The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions
The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.
Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)
Decision Documents
19F-H1919059-REL Decision – 767041.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:17:44 (94.6 KB)
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Mary J Bartle(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf and testified at the rehearing
Respondent Side
Nicole Payne(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC Counsel for Respondent Saguaro West Owner's Association
The Petitioner's request for a hearing was denied and the petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove the Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) or its Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the meeting agenda or ballot.
Why this result: The relevant statute and HOA bylaws do not mandate that the Board add a member-proposed amendment to the agenda; the member has the independent recourse of gathering member support (25% or 1/4 of votes) to call a special meeting, a route the Petitioner was aware of but did not pursue.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual meeting
Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment (Bylaw 3.13, concerning banning directors whose actions resulted in a paid claim) on the agenda or ballot for the annual meeting.
Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner did not establish that Respondent violated the cited statute or bylaw by declining to add the proposed amendment to the agenda or ballot.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
Bylaw 1.5
Bylaw 2.2
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Bylaw Amendment, Meeting Agenda, Director liability, Statute interpretation
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Respondent’s Bylaw 1.5
Respondent’s Bylaw 2.2
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919065-REL Decision – 742075.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:36 (159.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919065-REL
Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Jason West (Petitioner) versus the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL. The petition, filed on May 20, 2019, was ultimately denied in a decision issued on October 1, 2019.
The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and its own Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to add his proposed bylaw amendment to the agenda for the annual members’ meeting. The proposed amendment sought to ban directors from serving for five years if their actions resulted in a paid claim against the Association.
The ALJ’s ruling was decisive: the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The decision rested on a strict interpretation of the relevant statute and bylaws. The ALJ concluded that neither A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) nor the Association’s bylaws compel the Board to place a member-initiated proposal on the agenda of a Board-scheduled meeting. Critically, the bylaws provide a distinct and available remedy for members: Bylaw 2.2 allows members to force a special meeting for any purpose, including bylaw amendments, by gathering the support of 25% of the voting membership. The record showed the Petitioner was aware of this option but did not attempt to use it. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was also denied, as the presiding body (the Office of Administrative Hearings) lacks the statutory authority to award them in such proceedings.
1. Case Overview
Case Name
Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association
Case Number
19F-H1919065-REL
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), Arizona
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Hearing Date
September 26, 2019
Decision Date
October 1, 2019
Petitioner
Jason West, appearing on his own behalf
Respondent
Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, represented by Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.
Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent’s Board violated state law and its governing documents by refusing to include his proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda and ballot for the annual meeting held in June 2019.
2. The Proposed Bylaw Amendment (Bylaw 3.13)
The Petitioner submitted a proposal to add a new Bylaw 3.13 to the Association’s governing documents. The full text of the proposed amendment is as follows:
Directors whose actions result in a paid claim
In an effort to reduce liability to the Association, any current or former director whose actions have resulted in a paid claim by the Association or its insurance carrier, is banned from serving as a director for a period of five years from the date of the final payment. This five year directorship ban also applies to any other individual co-owning an Association lot with the director. This Amendment is retroactive.
The stated purpose of the amendment was to reduce the Association’s liability. The decision notes that some of the current Board members may have been serving when the Association’s insurance carrier paid legal fees and other costs associated with a previous petition filed by the Petitioner.
3. Chronology of the Dispute
• December 23, 2018: The Petitioner first sent his proposed Bylaw 3.13 amendment to Joanelize Morales, the Association’s property manager.
• January 3 & 4, 2019: The Petitioner emailed Mickey Latz, owner of the management company, demanding the proposal be added to the next meeting’s agenda and ballot. In this correspondence, the Petitioner explicitly stated his awareness of the alternative process, writing, “I can also force the Board to call a Special Meeting of the Members at any time with 10 signatures from members of our Association. This is Article 2.2 of our Bylaws.”
• January – June 2019: Mr. Latz repeatedly informed the Petitioner that the Board, based on legal advice, had decided not to add the proposal to the agenda of a Board-scheduled meeting.
• April 17, 2019: Notice was sent to members for the annual meeting scheduled for June 4, 2019. The agenda was limited to (1) Election of Directors and (2) Approval of 2018 Annual Meeting Minutes. On the same day, the Petitioner re-sent his proposed amendment.
• May 14, 2019: The Petitioner attended a Board meeting and threatened to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate if his amendment was not placed on the agenda.
• May 20, 2019: The Petitioner filed the formal petition that led to this hearing.
• June 3, 2019: A notice was sent rescheduling the meeting to June 20, 2019, with the agenda unchanged.
• June 20, 2019: At the annual meeting, the Petitioner, whose name was on the ballot, was not elected to the Board of Directors.
4. Governing Authorities and Bylaws
The ALJ’s decision centered on the interpretation of one state statute and two specific Association bylaws.
• A.R.S. § 33-1804(B): This Arizona statute governs homeowners’ association meetings. It requires annual meetings and specifies notice requirements. It explicitly provides a mechanism for members to call special meetings: “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president, by a majority of the board of directors or by members having at least twenty-five percent, or any lower percentage specified in the bylaws, of the votes in the association.”
• Bylaw 1.5 (Amendment Process): This bylaw states that amendments can be made “at a regular or special meeting of the Members, by a vote of the Members having a majority (more than 50%) of the votes.” The ALJ found that this bylaw is permissive, allowing for votes on amendments, but does not obligate the Board to place any specific proposal on an agenda.
• Bylaw 2.2 (Special Meetings): This bylaw mirrors the state statute, allowing members to compel a meeting. It states: “Special meetings of the Members may be called at any time … upon written request signed by Members having at least one-fourth (1/4) of the authorized votes… which request shall be delivered to the President or Secretary.”
5. Summary of Key Testimony
The hearing included testimony from the Petitioner and six witnesses he subpoenaed, including property managers and the three current Board members.
• Board Members (Bryan Selna, David Epstein, Linda Seidler): All testified that they consulted with the Association’s attorneys and property management company. Based on the advice received, they collectively decided not to add the Petitioner’s proposal to the agenda.
• Mickey Latz (Property Management Co. Owner): Testified that the Board as a whole, not the secretary, determines the meeting agenda. He affirmed that counsel had advised the Board it was not obligated to add member-requested items. Mr. Latz testified that he explicitly pointed the Petitioner to the process outlined in Bylaw 2.2, which allows members to call their own meetings directly.
• Joanelize Morales (Property Manager): Confirmed that she prepares meeting agendas based on the Board’s instructions. She also testified that the Petitioner never attempted to use the Bylaw 2.2 process to gather the support of his neighbors to schedule a meeting to consider his proposed amendment.
6. Historical Context and Prior Litigation
The decision provides context regarding the Petitioner’s previous interactions with the Association.
• Prior Petition (OAH Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL): In April 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition concerning the Board’s failure to fill vacant positions. On June 28, 2017, an ALJ dismissed that petition, concluding that the Board had done all it could and that vacancies were due in part to the Petitioner’s “obstructionist tactics.”
• Successful Amendment (Bylaw 3.12): In April 2017, the Petitioner proposed a different amendment regarding director resignations. The Board at that time agreed to submit it to a vote, and it was passed by the membership in May 2017.
7. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s conclusions of law methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s claims, leading to the dismissal of the petition.
• Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent had violated the statute and bylaw.
• Statutory and Bylaw Interpretation: The ALJ applied a plain-language reading to the governing authorities.
◦ The court found that nothing in the language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)requires an HOA board to add an item to an agenda at a member’s request. Instead, it provides the remedy for members to call a meeting themselves.
◦ Similarly, the court concluded that Bylaw 1.5 allows for bylaw amendments to be considered at meetings but does not compel the Board to include such proposals on the agenda of a meeting it has noticed.
◦ The ALJ found that Bylaw 2.2 provides the explicit and proper procedure for a member to bring an issue to a vote when the Board declines to do so: gather support from 25% of the members to call a special meeting.
• Final Ruling: Because the Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any cited statute or bylaw, the petition was ordered to be denied.
• Attorney’s Fees: The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The decision cited legal precedent establishing that administrative bodies like the Department of Real Estate and the OAH are not empowered by the legislature to award attorney’s fees in these types of disputes.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919065-REL
Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the provided administrative law judge decision.
1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?
2. What specific action did the Petitioner, Jason West, allege the Respondent took that violated Arizona statute and the association’s bylaws?
3. Describe the substance of the proposed Bylaw 3.13 that the Petitioner wanted to add to the agenda.
4. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not adding the proposed bylaw amendment to the annual meeting’s agenda or ballot?
5. According to Bylaw 2.2, what procedural option did the Petitioner have to bring his proposed amendment to a vote without the Board’s approval?
6. What was the outcome of the Petitioner’s previous case against the Respondent in 2017 (OAH Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL)?
7. What two specific authorities did the Petitioner claim the Respondent’s Board violated?
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation, does A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) require an HOA board to add an item to an agenda at a single member’s request?
9. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge in this case (No. 19F-H1919065-REL)?
10. What was the judge’s ruling regarding the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees, and what was the reason for this ruling?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner is Jason West, who owns a house in the Desert Sage Two development. The Respondent is the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, of which the Petitioner is a member.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and its own Bylaw 1.5. The specific violation was the Board’s failure to place a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner on the agenda of the association’s annual meeting.
3. The proposed Bylaw 3.13 sought to ban any current or former director from serving on the board for five years if their actions resulted in a paid claim by the association or its insurance carrier. This ban would be retroactive and also apply to any individual co-owning a lot with the director.
4. The Respondent’s Board, after consulting with its attorneys and property management company, argued that neither state law nor its bylaws obliged them to add items to an agenda at a single member’s request. They contended that the Petitioner had the option to call a special meeting himself by gathering support from other members.
5. Bylaw 2.2 allows for a special meeting of the members to be called upon a written request signed by members who hold at least one-fourth (25%) of the authorized votes. The Petitioner was aware of this option but had not attempted to use it.
6. In the previous case, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. The judge concluded that the Board had done all it could to fill vacant positions and that the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics” were part of the reason no eligible members were willing to serve.
7. The Petitioner claimed the Respondent’s Board violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(B) and the association’s Bylaw 1.5.
8. No, the judge concluded that nothing in the language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) requires a homeowners’ association board to add an item to an agenda or ballot at the request of a single member. The statute only provides that members with at least 25% of the votes can independently call a meeting.
9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge found that the Petitioner had not established that the Respondent’s Board violated either A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) or Bylaw 1.5.
10. The judge ruled that attorney’s fees could not be awarded to the Respondent. The reason given is that the legislature has not empowered the Department of Real Estate or the Office of Administrative Hearings to award attorney’s fees in this type of administrative proceeding.
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Essay Questions
Construct a detailed essay response for each of the following prompts, using only evidence and reasoning found within the case document.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory construction and interpretation of restrictive covenants. How did the judge apply these principles to A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5 to reach a conclusion?
2. Discuss the balance of power between an individual HOA member and the Board of Directors as illustrated in this case. What rights and recourses are available to a member who disagrees with a Board decision, according to the Respondent’s Bylaws?
3. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the standard required, and why was the Petitioner unable to meet this standard?
4. Examine the history between the Petitioner and the Respondent as detailed in the “Findings of Fact.” How might this prior history, including the 2017 legal case and a previously successful bylaw amendment, have influenced the actions of both parties in the current dispute?
5. Based on the testimony of Michael David (“Mickey”) Latz and the text of the bylaws, contrast the process for placing an item on the agenda of a Board-scheduled meeting versus the process for calling a member-initiated special meeting. What are the key differences in initiative, requirements, and control?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent official (Diane Mihalsky) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presides over evidentiary hearings and issues decisions on petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
An Arizona statute cited by the Petitioner. It stipulates that an HOA members’ meeting must be held at least annually and that special meetings can be called by the president, a board majority, or members with at least 25% of the votes.
Bylaw 1.5
A bylaw of the Desert Sage Two HOA that states the Bylaws may be amended at a regular or special meeting by a majority vote of members present in person or by proxy.
Bylaw 2.2
A bylaw of the Desert Sage Two HOA that allows for special meetings of the members to be called by the president, the Board, or upon written request from members holding at least one-fourth (25%) of the votes.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state body authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.
Homeowners’ Association
An organization whose members own property and/or residences in a specific development (in this case, Desert Sage Two in Scottsdale, Arizona).
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency to which the Department refers petitions for an evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner
Jason West, the member of the homeowners’ association who filed the petition alleging a violation by the association’s Board.
Petition
A formal complaint filed with the Department of Real Estate by an HOA member or the HOA itself concerning alleged violations.
Preponderance of the evidence
The burden of proof standard required in the hearing. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”
Respondent
The Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, the entity against which the petition was filed.
Restrictive Covenant
A rule or provision within community documents, like bylaws, that is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties if it is unambiguous.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919065-REL
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19F-H1919065-REL
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This text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) concerning a dispute between a homeowner, Jason West (Petitioner), and his association, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)) and an association bylaw by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual meeting. The proposed amendment sought to ban directors whose actions resulted in a paid insurance claim from serving for five years, but the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that neither the statute nor the association’s bylaws required the Board to add a member-proposed item to a scheduled agenda or ballot. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation and denied the petition.
What was the specific legal and procedural context of this homeowners association dispute?
How did the Petitioner’s proposed bylaw amendment attempt to alter Board member liability?
What statutory and bylaw provisions guided the final Administrative Law Judge decision?
Edward A. Padilla(property manager) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Property manager in May 2017; testified for Petitioner; also referred to as 'Eddie'
Joanelize Morales(property manager) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Property manager since August 2018; testified for Petitioner
Bryan Robert Selna(board member) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Current Vice President of Respondent's Board; testified for Petitioner
David Epstein(board member) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Current President of Respondent's Board; testified for Petitioner
Linda Maria Seidler(board member) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Current Secretary of Respondent's Board; testified for Petitioner
Michael David Latz(property manager) Golden Valley Property Management Owner of Golden Valley Property Management; testified for Petitioner; also referred to as 'Mickey'
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Petitioner's request for a hearing was denied and the petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove the Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) or its Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the meeting agenda or ballot.
Why this result: The relevant statute and HOA bylaws do not mandate that the Board add a member-proposed amendment to the agenda; the member has the independent recourse of gathering member support (25% or 1/4 of votes) to call a special meeting, a route the Petitioner was aware of but did not pursue.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to place a proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual meeting
Petitioner alleged Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment (Bylaw 3.13, concerning banning directors whose actions resulted in a paid claim) on the agenda or ballot for the annual meeting.
Orders: Petition denied because Petitioner did not establish that Respondent violated the cited statute or bylaw by declining to add the proposed amendment to the agenda or ballot.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
Bylaw 1.5
Bylaw 2.2
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Bylaw Amendment, Meeting Agenda, Director liability, Statute interpretation
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Respondent’s Bylaw 1.5
Respondent’s Bylaw 2.2
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919065-REL Decision – 742075.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:19 (159.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919065-REL
Briefing Document: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Jason West (Petitioner) versus the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H1919065-REL. The petition, filed on May 20, 2019, was ultimately denied in a decision issued on October 1, 2019.
The central issue was the Petitioner’s allegation that the Respondent’s Board of Directors violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and its own Bylaw 1.5 by refusing to add his proposed bylaw amendment to the agenda for the annual members’ meeting. The proposed amendment sought to ban directors from serving for five years if their actions resulted in a paid claim against the Association.
The ALJ’s ruling was decisive: the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The decision rested on a strict interpretation of the relevant statute and bylaws. The ALJ concluded that neither A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) nor the Association’s bylaws compel the Board to place a member-initiated proposal on the agenda of a Board-scheduled meeting. Critically, the bylaws provide a distinct and available remedy for members: Bylaw 2.2 allows members to force a special meeting for any purpose, including bylaw amendments, by gathering the support of 25% of the voting membership. The record showed the Petitioner was aware of this option but did not attempt to use it. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was also denied, as the presiding body (the Office of Administrative Hearings) lacks the statutory authority to award them in such proceedings.
