Douglas J Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID20F-H2020041-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2020-05-21
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomePetitioner was deemed the prevailing party after establishing that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and the community documents by improperly recording Amended CC&Rs without proper owner consent. The Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. However, the ALJ could not grant the requested relief (rescission of the Amended CC&Rs) due to a lack of statutory authority.
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerDouglas J. KarolakCounsel
RespondentVVE – Casa Grande Homeowners AssociationCounselDavid Fitzgibbons

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1); CC&Rs Part 10, Section 10.4

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party after establishing that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and the community documents by improperly recording Amended CC&Rs without proper owner consent. The Respondent was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. However, the ALJ could not grant the requested relief (rescission of the Amended CC&Rs) due to a lack of statutory authority.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation regarding the validity of Amended CC&Rs due to lack of required owner approval.

The Petitioner alleged that the Amended CC&Rs recorded by the Board were invalid because they were not approved by two-thirds (2/3) of the lot owners as required by the CC&Rs and statute. The ALJ agreed, finding the Board acted improperly and violated the documents and statute.

Orders: Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00. No civil penalty was assessed. The ALJ determined she lacked the statutory authority to order the rescission of the Amended CC&Rs requested by the Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • CC&Rs Part 10, Section 10.4

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Amendment, Board Authority, Filing Fee Refund, Partial Win
Additional Citations:
  • 20F-H2020041-REL
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • CC&Rs Part 10, Section 10.4

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Decision Documents

20F-H2020041-REL Decision – 792824.pdf

Uploaded 2026-05-01T09:47:41 (102.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Douglas J. Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association (No. 20F-H2020041-REL). The central issue was whether the HOA Board had the authority to unilaterally amend and record changes to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) without the required homeowner vote.

The petitioner, Douglas J. Karolak, successfully argued that the HOA violated its own governing documents and Arizona state law by filing “Amended CC&Rs” on October 5, 2018, without securing the approval of two-thirds of the lot owners. The HOA contended its actions were a valid exercise of its authority to create “Association Rules.”

ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer ruled decisively in favor of the petitioner. The decision established a clear legal distinction between the Board’s power to adopt rules and the separate, more stringent process required to formally amend the CC&Rs. The judge found the Board acted improperly, declaring Karolak the prevailing party and ordering the HOA to reimburse his $500 filing fee. Notably, while the judge found the amended document was improperly recorded, she concluded she lacked the statutory authority to order its rescission, which was the remedy the petitioner had requested.

Case Overview

Case Name

Douglas J. Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

Case Number

20F-H2020041-REL

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

May 1, 2020

Decision Date

May 21, 2020

The Central Dispute

The core of the dispute revolved around the legitimacy of a document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates” (Amended CC&Rs), which the HOA Board recorded with the Pinal County Recorder on October 5, 2018.

Petitioner’s Position (Douglas J. Karolak): The Amended CC&Rs are invalid because they were not approved by “owners of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Lots,” a requirement explicitly stated in Section 10.4 of the original CC&Rs and supported by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1). Karolak argued that the Board’s action of recording an amendment is fundamentally different from its power to adopt internal “Association Rules.”

Respondent’s Position (VVE – Casa Grande HOA): The Board argued that its actions were a valid exercise of the authority granted to it under the CC&Rs. It claimed that because the only changes were to Part 7 (Use Restrictions), they fell under the Board’s power to “adopt, amend, or repeal such rules and regulations as it deems reasonable and appropriate” (Section 3.4) and to “modify or waive the foregoing restrictions… by reasonable rules and regulations” (Section 7.43). The Respondent’s counsel did, however, concede that “perhaps the Amended CC&Rs should not have been recorded.”

Factual Background and Chronology

• The VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association is a 56-lot community in Casa Grande, Arizona, with 19 lots remaining vacant at the time of the hearing.

April 30, 1999: The original “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for VVE” (CC&Rs) was recorded.

2014 and 2015: The HOA Board made unsuccessful attempts to amend the CC&Rs through membership votes.

2018: Following the failed votes, the Board determined it would make changes to the “rules section” of the CC&Rs under the authority it believed was granted by Section 3.4.

October 5, 2018: The Board recorded the Amended CC&Rs with the Pinal County Recorder. The HOA acknowledged that these amendments had not been approved by the required two-thirds of lot owners.

Legal Analysis and Key Provisions

The decision rested on the interpretation of specific sections of the community’s CC&Rs and Arizona state law. The judge concluded that the document’s structure clearly separates the process of rulemaking from the process of formal amendment.

Provision

Source

Summary of Stipulation

Amendment Process

CC&Rs Section 10.4

Requires an instrument “executed by the Owners of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Lots” and recorded to become effective.

Rulemaking Authority

CC&Rs Section 3.4

Empowers the Board to adopt, amend, or repeal “Association Rules” governing the use of the property. States rules have the “same force and effect as if they were set forth in” the CC&Rs.

Statutory Requirement

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

Provides that a declaration may be amended by the association via an affirmative vote or written consent of the number of owners specified in the declaration.

The judge’s rationale emphasized that the distinct sections for rulemaking (3.4) and amendments (10.4) demonstrate that the original drafters did not intend for the Board to have the power to unilaterally amend the CC&Rs. The judge stated, “The fact that the two topics are covered as separate topics in the CC&Rs leads to the conclusion that the original drafters of the CC&Rs did not contemplate that the Board had the authority to, on its own, amend the CC&Rs.”

The Court’s Decision and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the petitioner, Douglas J. Karolak, had successfully proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent HOA had acted improperly.

Key Findings:

• The HOA Board did not have the authority to amend the CC&Rs without the approval of two-thirds of the lot owners.

• The Board’s action of recording the Amended CC&Rs on October 5, 2018, was a violation of the community’s governing documents (Section 10.4) and Arizona state law (A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)).

• The Board’s ability to create “Association Rules” is a separate and distinct process from the formal procedure required to amend the Declaration.

Final Order:

• The petitioner, Douglas J. Karolak, was deemed the prevailing party.

• The respondent HOA was ordered to pay the petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days of the order.

No civil penalty was found to be appropriate in the matter.

• Critically, the judge determined that under the applicable statute (A.R.S. § 32-2199.02), the Administrative Law Judge does not have the authority to order the Amended CC&Rs rescinded, despite this being the remedy requested by the petitioner.

The order is binding on both parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the decision.

Study Guide: Karolak v. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Douglas J. Karolak vs. VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association (No. 20F-H2020041-REL).

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the provided legal decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was the petitioner’s core allegation?

2. What specific statute and section of the community documents did the petitioner claim the respondent violated?

3. According to Section 10.4 of the original CC&Rs, what was the required procedure for amending the Declaration?

4. Under what authority did the VVE – Casa Grande HOA Board claim it could make changes to the community documents without a membership vote?

5. What key event occurred on or about October 5, 2018, that became the central point of the dispute?

6. What was the respondent’s primary argument for why their actions were valid?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence,” and which party bears the burden of proof to establish a violation?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude that the Board’s authority to create “Association Rules” was a separate process from amending the CC&Rs?

9. What remedy did the petitioner request, and why was it not granted by the Administrative Law Judge?

10. What was the final order issued by the Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Douglas J. Karolak, a homeowner. The respondent was the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association. Karolak’s core allegation was that the HOA had improperly amended the community’s governing documents.

2. The petitioner alleged a violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1817(A)(1). He also claimed a violation of Part 10, Section 10.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

3. Section 10.4 of the CC&Rs stipulated that the Declaration could be amended by an instrument executed by the owners of at least two-thirds (2/3) of the lots. The amendment would not be effective until that instrument was officially recorded.

