final ruling issued on March 8, 2021, denied the Petitioner’s petition once again. The judge affirmed the original findings, concluding there was no violation of Section 14.8 and that the Petitioner had not introduced any evidence to support his grounds for a rehearing.
10. After the final order resulting from the rehearing, the Petitioner’s only remaining recourse was to seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal had to be filed within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis. Formulate a comprehensive essay response for each prompt, using specific evidence and details from the source documents to support your arguments.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning of Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark in her interpretation of Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs. Explain why this section was deemed inapplicable to the Petitioner’s situation and how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome in both the hearing and rehearing.
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required, and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet this standard in the judgment of the court.
3. Trace the complete procedural history of this case, starting from the initial petition. Detail the key dates, filings (petition, answer, rehearing request), hearings, and decisions, explaining the significance of each step in the administrative legal process from March 2020 to March 2021.
4. Examine the actions of the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, beginning in November 2019. Evaluate his rationale for unilaterally changing his payment method, the specific steps he took, and how his choices directly led to the late fees and risk of foreclosure he sought to avoid.
5. Explain the roles and jurisdictional limitations of the Arizona Department of Real Estate (the Department) and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in this dispute. Why were certain statutes cited by the Petitioner, such as those under Title 10 of the ARIZ. REV. STAT., dismissed by the court as being outside its purview?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, and issues decisions for state agencies.
Answer
The formal written response filed by the Respondent (the Association) on March 24, 2020, denying all items in the Petitioner’s complaint.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings regarding disputes within homeowners’ associations in Arizona.
Arizona Revised Statutes (ARIZ. REV. STAT.)
The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Specific statutes were cited by the Petitioner and referenced by the court.
Association
The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association responsible for governing the real estate development and enforcing its CC&Rs.
Board of Directors (the Board)
The governing body that oversees the Homeowners Association.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial (in this case, the Petitioner) to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.
An acronym for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the judge’s decision that applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case to reach a final judgment.
Findings of Fact
The section of the judge’s decision that details the factual background, procedural history, and evidence presented during the hearing.
Hearing
A formal proceeding before an administrative law judge where parties present evidence and arguments. In this case, hearings were held on July 14, 2020, and February 16, 2021.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Department’s jurisdiction was limited and did not extend to disputes arising from Title 10 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency that provides administrative law judges to conduct hearings for other state agencies, ensuring impartiality.
The final, binding command issued by the judge at the conclusion of the decision. In this case, the order was to deny the Petitioner’s petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg.
Petition
The formal legal document filed by the Petitioner on March 2, 2020, to initiate the hearing process with the Department.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
Rehearing
A second hearing granted to a party to re-examine the issues of a case, typically requested on grounds of legal error or an unjust decision. The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing was granted.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.
Restricted Delivery
A service offered by the United States Postal Service (USPS) that ensures mail is delivered only to a specific addressee or their authorized agent.
Statutory Agent
An individual or entity designated to receive legal notices and service of process on behalf of a corporation or association. For the Association, this was Diana Crites.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020049-REL
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20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
2 sources
These documents contain the Administrative Law Judge Decisions stemming from a dispute between a homeowner, Michael J. Stoltenberg, and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association regarding the timely delivery of monthly assessment payments. The initial decision in August 2020 denied the homeowner’s petition, finding that the Association did not violate Section 14.8 of the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs), as that provision governs the Association’s notice obligation to members, not homeowners’ mail to the Association. Following a granted request for rehearing due to alleged errors of law, the subsequent March 2021 decision affirmed the original ruling, concluding that the homeowner’s self-imposed restriction on mail delivery caused the delays and that the relevant CC&R section was inapplicable to the petitioner’s complaint. Both decisions noted that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacked jurisdiction over one of the statutes cited by the petitioner.
What were the legal and procedural reasons for granting the rehearing request?
How did the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8 resolve the core dispute?
What was the Petitioner’s basis for claiming a violation against the Association?
Based on 2 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Michael J Stoltenberg(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Nicole Payne(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Appeared telephonically for Respondent
Rhea Carlisle(board member) Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Unpaid volunteer board member
Diana Crites(statutory agent) Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020
Lydia Peirce Linsmeier(attorney contact) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Recipient of electronic transmission for Respondent in initial decision
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) ADRE Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Mary J Bartle
Counsel
—
Respondent
Saguaro West Owner's Association
Counsel
Nicole Payne, Esq.
Alleged Violations
Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions
The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.
Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG Decision – 767041.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:24 (94.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association (Case No. 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG)
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Mary J. Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association. The final order, issued on January 30, 2020, dismissed the petition brought by Ms. Bartle. The core of the case revolved around a financial transaction where $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018, and redeposited on November 30, 2018.