1. Case Overview
Case Name
Jason West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association
Case Number
19F-H1919065-REL
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), Arizona
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Hearing Date
September 26, 2019
Decision Date
October 1, 2019
Petitioner
Jason West, appearing on his own behalf
Respondent
Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, represented by Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.
Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent’s Board violated state law and its governing documents by refusing to include his proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda and ballot for the annual meeting held in June 2019.
2. The Proposed Bylaw Amendment (Bylaw 3.13)
The Petitioner submitted a proposal to add a new Bylaw 3.13 to the Association’s governing documents. The full text of the proposed amendment is as follows:
Directors whose actions result in a paid claim
In an effort to reduce liability to the Association, any current or former director whose actions have resulted in a paid claim by the Association or its insurance carrier, is banned from serving as a director for a period of five years from the date of the final payment. This five year directorship ban also applies to any other individual co-owning an Association lot with the director. This Amendment is retroactive.
The stated purpose of the amendment was to reduce the Association’s liability. The decision notes that some of the current Board members may have been serving when the Association’s insurance carrier paid legal fees and other costs associated with a previous petition filed by the Petitioner.
3. Chronology of the Dispute
• December 23, 2018: The Petitioner first sent his proposed Bylaw 3.13 amendment to Joanelize Morales, the Association’s property manager.
• January 3 & 4, 2019: The Petitioner emailed Mickey Latz, owner of the management company, demanding the proposal be added to the next meeting’s agenda and ballot. In this correspondence, the Petitioner explicitly stated his awareness of the alternative process, writing, “I can also force the Board to call a Special Meeting of the Members at any time with 10 signatures from members of our Association. This is Article 2.2 of our Bylaws.”
• January – June 2019: Mr. Latz repeatedly informed the Petitioner that the Board, based on legal advice, had decided not to add the proposal to the agenda of a Board-scheduled meeting.
• April 17, 2019: Notice was sent to members for the annual meeting scheduled for June 4, 2019. The agenda was limited to (1) Election of Directors and (2) Approval of 2018 Annual Meeting Minutes. On the same day, the Petitioner re-sent his proposed amendment.
• May 14, 2019: The Petitioner attended a Board meeting and threatened to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate if his amendment was not placed on the agenda.
• May 20, 2019: The Petitioner filed the formal petition that led to this hearing.
• June 3, 2019: A notice was sent rescheduling the meeting to June 20, 2019, with the agenda unchanged.
• June 20, 2019: At the annual meeting, the Petitioner, whose name was on the ballot, was not elected to the Board of Directors.
4. Governing Authorities and Bylaws
The ALJ’s decision centered on the interpretation of one state statute and two specific Association bylaws.
• A.R.S. § 33-1804(B): This Arizona statute governs homeowners’ association meetings. It requires annual meetings and specifies notice requirements. It explicitly provides a mechanism for members to call special meetings: “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president, by a majority of the board of directors or by members having at least twenty-five percent, or any lower percentage specified in the bylaws, of the votes in the association.”
• Bylaw 1.5 (Amendment Process): This bylaw states that amendments can be made “at a regular or special meeting of the Members, by a vote of the Members having a majority (more than 50%) of the votes.” The ALJ found that this bylaw is permissive, allowing for votes on amendments, but does not obligate the Board to place any specific proposal on an agenda.
• Bylaw 2.2 (Special Meetings): This bylaw mirrors the state statute, allowing members to compel a meeting. It states: “Special meetings of the Members may be called at any time … upon written request signed by Members having at least one-fourth (1/4) of the authorized votes… which request shall be delivered to the President or Secretary.”
5. Summary of Key Testimony
The hearing included testimony from the Petitioner and six witnesses he subpoenaed, including property managers and the three current Board members.
• Board Members (Bryan Selna, David Epstein, Linda Seidler): All testified that they consulted with the Association’s attorneys and property management company. Based on the advice received, they collectively decided not to add the Petitioner’s proposal to the agenda.
• Mickey Latz (Property Management Co. Owner): Testified that the Board as a whole, not the secretary, determines the meeting agenda. He affirmed that counsel had advised the Board it was not obligated to add member-requested items. Mr. Latz testified that he explicitly pointed the Petitioner to the process outlined in Bylaw 2.2, which allows members to call their own meetings directly.
• Joanelize Morales (Property Manager): Confirmed that she prepares meeting agendas based on the Board’s instructions. She also testified that the Petitioner never attempted to use the Bylaw 2.2 process to gather the support of his neighbors to schedule a meeting to consider his proposed amendment.
6. Historical Context and Prior Litigation
The decision provides context regarding the Petitioner’s previous interactions with the Association.
• Prior Petition (OAH Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL): In April 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition concerning the Board’s failure to fill vacant positions. On June 28, 2017, an ALJ dismissed that petition, concluding that the Board had done all it could and that vacancies were due in part to the Petitioner’s “obstructionist tactics.”
• Successful Amendment (Bylaw 3.12): In April 2017, the Petitioner proposed a different amendment regarding director resignations. The Board at that time agreed to submit it to a vote, and it was passed by the membership in May 2017.
7. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s conclusions of law methodically dismantled the Petitioner’s claims, leading to the dismissal of the petition.
• Burden of Proof: The decision established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent had violated the statute and bylaw.
• Statutory and Bylaw Interpretation: The ALJ applied a plain-language reading to the governing authorities.
◦ The court found that nothing in the language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)requires an HOA board to add an item to an agenda at a member’s request. Instead, it provides the remedy for members to call a meeting themselves.
◦ Similarly, the court concluded that Bylaw 1.5 allows for bylaw amendments to be considered at meetings but does not compel the Board to include such proposals on the agenda of a meeting it has noticed.
◦ The ALJ found that Bylaw 2.2 provides the explicit and proper procedure for a member to bring an issue to a vote when the Board declines to do so: gather support from 25% of the members to call a special meeting.
• Final Ruling: Because the Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any cited statute or bylaw, the petition was ordered to be denied.
• Attorney’s Fees: The Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. The decision cited legal precedent establishing that administrative bodies like the Department of Real Estate and the OAH are not empowered by the legislature to award attorney’s fees in these types of disputes.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919065-REL
Study Guide: West v. Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the provided administrative law judge decision.
1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?
2. What specific action did the Petitioner, Jason West, allege the Respondent took that violated Arizona statute and the association’s bylaws?
3. Describe the substance of the proposed Bylaw 3.13 that the Petitioner wanted to add to the agenda.
4. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not adding the proposed bylaw amendment to the annual meeting’s agenda or ballot?
5. According to Bylaw 2.2, what procedural option did the Petitioner have to bring his proposed amendment to a vote without the Board’s approval?
6. What was the outcome of the Petitioner’s previous case against the Respondent in 2017 (OAH Case No. 17F-H1716031-REL)?
7. What two specific authorities did the Petitioner claim the Respondent’s Board violated?
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation, does A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) require an HOA board to add an item to an agenda at a single member’s request?
9. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge in this case (No. 19F-H1919065-REL)?
10. What was the judge’s ruling regarding the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees, and what was the reason for this ruling?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner is Jason West, who owns a house in the Desert Sage Two development. The Respondent is the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, of which the Petitioner is a member.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and its own Bylaw 1.5. The specific violation was the Board’s failure to place a bylaw amendment proposed by the Petitioner on the agenda of the association’s annual meeting.
3. The proposed Bylaw 3.13 sought to ban any current or former director from serving on the board for five years if their actions resulted in a paid claim by the association or its insurance carrier. This ban would be retroactive and also apply to any individual co-owning a lot with the director.
4. The Respondent’s Board, after consulting with its attorneys and property management company, argued that neither state law nor its bylaws obliged them to add items to an agenda at a single member’s request. They contended that the Petitioner had the option to call a special meeting himself by gathering support from other members.
5. Bylaw 2.2 allows for a special meeting of the members to be called upon a written request signed by members who hold at least one-fourth (25%) of the authorized votes. The Petitioner was aware of this option but had not attempted to use it.
6. In the previous case, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. The judge concluded that the Board had done all it could to fill vacant positions and that the Petitioner’s own “obstructionist tactics” were part of the reason no eligible members were willing to serve.
7. The Petitioner claimed the Respondent’s Board violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(B) and the association’s Bylaw 1.5.
8. No, the judge concluded that nothing in the language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) requires a homeowners’ association board to add an item to an agenda or ballot at the request of a single member. The statute only provides that members with at least 25% of the votes can independently call a meeting.
9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge found that the Petitioner had not established that the Respondent’s Board violated either A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) or Bylaw 1.5.
10. The judge ruled that attorney’s fees could not be awarded to the Respondent. The reason given is that the legislature has not empowered the Department of Real Estate or the Office of Administrative Hearings to award attorney’s fees in this type of administrative proceeding.
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Essay Questions
Construct a detailed essay response for each of the following prompts, using only evidence and reasoning found within the case document.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory construction and interpretation of restrictive covenants. How did the judge apply these principles to A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and Bylaw 1.5 to reach a conclusion?
2. Discuss the balance of power between an individual HOA member and the Board of Directors as illustrated in this case. What rights and recourses are available to a member who disagrees with a Board decision, according to the Respondent’s Bylaws?
3. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the standard required, and why was the Petitioner unable to meet this standard?
4. Examine the history between the Petitioner and the Respondent as detailed in the “Findings of Fact.” How might this prior history, including the 2017 legal case and a previously successful bylaw amendment, have influenced the actions of both parties in the current dispute?
5. Based on the testimony of Michael David (“Mickey”) Latz and the text of the bylaws, contrast the process for placing an item on the agenda of a Board-scheduled meeting versus the process for calling a member-initiated special meeting. What are the key differences in initiative, requirements, and control?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent official (Diane Mihalsky) from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presides over evidentiary hearings and issues decisions on petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
An Arizona statute cited by the Petitioner. It stipulates that an HOA members’ meeting must be held at least annually and that special meetings can be called by the president, a board majority, or members with at least 25% of the votes.
Bylaw 1.5
A bylaw of the Desert Sage Two HOA that states the Bylaws may be amended at a regular or special meeting by a majority vote of members present in person or by proxy.
Bylaw 2.2
A bylaw of the Desert Sage Two HOA that allows for special meetings of the members to be called by the president, the Board, or upon written request from members holding at least one-fourth (25%) of the votes.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state body authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.
Homeowners’ Association
An organization whose members own property and/or residences in a specific development (in this case, Desert Sage Two in Scottsdale, Arizona).
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency to which the Department refers petitions for an evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner
Jason West, the member of the homeowners’ association who filed the petition alleging a violation by the association’s Board.
Petition
A formal complaint filed with the Department of Real Estate by an HOA member or the HOA itself concerning alleged violations.
Preponderance of the evidence
The burden of proof standard required in the hearing. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”
Respondent
The Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association, the entity against which the petition was filed.
Restrictive Covenant
A rule or provision within community documents, like bylaws, that is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties if it is unambiguous.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919065-REL
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19F-H1919065-REL
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This text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) concerning a dispute between a homeowner, Jason West (Petitioner), and his association, the Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)) and an association bylaw by refusing to place his proposed bylaw amendment on the agenda of the annual meeting. The proposed amendment sought to ban directors whose actions resulted in a paid insurance claim from serving for five years, but the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that neither the statute nor the association’s bylaws required the Board to add a member-proposed item to a scheduled agenda or ballot. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation and denied the petition.
What was the specific legal and procedural context of this homeowners association dispute?
How did the Petitioner’s proposed bylaw amendment attempt to alter Board member liability?
What statutory and bylaw provisions guided the final Administrative Law Judge decision?
Edward A. Padilla(property manager) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Property manager in May 2017; testified for Petitioner; also referred to as 'Eddie'
Joanelize Morales(property manager) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Property manager since August 2018; testified for Petitioner
Bryan Robert Selna(board member) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Current Vice President of Respondent's Board; testified for Petitioner
David Epstein(board member) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Current President of Respondent's Board; testified for Petitioner
Linda Maria Seidler(board member) Desert Sage Two Homeowners Association Current Secretary of Respondent's Board; testified for Petitioner
Michael David Latz(property manager) Golden Valley Property Management Owner of Golden Valley Property Management; testified for Petitioner; also referred to as 'Mickey'
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the required threshold of 21 valid signatures from eligible voters needed to compel the Association to call a special meeting under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243. The petition was consequently denied.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to provide the minimum required 21 valid signatures from eligible unit owners (only 13 were valid) as required by the Association's Bylaws and state statute.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of failure to call a special meeting to remove a board member.
Petitioner filed a petition alleging the Association failed to call a special meeting to remove a board member after collecting what Petitioner believed were sufficient signatures (36 collected, 21 required). The Association countered that only 13 of those signatures were valid (excluding non-owners, duplicates, and delinquent members ineligible to vote).
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Condominium, Special Meeting, Board Member Removal, Petition Signature Validity, Voting Rights, Delinquency
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919060-REL Decision – 737890.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:30 (142.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919060-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Kelly vs. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919060-REL, a dispute between Petitioner John H. Kelly and the Respondent, Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (“the Association”). The core issue was whether the Association violated Arizona state law by refusing to call a special meeting to remove a board member, as demanded by a petition initiated by Mr. Kelly.
The Association’s bylaws require a petition signed by at least 25% of eligible voting members—in this case, 21 of the 84 unit owners—to compel such a meeting. Mr. Kelly submitted a petition with 36 signatures. However, upon review, the Association invalidated 23 signatures for specific reasons: 11 were from non-owner renters, 6 were duplicate signatures from units that had already signed, and 6 were from owners whose voting rights were suspended due to being over 15 days delinquent on payments.
This left only 13 valid signatures, well short of the 21 required. The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The evidence clearly demonstrated that the number of valid signatures was insufficient to legally compel the Association to call a special meeting. Consequently, the judge ruled that the Association did not violate Arizona statute § 33-1243 and denied Mr. Kelly’s petition.
Case Overview
Parties Involved
Name / Entity
Details
Petitioner
John H. Kelly
A condominium owner and member of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. Appeared on his own behalf.
Respondent
Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
The homeowners’ association for the Cortez Canyon condominium development in Phoenix, AZ. Represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq.
Witness
Saundra Garcia
President of the Association’s Board of Directors.
Adjudicator
Jenna Clark
Administrative Law Judge, Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
Core Dispute
The central issue adjudicated was whether the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member after receiving a petition from unit owners. The Petitioner alleged that the required number of signatures had been collected, while the Respondent denied this claim, asserting that the petition lacked the requisite number of valid signatures from eligible voters.
Legal and Governance Framework
The dispute was governed by Arizona state law and the Association’s own internal documents.
• Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243(H)(4): This statute mandates that an association with 1,000 or fewer members must call a special meeting to remove a board member upon receipt of a petition signed by at least 25% of the eligible voters in the association.
• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 2: Mirrors the state statute, stipulating that a special meeting may be called by unit owners holding at least 25% of the votes in the Association.
• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 7: Critically, this section states that a unit owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if they are in arrears on payments (assessments, penalties, etc.) for a period of 15 days. This suspension remains until all payments are brought current.
Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (John H. Kelly)
Mr. Kelly initiated the petition to recall an Association board member. His position and the evidence he presented are summarized as follows:
• Petition Submission: Mr. Kelly, with assistance from others, collected 36 signatures and submitted them to the Association’s then-property management group, Golden Valley.
• Initial Confirmation: He testified that Golden Valley initially informed him that he had secured enough signatures to compel the special meeting.
• Reversal by New Management: A short time later, after the Association’s contract with Golden Valley expired on June 1, 2019, a new property management company informed him that the petition did not meet the signature threshold.
• Key Admission: Mr. Kelly testified that neither he nor his assistants verified whether the signatories were unit owners eligible to vote prior to submitting the petition.
• Argument at Hearing: Mr. Kelly argued that he had submitted a minimum of 23 valid signatures. This included the signature of Jeffery Law, an owner of six units, which Mr. Kelly contended should be counted six times. However, it was established that Mr. Law’s signature was secured after the initial submission and was never provided to the management company.