4. The HOA Board claimed it had the authority to make the changes under Section 3.4 of the CC&Rs. This section empowered the Board to adopt, amend, or repeal “Association Rules” as it deemed reasonable and appropriate.

5. On or about October 5, 2018, the Board recorded a document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates” (Amended CC&Rs) with the Pinal County Recorder. This was done without the required two-thirds vote from the lot owners.

6. The respondent argued that because the only changes made were to Part 7 (Use Restrictions), which fell under the type of rules the Board was authorized to adopt, the Amended CC&Rs were a valid exercise of the Board’s authority. Their counsel did acknowledge, however, that perhaps the document should not have been recorded.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that the respondent committed the alleged violations by this standard.

8. The Judge concluded they were separate processes because the CC&Rs cover the topics in different sections. This separation led the Judge to believe the original drafters did not intend for the Board to have the authority to amend the CC&Rs on its own.

9. The petitioner requested that the improperly recorded Amended CC&Rs be rescinded. This remedy was not granted because the applicable statute, A.R.S. § 32-2199.02, does not give the Administrative Law Judge the specific authority to order a document rescinded.

10. The final order deemed the petitioner the prevailing party. It further ordered the respondent to repay the petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days, but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, using only the information presented in the legal decision.

1. Analyze the distinction made by the Administrative Law Judge between the Board’s authority to create “Association Rules” under Section 3.4 and the process for amending the Declaration under Section 10.4. Why was this distinction critical to the case’s outcome?

2. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. How did the petitioner successfully meet this burden of proof to establish the respondent’s violation, and what specific facts supported this conclusion?

3. Examine the respondent’s (HOA’s) argument regarding its authority to amend the CC&Rs. What were the fundamental flaws in this argument, and how did their counsel’s acknowledgment about the recording of the Amended CC&Rs potentially weaken their position?

4. Explain the legal framework governing this dispute, citing the specific Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) mentioned in the decision. Detail the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the Administrative Law Judge in resolving this type of HOA conflict.

5. Evaluate the final Order of the Administrative Law Judge. While the petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, why was their requested remedy (rescission of the Amended CC&Rs) denied? What does this reveal about the specific limits of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in such cases under A.R.S. § 32-2199.02?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Office of Administrative Hearings made the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and issued the final order.

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)

The specific Arizona Revised Statute cited by the petitioner. It states that a declaration may be amended by the association with an affirmative vote or written consent of the number of owners specified in the declaration.

Amended CC&Rs

The document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates,” which the HOA Board recorded on October 5, 2018, without the required two-thirds owner approval.

Association Rules

Rules and regulations that the HOA Board is empowered to adopt, amend, or repeal under Section 3.4 of the CC&Rs to govern the use of Common Areas and other parts of the Project. The Board argued their changes fell under this authority.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the respondent’s violations by a preponderance of the evidence.

An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents for a planned community. The original “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for VVE” was recorded on April 30, 1999.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the petitioner filed his Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association, an association of 56 lot owners in Casa Grande, Arizona.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The office responsible for conducting hearings for disputes filed with state agencies like the Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, homeowner Douglas J. Karolak.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association.

Your HOA Just Changed the Rules? Why This Homeowner’s $500 Victory is a Warning to Everyone

For millions of Americans, living in a planned community means living under the authority of a Homeowners Association (HOA). While intended to protect property values, these relationships can often feel one-sided, with boards issuing mandates and homeowners feeling powerless to push back. It’s a common frustration, but it’s rare to see a single homeowner challenge their board and force a legal reckoning.

A recent case from Arizona, Douglas J. Karolak versus the VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association, provides a critical case study in board overreach and the surprising limits of legal victory. Karolak alleged his HOA board violated its own governing documents and state law by improperly changing the community’s core rules.

He took his case to an administrative law judge and, in a significant ruling, he won. But the outcome of this seemingly straightforward dispute was far from simple. The final decision reveals a shocking twist that holds critical lessons for every homeowner about the difference between being right on paper and getting the remedy you actually want.

There’s a Huge Difference Between a ‘Rule Change’ and a ‘Declaration Amendment’

The first lesson from this case is a critical one for every homeowner: understand the constitutional hierarchy of your community’s documents. The core of the dispute was the HOA Board’s attempt to amend its foundational document, the CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions), without getting the required approval from the homeowners.

Here are the key facts of the case:

The Original Rule: The community’s CC&Rs explicitly stated in Section 10.4 that any amendment required a vote and execution by “at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Lots.” This is the highest level of authority in a planned community, akin to a constitution.

The Failed Attempts: The Board had tried to get this two-thirds vote in both 2014 and 2015, but was unsuccessful.

The Workaround: In 2018, the Board decided to bypass the homeowners. It used a separate power granted in Section 3.4 of the CC&Rs—the authority to create day-to-day “Association Rules”—to make what it called changes to the “‘rules section’ of the CC&Rs, specifically targeting the Use Restrictions in Part 7.”

The judge’s conclusion was crystal clear: The CC&Rs were drafted to treat the power to create “rules” and the power to “amend” the declaration as two entirely separate processes. This separation acts as a crucial check on the board’s power, preventing a small group from unilaterally changing the fundamental property rights of all owners. As the judge noted, “the original drafters of the CC&Rs did not contemplate that the Board had the authority to, on its own, amend the CC&Rs.”

Recording a Document Doesn’t Magically Make It Valid

To make their changes appear official, the HOA Board took a significant step. On October 5, 2018, they filed a document titled “Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Val Vista Estates (Amended CC&Rs)” with the Pinal County Recorder.

For the average homeowner, a formally recorded document filed with the county looks final, official, and legally binding. It’s an intimidating piece of paper that suggests any challenge would be futile.

However, the judge’s ruling highlights a critical legal truth: procedural legitimacy is paramount. An official-looking document, even one filed with the county, is invalid if the legal process required to create it was ignored. The judge found that because the Board did not follow the correct internal procedure—securing the two-thirds vote from homeowners—the very act of recording the document was improper. Even the HOA’s own lawyer seemed to concede this point during the hearing, acknowledging that “perhaps the Amended CC&Rs should not have been recorded.”

The Winner’s Paradox: You Can Be Right and Still Not Get Your Desired Fix

The final order from the Administrative Law Judge was unambiguous: Douglas Karolak, the petitioner, was officially deemed the “prevailing party.” The judge concluded that the HOA had acted in violation of its own community documents and Arizona state law. This was a clear-cut victory for the homeowner.

But here is the shocking twist. Karolak’s requested remedy was for the illegally filed “Amended CC&Rs” to be rescinded—in other words, to have them officially nullified and removed. This seems like the logical and necessary fix to the problem.

The judge, however, was bound by the limits of her authority. The final decision states plainly: “The Administrative Law Judge does not have the authority under the applicable statute to order the Amended CC&Rs rescinded.” This highlights a critical jurisdictional gap. The Administrative Law Judge’s role in this venue is to determine if a violation occurred and assign limited penalties, not to perform the function of a higher court, which might have the power to void a recorded document.

So, what was the actual remedy for this clear violation? The judge ordered the HOA to repay Karolak his $500 filing fee. No other civil penalty was issued. The homeowner won the argument but did not get the one thing he asked for to correct the board’s improper action.

A Victory on Paper, A Question in Practice

The case of Douglas J. Karolak is a powerful real-world lesson. It proves that a single homeowner, armed with a thorough understanding of their community’s governing documents, can successfully challenge an overreaching HOA board and win. It confirms that procedural shortcuts, even when filed and recorded, do not make an illegal action legal.

