A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.
Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.
Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two
Executive Summary
This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.
Case Overview
Detail
Information
Case Name
William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two
Case Number
19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Petitioner
William P. Lee (Homeowner)
Respondent
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)
Hearing Date
April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)
Decision Date
April 22, 2019
Final Order
Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Presiding ALJ
Velva Moses-Thompson
Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments
William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:
• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:
◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).
◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).
◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).
• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.
◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.
◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.
• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”
Respondent’s Defense
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:
• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.
• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.
• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.
Analysis of Key Governing Documents
The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.
Document
Key Provision / Content
Relevance to Case
CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3
These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.
The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.
Bylaws, Article V, Section 1
“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”
The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.
Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8
“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.
This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions
The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.
Burden of Proof
The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Key Conclusions of Law
1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.
2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.
3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.
4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.
◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”
◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.
◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.
5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.
Final Order and Implications
Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”
• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL
Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.
Case Overview
This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.
Key Parties and Roles
Party/Role
Name / Entity
Description
Petitioner
William P. Lee
A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.
Respondent
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two
The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.
Legal Counsel
Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.
Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.
Adjudicator
Velva Moses-Thompson
The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.
Timeline of Key Events
June 16, 1986
Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.
July 2, 1999
Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.
July 6, 2018
Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.
September 12, 2018
William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
December 13, 2018
The original hearing on the petition was conducted.
February 11, 2019
The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.
April 1, 2019
The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.
April 22, 2019
The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.
The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations
The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.
• Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).
• Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.
• Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.
• Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.
• Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.
• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.
• Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.
• No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.
• Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.
• No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.
Governing Documents and Legal Principles
• Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.
• Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.
• Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.
• Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”
• Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.
• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”
The Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:
1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.
2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.
3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.
4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.
5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.
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Quiz: Test Your Understanding
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.
1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?
2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?
3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?
4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?
5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?
6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?
7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?
8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?
9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?
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Answer Key
1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.
2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.
3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.
4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.
5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”
6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.
7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.
8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.
9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.
10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.
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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis
The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.
2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?
3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.
4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?
5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?
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Glossary of Key Terms
• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.
• Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.
• Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.
• Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.
• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.
• Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.
• Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.
• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”
• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.
• Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL
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19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
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This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between William P. Lee, a homeowner, and Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two, his Homeowners Association. The central issue revolved around the Greenlaw HOA’s implementation of a comprehensive ban on street parking and its contracting with a towing company to enforce the rule, which Mr. Lee contended violated the association’s governing documents, specifically amendments to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the proper notification procedures for revised rules. The findings of fact detail the history of the parking rules, the homeowner’s receipt of the electronic notification of the revised rules, and Mr. Lee’s arguments that the association failed to use the required postal mail or personal delivery methods for notice. The Conclusions of Law determined that the controlling rules were the revised July 2018 Rules and Regulations and that Mr. Lee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated either the CC&Rs or relevant Arizona statutes. Consequently, the Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
William P. Lee(petitioner) Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association member Testified on behalf of himself
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Timothy D. Butterfield(HOA attorney) Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
Barbara(board member) Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Contended by Lee to be the reason for the parking ban
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services
Counsel
Chad Gallacher, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
Outcome Summary
The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules
Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.
Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:25:31 (97.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL
Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.
The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.
The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.
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1. Case Overview and Core Dispute
• Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)
◦ Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)
• Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
• Hearing Date: December 4, 2018
• Decision Date: December 20, 2018
The Petitioner’s Allegation
On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.
At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.
The Respondent’s Position
The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).
2. Relevant CC&R Provisions
The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.
Section
Title / Subject
Description
10.11.4
Inoperable Vehicles
Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”
10.11.2
Street Parking
Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.
Nuisances
Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”
3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline
Violation Notices and Fines
Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.
The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:
• September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.
• October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.
• December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.
• January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.
• April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.
Competing Testimonies
• Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.
• Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:
◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.
◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.
◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”
4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order
Burden of Proof
The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.
Judge’s Rationale
The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:
1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.
2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).
3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.
4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”
Final Order
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.
The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).
Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL
Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?
2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?
3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?
4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?
5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?
6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.
7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?
8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?
9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.
2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.
3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.
4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.
5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.
6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.
7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.
8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.
9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?
2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.
3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?
4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.
5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.
Appearances
A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.
The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)
The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.
Community Manager
An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.
Findings of Fact
The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.
Nuisance
A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.
Operating Condition
A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.
The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.
Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL
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19F-H18020-REL
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The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jerry R. Collis(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Chad Gallacher(HOA attorney) Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
Lisa Riesland(community manager) Laveen Meadows HOA Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
f del sol(admin support) Signed copy distribution notice
Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services
Counsel
Chad Gallacher, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
Outcome Summary
The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules
Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.
Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:11 (97.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL
Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.
The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.
The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.
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1. Case Overview and Core Dispute
• Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)
◦ Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)
• Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
• Hearing Date: December 4, 2018
• Decision Date: December 20, 2018
The Petitioner’s Allegation
On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.
At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.
The Respondent’s Position
The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).
2. Relevant CC&R Provisions
The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.
Section
Title / Subject
Description
10.11.4
Inoperable Vehicles
Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”
10.11.2
Street Parking
Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.
Nuisances
Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”
3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline
Violation Notices and Fines
Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.
The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:
• September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.
• October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.
• December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.
• January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.
• April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.
Competing Testimonies
• Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.
• Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:
◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.
◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.
◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”
4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order
Burden of Proof
The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.
Judge’s Rationale
The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:
1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.
2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).
3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.
4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”
Final Order
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.
The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).
Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL
Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?
2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?
3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?
4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?
5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?
6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.
7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?
8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?
9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.
2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.
3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.
4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.
5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.
6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.
7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.
8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.
9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?
2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.
3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?
4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.
5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.
Appearances
A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.
The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)
The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.
Community Manager
An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.
Findings of Fact
The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.
Nuisance
A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.
Operating Condition
A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.
The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.
Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL
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19F-H18020-REL
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The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jerry R. Collis(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Chad Gallacher(HOA attorney) Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
Lisa Riesland(community manager) Laveen Meadows HOA Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
f del sol(admin support) Signed copy distribution notice
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).
Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:56 (112.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818050-REL
Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.
The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.
1. Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1818050-REL
Petitioner
Brent J. Mathews
Respondent
American Ranch Community Association
Hearing Date
September 21, 2018
Decision Date
October 11, 2018
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.
2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation
After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:
“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”
The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.
3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events
The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.
A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.
June 2011
The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.
November 23, 2013
Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.
July 30, 2016
Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.
August 2016
Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.
August 9, 2016
The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.
4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning
The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.
A. Burden of Proof
The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.
B. Variance vs. Amendment
The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.
• Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.
• Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”
The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.
C. The Board’s Delegated Authority
The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:
1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.
2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”
3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.
5. Final Order
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:
• Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.
• Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”
The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818050-REL
Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?
3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?
4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?
5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?
6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?
7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?
8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?
9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.
2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.
3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.
4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.
5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.
6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.
7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.
8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.
9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.
10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.
2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”
3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?
4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.
5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.
Architectural Review Committee
A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.
Bylaws
The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).
Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.
Petition
The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.
Variance
An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.
Well Agreement 1
A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.
Well Agreement 2
An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818050-REL
Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown
1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome
It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.
That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.
The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.
2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone
Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.
However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.
3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees
This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.
This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.
According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.
“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”
This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.
4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution
While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.
The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.
When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”
The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.
5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them
The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.
This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Brent J. Mathews(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).
Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:00 (112.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818050-REL
Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.
The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.
1. Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1818050-REL
Petitioner
Brent J. Mathews
Respondent
American Ranch Community Association
Hearing Date
September 21, 2018
Decision Date
October 11, 2018
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.
2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation
After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:
“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”
The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.
3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events
The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.
A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.
June 2011
The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.
November 23, 2013
Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.
July 30, 2016
Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.
August 2016
Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.
August 9, 2016
The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.
4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning
The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.
A. Burden of Proof
The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.
B. Variance vs. Amendment
The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.
• Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.
• Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”
The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.
C. The Board’s Delegated Authority
The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:
1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.
2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”
3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.
5. Final Order
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:
• Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.
• Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”
The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818050-REL
Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?
3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?
4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?
5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?
6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?
7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?
8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?
9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.
2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.
3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.
4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.
5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.
6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.
7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.
8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.
9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.
10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.
2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”
3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?
4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.
5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.
Architectural Review Committee
A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.
Bylaws
The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).
Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.
Petition
The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.
Variance
An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.
Well Agreement 1
A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.
Well Agreement 2
An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818050-REL
Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown
1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome
It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.
That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.
The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.
2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone
Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.
However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.
3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees
This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.
This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.
According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.
“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”
This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.
4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution
While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.
The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.
When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”
The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.
5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them
The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.
This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Brent J. Mathews(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Petitioner won the statutory claim regarding access to association documents (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) and was refunded the $500 filing fee. Petitioner lost the claim regarding the failure to maintain exterior walls (CC&Rs) due to insufficient evidence.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the maintenance issue by a preponderance of the evidence (for case 18F-H1818025-REL).
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to repair and maintain exterior walls
Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to repair damage (crack) to the exterior wall of his unit as required by the CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence (black and white photographs did not clearly show the damage) to establish a violation.
Orders: Petitioner's petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
CC&Rs
5
17
Failure to provide requested association records
Petitioner requested meeting notices and minutes in December 2017. Respondent's former management company failed to respond in a timely fashion. Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the statute.
Orders: Petitioner deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL. Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) in the future and pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00.
Administrative Hearing Brief: Duffett vs. Suntech Patio Homes HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in two consolidated cases filed by homeowner Rex E. Duffett against the Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association (HOA). The ruling presents a split decision, with the petitioner prevailing on one claim while failing to provide sufficient evidence for the other.
The first petition, concerning the HOA’s alleged failure to repair exterior walls, was denied. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as the submitted photographic evidence was unclear and did not sufficiently establish the existence or severity of the damage requiring immediate repair.
The second petition, concerning the HOA’s failure to provide association records upon request, was upheld. The judge found that the HOA, through its former management company, violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) by not responding to a formal document request within the mandated ten-business-day window.
As a result, Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in the records-request case. The HOA was ordered to pay his $500 filing fee and to ensure future compliance with the relevant statutes. The case highlights critical issues of evidence quality in homeowner disputes and demonstrates the legal liability an HOA retains for the failures of its management agents, particularly during periods of transition.
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Case Overview
Case Numbers
18F-H1818025-REL and 18F-H1818027-REL (Consolidated)
Petitioner
Rex E. Duffett
Respondent
Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association
Hearing Date
April 4, 2018
Decision Date
April 24, 2018
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
The hearing addressed two separate petitions filed by Rex E. Duffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate:
1. Petition 1 (18F-H1818025-REL): Alleged the HOA violated community CC&Rs by failing to repair exterior walls of the petitioner’s unit.
2. Petition 2 (18F-H1818027-REL): Alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide requested documents.
Petition 1: Failure to Repair Exterior Walls (Denied)
Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence
• Core Claim: The petitioner alleged the HOA failed its duty, as defined by a March 1993 amendment to the CC&Rs, to maintain the exterior walls of his unit. The CC&Rs state, “The Suntech Patio Homeowners Association shall be responsible for the painting and maintenance of the following: A) Exterior walls of all units . . . .”