• Formal Allegation: In his April 29, 2019, filing with the Department, Mr. Kelly stated: “Cortez Canyon has 84 units and 25% is 21 units. Homeowners have collected more than the required 21 home-owner’s signatures. The Cortez Canyon HOA board has stated that they will not schedule the required special meeting.”
Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Cortez Canyon Association)
The Association, represented by its Board President Saundra Garcia, presented a detailed rebuttal based on a thorough review of the submitted petition.
• Receipt of Petition: The Association received the petition with 36 purported unit owner signatures on or about April 19, 2019.
• Signature Verification Process: Upon review, the Association determined that a significant number of signatures were invalid based on the community’s governing documents.
• Disqualification of Signatures: The Association provided a specific breakdown of the 23 signatures it disqualified:
◦ 11 signatures were removed because they were from non-owner renters or occupants.
◦ 6 signatures were removed because they were from units for which another owner’s signature had already been collected (only one vote is permitted per unit).
◦ 6 signatures were removed because the unit owner was ineligible to vote, being more than 15 days delinquent on fines, fees, or dues owed to the Association, as stipulated in the Bylaws.
• Final Tally: After removing the 23 invalid signatures from the 36 submitted, the Association concluded that the petition contained only 13 valid signatures.
• Conclusion: Since 13 signatures is below the required threshold of 21, the Association determined it was not obligated by law or its bylaws to call the special meeting. The signature from the multi-unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not part of the petition received by the Association and was therefore not considered in its count.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling
The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, reviewed the evidence and testimony from both parties and issued a decision decisively in favor of the Respondent.
Conclusions of Law
• Burden of Proof: The Judge established that the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association had violated the statute. A preponderance of evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.
• Undisputed Facts: The material facts of the case were not at issue. Both parties agreed that 21 valid signatures were required to compel the special meeting.
• Evidence of Record: The Judge found that the evidence presented demonstrated the Petitioner’s failure to meet the required threshold. The decision states, “While Petitioner is correct that he submitted more than twenty-one signatures to the Association, he is incorrect that all of signatures provided were valid.”
• Final Determination on Signatures: The ruling affirmed the Association’s count, concluding, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner only provided thirteen valid signatures along with his petition to the Association, which was not enough to compel the Association to call a special meeting.”
Final Order
Based on the failure of the Petitioner to sustain his burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on September 13, 2019:
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919060-REL
Study Guide: Kelly v. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919060-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Petitioner John H. Kelly and Respondent Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. It is designed to test and reinforce understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, governing documents, and final outcome.
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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences, based solely on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the specific violation of Arizona law alleged by the Petitioner in his initial petition to the Department of Real Estate?
3. How many condominium units are in the Cortez Canyon development, and what number of valid signatures was consequently required to compel a special meeting?
4. According to the Association’s Bylaws, what circumstances would cause a Unit Owner to have their voting rights suspended?
5. List the three categories of invalid signatures that the Association identified in its review of the Petitioner’s submission.
6. Who was Jeffery Law, and why was his signature ultimately not counted by the Association?
7. What was the initial assessment given to the Petitioner by the property management group, Golden Valley, and how did it differ from the Association’s final determination?
8. In this type of legal proceeding, who bears the “burden of proof,” and what standard of proof must be met?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim?
10. What was the final ORDER issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Part II: Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John H. Kelly, the “Petitioner,” who appeared on his own behalf, and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the “Respondent,” which was represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq. Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark presided over the hearing. Saundra Garcia, the Association’s Board President, appeared as a witness for the Respondent.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member. He claimed to have collected the required number of signatures from homeowners to compel such a meeting.
3. The Cortez Canyon development has 84 units. Based on the requirement for signatures from 25% of the votes in the Association, a total of 21 valid Unit Owner signatures were required to compel a special meeting.
4. According to Bylaws Article II, Section 7, a Unit Owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if the owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties, or other fees for a period of fifteen days. This suspension remains in effect until all payments are brought current.
5. The Association determined that of the 36 submitted signatures, 23 were invalid. The categories for invalidation were: eleven signatures from non-owner renters or occupants, six signatures from units where another signature had already been collected, and six signatures from Unit Owners who were ineligible to vote due to being delinquent on payments.
6. Jeffery Law was an Association member and owner of six condominium units. His signature was not counted because the Petitioner secured it after submitting the petition to the management company and never provided it to the Association as part of the formal submission.
7. The former property management group, Golden Valley, initially informed the Petitioner that he had secured enough valid signatures to compel a special meeting. However, after the Association directly reviewed the petition, it determined that only 13 of the signatures were valid, far short of the required 21.
8. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means providing evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight than the evidence presented by the opposing side.
9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof. The credible evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner submitted only thirteen valid signatures, which was insufficient to compel the Association to call a special meeting under its Bylaws and state law.
10. The final ORDER, based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.
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Part III: Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. They require a deeper analysis of the case’s themes, legal principles, and procedural elements. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means in this context, who held the burden, and how the failure to meet this standard was the central reason for the judge’s final decision.
2. Discuss the critical importance of an association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) in resolving internal disputes. Use specific articles and sections from the Cortez Canyon Bylaws to illustrate how they definitively established the rules for calling a special meeting and determining voter eligibility, leaving little room for interpretation.
3. Evaluate the Petitioner’s strategy and execution in collecting signatures for his petition. Identify the critical errors he and his assistants made in the process, and outline the specific steps he could have taken to verify signatures and ensure his petition was valid before its submission.
4. Explain the legal and practical distinctions between a Unit Owner, an occupant/renter, and an “eligible voter” within the context of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. How did the Petitioner’s failure to understand these distinctions become the central point of failure for his petition?
5. Imagine you are advising the Cortez Canyon Board of Directors following this hearing. Based on the evidence and outcome of the case, what recommendations would you make regarding their procedures for validating petitions and their communication with Unit Owners about voting rights, petition requirements, and the consequences of financial delinquency?
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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official (Jenna Clark) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, reviews evidence, and makes legal findings and conclusions.
Answer
The formal written response filed by the Respondent (the Association) on May 28, 2019, denying the Petitioner’s allegations.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at issue was § 33-1243.
Association
The Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the governing body for the condominium development, comprised of all unit owners.
Board of Directors (the Board)
The group of individuals that oversees the Association, as empowered by the CC&Rs. The petition sought to remove a member of this board.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation on one party in a dispute (in this case, the Petitioner) to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim.
Bylaws
The set of rules adopted by the Association on June 14, 2000, that govern its internal operations, including meetings and voting rights.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The primary governing documents for the development, recorded on May 9, 2000, which form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.
Eligible Votes
A term defined in the Bylaws as the total number of votes that can be lawfully cast, excluding those from members whose voting rights are suspended.
Findings of Fact
The section of the legal decision that outlines the established, undisputed facts of the case based on the hearing evidence.
OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)
An independent state agency where evidentiary hearings are conducted by Administrative Law Judges.
The final, legally binding command issued by the judge at the conclusion of the decision. In this case, the Order was to deny the petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, John H. Kelly.
Petition
The formal document filed by the Petitioner on April 29, 2019, with the Department to initiate the hearing process against the Association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, meaning that the evidence must be sufficient to convince the judge that the contention is more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association.
Special Meeting
A meeting of Association members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled meetings. The petition sought to compel a special meeting to remove a board member.
Unit Owner
An individual who holds legal title to a condominium within the Cortez Canyon development and is a member of the Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919060-REL
He Gathered 36 Signatures to Oust His HOA Board. Here’s Why Only 13 Counted.
Introduction: The Power and Pitfalls of Community Action
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of trying to enact change within their community, especially when it involves challenging the decisions of a Homeowners Association (HOA) board. It can feel like an uphill battle, but the right to petition and call for special meetings is a cornerstone of community governance.
However, a real-world case involving homeowner John H. Kelly and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association serves as a critical cautionary tale. Mr. Kelly gathered what he believed were more than enough signatures to force a special meeting to remove a board member. Despite his significant effort, his petition failed spectacularly. This article breaks down the key legal and procedural reasons why, offering essential lessons for every homeowner.
1. Not All Signatures Are Created Equal: The Validity Gauntlet
The core of the issue began with a simple numbers game. The Cortez Canyon HOA has 84 units, meaning a petition required signatures from 25%, or 21, of the unit owners to compel a special meeting. Mr. Kelly successfully collected 36 signatures—a number that seemed to guarantee his success.
In a moment of false victory, the association’s property management company at the time, Golden Valley, informed Mr. Kelly that he had indeed secured enough signatures. But this assurance was short-lived. A new management company took over, and after a formal review, the association delivered devastating news: only 13 of the 36 signatures were valid. The petition was dead on arrival.
The association disqualified 23 signatures for specific, documented reasons:
• Non-Owners: Eleven signatures were from renters or other residential occupants who were not the legal owners of the unit.
• Duplicate Units: Six signatures were removed because another signature had already been collected from the same unit, upholding the “one vote per unit” principle.
• Ineligible Owners: Six signatures were from homeowners who were technically owners but were found to be ineligible to vote at the time they signed.
This reveals the petitioner’s first critical, and ultimately fatal, assumption: that the HOA would do the work of verifying his supporters. In reality, the burden of proof was his alone. The legal findings state it plainly: “Neither Petitioner nor his assistants verified if the signatures that were collected belonged to Unit Owners eligible to vote.” From a governance perspective, this initial culling of signatures is where most grassroots community efforts fail.
2. The Fine Print That Disenfranchises: “Good Standing” and Your Right to Vote
Here, we find the kind of boilerplate legal language that is often ignored by homeowners but wielded with immense power by boards. The ineligibility of six homeowners stemmed from a specific clause in the association’s bylaws related to financial standing.
The bylaw states:
“In the event any Unit Owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties or other fees and charges due under the terms of the Condominium Documents for a period of fifteen (15) days, the Unit Owner’s right to vote as a member of the Association shall be automatically suspended…”
This single provision had a profound impact. Six of the signatures Mr. Kelly collected were from homeowners who were more than 15 days late on their dues or fines. Their voting rights were suspended, and their signatures were rendered invalid. This highlights a crucial preparatory step for any petitioner: confidentially requesting a list of members in good standing from the association before collecting signatures, if the governing documents allow, or at minimum, reminding potential signatories to ensure their accounts are current.
3. Process is Paramount: The Signature That Never Was
Facing a losing battle at the administrative hearing, the petitioner made a final argument to salvage his petition. He contended that he had also secured the signature of a member named Jeffrey Law, who owned six separate units. Mr. Kelly argued this single signature should count as six votes, which would have put him over the required threshold.
However, this argument failed due to a simple but fatal procedural error. According to the court’s findings, the signature from Mr. Law was never actually submitted with the petition to the association.
The Administrative Law Judge’s finding was unambiguous: “The signature Petitioner collected from the multiple unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not a part of the petition received by the Association and therefore was not counted.” This procedural error, while seemingly minor, is an absolute bar to success in administrative law. Unlike a casual disagreement, there is no room for “I meant to” or “I thought I had.”
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power in an HOA
Because the petitioner could only provide 13 valid signatures instead of the required 21, the Administrative Law Judge denied his petition. The HOA was not required to call the special meeting, and the board member remained in place. Mr. Kelly’s story is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort are not enough to navigate the complexities of community governance. The case provides three clear takeaways for any homeowner:
1. Quality Over Quantity: A short, verified list of eligible voters is infinitely more powerful than a long list of unverified names.
2. Bylaws are Your Battlefield: The governing documents contain the rules of engagement. Ignoring them—especially clauses on voter eligibility—is a unilateral surrender.
3. Documentation is Everything: If it wasn’t formally submitted to the correct party, it legally never happened. Your ability to prove submission is as important as the submission itself.
This case is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort aren’t enough. The real question every homeowner should ask is: Do you truly know the rules that govern your rights in your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John H. Kelly(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Jonathan A. Dessaules(attorney) Dessaules Law Group Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Saundra Garcia(board member) Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association Called as a witness and testified as Board President
Jacob A. Kubert(attorney) Dessaules Law Group Counsel receiving notice of decision
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision transmitted to Commissioner
Other Participants
Jeffery Law(owner) Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association Unit owner whose signature Petitioner secured but was not submitted to the Association
The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the required threshold of 21 valid signatures from eligible voters needed to compel the Association to call a special meeting under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243. The petition was consequently denied.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to provide the minimum required 21 valid signatures from eligible unit owners (only 13 were valid) as required by the Association's Bylaws and state statute.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of failure to call a special meeting to remove a board member.
Petitioner filed a petition alleging the Association failed to call a special meeting to remove a board member after collecting what Petitioner believed were sufficient signatures (36 collected, 21 required). The Association countered that only 13 of those signatures were valid (excluding non-owners, duplicates, and delinquent members ineligible to vote).
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Condominium, Special Meeting, Board Member Removal, Petition Signature Validity, Voting Rights, Delinquency
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919060-REL Decision – 737890.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:17 (142.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919060-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Kelly vs. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919060-REL, a dispute between Petitioner John H. Kelly and the Respondent, Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (“the Association”). The core issue was whether the Association violated Arizona state law by refusing to call a special meeting to remove a board member, as demanded by a petition initiated by Mr. Kelly.
The Association’s bylaws require a petition signed by at least 25% of eligible voting members—in this case, 21 of the 84 unit owners—to compel such a meeting. Mr. Kelly submitted a petition with 36 signatures. However, upon review, the Association invalidated 23 signatures for specific reasons: 11 were from non-owner renters, 6 were duplicate signatures from units that had already signed, and 6 were from owners whose voting rights were suspended due to being over 15 days delinquent on payments.
This left only 13 valid signatures, well short of the 21 required. The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The evidence clearly demonstrated that the number of valid signatures was insufficient to legally compel the Association to call a special meeting. Consequently, the judge ruled that the Association did not violate Arizona statute § 33-1243 and denied Mr. Kelly’s petition.
Case Overview
Parties Involved
Name / Entity
Details
Petitioner
John H. Kelly
A condominium owner and member of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. Appeared on his own behalf.
Respondent
Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
The homeowners’ association for the Cortez Canyon condominium development in Phoenix, AZ. Represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq.
Witness
Saundra Garcia
President of the Association’s Board of Directors.
Adjudicator
Jenna Clark
Administrative Law Judge, Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
Core Dispute
The central issue adjudicated was whether the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member after receiving a petition from unit owners. The Petitioner alleged that the required number of signatures had been collected, while the Respondent denied this claim, asserting that the petition lacked the requisite number of valid signatures from eligible voters.
Legal and Governance Framework
The dispute was governed by Arizona state law and the Association’s own internal documents.
• Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243(H)(4): This statute mandates that an association with 1,000 or fewer members must call a special meeting to remove a board member upon receipt of a petition signed by at least 25% of the eligible voters in the association.
• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 2: Mirrors the state statute, stipulating that a special meeting may be called by unit owners holding at least 25% of the votes in the Association.
• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 7: Critically, this section states that a unit owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if they are in arrears on payments (assessments, penalties, etc.) for a period of 15 days. This suspension remains until all payments are brought current.
Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (John H. Kelly)
Mr. Kelly initiated the petition to recall an Association board member. His position and the evidence he presented are summarized as follows:
• Petition Submission: Mr. Kelly, with assistance from others, collected 36 signatures and submitted them to the Association’s then-property management group, Golden Valley.
• Initial Confirmation: He testified that Golden Valley initially informed him that he had secured enough signatures to compel the special meeting.
• Reversal by New Management: A short time later, after the Association’s contract with Golden Valley expired on June 1, 2019, a new property management company informed him that the petition did not meet the signature threshold.
• Key Admission: Mr. Kelly testified that neither he nor his assistants verified whether the signatories were unit owners eligible to vote prior to submitting the petition.
• Argument at Hearing: Mr. Kelly argued that he had submitted a minimum of 23 valid signatures. This included the signature of Jeffery Law, an owner of six units, which Mr. Kelly contended should be counted six times. However, it was established that Mr. Law’s signature was secured after the initial submission and was never provided to the management company.