But it also reveals the frustrating limitations that can exist within the legal process. The homeowner was proven right, but the improperly filed document remains on the books, unable to be rescinded in this specific venue. It raises a crucial question for homeowners everywhere: How do you ensure your victory has real teeth?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Douglas J. Karolak (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • David A. Fitzgibbons III (HOA attorney)
    Fitzgibbons Law Offices PLC
    Represented VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • CV Mathai (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • John Kelsey (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Kristi Kelsey (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • William Findley (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Kay Niemi (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Mark Korte (witness)
    VVE – Casa Grande Homeowners Association
  • Felicia Del Sol (property manager rep)
    Norris Management

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Richard P Quinn vs. Homestead North Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID20F-H2019040-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2020-05-05
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe ALJ dismissed the petition. The ruling clarified that while the Bylaws mention automatic resignation for delinquency, it is only effective upon Board acceptance. The Petitioner's attempt to accept the resignation via email did not constitute a valid Board action/vote.
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerRichard P. QuinnCounsel
RespondentHomestead North Homeowners AssociationCounselQuinten T. Cupps

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section III, Item 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition. The ruling clarified that while the Bylaws mention automatic resignation for delinquency, it is only effective upon Board acceptance. The Petitioner's attempt to accept the resignation via email did not constitute a valid Board action/vote.

Why this result: The Bylaws explicitly state resignation is effective when the Board accepts it. The Petitioner's email action was not a valid Board act under the Bylaws regarding meetings and quorums.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to accept automatic resignation of delinquent director

Petitioner alleged that a Board member's delinquency constituted an automatic resignation under the Bylaws and that he, as a Board member, accepted it via email. The ALJ determined that the Bylaws require the Board to accept the resignation for it to be effective. The Petitioner's email did not constitute an act of the Board as it was not done at a duly held meeting with a quorum.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • Bylaws Article III, Section 4
  • Bylaws Article III, Section 9

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Video Overview

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Decision Documents

20F-H2019040-REL Decision – 787679.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:24:58 (108.8 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Quinn v. Homestead North Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative decision in the matter of Richard P. Quinn v. Homestead North Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2019040-REL). The case centered on a dispute regarding whether a member of the Association’s Board of Directors, Karen Igo, had effectively resigned due to a financial delinquency under the Association's Bylaws.

The Petitioner, Richard P. Quinn, alleged that a "Wall Charge" of $3,925.00 applied to Ms. Igo’s account constituted a delinquent assessment that should have triggered an automatic resignation. The Respondent, Homestead North Homeowners Association, argued that even if a delinquency existed, the Board never formally accepted any resignation as required by the Bylaws. Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Board had legally accepted the resignation, a necessary condition for the resignation to take effect.


Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Interpretation of "Automatic Resignation" Clauses

The case turned significantly on the specific language of the Association’s Bylaws, Article III, Section 4. While the Bylaws state that a delinquency of more than 30 days "shall automatically constitute a resignation," this phrase is immediately qualified by the clause "effective when the Board of Directors accepts such resignation."

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that regardless of whether the debt was a delinquent assessment, the "automatic" resignation was not self-executing. It required an affirmative act of the Board to become effective. This interpretation underscores the principle that qualifying clauses in community documents can prevent immediate, unilateral changes in Board composition.

2. Quorum and Valid Board Actions

A central theme of the dispute was what constitutes a valid act of the Board. The Petitioner attempted to "accept" the resignation via email, claiming that as a Board member, his sole vote in favor (with no other responses) constituted a majority.

The ALJ rejected this based on Article III, Section 9 of the Bylaws, which defines a quorum and the requirements for a "duly held meeting." The ruling clarified two critical procedural standards:

  • Email is not a meeting: Correspondence via email does not satisfy the requirement for a duly held meeting.
  • Individual action is not Board action: A single member cannot constitute a quorum or take a "majority" vote in the absence of other participating members at a formal meeting.
3. Classification of Financial Obligations

The dispute highlighted the distinction between "Assessments" and other charges, such as "Wall Charges" or "Self-Help" codes. Ms. Igo’s account showed a $3,925.00 charge listed under "Self-Help" rather than "Assessment."

While the Petitioner argued this debt triggered the resignation clause, the Respondent noted that Ms. Igo had cleared the balance in full before the petition was filed. Ultimately, the ALJ found the classification of the debt moot because the procedural requirement for Board acceptance of the resignation had not been met.


Important Quotes with Context

QuoteContextSignificance
"Any delinquency or violation shall automatically constitute a resignation effective when the Board of Directors accepts such resignation."Found in Article III, Section 4 of the Association Bylaws.This is the "pivot point" of the case; it established that resignation is not final until the Board acts.
"Every act or decision done or made by a majority of the directors present at a duly held meeting at which a quorum is present shall be regarded as the act of the Board."Found in Article III, Section 9 of the Association Bylaws regarding Quorum.This established the legal standard for what counts as an official HOA decision.
"An email correspondence does not constitute a duly held meeting of the Board."Conclusion of Law #5 by ALJ Tammy L. Eigenheer.This clarifies that electronic messaging between members cannot bypass the formal meeting requirements of the Bylaws.
"Petitioner’s purported 'vote' could not be considered a majority of the Board voting on the matter."Conclusion of Law #5 regarding Petitioner’s email to other Board members.This emphasizes that one person cannot create a "majority" by being the only one to respond to an email.

Actionable Insights

Procedural Rigor in Governance

The decision emphasizes that Board members must adhere strictly to the procedural requirements outlined in their community documents. Unilateral actions—such as one member attempting to accept a resignation on behalf of the whole Board—are legally insufficient and will likely be overturned in administrative hearings.

The Limitation of Email in HOA Business

HOA Boards should be cautious about conducting official business via email. As demonstrated in this case, email lacks the legal standing of a "duly held meeting" unless specifically permitted and structured under state law or community bylaws. Official acts, particularly those involving the removal or resignation of directors, must occur within the framework of a meeting where a quorum is present.

Burden of Proof for Petitioners

In HOA disputes, the Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish a violation by a "preponderance of the evidence." This case serves as a reminder that even if a violation seems apparent (such as a delinquency), the Petitioner must also prove that all conditions for a remedy (such as the effective date of a resignation) have been met according to the plain language of the Bylaws.

Drafting and Reviewing Bylaws

For community associations, the wording of "automatic" triggers is critical. The inclusion of the phrase "effective when the Board of Directors accepts such resignation" provides a safeguard for the Board to maintain stability, but it also creates a procedural hurdle that must be cleared before a seat can be declared vacant.

Case Study: Quinn v. Homestead North Homeowners Association (Administrative Decision 20F-H2019040-REL)

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative hearing between Richard P. Quinn and the Homestead North Homeowners Association. It explores the interpretation of community bylaws, the legal requirements for board actions, and the evidentiary standards applied in Arizona administrative law.


Key Concepts and Legal Principles

1. The HOA Dispute Process (A.R.S. § 32-2199)

Under Arizona law, homeowners or planned community organizations may file a petition with the Department of Real Estate to resolve disputes regarding violations of community documents or state statutes. These cases are adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

2. Automatic Resignation vs. Effective Resignation

The case centers on Article III, Section 4 of the Association's Bylaws. While a director’s delinquency in paying assessments for more than 30 days "automatically" constitutes a resignation, that resignation is not legally final or operational until it is formally accepted by the Board of Directors.

3. Board Quorum and Official Acts

Pursuant to Article III, Section 9 of the Bylaws:

  • Quorum: A majority of the directors must be present to transact business.
  • Act of the Board: An official decision or act of the Board requires a majority vote of the directors present at a "duly held meeting" where a quorum exists.
4. Evidentiary Standards: Preponderance of the Evidence

In administrative hearings, the Petitioner carries the burden of proof. They must establish the violation by a "preponderance of the evidence," meaning the evidence shows the claim is more probably true than not. This is defined as the "greater weight of the evidence" or evidence with the "most convincing force."


