Laveen Meadows HOA c/o Planned Development Services
Counsel
Chad Gallacher, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs Sections 10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16; A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
Outcome Summary
The Petitioner's challenge against the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the community documents or statutes when issuing citations.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to HOA fine citations/improper enforcement of parking and nuisance rules
Petitioner claimed the Respondent HOA improperly issued citations against him for vehicle violations (inoperable vehicle, street parking, nuisance), asserting the HOA could not violate CC&R 10.11.4 but that the citations alleging the violation were unwarranted.
Orders: Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&Rs, Vehicle Parking, Nuisance, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H18020-REL Decision – 677244.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:11 (97.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H18020-REL
Briefing Document: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA (Case No. 19F-H18020-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the administrative hearing of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus the Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Mr. Collis’s petition, which alleged the HOA had wrongly issued citations concerning his vehicle.
The central issue revolved around a series of violation notices issued to Mr. Collis for an “Inoperable Vehicle.” While Mr. Collis focused his argument on proving the vehicle was, in fact, operational, the HOA successfully argued that the citations were based on a broader set of violations. These included not only the vehicle’s condition under CC&R Section 10.11.4 but also violations for street parking (Section 10.11.2) and creating a nuisance (Section 10.16) due to its unsightly appearance, which included cobwebs, debris, a flat tire, and a covered window.
The Judge concluded that the petitioner, Mr. Collis, failed to meet the burden of proof. By only addressing the vehicle’s operability, he did not disprove the other valid grounds for the citations. Consequently, the Judge found that the HOA had not violated its own governing documents or state statutes, dismissing the petition and declaring the HOA the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
1. Case Overview and Core Dispute
• Case Number: 19F-H18020-REL
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Jerry R. Collis (representing himself)
◦ Respondent: Laveen Meadows HOA (represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.)
• Adjudicator: Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
• Hearing Date: December 4, 2018
• Decision Date: December 20, 2018
The Petitioner’s Allegation
On September 17, 2018, Jerry R. Collis filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The initial Notice of Hearing framed the allegation as the Laveen Meadows HOA having violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), which pertains to inoperable vehicles.
At the December 4, 2018 hearing, Mr. Collis clarified his position. He argued that the issue was not that the HOA itself could violate that section, but that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations alleging a violation of that provision when his vehicle was fully operational.
The Respondent’s Position
The Laveen Meadows HOA, represented by Community Manager Lisa Riesland, objected to this reframing of the issue. The HOA contended that the citations issued to Mr. Collis were justified under multiple sections of the CC&Rs, not solely the “inoperable vehicle” clause. The HOA’s actions were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).
2. Relevant CC&R Provisions
The dispute centered on the interpretation and application of three specific sections within the Laveen Meadows HOA CC&Rs.
Section
Title / Subject
Description
10.11.4
Inoperable Vehicles
Prohibits any motor vehicle “which are not in operating condition” from being parked in unenclosed areas, including driveways. This section was amended in May 2013 to clarify the definition of “operating condition.”
10.11.2
Street Parking
Prohibits parking on the streets within the community.
Nuisances
Prohibits nuisances, which are defined to include conditions that are “unsightly or that could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.”
3. Analysis of Evidence and Timeline
Violation Notices and Fines
Between September 2016 and June 2017, the HOA sent seven notifications to Mr. Collis regarding his vehicle. A key finding from the hearing was that while all seven notices stated, “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle,” none of them cited a specific provision of the CC&Rs.
The timeline of notifications and fines is as follows:
• September 19, 2016: Initial letter citing expired tags and an inoperable vehicle on the street. Given 10 days to correct.
• October 11, 2016: Letter warning of a potential $25 fine. Notified of appeal rights. No evidence of appeal by Collis.
• December 1, 2016: A $25 fine was charged to Mr. Collis’s account. Mr. Collis appealed this to the HOA Board.
• January 26, 2017: The HOA Board sent a letter to Mr. Collis denying his appeal.
• April 20, 2017: A $50 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• May 9, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• May 23, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• June 8, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
• June 26, 2017: A $100 fine and a $10 mailing fee were charged. No evidence of appeal.
For each fine assessed from October 2016 onwards, the HOA’s letters informed Mr. Collis of his right to appeal to the Board and to request an administrative hearing. The record shows no evidence that Mr. Collis requested an administrative hearing for any of the fines prior to filing his petition in 2018.
Competing Testimonies
• Petitioner (Collis): Testified that his vehicle was never inoperable. He acknowledged that at the time of the June 2017 letters, the vehicle had a flat tire and a covered window, but explained this was the result of vandalism.
• Respondent (HOA): Community Manager Lisa Riesland provided testimony deemed “credible” by the Judge. She stated that the vehicle’s condition constituted a nuisance under Section 10.16. Specific details included:
◦ Cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle.
◦ At various times, cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground, trapping leaves.
◦ The condition was deemed “unsightly.”
4. Legal Conclusions and Final Order
Burden of Proof
The Judge established that Mr. Collis, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning evidence sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue over the other.
Judge’s Rationale
The decision rested on the following legal conclusions:
1. CC&Rs as a Contract: The CC&Rs constitute a binding contract between the homeowner and the HOA, requiring both parties to comply with its terms. The HOA must act reasonably in exercising its authority.
2. Multiple Grounds for Citations: The preponderance of evidence demonstrated that the HOA’s citations were based on violations of Sections 10.11.2 (street parking), 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicle), and 10.16 (nuisance).
3. Insufficiency of Petitioner’s Argument: Because the citations were multifaceted, Mr. Collis’s argument that his vehicle was in operating condition was insufficient to prove the citations were unwarranted. His claim did not address the evidence of street parking or the unsightly conditions that constituted a nuisance.
4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ultimately, the Judge concluded: “Mr. Collis has failed to show that the Respondent violated any of the CC&Rs, other community documents, or the statutes that regulate planned communities.”
Final Order
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jerry R. Collis’s petition is dismissed.
The decision established the Laveen Meadows HOA as the prevailing party. This order is binding unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order (December 20, 2018).
Study Guide – 19F-H18020-REL
Study Guide: Collis v. Laveen Meadows HOA
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Jerry R. Collis (Petitioner) versus Laveen Meadows HOA (Respondent), Case No. 19F-H18020-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal document.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and who represented them?
2. What was the original violation Mr. Collis alleged against the Laveen Meadows HOA in his petition filed on September 17, 2018?
3. How did Mr. Collis clarify or reframe the issue he was raising during the December 4, 2018 hearing?
4. According to the HOA’s community manager, Lisa Riesland, what three CC&R sections were the basis for the citations issued to Mr. Collis?
5. What common phrase was used to describe the violation in all seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis, and what crucial detail did these notifications omit?
6. Describe the initial fine issued to Mr. Collis, including the date of the letter and the amount.
7. What physical evidence did the HOA present to support its claim that Mr. Collis’s vehicle created an “unsightly condition” under CC&R Section 10.16?
8. In addition to the unsightly conditions, what two other issues with the vehicle were noted around June 2017, and what was Mr. Collis’s explanation for them?
9. According to the “Conclusions of Law,” who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was the legal consequence of this decision for the parties?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Jerry R. Collis, the Petitioner, who appeared on his own behalf, and Laveen Meadows HOA, the Respondent. The Respondent was represented by Chad Gallacher, Esq.
2. Mr. Collis’s original petition, as shown in the Notice of Hearing, alleged that the Laveen Meadows HOA had violated Article 10, Section 10.11.4 of its own CC&Rs. This section pertains to parking motor vehicles that are not in operating condition in unenclosed areas.
3. At the hearing, Mr. Collis acknowledged the HOA could not violate its own rule and clarified that the real issue was that the HOA had wrongly issued him citations for violating Section 10.11.4. He argued that he was not, in fact, in violation of that provision.
4. Lisa Riesland testified that the citations were based not just on Section 10.11.4 (inoperable vehicles), but also on Section 10.11.2, which prohibits parking on the streets, and Section 10.16, which prohibits nuisances.
5. All seven notifications sent to Mr. Collis included the statement: “Violation: Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” However, none of the notifications listed a specific provision of the CC&Rs that had allegedly been violated.
6. The first fine was detailed in a letter dated December 1, 2016. The letter informed Mr. Collis that his account had been charged a $25 fine for the ongoing violation of storing an inoperable vehicle on the street.
7. The HOA presented credible testimony from Lisa Riesland that there were cobwebs and debris on or beneath the vehicle. At various times, these cobwebs extended from the vehicle to the ground and had trapped leaves, creating an unsightly condition.
8. Around June 2017, the vehicle also had a flat tire and a bag or cardboard covering one window. Mr. Collis acknowledged these facts and explained that the vehicle had been vandalized.
9. The “Conclusions of Law” state that Mr. Collis, the petitioner, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is that of a “preponderance of the evidence.”
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Collis’s petition be dismissed. This legally binding order deemed the Respondent (Laveen Meadows HOA) to be the prevailing party in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the discrepancy between Mr. Collis’s initial petition alleging a violation of Section 10.11.4 and the actual issue he raised at the hearing. How did this “reframing” of the issue affect his case, and how did the Respondent react?
2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the document. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by both Mr. Collis and the HOA to reach the final decision.
3. Trace the series of notifications and fines issued by the Laveen Meadows HOA, beginning with the September 19, 2016 letter. Evaluate the HOA’s process and communication based on the details provided in the letters. Did the HOA act reasonably, according to the legal standards cited in the decision?
4. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections (10.11.2, 10.11.4, and 10.16) as the basis for the citations, even though the notifications only stated “Vehicle Parking – Inoperable Vehicle.” Explore the significance of each of these sections and explain why Mr. Collis’s focus on his vehicle being operable was insufficient to win his case.
5. Examine the appeal options available to Mr. Collis at each stage of the violation process. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” what actions did he take or fail to take regarding his appeal rights, and how might this have impacted the overall trajectory of the dispute?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof for the hearing.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. Various sections are cited regarding homeowner association disputes and administrative procedures.
Appearances
A formal term for the individuals present and participating in the hearing. In this case, it was Jerry R. Collis and Chad Gallacher, Esq.
The governing body of the Laveen Meadows HOA, to which Mr. Collis had the right to appeal fines. He appealed one fine to the Board, which was denied.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Collis.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)
The governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners’ association. The decision establishes the CC&Rs as a contract between the HOA and its members.
Community Manager
An individual responsible for managing the operations of the HOA. Lisa Riesland served this role for the Respondent and testified at the hearing.
Conclusions of Law
The section of the decision where the Administrative Law Judge applies legal principles and statutes to the established facts to reach a judgment.
Findings of Fact
The section of the decision that lists the established, undisputed facts of the case based on evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.
Nuisance
A condition prohibited by CC&R Section 10.16. It is defined as a condition that is unsightly or could reasonably cause annoyance to other members of the Association.
Operating Condition
A term from CC&R Section 10.11.4, which was amended in May 2013 to clarify its meaning. Mr. Collis argued his vehicle was always in operating condition.
The final, legally binding ruling of the Administrative Law Judge. In this case, the Order was to dismiss the petitioner’s petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Jerry R. Collis is the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Laveen Meadows HOA is the Respondent.
Blog Post – 19F-H18020-REL
🏛️
No emoji found
Loading
19F-H18020-REL
1 source
The provided text consists of an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Petitioner Jerry R. Collis and the Laveen Meadows HOA, which is the Respondent. This decision addresses Mr. Collis’s petition alleging the HOA violated its CC&Rs by improperly issuing citations related to his vehicle. The Findings of Fact detail that Mr. Collis’s vehicle was cited for being inoperable, having expired tags, and creating an unsightly condition defined as a nuisance under multiple CC&R sections. Ultimately, the Conclusions of Law state that Mr. Collis failed to meet his burden of proof to show the HOA violated any community documents or statutes, leading to the dismissal of his petition.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jerry R. Collis(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Chad Gallacher(HOA attorney) Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. Counsel for Respondent Laveen Meadows HOA
Lisa Riesland(community manager) Laveen Meadows HOA Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
f del sol(admin support) Signed copy distribution notice
18F-H1818045-REL (Consolidated with 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818054-REL)
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
partial
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Warren R. Brown
Counsel
—
Respondent
Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Counsel
Gregory A. Stein, Esq.
Alleged Violations
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
Outcome Summary
Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the excessive late fee ($25 instead of $15 or 10%) in violation of ARS 33-1803(A). However, both petitioners (Brown in 029, Stevens in 054) failed to prove a violation of ARS 33-1803(A) regarding the overall 39.4% assessment increase, resulting in those petitions being dismissed.
Why this result: Petitioners lost the challenge to the assessment increase because their definition of “regular assessment” was not supported by principles of statutory construction, which would have rendered the word “regular” trivial or void in the statute.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA charging excessive late payment fees and interest.
Mogollon charged a $25 late fee, exceeding the statutory limit set in ARS 33-1803(A), which limits late charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.
Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay to Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA assessment increase, Late fees, Statutory interpretation, Regular vs Special assessment, Homeowner petition
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:50 (151.9 KB)
18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:51 (144.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG
Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision from October 18, 2018, concerning three consolidated petitions filed by homeowners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute centers on Mogollon’s 2018 financial actions, specifically a 39.4% increase in total annual assessments and the imposition of new late payment penalties.
The case produced a split decision. The ALJ ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the primary issue of the assessment increase. The judge determined that the statutory 20% cap on annual increases, as defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies exclusively to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments.” Mogollon had structured its $325 increase as a combination of a compliant 14.1% regular assessment hike and a separate $209 special assessment, a practice the ALJ found permissible under the law.
Conversely, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding the HOA’s $25 late fee. The judge found this fee to be in direct violation of § 33-1803(A), which limits such charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The ALJ’s rationale was that this statutory limit applies to all “assessments” without qualification, not just regular ones.