The petitioner, Ms. Bartle, alleged this transaction violated a specific provision of the Association’s bylaws—Article VIII, section 8(d)—which outlines the duties of the Treasurer. Despite two hearings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently concluded that Ms. Bartle failed to meet her burden of proof. The central finding was that while evidence suggested the transaction “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper,” the petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, how this transaction specifically violated any of the enumerated duties of the Treasurer as set forth in the cited bylaw. The decision underscores a critical legal distinction between a potentially improper act and a proven violation of the specific bylaw under which the complaint was filed.
Case Overview
Case Name
Mary J. Bartle, Petitioner, vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association, Respondent
Case Number
19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Petitioner
Mary J. Bartle (representing herself)
Respondent
Saguaro West Owner’s Association (represented by Nicole Payne, Esq.)
Rehearing Date
January 14, 2020
Final Decision Date
January 30, 2020
Procedural History and Core Allegation
The case proceeded through an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, following a specific timeline of events:
• April 22, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed the initial petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• August 29, 2019: The first hearing was held. At the outset, a discussion was held to narrow the scope of the hearing. Ms. Bartle agreed to limit her petition to a single issue.
• The Single Issue: Whether the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) through a withdrawal of $49,000.50 on October 22, 2018, and a redeposit of the same amount on November 30, 2018.
• September 18, 2019: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, dismissing Ms. Bartle’s petition.
• October 23, 2019: Ms. Bartle filed a request for a rehearing, asserting an error in the admission of evidence.
• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing.
• January 14, 2020: The rehearing was convened. Ms. Bartle testified, while the Respondent presented no witnesses.
• January 30, 2020: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision was issued, reaffirming the dismissal of the petition.
At the rehearing, Ms. Bartle testified “to the effect that laws must have been violated by the withdrawal and redepositing of the $49,000.50 without the Association’s members being provided any notice of these transactions.”
Analysis of Bylaw and Judicial Findings
Bylaw Article VIII, Section 8(d): The Treasurer’s Duties
The entirety of the petitioner’s case rested on proving a violation of the specific duties outlined for the Treasurer in the Association’s bylaws. The text of the bylaw is as follows:
The Treasurer shall receive and deposit in the Association’s bank accounts all monies received by the Association and shall disburse such funds as directed by resolution [of] the Board of Directors; shall properly prepare and sign all checks before presenting them to be co-signed; keep proper books of account; cause an annual audit of the Association’s books to be made by a public accountant at the completion of each fiscal year; and shall prepare an annual budget to be presented to the membership at the annual meeting; to cause all Federal and State reports to be prepared; and shall prepare all monthly statements of finance for the Board of Directors.
Key Judicial Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision hinged on the petitioner’s failure to connect the disputed financial transaction to a specific violation of the duties listed above. The judge made a clear distinction between the potential impropriety of the transaction and the narrow scope of the legal claim.
• Initial Hearing Conclusion: The decision from the first hearing, which the judge took notice of in the rehearing, established the core finding:
• Rehearing Conclusion: The final decision after the rehearing reinforced this exact point, stating:
Ultimately, the case was dismissed because Ms. Bartle did not meet the legal standard required to prove her specific claim.
Legal Framework and Final Order
Applicable Legal Standards
The decision was grounded in several key legal principles cited by the Administrative Law Judge:
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate possesses authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
• Burden of Proof: Ms. Bartle, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof on all issues.
• Standard of Proof: The standard was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
• Contractual Nature of Bylaws: Citing McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., the decision notes that “The Bylaws are a contract between the parties and the parties are required to comply with its terms.”
Final Order and Implications
Based on the failure to meet the burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with the following key points:
1. Dismissal: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed.
2. Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, is deemed the prevailing party.
3. Appeal Rights: A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served, as prescribed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 12-904(A) and Title 12, Chapter 7, Article 6.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Bartle v. Saguaro West Owner’s Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of the legal matter.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal matter, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific financial transaction was the central subject of the petitioner’s complaint?
3. Which specific article and section of the Association’s Bylaws did the petitioner claim was violated?
4. What was the legal standard of proof that the petitioner was required to meet, and who had the burden of proof?
5. On what grounds did Ms. Bartle file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision?
6. According to the judge’s decision, what was the key failure in the petitioner’s argument regarding the financial transaction?
7. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on January 30, 2020?
8. Although the judge dismissed the petition, what did the decision state about the nature of the financial transactions?