Short-Answer Practice Questions

1. What specific provision of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated? The Petitioner asserted a violation of Bylaws Article III, Section III, Item 4 (later referenced as Article III, Section 4).

2. What was the "Wall Charge" and how did it differ from a standard assessment? The Board posted a charge of $3,925.00 to Karen Igo’s account on March 13, 2019. It was categorized under the code type "Self-Help" rather than "Assessment."

3. According to the Bylaws, what circumstances besides delinquency can lead to the removal of a director? A director may be removed for more than three consecutive absences from regular Board meetings (unless due to injury or illness) or if they cease to be an owner of a lot or have an interest therein.

4. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reject the Petitioner's email "vote" as a valid Board action? The ALJ ruled that email correspondence does not constitute a "duly held meeting" of the Board. Furthermore, a single member’s email cannot constitute a quorum, meaning the individual vote was not a majority act of the Board.

5. What was the outcome of the October 30, 2019, Executive Session regarding this matter? The Petitioner attempted to raise the topic of the resignation, but the President of the Board "shut down" the Executive Session at that point.

6. What is the filing fee for an HOA Dispute Process Petition according to the document? The Petitioner paid a $500.00 filing fee.


Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

1. The Interplay of Automaticity and Board Discretion

Analyze the language of Article III, Section 4: "said delinquency or violation shall automatically constitute a resignation effective when the Board of Directors accepts such resignation." Discuss the potential conflict between the word "automatically" and the requirement for Board acceptance. Does this requirement give the Board the power to shield a delinquent member from removal?

2. Procedural Validity in Corporate Governance

Using the ALJ's findings regarding Article III, Section 9, argue the importance of "duly held meetings" and "quorums" in preventing unilateral actions by individual board members. Why is the Petitioner's reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order insufficient to overcome the specific requirements of the Association's Bylaws?

3. Definition of Debt in Homeowners Associations

The case bifurcated two questions: whether the "Wall Charge" was an "Assessment" and whether the Board accepted the resignation. Given that the charge was labeled "Self-Help," discuss how the classification of a debt impacts the rights and standing of board members under community governing documents.


Glossary of Important Terms

TermDefinition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)A presiding officer who hears evidence and issues decisions in administrative law cases.
AssessmentPeriodic fees paid by homeowners to the HOA; delinquency in these may trigger board member disqualification.
BifurcationThe legal process of dividing a trial or hearing into two parts to address specific issues separately.
Duly Held MeetingA formal gathering of the Board conducted according to the rules set forth in the Bylaws.
MootA point or question that is no longer relevant or has no practical legal effect; in this case, Respondent argued the issue was moot because the debt was paid.
PetitionerThe party who files the petition or claim (Richard P. Quinn).
Preponderance of the EvidenceThe standard of proof in civil and administrative cases; proof that a contention is more likely true than not.
QuorumThe minimum number of board members (a majority) required to be present to make the proceedings of a meeting valid.
RespondentThe party against whom a petition is filed (Homestead North Homeowners Association).
Self-HelpA specific code type used by the Association to categorize the "Wall Charge" debt, distinct from standard assessments.

HOA Resignations and the Power of Board Acceptance: A Case Study from Homestead North

Introduction: When Does a Board Resignation Actually Count?

In the battle between “automatic” rules and board process, process almost always wins. For many Homeowners Association (HOA) board members, the governing documents feel like a series of tripwires: miss a meeting, fall behind on dues, or violate a rule, and you’re out. But as a recent case from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings demonstrates, the law favors stability and formal procedure over the “gotcha” moments individual members might try to manufacture.

The case of Richard P. Quinn vs. Homestead North Homeowners Association (No. 20F-H2019040-REL) centers on a fundamental question of HOA governance: Can a board member be forced out the moment they become financially delinquent, or is the exit only final once the board officially “accepts” it? As we will see, even when a bylaw uses the word “automatic,” the procedural fine print often tells a different story.

The "Wall Charge" Controversy: Background of the Dispute

The conflict at Homestead North began with a significant charge on the account of board member Karen Igo. Petitioner Richard P. Quinn argued that this debt triggered an automatic resignation under the community’s bylaws, claiming Ms. Igo was ineligible to serve.

The financial timeline is essential to understanding the dispute:

  • March 13, 2019: The Association posted a "Wall Charge" of $3,925.00 to Ms. Igo’s account.
  • The "Self-Help" Distinction: Crucially, the Board categorized this as "Self-Help" rather than a standard "Assessment." In HOA governance, "Self-Help" typically refers to costs incurred by the association to repair or maintain an owner's property when the owner has failed to do so.
  • Payment History: From April through September 2019, Ms. Igo made monthly payments of $100.00. This covered her $48.50 monthly assessment and applied the remainder to the "Wall Charge."
  • Final Resolution: On October 21, 2019, Ms. Igo paid the remaining balance of $3,600.00 in full, resulting in a credit on her account.

Quinn’s argument was straightforward: Because the debt existed for more than 30 days, Ms. Igo had effectively resigned from the board by default. He contended that the moment the delinquency crossed the 30-day threshold, the seat became vacant.

Decoding the Bylaws: The "Effective When" Clause

To determine if Ms. Igo was actually ousted, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) scrutinized Article III, Section 4 of the Homestead North Bylaws. This section serves as the "Rule of Law" for director disqualification.

The Bylaws state:

"No director shall continue to serve on the Board if such director is more than thirty (30) days delinquent in the payment of an Assessment or in violation of Declaration or Architectural Guidelines and said delinquency or violation shall automatically constitute a resignation effective when the Board of Directors accepts such resignation."

As a governance specialist, I cannot overemphasize the importance of that final phrase. While Quinn focused on the word "automatically," the ALJ focused on the procedural gatekeeper: the resignation is only effective when the Board accepts it. This wording prevents "automatic" rules from being weaponized to decapitate a board without the remaining directors’ knowledge or consent. It transforms a self-executing event into one that requires formal board action.

The Procedural Pitfall: Why an Email Isn't a Meeting

In an attempt to force the issue, Quinn took matters into his own hands. On October 18, 2019, he sent an email to the board stating that he, as a director, accepted Ms. Igo’s resignation. When no other directors responded, Quinn argued that under Robert’s Rules of Order, his single "vote" constituted a majority of one to zero.

The reality of board governance is rarely that simple. The "messy reality" of this dispute peaked on October 30, 2019, during an Executive Session. When Quinn attempted to raise the issue of Ms. Igo’s resignation, the Board President "shut down" the session entirely, refusing to entertain the unilateral move.

The ALJ’s reasoning for rejecting Quinn’s email "acceptance" rested on two foundational pillars of HOA law found in Article III, Section 9:

  • The Quorum Rule: Official board acts require a majority of directors to be present to constitute a quorum. One director acting alone via email never meets the legal threshold for a quorum.
  • The Meeting Requirement: An "act of the Board" must occur at a "duly held meeting." The judge ruled that an email chain is not a meeting. Governance cannot be conducted through one-sided digital correspondence; it requires a formal forum where the body can deliberate and vote.

The ALJ's Final Verdict: A Lesson in Governance

The Administrative Law Judge ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing the petition. The decision hinged on the preponderance of the evidence—the legal standard requiring the Petitioner to prove that his claims were more likely true than not.

The ALJ concluded that Quinn failed to prove the Board ever formally accepted the resignation at a duly held meeting. Because the "procedural gate" of board acceptance was never passed, the underlying question—whether the "Wall Charge" technically qualified as an "Assessment"—became moot. In legal terms, since the board hadn't accepted the resignation, the nature of the debt was irrelevant; Ms. Igo remained on the board regardless.