While the hearing was limited to these specific statutory violations, the petitions were underpinned by serious allegations from Brown and Stevens of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by Mogollon’s leadership, intended to create a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the fee increases. These underlying allegations were not substantively addressed in the hearing.
Case Overview
This consolidated matter combines three separate petitions heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on September 28, 2018, with Thomas Shedden serving as the Administrative Law Judge.
• Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.
• Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
• Docket Numbers:
◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown
◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown
◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”), Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens
Core Issues Contested
The dispute arose from Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 decision to increase assessments and institute new fees for late payments and past-due accounts.
1. The 2018 Assessment Increase
The central conflict involved the legality of a significant increase in annual homeowner assessments.
• Financial Details:
◦ Previous Year’s Assessment (2017): $825
◦ 2018 Total Increase: $325
◦ Total Percentage Increase: 39.4%
• Mogollon’s Breakdown of the Increase:
◦ Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)
◦ Special Assessment: $209
Argument on the Assessment Increase
Petitioners (Brown & Stevens)
Argued that the entire $325 increase constituted a single assessment action. Because the 39.4% increase exceeded the 20% annual cap stipulated in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), it was unlawful. They contended that the term “regular assessment” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote), not a specific type of assessment. They further alleged that Mogollon’s governing documents provided no authority to levy a “special assessment.”
Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)
Asserted that § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.” They argued that their regular assessment increase of $116 (14.1%) was well within the 20% limit. The $209 portion was a “special assessment,” which they described as a “term of art in the industry” not subject to the 20% cap. They cited the use of the term “special assessment” in another statute, § 33-1806, as evidence of legislative intent to differentiate between assessment types.
2. Late Payment Charges
Petitioner Brown separately challenged the legality of newly instituted penalties for late payments.
• Charges Implemented by Mogollon:
◦ A flat $25 fee for late payments.
◦ 18% interest on past-due accounts.
• Petitioner’s Argument (Brown): The $25 late fee violated the plain language of § 33-1803(A), which explicitly limits late payment charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Brown provided an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.
• Respondent’s Argument (Mogollon): The HOA argued that the statutory limits on late fees did not apply in this case because the fee was charged on a special assessment, which they contended was outside the scope of § 33-1803(A).
Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct
Although the hearing was limited to the narrow legal questions above, the petitioners’ filings contained extensive allegations of financial impropriety against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. These claims formed the motive for the contested assessments.
• Core Allegation: The petitioners asserted that the HOA leadership engaged in “numerous accounting improprieties” and used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods, including keeping two sets of books.”
• Alleged Purpose: The goal was to create a “fabricated shortfall” and present an “inaccurate picture of the HOA finances.” This was done, according to Mr. Brown, “ostensibly to show that the 2016 board of directors left office showing a loss of funds,” when in fact they had improved the treasury by approximately $200,000.
• Justification for Increase: This artificially created financial need was then used “to convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”
• Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged accounting practices. He testified that Mogollon possessed over $1 million and did not need an assessment increase. He also stated his belief that the $209 special assessment was a “trial run” for future assessments for purposes not authorized by the governing documents.
• ALJ’s Position: The judge noted these underlying allegations but stated, “the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.” A footnote suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ issued a split decision, ruling for the Respondent on the assessment increase and for the Petitioner on the late fee. The decision was based on established principles of statutory construction.
Legal Principles Applied
• Burden of Proof: Placed on Petitioners Brown and Stevens to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Statutory Construction:
1. Statutes must be interpreted to yield a “fair and sensible result” and avoid “absurd and unreasonable construction.”
2. Every word and phrase in a statute must be given meaning so that no part is “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”
3. When a term is used in one part of a statute but omitted in another, it should not be read into the section where it is absent.
Conclusion on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)
• Verdict: The petitions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.
• Rationale: The ALJ rejected the petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment.” The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant passed by a regular process (motion, second, vote), then the word would be meaningless (“trivial or void”), as all assessments are assumed to follow that process. This would violate a core principle of statutory construction. Therefore, the legislature must have intended “regular assessment” to be a specific type of assessment, distinct from others like “special assessments.” Because the 20% cap in § 33-1803(A) explicitly applies only to regular assessments, Mogollon’s $209 special assessment was not subject to that limit.
Conclusion on the Late Fee (Matter 045)
• Verdict: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.
• Rationale: The ALJ found that the statutory clause limiting late fees applies to “assessments” in general, not specifically to “regular assessments.” The legislature’s omission of the word “regular” in this part of the statute was deliberate. Mogollon’s argument that the limit only applied to regular assessments required reading a word into the statute that was not there, which “violates principles of statutory construction.” The $25 fee clearly exceeded the allowable limit.
Final Orders
The ALJ issued separate orders for each consolidated docket, reflecting the split decision.
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1818045-REL
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Outcome
partial
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Warren R. Brown
Counsel
—
Respondent
Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Counsel
Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.
Alleged Violations
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
Outcome Summary
The matter was consolidated with two other petitions concerning assessment increases (18F-H1818029-REL-RHG and 18F-H1818054-REL). The ALJ dismissed the claims regarding the $325 assessment increase (029 and 054 matters) against the HOA. However, Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter, proving the HOA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by charging a $25 late fee, resulting in an order for rescission of the fee and refund of his $500 filing fee.
Why this result: Petitioner Brown (029 matter) and Petitioner Stevens (054 matter) lost their claims regarding the $325 assessment increase because they failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon violated section 33-1803(A). The ALJ determined that the petitioners' definition of 'regular assessment' as referring to process (motion, second, vote) was not supported by principles of statutory construction.
Key Issues & Findings
Late payment charges limitation
Petitioner Brown alleged that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803 by charging a late fee of $25 and interest of 18% on late payments, asserting the statute limits late charges to the greater of $15.00 or 10%. The ALJ agreed, concluding the statute's limit on late charges applies to all assessments, not just regular assessments, and found the $25 late charge violated the statute.
Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay him his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (151.9 KB)
18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:33 (144.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG
Briefing Document: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision concerning three consolidated petitions filed by residents Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute revolves around a significant 2018 assessment increase and the legality of associated late fees under Arizona statute.
The central legal question was the interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), which limits an HOA’s ability to “impose a regular assessment that is more than twenty percent greater than the immediately preceding fiscal year’s assessment.” The petitioners argued that the HOA’s total 39.4% increase violated this cap. The HOA contended the increase was comprised of a compliant “regular assessment” and a separate “special assessment” not subject to the cap.
The ALJ’s decision resulted in a split outcome:
• On the Assessment Increase: The judge ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The petitions challenging the assessment increase were dismissed. The ALJ’s rationale was that statutory construction requires distinguishing between “regular” and “special” assessments, and the 20% cap applies only to the former.
• On the Late Fees: The judge ruled in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown. The HOA’s $25 late fee was found to be in violation of the statutory limit, which applies to “assessments” in general, not just “regular assessments.” The HOA was ordered to rescind the fee and reimburse the petitioner’s filing costs.
Underlying these specific legal challenges were broader allegations by the petitioners of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by the HOA’s treasurer, which they claimed were intended to create a false justification for the assessment increase. These allegations were noted but not adjudicated in this hearing.
I. Case Overview
The matter concerns a consolidated hearing held on September 28, 2018, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona. Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden presided over the case, which combined three separate petitions against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
• Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.
• Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
• Docket Numbers:
◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”): Warren R. Brown, Petitioner
◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”): Warren R. Brown, Petitioner
◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”): Brad W. Stevens, Petitioner
II. Central Disputes and Allegations
A. The 2018 Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)
The primary dispute centered on Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 assessment changes.
• Previous Assessment (2017): $825
• 2018 Increase: $325, representing a 39.4% total increase.
• HOA’s Breakdown of Increase:
◦ Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)
◦ Special Assessment: $209
• Legal Challenge: The petitioners alleged the total $325 increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), which prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment that is more than [20%] greater than the immediately preceding fiscal year’s assessment” without member approval.
B. Late Fees and Interest Charges (Matter 045)
The second dispute, raised by Mr. Brown, concerned new penalties for late payments.
• New Charges: A $25 late fee and 18% interest on past-due accounts.
• Legal Challenge: Mr. Brown alleged these charges violated the same statute, which limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” He presented an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.
C. Underlying Allegations of Financial Impropriety
Although the hearing’s scope was limited, the petitions were rooted in serious allegations of financial misconduct by the HOA. These claims formed the petitioners’ motive for challenging the assessments but were not the direct subject of the ALJ’s ruling.
• Core Claim: The petitioners asserted that Mogollon’s treasurer and others used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” including keeping two sets of books, to create the appearance of a financial shortfall.
• Alleged Purpose: This “fabricated shortfall” was allegedly used to convince the Board of Directors that a 39.4% dues increase was necessary.
• Petitioners’ Financial View: Mr. Stevens testified that he believed the HOA possessed funds in excess of $1 million and therefore did not require the increased assessment.
• ALJ’s Acknowledgment: The decision noted, “Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise. Regardless, the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.”
III. Arguments of the Parties
The central legal conflict hinged on the interpretation of the term “regular assessment” within the statute.
Petitioners’ Position (Brown & Stevens)
Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)
Assessment Increase
The term “regular assessment” in § 33-1803(A) describes the process by which an assessment is instituted (i.e., by motion, second, and vote). Therefore, the entire $325 increase is a single assessment subject to and in violation of the 20% statutory cap. They further argued the HOA’s governing documents provide no authority to impose “special assessments.”
“Regular assessment” and “special assessment” are distinct types of assessments and industry terms of art. The 20% cap applies only to the regular portion. The $116 regular increase (14.1%) was compliant. The existence of the term “special assessment” in another statute (§ 33-1806) proves the legislature intended this distinction.
Late Fees
The 25latefeeisaclearviolationofthestatutorylimitof”15.00 or 10%.” The statutory text for late fees applies to “assessments” generally, not just “regular assessments.”
The statutory limit on late fees applies only to regular assessments. Since the late fee was charged on a special assessment, it did not violate the statute.
IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ applied principles of statutory construction to arrive at a split decision, finding for the respondent on the main issue of the assessment increase but for the petitioner on the secondary issue of late fees.
A. Ruling on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)
• Conclusion: The petitions filed by Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.
• Rationale: The judge concluded that the petitioners had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the statute was violated. Their definition of “regular assessment” as a procedural term was found to be inconsistent with principles of statutory construction. The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant the standard process of passing an assessment, the word would be redundant (“trivial or void”) because all assessments must follow that process. This interpretation supports the view that the legislature intended to differentiate between types of assessments, and that the 20% cap applies only to the “regular” type.
B. Ruling on Late Fees (Matter 045)
• Conclusion: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.
• Rationale: The judge rejected Mogollon’s argument that late fee limits apply only to regular assessments. The statutory text states, “Charges for the late payment of assessments are limited to…” without the “regular” qualifier. The ALJ determined that adding the word “regular” where the legislature chose to omit it would violate statutory construction principles. Therefore, the $25 late fee, being greater than the allowed $15 or 10%, was illegal.
V. Final Orders
The ALJ issued the following binding orders on October 18, 2018:
• ORDER FOR DOCKET NO. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (Brown vs. Mogollon):
◦ The petition is dismissed.
• ORDER FOR DOCKET NO. 18F-H1818045-REL (Brown vs. Mogollon):
◦ Petitioner Warren R. Brown is deemed the prevailing party.
◦ Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee it assessed against Mr. Brown.
◦ Mogollon Airpark Inc. must pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.
• ORDER FOR DOCKET NO. 18F-H1818054-REL (Stevens vs. Mogollon):
◦ The petition is dismissed.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the consolidated administrative hearing involving petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The case centers on disputes over Homeowners Association (HOA) assessments and fees under Arizona law.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this consolidated matter and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific actions did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. take in 2018 that led to the legal petitions?
3. What was the total percentage increase of the 2018 assessment, and how did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. break down this increase?
4. Explain the petitioners’ main legal argument regarding the assessment increase and which statute they claimed was violated.
5. How did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. legally defend its decision to increase the assessment by more than 20%?
6. What was the central issue in the “045 matter” filed by Warren R. Brown?
7. Upon what legal principle did the Administrative Law Judge primarily rely to reach his conclusions on both the assessment increase and the late fee?
8. Why did the judge rule in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the assessment increase but in favor of Warren R. Brown on the late fee?
9. What were the underlying allegations made by the petitioners concerning Mogollon Airpark’s financial management that were not addressed in the hearing?
10. What was the final outcome and order for each of the three consolidated petitions (029, 045, and 054)?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The petitioners were Warren R. Brown (dockets 029 and 045) and Brad W. Stevens (docket 054), who were members of the HOA. The respondent was Mogollon Airpark, Inc., the HOA being challenged. The matter was decided by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.
2. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its 2018 assessment by a total of $325. It also instituted a new $25 fee for late payments and began charging 18% interest on past-due accounts.
3. The total increase of $325 over the previous year’s assessment of $825 constituted a 39.4% increase. Mogollon classified this increase as two separate parts: a $116 (14.1%) increase to the “regular assessment” and a $209 “special assessment.”
4. The petitioners argued that the total $325 increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), which prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment” that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s assessment. They contended that the term “regular assessment” refers to the standard process of levying an assessment (motion, second, vote), not a specific type of assessment.
5. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. argued that the 20% limit in section 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments,” which it claimed is a separate term of art in the industry. Since the increase to the regular assessment was only $116 (14.1%), it was below the 20% statutory threshold and therefore legal.
6. The central issue in the “045 matter” was Warren R. Brown’s allegation that Mogollon’s $25 late fee and 18% interest charge violated section 33-1803(A). The statute limits late charges to the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the unpaid assessment.
7. The judge primarily relied on principles of statutory construction. This involved giving meaning to every word in the statute and not reading words into a provision where the legislature omitted them, which led to different interpretations of the statute’s clauses on assessments versus late fees.