• Initial Request (July 14, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed the HOA’s management company, The Management Trust, stating, “While inspecting the outside of my property I noticed a crack in the exterior wall. Please inspect, repair and paint the wall as soon as possible to prevent any damage which could result from rain water in the interior of the wall.”
• Follow-Up Request (August 21, 2017): In a certified letter, Mr. Duffett provided more detail, identifying a crack in the entryway wall allowing “rain water to seep into the interior wall,” a “bare concrete” area on the garage, and a previously cracked garage wall that had been repaired by a roofing company but not painted.
• Hearing Testimony: Mr. Duffett testified that a roofing company he hired to find a leak in his garage ceiling determined the source was not the roof but a crack in the exterior wall.
• Submitted Evidence: The petitioner submitted five black-and-white photographs of his home’s exterior across his two communications.
Respondent’s Position and Evidence
• Management Transition: Pride Community Management took over from The Management Trust on February 1, 2018. The new manager, Rebecca Stowers, and owner, Frank Peake, testified to a difficult transition where The Management Trust initially provided only one box of records, later discovering seven or eight more boxes in storage. Mr. Peake stated that Pride had not seen the petitioner’s communications regarding the damage until the hearing.
• Inspection: Ms. Stowers testified that she inspected the petitioner’s home on March 27, 2018. While she noted “a missing area of stucco on the front of the garage that needed to be repaired,” she “denied being able to identify a crack in the stucco anywhere else on the front of the house.”
• Community-Wide Repair Plan: Ms. Stowers stated that the HOA intended to repair the stucco and paint all exterior walls in the community during the 2018 calendar year at a projected cost of $46,000, to be funded potentially through a special assessment due to the HOA being underfunded.
Conclusion of Law and Ruling
• Burden of Proof: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the petitioner bore the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Evidence Failure: The ALJ found the submitted evidence insufficient. The decision states: “The black and white photographs submitted at hearing did not clearly show the crack Petitioner alleged existed on the exterior wall of his unit… The Administrative Law Judge was unable to identify the location or severity of the alleged crack, and therefore, cannot conclude that such a crack exists and/or that it is necessary to be repaired immediately.”
• Final Ruling: The petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL was denied.
Petition 2: Failure to Provide Association Records (Upheld)
Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence
• Core Claim: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), which requires an association to fulfill a request for records within ten business days.
• The Request (December 22, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed The Management Trust a request for specific documents, citing a statement made by the HOA in a separate case. He requested copies of:
◦ Meeting notices and minutes for all meetings where “rules and regulations were discussed” in August/September 2017.
◦ Meeting notices and minutes for meetings where the last HOA dues increase was discussed.
◦ A copy of the notice for the last association rate increase.
Respondent’s Position and Evidence
• Lack of Awareness: The HOA’s initial response on January 29, 2018, indicated it had only become aware of the request upon receiving notice of the petition. The current management company, Pride, testified they had not seen the original communication from the petitioner.
• Vagueness of Request: Frank Peake of Pride testified that the request for minutes of meetings “where the rules and regulations were discussed” was unclear “because rules and regulations are discussed in some form at virtually every meeting of the association.”
• Claim of Privilege: The initial response from The Management Trust on January 29, 2018, claimed that the requested minutes were for “closed executive meetings and were only available to Board members.”
Conclusion of Law and Ruling
• Statutory Violation: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner clearly made a request for documents and that the HOA, via its former management company, failed to act as required by law.
• Failure of Former Management: The decision explicitly faults the prior management company: “The Management Trust should have responded or requested additional clarification of what documents Petitioner was requesting as it was the management company during the ten day window Respondent had to respond pursuant to the statute.”
• Final Ruling: The petitioner successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL.
Final Order and Implications
The Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders based on the conclusions of law:
Case Number
Subject
Ruling
18F-H1818025-REL
Exterior Wall Repairs
Petition Denied
18F-H1818027-REL
Document Request
Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party
Directives to the Respondent (Suntech Patio Homes HOA):
1. Future Compliance: The HOA must comply with the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) going forward.
2. Payment of Filing Fee: The HOA must pay the petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
This order is considered binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.
Petitioner won the statutory claim regarding access to association documents (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) and was refunded the $500 filing fee. Petitioner lost the claim regarding the failure to maintain exterior walls (CC&Rs) due to insufficient evidence.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the maintenance issue by a preponderance of the evidence (for case 18F-H1818025-REL).
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to repair and maintain exterior walls
Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to repair damage (crack) to the exterior wall of his unit as required by the CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence (black and white photographs did not clearly show the damage) to establish a violation.
Orders: Petitioner's petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
CC&Rs
5
17
Failure to provide requested association records
Petitioner requested meeting notices and minutes in December 2017. Respondent's former management company failed to respond in a timely fashion. Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the statute.
Orders: Petitioner deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL. Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) in the future and pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00.
Administrative Hearing Brief: Duffett vs. Suntech Patio Homes HOA
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in two consolidated cases filed by homeowner Rex E. Duffett against the Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association (HOA). The ruling presents a split decision, with the petitioner prevailing on one claim while failing to provide sufficient evidence for the other.
The first petition, concerning the HOA’s alleged failure to repair exterior walls, was denied. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as the submitted photographic evidence was unclear and did not sufficiently establish the existence or severity of the damage requiring immediate repair.
The second petition, concerning the HOA’s failure to provide association records upon request, was upheld. The judge found that the HOA, through its former management company, violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) by not responding to a formal document request within the mandated ten-business-day window.
As a result, Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in the records-request case. The HOA was ordered to pay his $500 filing fee and to ensure future compliance with the relevant statutes. The case highlights critical issues of evidence quality in homeowner disputes and demonstrates the legal liability an HOA retains for the failures of its management agents, particularly during periods of transition.
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Case Overview
Case Numbers
18F-H1818025-REL and 18F-H1818027-REL (Consolidated)
Petitioner
Rex E. Duffett
Respondent
Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association
Hearing Date
April 4, 2018
Decision Date
April 24, 2018
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
The hearing addressed two separate petitions filed by Rex E. Duffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate:
1. Petition 1 (18F-H1818025-REL): Alleged the HOA violated community CC&Rs by failing to repair exterior walls of the petitioner’s unit.
2. Petition 2 (18F-H1818027-REL): Alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide requested documents.
Petition 1: Failure to Repair Exterior Walls (Denied)
Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence
• Core Claim: The petitioner alleged the HOA failed its duty, as defined by a March 1993 amendment to the CC&Rs, to maintain the exterior walls of his unit. The CC&Rs state, “The Suntech Patio Homeowners Association shall be responsible for the painting and maintenance of the following: A) Exterior walls of all units . . . .”
• Initial Request (July 14, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed the HOA’s management company, The Management Trust, stating, “While inspecting the outside of my property I noticed a crack in the exterior wall. Please inspect, repair and paint the wall as soon as possible to prevent any damage which could result from rain water in the interior of the wall.”
• Follow-Up Request (August 21, 2017): In a certified letter, Mr. Duffett provided more detail, identifying a crack in the entryway wall allowing “rain water to seep into the interior wall,” a “bare concrete” area on the garage, and a previously cracked garage wall that had been repaired by a roofing company but not painted.
• Hearing Testimony: Mr. Duffett testified that a roofing company he hired to find a leak in his garage ceiling determined the source was not the roof but a crack in the exterior wall.
• Submitted Evidence: The petitioner submitted five black-and-white photographs of his home’s exterior across his two communications.
Respondent’s Position and Evidence
• Management Transition: Pride Community Management took over from The Management Trust on February 1, 2018. The new manager, Rebecca Stowers, and owner, Frank Peake, testified to a difficult transition where The Management Trust initially provided only one box of records, later discovering seven or eight more boxes in storage. Mr. Peake stated that Pride had not seen the petitioner’s communications regarding the damage until the hearing.
• Inspection: Ms. Stowers testified that she inspected the petitioner’s home on March 27, 2018. While she noted “a missing area of stucco on the front of the garage that needed to be repaired,” she “denied being able to identify a crack in the stucco anywhere else on the front of the house.”
• Community-Wide Repair Plan: Ms. Stowers stated that the HOA intended to repair the stucco and paint all exterior walls in the community during the 2018 calendar year at a projected cost of $46,000, to be funded potentially through a special assessment due to the HOA being underfunded.
Conclusion of Law and Ruling
• Burden of Proof: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the petitioner bore the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Evidence Failure: The ALJ found the submitted evidence insufficient. The decision states: “The black and white photographs submitted at hearing did not clearly show the crack Petitioner alleged existed on the exterior wall of his unit… The Administrative Law Judge was unable to identify the location or severity of the alleged crack, and therefore, cannot conclude that such a crack exists and/or that it is necessary to be repaired immediately.”
• Final Ruling: The petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL was denied.
Petition 2: Failure to Provide Association Records (Upheld)
Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence
• Core Claim: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), which requires an association to fulfill a request for records within ten business days.
• The Request (December 22, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed The Management Trust a request for specific documents, citing a statement made by the HOA in a separate case. He requested copies of:
◦ Meeting notices and minutes for all meetings where “rules and regulations were discussed” in August/September 2017.
◦ Meeting notices and minutes for meetings where the last HOA dues increase was discussed.
◦ A copy of the notice for the last association rate increase.
Respondent’s Position and Evidence
• Lack of Awareness: The HOA’s initial response on January 29, 2018, indicated it had only become aware of the request upon receiving notice of the petition. The current management company, Pride, testified they had not seen the original communication from the petitioner.
• Vagueness of Request: Frank Peake of Pride testified that the request for minutes of meetings “where the rules and regulations were discussed” was unclear “because rules and regulations are discussed in some form at virtually every meeting of the association.”
• Claim of Privilege: The initial response from The Management Trust on January 29, 2018, claimed that the requested minutes were for “closed executive meetings and were only available to Board members.”
Conclusion of Law and Ruling
• Statutory Violation: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner clearly made a request for documents and that the HOA, via its former management company, failed to act as required by law.
• Failure of Former Management: The decision explicitly faults the prior management company: “The Management Trust should have responded or requested additional clarification of what documents Petitioner was requesting as it was the management company during the ten day window Respondent had to respond pursuant to the statute.”
• Final Ruling: The petitioner successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL.
Final Order and Implications
The Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders based on the conclusions of law:
Case Number
Subject
Ruling
18F-H1818025-REL
Exterior Wall Repairs
Petition Denied
18F-H1818027-REL
Document Request
Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party
Directives to the Respondent (Suntech Patio Homes HOA):
1. Future Compliance: The HOA must comply with the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) going forward.
2. Payment of Filing Fee: The HOA must pay the petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
This order is considered binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818025-REL
Study Guide: Duffett v. Suntech Patio Homes HOA
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the consolidated cases of Rex E. Duffett v. Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association, Case Numbers 18F-H1818025-REL and 18F-H1818027-REL. The decision, issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, addresses two separate petitions filed by a homeowner against his Homeowners Association (HOA), one concerning property maintenance and the other concerning access to association records.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case decision.
1. Who were the primary parties in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two distinct allegations made by the Petitioner in the petitions that were consolidated for this hearing?