Key Takeaways for HOA Boards and Members

This case is a masterclass in why process matters as much as—if not more than—the rules themselves. Board members and directors should take note of these three pillars:

  1. Language Matters—Look for the "Hook": Pro-tip: Always look for phrases like "effective when the board accepts." These hooks are designed to protect the board from being destabilized by minor accounting errors or weaponized bylaws. They ensure that the board maintains control over its own composition.
  2. Process Over Emotion: Even if a violation seems black-and-white, individual board members cannot act unilaterally. Whether it is an email or an unscheduled outburst in an executive session, efforts to bypass formal agendas will almost always fail in court.
  3. Know Your Quorum: To be legally defensible, a board decision must be a collective act. This means notice, a quorum, and a formal vote at a "duly held meeting." Private emails and "votes of one" are not just bad practice; they are legally void.

By adhering strictly to procedural bylaws, HOAs can avoid the high costs and headaches of administrative hearings, ensuring that community leadership remains stable and legally sound.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Richard P. Quinn (Petitioner)
    Homestead North Homeowners Association (Board Member)
    Appeared on his own behalf; member of the Board

Respondent Side

  • Quinten T. Cupps (Respondent Attorney)
    Represented Homestead North Homeowners Association
  • Karen Igo (Board member)
    Homestead North Homeowners Association
    Subject of the resignation dispute; had delinquent 'Wall Charge'

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the order

Robert L Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID20F-H2019018-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2020-01-29
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge concluded that Bellasera Community Association, Inc. did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the homeowner received constructive notice of the violation and fine structure, satisfying statutory requirements. The petition was dismissed.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerRobert L GrecoCounsel
RespondentBellasera Community Association, Inc.CounselNathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Bellasera Community Association, Inc. did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the homeowner received constructive notice of the violation and fine structure, satisfying statutory requirements. The petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proving Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), as the evidence showed Petitioner received sufficient constructive notice of the alleged violation and had an opportunity to be heard or appeal.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated statutory requirements regarding notice and imposition of monetary penalties/late fees, resulting in suspension of privileges.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by imposing fines and suspending gate/clubhouse access without providing adequate (actual) notice of the violation and hearing opportunity, and by improperly imposing late fees. The ALJ found the HOA provided constructive notice, satisfying the statute, and was entitled to impose cumulative fines for the ongoing violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1220
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1090

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fines, Constructive notice, Statutory violation, Access suspension, Maintenance violation
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019018-REL Decision – 766844.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:37 (133.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Robert L. Greco (Petitioner) versus the Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Respondent), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Homeowners Association (HOA).

The core dispute originated from a 2013 violation notice regarding a faded garage door. The Petitioner claimed he did not receive the initial notices and only became aware of the issue upon receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney. Despite subsequently painting the door, an outstanding balance of $750 in fines remained on his account. For six years, the Petitioner paid his quarterly dues but ignored the outstanding fine balance. In June 2019, after failed settlement negotiations, the HOA deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and clubhouse access, prompting him to file the formal dispute.

The judge’s decision rested on two key legal conclusions. First, the court rejected the Petitioner’s argument that “actual notice” was required for the fines to be valid. It ruled that the multiple notices mailed to the Petitioner’s residence constituted sufficient “constructive notice” under Arizona law, providing both notification of the violation and an opportunity to be heard. Second, the court determined that the $750 charge was not an improper late fee but rather three separate, legitimate fines of $250 each, levied for an ongoing, uncorrected violation as per the HOA’s enforcement policy.

Case Overview

Case Name

Robert L Greco, Petitioner, vs. Bellasera Community Association, Inc., Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2019018-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

January 9, 2020

Decision Date

January 29, 2020

Petitioner’s Core Allegation

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by imposing penalties and revoking privileges without providing proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Core Factual Issue

The denial of automatic gate and clubhouse access to the Petitioner on July 1, 2019, due to unpaid fines from 2013.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict between Mr. Greco and the Bellasera Community Association unfolded over six years, escalating from a minor maintenance issue to a formal legal dispute and revocation of privileges.

Initial Violation and Fines (2013)

Details

Feb. 5, 2013

Courtesy Notice

Respondent sent a notice to Petitioner’s address stating his garage door was faded and needed to be repainted, in violation of the Design Guidelines.

Mar. 14, 2013

Final Notice & First Fine

A follow-up notice was sent, stating a $250 fine was posted to Petitioner’s account. It warned that an additional $250 fine would be assessed automatically every 14 days if the violation remained uncorrected.

Apr. 2, 2013

Notice of Remedy & Second Fine

A third notice was sent, posting another $250 fine. This letter explicitly warned that the HOA had the “ability to suspend privileges for use of the Recreational Facilities” and informed the Petitioner of his right to appeal within 14 days.

May 7, 2013

Fourth Notice & Third Fine

A fourth notice was sent, posting another $250 fine to the account. It again noted the right to appeal the fine.

Jun. 5, 2013

Letter from HOA Counsel

Attorney Kelly Oetinger sent a letter demanding the garage door be repainted within 15 days. The letter explicitly stated, “If you do not repaint… the Association may disable the transponder you use to enter the community and may disable the fobs you use for the clubhouse.”

Petitioner’s Response and Aftermath (2013)

July 4, 2013: Petitioner repainted the garage door.

July 5, 2013: Petitioner sent a letter to the HOA stating the attorney’s letter was his “initial alert of the garage door condition.” He explained his delay by stating, “To effectively manage my workload, I dispose of unsolicited mail… In the future, I will exercise greater caution in disposing of unsolicited mail.”

July 5, 2013: The HOA sent a letter acknowledging the repainting and offered to settle the $900 in fines for a payment of $500. The letter reiterated the threat to deactivate gate openers and fobs.

July 17, 2013: The HOA sent a follow-up letter correcting an internal accounting error. The total fines were $750, not $900. A new settlement offer was made: pay $375, and the remaining $375 would be waived.

Period of Inaction (2013 – 2019)

From 2013 to 2019, the Petitioner received quarterly statements from the HOA indicating a $750 balance in addition to current assessments. Each quarter, the Petitioner would physically cross out the $750 balance and pay only the current assessment amount.

Escalation and Revocation of Privileges (2019)

June 2019: Dennis Carson, a friend of the Petitioner serving on the HOA Board of Directors, informed him that his name was on a penalty list and the Board planned to deactivate his security gate and clubhouse access.

June 2019: Settlement negotiations failed. The Petitioner offered $100; the Board countered with $250. The Petitioner then offered $251 ($250 for the fine and $1 to rent the clubhouse), which the Board declined.

July 1, 2019: The Respondent deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and access to the clubhouse.

October 11, 2019: The Petitioner filed the Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition, initiating the legal proceedings.

Key Arguments and Legal Findings

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of “notice” as required by state law and the legitimacy of the fines imposed by the HOA.

Petitioner’s Position

1. Lack of Proper Notice: The Petitioner argued that he had not received “actual notice” of the violation or the impending fines until the letter from the HOA’s counsel on June 5, 2013. He asserted that because he acted promptly after receiving that letter, the fines were unjust. His argument implied that warnings in mail he did not personally read could not be held against him.

2. Improper Fines: The Petitioner alleged that the additional $500 in charges on the original $250 fine constituted improper late fees.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The Judge systematically refuted the Petitioner’s arguments, concluding that the HOA acted within its rights and in accordance with the law.

1. On the Matter of Notice:

• The governing statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), requires “notice and an opportunity to be heard” before imposing penalties.

• The Judge found no legal authority requiring this to be “actual notice.” To accept this argument would create an unworkable standard where a homeowner could “avoid receiving ‘actual notice’ by simply refusing to sign for a certified mailing.”