8. The judge ruled against the petitioners on the assessment because their interpretation would make the word “regular” in the statute redundant. However, he ruled for Brown on the late fee because the statutory text limits charges on “assessments” in general, not just “regular assessments,” and to rule otherwise would require adding a word the legislature did not include.
9. The petitioners alleged that Mogollon’s treasurer engaged in deceptive and nonstandard accounting practices, including keeping two sets of books, to create a “fabricated shortfall.” They claimed this was done to falsely justify the need for the assessment increase, as the HOA actually had over $1 million in funds.
10. The petitions in the 029 matter (Brown) and 054 matter (Stevens) concerning the assessment increase were both dismissed. The petition in the 045 matter (Brown) concerning the late fee was successful; Mogollon was ordered to rescind the $25 fee and reimburse Brown’s $500 filing fee.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: Consider the following questions for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response based solely on the information in the provided legal decision.
1. Analyze the role of statutory construction in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. How did the interpretation of the specific word “regular” and the general term “assessments” shape the final, divergent outcomes for the consolidated petitions?
2. Discuss the petitioners’ underlying allegations of deceptive accounting practices. Although not the central issue of the hearing, how did these claims frame the dispute, and why did the judge note that civil courts might be better suited to address them?
3. Compare and contrast the legal arguments presented by the petitioners and the respondent regarding the interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A). Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s position as described in the decision.
4. Trace the procedural history of the “029 matter,” from its initial filing and dismissal to the rehearing. What does this progression reveal about the procedural requirements for filing a successful petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings?
5. Evaluate the outcome of the consolidated hearing. Why was one petitioner successful on one claim while both were unsuccessful on another, despite the claims originating from the same set of actions by the HOA?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues decisions and orders.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
The specific Arizona statute at the center of the dispute. It limits HOA “regular assessment” increases to 20% over the prior year and caps late payment charges at the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.
Assessment
A fee imposed by an HOA on its members. The case distinguishes between a “regular assessment” (a recurring charge) and a “special assessment” (a one-time charge for a specific purpose).
Burden of Proof
The obligation of the petitioners, Messrs. Brown and Stevens, to prove their allegations against the respondent.
Consolidated Matter
The joining of multiple, separate legal petitions (in this case, 029, 045, and 054) into a single hearing because they involved the same parties and related issues.
Petitioner
A party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this matter, Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens were the petitioners.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was the respondent.
Single-Issue Petition
A petition filed with the Department of Real Estate that is limited to a single allegation, which in the case of Mr. Stevens’s 054 matter required a $500 filing fee.
Statutory Construction
The legal process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge used principles of statutory construction to determine the meaning of “regular assessment” and “assessments” in the relevant statute.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG
How One Word Created an HOA Loophole for a 40% Fee Hike—And How Another Word Gave a Homeowner a Key Victory
1.0 Introduction: The Dreaded HOA Letter
It’s the letter every homeowner dreads opening. A crisp envelope from the Homeowners Association lands in your mailbox, and inside is a notice that your mandatory fees are about to skyrocket. For a group of homeowners in Arizona’s Mogollon Airpark, this scenario became a reality when their HOA announced a staggering 39.4% increase in their annual assessments.
What followed was a legal battle that provides a fascinating and cautionary tale for every homeowner living under an HOA. The dispute, which pitted homeowners Warren Brown and Brad Stevens against Mogollon Airpark, Inc., didn’t hinge on fairness or financial need, but on the legal interpretation of a single word. This article distills the surprising and counter-intuitive lessons learned from their fight, revealing loopholes and legal technicalities that can make all the difference.
2.0 A 40% Fee Hike Can Be Legal Thanks to the “Special Assessment” Loophole
The core of the dispute was the massive fee hike. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its 2018 assessment by $325 from the previous year’s $825—a 39.4% increase. This seemed to be a clear violation of Arizona law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)), which explicitly prohibits an HOA from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% in one year without a majority vote from members.
The HOA, however, employed a clever strategy. It split the $325 increase into two distinct parts:
• A $116 “regular assessment” increase, which amounted to a legal 14.1% hike.
• A separate $209 “special assessment.”
The HOA argued that the 20% statutory cap only applied to the “regular” portion of the increase, making their move perfectly legal.
The homeowners countered that this was a deceptive maneuver. They argued that the term “regular assessment” in the law refers to the process of creating an assessment (a motion, a second, and a vote), not a specific type of assessment. From their perspective, the entire 39.4% increase was a single action and was therefore illegal.
In a surprising ruling, the Administrative Law Judge sided with the HOA. The judge reasoned that if the homeowners’ interpretation was correct and all assessments followed the same “regular” process, then the word “regular” in the statute would be rendered “trivial or void.” By giving meaning to that single word, the judge affirmed that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are different categories, and the 20% cap only applies to the former. This interpretation effectively creates a significant loophole for HOAs to bypass statutory limits and implement large fee increases.
3.0 The Devil Is in the Details: “Regular Assessment” vs. “Assessments”
While the HOA won the main argument over the 39.4% increase, they lost on a smaller but crucial point: late fees. Along with the assessment hike, the HOA instituted a new $25 late fee for overdue payments.
Homeowner Warren Brown challenged this fee, pointing to the same state law. He argued that the statute limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Since the new $25 fee exceeded this limit, it was a direct violation.
Emboldened by their victory on the assessment increase, the HOA extended its logic, arguing that since the late fee was applied to a special assessment, the statutory limit—which they claimed was intended for regular assessments—did not apply.
This time, the judge decisively ruled in favor of the homeowner. The judge highlighted a critical distinction in the law’s wording. The part of the statute limiting assessment increases uses the specific term “regular assessment.” However, the part of the law limiting late charges uses the broader, more general term “assessments.” The omission of the word “regular” was the key.
The judge’s reasoning was a masterclass in statutory construction:
This argument fails because the statute’s limit on late charges applies to “assessments,” not “regular assessments.” Under Mogollon’s interpretation, it is necessary to add the word “regular” where the legislature chose not to use it. This violates principles of statutory construction.
This outcome underscores the immense importance of precise legal language. The legislature’s choice to omit a single word in one clause of a law gave the homeowner a clear victory and held the HOA accountable.
4.0 Serious Allegations Don’t Guarantee a Day in Court
Underlying the homeowners’ legal challenge were serious allegations of financial misconduct. Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens claimed the HOA treasurer used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” kept “two sets of books,” and created a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the assessment increase and “convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”
Surprisingly, none of these explosive allegations were addressed during the hearing. The reason for this is a crucial lesson in legal strategy. The homeowners had filed “single-issue petitions,” which legally limited the scope of the administrative hearing to one narrow question: did the HOA violate the specific statute governing assessment increases (ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A))? All other matters, including the allegations of accounting improprieties, were outside the hearing’s jurisdiction.
The judge explicitly noted this limitation in a footnote to the decision:
Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise. Regardless, the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.
This case is a powerful reminder that in law, the structure of your argument can be more important than the weight of your accusations. By filing a narrow petition, the homeowners guaranteed a hearing on that one issue but forfeited the chance to have their broader, more serious claims heard in that venue.
5.0 A Partial Victory Is Still a Victory
The final outcome of the consolidated case was decidedly mixed. The homeowners lost their primary challenge, and the court upheld the HOA’s $325 assessment increase.
However, Mr. Brown was officially deemed the “prevailing party” in his case regarding the illegal late fees. This was not just a moral victory; it came with a direct order from the judge. Mogollon Airpark Inc. was ordered to:
• Rescind the $25 late fee it assessed against Mr. Brown.
• Pay Mr. Brown back his $500 filing fee for the case.
While it wasn’t the total win they had hoped for, this outcome demonstrates that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully hold their HOA accountable for breaking the law, even on smaller matters. It proves that knowing the rules and persevering can lead to tangible results, forcing an association to correct its illegal actions and compensating the homeowner for the cost of the fight.
6.0 Conclusion: Know the Law, Word by Word
The case of Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark is a potent lesson in how legal battles are won and lost in the margins. A single word—”regular”—opened a loophole for the HOA to impose a nearly 40% fee hike, while the deliberate absence of that same word in a later clause empowered a homeowner to strike back and win.
This case serves as a powerful reminder that when it comes to the laws governing your community, every word matters. It poses a vital question for all homeowners: are the protections you count on in state law as ironclad as you think, or could they evaporate based on the interpretation of a single adjective?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Warren R. Brown(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Brad W. Stevens(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf; presented testimony
Respondent Side
Gregory A. Stein(attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Counsel for Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Mark K. Sahl(attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Counsel for Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes
Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.
Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart's petition and deemed the Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., to be the prevailing party.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4 or acted unreasonably or in bad faith when denying his request for a variance. The Bylaw section cited was determined to be a liability shield for the Board, not a source of duty owed to the homeowner.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged failure of HOA Board to act in good faith when denying Petitioner's request for a variance for unauthorized common area changes
Petitioner made changes to the common area without permission and the Board denied his subsequent request for a variance. Petitioner alleged the Board violated Bylaws Section 5.4 by failing to act in good faith and showing bias. The ALJ found that Section 5.4 is a liability shield for the Board, not a duty imposed upon them, and Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show bad faith or unreasonableness.
Orders: Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA governance, variance denial, common area modifications, good faith requirement, board liability shield, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 660026.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:02 (91.5 KB)
18F-H1818052-REL Decision – 720468.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:02 (103.5 KB)
This is a concise summary of the administrative law proceedings concerning Lawrence M. Stewart's petition against the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., drawing from the original hearing (September 6, 2018) and the subsequent rehearing (January 2, 2019).
Summary of Administrative Law Case: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
Key Facts
The Petitioner, Lawrence M. Stewart, an owner and former Board member, made changes to the common or limited common area around his unit without prior permission, violating section 5.1 of the CC&Rs. After being informed of the violation, Mr. Stewart requested a variance from the Association Board while he was still a member. At a Board meeting on February 18, 2018, Mr. Stewart resigned, and the two remaining Board members (Sandra Fernandez and David Larson) voted to deny his variance request, requiring him to restore the areas to their original condition.
Main Issues and Petitioner's Arguments
Mr. Stewart filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the Association violated Bylaws section 5.4. His central argument was that the Board did not act in good faith when denying the variance request. He asserted that Board member David Larson was biased against him and that the denial was unfair because other units were also non-conforming with the CC&Rs. Mr. Stewart cited Bylaws Section 5.4 because he testified it was the only section referring to a “good faith” requirement in the governing documents.
Key Legal Points and Analysis
Burden of Proof: Mr. Stewart bore the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws are considered a contract, and the Respondent (Association) is required to act reasonably in exercising its authority.
Applicability of Section 5.4: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Bylaws Article V, Section 5.4 (Liability/Indemnification) does not impose any duty on the Board members; rather, it merely shields them from liability if they act in good faith. Mr. Stewart eventually acknowledged that the Association had not technically violated Section 5.4.
Reasonableness of Board Action: The Board's stated reason for denying the variance was fear of "open[ing] a Pandora’s Box" where other unit owners would request variances. The ALJ found this concern to be a not unreasonable position for a condominium association board.
Lack of Evidence for Bias/Unfairness: The ALJ found that Mr. Stewart did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board lacked good faith, was biased against him, or treated him unfairly. Regarding the assertion of other non-conforming units, there was no evidence that those owners had requested variances, making that testimony not probative of the issue at hand.
Outcome
The Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. Stewart failed to meet his burden of proof. Consequently, Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart’s petition was dismissed in both the initial decision (September 14, 2018) and the binding order issued after the rehearing (January 17, 2019). The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818052-REL
Study Guide: Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the administrative legal case Lawrence M. Stewart v. Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818052-REL). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the initial hearing and subsequent rehearing as detailed in the decisions issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following ten questions based on the provided case documents. Each answer should be approximately two to three sentences long.
1. What initial action taken by Lawrence M. Stewart prompted the Canyon Gate Condominium Association to contact him with a notice of violation?
2. What specific section of the Association Bylaws did Mr. Stewart allege was violated in his petition to the Department of Real Estate?
3. What was Mr. Stewart’s position within the Association at the time he requested a variance for the changes he had made?
4. According to Mr. Stewart, what was the Board’s primary reason for denying his variance request?
5. Why did Mr. Stewart ultimately resign from the Association’s Board during the February 18, 2018 meeting?
6. In the initial hearing, what three pieces of evidence did Mr. Stewart present to support his allegation that Board member David Larson was biased against him?
7. What is the legal standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bears the burden of meeting that standard?
8. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the function of Bylaws Section 5.4, characterizing it as either a “shield” or a “sword”?
9. During the rehearing, what new piece of evidence did Mr. Stewart introduce to support his claim of bias from Mr. Larson?
10. What was the final ruling in both the initial hearing (September 14, 2018) and the rehearing (January 17, 2019)?
——————————————————————————–
Quiz Answer Key
1. Mr. Stewart made changes to the common area and/or limited common area around his condominium unit without first getting permission from the Association. This action was a violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs, leading the Association’s counsel to send him a letter on November 15, 2017.
2. Mr. Stewart’s petition alleged that the Association violated Bylaws Section 5.4. He later clarified that he cited this specific section because it was the only one in the governing documents that included a “good faith” requirement, which he believed the Board had failed to meet.
3. At the time he requested a variance to approve the changes he had made, Mr. Stewart was an active member of the Association’s Board of Directors. The other two members were Sandra Fernandez and David Larson.
4. The Board denied his request because they feared it would “open a Pandora’s Box,” leading other unit owners to request variances for changes to the common area. The judge found this was not an unreasonable position for a condominium association board to take.
5. Mr. Stewart resigned from the Board because he got the sense “right away” that the other two board members, Ms. Fernandez and Mr. Larson, had already made up their minds to deny his request and would not approve it.