3. According to the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs), what specific responsibility did the HOA have regarding the exterior of residential units?
4. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge rule against the Petitioner in his claim for wall repairs (Case No. 18F-H1818025-REL)?
5. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner claim the HOA violated in his second petition regarding access to records (Case No. 18F-H1818027-REL)?
6. Describe the roles and performance of the two management companies, The Management Trust and Pride Community Management, as detailed in the hearing evidence.
7. What was the final outcome of the petition concerning the HOA’s failure to provide documents, and who was named the prevailing party?
8. What specific types of documents did the Petitioner request from the HOA in his fax dated December 22, 2017?
9. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and for which petition did he successfully meet it?
10. What financial penalty was imposed upon the Respondent as part of the final Order?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner was Rex E. Duffett, a homeowner who filed the petitions. The Respondent was the Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association, the entity Mr. Duffett alleged had violated community rules and state law.
2. The first petition alleged that the HOA violated the CC&Rs by failing to respond to repeated requests for repairs to the exterior walls of his unit. The second petition alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide requested association documents.
3. A March 1993 amendment to the CC&Rs states that the Suntech Patio Homeowners Association “shall be responsible for the painting and maintenance of the… Exterior walls of all units.”
4. The judge ruled against the Petitioner because he failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The black and white photographs submitted did not clearly show the alleged crack’s location or severity, so the judge could not conclude that a repair was immediately necessary.
5. The Petitioner claimed the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). This statute requires an association to make records reasonably available for examination and to provide copies of requested records within ten business days.
6. The Management Trust was the HOA’s management company when the incidents occurred and failed to properly respond to the Petitioner’s requests. Pride Community Management took over on February 1, 2018, and testified that the transition was difficult due to the sparse documentation initially provided by The Management Trust.
7. The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner, deeming him the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL. The judge ordered the HOA to comply with the applicable statute in the future.
8. The Petitioner requested copies of meeting notices and minutes for meetings where rules and regulations were discussed and where the last HOA dues increase was discussed. He also requested a copy of the notice of the last rate increase and any associated signed written consents.
9. The legal standard was “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force. The Petitioner failed to meet this standard for the wall repair petition but successfully met it for the document request petition.
10. The Respondent (HOA) was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00. The payment was to be made directly to the Petitioner within thirty days of the Order.
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Suggested Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a response using only the information and evidence presented in the provided decision.
1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. How did the quality of evidence submitted by the Petitioner lead to two different outcomes for his two petitions?
2. Discuss the role and responsibilities of a homeowners association’s management company, using the actions of The Management Trust and the subsequent challenges faced by Pride Community Management as primary examples. How did the transition between these two companies impact the case?
3. Evaluate the Respondent’s arguments and actions in both petitions. In the wall repair case, what was their stated plan, and why was it ultimately not considered by the judge? In the document request case, what was their defense, and why did it fail?
4. Based on the text of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), explain the specific obligations of an HOA regarding member requests for records. Detail how the Suntech Patio Homes HOA, through its management, failed to meet these obligations, leading to the ruling against them.
5. Examine the communication breakdown between the Petitioner and the Respondent. Citing specific examples from the “Findings of Fact” and “Hearing Evidence” sections, explain how miscommunication and lack of timely response exacerbated the conflict.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues a legally binding decision. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
An Arizona Revised Statute that legally requires homeowners associations to make financial and other records available for member examination and to provide copies upon request within ten business days.
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
The section of the Arizona Revised Statutes that grants jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate to hear disputes between homeowners and their associations.
Conditions, Covenants and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The governing legal documents that establish the rules, obligations, and restrictions for a planned community and its homeowners association.
Consolidated for Hearing
A procedural step where two or more separate legal cases involving the same parties are combined into a single hearing for efficiency.
Department
Within the context of this case, refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency where the Petitioner initially filed his petitions.
The final, legally binding ruling issued by the Administrative Law Judge at the conclusion of the hearing.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, homeowner Rex E. Duffett.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is met when the evidence presented has “the most convincing force” and is more likely true than not.
Prevailing Party
The party who is found to have won the legal dispute. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party in the document request case.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818025-REL
A Homeowner Sued His HOA Over a Cracked Wall. He Lost Because of Bad Photocopies.
Introduction: The David vs. Goliath Battle Against Your HOA
For many homeowners, a dispute with their Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like an uphill battle. It’s a common story of frustration, complex rules, and feeling unheard. The legal case of Rex E. Duffett versus the Suntech Patio Homes HOA is a perfect example, but with a twist. This isn’t just a story about winning or losing; it’s a fascinating cautionary tale filled with surprising lessons for any homeowner navigating a conflict with their association. This breakdown of the real-life administrative court decision reveals the unexpected details that can make or break a case.
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1. Takeaway #1: The Quality of Your Proof Matters More Than the Truth
The dispute began when Rex Duffett filed a petition alleging his HOA had failed to repair a crack in his exterior wall that he claimed was causing a water leak. According to the association’s own CC&Rs, maintaining exterior walls was the HOA’s responsibility. To document the problem, he diligently sent faxes and certified mail to the management company, including photographs of the damage.
Despite his efforts, the Administrative Law Judge denied his petition for repairs.
The reason was as surprising as it was simple: the evidence he submitted was not clear enough. The black and white copies of the photographs he provided at the hearing “did not clearly show any damage.” The judge’s finding was blunt and highlights a critical point for any legal dispute:
The Administrative Law Judge was unable to identify the location or severity of the alleged crack, and therefore, cannot conclude that such a crack exists and/or that it is necessary to be repaired immediately.
The lesson here is critical. In a legal dispute, having proof is not enough; the proof must be clear, convincing, and well-presented. Mr. Duffett’s primary case failed not because he was necessarily wrong, but because his evidence failed to persuade the judge. In an administrative hearing, a handful of high-resolution color photographs, or even a short video, would have provided irrefutable evidence and could have changed the entire outcome of his primary petition.
2. Takeaway #2: Your HOA is on the Hook for Its Management Company’s Failures
Mr. Duffett also filed a second petition against the HOA for failing to provide records he requested, such as meeting minutes. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)), an association must fulfill such a request within ten business days. The HOA failed to do so.
The root of the problem was the HOA’s previous management company, “The Management Trust.” This company not only failed to respond to the homeowner’s request but also failed to notify the new management company about it. The relationship between the HOA and this vendor was so poor that the HOA had previously tried to terminate the contract, but the management company “refused to acknowledge the termination and held Respondent to the full two year contract.” The transition was chaotic; the old company initially provided only one box of information before later discovering “seven or eight more boxes” in storage.
Even though the management company was clearly at fault, the Judge ruled that the HOA violated the law. This provides a powerful insight for both boards and homeowners: an HOA cannot blame its vendors. Legally, the association is the responsible party. Hiring an incompetent or unresponsive management company creates significant legal and financial liability for the association and, by extension, every homeowner. This is not an abstract risk; in this case, the management company’s failure to forward a simple request directly led to a legal violation that cost the association—and thus, its members—the $500 filing fee ordered by the judge.
3. Takeaway #3: A “Win” Can Be More Complicated Than It Looks
When you look at the final outcome, Mr. Duffett’s case presents a nuanced picture of what a “win” really means in an HOA dispute. The judge issued a split decision:
• Petition for Repairs: Denied. The homeowner lost.
• Petition for Documents: The homeowner was deemed the “prevailing party.” He won.
As the prevailing party in the second petition, the homeowner received a clear victory. The judge ordered the HOA to comply with the document access law in the future and, crucially, to pay the homeowner back his $500 filing fee.
This highlights a common reality in legal disputes: a homeowner can secure a clear procedural victory (enforcing the right to documents and recovering fees) while simultaneously failing to achieve their core substantive goal (getting the wall repaired). The outcome shows that legal victories can be partial and may not address the real-world problem that initiated the dispute in the first place.
4. Takeaway #4: Vague Requests and Messy Records Create Chaos
This case is a masterclass in how poor communication from both sides can create a perfect storm of dysfunction.
First, the homeowner’s request for documents was “somewhat vague.” The new management company testified it was “unclear because rules and regulations are discussed in some form at virtually every meeting.” While the HOA still violated the law by failing to respond at all, this highlights a crucial lesson for homeowners: be as specific and clear as possible in all written communication to avoid ambiguity.
This vague request then ran headlong into the second problem: the HOA’s institutional chaos. The new Community Manager testified that the only relevant document they possessed was the minutes from a single meeting, and that “seven or eight more boxes” of records were missing after a disastrous transition between management companies. The homeowner’s ambiguous request met an organization that likely couldn’t have responded effectively even if it wanted to.
For both sides, meticulous documentation is a shield. For homeowners, a clear, specific, and undeniable paper trail strengthens their position. For HOA boards, organized records are essential for smooth operations, seamless transitions between management companies, and, most importantly, avoiding legal liability.
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Conclusion: The Devil is in the Details
The case of Duffett v. Suntech Patio Homes HOA is a powerful reminder that in legal disputes, the outcome often hinges on the small stuff. Small details—the quality of a photocopy, the precise wording of a request, the competence of a vendor, the location of a box of files—can have massive consequences. They can mean the difference between winning and losing, between getting a problem solved and walking away with only a partial victory.
This case shows how easily things can go wrong. The next time you’re in a dispute, what’s the one small detail you might be overlooking that could change everything?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Rex E. Duffett(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(attorney) BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC
Rebecca Stowers(property manager) Pride Community Management Community Manager
Frank Peake(property manager) Pride Community Management Owner of Pride
Shawn Mason(property manager) The Management Trust Former management company staff
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-02-26
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
John L. Shields
Counsel
—
Respondent
Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Counsel
Maria R. Kupillas
Alleged Violations
CC&R § 6.2(A)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition. It was determined that the Respondent (HOA) did not err in approving the neighbor's wall extension proposal, as the responsibility for obtaining adjoining owner approval under CC&R § 6.2(A) lay solely with the neighboring owner, not the HOA. The HOA's approval under CC&R § 7.2 only required considering aesthetic compliance.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent erroneously approved the neighbor's proposal. The HOA was only required by CC&R § 7.2 to consider aesthetics when approving alterations, and neighbor approval (required by CC&R § 6.2(A)) was the sole responsibility of the building owner, not the HOA.
Key Issues & Findings
Respondent improperly approved a block wall extension built by a neighbor without securing Petitioner's required adjoining owner approval.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs by formally approving a neighbor's block wall extension (approximately 5' long x 6' high) because Petitioner, the adjoining property owner, had not approved the wall as required by CC&R § 6.2(A).
Orders: The petition was dismissed, and no action was required of Respondent.
Briefing Document: Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner John Shields (Petitioner) and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Homeowners’ Association (Respondent). The core of the dispute is a 5-foot by 6-foot common block wall extension constructed by the Petitioner’s neighbor, Joe Johnson. The Petitioner alleged the Respondent violated its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving the wall alteration without the Petitioner’s required consent as the adjoining property owner.
Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed the Petitioner’s claims. The decisions established several critical legal and procedural points:
• Distinct HOA Obligations: The HOA’s architectural approval role, governed by CC&R § 7.2, is distinct from the neighbor-approval requirement in CC&R § 6.2(A). The HOA’s approval is based solely on aesthetic and community consistency standards and does not obligate it to verify or enforce separate homeowner-to-homeowner agreements or approvals.