• The decision established that the Petitioner received constructive notice through the “multiple mailings that were presumably delivered to his residential address.”

• The notices also informed the Petitioner how to appeal the matter, thereby satisfying the requirement for an “opportunity to be heard.”

Conclusion: “Accordingly, Petitioner was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).”

2. On the Matter of Fines:

• The Judge differentiated between late fees and fines for an ongoing violation.

• The notices sent by the Respondent “clearly stated that an ongoing failure to remedy the violation would result in additional fines every 14 days.”

• The violation persisted from before March 14, 2013 (first fine) until July 5, 2013 (when the door was confirmed painted).

Conclusion: The Respondent was entitled to impose three separate fines for the “ongoing condition of the garage door,” making the total of $750 legitimate.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis of the evidence and law, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

Final Ruling: “This Tribunal concludes that Respondent did not violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).”

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: The order, dated January 29, 2020, is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Robert L. Greco (Petitioner) versus Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 20F-H2019018-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz to test your knowledge, an answer key for review, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was the Petitioner’s central complaint that initiated the legal action?

2. What specific violation of the community’s rules was the Petitioner initially accused of, and which governing documents were cited as being violated?

3. Describe the timeline of notices and fines issued by the Respondent between February and May 2013.

4. What was the Petitioner’s explanation for not responding to the initial violation notices from the Respondent before receiving a letter from the association’s attorney?

5. What actions did the Respondent take in or around June 2019 that led the Petitioner to file his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

6. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument regarding the “notice” required by the Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge differentiate between “actual notice” and “constructive notice” in her decision?

8. Why did the judge ultimately conclude that the Respondent had provided the Petitioner with adequate “notice and an opportunity to be heard”?

9. Explain the Petitioner’s allegation about improper late fees and the reason the judge rejected this argument.

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was homeowner Robert L. Greco, and the Respondent was the Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (the HOA). Greco’s central complaint, filed on October 11, 2019, was that the HOA had denied him automatic gate access and use of clubhouse facilities on July 1, 2019, despite his being a long-term resident with timely payment of all quarterly dues.

2. The Petitioner was accused of having a faded garage door that needed to be repainted. The violation was cited as being contrary to the CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions), specifically Article V, Section 5.2, and the community’s Design Guidelines, specifically Article III, Section J.

3. The Respondent sent an initial “Courtesy Notice” on February 5, 2013. This was followed by a “Final Notice” with a $250 fine on March 14, a “Notice of Remedy” with another $250 fine on April 2, and a “Fourth Notice of Non-Compliance” with another $250 fine on May 7, 2013.

4. The Petitioner claimed that the attorney’s letter, received around June 5, 2013, was his “initial alert” regarding the garage door condition. He stated that he routinely disposes of unsolicited mail without reading it and had inadvertently discarded the previous notices sent by the Respondent.

5. In June 2019, after failed settlement negotiations over the outstanding $750 in fines from 2013, the Respondent deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and his access to the clubhouse. This action prompted the Petitioner to file his dispute petition.

6. The Petitioner’s primary argument was that he did not receive “actual notice” of the violation until the attorney’s letter. He contended that because he acted promptly to correct the violation after receiving actual notice, he should not have been fined.

7. The judge used definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary. “Actual notice” was defined as notice given directly to, or personally received by, a party. “Constructive notice” was defined as notice arising by presumption of law from facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.

8. The judge concluded that the multiple notices mailed to the Petitioner’s residential address constituted “constructive notice” of the violation. Because the relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), does not explicitly require “actual notice,” and the mailings also advised him of his right to appeal, the judge found the Respondent had fulfilled its obligation to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.

9. The Petitioner alleged that the additional $500 in fines were improper late fees on the original $250 fine. The judge rejected this, clarifying that the Respondent’s notices stated that additional fines would be assessed every 14 days for an ongoing failure to remedy the violation. Therefore, the additional charges were three separate fines for the “ongoing condition of the garage door,” not late fees.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The parties were notified that this order was binding unless a request for rehearing was filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for favoring “constructive notice” over “actual notice” in the context of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B). Discuss the potential consequences for homeowners and HOAs if the ruling had required “actual notice.”

2. Trace the negotiation attempts between the Petitioner and the Respondent in 2013 and 2019. Evaluate the effectiveness of these attempts and discuss whether the dispute could have been resolved without formal legal proceedings.

3. The Petitioner argued that the fines imposed after the initial $250 were improper late fees. The judge, however, characterized them as new fines for an “ongoing condition.” Based on the evidence presented in the notices, construct an argument supporting both the Petitioner’s and the judge’s interpretation.

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and identify the key pieces of evidence that allowed the judge to conclude the Respondent did not violate the statute.

5. Examine the roles of the various community governing documents cited in this case (CC&Rs, Design Guidelines, Violation Enforcement policy). Explain how these documents worked together to grant the Respondent the authority to take action against the Petitioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

The Arizona Revised Statute central to this case, which permits an HOA board to impose reasonable monetary penalties for violations after providing “notice and an opportunity to be heard.”

Actual Notice

As defined in the decision, it is “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.”

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision. In this case, it was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners association (HOA) for the Bellasera Community in Arizona.

An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents for the community, which the Petitioner was found to have violated (specifically Article V, Section 5.2).

Constructive Notice

As defined in the decision, it is “[n]otice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.” The judge ruled that mail sent to a residence constitutes this form of notice.

Design Guidelines

A set of rules established by the HOA governing the aesthetic appearance of properties. The Petitioner was found in violation of Article III, Section J of these guidelines.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition seeking a ruling. In this case, it was the homeowner, Robert L. Greco.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, it was the HOA.

He Threw Away His Mail for Years. His HOA’s Response Is a Warning to Every Homeowner.

That official-looking envelope from your Homeowners Association sits on the counter, a silent challenge. It’s easy to dismiss it as a newsletter or a bland reminder, just another piece of paper to be sorted later. But what if it isn’t? What if that envelope is a legal summons in disguise, the first shot in a battle you don’t even know you’re fighting?

For Robert L. Greco, a resident in his community for 17 years, this hypothetical became a harsh reality. He learned that ignoring HOA correspondence can ignite a conflict that smolders for years before erupting into severe consequences. Originating from a maintenance issue as simple as a faded garage door, his case offers a masterclass in the powerful lessons every homeowner should heed.

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1. The “I Didn’t Read It” Defense Doesn’t Work

The central pillar of the homeowner’s defense was disarmingly simple: he claimed he never received the first four violation notices because he habitually throws away what he considers “unsolicited mail.” He argued that without having read the warnings, he couldn’t be held responsible for the fines.

The judge’s ruling, however, invoked a foundational legal concept that extends far beyond HOA disputes into areas like property deeds and public records: the difference between “actual notice” and “constructive notice.” While actual notice means you personally saw the information, constructive notice presumes you have knowledge of something because it was delivered properly—in this case, mailed to the correct address. Whether you open the envelope is irrelevant.

In a July 5, 2013 letter, the homeowner unwittingly sealed his own fate by describing his mail-handling routine:

Routinely, Saturdays are my mail-pick-up days, and invariably, I walk straight to the re-cyclable container, and deposit the mail in the receptacle… I was astonished to learn that my garage door failed inspection. This is my initial alert of the garage door condition.

For homeowners, the takeaway is a stark one: in the eyes of the law, your recycling bin is not a valid legal defense. The burden doesn’t fall on an HOA to ensure you read your mail, only to send it. The responsibility to open and review all official correspondence rests squarely on the homeowner.

2. A Tiny Issue Can Snowball into a Years-Long Standoff

The timeline of this dispute reveals a classic case of conflict avoidance, where a minor, fixable problem was allowed to spiral into a major legal battle. The cost of a can of paint and a Saturday afternoon of work was ultimately dwarfed by a six-year, $750 dispute that cost the homeowner his access to his own community.