• Formal Allegation: In his April 29, 2019, filing with the Department, Mr. Kelly stated: “Cortez Canyon has 84 units and 25% is 21 units. Homeowners have collected more than the required 21 home-owner’s signatures. The Cortez Canyon HOA board has stated that they will not schedule the required special meeting.”
Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Cortez Canyon Association)
The Association, represented by its Board President Saundra Garcia, presented a detailed rebuttal based on a thorough review of the submitted petition.
• Receipt of Petition: The Association received the petition with 36 purported unit owner signatures on or about April 19, 2019.
• Signature Verification Process: Upon review, the Association determined that a significant number of signatures were invalid based on the community’s governing documents.
• Disqualification of Signatures: The Association provided a specific breakdown of the 23 signatures it disqualified:
◦ 11 signatures were removed because they were from non-owner renters or occupants.
◦ 6 signatures were removed because they were from units for which another owner’s signature had already been collected (only one vote is permitted per unit).
◦ 6 signatures were removed because the unit owner was ineligible to vote, being more than 15 days delinquent on fines, fees, or dues owed to the Association, as stipulated in the Bylaws.
• Final Tally: After removing the 23 invalid signatures from the 36 submitted, the Association concluded that the petition contained only 13 valid signatures.
• Conclusion: Since 13 signatures is below the required threshold of 21, the Association determined it was not obligated by law or its bylaws to call the special meeting. The signature from the multi-unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not part of the petition received by the Association and was therefore not considered in its count.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling
The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, reviewed the evidence and testimony from both parties and issued a decision decisively in favor of the Respondent.
Conclusions of Law
• Burden of Proof: The Judge established that the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association had violated the statute. A preponderance of evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.
• Undisputed Facts: The material facts of the case were not at issue. Both parties agreed that 21 valid signatures were required to compel the special meeting.
• Evidence of Record: The Judge found that the evidence presented demonstrated the Petitioner’s failure to meet the required threshold. The decision states, “While Petitioner is correct that he submitted more than twenty-one signatures to the Association, he is incorrect that all of signatures provided were valid.”
• Final Determination on Signatures: The ruling affirmed the Association’s count, concluding, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner only provided thirteen valid signatures along with his petition to the Association, which was not enough to compel the Association to call a special meeting.”
Final Order
Based on the failure of the Petitioner to sustain his burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on September 13, 2019:
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919060-REL
Study Guide: Kelly v. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919060-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Petitioner John H. Kelly and Respondent Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. It is designed to test and reinforce understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, governing documents, and final outcome.
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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences, based solely on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the specific violation of Arizona law alleged by the Petitioner in his initial petition to the Department of Real Estate?
3. How many condominium units are in the Cortez Canyon development, and what number of valid signatures was consequently required to compel a special meeting?
4. According to the Association’s Bylaws, what circumstances would cause a Unit Owner to have their voting rights suspended?
5. List the three categories of invalid signatures that the Association identified in its review of the Petitioner’s submission.
6. Who was Jeffery Law, and why was his signature ultimately not counted by the Association?
7. What was the initial assessment given to the Petitioner by the property management group, Golden Valley, and how did it differ from the Association’s final determination?
8. In this type of legal proceeding, who bears the “burden of proof,” and what standard of proof must be met?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim?
10. What was the final ORDER issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Part II: Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John H. Kelly, the “Petitioner,” who appeared on his own behalf, and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the “Respondent,” which was represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq. Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark presided over the hearing. Saundra Garcia, the Association’s Board President, appeared as a witness for the Respondent.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member. He claimed to have collected the required number of signatures from homeowners to compel such a meeting.
3. The Cortez Canyon development has 84 units. Based on the requirement for signatures from 25% of the votes in the Association, a total of 21 valid Unit Owner signatures were required to compel a special meeting.
4. According to Bylaws Article II, Section 7, a Unit Owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if the owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties, or other fees for a period of fifteen days. This suspension remains in effect until all payments are brought current.
5. The Association determined that of the 36 submitted signatures, 23 were invalid. The categories for invalidation were: eleven signatures from non-owner renters or occupants, six signatures from units where another signature had already been collected, and six signatures from Unit Owners who were ineligible to vote due to being delinquent on payments.
6. Jeffery Law was an Association member and owner of six condominium units. His signature was not counted because the Petitioner secured it after submitting the petition to the management company and never provided it to the Association as part of the formal submission.
7. The former property management group, Golden Valley, initially informed the Petitioner that he had secured enough valid signatures to compel a special meeting. However, after the Association directly reviewed the petition, it determined that only 13 of the signatures were valid, far short of the required 21.
8. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means providing evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight than the evidence presented by the opposing side.
9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof. The credible evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner submitted only thirteen valid signatures, which was insufficient to compel the Association to call a special meeting under its Bylaws and state law.
10. The final ORDER, based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.
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Part III: Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. They require a deeper analysis of the case’s themes, legal principles, and procedural elements. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means in this context, who held the burden, and how the failure to meet this standard was the central reason for the judge’s final decision.
2. Discuss the critical importance of an association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) in resolving internal disputes. Use specific articles and sections from the Cortez Canyon Bylaws to illustrate how they definitively established the rules for calling a special meeting and determining voter eligibility, leaving little room for interpretation.
3. Evaluate the Petitioner’s strategy and execution in collecting signatures for his petition. Identify the critical errors he and his assistants made in the process, and outline the specific steps he could have taken to verify signatures and ensure his petition was valid before its submission.
4. Explain the legal and practical distinctions between a Unit Owner, an occupant/renter, and an “eligible voter” within the context of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. How did the Petitioner’s failure to understand these distinctions become the central point of failure for his petition?
5. Imagine you are advising the Cortez Canyon Board of Directors following this hearing. Based on the evidence and outcome of the case, what recommendations would you make regarding their procedures for validating petitions and their communication with Unit Owners about voting rights, petition requirements, and the consequences of financial delinquency?
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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official (Jenna Clark) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, reviews evidence, and makes legal findings and conclusions.
Answer
The formal written response filed by the Respondent (the Association) on May 28, 2019, denying the Petitioner’s allegations.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at issue was § 33-1243.
Association
The Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the governing body for the condominium development, comprised of all unit owners.
Board of Directors (the Board)
The group of individuals that oversees the Association, as empowered by the CC&Rs. The petition sought to remove a member of this board.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation on one party in a dispute (in this case, the Petitioner) to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim.
Bylaws
The set of rules adopted by the Association on June 14, 2000, that govern its internal operations, including meetings and voting rights.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The primary governing documents for the development, recorded on May 9, 2000, which form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.
Eligible Votes
A term defined in the Bylaws as the total number of votes that can be lawfully cast, excluding those from members whose voting rights are suspended.
Findings of Fact
The section of the legal decision that outlines the established, undisputed facts of the case based on the hearing evidence.
OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)
An independent state agency where evidentiary hearings are conducted by Administrative Law Judges.
The final, legally binding command issued by the judge at the conclusion of the decision. In this case, the Order was to deny the petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, John H. Kelly.
Petition
The formal document filed by the Petitioner on April 29, 2019, with the Department to initiate the hearing process against the Association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, meaning that the evidence must be sufficient to convince the judge that the contention is more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association.
Special Meeting
A meeting of Association members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled meetings. The petition sought to compel a special meeting to remove a board member.
Unit Owner
An individual who holds legal title to a condominium within the Cortez Canyon development and is a member of the Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919060-REL
He Gathered 36 Signatures to Oust His HOA Board. Here’s Why Only 13 Counted.
Introduction: The Power and Pitfalls of Community Action
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of trying to enact change within their community, especially when it involves challenging the decisions of a Homeowners Association (HOA) board. It can feel like an uphill battle, but the right to petition and call for special meetings is a cornerstone of community governance.
However, a real-world case involving homeowner John H. Kelly and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association serves as a critical cautionary tale. Mr. Kelly gathered what he believed were more than enough signatures to force a special meeting to remove a board member. Despite his significant effort, his petition failed spectacularly. This article breaks down the key legal and procedural reasons why, offering essential lessons for every homeowner.
1. Not All Signatures Are Created Equal: The Validity Gauntlet
The core of the issue began with a simple numbers game. The Cortez Canyon HOA has 84 units, meaning a petition required signatures from 25%, or 21, of the unit owners to compel a special meeting. Mr. Kelly successfully collected 36 signatures—a number that seemed to guarantee his success.
In a moment of false victory, the association’s property management company at the time, Golden Valley, informed Mr. Kelly that he had indeed secured enough signatures. But this assurance was short-lived. A new management company took over, and after a formal review, the association delivered devastating news: only 13 of the 36 signatures were valid. The petition was dead on arrival.
The association disqualified 23 signatures for specific, documented reasons:
• Non-Owners: Eleven signatures were from renters or other residential occupants who were not the legal owners of the unit.
• Duplicate Units: Six signatures were removed because another signature had already been collected from the same unit, upholding the “one vote per unit” principle.
• Ineligible Owners: Six signatures were from homeowners who were technically owners but were found to be ineligible to vote at the time they signed.
This reveals the petitioner’s first critical, and ultimately fatal, assumption: that the HOA would do the work of verifying his supporters. In reality, the burden of proof was his alone. The legal findings state it plainly: “Neither Petitioner nor his assistants verified if the signatures that were collected belonged to Unit Owners eligible to vote.” From a governance perspective, this initial culling of signatures is where most grassroots community efforts fail.
2. The Fine Print That Disenfranchises: “Good Standing” and Your Right to Vote
Here, we find the kind of boilerplate legal language that is often ignored by homeowners but wielded with immense power by boards. The ineligibility of six homeowners stemmed from a specific clause in the association’s bylaws related to financial standing.
The bylaw states:
“In the event any Unit Owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties or other fees and charges due under the terms of the Condominium Documents for a period of fifteen (15) days, the Unit Owner’s right to vote as a member of the Association shall be automatically suspended…”
This single provision had a profound impact. Six of the signatures Mr. Kelly collected were from homeowners who were more than 15 days late on their dues or fines. Their voting rights were suspended, and their signatures were rendered invalid. This highlights a crucial preparatory step for any petitioner: confidentially requesting a list of members in good standing from the association before collecting signatures, if the governing documents allow, or at minimum, reminding potential signatories to ensure their accounts are current.
3. Process is Paramount: The Signature That Never Was
Facing a losing battle at the administrative hearing, the petitioner made a final argument to salvage his petition. He contended that he had also secured the signature of a member named Jeffrey Law, who owned six separate units. Mr. Kelly argued this single signature should count as six votes, which would have put him over the required threshold.
However, this argument failed due to a simple but fatal procedural error. According to the court’s findings, the signature from Mr. Law was never actually submitted with the petition to the association.
The Administrative Law Judge’s finding was unambiguous: “The signature Petitioner collected from the multiple unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not a part of the petition received by the Association and therefore was not counted.” This procedural error, while seemingly minor, is an absolute bar to success in administrative law. Unlike a casual disagreement, there is no room for “I meant to” or “I thought I had.”
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power in an HOA
Because the petitioner could only provide 13 valid signatures instead of the required 21, the Administrative Law Judge denied his petition. The HOA was not required to call the special meeting, and the board member remained in place. Mr. Kelly’s story is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort are not enough to navigate the complexities of community governance. The case provides three clear takeaways for any homeowner:
1. Quality Over Quantity: A short, verified list of eligible voters is infinitely more powerful than a long list of unverified names.
2. Bylaws are Your Battlefield: The governing documents contain the rules of engagement. Ignoring them—especially clauses on voter eligibility—is a unilateral surrender.
3. Documentation is Everything: If it wasn’t formally submitted to the correct party, it legally never happened. Your ability to prove submission is as important as the submission itself.
This case is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort aren’t enough. The real question every homeowner should ask is: Do you truly know the rules that govern your rights in your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John H. Kelly(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Jonathan A. Dessaules(attorney) Dessaules Law Group Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Saundra Garcia(board member) Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association Called as a witness and testified as Board President
Jacob A. Kubert(attorney) Dessaules Law Group Counsel receiving notice of decision
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision transmitted to Commissioner
Other Participants
Jeffery Law(owner) Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association Unit owner whose signature Petitioner secured but was not submitted to the Association
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding both the DRC's restriction on speaking during specific deliberations and the use of email communications for non-regularly scheduled committee business.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically because the DRC's restrictions on speaking were deemed reasonable, and email communications were not considered 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' requiring public access.
Key Issues & Findings
Open Meetings and Member Right to Speak (DRC and Email Meetings)
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by denying her the ability to speak at DRC meetings on other members’ requests, and by conducting deliberations and making decisions via email outside of regularly scheduled meetings.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Design Review Committee, Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Email Meetings, A.R.S. 33-1804
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919046-REL Decision – 712028.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:53 (94.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919046-REL
Briefing Document: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (Case No. 19F-H1919046-REL)
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Vicky Glover versus the Foothills Community Association (FCA), where the petitioner’s claims were denied. The petitioner alleged that the FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) violated Arizona’s open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on two fronts: first, by conducting unannounced “email meetings” to vote on non-emergency matters, and second, by preventing members from speaking at appropriate times during regularly scheduled DRC meetings.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Tammy L. Eigenheer, concluded that the petitioner failed to prove any statutory violation. The decision rested on a strict textual interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. Regarding speaking rights, the ALJ determined that while members have a right to speak at an “appropriate time” in committee meetings, the more specific right to speak on an agenda item before a formal vote applies exclusively to Board of Directors meetings, not committee meetings. The judge found it was reasonable for the DRC to rule that a member speaking on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”
Concerning the email communications, the ALJ ruled that they do not constitute “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as defined by the statute. Because the email discussions and decisions did not occur at a set weekly, monthly, or quarterly time, they are not subject to the open meeting requirements. The general state policy favoring open meetings was found to be subordinate to the specific statutory language. The petition was therefore denied in its entirety.
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Case Overview
This case involved a dispute between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the application of Arizona’s open meeting laws to a committee of the association.
Name / Entity
Representation / Title
Petitioner
Vicky Glover
Appeared on her own behalf
Respondent
Foothills Community Association (FCA)
B. Austin Baillio (Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.)
Adjudicator
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Administrative Law Judge
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings
Phoenix, Arizona
Case Timeline
• December 13, 2018 & January 9, 2019: Petitioner attends and records DRC meetings where the alleged violations occurred.
• January 23, 2019: Vicky Glover files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• January 28, 2019: The Department issues a notice to the FCA regarding the petition.
• May 10, 2019: An administrative hearing is held.
• May 30, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.
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Petitioner’s Allegations
The petitioner, Vicky Glover, alleged that the Foothills Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804 in two specific ways:
1. Improper Email Meetings: The FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) held unannounced meetings via email to vote on non-emergency matters, which should have been handled in open, public meetings.
2. Denial of Speaking Rights: The DRC refused to allow community members, including the petitioner, to speak at an appropriate time during its regularly scheduled meetings, specifically when she wished to speak on other members’ pending requests.
Key Factual Findings
The facts underlying the petition were not in dispute by the parties during the hearing. The key findings of fact established were:
• Organizational Structure:
◦ The FCA Board of Directors is comprised of seven members and meets on the fourth Wednesday of the month at 6:00 p.m.
◦ The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, is comprised of five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets on the second Wednesday of the month at 2:00 p.m.
• Events at DRC Meetings:
◦ On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Vicky Glover attended and recorded DRC meetings.
◦ During these meetings, she was not permitted to speak on issues being discussed related to other members’ pending requests.
• Use of Email by the DRC:
◦ During meetings, DRC members mentioned that additional information for certain requests would be shared via email after the meeting.
◦ Based on this emailed information, DRC members would approve or deny the request.
◦ Decisions made via email between meetings were formally “ratified” at the subsequent DRC meeting.
◦ FCA Manager Pat Wontor testified, denying that the DRC took initial action via email, asserting instead that emails were only used to gather additional information on matters that had already been discussed in an open meeting.