6. To support his bias claim, Mr. Stewart relied on: (1) a biography of Mr. Larson prepared by the property manager, (2) statements Mr. Larson made in notes from a November 28, 2017 Board meeting, and (3) his belief that the other members had already decided the matter without his input.
7. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof to meet this standard rests entirely on the Petitioner, Mr. Stewart.
8. The judge concluded that Section 5.4 acts as a “shield” to protect Board members from liability when they act in good faith. It does not impose a duty on them and cannot be used as a “sword” by an owner to force a particular action from the Board.
9. At the rehearing, Mr. Stewart entered into evidence an October 3, 2018 letter written by Mr. Larson to the Association’s members. In the letter, Mr. Larson urged the members not to vote for Mr. Stewart in an upcoming election.
10. In both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Stewart’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that Bylaws Section 5.4 was not applicable to Mr. Stewart’s claim. How did Mr. Stewart’s interpretation of the section as a “sword” versus a “shield” contribute to this outcome?
2. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Evaluate the evidence Mr. Stewart presented to prove bias and unfair treatment, and explain why the judge found it insufficient to meet this standard.
3. Examine the Board’s justification for denying the variance request (the “Pandora’s Box” argument). Based on the court’s conclusions, discuss why this was considered a “reasonable position” for a condominium association board, even without a detailed inspection of Mr. Stewart’s specific changes.
4. Trace the evolution of Mr. Stewart’s arguments and evidence from the initial hearing on September 6, 2018, to the rehearing on January 2, 2019. What new evidence was introduced, and did it fundamentally change the core issues or the final outcome of the case?
5. Explore the principle established in the “Conclusions of Law” that Association Bylaws function as a contract between the parties. How does this principle require both homeowners and the Association Board to act, and how did it influence the judge’s final decision in this matter?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition in the Context of the Case
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, Thomas Shedden, who presided over the hearings, reviewed the evidence, and issued the final decisions in this matter.
Bylaws
A contract between the Association and its members. The parties are required to comply with its terms, and the Association must act reasonably in exercising its authority under them. Mr. Stewart alleged a violation of Bylaws Section 5.4.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. Mr. Stewart was found to be in violation of section 5.1 of the CC&Rs for making unapproved changes to a common area.
Common Area
An area around a condominium unit that is not privately owned. Mr. Stewart made unauthorized changes to the common and/or limited common area around his unit.
Good Faith
A standard of conduct mentioned in Bylaws Section 5.4, which shields Board members from liability if they act accordingly. Mr. Stewart’s core argument was that the Board did not act in good faith when denying his variance request.
Indemnification
The subject of Article V of the Bylaws. Section 5.4, titled “Liability,” falls under this article and serves to protect, or indemnify, the Board from liability.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Lawrence M. Stewart.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Recuse
To formally withdraw from a decision-making process due to a conflict of interest. The Association’s attorney incorrectly stated in a letter that Mr. Stewart had recused himself from voting on his own variance request.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc.
Variance
A formal request for an exception to the established rules (the CC&Rs). Mr. Stewart requested a variance to gain approval for the changes he had already made to the common area.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818052-REL
Select all sources
660026.pdf
683622.pdf
694095.pdf
720468.pdf
No emoji found
Loading
18F-H1818052-REL-RHG
4 sources
These documents consist of Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, detailing a dispute between Petitioner Lawrence M. Stewart and the Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. The core issue revolves around Mr. Stewart making unauthorized changes to the common area of his unit and his subsequent failed attempt to obtain a variance from the Association’s Board. The sources include an initial decision (dated September 14, 2018) and two decisions stemming from a rehearing (both dated January 17, 2019, though one is more detailed), all concluding that Mr. Stewart’s petition must be dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge determined that Mr. Stewart failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association acted in bad faith or was biased against him when it denied his request, despite his reliance on a Bylaws section regarding indemnity which the court found acted as a “shield” for the Board rather than a source of duty.
Based on 4 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Lawrence M. Stewart(petitioner) Was also a board member during the variance request period, but resigned prior to the vote to deny his request
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(Respondent Attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Nicolas C. S. Nogami(Respondent Attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Also appears as 'Nichols C. S. Nogami'
Sandra Fernandez(board member) Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request
David Larson(board member) Canyon Gate Condominium Association, Inc. Voted to deny Petitioner's variance request; Petitioner alleged bias against him
Neutral Parties
Thomas Shedden(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
F. Del Sol(Administrative Staff) Transmitted copies of the decision
Bylaws Article VIII Bylaws Article VIII; Bylaws Article IV, Section 1 ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A), (A)(1), and (A)(2)
Outcome Summary
The Petitioner's petition, raising three issues concerning the HOA's election nominating process, was dismissed entirely. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on all issues. The ALJ found that the Nominating Committee acted within the authority granted by the Bylaws regarding deadlines and nominee selection discretion, and the relevant election statute (A.R.S. § 33-1812) was not applicable to the nomination process.
Key Issues & Findings
Nominating Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline by which parties were to submit applications to nominate themselves.
Petitioner alleged the Nominating Committee violated Article VIII by accepting applications after the September 29th administrative deadline, arguing the deadline was a 'term[], limitation[], or rule[] adopted by the Board of Directors'.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. The deadline was an administrative deadline set by management, not a rule adopted by the Board, and therefore the Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications late.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Bylaws Article VIII
The Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by asking candidates questions that had the effect of imposing qualification requirements for the Board’s Directors that exceed those set out in the Bylaws.
Petitioner alleged that the Committee imposing questions (such as whether an applicant had filed a lawsuit against the Association) created unauthorized qualifications for the Board, violating the Bylaws.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. Bylaws Article IV Section 3 grants the Nominating Committee discretion to determine the number of nominations, and it was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants while exercising this explicit discretion.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Bylaws Article VIII
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
By failing to include on the election-ballot members who had submitted 'self-nominations,' the Committee violated election statutes.
Petitioner asserted that because members could not vote for the four applicants the Nominating Committee did not nominate, the Committee engaged in proxy voting, violating election requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1812.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. Because Bylaws Article IV Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Nominating Committee, nominations are not 'votes allocated to a unit' and ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 is not applicable.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(1)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Election, Nominating Committee, Bylaws Enforcement, Director Qualifications, Administrative Deadline, Statutory Interpretation, Self-Nomination
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817017-REL Decision – 615818.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:17 (125.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817017-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, concerning a petition filed by William Travis against The Val Vista Lakes Community Association. The core of the dispute revolves around the actions of the Association’s Nominating Committee during the process for the November 16, 2017 Board of Directors election.
Mr. Travis raised three primary allegations: 1) the Committee violated Association Bylaws by accepting candidate applications after a stated September 29, 2017 deadline; 2) the Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing candidates, thereby imposing qualification requirements beyond those stipulated in the Bylaws; and 3) the failure to include all applicants on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes related to proxy voting.
The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, dismissed Mr. Travis’s petition in its entirety. The decision found that Travis failed to prove the application deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board, concluding it was an administrative deadline set by the management company. The Judge determined that the Committee’s actions, including interviewing applicants, were a reasonable exercise of the discretion explicitly granted to it by the Bylaws. Finally, the Judge ruled that the state statute cited by Travis applies to the casting of votes, not the internal nomination process, and was therefore inapplicable to the Committee’s actions. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1817017-REL
Petitioner
William Travis
Respondent
The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Hearing Date
January 26, 2018
Decision Date
February 2, 2018
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Testifying Parties
William Travis (on his own behalf); Simone McGinnis (Association’s on-site manager)
Petitioner’s Allegations
William Travis’s petition, as amended, centered on three specific issues concerning the Nominating Committee’s conduct for the November 16, 2017 Board election:
1. Violation of Application Deadline: The Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline for candidate applications. Travis contended that this deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board,” and by accepting applications after this date, the Committee violated Bylaws Article VIII.
2. Exceeding Authority and Imposing Qualifications: The Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing and questioning applicants. Travis argued that this process had the effect of creating new qualification requirements for Board Directors, beyond the sole requirement of Association membership outlined in Bylaws Article IV. He asserted the Committee had no authority to ask any questions.
3. Statutory Violation of Voting Rights: By failing to place all members who submitted “self-nominations” on the official election ballot, the Committee violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A). Travis claimed this action was tantamount to proxy voting because it prevented members from voting for or against certain candidates.
Key Factual Findings
Election and Nomination Timeline
• August 17, 2017: The Board of Directors appoints Cheryl Peterson-McCoy as the Nominating Committee Chairperson.
• September 12, 2017: The Association’s management company emails residents, announcing three open Board positions and an application deadline of September 29, 2017, at 5:00 p.m.
• By September 29, 2017: Four applications are received. At this point, the members of the Nominating Committee (other than the Chairperson) have not yet been selected.
• After September 29, 2017: The Association accepts four additional applications, including one from Mr. Travis. No revised notice is sent to the membership about an extended deadline.
• October 5, 2017: Mr. Travis, then a Board member, makes an email motion to extend the application deadline to October 16, which is denied.
• October 19, 2017: The Board formally approves six members for the Nominating Committee. Mr. Travis’s subsequent motion at this meeting to extend the deadline fails for lack of a second.
Nominating Committee Actions and Rationale
• The Committee considered all eight applications submitted, including the four received after the initial deadline.
• The Committee scheduled and conducted interviews with all eight applicants.
• During interviews, applicants were asked questions including whether they had ever filed a lawsuit against the Association, were considering filing a lawsuit, or had any compliance violations.
• The Committee ultimately nominated four candidates to be placed on the ballot for the election. Of these four, two had applied by the September 29 deadline and two had applied after.
Association’s Position and Testimony
• Simone McGinnis, the Association’s on-site manager, testified that the September 29 deadline was not imposed by the Board but was an administrative deadline set by the management company to allow time for the nomination and ballot-printing process.
• The Association’s position, articulated at the November 16, 2017 Board meeting, is that the only way to get on the ballot is to be nominated by the Nominating Committee, although write-in candidates are permitted during the election.
• The Board acknowledged that it had only strictly adhered to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee for the past two years, after thirty years of non-adherence.
• The Board’s attorney stated that the Committee members have a duty to act reasonably and that any member who disagrees with the Committee’s discretionary choices should seek to amend the bylaws.
Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes
The judge’s decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state law.
Document/Statute
Relevant Provision
Application in this Case
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
“Nominations for election to the Board of Directors shall be made by a Nominating Committee… The Nominating Committee shall make as many nominations… as it shall in its discretion determine…”
This article grants the Committee explicit discretion to select nominees. It does not provide for “self-nomination” or require the Committee to nominate all applicants.
Bylaws Article VIII
“no committee may take action which exceeds its responsibilities. Each committee shall operate in accordance with any terms, limitations, or rules adopted by the Board.”
Mr. Travis argued the deadline was a “rule adopted by the Board.” The court found no evidence to support this, concluding it was an administrative deadline.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 1
States that Board Directors must be members of the Association. It lists no other qualifications.
Mr. Travis argued that questioning candidates imposed extra qualifications. The court found this was part of the Committee’s discretionary selection process, not the imposition of new formal requirements.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812
Prohibits proxy voting and requires that ballots set forth each proposed action and provide an opportunity to vote for or against it.
The court determined this statute applies to “votes allocated to a unit” (i.e., the member’s vote) and not the nomination process itself, which is governed by the Bylaws.
Conclusions of Law and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge made the following conclusions based on a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Deadline was Administrative: There was no substantial evidence showing the September 29, 2017 deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board. Therefore, the Nominating Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications after this date.
2. Committee Acted Within its Discretion: The plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Committee and grants it discretion. The concept of “self-nomination” is not supported by the Bylaws. It was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants as part of exercising its explicit discretion to select nominees.
3. State Voting Statute Not Applicable: The nomination process, as dictated by the Bylaws, is separate from the act of voting. Since ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812 governs “votes allocated to a unit,” it is not applicable to the Committee’s function of selecting nominees.
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner William Travis’s petition is dismissed.
The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested from the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817017-REL
Study Guide: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source context.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, and what were their roles?
2. What were the three central issues that petitioner William Travis raised regarding the Board election held on November 16, 2017?
3. What was the petitioner’s argument concerning the September 29, 2017, application deadline set by the Association?
4. According to the Association’s on-site manager, Simone McGinnis, what was the origin and purpose of the September 29th deadline?
5. How did the petitioner claim the Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by questioning candidates?
6. What was the Association’s defense for the Nominating Committee’s practice of interviewing and questioning applicants?
7. What is the sole qualification required to serve on the Board of Directors, according to the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Bylaws?
8. How did the petitioner link the Nominating Committee’s failure to place all applicants on the ballot to a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812?
9. According to testimony during the November 16, 2017, Board meeting, how long had the Association been strictly adhering to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee?
10. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden in this case?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, William Travis, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Travis represented himself, while the Association was represented by attorneys Mark K. Sahl and Nicholas C. Nogami.
2. The three issues raised by Mr. Travis were: (1) the Nominating Committee improperly disregarded the September 29th application deadline; (2) the Committee exceeded its authority by asking questions that effectively added new qualification requirements for Board members; and (3) the Committee’s failure to include all “self-nominations” on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes on proxy voting.
3. Mr. Travis argued that the September 29th deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board of Directors” under Bylaws Article VIII. Therefore, by accepting applications after this date, the Nominating Committee violated the Association’s own rules.
4. Simone McGinnis testified that the Board did not impose the deadline. Instead, it was an administrative deadline set by the Association’s management company to allow sufficient time for the Nominating Committee to review applications and have ballots printed.
5. Mr. Travis argued that by asking applicants questions, the Nominating Committee was effectively imposing qualification requirements beyond the single one set out in the Bylaws (being a member of the Association). He asserted the committee had no authority to ask any questions at all as part of its process.