February 5, 2013: The HOA sends its first “Courtesy Notice” regarding a faded garage door in need of repainting.

March – May 2013: After no response, the HOA issues three more notices, levying escalating fines that total $750.

2013 to 2019: For six years, the homeowner receives quarterly statements showing the $750 balance. Each time, he would “cross out the $750.00 balance and pay the current assessment.”

June/July 2019: The HOA finally forces the issue by deactivating his security gate fob and his access to the clubhouse.

This progression shows how a simple lack of communication transformed a weekend chore into a years-long standoff. By ignoring the notices and the subsequent fines, the homeowner allowed a molehill to grow into a mountain of conflict.

3. “Continuing Violation” Fines Are Not Late Fees

The homeowner contended that the HOA was improperly stacking late fees on top of an initial $250 penalty. However, the administrative law judge highlighted a critical distinction embedded in the association’s rules.

The HOA wasn’t charging late fees on a single, past-due penalty. It was levying new fines for a “continuing violation.” The notice sent on March 14, 2013, explicitly warned that “an additional fine of $250 will be assessed automatically every 14 days… if the violation remains uncorrected.”

This is a crucial detail found in many HOA bylaws. An unpainted garage door is not a one-time offense; it is an ongoing breach of community standards. A homeowner who thinks they are simply letting a single fine sit unpaid may actually be incurring entirely new violations over time, dramatically increasing their financial liability.

4. Failed Negotiations Can Cost More Than Money

Twice, this dispute could have been resolved. The breakdown in negotiations, however, reveals how ego and principle can prove more costly than the fines themselves.

The first attempt came in 2013, after the homeowner had finally painted the garage. The HOA initially offered to settle a supposed $900 balance for $500. This, however, was based on an “internal accounting error.” In a subsequent letter, the HOA apologized, corrected the record to show the true balance was $750, and made a formal offer: pay half—just $375—and the matter would be closed. The offer was not accepted. Including this error shows the HOA was not infallible, making the subsequent stalemate more complex.

The second negotiation occurred in 2019, prompted by a friend on the Board who urged a settlement. The homeowner offered $100. The Board countered with $250. The homeowner’s final offer was exquisitely specific: “$251.00, $250.00 to settle the outstanding fines and $1.00 to rent the clubhouse on a specific date.”

This offer was a tactical and psychological blunder. That extra dollar wasn’t about money; it was a message. Whether intended as a sarcastic jab or a principled stand to assert his rights as a member, it transformed a financial negotiation into a battle of wills. For a Board of Directors, accepting such an offer could be seen as capitulating to a petty gesture, setting a precedent that defiance works. They declined. Shortly after, the homeowner’s access to community facilities was cut off, leading to the legal petition he ultimately lost.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: A Lesson in Communication

This case serves as a powerful warning. The legal force of “constructive notice” makes you responsible for the mail you receive, not just the mail you read. The six-year standoff over a can of paint shows how inaction can have disproportionate consequences. And the failed $251 offer demonstrates that good-faith negotiation is paramount.

Ultimately, the homeowner was left still owing the money and locked out of his own amenities—a casualty of a battle he prolonged at every turn. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question to consider: in a dispute with your HOA, where is the line between standing on principle and causing yourself unnecessary harm?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert L Greco (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (attorney)
    Brown|Olcott, PLLC
  • David Reid (board member)
    Testified for Respondent
  • Annette McCarthy (manager)
    Acting Manager; Testified for Respondent
  • Kelly Oetinger (attorney)
    Counsel for Respondent in 2013
  • Dennis Carson (board member)

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE

Paul L Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID20F-H2019014-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2020-01-27
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerPaul L MoffettCounselRichard M. Rollman
RespondentVistoso Community AssociationCounselJason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.

Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.

Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
  • CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Related election workflow tool

Many HOA election disputes start with preventable workflow problems: unclear ballot language, separate-vote issues, quorum tracking, paper/online reconciliation, proxy handling, or incomplete records. HOABallot is a separate platform built to document the voting workflow from notice through certification.

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:35 (48.3 KB)

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:39 (109.1 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

Executive Summary

On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.

The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.

The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.

Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.

Detail

Information

Case Name

Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association

Case Number

20F-H2019014-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petition Filed

On or about September 25, 2019

Hearing Date

December 16, 2019

Decision & Order Date

January 27, 2020

Petitioner

Paul L. Moffett

Petitioner’s Counsel

Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.

Respondent

Vistoso Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC

The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments

Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.

The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:

Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.

Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.

Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.

Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions

The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.

Key Governing Document Provisions

Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.

Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)

The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:

• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.

• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.

• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.

Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)

The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:

• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.

• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.

• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.

Established Findings of Fact

The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.

March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.

March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.

October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.

March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.

Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Legal Interpretation

The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.

The decision states:

“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”

The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.

Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy

The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”

Final Order

Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.

Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?

3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?

5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?

6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?

8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.

2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.

3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.

4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.

6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.

8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.

9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.

2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?

4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.

5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1

The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3

The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Declarant

The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.

Developer Owner

An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.

The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head

For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.

This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.

The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote

The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.

The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:

Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.

On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.

The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years

The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.

• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.

• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.

The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole

This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.

In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.

The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:

Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.

The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote

Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.

The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).

While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.

This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.

Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details

This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.

The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul L Moffett (petitioner)
    Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
  • Richard M. Rollman (petitioner attorney)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
  • Alyssa Leverette (legal staff)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
    Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
  • Kimberly Rubly (witness)
    Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
  • Sean K. Moynihan (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
    Recipient of Order

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order

Other Participants

  • Sarah Nelson (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Patrick Straney (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Dennis Ottley (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election

Michael D. Pursley vs. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association,

Case Summary

Case ID20F-H2019004-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-12-04
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner on both counts. It was found that the HOA violated statutes by failing to hold annual meetings in 2017 and 2018 and failing to timely respond to records requests. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $1,000.00 filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded$1,000.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerMichael D. PursleyCounsel
RespondentSycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc.CounselMaxwell T. Riddiough

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner on both counts. It was found that the HOA violated statutes by failing to hold annual meetings in 2017 and 2018 and failing to timely respond to records requests. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $1,000.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to hold annual meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to hold annual meetings. Respondent admitted to not holding meetings in 2017 and 2018 due to a belief that a quorum could not be established.

Orders: Violation found. Respondent ordered to comply (implied via prevailing party status).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Failure to timely provide records

Petitioner alleged Respondent repeatedly failed to provide requested community documents within the statutory timeframe. Respondent eventually provided documents but not within the required time.

Orders: Violation found.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Related election workflow tool

Many HOA election disputes start with preventable workflow problems: unclear ballot language, separate-vote issues, quorum tracking, paper/online reconciliation, proxy handling, or incomplete records. HOABallot is a separate platform built to document the voting workflow from notice through certification.

Preview HOABallot election workflows

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019004-REL Decision – 757066.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:22:35 (89.0 KB)

Briefing Document: Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document details the administrative law proceedings and subsequent decision in the case of Michael D. Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 20F-H2019004-REL). The matter, heard on October 18, 2019, centered on allegations that the Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc. (the HOA), violated Arizona Revised Statutes regarding the conduct of annual meetings and the timely provision of community records to its members.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Respondent failed to comply with its statutory obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Consequently, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party and the HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,000.00.


Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Mandatory Annual Meeting Requirements

The primary legal dispute involved the HOA's failure to hold annual member meetings in 2017 and 2018. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), an association is strictly required to hold a meeting of the members at least once each year.