• Homeowner Responsibility: The responsibility to obtain an adjoining owner’s approval for a shared wall alteration rests entirely with the homeowner undertaking the construction (in this case, Mr. Johnson), not with the HOA.
• Discretionary Enforcement: The HOA’s power to enforce CC&R violations is discretionary, not mandatory. CC&R § 8.1 uses the permissive term “may,” granting the board latitude in deciding whether to pursue enforcement actions, particularly in cases with conflicting evidence.
• Alternative Remedy: The Petitioner is not without a remedy. The same CC&R section that grants the HOA enforcement power also explicitly authorizes individual owners to bring a private action against another owner to enforce the CC&Rs.
Ultimately, the HOA was found to have acted within its authority as defined by the governing documents, and both petitions against it were dismissed.
I. Case Overview
This matter concerns a petition filed on May 3, 2017, by John Shields with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against his HOA, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch. The case was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for adjudication.
Entity
Details
John Shields
Petitioner
Homeowner at 20431 E. Bronco Drive, Queen Creek, Arizona.
Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Respondent
The Homeowners’ Association (HOA) for the development.
Joe and Sandy Johnson
Adjoining Neighbor
Constructed the disputed wall extension between their property and the Petitioner’s.
The Disputed Structure
Wall Extension
An approximately 5-foot long by 6-foot high common block wall extension.
The dispute was adjudicated in two separate hearings:
1. Initial Hearing: Held on September 27, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky. A decision dismissing the petition was issued on October 11, 2017.
2. Rehearing: Granted on December 5, 2017, and held on February 5, 2018, before ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer. A final decision, again dismissing the petition, was issued on February 26, 2018.
II. Petitioner’s Claim and Central Issue
The Petitioner’s central claim was that the Respondent HOA violated CC&R § 6.2(A) by approving the wall extension built by his neighbor, Joe Johnson, without first securing or verifying the Petitioner’s approval.
• Core Allegation: Any alteration to a shared “Party Wall” requires the approval of both the HOA’s Architectural Control Committee (“the Committee”) and the adjoining owner. The Petitioner asserted he never gave his approval.
• Petitioner’s Testimony: He steadfastly denied ever approving the wall, stating that he expressed his disapproval to the Johnsons on October 16, 2016, three days after its construction. He submitted a photograph and testified the wall “looked like crap” and was an “eyesore.”
• Evolving Argument:
◦ In the first hearing, the Petitioner argued that the HOA was responsible for enforcing the CC&Rs by compelling Mr. Johnson to remove the unapproved wall.
◦ In the rehearing, the Petitioner “vacillated” before firmly asserting his issue was that the HOA had improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal in the first place.
III. Relevant Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The decisions in this case hinged on the interpretation and interplay of three specific sections of the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch CC&Rs.
Section
Key Provision
§ 6.2(A)
Fences as Party Walls
“Such Party Walls and Fences shall not be altered, or changed… without [the] approval of the adjoining Owner(s), if any, and the [Architectural Control] Committee.”
Review by the Committee
“No … fences … shall be commenced [or] erected … until the plans and specifications … have been submitted to and approved by the Committee. … the Committee shall have the right to refuse to approve any Alteration which is not suitable or desirable in their opinion for aesthetic or other reasons…” It also states the Committee’s approval is not an endorsement of compliance with laws or ordinances.
Effect of Declaration and Remedies
“In the event of any violation… they may be enforced by an action brought by [Respondent], the Committee or by the Owner or Owners… at law or in equity…”
IV. Chronology of Events and Factual Evidence
1. Prior to Oct 13, 2016: Mr. Johnson discussed his plans to build the wall extension to hide his RV on multiple occasions with the Petitioner present.
◦ Conflicting Testimony: A.J. Denardo testified he was present for at least three such conversations and that the Petitioner voiced no objection, even stating the wall “looked good” immediately after it was built. Sandy Johnson testified the Petitioner was present for at least ten discussions and never disapproved, sometimes nodding in apparent approval. The Petitioner denied ever giving approval.
2. On/About Oct 13, 2016: Mr. Johnson constructed the wall extension without prior approval from the Committee.
3. On/About Oct 16, 2016: The Petitioner expressed his disapproval of the wall to Mr. and Mrs. Johnson.
4. On/About Nov 2, 2016: Mr. Johnson retroactively submitted plans for the wall extension and a proposal to move his gate forward to the Committee for approval.
5. Nov 16, 2016: The newly elected HOA board, acting as the Committee, met and verbally approved Mr. Johnson’s wall. They specifically advised him that “he will need to seek neighboring property owner’s approval.”
6. December 2016: The board held an executive session to obtain legal advice on enforcement issues.
7. Jan 18, 2017: At a regular board meeting, the board formally approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal, resolving “to ratify the unanimous written consent received outside this regular meeting.”
8. Post-Approval: The City of Queen Creek notified Mr. Johnson that he could not move his gate forward as proposed, as it violated city codes.
V. Legal Analysis and Rulings
Both administrative law judges ultimately concluded that the HOA had not violated its CC&Rs and dismissed the petition. The reasoning in each decision focused on different facets of the HOA’s duties.
A. First Hearing Decision (ALJ Diane Mihalsky)
The initial ruling focused on the HOA’s role in enforcement.
• Discretionary Power: The decision centered on the word “may” in CC&R § 8.1. Citing case law (Walker v. Wilkinson), the judge found that “may” indicates a permissive intent, while “shall” indicates a mandatory one. Therefore, the CC&Rs gave the Respondent board the option to bring an enforcement action, but did not require it to do so.
• No Abuse of Discretion: The board was aware of the dispute and the conflicting testimony from multiple witnesses regarding the Petitioner’s prior approval (or lack of objection). The board determined it was not its “job to decide who was telling the truth.” Given this conflicting evidence, the judge found that the board’s decision not to pursue enforcement against Mr. Johnson was not an abuse of its discretion.
• Petitioner’s Remedy: The decision explicitly noted that the Petitioner was not without a remedy, as CC&R § 8.1 also authorizes him to file his own action directly against the Johnsons for their alleged violation of CC&R § 6.2(A).
B. Rehearing Decision (ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer)
The rehearing focused on the Petitioner’s clarified claim that the HOA’s approval of the plans was improper.
• Separate and Distinct Obligations: The judge ruled that CC&R § 6.2(A) and CC&R § 7.2 create separate obligations for separate parties.
◦ § 6.2(A) requires the homeowner (Mr. Johnson) to obtain the adjoining neighbor’s approval.
◦ § 7.2 requires the HOA Committee to review the proposal based only on aesthetic criteria and consistency with the development.
• Limited Scope of Committee Review: The decision states, “Nothing in CC&R § 7.2 requires Respondent to consider whether the adjoining neighbor had approved the block wall extension.” The board’s role was to evaluate if the wall was “aesthetically pleasing and consistent” with other structures, which it did.
• No Erroneous Approval: Because the HOA’s approval process is defined and limited by § 7.2, its decision to approve the wall based on those criteria was not erroneous. The HOA had “no obligation under CC&R § 6.2(A) to obtain or ensure Petitioner approved the block wall extension.”
VI. Final Outcome
The Petitioner’s petition against the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch HOA was dismissed. The final order from the February 26, 2018, rehearing, which is binding on the parties, concluded that no action was required of the Respondent. The Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated its governing documents in either its approval of the wall extension or its decision not to pursue enforcement.
Study Guide – 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Shields v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between John Shields and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association. It is based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and evidence presented in two separate hearings before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who are the primary parties involved in this legal dispute, and what is their relationship?
2. What specific structure is at the center of the dispute, when was it built, and by whom?
3. According to CC&R § 6.2(A), what two distinct approvals are required before a party wall can be altered?
4. Why did the Respondent’s board state it was unsure whether the Petitioner had approved the wall extension before it was constructed?
5. What criteria did the Architectural Control Committee use when it formally approved the wall extension, as outlined in CC&R § 7.2?
6. Explain the legal significance of the word “may” in CC&R § 8.1 regarding the homeowners’ association’s enforcement duties.
7. On what grounds was the Petitioner, John Shields, granted a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?
8. During the rehearing, what did the Petitioner clarify was his single, primary complaint against the Respondent?
9. What was the final recommended order in both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing?
10. According to the first judge’s decision, what other legal remedy is available to the Petitioner to address his grievance against his neighbor?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties are John Shields (the Petitioner) and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association (the Respondent). Mr. Shields is a homeowner and member of the association, and his dispute concerns the association’s handling of a wall built by his next-door neighbor, Joe Johnson.
2. The structure is an approximately 5-foot long by 6-foot high common block wall extension. It was built on or about October 13, 2016, by the Petitioner’s neighbor, Joe Johnson, between their two properties.
3. CC&R § 6.2(A) requires that any alteration to a party wall must have the approval of the adjoining owner(s), if any, as well as the approval of the Architectural Control Committee. Both approvals are necessary.
4. The board was unsure about the Petitioner’s prior approval because at least four witnesses stated they heard the Petitioner either actually approve of the wall or fail to object while Mr. Johnson was discussing plans to build it in his presence. This created a conflict between the Petitioner’s claims and the testimony of others.
5. According to testimony from board member Kristi Hancock, the Committee’s approval was based solely on whether the wall was aesthetically pleasing and consistent with other wall extensions in the development. The Committee’s review under CC&R § 7.2 did not require it to confirm whether the adjoining neighbor had given approval.
6. The first decision concluded that the word “may” in CC&R § 8.1 indicates permissive intent, not a mandatory requirement. This means the association had the discretion, but not the obligation, to bring an enforcement action against Mr. Johnson.
7. A rehearing was granted by Commissioner Judy Lowe because the Petitioner claimed there were errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, other errors of law during the proceeding, and misconduct by the Administrative Law Judge that deprived him of a fair hearing.
8. After some vacillation, the Petitioner firmly asserted during the rehearing that his single issue was that the Respondent had improperly approved Mr. Johnson’s proposal to build the block wall extension and move his gate forward.
9. In both hearings, the recommended order was that no action was required of the Respondent and that the petition should be dismissed.
10. The first decision points out that under CC&R § 8.1, the Petitioner is not without a remedy. This section authorizes an owner, not just the association, to file an action against another owner for an alleged violation of the CC&Rs.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, citing specific facts, testimony, and CC&R provisions from the source documents.
1. Analyze the differing responsibilities of the homeowner (Mr. Johnson), the adjoining neighbor (Mr. Shields), and the homeowners’ association (the Respondent) as outlined in CC&Rs § 6.2(A), § 7.2, and § 8.1. How do these distinct roles and responsibilities intersect and conflict in this case?
2. Compare and contrast the evidence and testimony presented in the first hearing (before ALJ Diane Mihalsky) with the focus of the second hearing (before ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer). How did the Petitioner’s framing of his central argument change between the two proceedings?
3. Discuss the legal standard “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain how the conflicting testimony regarding the Petitioner’s “tacit approval” influenced the Respondent’s decision-making and, ultimately, the Administrative Law Judges’ conclusions.