6. The Association contended that questioning applicants was a reasonable exercise of the Nominating Committee’s discretion. This discretion is granted by the Bylaws, which state the Committee shall make as many nominations as it determines is appropriate.
7. According to Bylaws Article IV, Section 1, the only qualification required for an individual to serve on the Board of Directors is that they must be a member of the Association. No other qualifications are specified in the Bylaws.
8. Mr. Travis asserted that because members were not allowed to vote for or against the four applicants who were not nominated, the Committee effectively engaged in proxy voting. He argued this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812, which requires that ballots provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.
9. During the meeting, the Board acknowledged that it had only been following the Bylaw requirement to use a Nominating Committee for the last two years. Prior to that, for approximately thirty years, strict adherence to this Bylaw had not been observed.
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner William Travis’s petition be dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, to be the prevailing party in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt using only the information and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the Nominating Committee’s role and authority as presented by William Travis and the Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 to resolve this dispute?
2. Discuss the significance of the September 29, 2017 deadline. Evaluate the evidence and arguments presented by both parties regarding its legitimacy and binding nature, and explain the Judge’s reasoning for concluding it was an administrative deadline.
3. Explain William Travis’s legal argument that the Nominating Committee’s selection process constituted a form of proxy voting in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812. Detail the Judge’s conclusion on this matter and the legal reasoning used to determine the statute’s applicability.
4. Examine the concept of “discretion” as it applies to the Nominating Committee’s actions. Based on the hearing testimony, including the Board attorney’s explanation, what are the implied powers and limitations of this discretion?
5. The Judge determined that Mr. Travis failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Identify the key claims made by Mr. Travis and detail why the evidence he presented (or failed to present) was insufficient to prove his case on each of the three issues.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and decisions.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was William Travis.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the respondent was The Val Vista Lakes Community Association.
Bylaws
The formal rules and regulations governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. They are considered a contract between the association and its members.
An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules governing the use of real estate within a planned community. Mr. Travis initially alleged a violation of CC&R Article V, Section 3.
Nominating Committee
A committee, established by the Bylaws, responsible for nominating candidates for election to the Board of Directors. It consists of a Chairperson from the Board and two or more other persons.
Self-Nomination
The act of a member putting their own name forward for consideration for a Board position. The petitioner acknowledged that the Bylaws do not explicitly provide for self-nomination.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Travis.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and has superior evidentiary weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.
Proxy Voting
A form of voting where a member authorizes another person to vote on their behalf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 prohibits this practice for community associations after the period of declarant control.
Prevailing Party
The party that wins the lawsuit. In this case, the Respondent Association was deemed the prevailing party upon the dismissal of the petition.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817017-REL
Your HOA Bylaws Might Not Mean What You Think: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Legal Showdown
Introduction: The Devil in the Details
Anyone who has ever sat through a contentious HOA annual meeting or received a violation notice for an overgrown flowerbed knows the feeling. You live in a community governed by rules, and you assume those rules operate on a shared understanding of common sense. But what happens when that common sense collides with the cold, hard text of your community’s governing documents?
A recent administrative law case in Arizona, Travis vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, provides a fascinating and instructive look under the hood of HOA governance. The dispute reveals how the precise, technical wording of community bylaws can lead to surprising and counter-intuitive outcomes for residents. This case isn’t just about one community; it’s a masterclass for any homeowner. Here are the three most impactful lessons from the legal showdown.
1. A Deadline Isn’t Always a Deadline
The first major complaint from the petitioner, Mr. Travis, seemed straightforward. For an election with three open seats on the Board of Directors, the HOA’s Nominating Committee had accepted applications after a publicly announced deadline of 5:00 p.m. on September 29, 2017. Four applications arrived on time, but four more—including one from Mr. Travis himself—were accepted after the cutoff. In a delicious twist of irony, Mr. Travis was a sitting Board member who had twice attempted to have the Board formally extend the deadline, but both motions failed. A missed deadline is a missed deadline, right?
Not in this case. The judge dismissed the complaint entirely, drawing a critical distinction: the September 29th deadline was not a formal “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board.”
Testimony from the Association’s manager, Simone McGinnis, revealed the deadline’s true nature. It was merely an administrative deadline set by the management company for purely logistical reasons, such as allowing the Nominating Committee enough time to review applications and get the ballots printed.
The Lesson: In legal and governance contexts, the source of a rule is as important as the rule itself. An administrative guideline set by a third-party manager for convenience does not carry the same binding legal weight as a formal rule passed by the Board of Directors according to the procedures outlined in the bylaws.
2. “Nomination” Is a Process of Selection, Not Just Collection
Mr. Travis’s second argument centered on the Nominating Committee’s actions. The committee interviewed all eight applicants and asked them questions, including whether they had ever sued the Association or had any compliance violations. Mr. Travis contended that the committee had exceeded its authority. In fact, he argued that because four members had applied by the original deadline for the three open seats, the committee’s job was already done—it shouldn’t have even been formed, let alone vetted anyone. His position was that its role was simply to collect names, not to filter them.
This argument also failed. The judge found the committee acted squarely within its rights as defined by the Association’s Bylaws. Article IV, Section 3 explicitly grants the Nominating Committee the discretion to “make as many nominations for election to the Board of Directors as it shall in its discretion determine.” The judge concluded that questioning applicants was a reasonable part of exercising this discretion to select candidates.
Adding a fascinating historical twist, the Board admitted during a meeting that for thirty years prior, the Association had not strictly followed its own Bylaw requiring the use of a Nominating Committee, only beginning to do so in the last two years. A long-ignored rule had suddenly become the central mechanism for determining board candidacy.
While the committee must act reasonably—it couldn’t disqualify a candidate for having red hair, the Board’s attorney noted—it absolutely has the power to be selective. The core issue decided by the court was not how the committee used its discretion, but whether the Bylaws granted it discretion in the first place. The answer was a clear yes.
The Lesson: The term “Nominating Committee” can be misleading. Depending on your bylaws, it may not be a passive paper-pusher that forwards all names to the ballot. It can be an active gatekeeper empowered to interview, question, and ultimately select which members get a chance to be elected.
3. The ‘Right’ to Run for Your HOA Board Might Be a Myth
The final issue gets to the heart of homeowner assumptions. Mr. Travis argued for a right to “self-nominate”—his term for a system where any member could place themselves directly on the ballot. He claimed that by failing to include all applicants, the Association was engaging in a form of illegal proxy voting under Arizona state law.
The judge’s refutation of this idea was decisive. Mr. Travis himself acknowledged that the Bylaws contained no provision allowing a member to “self-nominate.” The court found that the only path to the ballot specified in the governing documents was via nomination by the Nominating Committee.
This created a critical procedural prerequisite. Because the Bylaws require nomination by the committee before a member can become a candidate, the state law governing voting (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812) was legally inapplicable. The judge ruled that the act of nomination is not a “vote allocated to a unit.” In other words, if you don’t clear the prerequisite of being nominated, your right to be voted upon by the membership doesn’t even come into play.
The Lesson: This is a powerful and potentially shocking takeaway for many homeowners. Unless your community’s governing documents explicitly guarantee it, you may not have an inherent “right” to run for your HOA board simply by being a member in good standing. The power to decide who appears on the ballot can be exclusively vested in a small, appointed committee.
Conclusion: Read Your Bylaws. Really.
The case of Mr. Travis vs. Val Vista Lakes is a stark reminder that an HOA’s governing documents are a binding contract. In the courtroom of community governance, common-sense assumptions are legally irrelevant; only the written word matters. An administrative deadline may be toothless, a nominating committee may be a powerful gatekeeper, and the right to run for office may not be a right at all.
It all comes down to what is written in the documents. So, when was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from start to finish? The power structures they define might be very different from what you imagine.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
William Travis(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Nicholas C. Nogami(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Simone McGinnis(property manager) Testified as a witness
Bylaws Article VIII Bylaws Article VIII; Bylaws Article IV, Section 1 ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A), (A)(1), and (A)(2)
Outcome Summary
The Petitioner's petition, raising three issues concerning the HOA's election nominating process, was dismissed entirely. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof on all issues. The ALJ found that the Nominating Committee acted within the authority granted by the Bylaws regarding deadlines and nominee selection discretion, and the relevant election statute (A.R.S. § 33-1812) was not applicable to the nomination process.
Key Issues & Findings
Nominating Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline by which parties were to submit applications to nominate themselves.
Petitioner alleged the Nominating Committee violated Article VIII by accepting applications after the September 29th administrative deadline, arguing the deadline was a 'term[], limitation[], or rule[] adopted by the Board of Directors'.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. The deadline was an administrative deadline set by management, not a rule adopted by the Board, and therefore the Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications late.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Bylaws Article VIII
The Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by asking candidates questions that had the effect of imposing qualification requirements for the Board’s Directors that exceed those set out in the Bylaws.
Petitioner alleged that the Committee imposing questions (such as whether an applicant had filed a lawsuit against the Association) created unauthorized qualifications for the Board, violating the Bylaws.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. Bylaws Article IV Section 3 grants the Nominating Committee discretion to determine the number of nominations, and it was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants while exercising this explicit discretion.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
Bylaws Article VIII
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
By failing to include on the election-ballot members who had submitted 'self-nominations,' the Committee violated election statutes.
Petitioner asserted that because members could not vote for the four applicants the Nominating Committee did not nominate, the Committee engaged in proxy voting, violating election requirements set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1812.
Orders: The claim was dismissed. Because Bylaws Article IV Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Nominating Committee, nominations are not 'votes allocated to a unit' and ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 is not applicable.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(1)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1812(A)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Election, Nominating Committee, Bylaws Enforcement, Director Qualifications, Administrative Deadline, Statutory Interpretation, Self-Nomination
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817017-REL Decision – 615818.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:12 (125.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817017-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, concerning a petition filed by William Travis against The Val Vista Lakes Community Association. The core of the dispute revolves around the actions of the Association’s Nominating Committee during the process for the November 16, 2017 Board of Directors election.
Mr. Travis raised three primary allegations: 1) the Committee violated Association Bylaws by accepting candidate applications after a stated September 29, 2017 deadline; 2) the Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing candidates, thereby imposing qualification requirements beyond those stipulated in the Bylaws; and 3) the failure to include all applicants on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes related to proxy voting.
The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, dismissed Mr. Travis’s petition in its entirety. The decision found that Travis failed to prove the application deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board, concluding it was an administrative deadline set by the management company. The Judge determined that the Committee’s actions, including interviewing applicants, were a reasonable exercise of the discretion explicitly granted to it by the Bylaws. Finally, the Judge ruled that the state statute cited by Travis applies to the casting of votes, not the internal nomination process, and was therefore inapplicable to the Committee’s actions. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association was deemed the prevailing party.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1817017-REL
Petitioner
William Travis
Respondent
The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Hearing Date
January 26, 2018
Decision Date
February 2, 2018
Presiding Judge
Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge
Testifying Parties
William Travis (on his own behalf); Simone McGinnis (Association’s on-site manager)
Petitioner’s Allegations
William Travis’s petition, as amended, centered on three specific issues concerning the Nominating Committee’s conduct for the November 16, 2017 Board election:
1. Violation of Application Deadline: The Committee disregarded a September 29, 2017 deadline for candidate applications. Travis contended that this deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board,” and by accepting applications after this date, the Committee violated Bylaws Article VIII.
2. Exceeding Authority and Imposing Qualifications: The Committee exceeded its authority by interviewing and questioning applicants. Travis argued that this process had the effect of creating new qualification requirements for Board Directors, beyond the sole requirement of Association membership outlined in Bylaws Article IV. He asserted the Committee had no authority to ask any questions.
3. Statutory Violation of Voting Rights: By failing to place all members who submitted “self-nominations” on the official election ballot, the Committee violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812(A). Travis claimed this action was tantamount to proxy voting because it prevented members from voting for or against certain candidates.
Key Factual Findings
Election and Nomination Timeline
• August 17, 2017: The Board of Directors appoints Cheryl Peterson-McCoy as the Nominating Committee Chairperson.
• September 12, 2017: The Association’s management company emails residents, announcing three open Board positions and an application deadline of September 29, 2017, at 5:00 p.m.
• By September 29, 2017: Four applications are received. At this point, the members of the Nominating Committee (other than the Chairperson) have not yet been selected.
• After September 29, 2017: The Association accepts four additional applications, including one from Mr. Travis. No revised notice is sent to the membership about an extended deadline.
• October 5, 2017: Mr. Travis, then a Board member, makes an email motion to extend the application deadline to October 16, which is denied.
• October 19, 2017: The Board formally approves six members for the Nominating Committee. Mr. Travis’s subsequent motion at this meeting to extend the deadline fails for lack of a second.
Nominating Committee Actions and Rationale
• The Committee considered all eight applications submitted, including the four received after the initial deadline.
• The Committee scheduled and conducted interviews with all eight applicants.
• During interviews, applicants were asked questions including whether they had ever filed a lawsuit against the Association, were considering filing a lawsuit, or had any compliance violations.
• The Committee ultimately nominated four candidates to be placed on the ballot for the election. Of these four, two had applied by the September 29 deadline and two had applied after.
Association’s Position and Testimony
• Simone McGinnis, the Association’s on-site manager, testified that the September 29 deadline was not imposed by the Board but was an administrative deadline set by the management company to allow time for the nomination and ballot-printing process.
• The Association’s position, articulated at the November 16, 2017 Board meeting, is that the only way to get on the ballot is to be nominated by the Nominating Committee, although write-in candidates are permitted during the election.
• The Board acknowledged that it had only strictly adhered to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee for the past two years, after thirty years of non-adherence.
• The Board’s attorney stated that the Committee members have a duty to act reasonably and that any member who disagrees with the Committee’s discretionary choices should seek to amend the bylaws.
Analysis of Governing Documents and Statutes
The judge’s decision rested on the interpretation of specific articles within the Association’s Bylaws and relevant Arizona state law.