• DRC Policies: A request submitted to the DRC is deemed approved if it is not denied within 60 days.
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Legal Analysis and Judge’s Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on a strict interpretation of the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The petitioner bore the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so on both counts.
I. Member Speaking Rights at Committee Meetings
The judge analyzed the petitioner’s claim that she was wrongfully denied the right to speak at DRC meetings.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) states that at “any regularly scheduled committee meetings… all members… shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”
• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge found a critical distinction within the statute’s text. A later clause specifies that “the board… shall permit a member… to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item.”
• Conclusion: The judge ruled that this specific right to speak on an item before a vote applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors, not to committee meetings. For committee meetings, the standard is the more general “appropriate time.” The ALJ concluded it was reasonable for the DRC to determine that having one member speak on another member’s private application was not an “appropriate time.” Therefore, the DRC’s refusal to allow the petitioner to speak did not violate the statute.
II. Email Deliberations and “Meetings”
The judge next addressed the claim that email communications constituted illegal, non-public meetings.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) mandates that open meeting rules apply to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.”
• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge concluded that the email discussions, deliberations, and decisions among DRC members did not meet the definition of “regularly scheduled.” These communications did not occur at a set time on a recurring basis (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly). While they could be considered a form of meeting, they were not regularly scheduled ones.
• Effect of State Policy: The judge acknowledged the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which expresses a legislative preference for open meetings. However, the judge ruled that this general policy “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”
• Conclusion: Because the email communications were not regularly scheduled, they did not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, and no violation occurred.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the legal analysis, the Administrative Law Judge found that the petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
• Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties. A party may file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919046-REL
Study Guide: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (No. 19F-H1919046-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Vicky Glover (Petitioner) and the Foothills Community Association (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the source document.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions based on the provided legal decision. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two specific violations of state statutes that the Petitioner alleged?
3. Describe the composition and meeting schedules of the Board of Directors and the Design Review Committee (DRC).
4. What specific action did the Petitioner take during the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019?
5. According to the decision, what was the DRC’s practice regarding decisions made via email between meetings?
6. What is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how does the decision define it?
7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statutory phrase “an appropriate time” for a member to speak during a committee meeting?
8. Why did the Judge conclude that the DRC’s email communications did not violate the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804?
9. What was the final ruling, or Order, issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
10. What recourse did the parties have if they disagreed with the Judge’s order?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Vicky Glover, the Petitioner who filed the complaint, and the Foothills Community Association (FCA), the Respondent homeowners association. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer in the Office of Administrative Hearings.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated state statutes by holding unannounced email meetings to vote on non-emergency matters. She also alleged that the Respondent would not allow community members to speak at appropriate times during Design Review Committee (DRC) meetings.
3. The Board of Directors has seven members and meets at 6:00 p.m. on the fourth Wednesday of the month. The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, has five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets at 2:00 p.m. on the second Wednesday of the month.
4. During the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, the Petitioner attended and recorded the proceedings. She was not allowed to speak on other members’ pending requests during these meetings.
5. The DRC would gather additional information via email after a meeting and members would then approve or deny the request via email. Any decisions made via email between DRC meetings were then “ratified” at the next formal DRC meeting.
6. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
7. The Judge determined that the statute does not define what constitutes “an appropriate time” to speak at a committee meeting. Therefore, it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that the deliberation regarding a different member’s request was not an appropriate time for the Petitioner to speak.
8. The Judge concluded that email communications are not “regularly scheduled committee meetings” because they do not occur at a set time on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Since A.R.S. § 33-1804 only requires regularly scheduled committee meetings to be open, the email discussions were not a violation.
9. The final Order was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), the order is binding unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer-form essay responses to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case details and legal reasoning. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s statutory construction of A.R.S. § 33-1804. How does the judge distinguish between the open meeting requirements for Board of Directors meetings versus committee meetings, and what role does the “plain language” of the statute play in this interpretation?
2. Discuss the two central allegations made by Vicky Glover. For each allegation, detail the undisputed facts of the events and explain the specific legal reasoning the judge used to conclude that no statutory violation occurred.
3. Examine the conflict between the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)) and the specific statutory language governing committee meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)). How did the judge resolve this apparent conflict in her final decision?
4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the operational procedures of the Design Review Committee, including its use of email for decision-making and subsequent ratification. How did these procedures become central to the legal dispute?
5. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the standard of “preponderance of the evidence” shape the proceedings, and why was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Petitioner “did not establish” a violation critical to the final order?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer, the judge who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
The Arizona Revised Statute that the Petitioner alleged was violated. It governs open meetings for planned communities, including member associations, boards of directors, and regularly scheduled committees.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the Petitioner filed her petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the Foothills Community Association, comprised of seven members. It appoints the Design Review Committee.
Design Review Committee (DRC)
A five-member committee appointed by the Board of Directors. Two of its members are also on the Board. The DRC’s meetings were the subject of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Foothills Community Association (FCA)
The Respondent in the case. An association of homeowners located in Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
Vicky Glover, who filed a petition on January 23, 2019, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Foothills Community Association.
Preponderance of the evidence
The burden of proof required of the Petitioner. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”
Ratified
The term used to describe the process where decisions made by the DRC via email between meetings were formally approved at the next DRC meeting.
Regularly scheduled committee meetings
The specific type of meeting subject to the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that email communications do not meet this definition as they do not occur at a set time.
Respondent
The Foothills Community Association (FCA), against which the petition was filed. Represented in the hearing by B. Austin Baillio.
Statutory Construction
The process of interpreting a statute. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the plain text of the statute.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919046-REL
3 Shocking Loopholes in HOA ‘Open Meeting’ Laws This Homeowner Discovered the Hard Way
Introduction: The Illusion of Transparency
For anyone living in a homeowner’s association (HOA), there’s a fundamental expectation: the business of the community is conducted in the open. We assume that as members, we have a right to attend meetings, understand the decisions being made, and voice our opinions before our board takes action.
But a startling court decision from an Arizona Administrative Law Judge throws a wrench in that assumption. One homeowner’s legal challenge against her association didn’t just fail—it inadvertently created a roadmap for how HOAs can legally operate behind closed doors, affecting millions of residents in planned communities.
This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from this legal battle, revealing how the specific wording of the law can create major gaps in transparency and challenge everything you thought you knew about your rights as a homeowner.
1. Your Right to Speak is Weaker Than You Think—Especially in Committee Meetings
Most homeowners believe they have a protected right to speak on any agenda item at any official HOA meeting. The case of petitioner Vicky Glover shows this is a dangerous assumption.
On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Ms. Glover attended meetings of her community’s Design Review Committee (DRC) and was not permitted to speak about other members’ pending architectural requests. She argued this violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities (A.R.S. § 33-1804).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), however, pointed out a critical distinction in the law’s text. The statute explicitly guarantees a member the right “to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action.” This specific right, the ALJ concluded, applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors.
For committee meetings, the law sets a much vaguer standard, requiring only that members “be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The ALJ found it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that having Ms. Glover speak on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”
This is a crucial distinction because committees—like architectural, design, or finance committees—often make the decisions that most directly impact homeowners’ property and daily lives. Yet, this ruling clarifies that the guaranteed right to be heard before a vote is taken is significantly weaker in those very forums.
2. “Email Meetings” Can Be a Legal Way to Sidestep Open Meeting Rules
The common understanding of open meeting laws is that they exist to prevent boards and committees from deliberating and making decisions in private. But what if the meeting doesn’t happen in a room, but in an email chain?
Ms. Glover’s second claim was that the DRC was conducting business and making decisions via email between its official meetings. Evidence showed that after a meeting, additional information would be shared with committee members who could then “approve or deny the request… via email.” The association’s manager, Pat Wontor, denied this, claiming emails were only used to gather information on matters already discussed in a meeting.
The ALJ’s conclusion on this matter was stunning and sidestepped the conflicting testimony entirely. The Arizona open meeting law in question only applies to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” Because email exchanges do not occur at a set, scheduled time—like the second Wednesday of the month—the judge ruled they do not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, regardless of their content.
The implication of this loophole is profound. It allows a committee to conduct significant deliberation and decision-making entirely outside of public view. This practice can turn the open meeting into a hollow formality. A committee can present a “done deal” for public ratification, rendering the member’s right to observe and speak effectively meaningless. The public meeting becomes a theatrical rubber stamp for a decision already made in secret.
3. The “Spirit of the Law” Doesn’t Beat the Letter of the Law
Many laws contain a policy statement that outlines their overarching goal—the “spirit of the law.” Arizona’s statute on HOA meetings has an exceptionally strong one, stating that all meetings should be open and that the law should be interpreted to favor transparency. The text explicitly declares:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.” (from A.R.S. § 33-1804(F))
Ms. Glover and many homeowners would read this and assume it guarantees broad transparency. The ALJ, however, ruled that this powerful policy statement “does not override the specific provisions” of the law.
In other words, the literal, specific text—like the distinction between “board” and “committee” meetings, or the “regularly scheduled” requirement—takes precedence over the law’s general intent.
This is perhaps the most important lesson for all homeowners. Relying on the assumed purpose or “spirit” of a rule is not enough. In a legal dispute, the precise, technical wording is what matters most. It highlights the critical importance for homeowners to read and understand the exact text of state statutes and their own governing documents, because the loopholes are often found in the fine print.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense
While Vicky Glover lost her petition, her case provides an invaluable education for every member of a community association. It is a stark warning that transparency in an HOA is not a guaranteed principle but a legal standard with specific, and at times counter-intuitive, boundaries that can be exploited.
The loopholes her case exposed reveal a sobering reality: your right to speak is conditional, “meetings” can legally occur out of sight in an email chain, and the stated “spirit” of the law can be rendered toothless by its literal text. HOA governance is not guided by general principles of fairness, but by very specific legal language.
Given these loopholes, it’s worth asking: How many of the most important decisions in your community are happening in an inbox instead of the boardroom?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Vicky Glover(petitioner)
Respondent Side
B. Austin Baillio(respondent attorney) Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Pat Wontor(manager) Manager for DRC/Foothills Community Association
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding both the DRC's restriction on speaking during specific deliberations and the use of email communications for non-regularly scheduled committee business.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically because the DRC's restrictions on speaking were deemed reasonable, and email communications were not considered 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' requiring public access.
Key Issues & Findings
Open Meetings and Member Right to Speak (DRC and Email Meetings)
Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by denying her the ability to speak at DRC meetings on other members’ requests, and by conducting deliberations and making decisions via email outside of regularly scheduled meetings.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Design Review Committee, Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Email Meetings, A.R.S. 33-1804
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919046-REL Decision – 712028.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:06 (94.0 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919046-REL
Briefing Document: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (Case No. 19F-H1919046-REL)
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Vicky Glover versus the Foothills Community Association (FCA), where the petitioner’s claims were denied. The petitioner alleged that the FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) violated Arizona’s open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on two fronts: first, by conducting unannounced “email meetings” to vote on non-emergency matters, and second, by preventing members from speaking at appropriate times during regularly scheduled DRC meetings.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Tammy L. Eigenheer, concluded that the petitioner failed to prove any statutory violation. The decision rested on a strict textual interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. Regarding speaking rights, the ALJ determined that while members have a right to speak at an “appropriate time” in committee meetings, the more specific right to speak on an agenda item before a formal vote applies exclusively to Board of Directors meetings, not committee meetings. The judge found it was reasonable for the DRC to rule that a member speaking on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”
Concerning the email communications, the ALJ ruled that they do not constitute “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as defined by the statute. Because the email discussions and decisions did not occur at a set weekly, monthly, or quarterly time, they are not subject to the open meeting requirements. The general state policy favoring open meetings was found to be subordinate to the specific statutory language. The petition was therefore denied in its entirety.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
This case involved a dispute between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the application of Arizona’s open meeting laws to a committee of the association.
Name / Entity
Representation / Title
Petitioner
Vicky Glover
Appeared on her own behalf
Respondent
Foothills Community Association (FCA)
B. Austin Baillio (Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.)
Adjudicator
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Administrative Law Judge
Jurisdiction
Office of Administrative Hearings
Phoenix, Arizona
Case Timeline
• December 13, 2018 & January 9, 2019: Petitioner attends and records DRC meetings where the alleged violations occurred.
• January 23, 2019: Vicky Glover files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• January 28, 2019: The Department issues a notice to the FCA regarding the petition.
• May 10, 2019: An administrative hearing is held.
• May 30, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.
——————————————————————————–
Petitioner’s Allegations
The petitioner, Vicky Glover, alleged that the Foothills Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804 in two specific ways:
1. Improper Email Meetings: The FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) held unannounced meetings via email to vote on non-emergency matters, which should have been handled in open, public meetings.
2. Denial of Speaking Rights: The DRC refused to allow community members, including the petitioner, to speak at an appropriate time during its regularly scheduled meetings, specifically when she wished to speak on other members’ pending requests.
Key Factual Findings
The facts underlying the petition were not in dispute by the parties during the hearing. The key findings of fact established were:
• Organizational Structure:
◦ The FCA Board of Directors is comprised of seven members and meets on the fourth Wednesday of the month at 6:00 p.m.
◦ The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, is comprised of five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets on the second Wednesday of the month at 2:00 p.m.
• Events at DRC Meetings:
◦ On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Vicky Glover attended and recorded DRC meetings.
◦ During these meetings, she was not permitted to speak on issues being discussed related to other members’ pending requests.
• Use of Email by the DRC:
◦ During meetings, DRC members mentioned that additional information for certain requests would be shared via email after the meeting.
◦ Based on this emailed information, DRC members would approve or deny the request.
◦ Decisions made via email between meetings were formally “ratified” at the subsequent DRC meeting.
◦ FCA Manager Pat Wontor testified, denying that the DRC took initial action via email, asserting instead that emails were only used to gather additional information on matters that had already been discussed in an open meeting.
• DRC Policies: A request submitted to the DRC is deemed approved if it is not denied within 60 days.
——————————————————————————–
Legal Analysis and Judge’s Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on a strict interpretation of the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The petitioner bore the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so on both counts.
I. Member Speaking Rights at Committee Meetings
The judge analyzed the petitioner’s claim that she was wrongfully denied the right to speak at DRC meetings.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) states that at “any regularly scheduled committee meetings… all members… shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”
• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge found a critical distinction within the statute’s text. A later clause specifies that “the board… shall permit a member… to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item.”
• Conclusion: The judge ruled that this specific right to speak on an item before a vote applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors, not to committee meetings. For committee meetings, the standard is the more general “appropriate time.” The ALJ concluded it was reasonable for the DRC to determine that having one member speak on another member’s private application was not an “appropriate time.” Therefore, the DRC’s refusal to allow the petitioner to speak did not violate the statute.
II. Email Deliberations and “Meetings”
The judge next addressed the claim that email communications constituted illegal, non-public meetings.
• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) mandates that open meeting rules apply to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.”
• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge concluded that the email discussions, deliberations, and decisions among DRC members did not meet the definition of “regularly scheduled.” These communications did not occur at a set time on a recurring basis (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly). While they could be considered a form of meeting, they were not regularly scheduled ones.
• Effect of State Policy: The judge acknowledged the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which expresses a legislative preference for open meetings. However, the judge ruled that this general policy “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”
• Conclusion: Because the email communications were not regularly scheduled, they did not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, and no violation occurred.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the legal analysis, the Administrative Law Judge found that the petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
• Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”
• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties. A party may file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919046-REL
Study Guide: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (No. 19F-H1919046-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Vicky Glover (Petitioner) and the Foothills Community Association (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the source document.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions based on the provided legal decision. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two specific violations of state statutes that the Petitioner alleged?
3. Describe the composition and meeting schedules of the Board of Directors and the Design Review Committee (DRC).
4. What specific action did the Petitioner take during the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019?
5. According to the decision, what was the DRC’s practice regarding decisions made via email between meetings?
6. What is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how does the decision define it?
7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statutory phrase “an appropriate time” for a member to speak during a committee meeting?