4. Evaluate the Respondent’s decision-making process regarding the approval of the wall extension. Consider the timeline of events from the wall’s unapproved construction in October 2016 to the formal ratification in January 2017, the conditional verbal approval, and the rationale provided by board members for their actions.
5. The first decision explicitly states that CC&R § 8.1 gives the Petitioner a separate remedy against his neighbor. Based on the information in both documents, construct the legal argument the Petitioner could make in a direct action against Mr. and Mrs. Johnson for their alleged violation of CC&R § 6.2(A).
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, takes evidence, and makes decisions or recommendations on legal and factual issues. In this case, Diane Mihalsky and Tammy L. Eigenheer served as ALJs.
Architectural Control Committee (The Committee)
A body within the homeowners’ association responsible for reviewing and approving or disapproving proposed alterations to properties, such as fences, based on aesthetic and other considerations as outlined in the CC&Rs. In this case, the board itself acted as the Committee.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (The Department)
The state agency with which the Petitioner initially filed his petition concerning violations of planned community documents. The Department then referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing legal documents that set out the rights and obligations of the homeowners’ association and its members. The key sections referenced are 6.2(A), 7.2, and 8.1.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The independent state agency responsible for conducting evidentiary hearings for disputes referred by other state agencies, such as the one between Shields and the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch.
Party Wall
A wall built on the boundary line between two adjoining properties, for the common benefit of both owners. CC&R § 6.2(A) governs the alteration of such walls.
Permissive Intent
A legal interpretation of language, such as the word “may,” which indicates that an action is allowed or discretionary but not required. This was central to the interpretation of CC&R § 8.1.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John Shields is the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this civil administrative case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, making it more probable that a contention is true than not.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case, granted in this instance because the Petitioner alleged errors of law and misconduct by the judge in the first proceeding.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch homeowners’ association is the Respondent.
Tacit Approval
Approval that is implied or inferred from actions or from a failure to state an objection, rather than being explicitly stated. Witnesses claimed the Petitioner gave tacit approval to the wall before it was built.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717034-REL-RHG
4 Surprising Lessons From a Neighbor’s Ugly Wall and the HOA That Did Nothing
Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma
In the world of community governance, the gap between homeowner expectation and contractual reality is a fertile ground for conflict. Most people assume their Homeowners’ Association (HOA) exists to be their first line of defense in a neighbor dispute; when a rule is broken, the HOA is expected to step in. But what happens when the HOA decides to do nothing?
This was the exact situation faced by homeowner John Shields, who was appalled when his neighbor, Joe Johnson, built a block wall extension he considered an eyesore. Mr. Shields turned to his HOA, Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch, expecting them to force its removal. The legal battle that followed provides a fascinating case study, revealing surprising realities about the power and obligations of an HOA. For any homeowner in a planned community, the takeaways are as counter-intuitive as they are crucial.
1. Your HOA Isn’t Obligated to Be Your Enforcer
Mr. Shields’s primary argument rested on a common but often mistaken assumption: that an HOA has a strict mandate to enforce every rule. His logic was straightforward: the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) required his approval for the wall extension. Since he never gave it, he believed the HOA was responsible for forcing his neighbor to tear the wall down.
The court, however, pointed to a different section of the CC&Rs (§ 8.1) which stated that the rules may be enforced by the HOA. This single word was the linchpin of the case. The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the critical legal distinction between a permissive option and a mandatory duty.
“[The] use of the word ‘may’ generally indicates permissive intent . . . while ‘shall’ generally indicates a mandatory provision.”
This gave the HOA discretion on whether to act. Because there was conflicting testimony about whether Mr. Shields had given tacit approval beforehand, the court found that the HOA “did not abuse its discretion by declining to bring an enforcement action.” The lesson is clear: your HOA’s governing documents might grant it the right to enforce rules without creating an obligation to do so in every single case.
2. The HOA’s “Approval” Might Not Mean What You Think
Adding another layer to the conflict, Mr. Johnson submitted plans for the wall and a related gate relocation to the HOA’s Architectural Control Committee after the wall was already built. The Committee ultimately approved it. To Mr. Shields, this seemed like the HOA was siding with his neighbor and ignoring his rights.
But the Committee’s review was far narrower than he assumed. According to CC&R § 7.2, their analysis was limited to whether the wall was “esthetically pleasing and consistent with other wall extensions that had been built in the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch development.” The Committee wasn’t tasked with policing neighbor-to-neighbor agreements.
A formal rehearing—granted after the petitioner alleged “errors of law”—clarified this crucial point. The judge found that under CC&R § 6.2(A), it was Mr. Johnson’s responsibility to get his neighbor’s approval, not the HOA’s. As the decision stated, “Respondent had no obligation under CC&R § 6.2(A) to obtain or ensure Petitioner approved the block wall extension.” This separation of duties is common in governing documents, as it strategically shields the HOA from liability in member disputes while allowing it to maintain aesthetic control over the community.
3. Your Silence Can Be Used Against You
The case devolved into a classic “he said, she said” scenario that ultimately weakened Mr. Shields’s position. He testified that he never approved the wall and, on October 16, 2016—three days after it was built—told his neighbors he disapproved, calling it an “eyesore” that “looked like crap.”
However, other witnesses told a different story. One, Mr. Denardo, testified that Mr. Shields “did not voice any objection” before the wall was constructed and even said it “looked good” immediately after. The neighbor’s wife, Mrs. Johnson, testified that Mr. Shields was present for at least ten discussions about the wall, “had never voiced any disapproval,” and had “sometimes nodded, apparently indicating his approval.”
This conflicting testimony was the direct basis for the board invoking its discretionary power. A board member testified that because of the conflicting accounts, the board “was less sure about whether Petitioner had actually or tacitly approved the block wall extension before it was built.” This uncertainty was the key factor that led them not to intervene. When it comes to property matters, clear, timely, and preferably documented communication is your strongest asset; ambiguity and silence can be interpreted as consent.
4. When the HOA Steps Aside, the Fight Might Be Yours Alone
While the court dismissed the petition against the HOA, it did not leave Mr. Shields without a path forward. The judge pointed to the very same rule that gave the HOA its discretion—CC&R § 8.1—as a source of the homeowner’s power. This rule proved to be a double-edged sword.
The judge’s first decision stated that CC&R § 8.1 “authorizes Petitioner to file an action against Mr. and Mrs. Johnson for their alleged violation of CC&R § 6.2(A).” The same clause that gave the HOA the discretion to step aside also explicitly empowered individual homeowners to act in the HOA’s stead.
When an association chooses to stay out of a member-to-member dispute, the responsibility—and the power—to enforce the community’s rules can fall directly to the affected homeowner. The HOA’s inaction does not mean a rule can’t be enforced; it just means you may have to be the one to do it by bringing a private legal action against your neighbor.
Conclusion: Read Your Fine Print
The story of the ugly wall serves as a powerful reminder that a homeowner’s assumptions about their HOA’s power can be miles apart from the legal reality written into the CC&Rs. This case perfectly illustrates the interplay between an HOA’s discretionary enforcement powers (Lesson 1), its carefully separated procedural duties (Lesson 2), the critical importance of homeowner communication and proof (Lesson 3), and the ultimate empowerment of members to enforce rules themselves (Lesson 4). These documents are not just a list of rules; they are a legal framework that dictates who has the power to act, when they are obligated to do so, and what recourse you have when a conflict arises.
You might know your community’s rules on trash cans and lawn care, but do you know who is truly responsible for enforcing them when a real dispute arises?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John Shields(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Maria R. Kupillas(HOA attorney) Law Offices of Farley Choate & Bergin Represented Respondent Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch
Dean Kabanuk(board president) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Board Testified for Petitioner via subpoena; elected President Nov 2016
Kristi Hancock(board member/witness) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Board Served as Vice President (Nov 2016-Nov 2017) and President (since Nov 2017)
Brenda Campbell(community manager) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Witness for Respondent
A.J. Denardo(witness) Not a member of Respondent; lives near Petitioner
Sandy Johnson(witness/neighbor) Wife of Joe Johnson; Petitioner's next-door neighbor
Joe Johnson(neighbor/homeowner) Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Built the block wall extension in question
Neutral Parties
Diane Mihalsky(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Issued initial ALJ Decision
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Issued ALJ Decision following rehearing
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Granted Petitioner's request for rehearing
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
James and Shawna Larson
Counsel
Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent
Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Counsel
Nathan Tennyson
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R sections 9 and 9(b)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition and deemed the Respondent HOA the prevailing party, concluding that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) to require the removal of the Petitioners' patio cover for building maintenance and painting. Furthermore, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), Petitioners are responsible for the cost of removing and reinstalling their limited common element patio cover.
Why this result: The ALJ concluded that the Respondent's plan for repairing and painting the buildings was reasonable and the Petitioners failed to cite any provision of the CC&Rs that Respondent had currently violated. The cost allocation was determined by A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) based on the patio cover being a limited common element.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA authority to mandate removal of patio cover (limited common element) for maintenance and allocation of associated costs.
Petitioners filed a petition alleging the HOA violated CC&Rs 10(a) by threatening to remove their patio cover during a painting project. The basic issue was Petitioners' assertion that the Respondent lacked authority to mandate the removal of their limited common element patio cover. The ALJ determined the HOA had authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) and A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), and Petitioners must pay the costs of removal and reinstallation.
Orders: Petitioners' petition was dismissed. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. Respondent has the authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover, and Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove and reinstall it.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
6
15
17
24
35
36
37
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, limited common elements, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, A.R.S. 33-1255(C)
Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson (Petitioners) and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (Respondent). The core conflict centered on the Respondent’s requirement that Petitioners remove their patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project. The case initially faced a jurisdictional challenge, with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommending dismissal due to the speculative nature of the Respondent’s threat to remove the cover. This recommendation was rejected by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, who found the matter ripe for adjudication and ordered a new hearing.
The final Administrative Law Judge Decision ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision found the HOA’s plan to remove the patio covers was reasonable, necessary for the safe and proper completion of the project, and authorized under the community’s CC&Rs. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona statute. Consequently, the financial responsibility for its removal and potential reinstallation rests solely with the Petitioners as the homeowners to whom the element is assigned. The Petitioners’ petition was dismissed, and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
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Procedural History
The case progressed through several distinct legal phases, beginning with a petition and culminating in a final administrative decision after a rehearing.
Outcome/Significance
June 15-16, 2017
Petition Filed
James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.
August 25, 2017
Order Recommending Dismissal
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil recommended dismissing the petition, finding no “justiciable controversy” because the Respondent had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the issue speculative.
August 31, 2017
Order Rejecting Recommendation
Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, rejected the ALJ’s recommendation. Citing a June 1, 2017 letter from the Respondent, the Commissioner determined the matter was “ripe for adjudication” and ordered the hearing to be rescheduled.
September 1, 2017
Notice of Re-Hearing Issued
The Arizona Department of Real Estate formally scheduled a new hearing in the matter.
November 20, 2017
Rehearing Conducted
A full hearing on the merits was conducted before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
December 11, 2017
Final Administrative Law Judge Decision
ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision, dismissing the Petitioners’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent.