Document/Statute
Relevant Provision
Application in this Case
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
“Nominations for election to the Board of Directors shall be made by a Nominating Committee… The Nominating Committee shall make as many nominations… as it shall in its discretion determine…”
This article grants the Committee explicit discretion to select nominees. It does not provide for “self-nomination” or require the Committee to nominate all applicants.
Bylaws Article VIII
“no committee may take action which exceeds its responsibilities. Each committee shall operate in accordance with any terms, limitations, or rules adopted by the Board.”
Mr. Travis argued the deadline was a “rule adopted by the Board.” The court found no evidence to support this, concluding it was an administrative deadline.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 1
States that Board Directors must be members of the Association. It lists no other qualifications.
Mr. Travis argued that questioning candidates imposed extra qualifications. The court found this was part of the Committee’s discretionary selection process, not the imposition of new formal requirements.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812
Prohibits proxy voting and requires that ballots set forth each proposed action and provide an opportunity to vote for or against it.
The court determined this statute applies to “votes allocated to a unit” (i.e., the member’s vote) and not the nomination process itself, which is governed by the Bylaws.
Conclusions of Law and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge made the following conclusions based on a preponderance of the evidence:
1. Deadline was Administrative: There was no substantial evidence showing the September 29, 2017 deadline was a formal rule adopted by the Board. Therefore, the Nominating Committee did not violate Bylaws Article VIII by accepting applications after this date.
2. Committee Acted Within its Discretion: The plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 requires nominations to be made by the Committee and grants it discretion. The concept of “self-nomination” is not supported by the Bylaws. It was not unreasonable for the Committee to question applicants as part of exercising its explicit discretion to select nominees.
3. State Voting Statute Not Applicable: The nomination process, as dictated by the Bylaws, is separate from the act of voting. Since ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812 governs “votes allocated to a unit,” it is not applicable to the Committee’s function of selecting nominees.
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner William Travis’s petition is dismissed.
The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested from the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817017-REL
Study Guide: Travis v. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source context.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in case number 18F-H1817017-REL, and what were their roles?
2. What were the three central issues that petitioner William Travis raised regarding the Board election held on November 16, 2017?
3. What was the petitioner’s argument concerning the September 29, 2017, application deadline set by the Association?
4. According to the Association’s on-site manager, Simone McGinnis, what was the origin and purpose of the September 29th deadline?
5. How did the petitioner claim the Nominating Committee exceeded its authority by questioning candidates?
6. What was the Association’s defense for the Nominating Committee’s practice of interviewing and questioning applicants?
7. What is the sole qualification required to serve on the Board of Directors, according to the Val Vista Lakes Community Association Bylaws?
8. How did the petitioner link the Nominating Committee’s failure to place all applicants on the ballot to a violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812?
9. According to testimony during the November 16, 2017, Board meeting, how long had the Association been strictly adhering to the Bylaw requirement of using a Nominating Committee?
10. What was the final Order issued by Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden in this case?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, William Travis, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Travis represented himself, while the Association was represented by attorneys Mark K. Sahl and Nicholas C. Nogami.
2. The three issues raised by Mr. Travis were: (1) the Nominating Committee improperly disregarded the September 29th application deadline; (2) the Committee exceeded its authority by asking questions that effectively added new qualification requirements for Board members; and (3) the Committee’s failure to include all “self-nominations” on the ballot constituted a violation of Arizona state statutes on proxy voting.
3. Mr. Travis argued that the September 29th deadline was a “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board of Directors” under Bylaws Article VIII. Therefore, by accepting applications after this date, the Nominating Committee violated the Association’s own rules.
4. Simone McGinnis testified that the Board did not impose the deadline. Instead, it was an administrative deadline set by the Association’s management company to allow sufficient time for the Nominating Committee to review applications and have ballots printed.
5. Mr. Travis argued that by asking applicants questions, the Nominating Committee was effectively imposing qualification requirements beyond the single one set out in the Bylaws (being a member of the Association). He asserted the committee had no authority to ask any questions at all as part of its process.
6. The Association contended that questioning applicants was a reasonable exercise of the Nominating Committee’s discretion. This discretion is granted by the Bylaws, which state the Committee shall make as many nominations as it determines is appropriate.
7. According to Bylaws Article IV, Section 1, the only qualification required for an individual to serve on the Board of Directors is that they must be a member of the Association. No other qualifications are specified in the Bylaws.
8. Mr. Travis asserted that because members were not allowed to vote for or against the four applicants who were not nominated, the Committee effectively engaged in proxy voting. He argued this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812, which requires that ballots provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.
9. During the meeting, the Board acknowledged that it had only been following the Bylaw requirement to use a Nominating Committee for the last two years. Prior to that, for approximately thirty years, strict adherence to this Bylaw had not been observed.
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner William Travis’s petition be dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, to be the prevailing party in the matter.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt using only the information and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the Nominating Committee’s role and authority as presented by William Travis and the Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge use the plain language of Bylaws Article IV, Section 3 to resolve this dispute?
2. Discuss the significance of the September 29, 2017 deadline. Evaluate the evidence and arguments presented by both parties regarding its legitimacy and binding nature, and explain the Judge’s reasoning for concluding it was an administrative deadline.
3. Explain William Travis’s legal argument that the Nominating Committee’s selection process constituted a form of proxy voting in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812. Detail the Judge’s conclusion on this matter and the legal reasoning used to determine the statute’s applicability.
4. Examine the concept of “discretion” as it applies to the Nominating Committee’s actions. Based on the hearing testimony, including the Board attorney’s explanation, what are the implied powers and limitations of this discretion?
5. The Judge determined that Mr. Travis failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Identify the key claims made by Mr. Travis and detail why the evidence he presented (or failed to present) was insufficient to prove his case on each of the three issues.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and decisions.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal case. In this matter, the petitioner was William Travis.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this matter, the respondent was The Val Vista Lakes Community Association.
Bylaws
The formal rules and regulations governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners’ association. They are considered a contract between the association and its members.
An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, which are rules governing the use of real estate within a planned community. Mr. Travis initially alleged a violation of CC&R Article V, Section 3.
Nominating Committee
A committee, established by the Bylaws, responsible for nominating candidates for election to the Board of Directors. It consists of a Chairperson from the Board and two or more other persons.
Self-Nomination
The act of a member putting their own name forward for consideration for a Board position. The petitioner acknowledged that the Bylaws do not explicitly provide for self-nomination.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the burden of proof was on Mr. Travis.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and has superior evidentiary weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.
Proxy Voting
A form of voting where a member authorizes another person to vote on their behalf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1812 prohibits this practice for community associations after the period of declarant control.
Prevailing Party
The party that wins the lawsuit. In this case, the Respondent Association was deemed the prevailing party upon the dismissal of the petition.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817017-REL
Your HOA Bylaws Might Not Mean What You Think: 3 Surprising Lessons from a Legal Showdown
Introduction: The Devil in the Details
Anyone who has ever sat through a contentious HOA annual meeting or received a violation notice for an overgrown flowerbed knows the feeling. You live in a community governed by rules, and you assume those rules operate on a shared understanding of common sense. But what happens when that common sense collides with the cold, hard text of your community’s governing documents?
A recent administrative law case in Arizona, Travis vs. The Val Vista Lakes Community Association, provides a fascinating and instructive look under the hood of HOA governance. The dispute reveals how the precise, technical wording of community bylaws can lead to surprising and counter-intuitive outcomes for residents. This case isn’t just about one community; it’s a masterclass for any homeowner. Here are the three most impactful lessons from the legal showdown.
1. A Deadline Isn’t Always a Deadline
The first major complaint from the petitioner, Mr. Travis, seemed straightforward. For an election with three open seats on the Board of Directors, the HOA’s Nominating Committee had accepted applications after a publicly announced deadline of 5:00 p.m. on September 29, 2017. Four applications arrived on time, but four more—including one from Mr. Travis himself—were accepted after the cutoff. In a delicious twist of irony, Mr. Travis was a sitting Board member who had twice attempted to have the Board formally extend the deadline, but both motions failed. A missed deadline is a missed deadline, right?
Not in this case. The judge dismissed the complaint entirely, drawing a critical distinction: the September 29th deadline was not a formal “term, limitation, or rule adopted by the Board.”
Testimony from the Association’s manager, Simone McGinnis, revealed the deadline’s true nature. It was merely an administrative deadline set by the management company for purely logistical reasons, such as allowing the Nominating Committee enough time to review applications and get the ballots printed.
The Lesson: In legal and governance contexts, the source of a rule is as important as the rule itself. An administrative guideline set by a third-party manager for convenience does not carry the same binding legal weight as a formal rule passed by the Board of Directors according to the procedures outlined in the bylaws.
2. “Nomination” Is a Process of Selection, Not Just Collection
Mr. Travis’s second argument centered on the Nominating Committee’s actions. The committee interviewed all eight applicants and asked them questions, including whether they had ever sued the Association or had any compliance violations. Mr. Travis contended that the committee had exceeded its authority. In fact, he argued that because four members had applied by the original deadline for the three open seats, the committee’s job was already done—it shouldn’t have even been formed, let alone vetted anyone. His position was that its role was simply to collect names, not to filter them.
This argument also failed. The judge found the committee acted squarely within its rights as defined by the Association’s Bylaws. Article IV, Section 3 explicitly grants the Nominating Committee the discretion to “make as many nominations for election to the Board of Directors as it shall in its discretion determine.” The judge concluded that questioning applicants was a reasonable part of exercising this discretion to select candidates.
Adding a fascinating historical twist, the Board admitted during a meeting that for thirty years prior, the Association had not strictly followed its own Bylaw requiring the use of a Nominating Committee, only beginning to do so in the last two years. A long-ignored rule had suddenly become the central mechanism for determining board candidacy.
While the committee must act reasonably—it couldn’t disqualify a candidate for having red hair, the Board’s attorney noted—it absolutely has the power to be selective. The core issue decided by the court was not how the committee used its discretion, but whether the Bylaws granted it discretion in the first place. The answer was a clear yes.
The Lesson: The term “Nominating Committee” can be misleading. Depending on your bylaws, it may not be a passive paper-pusher that forwards all names to the ballot. It can be an active gatekeeper empowered to interview, question, and ultimately select which members get a chance to be elected.
3. The ‘Right’ to Run for Your HOA Board Might Be a Myth
The final issue gets to the heart of homeowner assumptions. Mr. Travis argued for a right to “self-nominate”—his term for a system where any member could place themselves directly on the ballot. He claimed that by failing to include all applicants, the Association was engaging in a form of illegal proxy voting under Arizona state law.
The judge’s refutation of this idea was decisive. Mr. Travis himself acknowledged that the Bylaws contained no provision allowing a member to “self-nominate.” The court found that the only path to the ballot specified in the governing documents was via nomination by the Nominating Committee.
This created a critical procedural prerequisite. Because the Bylaws require nomination by the committee before a member can become a candidate, the state law governing voting (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812) was legally inapplicable. The judge ruled that the act of nomination is not a “vote allocated to a unit.” In other words, if you don’t clear the prerequisite of being nominated, your right to be voted upon by the membership doesn’t even come into play.
The Lesson: This is a powerful and potentially shocking takeaway for many homeowners. Unless your community’s governing documents explicitly guarantee it, you may not have an inherent “right” to run for your HOA board simply by being a member in good standing. The power to decide who appears on the ballot can be exclusively vested in a small, appointed committee.
Conclusion: Read Your Bylaws. Really.
The case of Mr. Travis vs. Val Vista Lakes is a stark reminder that an HOA’s governing documents are a binding contract. In the courtroom of community governance, common-sense assumptions are legally irrelevant; only the written word matters. An administrative deadline may be toothless, a nominating committee may be a powerful gatekeeper, and the right to run for office may not be a right at all.
It all comes down to what is written in the documents. So, when was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from start to finish? The power structures they define might be very different from what you imagine.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
William Travis(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Nicholas C. Nogami(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazelwood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
Simone McGinnis(property manager) Testified as a witness
The Petitioner's petition was dismissed because he failed to appear or provide an authorized representative at the scheduled hearing, resulting in the Respondent being deemed the prevailing party.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing scheduled at his request and failed to provide an authorized representative (as appearances are considered the practice of law under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31).
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of CC&Rs
Petitioner Jeff Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of the CC&Rs.
Orders: Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Dismissal, Failure to Appear, Unauthorized Representation, HOA, CC&R
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817009-REL Decision – 611264.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:53 (69.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817009-REL
Briefing Document: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA (Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL)
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion (Petitioner) versus Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s case, which alleged a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs, was dismissed due to the Petitioner’s failure to appear at the scheduled hearing on January 9, 2018.
The hearing had been rescheduled to this date at the Petitioner’s own request. On the day of the hearing, two witnesses for Mr. Lion appeared but were informed by the tribunal that they could not legally represent him as they were not licensed attorneys, a requirement under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31. Because no authorized representative for the Petitioner was present, no evidence could be presented to support the claim. Consequently, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden dismissed the petition and designated the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association as the prevailing party.
Case Background and Procedural History
The matter originated from a petition filed by Jeff Lion against the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.
• Initial Allegation: Mr. Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
• Notice of Hearing: On October 2, 2017, the Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing, initially scheduling the matter for November 29, 2017, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix.
• Continuance: Mr. Lion filed a Motion to Continue the hearing, which was rescheduled for 9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2018, without objection from the Respondent.
Analysis of the January 9, 2018 Hearing
The proceedings on the rescheduled hearing date were pivotal to the case’s outcome.
• Petitioner’s Failure to Appear: Mr. Jeff Lion, the Petitioner, did not appear at the hearing at its scheduled time.
• Attempted Representation by Non-Attorneys: Two witnesses named by Mr. Lion were present. They informed the tribunal that Mr. Lion would not be appearing and that they intended to represent him.