9. Which government department granted the request for a rehearing and has authority over this type of matter?
10. What options does a party have if they wish to appeal the final administrative law judge order?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Mary J. Bartle, and the Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association. Ms. Bartle brought the petition against the Association, alleging a violation of its bylaws.
2. The central subject was the withdrawal of $49,000.50 from the Association’s operating account on October 22, 2018. The same amount was subsequently redeposited into the account on November 30, 2018.
3. The petitioner claimed the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). This section outlines the specific duties and responsibilities of the Association’s Treasurer.
4. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioner, Ms. Bartle, to demonstrate that the Association had violated the bylaw.
5. Ms. Bartle filed her Rehearing Request on the grounds that there was an error in the admission of evidence. She specifically referenced documents dated July 5, August 6, and September 13, 2019, in her request.
6. The key failure was that Ms. Bartle did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the withdrawal and redeposit specifically violated any of the treasurer’s duties as explicitly listed in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Her claim was too narrow for the evidence she presented.
7. The final order was that Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Saguaro West Owner’s Association, was deemed to be the prevailing party in the matter.
8. The decision stated that there was evidence to suggest that the withdrawal and redeposit of the $49,000.50 “may have been in violation of the law or otherwise improper.” However, this was not sufficient to prove a violation of the specific bylaw in question.
9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the rehearing on November 18, 2019. This department has authority over the matter as established by ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes. The appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: Consider the following questions for a deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information provided in the source document.
1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain why Mary J. Bartle failed to meet this standard, despite the judge’s acknowledgment that the transaction may have been “improper” or in “violation of the law.”
2. Discuss the procedural significance of limiting the hearing to the single issue of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). How might the case’s outcome have differed if the scope of the hearing had been broader?
3. Trace the complete timeline of the case from the initial petition filing in April 2019 to the final order in January 2020. What do the key events and dates reveal about the process of administrative hearings and rehearings?
4. Based on the full text of Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d), what specific types of evidence would the petitioner have needed to present to successfully prove that the treasurer’s duties were violated by the $49,000.50 transaction?
5. Evaluate the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between a transaction that is potentially illegal or improper and a transaction that specifically violates the duties enumerated in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d). Why is this distinction critical to the final order of dismissal?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues decisions on matters under the jurisdiction of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Thomas Shedden.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona’s state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited to establish jurisdiction and the appeals process.
Bylaws
A set of rules established by an organization, such as a homeowners’ association, to regulate itself. In this case, the bylaws are treated as a binding contract between the parties.
Conclusion of Law
The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts of the case.
Finding of Fact
The section of a legal decision that lists the factual determinations made by the judge based on the evidence presented during the hearing.
Judicial Review
The process by which a court of law reviews the decision of a lower court or an administrative agency to determine if the decision was legally sound.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
A state agency that provides a neutral forum for conducting administrative hearings for other state agencies. The hearings in this matter were held at the OAH.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, the petitioner was Mary J. Bartle.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is met when the evidence presented has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Prevailing Party
The party in a legal dispute who is successful and in whose favor the judgment is rendered. In this case, the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to consider new evidence or to argue against the original decision on the basis of an error. Ms. Bartle’s request for a rehearing was granted.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Saguaro West Owner’s Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
A Homeowner Found a Mysterious $49,000 Transaction in Her HOA’s Books. The Reason She Lost in Court Is a Lesson for Everyone.
Introduction: The David-vs-Goliath Fight That Didn’t Go as Planned
For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners’ Association (HOA) can feel like a constant battle for transparency and fairness. It’s a common story: a resident raises concerns about financial decisions made behind closed doors, only to be met with resistance or silence. But what happens when a homeowner pushes back and takes that fight to an administrative hearing?
After an initial hearing and a persistent request for a rehearing, the final decision in Mary J. Bartle’s case against the Saguaro West Owner’s Association seemed, on the surface, like a clear-cut quest for accountability. The dispute centered on a single, alarming event: the withdrawal and subsequent redeposit of $49,000.50 from the association’s operating account without any notice to the members. It appeared to be a straightforward case of a concerned resident demanding answers.
However, the ruling from the administrative hearing offers a surprising and crucial lesson in how the legal system operates. The outcome reveals that suspicion, no matter how justified, is not enough to win. This article breaks down the top counter-intuitive takeaways from the judge’s decision and what they mean for any homeowner considering a legal challenge against their HOA.
Takeaway 1: A “Suspicious” Act Isn’t a Guaranteed Win
Feeling Something Is Wrong Isn’t the Same as Proving It.
The core facts of the case were not in dispute. On October 22, 2018, $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Saguaro West Owner’s Association’s operating account. On November 30, 2018, the exact same amount was redeposited. Members were not notified of these transactions. To any reasonable observer, this activity raises immediate questions.