Core Dispute Analysis
The conflict arose from a maintenance project initiated by the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which consists of 169 units. The project involved repairing and painting the exteriors of the community’s twenty-five two-story buildings.
Respondent’s (HOA’s) Mandate and Rationale
• Project Requirement: The HOA informed homeowners with patio covers that they were required to remove the covers at their own expense before repairs and painting could begin.
• Enforcement Threat: In a letter dated June 1, 2017, the HOA stated that if the Larsons’ patio cover was not removed within ten days, the HOA would remove it under the authority of CC&R section 10(a) and charge the homeowners for the cost.
• Legal Justification: The HOA asserted its authority based on:
◦ CC&R Section 9(b): Grants the Respondent responsibility for maintaining the building exteriors.
◦ CC&R Section 9: States, “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the … [building] exteriors … shall be taken by the [Respondent].”
• Practical Necessity: The HOA argued that removal was essential for the project’s proper and safe completion, a position supported by its project manager.
Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Objections and Counter-Arguments
• Initial Legal Position: In their brief, the Petitioners stated that “the true issues underlying this issue are not about whether Respondent’s current threatened actions are a violation of the CC&Rs. The true issues relate to Respondent Association’s actions and inactions that have lead up to the point where the Parties now find themselves addressing this administrative law panel.”
• Lack of Authority: In a May 19, 2017 letter, the Larsons’ counsel argued the HOA had no legal authority to support its request.
• Unreasonable Cost: The Petitioners asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation would be “thousands of dollars” and provided bids ranging from $3,980 to $5,975.
• Historical Precedent: The patio cover was in place when the Larsons purchased their unit in 1999, and they argued the HOA did not disclose any violation at that time.
• Proposed Alternatives:
1. The Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense, which the HOA rejected over concerns about project warranty and management.
2. During the November 20 hearing, after hearing testimony, the Larsons offered not to reinstall their patio cover if the Respondent would pay for its removal.
Key Evidence and Testimony
The final decision heavily relied on the testimony of Wayne King, the project manager hired by the HOA, and an analysis of competing cost estimates.
Testimony of Wayne King (Project Manager)
• Project Scope: King testified that the project involved not only painting but also repairing damaged siding, much of which was caused by improperly flashed patio covers. To “do the job right,” the process required sanding, power washing, and patching before painting.
• Contractor Requirements: All five contractors who bid on the project required the patio covers to be removed.
• Safety and Logistics: King explained why working around the covers was not viable:
◦ Scaffolding: “Regular” scaffolding would not fit, and commercial scaffolding would not provide access to the entire building.
◦ Lifts: Using a “reach” or forklift was not an option due to overhead powerlines creating a safety hazard.
◦ Worker Safety: Allowing painters to walk on homeowners’ patio covers was not a safe option. He noted that changes in safety laws since the buildings were last painted necessitated different methods.
• Warranty: King testified that the paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, like the Larsons, painted their own units.
Cost Estimates and Discrepancies
• Petitioners’ Estimates: The Larsons submitted two bids for their wooden patio cover:
◦ Bid 1: $1,250 to remove and dispose; $3,980 to remove and rebuild with new wood.
◦ Bid 2: $5,975 to remove and replace the structure.
• Respondent’s Estimates:
◦ The HOA’s initial letter offered a contractor who would remove aluminum covers for $150. The cost for the Larsons’ wood cover was stated as $225, though this was not a firm price.
◦ Wayne King testified that the Petitioners’ estimates were “very high” and opined that $1,000 should cover the cost of removing and rebuilding, assuming existing materials were reused. He acknowledged decking material would likely need replacement but estimated 80% of rafters could be reused.
Legal Findings and Final Decision
The Administrative Law Judge Decision of December 11, 2017, provided a comprehensive legal analysis that concluded in the Respondent’s favor.
Governing Authority and Reasonableness
• Deference to the HOA: Citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, the decision established that the tribunal must accord the HOA deference in its decisions regarding maintenance and repair, provided it acts reasonably.
• Finding of Reasonableness: Based on the credible testimony of Wayne King, the judge found that the Respondent’s proposed plan for repairing and painting was reasonable, as the buildings could not be “properly and safely painted without the patio covers being removed.”
• Authorization under CC&Rs: The judge concluded that CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”
“Limited Common Element” Doctrine and Cost Allocation
The central legal issue of financial responsibility was resolved by applying Arizona state statutes.
1. Classification: The Petitioners’ patio cover was classified as a limited common element within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).
2. Statutory Rule: The judge then applied ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), which states:
3. Conclusion on Cost: Based on a “reasonable reading” of this statute, the decision concluded that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, should they choose to do so, the cost of reinstalling it.
Final Ruling
• The evidence supported the conclusion that the Respondent had the authority to require the removal of the patio cover at the Petitioners’ expense.
• IT IS ORDERED that the petition filed by James and Shawna Larson is dismissed.
• The Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.
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Key Parties and Representatives
Name(s)
Representation
Petitioners
James and Shawna Larson
Lisa M. Hanger, Esq.
Respondent
Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Nathan Tennyson, Esq. (Brown Alcott PLLC)
ALJ (Initial)
Suzanne Marwil
Office of Administrative Hearings
ALJ (Final)
Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings
Commissioner
Judy Lowe
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Study Guide – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Study Guide for Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, culminating in the Administrative Law Judge Decision of December 11, 2017. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was their relationship?
2. What was the initial reason given by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil for recommending the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition?
3. Why did Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate Judy Lowe reject the initial recommendation for dismissal?
4. What was the central issue adjudicated at the November 20, 2017 hearing before ALJ Thomas Shedden?
5. According to the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which specific sections of the CC&Rs granted it the authority to require the removal of patio covers?
6. Who was Wayne King, and what was the substance of his testimony during the hearing?
7. How did the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) classify the Petitioners’ patio cover, and why was this classification legally significant for the case’s outcome?
8. What safety and logistical reasons were provided to justify the necessity of removing the patio covers for the painting project?
9. What was the final decision issued by ALJ Thomas Shedden on December 11, 2017?
10. According to the final ruling, who is financially responsible for the removal and potential reinstallation of the Petitioners’ patio cover, and what was the legal basis for this conclusion?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners James and Shawna Larson, and the Respondent, their homeowner’s association, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation. The dispute arose from the Respondent’s requirement that the Petitioners remove a patio cover at their unit.
2. ALJ Suzanne Marwil recommended dismissal on August 25, 2017, for a lack of a “justiciable controversy.” She reasoned that the Respondent’s threat to take down the patio cover had not yet been undertaken, making the issue speculative and more appropriate for a declaratory judgment action in superior court.
3. Commissioner Judy Lowe rejected the recommendation on August 31, 2017, stating the matter was “ripe for adjudication.” Her decision was based on a letter from June 1, 2017, in which the Respondent alleged a violation of the governing documents, thus creating a tangible controversy for the administrative tribunal to rule upon.
4. The central issue was whether the Respondent had the authority to mandate the removal of the Petitioners’ patio cover to facilitate a large-scale building repair and painting project. A secondary issue was determining who was financially responsible for the cost of removal and reinstallation.
5. The Respondent cited CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) as the source of its authority. Section 9(b) makes the Respondent responsible for maintaining building exteriors, and section 9 grants it the power to take “any cooperative action necessary or appropriate” for that maintenance.
6. Wayne King was the project manager hired by the Respondent for the painting project. He provided expert testimony that removing the patio covers was necessary to properly and safely repair and paint the buildings, noting that all five bidding contractors required their removal and that alternative methods were not viable or safe.
7. The patio cover was classified as a “limited common element” under A.R.S. § 33-1212(4). This was significant because A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) states that common expenses associated with the maintenance or repair of a limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which it is assigned, placing the financial burden on the Petitioners.
8. Project manager Wayne King testified that removal was necessary to accommodate the 14-foot by 8-foot area required for scaffolding. He explained that using a forklift was unsafe due to overhead powerlines, and allowing painters to walk on the covers was also a safety hazard, especially given changes in safety laws since the last painting project.
9. ALJ Thomas Shedden dismissed the Petitioners’ petition and deemed the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, to be the prevailing party. The order found that the Respondent’s plan was reasonable and that it had the authority to require the patio cover’s removal.
10. The final ruling concluded that the Petitioners, James and Shawna Larson, were responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it if they chose to do so. The legal basis was A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), which assigns expenses related to a “limited common element” (the patio cover) exclusively to the unit owner it benefits.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing evidence from the provided source documents.
1. Trace the procedural history of case No. 17F-H1717038-REL from the initial petition to the final decision. Explain the reasoning behind each major procedural step, including the initial recommendation for dismissal, its rejection by the Commissioner, and the final order.
2. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioners (James and Shawna Larson) and the Respondent (Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation) at the November 20, 2017 hearing. Discuss the key pieces of evidence, including witness testimony, cost estimates, and CC&R provisions, that each side used to support its position.
3. Explain the concept of “justiciable controversy” as it was applied by ALJ Suzanne Marwil in her recommendation for dismissal. Contrast her interpretation with Commissioner Judy Lowe’s reasoning for why the matter was “ripe for adjudication.”
4. Discuss the legal significance of classifying the patio cover as a “limited common element.” How did this classification, in conjunction with Arizona Revised Statutes and the community’s CC&Rs, ultimately determine the outcome of the case regarding financial responsibility?
5. Evaluate the role of expert testimony in the final administrative hearing. How did the testimony of Wayne King influence ALJ Thomas Shedden’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the reasonableness and necessity of the Respondent’s actions?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The judge who presides over administrative hearings at a government agency, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Suzanne Marwil and Thomas Shedden served as ALJs.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The official compilation of the laws of the state of Arizona. Key statutes cited include A.R.S. § 32-2199, § 33-1212(4), and § 33-1255(C).
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)
The governing documents for a planned community or condominium association that outline the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the association. In this case, sections 9, 9(b), and 10(a) were specifically mentioned.
Declaratory Judgment Action
A legal action filed in superior court where a party asks the court to provide a binding ruling on the rights and obligations of the parties before an actual injury has occurred.
Justiciable Controversy
A real, substantial legal dispute that is appropriate for a court or tribunal to resolve. It cannot be a hypothetical, speculative, or advisory matter.
Limited Common Element
As defined in A.R.S. § 33-1212(4), a common element of a condominium assigned for the exclusive use of one or more units, but fewer than all of them. The Larsons’ patio cover was classified as such.
Petition
The formal written request filed by a party to initiate a case with an administrative body. The Larsons filed their petition with the Department of Real Estate on June 15/16, 2017.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, James and Shawna Larson were the Petitioners.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means the greater weight of the evidence is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation was the Respondent.
Tribunal
A body, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings, with the authority to judge, adjudicate on, or determine claims or disputes.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
They Fought the HOA Over a Patio and Lost: 3 Shocking Legal Lessons for Every HOA Member
It’s the letter every homeowner dreads. An official-looking envelope from the Homeowner’s Association (HOA) lands in your mailbox, and the message inside is not a friendly neighborhood greeting. It’s a demand.