• Tribunal’s Ruling on Representation: The tribunal advised the witnesses that they were legally prohibited from representing Mr. Lion. Citing Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, the judge clarified that appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings constitute the practice of law and require representation by an attorney licensed in Arizona. The witnesses confirmed they did not hold such licenses.
• Consequences of Non-Appearance: As there was no authorized representative present for the Petitioner, no evidence was taken. The judge noted that the hearing had been continued to that specific date at Mr. Lion’s request and proceeded to vacate the matter based on his failure to appear.
Legal Findings and Conclusions of Law
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was grounded in established legal principles and procedural rules.
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate was confirmed to have authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
• Burden of Proof: The decision reiterated that the party asserting a claim—in this case, Mr. Lion—carries the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
• Core Rationale for Dismissal: The central conclusion of law was that Mr. Lion failed to meet his burden of proof. By not appearing at the hearing he had requested, and by not securing authorized legal representation, he “failed to present any evidence in support of his petition.”
Final Order and Implications
The decision, issued on January 10, 2018, formally concluded the administrative hearing process with a definitive outcome.
• Dismissal of Petition: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that “Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Post-Decision Options: The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Key Parties and Representatives
Name/Entity
Contact/Representation Information
Petitioner
Jeff Lion
PO Box 1350, Selma, CA 93662
Respondent
Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association
Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq.
Respondent’s Counsel
Nathan Tennyson, Esq.
BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC, 373 S. Main Ave., Tucson, AZ 85701
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings
Overseeing Body
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Commissioner: Judy Lowe
Study Guide – 18F-H1817009-REL
Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms found within the document.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based entirely on the provided legal decision.
1. Who were the petitioner and respondent in this matter, and what was the petitioner’s central allegation?
2. Why was the administrative hearing held on January 9, 2018, instead of the originally scheduled date?
3. Describe the events that occurred at the scheduled hearing time on January 9, 2018.
4. What specific rule was cited by the tribunal to prevent the petitioner’s witnesses from representing him?
5. What is the standard of proof for this matter, and which party had the burden of proof?
6. According to the decision, what was the direct consequence of the petitioner’s failure to have an authorized representative present at the hearing?
7. How does the legal document define the term “preponderance of the evidence”?
8. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
9. Who was identified as the “prevailing party” and why?
10. What option was available to the parties if they disagreed with the judge’s order?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The petitioner was Jeff Lion, and the respondent was the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association. Mr. Lion alleged that the respondent had violated Article 8 of its CC&Rs.
2. The hearing was originally set for November 29, 2017. It was rescheduled to January 9, 2018, because the petitioner, Mr. Lion, filed a Motion to Continue, to which the respondent did not object.
3. On January 9, 2018, the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear for the hearing. Two witnesses appeared on his behalf and stated their intention to represent him, but they were not permitted to do so.
4. The tribunal cited Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, which governs the practice of law. Since the witnesses were not licensed attorneys in Arizona, they were not legally permitted to represent Mr. Lion at the hearing.
5. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The party asserting the claim, in this case, the petitioner Jeff Lion, had the burden of proof.
6. Because no authorized representative was present for Mr. Lion, no evidence was taken in support of his petition. This failure to present evidence was a key factor in the case’s dismissal.
7. The document defines “preponderance of the evidence” by quoting Black’s Law Dictionary as: “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
8. The final order was that Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed. The decision was issued on January 10, 2018.
9. The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party. This was because Mr. Lion failed to present any evidence in support of his petition, leading to its dismissal.
10. The parties could request a rehearing pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04. The request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
——————————————————————————–
Suggested Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to explore the procedural and legal principles of the case more deeply.
1. Analyze the significance of Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31 in the outcome of this case. How does the principle that appearances at administrative hearings constitute the “practice of law” affect how individuals can pursue claims?
2. Discuss the interrelated concepts of “burden of proof” and “standard of proof” as they apply to this case. Explain why Jeff Lion’s failure to appear made it legally impossible for him to meet the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.”
3. Evaluate the procedural fairness of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to dismiss the petition. Consider the timeline of events, including the petitioner’s own request to reschedule the hearing, in your analysis.
4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, construct an argument explaining the logical steps Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden took to arrive at the final order of dismissal.
5. Examine the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings as outlined in the document. How do these two entities interact in resolving a dispute initiated by a homeowner against a Homeowners Association?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency to resolve disputes.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Title 32, Chapter 20, Article 11 is cited as giving the Department of Real Estate authority.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Lion) had the burden of proof.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are rules governing a planned community or homeowners association. Mr. Lion alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.
Motion to Continue
A formal request made by a party to an administrative tribunal or court to postpone a scheduled hearing to a later date.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency where the hearing took place, which conducts hearings for other state agencies.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Jeff Lion.
Practice of Law
The act of representing others in legal proceedings. The decision states that appearances at the OAH are considered the practice of law and are restricted to licensed attorneys under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case. It is met when the evidence presented is more convincing and has greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue.
Prevailing Party
The party who wins a legal case or dispute. The Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association was deemed the prevailing party.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to re-examine the issues and the decision. The parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.
Tribunal
A body established to settle certain types of dispute. In this context, it refers to the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the hearing.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817009-REL
How One Homeowner Lost His Case Against His HOA Before It Even Began
Introduction: The David vs. Goliath Story You Haven’t Heard
Disputes with a Homeowners Association (HOA) are a common source of frustration. It often feels like a David vs. Goliath battle, pitting an individual against a structured organization with rules and resources. When faced with what they believe is an unfair application of those rules, some homeowners decide to fight back.
This was the situation for Jeff Lion, who filed a petition against his HOA, Riggs Ranch Meadows, alleging a violation of Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). But this story didn’t end with a dramatic debate over property rights. Instead, it was over before it started, derailed by a simple but fatal procedural misstep. This case offers three critical lessons for anyone considering a formal dispute, revealing how understanding the basic rules of the game is far more important than just believing you have a good argument.
——————————————————————————–
1. The Most Important Step is Showing Up
The central, decisive event of the case was a stunning failure in participation: the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear at the hearing on January 9, 2018. The ultimate procedural irony? This was the exact hearing date that he himself had requested.
The contrast on that day could not have been starker. While Mr. Lion was a no-show for the fight he started, the HOA—the “Goliath” in this story—arrived fully prepared, represented by its attorney, Nathan Tennyson, Esq. The judge’s decision was swift and absolute. Because Mr. Lion did not appear, no evidence was taken, and his petition was dismissed entirely.
This outcome is rooted in a core legal principle known as the “burden of proof.” Simply put, the person making a claim is responsible for presenting evidence to support it. As the one who filed the petition, it was Mr. Lion’s job to prove his case. By failing to appear, he presented zero evidence and could not possibly meet this fundamental burden. The merits of his specific complaint about Article 8 were never even heard, all because of a self-inflicted failure to participate in the process he initiated on the day he chose.
——————————————————————————–
2. Not Just Anyone Can Speak for You in Court
In a surprising turn, while Mr. Lion was absent, his two named witnesses did appear at the hearing. They informed the judge that the petitioner would not be attending and that they intended to represent him in his absence.
The Administrative Law Judge immediately shut down their attempt. The reason highlights a crucial rule that trips up many non-lawyers: the witnesses were not licensed attorneys, and the law strictly forbids such representation. Appearances at these administrative hearings are legally considered “the practice of law.”
The court’s decision was based on an unambiguous rule, which it cited in its legal conclusions:
Appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings are considered to be the practice of law. See Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.
This is a counter-intuitive lesson for many. You might assume a trusted friend, family member, or knowledgeable witness could speak on your behalf. This case demonstrates that the legal system has rigid rules about who is authorized to provide representation. Good intentions and a willingness to help are not enough to grant someone the legal authority to act as your advocate in a formal hearing.
——————————————————————————–
3. “Winning” is About Tipping the Scale of Evidence
In administrative hearings, the standard for winning is called “a preponderance of the evidence.” This doesn’t mean proving your case beyond all doubt. Think of it like a scale. “Preponderance of the evidence” simply means you have to provide enough evidence to make the scale tip, even just slightly, in your favor.
The formal definition clarifies this concept of relative weight:
The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
Applying this standard to Mr. Lion’s case makes the outcome painfully clear. Since he failed to appear and no evidence was taken on his behalf, the “weight” of his evidence was zero. It was therefore impossible for him to tip the scale, no matter how strong his case might have been in theory. Because he presented nothing, Riggs Ranch Meadows was deemed the “prevailing party” by default. This demonstrates how the legal system is a structured process focused on evidence presented according to rules, not just on feelings or the theoretical rightness of a claim.
——————————————————————————–
Conclusion: The Rules of the Game Matter
The case of Jeff Lion provides a masterclass in legal procedure. The three key lessons are simple but absolute: you must show up to your own hearing, especially one you scheduled; only licensed attorneys can legally represent you; and you must present evidence to meet your burden of proof.
This case wasn’t ultimately about CC&Rs or neighborhood rules; it was about procedure. It serves as a stark reminder that before entering any formal dispute, the first question to ask isn’t “Am I right?” but “Do I understand the rules?”
The Petitioner's petition was dismissed because he failed to appear or provide an authorized representative at the scheduled hearing, resulting in the Respondent being deemed the prevailing party.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing scheduled at his request and failed to provide an authorized representative (as appearances are considered the practice of law under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31).
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of CC&Rs
Petitioner Jeff Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of the CC&Rs.
Orders: Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Dismissal, Failure to Appear, Unauthorized Representation, HOA, CC&R
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817009-REL Decision – 611264.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:07 (69.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817009-REL
Briefing Document: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA (Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL)
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion (Petitioner) versus Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s case, which alleged a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs, was dismissed due to the Petitioner’s failure to appear at the scheduled hearing on January 9, 2018.
The hearing had been rescheduled to this date at the Petitioner’s own request. On the day of the hearing, two witnesses for Mr. Lion appeared but were informed by the tribunal that they could not legally represent him as they were not licensed attorneys, a requirement under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31. Because no authorized representative for the Petitioner was present, no evidence could be presented to support the claim. Consequently, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden dismissed the petition and designated the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association as the prevailing party.
Case Background and Procedural History
The matter originated from a petition filed by Jeff Lion against the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.
• Initial Allegation: Mr. Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
• Notice of Hearing: On October 2, 2017, the Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing, initially scheduling the matter for November 29, 2017, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix.
• Continuance: Mr. Lion filed a Motion to Continue the hearing, which was rescheduled for 9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2018, without objection from the Respondent.
Analysis of the January 9, 2018 Hearing
The proceedings on the rescheduled hearing date were pivotal to the case’s outcome.
• Petitioner’s Failure to Appear: Mr. Jeff Lion, the Petitioner, did not appear at the hearing at its scheduled time.
• Attempted Representation by Non-Attorneys: Two witnesses named by Mr. Lion were present. They informed the tribunal that Mr. Lion would not be appearing and that they intended to represent him.
• Tribunal’s Ruling on Representation: The tribunal advised the witnesses that they were legally prohibited from representing Mr. Lion. Citing Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, the judge clarified that appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings constitute the practice of law and require representation by an attorney licensed in Arizona. The witnesses confirmed they did not hold such licenses.
• Consequences of Non-Appearance: As there was no authorized representative present for the Petitioner, no evidence was taken. The judge noted that the hearing had been continued to that specific date at Mr. Lion’s request and proceeded to vacate the matter based on his failure to appear.
Legal Findings and Conclusions of Law
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was grounded in established legal principles and procedural rules.
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate was confirmed to have authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.
• Burden of Proof: The decision reiterated that the party asserting a claim—in this case, Mr. Lion—carries the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
• Core Rationale for Dismissal: The central conclusion of law was that Mr. Lion failed to meet his burden of proof. By not appearing at the hearing he had requested, and by not securing authorized legal representation, he “failed to present any evidence in support of his petition.”
Final Order and Implications
The decision, issued on January 10, 2018, formally concluded the administrative hearing process with a definitive outcome.
• Dismissal of Petition: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that “Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.”
• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
• Post-Decision Options: The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.
Key Parties and Representatives
Name/Entity
Contact/Representation Information
Petitioner
Jeff Lion
PO Box 1350, Selma, CA 93662
Respondent
Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association
Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq.
Respondent’s Counsel
Nathan Tennyson, Esq.
BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC, 373 S. Main Ave., Tucson, AZ 85701
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Office of Administrative Hearings
Overseeing Body
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Commissioner: Judy Lowe
Study Guide – 18F-H1817009-REL
Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms found within the document.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based entirely on the provided legal decision.
1. Who were the petitioner and respondent in this matter, and what was the petitioner’s central allegation?
2. Why was the administrative hearing held on January 9, 2018, instead of the originally scheduled date?
3. Describe the events that occurred at the scheduled hearing time on January 9, 2018.
4. What specific rule was cited by the tribunal to prevent the petitioner’s witnesses from representing him?
5. What is the standard of proof for this matter, and which party had the burden of proof?
6. According to the decision, what was the direct consequence of the petitioner’s failure to have an authorized representative present at the hearing?
7. How does the legal document define the term “preponderance of the evidence”?
8. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
9. Who was identified as the “prevailing party” and why?
10. What option was available to the parties if they disagreed with the judge’s order?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The petitioner was Jeff Lion, and the respondent was the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association. Mr. Lion alleged that the respondent had violated Article 8 of its CC&Rs.
2. The hearing was originally set for November 29, 2017. It was rescheduled to January 9, 2018, because the petitioner, Mr. Lion, filed a Motion to Continue, to which the respondent did not object.
3. On January 9, 2018, the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear for the hearing. Two witnesses appeared on his behalf and stated their intention to represent him, but they were not permitted to do so.
4. The tribunal cited Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, which governs the practice of law. Since the witnesses were not licensed attorneys in Arizona, they were not legally permitted to represent Mr. Lion at the hearing.
5. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The party asserting the claim, in this case, the petitioner Jeff Lion, had the burden of proof.
6. Because no authorized representative was present for Mr. Lion, no evidence was taken in support of his petition. This failure to present evidence was a key factor in the case’s dismissal.
7. The document defines “preponderance of the evidence” by quoting Black’s Law Dictionary as: “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
8. The final order was that Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed. The decision was issued on January 10, 2018.
9. The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party. This was because Mr. Lion failed to present any evidence in support of his petition, leading to its dismissal.
10. The parties could request a rehearing pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04. The request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
——————————————————————————–
Suggested Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to explore the procedural and legal principles of the case more deeply.
1. Analyze the significance of Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31 in the outcome of this case. How does the principle that appearances at administrative hearings constitute the “practice of law” affect how individuals can pursue claims?
2. Discuss the interrelated concepts of “burden of proof” and “standard of proof” as they apply to this case. Explain why Jeff Lion’s failure to appear made it legally impossible for him to meet the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.”
3. Evaluate the procedural fairness of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to dismiss the petition. Consider the timeline of events, including the petitioner’s own request to reschedule the hearing, in your analysis.
4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, construct an argument explaining the logical steps Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden took to arrive at the final order of dismissal.
5. Examine the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings as outlined in the document. How do these two entities interact in resolving a dispute initiated by a homeowner against a Homeowners Association?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency to resolve disputes.
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Title 32, Chapter 20, Article 11 is cited as giving the Department of Real Estate authority.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Lion) had the burden of proof.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are rules governing a planned community or homeowners association. Mr. Lion alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.
Motion to Continue
A formal request made by a party to an administrative tribunal or court to postpone a scheduled hearing to a later date.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency where the hearing took place, which conducts hearings for other state agencies.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Jeff Lion.
Practice of Law
The act of representing others in legal proceedings. The decision states that appearances at the OAH are considered the practice of law and are restricted to licensed attorneys under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case. It is met when the evidence presented is more convincing and has greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue.
Prevailing Party
The party who wins a legal case or dispute. The Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association was deemed the prevailing party.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to re-examine the issues and the decision. The parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.
Tribunal
A body established to settle certain types of dispute. In this context, it refers to the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the hearing.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817009-REL
How One Homeowner Lost His Case Against His HOA Before It Even Began
Introduction: The David vs. Goliath Story You Haven’t Heard
Disputes with a Homeowners Association (HOA) are a common source of frustration. It often feels like a David vs. Goliath battle, pitting an individual against a structured organization with rules and resources. When faced with what they believe is an unfair application of those rules, some homeowners decide to fight back.
This was the situation for Jeff Lion, who filed a petition against his HOA, Riggs Ranch Meadows, alleging a violation of Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). But this story didn’t end with a dramatic debate over property rights. Instead, it was over before it started, derailed by a simple but fatal procedural misstep. This case offers three critical lessons for anyone considering a formal dispute, revealing how understanding the basic rules of the game is far more important than just believing you have a good argument.
——————————————————————————–
1. The Most Important Step is Showing Up
The central, decisive event of the case was a stunning failure in participation: the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear at the hearing on January 9, 2018. The ultimate procedural irony? This was the exact hearing date that he himself had requested.
The contrast on that day could not have been starker. While Mr. Lion was a no-show for the fight he started, the HOA—the “Goliath” in this story—arrived fully prepared, represented by its attorney, Nathan Tennyson, Esq. The judge’s decision was swift and absolute. Because Mr. Lion did not appear, no evidence was taken, and his petition was dismissed entirely.
This outcome is rooted in a core legal principle known as the “burden of proof.” Simply put, the person making a claim is responsible for presenting evidence to support it. As the one who filed the petition, it was Mr. Lion’s job to prove his case. By failing to appear, he presented zero evidence and could not possibly meet this fundamental burden. The merits of his specific complaint about Article 8 were never even heard, all because of a self-inflicted failure to participate in the process he initiated on the day he chose.
——————————————————————————–
2. Not Just Anyone Can Speak for You in Court
In a surprising turn, while Mr. Lion was absent, his two named witnesses did appear at the hearing. They informed the judge that the petitioner would not be attending and that they intended to represent him in his absence.
The Administrative Law Judge immediately shut down their attempt. The reason highlights a crucial rule that trips up many non-lawyers: the witnesses were not licensed attorneys, and the law strictly forbids such representation. Appearances at these administrative hearings are legally considered “the practice of law.”
The court’s decision was based on an unambiguous rule, which it cited in its legal conclusions:
Appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings are considered to be the practice of law. See Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.
This is a counter-intuitive lesson for many. You might assume a trusted friend, family member, or knowledgeable witness could speak on your behalf. This case demonstrates that the legal system has rigid rules about who is authorized to provide representation. Good intentions and a willingness to help are not enough to grant someone the legal authority to act as your advocate in a formal hearing.
——————————————————————————–
3. “Winning” is About Tipping the Scale of Evidence
In administrative hearings, the standard for winning is called “a preponderance of the evidence.” This doesn’t mean proving your case beyond all doubt. Think of it like a scale. “Preponderance of the evidence” simply means you have to provide enough evidence to make the scale tip, even just slightly, in your favor.
The formal definition clarifies this concept of relative weight:
The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.
Applying this standard to Mr. Lion’s case makes the outcome painfully clear. Since he failed to appear and no evidence was taken on his behalf, the “weight” of his evidence was zero. It was therefore impossible for him to tip the scale, no matter how strong his case might have been in theory. Because he presented nothing, Riggs Ranch Meadows was deemed the “prevailing party” by default. This demonstrates how the legal system is a structured process focused on evidence presented according to rules, not just on feelings or the theoretical rightness of a claim.
——————————————————————————–
Conclusion: The Rules of the Game Matter
The case of Jeff Lion provides a masterclass in legal procedure. The three key lessons are simple but absolute: you must show up to your own hearing, especially one you scheduled; only licensed attorneys can legally represent you; and you must present evidence to meet your burden of proof.
This case wasn’t ultimately about CC&Rs or neighborhood rules; it was about procedure. It serves as a stark reminder that before entering any formal dispute, the first question to ask isn’t “Am I right?” but “Do I understand the rules?”
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed Thomas Barrs' petition against the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association. The Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 in any of the remaining seven allegations related to record access. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof (preponderance of the evidence) on all claims. In several instances, the Respondent either cured any potential breach (Issue 2), timely complied (Issue 1), or was under no legal obligation to fulfill the request in the manner demanded (emailing records, Issues 3, 6, 7).
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged failure to provide records or copies, specifically via email (Issues 3, 6, 7)
Petitioner requested records (insurance policies, budget, EDC actions) be emailed. Respondent offered examination and purchase of copies. Petitioner declined the offers and blocked the attorney's emails. The ALJD determined the statute does not mandate emailing records.
Orders: Petitioner failed to prove Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding requests for emailed documents, as the statute requires records to be made reasonably available for examination or purchase of copies, not emailed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records request, HOA records access, A.R.S. 33-1805, right to inspect, email delivery
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1812
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 1-243
Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, 226 Ariz. 395, 249 P.3d 1095 (2011)
State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
City of Phoenix v. Donofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 133, 407 P.2d 91, 94 (1965)
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H181708-REL Decision – 608861.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:22 (120.7 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H181708-REL
Briefing Document: Administrative Law Judge Decision in Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in case number 18F-H1817008-REL, involving Petitioner Thomas Barrs and Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA). The central outcome of the December 1, 2017 hearing was the complete dismissal of Mr. Barrs’ petition. The ALJ determined that Mr. Barrs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1805 regarding member access to association records.
The decision hinged on a key statutory interpretation: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 requires an HOA to make records “reasonably available for examination” and to provide copies upon request, but it does not obligate the association to email documents to members. The Judge found that the HOA’s offers to allow Mr. Barrs to inspect records in person were legally sufficient. The failure to access records was ultimately attributed to the petitioner’s own actions, including a self-initiated communication breakdown with a key Board member and a subsequent refusal of the HOA’s offers for in-person inspection. The Judge concluded that for each of the contested allegations, the HOA had either fulfilled its statutory duty, the requested records did not exist, or its attempts to provide access were declined by the petitioner.
Case Overview
Case Name
Thomas Barrs (Petitioner) v. Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent)
Case Number
18F-H1817008-REL
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Thomas Shedden
Hearing Date
December 1, 2017
Decision Date
December 27, 2017
Central Allegation
The Petitioner alleged nine instances where the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to accommodate requests to inspect or receive via email various HOA records.
Final Disposition
The Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.
Analysis of Petitioner’s Allegations and Findings
The petition, filed on September 4, 2017, contained nine specific allegations of statutory violations by the HOA. These issues and the ALJ’s findings are detailed below.
Summary of Allegations
Request
Date of Request
Finding of Fact
View April 29, 2017 Board election documents
May 19, 2017
No violation; request fulfilled within statutory time limit.
View March 18, 2017 Board election documents
June 17, 2017
No violation; HOA cured any potential breach with offers to inspect, which were declined.
Email copies of insurance policies
July 11, 2017
No violation; HOA offered inspection, which fulfills statutory duty.
Insurance company phone number & policy number
Aug 26, 2017
No violation; Petitioner acknowledged receipt of information.
Email Secretary’s shorthand notes from March 18 meeting
July 11, 2017
No violation; the requested notes do not exist.
Email the annual budget
July 11, 2017
No violation; HOA offered inspection, which fulfills statutory duty.
Email written record of EDC actions after July 2016
July 11, 2017
No violation; HOA offered inspection, which fulfills statutory duty.
Email name of EDC chairperson
July 11, 2017
Withdrawn by Petitioner at the hearing.
Email list of Board meeting dates
July 11, 2017
Withdrawn by Petitioner at the hearing.
Detailed Findings by Issue
At the hearing, the Petitioner withdrew his allegations concerning the name of the EDC chairperson (Issue 8) and the list of past Board meeting dates (Issue 9).
• Issue 4 (Insurance Information): The Judge noted that Mr. Barrs “effectively acknowledged that he has received the insurance company’s phone number and the policy number.” No violation was found.
• Issue 5 (Shorthand Meeting Notes): The evidence demonstrated that no shorthand notes from the March 18, 2017 meeting exist. The Board had previously informed Mr. Barrs of this fact. Consequently, the Judge found no violation.
The petitioner requested to view documents related to the April 29, 2017, election via an email sent at 8:59 p.m. on Friday, May 19, 2017. The Judge determined that this request was effectively received on the next business day, Monday, May 22, 2017. Under the statute, the HOA had ten business days, until June 5, 2017, to fulfill the request. The HOA made the documents available for Mr. Barrs’ inspection on June 3, 2017, which was within the required timeframe. The decision also dismissed related claims by Mr. Barrs regarding a “late ballot” (which was actually a nomination petition) and “undeliverable ballots” (which did not exist as mailing envelopes had no return address). The Judge concluded the HOA did not violate the statute.
These issues center on a series of requests made in June and July 2017 and a significant communication failure initiated by the Petitioner.
Background: In March 2017, after HOA Board member Brian Schoeffler asked to be removed from a resident email thread, Mr. Barrs ceased all email communication with Mr. Schoeffler and blocked his email address, preventing him from receiving any emails sent by Mr. Schoeffler.
Timeline of Events:
• June 17, 2017: Mr. Barrs requested to view the March 18 election ballots (Issue 2). On June 19, Board President Catherine Overby informed him the materials were with Mr. Schoeffler and that he should contact him.
• July 11, 2017: Mr. Barrs emailed the Board (excluding Mr. Schoeffler) requesting that the insurance policies (Issue 3), annual budget (Issue 6), and EDC records (Issue 7) be emailed to him.
• July 12, 2017: Ms. Overby responded that she would forward the request to Mr. Schoeffler and later stated that Mr. Barrs should go to Mr. Schoeffler’s house to view the records. On the same day, Mr. Schoeffler emailed Mr. Barrs—an email Mr. Barrs did not receive—offering to meet and provide copies.
• July 25, 2017: Mr. Barrs informed the Board for the first time that he had blocked Mr. Schoeffler’s emails.
• July 28, 2017: Mr. Schoeffler sent another email, offering dates to meet and explaining that the statute required only that documents be made “reasonably available.”
• July 29, 2017: Mr. Barrs responded to the Board, stating he “will not stipulate to the preconditions” set by Mr. Schoeffler and concluding that the documents were “apparently” not available.
Finding: The Judge found that the Board responded to the July 11 requests in a timely manner (on July 12) and continued to try and accommodate them. However, Mr. Barrs “initially delayed matters by refusing to contact Mr. Schoeffler and he then declined Respondent’s offers.” For Issue 2, the Judge concluded that even if the HOA had initially failed to provide access within ten days, it had “cured its breach” with the subsequent offers of inspection on July 12 and July 28, which Mr. Barrs declined.
Central Legal Conclusions
The ALJ’s decision rested on several key conclusions of law regarding statutory interpretation and the burden of proof.
• Burden of Proof: Mr. Barrs, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The Judge concluded that he failed to meet this standard on all counts.
• Interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(A): This was the pivotal legal finding. The statute reads, in part:
• The ALJ concluded that this language does not obligate an HOA to email records to a member. The statutory requirement is satisfied when the association makes the records “reasonably available” for in-person inspection and allows the member to purchase copies (for a fee of not more than fifteen cents per page).
• Application to the Case: The HOA’s offer for Mr. Barrs to examine the requested documents at Mr. Schoeffler’s residence and to have copies made fulfilled its legal duty. Mr. Barrs’ insistence on receiving documents via email and his ultimate refusal of the in-person inspection offer were the reasons he did not gain access to the records.
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:
“IT IS ORDERED that Thomas Barrs’ petition is dismissed.”
The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