Even the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the case acknowledged the questionable nature of the transaction. In his final decision, he validated Ms. Bartle’s initial concerns with a striking statement:
The evidence shows that $49,000.50 was withdrawn from the Association’s account in October 2018 and the same amount was deposited in November 2018, and there is evidence to suggest that the transactions may have been in violation of the law.
This is the most stunning part of the case: the judge agreed that the transaction looked suspicious and might have broken the law, yet Ms. Bartle still lost. This reveals a critical distinction in legal proceedings. A judge is not an arbiter of general fairness but an interpreter of specific laws and rules. The judge’s comment shows he understood the spirit of Ms. Bartle’s complaint, but his hands were tied by the letter of her petition. The legal system requires more than a gut feeling; it demands specific proof that a specific rule was violated, which leads directly to the next critical lesson.
Takeaway 2: You Must Prove theExactRule Was Broken
Specificity Is Your Only Weapon.
Ms. Bartle’s case was ultimately narrowed to a single, highly specific issue: whether the $49,000.50 transaction violated Article VIII, section 8(d) of the association’s bylaws. This is a crucial detail because courts and administrative bodies require this rigid specificity to ensure fairness, prevent “moving goalposts,” and keep proceedings focused on the actual claims filed, not a general feeling of grievance.
Her entire case hinged on proving a violation of that specific section and no other. The rule in question outlines the treasurer’s duties, which include the power to: “receive and deposit…all monies,” “disburse such funds as directed,” “sign all checks,” and “keep proper books of account.”
The judge’s conclusion was brutally precise. He found that Ms. Bartle had “not shown by a preponderance of the evidence” that the transaction violated any of those specific, listed duties. She couldn’t prove the treasurer failed to deposit money or keep proper books; she could only prove a strange transaction occurred that wasn’t explicitly forbidden by the rule she cited. This is a critical lesson: it doesn’t matter if an HOA’s action feels wrong; what matters is whether you can prove it violated the precise rule you cited in your petition.
Takeaway 3: The Burden of Proof Rests Entirely on the Accuser
It’s Your Job to Build the Case, Not Theirs to Disprove It.
In a civil administrative hearing like this, the petitioner—Ms. Bartle—carries the “burden of proof.” The standard she had to meet was the “preponderance of the evidence.” The legal definition for this is:
“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
In simple terms, she had to present enough convincing evidence to make the judge believe that her version of events was more likely true than not. The judge’s decision explicitly states that Ms. Bartle bore this burden and ultimately failed to meet it.
One of the most powerful details from the case file illustrates this point perfectly: the Saguaro West Owner’s Association, though represented by legal counsel, “presented no witnesses.” They didn’t have to. They didn’t need to explain the transaction or justify their actions because Ms. Bartle failed to build a strong enough case to prove her specific claim. The onus was completely on her to prove her argument, and when it fell short, the case was dismissed.
Conclusion: A Sobering Reminder for Homeowners
The case of Mary Bartle is a sobering reminder that winning a legal fight against a well-resourced entity like an HOA is less about moral rightness and more about meticulous legal strategy and precision.
While the judge acknowledged that Ms. Bartle’s concerns about the $49,000.50 transaction were potentially valid, her petition was dismissed not on a simple technicality, but because of a core principle of law: the failure to prove that the specific rule cited had actually been broken. Her case highlights the immense challenge for individual homeowners seeking transparency. It leaves us asking, if the legal bar is this specific, what practical recourse do residents have when they feel something is fundamentally wrong?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Mary J Bartle(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf and testified
Respondent Side
Nicole Payne(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
Edith Rudder(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Saguaro West Owner's Association
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions
The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.
Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Decision Documents
19F-H1919059-REL Decision – 767041.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:17:44 (94.6 KB)
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Mary J Bartle(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf and testified at the rehearing
Respondent Side
Nicole Payne(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Respondent Saguaro West Owner's Association
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1918042-REL
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Joan A. Tober
Counsel
—
Respondent
Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
Counsel
Diana J. Elston
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA) was the prevailing party. The ALJ found that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B) because the specific attorney letter requested was privileged and could be withheld,, and Petitioner's request for additional 'background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified,.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) as the HOA lawfully withheld privileged documents under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B) and was not required to guess what records were requested due to the vague nature of the demand for 'any and all documentation'.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA violation of requirement to provide association records.
Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide all requested documentation, specifically an attorney letter concerning the North Ridge wall, and failed to comply with the 10-business day response period required for record requests.
Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party on rehearing and Petitioner's appeal was dismissed. The HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B). The requested attorney letter was privileged communication and could be withheld.
Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”
The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.
The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.
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Case Overview
This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Case Name
Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.
Case Number
19F-H1918042-REL
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Core Issue
Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.
Initial Hearing Date
June 5, 2019
Initial Decision Date
July 29, 2019
Rehearing Date
December 11, 2019
Final Decision Date
January 15, 2020
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Key Parties and Individuals
• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober
◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.
◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.
◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.
◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.
◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.
• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)
◦ The governing body for the planned community.
◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn
◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
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Chronology of the Dispute
Nov 20, 2018
At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.
Nov 26, 2018
Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.
Nov 27, 2018
Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.
Nov 29, 2018
At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
Nov 29, 2018
At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.
Dec 13, 2018
Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”
Dec 26, 2018
Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Jan 15-16, 2019
The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.
June 5, 2019
The initial administrative hearing is held.
July 29, 2019
Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.
Aug 5, 2019
Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”
Aug 23, 2019
The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.
Dec 11, 2019
The rehearing is conducted.
Jan 15, 2020
Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.
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Core Dispute and Arguments
Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)
1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”
2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.
3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).
Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)
1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.
4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.
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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence
The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.
• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”
• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.
• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:
◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.
◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”
◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”
◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.
• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.
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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law
Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)
• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.
• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”
• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.
Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)
• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.
• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”
• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”
• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”
• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”
• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
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Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.
1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?
2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?
3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?
4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?
5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?
6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?
7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?
8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?
9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.
10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?
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Answer Key
1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.
4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.
5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.
6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.
8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.
9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.
10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.
2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.
3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?
5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.
A.R.S. § 33-1805
The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.
Attorney-Client Privilege
A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.
Executive Session
A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.
An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.
Petition
The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”
Rehearing
A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
The Letter
The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.
Introduction: The Fight for Information
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.
This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.
1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.
The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.
The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.
2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.
Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.
After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”
In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:
An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.
The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.
3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.
What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.
But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:
Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.
Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.
Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort
The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.
This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Joan A. Tober(petitioner) Former Board member; current Finance Committee member
Respondent Side
Diana J. Elston(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Mr. Mastrosimone(Board President) Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Testified at rehearing
Neutral Parties
Kay A. Abramsohn(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
c. serrano(Clerk)
Felicia Del Sol(Clerk)
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1918042-REL
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Joan A. Tober
Counsel
—
Respondent
Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
Counsel
Diana J. Elston
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.
Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”
The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.
The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.
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Case Overview
This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Case Name
Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.
Case Number
19F-H1918042-REL
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Core Issue
Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.
Initial Hearing Date
June 5, 2019
Initial Decision Date
July 29, 2019
Rehearing Date
December 11, 2019
Final Decision Date
January 15, 2020
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Key Parties and Individuals
• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober
◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.
◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.
◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.
◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.
◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.
• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)
◦ The governing body for the planned community.
◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn
◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
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Chronology of the Dispute
Nov 20, 2018
At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.
Nov 26, 2018
Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.
Nov 27, 2018
Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.
Nov 29, 2018
At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
Nov 29, 2018
At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.
Dec 13, 2018
Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”
Dec 26, 2018
Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Jan 15-16, 2019
The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.
June 5, 2019
The initial administrative hearing is held.
July 29, 2019
Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.
Aug 5, 2019
Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”
Aug 23, 2019
The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.
Dec 11, 2019
The rehearing is conducted.
Jan 15, 2020
Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.
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Core Dispute and Arguments
Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)
1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”
2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.
3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).
Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)
1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.
4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.
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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence
The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.
• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”
• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.
• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:
◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.
◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”
◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”
◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.
• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.
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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law
Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)
• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.
• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”
• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.
Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)
• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.
• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”
• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”
• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”
• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”
• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
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Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.
1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?
2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?
3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?
4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?
5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?
6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?
7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?
8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?
9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.
10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?
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Answer Key
1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.
4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.
5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.
6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.
8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.
9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.
10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.
2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.
3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?
5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.
A.R.S. § 33-1805
The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.
Attorney-Client Privilege
A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.
Executive Session
A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.
An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.
Petition
The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”
Rehearing
A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
The Letter
The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.
Introduction: The Fight for Information
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.
This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.
1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.
The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.
The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.
2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.
Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.
After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”
In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:
An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.
The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.
3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.
What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.
But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:
Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.
Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.
Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort
The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.
This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Joan A. Tober(petitioner) Former Board member; current Finance Committee member
Respondent Side
Diana J. Elston(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Mr. Mastrosimone(Board President) Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Testified at rehearing
Neutral Parties
Kay A. Abramsohn(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
c. serrano(Clerk)
Felicia Del Sol(Clerk)
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.
Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