This is exactly what happened to Arizona couple James and Shawna Larson. Their HOA, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was planning a large-scale project to repair and paint the building exteriors. To do the job properly, the HOA demanded that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover—at their own expense. The Larsons, believing this was an unreasonable overreach, refused. That refusal kicked off a legal battle that serves as a masterclass in the often-shocking realities of HOA power.
This post distills the most important lessons from their fight. These are the legal realities that every homeowner should understand before they find themselves on the receiving end of a similar notice.
You Can Win the First Round and Still Lose the Case
In the first stage of the dispute, the Administrative Law Judge actually recommended that the Larsons’ petition be dismissed. The judge’s reasoning was based on a crucial legal doctrine: ripeness. Because the HOA had only threatened to remove the patio cover and hadn’t physically done it yet, the judge found the issue “speculative.” In the court’s view, there was no “justiciable controversy” to rule on yet.
The initial ruling contained a powerful statement highlighting the confusion:
Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
But this initial victory was short-lived. In a surprising twist, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected the judge’s recommendation. The Commissioner found that the core question—whether the patio cover violated the association’s rules—was “ripe for adjudication” and ordered the case back to court for a full hearing. This highlights a key principle: administrative bodies often prefer to rule on the substance of a dispute rather than dismiss it on procedural grounds, ensuring that core community conflicts are actually resolved.
A case isn’t over until it’s over. An initial procedural win (or loss) can be overturned, shifting the entire battlefield. With the case now officially back on, the court turned to the central question of the dispute: who was financially responsible for the patio cover?
It’s Your Patio, So It’s Your Bill—Even When the HOA Forces the Work
The central conflict boiled down to one question: who should pay? The Larsons believed that since the HOA required the patio cover to be removed for its maintenance project, the HOA should bear the associated costs. This seems like common sense, but HOA law operates on a different logic.
The case was decided by a key legal concept: the patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element.” For most homeowners, this is where their jaw hits the floor. A limited common element is part of the common area (like exterior walls or roofs) but is assigned for the exclusive use of a single unit owner. The logic behind this law is that while the HOA maintains general common areas, elements that provide an exclusive benefit to one owner—like their personal patio, balcony, or assigned parking spot—carry an exclusive financial responsibility, even for HOA-mandated work.
This classification has a devastating financial consequence spelled out in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1255(C). The law states that common expenses associated with a limited common element are assessed against the unit it’s assigned to. The judge’s final conclusion was direct and absolute:
Because the patio cover is a limited common element, under a reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, if they choose to do so, the cost of reinstalling it.
Under the law, because the patio exclusively benefitted the Larsons, they were solely responsible for all costs associated with it, even when the work was demanded by the HOA for its own project.
Deference is Given to a Well-Prepared HOA
The HOA didn’t win just because of a legal statute; it won because it built a sound, well-documented case for its demand. They didn’t just issue an order; they presented extensive evidence that their plan was “reasonable.”
The testimony of their project manager, Wayne King, was particularly compelling. He laid out a series of facts that were difficult to dispute:
• The project involved necessary repairs to siding and flashing, not just cosmetic painting.
• All five painting contractors who bid on the project required the patio covers to be removed.
• Removal was essential to comply with modern safety laws for scaffolding and to allow for proper work, including sanding and power washing.
• Safety laws had changed since the buildings were last painted, making old methods unsafe and illegal.
• Allowing individual homeowners to paint their own sections would void the painter’s warranty for the entire project.
Faced with this mountain of meticulously documented evidence, the judge ruled that the HOA’s plan was “reasonable.” Because of this, the court was legally bound to “accord Respondent deference in decisions regarding maintenance and repair of the common areas.” In other words, when an HOA acts logically, documents its process, and prioritizes safety and proper procedure, courts will give it significant authority to enforce its decisions.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power in an HOA
The Larsons’ case is a stark reminder that in an HOA, what feels fair is irrelevant. The only things that matter are procedural correctness (even a ‘win’ can be temporary), the fine print of legal definitions (you can be forced to pay to remove your own property), and an HOA’s documented reasonableness (a well-prepared board is nearly unbeatable). These principles are found not in a sense of fairness, but in the specific, often surprising language of state law and a community’s own CC&Rs.
This case was about a patio cover, but the principles apply to fences, doors, and windows—do you truly know what you own and what you’re responsible for?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
James Larson(petitioner)
Shawna Larson(petitioner)
Lisa M. Hanger(petitioner attorney)
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(respondent attorney) Brown Alcott PLLC
Wayne King(witness) Project Manager for painting project hired by Respondent
Neutral Parties
Suzanne Marwil(ALJ) Issued initial Recommended Order of Dismissal (August 25, 2017)
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Issued Administrative Law Judge Decision (December 11, 2017)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Rejected initial recommendation of dismissal
Dan Gardner(HOA Coordinator) Transmitted Commissioner's order
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
James and Shawna Larson
Counsel
Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent
Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Counsel
Nathan Tennyson
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R sections 9 and 9(b)
Outcome Summary
The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.
Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).
Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
CC&R section 9
CC&R section 9(b)
A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party
Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Executive Summary
This briefing document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson (Petitioners) and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (Respondent). The core conflict centered on the Respondent’s requirement that Petitioners remove their patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project. The case initially faced a jurisdictional challenge, with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommending dismissal due to the speculative nature of the Respondent’s threat to remove the cover. This recommendation was rejected by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, who found the matter ripe for adjudication and ordered a new hearing.
The final Administrative Law Judge Decision ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision found the HOA’s plan to remove the patio covers was reasonable, necessary for the safe and proper completion of the project, and authorized under the community’s CC&Rs. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona statute. Consequently, the financial responsibility for its removal and potential reinstallation rests solely with the Petitioners as the homeowners to whom the element is assigned. The Petitioners’ petition was dismissed, and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
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Procedural History
The case progressed through several distinct legal phases, beginning with a petition and culminating in a final administrative decision after a rehearing.
Outcome/Significance
June 15-16, 2017
Petition Filed
James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.
August 25, 2017
Order Recommending Dismissal
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil recommended dismissing the petition, finding no “justiciable controversy” because the Respondent had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the issue speculative.
August 31, 2017
Order Rejecting Recommendation
Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, rejected the ALJ’s recommendation. Citing a June 1, 2017 letter from the Respondent, the Commissioner determined the matter was “ripe for adjudication” and ordered the hearing to be rescheduled.
September 1, 2017
Notice of Re-Hearing Issued
The Arizona Department of Real Estate formally scheduled a new hearing in the matter.
November 20, 2017
Rehearing Conducted
A full hearing on the merits was conducted before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
December 11, 2017
Final Administrative Law Judge Decision
ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision, dismissing the Petitioners’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent.
Core Dispute Analysis
The conflict arose from a maintenance project initiated by the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which consists of 169 units. The project involved repairing and painting the exteriors of the community’s twenty-five two-story buildings.
Respondent’s (HOA’s) Mandate and Rationale
• Project Requirement: The HOA informed homeowners with patio covers that they were required to remove the covers at their own expense before repairs and painting could begin.
• Enforcement Threat: In a letter dated June 1, 2017, the HOA stated that if the Larsons’ patio cover was not removed within ten days, the HOA would remove it under the authority of CC&R section 10(a) and charge the homeowners for the cost.
• Legal Justification: The HOA asserted its authority based on:
◦ CC&R Section 9(b): Grants the Respondent responsibility for maintaining the building exteriors.
◦ CC&R Section 9: States, “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the … [building] exteriors … shall be taken by the [Respondent].”
• Practical Necessity: The HOA argued that removal was essential for the project’s proper and safe completion, a position supported by its project manager.
Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Objections and Counter-Arguments
• Initial Legal Position: In their brief, the Petitioners stated that “the true issues underlying this issue are not about whether Respondent’s current threatened actions are a violation of the CC&Rs. The true issues relate to Respondent Association’s actions and inactions that have lead up to the point where the Parties now find themselves addressing this administrative law panel.”
• Lack of Authority: In a May 19, 2017 letter, the Larsons’ counsel argued the HOA had no legal authority to support its request.
• Unreasonable Cost: The Petitioners asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation would be “thousands of dollars” and provided bids ranging from $3,980 to $5,975.
• Historical Precedent: The patio cover was in place when the Larsons purchased their unit in 1999, and they argued the HOA did not disclose any violation at that time.
• Proposed Alternatives:
1. The Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense, which the HOA rejected over concerns about project warranty and management.
2. During the November 20 hearing, after hearing testimony, the Larsons offered not to reinstall their patio cover if the Respondent would pay for its removal.
Key Evidence and Testimony
The final decision heavily relied on the testimony of Wayne King, the project manager hired by the HOA, and an analysis of competing cost estimates.
Testimony of Wayne King (Project Manager)
• Project Scope: King testified that the project involved not only painting but also repairing damaged siding, much of which was caused by improperly flashed patio covers. To “do the job right,” the process required sanding, power washing, and patching before painting.
• Contractor Requirements: All five contractors who bid on the project required the patio covers to be removed.
• Safety and Logistics: King explained why working around the covers was not viable:
◦ Scaffolding: “Regular” scaffolding would not fit, and commercial scaffolding would not provide access to the entire building.
◦ Lifts: Using a “reach” or forklift was not an option due to overhead powerlines creating a safety hazard.
◦ Worker Safety: Allowing painters to walk on homeowners’ patio covers was not a safe option. He noted that changes in safety laws since the buildings were last painted necessitated different methods.
• Warranty: King testified that the paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, like the Larsons, painted their own units.
Cost Estimates and Discrepancies
• Petitioners’ Estimates: The Larsons submitted two bids for their wooden patio cover:
◦ Bid 1: $1,250 to remove and dispose; $3,980 to remove and rebuild with new wood.
◦ Bid 2: $5,975 to remove and replace the structure.
• Respondent’s Estimates:
◦ The HOA’s initial letter offered a contractor who would remove aluminum covers for $150. The cost for the Larsons’ wood cover was stated as $225, though this was not a firm price.
◦ Wayne King testified that the Petitioners’ estimates were “very high” and opined that $1,000 should cover the cost of removing and rebuilding, assuming existing materials were reused. He acknowledged decking material would likely need replacement but estimated 80% of rafters could be reused.
Legal Findings and Final Decision
The Administrative Law Judge Decision of December 11, 2017, provided a comprehensive legal analysis that concluded in the Respondent’s favor.
Governing Authority and Reasonableness
• Deference to the HOA: Citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, the decision established that the tribunal must accord the HOA deference in its decisions regarding maintenance and repair, provided it acts reasonably.
• Finding of Reasonableness: Based on the credible testimony of Wayne King, the judge found that the Respondent’s proposed plan for repairing and painting was reasonable, as the buildings could not be “properly and safely painted without the patio covers being removed.”
• Authorization under CC&Rs: The judge concluded that CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”
“Limited Common Element” Doctrine and Cost Allocation
The central legal issue of financial responsibility was resolved by applying Arizona state statutes.
1. Classification: The Petitioners’ patio cover was classified as a limited common element within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).
2. Statutory Rule: The judge then applied ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), which states:
3. Conclusion on Cost: Based on a “reasonable reading” of this statute, the decision concluded that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, should they choose to do so, the cost of reinstalling it.
Final Ruling
• The evidence supported the conclusion that the Respondent had the authority to require the removal of the patio cover at the Petitioners’ expense.