8. Why did the Judge conclude that the DRC’s email communications did not violate the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804?
9. What was the final ruling, or Order, issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
10. What recourse did the parties have if they disagreed with the Judge’s order?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Vicky Glover, the Petitioner who filed the complaint, and the Foothills Community Association (FCA), the Respondent homeowners association. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer in the Office of Administrative Hearings.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated state statutes by holding unannounced email meetings to vote on non-emergency matters. She also alleged that the Respondent would not allow community members to speak at appropriate times during Design Review Committee (DRC) meetings.
3. The Board of Directors has seven members and meets at 6:00 p.m. on the fourth Wednesday of the month. The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, has five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets at 2:00 p.m. on the second Wednesday of the month.
4. During the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, the Petitioner attended and recorded the proceedings. She was not allowed to speak on other members’ pending requests during these meetings.
5. The DRC would gather additional information via email after a meeting and members would then approve or deny the request via email. Any decisions made via email between DRC meetings were then “ratified” at the next formal DRC meeting.
6. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
7. The Judge determined that the statute does not define what constitutes “an appropriate time” to speak at a committee meeting. Therefore, it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that the deliberation regarding a different member’s request was not an appropriate time for the Petitioner to speak.
8. The Judge concluded that email communications are not “regularly scheduled committee meetings” because they do not occur at a set time on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Since A.R.S. § 33-1804 only requires regularly scheduled committee meetings to be open, the email discussions were not a violation.
9. The final Order was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), the order is binding unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer-form essay responses to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case details and legal reasoning. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s statutory construction of A.R.S. § 33-1804. How does the judge distinguish between the open meeting requirements for Board of Directors meetings versus committee meetings, and what role does the “plain language” of the statute play in this interpretation?
2. Discuss the two central allegations made by Vicky Glover. For each allegation, detail the undisputed facts of the events and explain the specific legal reasoning the judge used to conclude that no statutory violation occurred.
3. Examine the conflict between the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)) and the specific statutory language governing committee meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)). How did the judge resolve this apparent conflict in her final decision?
4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the operational procedures of the Design Review Committee, including its use of email for decision-making and subsequent ratification. How did these procedures become central to the legal dispute?
5. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the standard of “preponderance of the evidence” shape the proceedings, and why was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Petitioner “did not establish” a violation critical to the final order?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer, the judge who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
The Arizona Revised Statute that the Petitioner alleged was violated. It governs open meetings for planned communities, including member associations, boards of directors, and regularly scheduled committees.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the Petitioner filed her petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the Foothills Community Association, comprised of seven members. It appoints the Design Review Committee.
Design Review Committee (DRC)
A five-member committee appointed by the Board of Directors. Two of its members are also on the Board. The DRC’s meetings were the subject of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Foothills Community Association (FCA)
The Respondent in the case. An association of homeowners located in Phoenix, Arizona.
Petitioner
Vicky Glover, who filed a petition on January 23, 2019, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Foothills Community Association.
Preponderance of the evidence
The burden of proof required of the Petitioner. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”
Ratified
The term used to describe the process where decisions made by the DRC via email between meetings were formally approved at the next DRC meeting.
Regularly scheduled committee meetings
The specific type of meeting subject to the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that email communications do not meet this definition as they do not occur at a set time.
Respondent
The Foothills Community Association (FCA), against which the petition was filed. Represented in the hearing by B. Austin Baillio.
Statutory Construction
The process of interpreting a statute. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the plain text of the statute.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919046-REL
3 Shocking Loopholes in HOA ‘Open Meeting’ Laws This Homeowner Discovered the Hard Way
Introduction: The Illusion of Transparency
For anyone living in a homeowner’s association (HOA), there’s a fundamental expectation: the business of the community is conducted in the open. We assume that as members, we have a right to attend meetings, understand the decisions being made, and voice our opinions before our board takes action.
But a startling court decision from an Arizona Administrative Law Judge throws a wrench in that assumption. One homeowner’s legal challenge against her association didn’t just fail—it inadvertently created a roadmap for how HOAs can legally operate behind closed doors, affecting millions of residents in planned communities.
This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from this legal battle, revealing how the specific wording of the law can create major gaps in transparency and challenge everything you thought you knew about your rights as a homeowner.
1. Your Right to Speak is Weaker Than You Think—Especially in Committee Meetings
Most homeowners believe they have a protected right to speak on any agenda item at any official HOA meeting. The case of petitioner Vicky Glover shows this is a dangerous assumption.
On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Ms. Glover attended meetings of her community’s Design Review Committee (DRC) and was not permitted to speak about other members’ pending architectural requests. She argued this violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities (A.R.S. § 33-1804).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), however, pointed out a critical distinction in the law’s text. The statute explicitly guarantees a member the right “to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action.” This specific right, the ALJ concluded, applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors.
For committee meetings, the law sets a much vaguer standard, requiring only that members “be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The ALJ found it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that having Ms. Glover speak on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”
This is a crucial distinction because committees—like architectural, design, or finance committees—often make the decisions that most directly impact homeowners’ property and daily lives. Yet, this ruling clarifies that the guaranteed right to be heard before a vote is taken is significantly weaker in those very forums.
2. “Email Meetings” Can Be a Legal Way to Sidestep Open Meeting Rules
The common understanding of open meeting laws is that they exist to prevent boards and committees from deliberating and making decisions in private. But what if the meeting doesn’t happen in a room, but in an email chain?
Ms. Glover’s second claim was that the DRC was conducting business and making decisions via email between its official meetings. Evidence showed that after a meeting, additional information would be shared with committee members who could then “approve or deny the request… via email.” The association’s manager, Pat Wontor, denied this, claiming emails were only used to gather information on matters already discussed in a meeting.
The ALJ’s conclusion on this matter was stunning and sidestepped the conflicting testimony entirely. The Arizona open meeting law in question only applies to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” Because email exchanges do not occur at a set, scheduled time—like the second Wednesday of the month—the judge ruled they do not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, regardless of their content.
The implication of this loophole is profound. It allows a committee to conduct significant deliberation and decision-making entirely outside of public view. This practice can turn the open meeting into a hollow formality. A committee can present a “done deal” for public ratification, rendering the member’s right to observe and speak effectively meaningless. The public meeting becomes a theatrical rubber stamp for a decision already made in secret.
3. The “Spirit of the Law” Doesn’t Beat the Letter of the Law
Many laws contain a policy statement that outlines their overarching goal—the “spirit of the law.” Arizona’s statute on HOA meetings has an exceptionally strong one, stating that all meetings should be open and that the law should be interpreted to favor transparency. The text explicitly declares:
“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.” (from A.R.S. § 33-1804(F))
Ms. Glover and many homeowners would read this and assume it guarantees broad transparency. The ALJ, however, ruled that this powerful policy statement “does not override the specific provisions” of the law.
In other words, the literal, specific text—like the distinction between “board” and “committee” meetings, or the “regularly scheduled” requirement—takes precedence over the law’s general intent.
This is perhaps the most important lesson for all homeowners. Relying on the assumed purpose or “spirit” of a rule is not enough. In a legal dispute, the precise, technical wording is what matters most. It highlights the critical importance for homeowners to read and understand the exact text of state statutes and their own governing documents, because the loopholes are often found in the fine print.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense
While Vicky Glover lost her petition, her case provides an invaluable education for every member of a community association. It is a stark warning that transparency in an HOA is not a guaranteed principle but a legal standard with specific, and at times counter-intuitive, boundaries that can be exploited.
The loopholes her case exposed reveal a sobering reality: your right to speak is conditional, “meetings” can legally occur out of sight in an email chain, and the stated “spirit” of the law can be rendered toothless by its literal text. HOA governance is not guided by general principles of fairness, but by very specific legal language.
Given these loopholes, it’s worth asking: How many of the most important decisions in your community are happening in an inbox instead of the boardroom?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Vicky Glover(petitioner)
Respondent Side
B. Austin Baillio(respondent attorney) Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Pat Wontor(manager) Manager for DRC/Foothills Community Association
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1918010-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John A Sellers
Counsel
—
Respondent
Rancho Madera Condominium Association
Counsel
Edward D. O'Brien, Edith I. Rudder
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs § 3.10, 3.10.2, 3.10.4
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by establishing that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs. The governing documents grant the HOA the right, but not the obligation, to enforce maintenance duties specifically assigned to Unit Owners concerning the drainage easement.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs because the HOA was found to have a right to enforce maintenance of the drainage easement, but not a mandatory obligation to do so under the terms of the CC&Rs.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA failure to enforce unit owner maintenance obligations regarding stormwater drainage easement
Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated the CC&Rs by failing to enforce unit owner responsibility to keep the stormwater drainage area free of obstructions like vegetation and fencing materials, potentially causing a risk of flooding to his unit.
Orders: The petition was dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the CC&Rs assign Unit Owners the responsibility to clear the drainage area and grant the HOA the right, but not an obligation, to enforce this maintenance.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Dispute Analysis: Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of a dispute between homeowner John A. Sellers (Petitioner) and the Rancho Madera Condominium Association (Respondent). The core of the conflict was Mr. Sellers’ allegation that the Association violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to compel other homeowners to remove vegetation and fencing from a common stormwater drainage channel, thereby creating a flood risk to his property, Unit 12.
The case was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in a process that included an initial hearing, a decision, a granted request for rehearing, and a final binding decision. In both instances, the Administrative Law Judge ruled against the Petitioner.
The initial decision, issued in December 2018, concluded that Mr. Sellers failed to provide sufficient evidence that the materials in the channel actually impeded water flow or posed an unreasonable flood risk. The ruling highlighted that the channel had functioned as intended since 2012 without any flooding incidents. Following a rehearing in April 2019, the second and final decision in May 2019 reinforced this conclusion. It further clarified a crucial distinction in the CC&Rs: while the Association possesses the right to enforce maintenance rules upon homeowners, the governing documents do not impose an explicit obligation to do so proactively before any damage has occurred. The responsibility for maintaining the drainage area rests with the individual unit owners, and the Association’s primary duty is to repair damages after the fact, billing the responsible owner. The petition was ultimately dismissed.
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I. Case Overview
This case documents a formal complaint filed by a homeowner against his condominium association, which was resolved through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.
• Case Number: 19F-H1918010-REL
• Petitioner: John A. Sellers, owner of Unit 12 in Rancho Madera
• Respondent: Rancho Madera Condominium Association, a 46-unit development in Cave Creek, Arizona.
• Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Key Chronology of Events
Aug 23, 2018
Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Oct 23, 2018
An OAH order vacates the initial hearing after the Petitioner indicates a wish to withdraw the petition.
Nov 5, 2018
The first evidentiary hearing convenes, indicating the withdrawal was rescinded.
Dec 12, 2018
The first evidentiary hearing concludes.
Dec 26, 2018
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky issues a decision denying the petition.
Feb 1, 2019
Petitioner files a Rehearing Request with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate.
Feb 22, 2019
The Commissioner grants the Rehearing Request.
Apr 15, 2019
The rehearing convenes and concludes before Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
May 7, 2019
OAH issues an order striking a supplemental, post-hearing filing by the Petitioner from the record.
May 10, 2019
Judge Eigenheer issues a final Administrative Law Judge Decision, again dismissing the petition.
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II. Petitioner’s Core Allegation
Mr. Sellers’ petition was based on a single issue: the alleged violation of Section 3.10 of the Association’s CC&Rs.
• The Violation: The Petitioner claimed the Association failed in its duty to require owners of “Drainage Easement Units” to remove obstructions from a shared stormwater channel.
• The Obstructions: The materials of concern included “large succulents, shrubs, and cacti” growing in the drainage area’s rip-rap, as well as chicken wire that at least one owner had installed to contain a pet.
• The Perceived Risk: Mr. Sellers testified that these items “could catch storm debris and cause the drainage channel to become clogged,” leading to a risk of flooding for his Unit 12. He submitted videos of heavy rains and flooding in other parts of Cave Creek as evidence of the potential danger.
• Financial Impact Claim: The Petitioner was undergoing a contentious divorce, and Unit 12, as a community asset, was for sale under a court order. He asserted that the unresolved drainage issue and his required disclosure of the dispute had reduced the unit’s market price by $40,000.
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III. Respondent’s Position and Actions
The Rancho Madera Condominium Association, represented by its President, Jeffrey Kaplan, denied any violation of the CC&Rs and presented a multi-faceted defense.
• Lack of Historical Precedent: Mr. Kaplan, an owner since 2012, testified that water had never entered the property from the east, and Unit 12 had never sustained any damage from flooding. This held true even during a “100-year storm in 2014.” After a significant rainstorm in August 2018, he personally inspected the drainage easement and “did not see any water in it.”
• Origin of Vegetation: Mr. Kaplan stated that the builder had originally planted the vegetation in the drainage easement that was shown in the Petitioner’s photographic evidence.
• Proactive Communication: To address the Petitioner’s concerns, the Board instructed its management company to act. Letters were sent to the relevant homeowners on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminding them of their responsibility to keep the easement free of obstructions.
• Jurisdictional Confirmation: Mr. Kaplan contacted officials from the Maricopa County Flood Control District and the Town of Cave Creek. Both agencies confirmed the drainage area was not on any official floodplain map, and therefore, the Association was “solely responsible” for its maintenance and enforcement.
• Contradictory Evidence: The Association submitted a June 22, 2018 email from the Petitioner’s wife, Debborah Sellers, which directly contradicted the Petitioner’s claims. She wrote, “There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing.” She also referred to his claims as “nonsense.”
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IV. Analysis of Governing CC&Rs
The dispute centered on the interpretation of specific sections of the Rancho Madera CC&Rs. The judges in both hearings analyzed these sections to determine the respective duties of the homeowners and the Association.
Section
Provision Summary
Key Language
Establishes a perpetual “Drainage Easement” over the eastern five feet of Units 9 through 18 for stormwater conveyance.
“…for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, repairing and replacing a drainage channel…”
3.10.2
Assigns the primary maintenance duty to the individual unit owners within the easement area.
“Each Unit Owner of a Drainage Easement Unit shall keep his Drainage Easement Area Free of weeds and other debris so that the stormwater can flow freely… No Improvement… shall be… allowed to grow… that may… impede the flow of water…”
3.10.4
Defines the Association’s role in the event of damage resulting from a unit owner’s failure to maintain the easement.
“If the failure of one Unit Owner to maintain his Drainage Easement Area… results in damage… the Association shall repair or replace such damage… and the cost… shall be paid by the Unit Owner that caused the damage…”
13.1.1
Grants the Association the power to enforce the CC&Rs.
“The Association shall have the right to enforce, by any proceeding at law or in equity, all restrictions, conditions, covenants…”
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V. Administrative Law Judge Decisions and Rationale
The Petitioner’s case was heard twice and denied both times, with the second decision providing a definitive interpretation of the Association’s duties under the CC&Rs.
Initial Decision (December 26, 2018)
• Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof “by a preponderance of the evidence.”
• Rationale: The judge found a critical failure in the Petitioner’s evidence. While he successfully “established that there are some plants and chicken wire in the stormwater drainage canal,” he “did not establish that the plants or chicken wire impede the flow of water.” The Respondent, in contrast, successfully established that the channel had always “functioned as intended” and that “Unit 12 has never flooded.” The judge concluded there was “no unreasonable risk that Unit 12 will flood.”
• Order: The petition was denied.
Rehearing and Final Decision (May 10, 2019)
• Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer
• Context: The rehearing was granted based on the Petitioner’s claims of procedural irregularities and legal errors in the first hearing.
• Petitioner’s Refined Argument: During the rehearing, the Petitioner argued that the Association’s right to enforce the CC&Rs (under Section 13.1.1) becomes an obligation when safety and property values are affected.
• Conclusion: The petition was dismissed.
• Rationale: The final decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. The judge determined that the documents create a clear hierarchy of responsibility:
1. Unit Owners: Bear the primary responsibility for keeping the easement clear (Section 3.10.2).
2. The Association: Has a responsibility to act only after damage occurs due to an owner’s failure, at which point it must repair the damage and bill the responsible owner (Section 3.10.4).