• IT IS ORDERED that the petition filed by James and Shawna Larson is dismissed.
• The Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.
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Key Parties and Representatives
Name(s)
Representation
Petitioners
James and Shawna Larson
Lisa M. Hanger, Esq.
Respondent
Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
Nathan Tennyson, Esq. (Brown Alcott PLLC)
ALJ (Initial)
Suzanne Marwil
Office of Administrative Hearings
ALJ (Final)
Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings
Commissioner
Judy Lowe
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Study Guide – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Study Guide for Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, culminating in the Administrative Law Judge Decision of December 11, 2017. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was their relationship?
2. What was the initial reason given by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil for recommending the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition?
3. Why did Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate Judy Lowe reject the initial recommendation for dismissal?
4. What was the central issue adjudicated at the November 20, 2017 hearing before ALJ Thomas Shedden?
5. According to the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which specific sections of the CC&Rs granted it the authority to require the removal of patio covers?
6. Who was Wayne King, and what was the substance of his testimony during the hearing?
7. How did the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) classify the Petitioners’ patio cover, and why was this classification legally significant for the case’s outcome?
8. What safety and logistical reasons were provided to justify the necessity of removing the patio covers for the painting project?
9. What was the final decision issued by ALJ Thomas Shedden on December 11, 2017?
10. According to the final ruling, who is financially responsible for the removal and potential reinstallation of the Petitioners’ patio cover, and what was the legal basis for this conclusion?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners James and Shawna Larson, and the Respondent, their homeowner’s association, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation. The dispute arose from the Respondent’s requirement that the Petitioners remove a patio cover at their unit.
2. ALJ Suzanne Marwil recommended dismissal on August 25, 2017, for a lack of a “justiciable controversy.” She reasoned that the Respondent’s threat to take down the patio cover had not yet been undertaken, making the issue speculative and more appropriate for a declaratory judgment action in superior court.
3. Commissioner Judy Lowe rejected the recommendation on August 31, 2017, stating the matter was “ripe for adjudication.” Her decision was based on a letter from June 1, 2017, in which the Respondent alleged a violation of the governing documents, thus creating a tangible controversy for the administrative tribunal to rule upon.
4. The central issue was whether the Respondent had the authority to mandate the removal of the Petitioners’ patio cover to facilitate a large-scale building repair and painting project. A secondary issue was determining who was financially responsible for the cost of removal and reinstallation.
5. The Respondent cited CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) as the source of its authority. Section 9(b) makes the Respondent responsible for maintaining building exteriors, and section 9 grants it the power to take “any cooperative action necessary or appropriate” for that maintenance.
6. Wayne King was the project manager hired by the Respondent for the painting project. He provided expert testimony that removing the patio covers was necessary to properly and safely repair and paint the buildings, noting that all five bidding contractors required their removal and that alternative methods were not viable or safe.
7. The patio cover was classified as a “limited common element” under A.R.S. § 33-1212(4). This was significant because A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) states that common expenses associated with the maintenance or repair of a limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which it is assigned, placing the financial burden on the Petitioners.
8. Project manager Wayne King testified that removal was necessary to accommodate the 14-foot by 8-foot area required for scaffolding. He explained that using a forklift was unsafe due to overhead powerlines, and allowing painters to walk on the covers was also a safety hazard, especially given changes in safety laws since the last painting project.
9. ALJ Thomas Shedden dismissed the Petitioners’ petition and deemed the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, to be the prevailing party. The order found that the Respondent’s plan was reasonable and that it had the authority to require the patio cover’s removal.
10. The final ruling concluded that the Petitioners, James and Shawna Larson, were responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it if they chose to do so. The legal basis was A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), which assigns expenses related to a “limited common element” (the patio cover) exclusively to the unit owner it benefits.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing evidence from the provided source documents.
1. Trace the procedural history of case No. 17F-H1717038-REL from the initial petition to the final decision. Explain the reasoning behind each major procedural step, including the initial recommendation for dismissal, its rejection by the Commissioner, and the final order.
2. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioners (James and Shawna Larson) and the Respondent (Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation) at the November 20, 2017 hearing. Discuss the key pieces of evidence, including witness testimony, cost estimates, and CC&R provisions, that each side used to support its position.
3. Explain the concept of “justiciable controversy” as it was applied by ALJ Suzanne Marwil in her recommendation for dismissal. Contrast her interpretation with Commissioner Judy Lowe’s reasoning for why the matter was “ripe for adjudication.”
4. Discuss the legal significance of classifying the patio cover as a “limited common element.” How did this classification, in conjunction with Arizona Revised Statutes and the community’s CC&Rs, ultimately determine the outcome of the case regarding financial responsibility?
5. Evaluate the role of expert testimony in the final administrative hearing. How did the testimony of Wayne King influence ALJ Thomas Shedden’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the reasonableness and necessity of the Respondent’s actions?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The judge who presides over administrative hearings at a government agency, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Suzanne Marwil and Thomas Shedden served as ALJs.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The official compilation of the laws of the state of Arizona. Key statutes cited include A.R.S. § 32-2199, § 33-1212(4), and § 33-1255(C).
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)
The governing documents for a planned community or condominium association that outline the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the association. In this case, sections 9, 9(b), and 10(a) were specifically mentioned.
Declaratory Judgment Action
A legal action filed in superior court where a party asks the court to provide a binding ruling on the rights and obligations of the parties before an actual injury has occurred.
Justiciable Controversy
A real, substantial legal dispute that is appropriate for a court or tribunal to resolve. It cannot be a hypothetical, speculative, or advisory matter.
Limited Common Element
As defined in A.R.S. § 33-1212(4), a common element of a condominium assigned for the exclusive use of one or more units, but fewer than all of them. The Larsons’ patio cover was classified as such.
Petition
The formal written request filed by a party to initiate a case with an administrative body. The Larsons filed their petition with the Department of Real Estate on June 15/16, 2017.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, James and Shawna Larson were the Petitioners.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means the greater weight of the evidence is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation was the Respondent.
Tribunal
A body, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings, with the authority to judge, adjudicate on, or determine claims or disputes.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
They Fought the HOA Over a Patio and Lost: 3 Shocking Legal Lessons for Every HOA Member
It’s the letter every homeowner dreads. An official-looking envelope from the Homeowner’s Association (HOA) lands in your mailbox, and the message inside is not a friendly neighborhood greeting. It’s a demand.
This is exactly what happened to Arizona couple James and Shawna Larson. Their HOA, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was planning a large-scale project to repair and paint the building exteriors. To do the job properly, the HOA demanded that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover—at their own expense. The Larsons, believing this was an unreasonable overreach, refused. That refusal kicked off a legal battle that serves as a masterclass in the often-shocking realities of HOA power.
This post distills the most important lessons from their fight. These are the legal realities that every homeowner should understand before they find themselves on the receiving end of a similar notice.
You Can Win the First Round and Still Lose the Case
In the first stage of the dispute, the Administrative Law Judge actually recommended that the Larsons’ petition be dismissed. The judge’s reasoning was based on a crucial legal doctrine: ripeness. Because the HOA had only threatened to remove the patio cover and hadn’t physically done it yet, the judge found the issue “speculative.” In the court’s view, there was no “justiciable controversy” to rule on yet.
The initial ruling contained a powerful statement highlighting the confusion:
Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
But this initial victory was short-lived. In a surprising twist, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected the judge’s recommendation. The Commissioner found that the core question—whether the patio cover violated the association’s rules—was “ripe for adjudication” and ordered the case back to court for a full hearing. This highlights a key principle: administrative bodies often prefer to rule on the substance of a dispute rather than dismiss it on procedural grounds, ensuring that core community conflicts are actually resolved.
A case isn’t over until it’s over. An initial procedural win (or loss) can be overturned, shifting the entire battlefield. With the case now officially back on, the court turned to the central question of the dispute: who was financially responsible for the patio cover?
It’s Your Patio, So It’s Your Bill—Even When the HOA Forces the Work
The central conflict boiled down to one question: who should pay? The Larsons believed that since the HOA required the patio cover to be removed for its maintenance project, the HOA should bear the associated costs. This seems like common sense, but HOA law operates on a different logic.
The case was decided by a key legal concept: the patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element.” For most homeowners, this is where their jaw hits the floor. A limited common element is part of the common area (like exterior walls or roofs) but is assigned for the exclusive use of a single unit owner. The logic behind this law is that while the HOA maintains general common areas, elements that provide an exclusive benefit to one owner—like their personal patio, balcony, or assigned parking spot—carry an exclusive financial responsibility, even for HOA-mandated work.
This classification has a devastating financial consequence spelled out in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1255(C). The law states that common expenses associated with a limited common element are assessed against the unit it’s assigned to. The judge’s final conclusion was direct and absolute:
Because the patio cover is a limited common element, under a reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, if they choose to do so, the cost of reinstalling it.
Under the law, because the patio exclusively benefitted the Larsons, they were solely responsible for all costs associated with it, even when the work was demanded by the HOA for its own project.
Deference is Given to a Well-Prepared HOA
The HOA didn’t win just because of a legal statute; it won because it built a sound, well-documented case for its demand. They didn’t just issue an order; they presented extensive evidence that their plan was “reasonable.”
The testimony of their project manager, Wayne King, was particularly compelling. He laid out a series of facts that were difficult to dispute:
• The project involved necessary repairs to siding and flashing, not just cosmetic painting.
• All five painting contractors who bid on the project required the patio covers to be removed.
• Removal was essential to comply with modern safety laws for scaffolding and to allow for proper work, including sanding and power washing.
• Safety laws had changed since the buildings were last painted, making old methods unsafe and illegal.
• Allowing individual homeowners to paint their own sections would void the painter’s warranty for the entire project.
Faced with this mountain of meticulously documented evidence, the judge ruled that the HOA’s plan was “reasonable.” Because of this, the court was legally bound to “accord Respondent deference in decisions regarding maintenance and repair of the common areas.” In other words, when an HOA acts logically, documents its process, and prioritizes safety and proper procedure, courts will give it significant authority to enforce its decisions.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power in an HOA
The Larsons’ case is a stark reminder that in an HOA, what feels fair is irrelevant. The only things that matter are procedural correctness (even a ‘win’ can be temporary), the fine print of legal definitions (you can be forced to pay to remove your own property), and an HOA’s documented reasonableness (a well-prepared board is nearly unbeatable). These principles are found not in a sense of fairness, but in the specific, often surprising language of state law and a community’s own CC&Rs.
This case was about a patio cover, but the principles apply to fences, doors, and windows—do you truly know what you own and what you’re responsible for?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
James Larson(petitioner)
Shawna Larson(petitioner)
Lisa M. Hanger(petitioner attorney)
Respondent Side
Nathan Tennyson(respondent attorney) Brown Alcott PLLC
Wayne King(witness) Project Manager for painting project hired by Respondent
Neutral Parties
Suzanne Marwil(ALJ) Issued initial Recommended Order of Dismissal (August 25, 2017)
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Issued Administrative Law Judge Decision (December 11, 2017)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Rejected initial recommendation of dismissal
Dan Gardner(HOA Coordinator) Transmitted Commissioner's order