• Final Legal Interpretation: The judge concluded, “While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.” The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner could not prove the Association had violated any actual obligation laid out in the governing documents. This decision was issued as final and binding on the parties.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918010-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL, Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative legal proceedings between Petitioner John A. Sellers and Respondent Rancho Madera Condominium Association. It is designed to assess comprehension of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the source documents.
1. What was the central allegation John A. Sellers filed against the Rancho Madera Condominium Association on August 23, 2018?
2. Identify the specific sections of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that were central to the dispute.
3. Who is responsible for maintaining the Drainage Easement Area according to CC&R § 3.10.2?
4. What actions did the Association’s management company take in response to the Petitioner’s concerns?
5. What was the testimony of Jeffrey Kaplan, the Association’s President, regarding the history of flooding at Rancho Madera?
6. Why did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grant the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?
7. What was the procedural outcome of Petitioner Sellers’ attempt to submit supplemental arguments after the April 15, 2019, rehearing?
8. How did Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer distinguish between a “right to enforce” and an “obligation to enforce” in her final decision?
9. What evidence did the Petitioner present to support his claim that the drainage channel was at risk of clogging?
10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated May 10, 2019?
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Answer Key
1. Petitioner John A. Sellers alleged that the Association had violated its CC&Rs, specifically § 3.10, by failing to require condominium owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel. Sellers claimed this failure created a risk of flooding for his unit.
2. The central CC&R sections were § 3.10, which establishes the stormwater drainage easement; § 3.10.2, which outlines the maintenance responsibilities of Unit Owners; § 3.10.4, which details the Association’s role in repairing damages; and § 13.1.1, which grants the Association the right to enforce the CC&Rs.
3. According to CC&R § 3.10.2, each individual Unit Owner of a Drainage Easement Unit is responsible for keeping their respective Drainage Easement Area free of weeds and other debris. The text explicitly states that no improvements, including plants, should be allowed that might impede the flow of water.
4. To address the Petitioner’s concerns, the Association’s management company sent letters to the owners of the Drainage Easement Units on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018. These letters reminded the owners of their responsibility to keep the easement area clear of obstructions and debris.
5. Jeffrey Kaplan testified that he bought one of the first units in 2012 and that water has never entered Rancho Madera from the east. He specifically noted that no flooding occurred even during the 100-year storm in 2014, and that after a significant rainstorm in August 2018, he inspected the easement and saw no water in it.
6. The Commissioner granted the Rehearing Request “for the reasons outlined in the Petitioners’ Rehearing Request.” The request itself alleged irregularity in the proceedings, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the original decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
7. After the rehearing concluded, the Petitioner submitted supplemental authority and argument. The Respondent argued this filing was untimely, and Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer ordered the filing to be stricken from the record and closed the record on May 7, 2019.
8. Judge Eigenheer’s decision concluded that while the Association has the right to enforce the CC&Rs under § 13.1.1, nothing in the documents creates an obligation for it to proactively do so regarding maintenance. The only obligation specified is to repair damage after it occurs, with the cost being billed to the responsible unit owner.
9. The Petitioner provided photographs showing large succulents, shrubs, and cacti growing in the rip rap of the Drainage Easement Area. He also showed at least one instance where chicken wire had been placed across the channel to contain a pet, testifying that these items could catch storm debris and cause a clog.
10. The final ruling, issued on May 10, 2019, was that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated Section 3.10 of the CC&Rs. Therefore, the petition was dismissed, and no action was required of the Respondent.
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Essay Questions
Construct detailed essay responses to the following prompts, drawing exclusively from the provided source documents to support your analysis.
1. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 19F-H1918010-REL from the initial petition to the final order. Detail the key dates, presiding judges, significant filings, and the outcome of each stage of the proceedings.
2. Analyze the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judges in both the initial decision (December 26, 2018) and the rehearing decision (May 10, 2019). Compare and contrast their interpretations of the CC&Rs and the standard of “preponderance of the evidence.”
3. Evaluate the evidence and arguments presented by both the Petitioner, John A. Sellers, and the Respondent, represented by Jeffrey Kaplan. What were the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case as detailed in the hearing summaries?
4. Discuss the roles and responsibilities of the Unit Owners versus the Condominium Association as defined by CC&R Sections 3.10, 3.10.2, 3.10.4, and 13.1.1. How did the interpretation of these sections ultimately determine the outcome of the case?
5. Examine the external factors mentioned in the hearings, such as the Petitioner’s divorce, the market value of his unit, and communications with the Maricopa County Flood Control District. How did the Administrative Law Judge address these issues and determine their relevance (or irrelevance) to the central legal question?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Diane Mihalsky presided over the initial hearing and Tammy L. Eigenheer presided over the rehearing.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for the Rancho Madera condominium development.
Common Elements
Areas within the condominium development designed for common use, such as areas for stormwater conveyance mentioned in the CC&Rs.
Drainage Easement Area
The eastern five feet of Units 9 through 18, over which a perpetual non-exclusive drainage easement was created for the purpose of stormwater drainage.
Drainage Improvements
The drainage channel constructed within the Drainage Easement Area, which may consist of decomposed granite, rip rap (large stones), or concrete.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner is John A. Sellers.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, making the contention more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent is the Rancho Madera Condominium Association.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or other legal document that limits the use of a property. The CC&Rs in this case are a form of restrictive covenant.
Unit Owner
An individual who owns a condominium unit within the development and is a member of the owners’ association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918010-REL-RHG
I Read an Entire HOA Lawsuit. Here Are 4 Shocking Lessons About Power, Rules, and Reality.
The Anatomy of a Neighborhood War
Living under a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex world of rules, regulations, and neighborhood politics. For most, disagreements are minor annoyances. But sometimes, a seemingly small issue can escalate into a full-blown legal war.
This is the story of one homeowner’s single-minded crusade against his HOA over a stormwater drainage channel he believed was a serious flooding risk. After filing a formal petition, the dispute escalated into a multi-stage legal battle that spanned nearly a year. The official court documents reveal that even after a judge ruled decisively against him, the homeowner doubled down, demanding a rare rehearing.
A deep dive into this protracted case reveals a fascinating and cautionary tale. The legal reasoning that ultimately settled the matter highlights several surprising lessons that apply to anyone living in a planned community.
1. Proving a Rule Was Broken Isn’t the Same as Proving Harm
The initial hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky in late 2018, centered on a seemingly straightforward argument from the petitioner, John Sellers. He pointed out that his neighbors had placed plants—including large succulents, shrubs, and cacti—as well as chicken wire in a stormwater drainage channel. This, he argued, was a clear violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which stated that no improvement “shall be constructed, installed or allowed to grow… that may… impede the flow of water.”
But in her December 26, 2018 decision, the judge ruled against him. While Sellers successfully proved the obstructions existed, he failed to meet the legal burden of proof that they actually “impede the flow of water.” His claim was defeated by testimony from the HOA President, Jeffrey Kaplan, who stated that the unit had never sustained any flood damage, not even during a “100-year storm in 2014.”
The lesson from this first round is stark: in this legal context, simply pointing out a technical rule break was not enough. The petitioner had to prove that the violation was causing a tangible, negative impact. Without evidence of actual harm or impeded water flow, the theoretical risk was insufficient to win the case.
2. An HOA’s “Right” to Enforce Is Not an “Obligation”
After losing the first round on a question of evidence, Sellers’ argument evolved. He requested a rehearing, which was granted, and the case landed before a new judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, in the spring of 2019. This shifted the legal focus from physical proof of impeded water flow to a more fundamental question of the HOA’s duties.
Sellers argued that because safety and property values were at stake, the association had a duty to enforce the CC&Rs and compel his neighbors to clear the drainage channel. He contended that at a certain point, an organization’s “right” to act becomes an “obligation.”
The judge’s final decision on May 10, 2019, was clear, absolute, and is where the most powerful lesson of the entire case lies.
“While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”
This distinction is critical for any homeowner. An HOA can possess the legal power to act but may not be legally compelled to use it. According to the judge’s interpretation, the governing documents placed the responsibility for keeping the channel clear on the individual unit owners. The association’s only stated obligation was to repair damage after it happened, with the cost being billed back to the responsible party.
3. Outside Conflicts Can Cast a Long Shadow
Legal disputes are rarely just about the facts of the case. During the initial hearing, it was revealed that the petitioner was going through a “contentious divorce” and that the condo unit at the center of the dispute was a community asset being sold by the court.
The most dramatic evidence, however, came from an email written by the petitioner’s own wife, Debborah Sellers. The email, submitted as evidence by the HOA, directly undermined his claims about the severity of the drainage issue.
“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”
In her decision, Judge Mihalsky officially stated that the divorce was “not relevant” to the technical question of whether the HOA violated the CC&Rs. However, she immediately added that the situation “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint,” suggesting that the personal context, and especially the damaging email, severely harmed the petitioner’s credibility.
4. Writing Letters Isn’t the Same as Being Heard
Throughout the dispute, the petitioner made his concerns known by writing “many letters” to the HOA president. He was persistent in his written communications, attempting to force the issue onto the association’s radar.
Yet, this effort was contrasted with a notable lack of direct participation. According to the testimony of HOA President Kaplan during the first hearing, Sellers “never attended any of Respondent’s noticed Board meetings” where his concerns could have been discussed among the board members.
The HOA’s response to his letters was limited; it sent two general reminder letters to all residents in the affected area but did not take direct enforcement action against any specific homeowner. The practical takeaway is that to effect change or be taken seriously in an HOA dispute, visibility and participation are critical. Writing letters is a start, but attending official meetings to present a case in person can be a more effective strategy for ensuring an issue is formally addressed.
A Cautionary Tale for Any Homeowner
What began as a seemingly straightforward complaint about drainage and rule enforcement devolved into a legal battle that consumed nearly a year, involving two multi-day hearings before two different administrative law judges. The petitioner lost his case on the evidence, then lost it again on the law.
It serves as a potent cautionary tale, demonstrating that in the world of HOA disputes, the obvious path is not always the winning one. It leaves every homeowner with a final, thought-provoking question to ponder: When you see a problem in your community, how do you decide if a fight is worth the cost—not just in money, but in time, credibility, and peace?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John A Sellers(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Edward D. O'Brien(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
Edith I. Rudder(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
Jeffrey Kaplan(board president/witness) Rancho Madera Condominium Association President of Respondent, testified
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings ALJ for initial proceedings
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings ALJ for rehearing proceedings
Judy Lowe(commissioner (ADRE)) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
c. serrano(clerk) Office of Administrative Hearings Transmittal/filing clerk
F. Del Sol(clerk) Office of Administrative Hearings Transmittal/filing clerk
Other Participants
Debborah Sellers(witness/spouse) Petitioner's wife, testimony via email submitted by Respondent
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1918010-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2019-05-10
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John A Sellers
Counsel
—
Respondent
Rancho Madera Condominium Association
Counsel
Edward D. O'Brien, Edith I. Rudder
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs § 3.10, 3.10.2, 3.10.4
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by establishing that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs. The governing documents grant the HOA the right, but not the obligation, to enforce maintenance duties specifically assigned to Unit Owners concerning the drainage easement.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs because the HOA was found to have a right to enforce maintenance of the drainage easement, but not a mandatory obligation to do so under the terms of the CC&Rs.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA failure to enforce unit owner maintenance obligations regarding stormwater drainage easement
Petitioner alleged that the Respondent HOA violated the CC&Rs by failing to enforce unit owner responsibility to keep the stormwater drainage area free of obstructions like vegetation and fencing materials, potentially causing a risk of flooding to his unit.
Orders: The petition was dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the CC&Rs assign Unit Owners the responsibility to clear the drainage area and grant the HOA the right, but not an obligation, to enforce this maintenance.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Dispute Analysis: Sellers vs. Rancho Madera Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of a dispute between homeowner John A. Sellers (Petitioner) and the Rancho Madera Condominium Association (Respondent). The core of the conflict was Mr. Sellers’ allegation that the Association violated its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by failing to compel other homeowners to remove vegetation and fencing from a common stormwater drainage channel, thereby creating a flood risk to his property, Unit 12.
The case was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in a process that included an initial hearing, a decision, a granted request for rehearing, and a final binding decision. In both instances, the Administrative Law Judge ruled against the Petitioner.
The initial decision, issued in December 2018, concluded that Mr. Sellers failed to provide sufficient evidence that the materials in the channel actually impeded water flow or posed an unreasonable flood risk. The ruling highlighted that the channel had functioned as intended since 2012 without any flooding incidents. Following a rehearing in April 2019, the second and final decision in May 2019 reinforced this conclusion. It further clarified a crucial distinction in the CC&Rs: while the Association possesses the right to enforce maintenance rules upon homeowners, the governing documents do not impose an explicit obligation to do so proactively before any damage has occurred. The responsibility for maintaining the drainage area rests with the individual unit owners, and the Association’s primary duty is to repair damages after the fact, billing the responsible owner. The petition was ultimately dismissed.
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I. Case Overview
This case documents a formal complaint filed by a homeowner against his condominium association, which was resolved through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.
• Case Number: 19F-H1918010-REL
• Petitioner: John A. Sellers, owner of Unit 12 in Rancho Madera
• Respondent: Rancho Madera Condominium Association, a 46-unit development in Cave Creek, Arizona.
• Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Key Chronology of Events
Aug 23, 2018
Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Oct 23, 2018
An OAH order vacates the initial hearing after the Petitioner indicates a wish to withdraw the petition.
Nov 5, 2018
The first evidentiary hearing convenes, indicating the withdrawal was rescinded.
Dec 12, 2018
The first evidentiary hearing concludes.
Dec 26, 2018
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky issues a decision denying the petition.
Feb 1, 2019
Petitioner files a Rehearing Request with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate.
Feb 22, 2019
The Commissioner grants the Rehearing Request.
Apr 15, 2019
The rehearing convenes and concludes before Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
May 7, 2019
OAH issues an order striking a supplemental, post-hearing filing by the Petitioner from the record.
May 10, 2019
Judge Eigenheer issues a final Administrative Law Judge Decision, again dismissing the petition.
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II. Petitioner’s Core Allegation
Mr. Sellers’ petition was based on a single issue: the alleged violation of Section 3.10 of the Association’s CC&Rs.
• The Violation: The Petitioner claimed the Association failed in its duty to require owners of “Drainage Easement Units” to remove obstructions from a shared stormwater channel.
• The Obstructions: The materials of concern included “large succulents, shrubs, and cacti” growing in the drainage area’s rip-rap, as well as chicken wire that at least one owner had installed to contain a pet.
• The Perceived Risk: Mr. Sellers testified that these items “could catch storm debris and cause the drainage channel to become clogged,” leading to a risk of flooding for his Unit 12. He submitted videos of heavy rains and flooding in other parts of Cave Creek as evidence of the potential danger.
• Financial Impact Claim: The Petitioner was undergoing a contentious divorce, and Unit 12, as a community asset, was for sale under a court order. He asserted that the unresolved drainage issue and his required disclosure of the dispute had reduced the unit’s market price by $40,000.
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III. Respondent’s Position and Actions
The Rancho Madera Condominium Association, represented by its President, Jeffrey Kaplan, denied any violation of the CC&Rs and presented a multi-faceted defense.
• Lack of Historical Precedent: Mr. Kaplan, an owner since 2012, testified that water had never entered the property from the east, and Unit 12 had never sustained any damage from flooding. This held true even during a “100-year storm in 2014.” After a significant rainstorm in August 2018, he personally inspected the drainage easement and “did not see any water in it.”
• Origin of Vegetation: Mr. Kaplan stated that the builder had originally planted the vegetation in the drainage easement that was shown in the Petitioner’s photographic evidence.
• Proactive Communication: To address the Petitioner’s concerns, the Board instructed its management company to act. Letters were sent to the relevant homeowners on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018, reminding them of their responsibility to keep the easement free of obstructions.
• Jurisdictional Confirmation: Mr. Kaplan contacted officials from the Maricopa County Flood Control District and the Town of Cave Creek. Both agencies confirmed the drainage area was not on any official floodplain map, and therefore, the Association was “solely responsible” for its maintenance and enforcement.
• Contradictory Evidence: The Association submitted a June 22, 2018 email from the Petitioner’s wife, Debborah Sellers, which directly contradicted the Petitioner’s claims. She wrote, “There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing.” She also referred to his claims as “nonsense.”
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IV. Analysis of Governing CC&Rs
The dispute centered on the interpretation of specific sections of the Rancho Madera CC&Rs. The judges in both hearings analyzed these sections to determine the respective duties of the homeowners and the Association.
Section
Provision Summary
Key Language
Establishes a perpetual “Drainage Easement” over the eastern five feet of Units 9 through 18 for stormwater conveyance.
“…for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, repairing and replacing a drainage channel…”
3.10.2
Assigns the primary maintenance duty to the individual unit owners within the easement area.
“Each Unit Owner of a Drainage Easement Unit shall keep his Drainage Easement Area Free of weeds and other debris so that the stormwater can flow freely… No Improvement… shall be… allowed to grow… that may… impede the flow of water…”
3.10.4
Defines the Association’s role in the event of damage resulting from a unit owner’s failure to maintain the easement.
“If the failure of one Unit Owner to maintain his Drainage Easement Area… results in damage… the Association shall repair or replace such damage… and the cost… shall be paid by the Unit Owner that caused the damage…”
13.1.1
Grants the Association the power to enforce the CC&Rs.
“The Association shall have the right to enforce, by any proceeding at law or in equity, all restrictions, conditions, covenants…”
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V. Administrative Law Judge Decisions and Rationale
The Petitioner’s case was heard twice and denied both times, with the second decision providing a definitive interpretation of the Association’s duties under the CC&Rs.
Initial Decision (December 26, 2018)
• Presiding Judge: Diane Mihalsky
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof “by a preponderance of the evidence.”
• Rationale: The judge found a critical failure in the Petitioner’s evidence. While he successfully “established that there are some plants and chicken wire in the stormwater drainage canal,” he “did not establish that the plants or chicken wire impede the flow of water.” The Respondent, in contrast, successfully established that the channel had always “functioned as intended” and that “Unit 12 has never flooded.” The judge concluded there was “no unreasonable risk that Unit 12 will flood.”
• Order: The petition was denied.
Rehearing and Final Decision (May 10, 2019)
• Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer
• Context: The rehearing was granted based on the Petitioner’s claims of procedural irregularities and legal errors in the first hearing.
• Petitioner’s Refined Argument: During the rehearing, the Petitioner argued that the Association’s right to enforce the CC&Rs (under Section 13.1.1) becomes an obligation when safety and property values are affected.
• Conclusion: The petition was dismissed.
• Rationale: The final decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. The judge determined that the documents create a clear hierarchy of responsibility:
1. Unit Owners: Bear the primary responsibility for keeping the easement clear (Section 3.10.2).
2. The Association: Has a responsibility to act only after damage occurs due to an owner’s failure, at which point it must repair the damage and bill the responsible owner (Section 3.10.4).
• Final Legal Interpretation: The judge concluded, “While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.” The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner could not prove the Association had violated any actual obligation laid out in the governing documents. This decision was issued as final and binding on the parties.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918010-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Case No. 19F-H1918010-REL, Sellers v. Rancho Madera Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative legal proceedings between Petitioner John A. Sellers and Respondent Rancho Madera Condominium Association. It is designed to assess comprehension of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the source documents.
1. What was the central allegation John A. Sellers filed against the Rancho Madera Condominium Association on August 23, 2018?
2. Identify the specific sections of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that were central to the dispute.
3. Who is responsible for maintaining the Drainage Easement Area according to CC&R § 3.10.2?
4. What actions did the Association’s management company take in response to the Petitioner’s concerns?
5. What was the testimony of Jeffrey Kaplan, the Association’s President, regarding the history of flooding at Rancho Madera?
6. Why did the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate grant the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?
7. What was the procedural outcome of Petitioner Sellers’ attempt to submit supplemental arguments after the April 15, 2019, rehearing?
8. How did Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer distinguish between a “right to enforce” and an “obligation to enforce” in her final decision?
9. What evidence did the Petitioner present to support his claim that the drainage channel was at risk of clogging?
10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated May 10, 2019?
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Answer Key
1. Petitioner John A. Sellers alleged that the Association had violated its CC&Rs, specifically § 3.10, by failing to require condominium owners to remove vegetation and fencing materials from the stormwater channel. Sellers claimed this failure created a risk of flooding for his unit.
2. The central CC&R sections were § 3.10, which establishes the stormwater drainage easement; § 3.10.2, which outlines the maintenance responsibilities of Unit Owners; § 3.10.4, which details the Association’s role in repairing damages; and § 13.1.1, which grants the Association the right to enforce the CC&Rs.
3. According to CC&R § 3.10.2, each individual Unit Owner of a Drainage Easement Unit is responsible for keeping their respective Drainage Easement Area free of weeds and other debris. The text explicitly states that no improvements, including plants, should be allowed that might impede the flow of water.
4. To address the Petitioner’s concerns, the Association’s management company sent letters to the owners of the Drainage Easement Units on April 18, 2018, and July 19, 2018. These letters reminded the owners of their responsibility to keep the easement area clear of obstructions and debris.
5. Jeffrey Kaplan testified that he bought one of the first units in 2012 and that water has never entered Rancho Madera from the east. He specifically noted that no flooding occurred even during the 100-year storm in 2014, and that after a significant rainstorm in August 2018, he inspected the easement and saw no water in it.
6. The Commissioner granted the Rehearing Request “for the reasons outlined in the Petitioners’ Rehearing Request.” The request itself alleged irregularity in the proceedings, newly discovered evidence, errors in the admission of evidence, and that the original decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
7. After the rehearing concluded, the Petitioner submitted supplemental authority and argument. The Respondent argued this filing was untimely, and Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer ordered the filing to be stricken from the record and closed the record on May 7, 2019.
8. Judge Eigenheer’s decision concluded that while the Association has the right to enforce the CC&Rs under § 13.1.1, nothing in the documents creates an obligation for it to proactively do so regarding maintenance. The only obligation specified is to repair damage after it occurs, with the cost being billed to the responsible unit owner.
9. The Petitioner provided photographs showing large succulents, shrubs, and cacti growing in the rip rap of the Drainage Easement Area. He also showed at least one instance where chicken wire had been placed across the channel to contain a pet, testifying that these items could catch storm debris and cause a clog.
10. The final ruling, issued on May 10, 2019, was that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated Section 3.10 of the CC&Rs. Therefore, the petition was dismissed, and no action was required of the Respondent.
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Essay Questions
Construct detailed essay responses to the following prompts, drawing exclusively from the provided source documents to support your analysis.
1. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 19F-H1918010-REL from the initial petition to the final order. Detail the key dates, presiding judges, significant filings, and the outcome of each stage of the proceedings.
2. Analyze the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judges in both the initial decision (December 26, 2018) and the rehearing decision (May 10, 2019). Compare and contrast their interpretations of the CC&Rs and the standard of “preponderance of the evidence.”
3. Evaluate the evidence and arguments presented by both the Petitioner, John A. Sellers, and the Respondent, represented by Jeffrey Kaplan. What were the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case as detailed in the hearing summaries?
4. Discuss the roles and responsibilities of the Unit Owners versus the Condominium Association as defined by CC&R Sections 3.10, 3.10.2, 3.10.4, and 13.1.1. How did the interpretation of these sections ultimately determine the outcome of the case?
5. Examine the external factors mentioned in the hearings, such as the Petitioner’s divorce, the market value of his unit, and communications with the Maricopa County Flood Control District. How did the Administrative Law Judge address these issues and determine their relevance (or irrelevance) to the central legal question?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Diane Mihalsky presided over the initial hearing and Tammy L. Eigenheer presided over the rehearing.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for the Rancho Madera condominium development.
Common Elements
Areas within the condominium development designed for common use, such as areas for stormwater conveyance mentioned in the CC&Rs.
Drainage Easement Area
The eastern five feet of Units 9 through 18, over which a perpetual non-exclusive drainage easement was created for the purpose of stormwater drainage.
Drainage Improvements
The drainage channel constructed within the Drainage Easement Area, which may consist of decomposed granite, rip rap (large stones), or concrete.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the Petitioner is John A. Sellers.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, making the contention more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, the Respondent is the Rancho Madera Condominium Association.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or other legal document that limits the use of a property. The CC&Rs in this case are a form of restrictive covenant.
Unit Owner
An individual who owns a condominium unit within the development and is a member of the owners’ association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918010-REL-RHG
I Read an Entire HOA Lawsuit. Here Are 4 Shocking Lessons About Power, Rules, and Reality.
The Anatomy of a Neighborhood War
Living under a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) often means navigating a complex world of rules, regulations, and neighborhood politics. For most, disagreements are minor annoyances. But sometimes, a seemingly small issue can escalate into a full-blown legal war.
This is the story of one homeowner’s single-minded crusade against his HOA over a stormwater drainage channel he believed was a serious flooding risk. After filing a formal petition, the dispute escalated into a multi-stage legal battle that spanned nearly a year. The official court documents reveal that even after a judge ruled decisively against him, the homeowner doubled down, demanding a rare rehearing.
A deep dive into this protracted case reveals a fascinating and cautionary tale. The legal reasoning that ultimately settled the matter highlights several surprising lessons that apply to anyone living in a planned community.
1. Proving a Rule Was Broken Isn’t the Same as Proving Harm
The initial hearing, held before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky in late 2018, centered on a seemingly straightforward argument from the petitioner, John Sellers. He pointed out that his neighbors had placed plants—including large succulents, shrubs, and cacti—as well as chicken wire in a stormwater drainage channel. This, he argued, was a clear violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which stated that no improvement “shall be constructed, installed or allowed to grow… that may… impede the flow of water.”
But in her December 26, 2018 decision, the judge ruled against him. While Sellers successfully proved the obstructions existed, he failed to meet the legal burden of proof that they actually “impede the flow of water.” His claim was defeated by testimony from the HOA President, Jeffrey Kaplan, who stated that the unit had never sustained any flood damage, not even during a “100-year storm in 2014.”
The lesson from this first round is stark: in this legal context, simply pointing out a technical rule break was not enough. The petitioner had to prove that the violation was causing a tangible, negative impact. Without evidence of actual harm or impeded water flow, the theoretical risk was insufficient to win the case.
2. An HOA’s “Right” to Enforce Is Not an “Obligation”
After losing the first round on a question of evidence, Sellers’ argument evolved. He requested a rehearing, which was granted, and the case landed before a new judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, in the spring of 2019. This shifted the legal focus from physical proof of impeded water flow to a more fundamental question of the HOA’s duties.
Sellers argued that because safety and property values were at stake, the association had a duty to enforce the CC&Rs and compel his neighbors to clear the drainage channel. He contended that at a certain point, an organization’s “right” to act becomes an “obligation.”
The judge’s final decision on May 10, 2019, was clear, absolute, and is where the most powerful lesson of the entire case lies.
“While Respondent has the right to enforce the requirements that the Unit Owners keep the Drainage Easement Area clear, nothing in the CC&Rs provides that Respondent has an obligation to do so.”
This distinction is critical for any homeowner. An HOA can possess the legal power to act but may not be legally compelled to use it. According to the judge’s interpretation, the governing documents placed the responsibility for keeping the channel clear on the individual unit owners. The association’s only stated obligation was to repair damage after it happened, with the cost being billed back to the responsible party.
3. Outside Conflicts Can Cast a Long Shadow
Legal disputes are rarely just about the facts of the case. During the initial hearing, it was revealed that the petitioner was going through a “contentious divorce” and that the condo unit at the center of the dispute was a community asset being sold by the court.
The most dramatic evidence, however, came from an email written by the petitioner’s own wife, Debborah Sellers. The email, submitted as evidence by the HOA, directly undermined his claims about the severity of the drainage issue.
“There has never been any issue with the storm drain behind our house and it is not a major disclosure item… Stop making something out of nothing. AND I HOPE YOU AREN[’]T FREAKING POTENTIAL BUYERS AND OTHER REALTORS WITH THIS NONSENSE.”
In her decision, Judge Mihalsky officially stated that the divorce was “not relevant” to the technical question of whether the HOA violated the CC&Rs. However, she immediately added that the situation “cast a long shadow over his administrative complaint,” suggesting that the personal context, and especially the damaging email, severely harmed the petitioner’s credibility.
4. Writing Letters Isn’t the Same as Being Heard
Throughout the dispute, the petitioner made his concerns known by writing “many letters” to the HOA president. He was persistent in his written communications, attempting to force the issue onto the association’s radar.
Yet, this effort was contrasted with a notable lack of direct participation. According to the testimony of HOA President Kaplan during the first hearing, Sellers “never attended any of Respondent’s noticed Board meetings” where his concerns could have been discussed among the board members.
The HOA’s response to his letters was limited; it sent two general reminder letters to all residents in the affected area but did not take direct enforcement action against any specific homeowner. The practical takeaway is that to effect change or be taken seriously in an HOA dispute, visibility and participation are critical. Writing letters is a start, but attending official meetings to present a case in person can be a more effective strategy for ensuring an issue is formally addressed.
A Cautionary Tale for Any Homeowner
What began as a seemingly straightforward complaint about drainage and rule enforcement devolved into a legal battle that consumed nearly a year, involving two multi-day hearings before two different administrative law judges. The petitioner lost his case on the evidence, then lost it again on the law.
It serves as a potent cautionary tale, demonstrating that in the world of HOA disputes, the obvious path is not always the winning one. It leaves every homeowner with a final, thought-provoking question to ponder: When you see a problem in your community, how do you decide if a fight is worth the cost—not just in money, but in time, credibility, and peace?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John A Sellers(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Edward D. O'Brien(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
Edith I. Rudder(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC/LLP
Jeffrey Kaplan(board president/witness) Rancho Madera Condominium Association President of Respondent, testified
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings ALJ for initial proceedings
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings ALJ for rehearing proceedings
Judy Lowe(commissioner (ADRE)) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of official orders
c. serrano(clerk) Office of Administrative Hearings Transmittal/filing clerk
F. Del Sol(clerk) Office of Administrative Hearings Transmittal/filing clerk
Other Participants
Debborah Sellers(witness/spouse) Petitioner's wife, testimony via email submitted by Respondent
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1919044-REL
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2019-05-07
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
partial
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$500.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Pointe Tapatio Community Association
Counsel
Lauren Vie
Respondent
Lanye C. Wilkey and Devin E. Wilkey
Counsel
Joseph Velez
Alleged Violations
CC&R Article 3, section 3.1
Outcome Summary
The ALJ found that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs by operating a business that created traffic and parking. The Respondents were ordered to cease business operations and pay a $500.00 civil penalty. The Petitioner's request for a refund of its filing fee was denied.
Why this result: Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied because they cited no authority showing that the refund was within the tribunal’s authority.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Residential Use covenant prohibiting traffic/parking generation by business
The Petitioner HOA alleged that the Respondents, co-owners of the unit, violated CC&Rs Article 3, section 3.1 by operating a payroll processing company out of the unit. The ALJ found that the business required two employees to drive to the unit daily, thereby creating traffic and parking, which clearly and unambiguously violates the CC&R provision prohibiting non-residential use that creates traffic or parking.
Orders: Respondents were ordered to cease business operations at the unit (720 E. North Lane, Unit 1) within thirty-five days to comply with CC&R Article 3, section 3.1, and pay a civil penalty of $500.00 to the Department of Real Estate within sixty days. The Petitioner's request for refund of the filing fee was denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No, Civil penalty: $500.00
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
Johnson v. The Pointe Community Association, 205 Ariz. 485, 73 P.3d 616 (App. 2003)