The Respondent acknowledged the failure but offered a defense based on practical constraints: because the subdivision's lots were largely undeveloped and uninhabited, the HOA believed it could not achieve a quorum. However, the ALJ found this defense insufficient to waive the statutory requirement. Compliance was eventually achieved in 2019 only after a corporate entity purchased enough lots to satisfy quorum requirements.

2. Timeliness of Records Production

The second core issue was the Respondent’s failure to provide governing documents and financial statements within the legally mandated timeframe. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) grants associations a maximum of ten business days to fulfill requests for the examination or copying of records.

The evidence demonstrated a significant delay in the HOA's response to the Petitioner:

Date of RequestMethodContent Requested
January 20, 2019LetterCC&Rs
April 6, 2019Certified LetterCC&Rs
June 21, 2019Certified LetterCC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Bylaws, Financial Statement

The HOA did not provide the documents via email until June 27, 2019—five months after the initial request and significantly beyond the ten-day limit following the final certified letter.

3. Burden of Proof and Legal Standards

In this administrative proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the allegations by a "preponderance of the evidence." The court applied the standard definition: evidence that shows the fact sought to be proved is "more probable than not." Given the Respondent's admissions regarding the lack of meetings and the documented timeline of the records requests, the ALJ determined the Petitioner successfully met this burden.


Important Quotes with Context

Statutory Mandates

"A meeting of the members' association shall be held at least once each year." — A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)

  • Context: This quote establishes the non-discretionary nature of annual meetings, which the Respondent failed to adhere to for two consecutive years.

"The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination. On request for purchase of copies of records… the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records." — A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

  • Context: This excerpt outlines the strict window of time an HOA has to respond to a member's request for information, a timeline the Respondent exceeded in this case.
Defense and Findings

"Respondent’s witness indicated that because the lots were undeveloped and no one was living in the association, Respondent believed it would be unable to have the number of owners present to make a quorum necessary to hold the annual meeting." — Findings of Fact, Paragraph 11

  • Context: This explains the Respondent’s rationale for skipping meetings, which the court ultimately found did not excuse the statutory violation.

"Petitioner initially denied having received the June 27, 2019 email that included the requested documents, but acknowledged that Respondent did email the documents to him even if he did not see them when they were sent to him." — Findings of Fact, Paragraph 10

  • Context: This clarifies that while documents were eventually provided, the provision occurred only after multiple requests and the initiation of the dispute process.

Actionable Insights

Based on the findings and the final order in this matter, the following insights are relevant for the management of homeowners associations:

  • Quorum Challenges Do Not Excuse Non-Compliance: HOAs must attempt to hold annual meetings regardless of development status or anticipated quorum issues to remain in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1804(B).
  • Strict Adherence to the 10-Day Records Rule: Once a member submits a written request for records, the association has a maximum of ten business days to provide the materials. Failure to do so, even if the records are eventually provided, constitutes a statutory violation.
  • Certified Mail as a Trigger: The use of certified mail by a member provides a clear, evidentiary timeline for records requests. Management companies should treat these as high-priority to avoid administrative litigation.
  • Financial Risk of Litigation: While the ALJ did not find a civil penalty appropriate in this specific case, the Respondent was still ordered to pay the Petitioner's $1,000 filing fee. This demonstrates the direct financial cost of failing to address member requests and statutory requirements in a timely manner.
  • Permissible Copying Fees: Per A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), while an association cannot charge for making materials available for review, they are entitled to charge a fee of no more than fifteen cents ($0.15) per page for physical copies.

Study Guide: Michael D. Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Michael D. Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019004-REL). It covers key legal concepts regarding Arizona Homeowners Association (HOA) regulations, the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and the statutory requirements for association transparency and governance.


Key Legal Concepts and Statutes

The case centers on the interpretation and application of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) regarding the conduct of homeowners associations and the rights of their members.

1. Mandatory Annual Meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804)

Under Arizona law, specifically A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), a homeowners association is mandated to hold a meeting of the members at least once every year. The failure to hold such a meeting constitutes a violation of the statute, regardless of internal logistical challenges such as a lack of quorum.

2. Member Access to Records (A.R.S. § 33-1805)

Members of an association have a statutory right to examine and copy association records. Key provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) include:

  • Reasonable Availability: All financial and other records must be made available for examination by a member or their designated representative.
  • Response Timeframe: The association has exactly ten business days to fulfill a request for examination or to provide copies of requested records.
  • Cost Limitations: Associations are prohibited from charging for the review of materials. If a member requests copies, the association may charge a fee of no more than fifteen cents per page.
3. Burden of Proof and Legal Standards
  • Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) has the authority to hear disputes between property owners and associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: In these administrative proceedings, the Petitioner (the homeowner) bears the burden of proof. They must prove their case by a "preponderance of the evidence," meaning the evidence shows the facts sought to be proved are "more probable than not."

Case Summary: Findings and Conclusions

The Dispute

Petitioner Michael D. Pursley, a member of the Sycamore Vista No. 7 HOA, filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate alleging two primary violations:

  1. The Respondent failed to hold annual meetings in 2017 and 2018.
  2. The Respondent failed to timely provide requested community documents (CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Bylaws, and Financial Statements) after multiple requests made in early 2019.
The Respondent’s Defense

The HOA acknowledged it did not hold the 2017 and 2018 meetings. Their defense was based on the fact that the lots were undeveloped and no residents were living in the association, leading them to believe they could not achieve a quorum (the minimum number of members required to conduct business). By 2019, a corporate entity had purchased enough lots to meet quorum requirements.

The Tribunal’s Decision

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner on both counts:

  • Meeting Violation: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold meetings for two consecutive years.
  • Records Violation: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide the requested records within the required ten-business-day window. While the records were eventually sent via email on June 27, 2019, this occurred months after the initial January and April requests.

Final Order:

  • Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party.
  • The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $1,000.00 filing fee.
  • No additional civil penalty was assessed.

Short-Answer Practice Questions

Q1: According to A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), how frequently must an HOA hold a members' meeting?

  • A: At least once each year.

Q2: What is the maximum per-page fee an HOA can charge for copies of records?

  • A: Fifteen cents ($0.15) per page.

Q3: How many business days does an association have to fulfill a request for records examination or copies?

  • A: Ten business days.

Q4: What reason did Sycamore Vista No. 7 HOA provide for not holding meetings in 2017 and 2018?

  • A: The lots were undeveloped and no one was living there, so the HOA believed it could not reach a quorum.

Q5: Who bears the burden of proof in an HOA dispute hearing, and what is the required standard of evidence?

  • A: The Petitioner bears the burden of proof by a "preponderance of the evidence."

Q6: What was the specific financial penalty/reimbursement ordered by the ALJ in this case?

  • A: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner his $1,000.00 filing fee.

Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. Statutory Compliance vs. Practical Constraints: Analyze the HOA’s defense regarding the lack of quorum due to undeveloped lots. Why did the ALJ find this defense insufficient to excuse the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)? Discuss the importance of maintaining statutory governance even in the early stages of a development.
  1. The Significance of Timely Disclosure: In this case, the Petitioner eventually received the requested documents. Explore why the law mandates a strict ten-business-day response time under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and the potential impact on homeowners when associations fail to meet this timeline.
  1. The Role of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): Based on the document, describe the process of an administrative hearing for HOA disputes. Evaluate how the ALJ weighs evidence (such as the "preponderance of the evidence" standard) to reach a conclusion when facts—such as the receipt of an email—are initially contested.

Glossary of Important Terms

TermDefinition
A.R.S.Arizona Revised Statutes; the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
CC&RsCovenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules for a planned community.
PetitionerThe party who initiates a lawsuit or petition (in this case, Michael D. Pursley).
RespondentThe party against whom a petition is filed (in this case, Sycamore Vista No. 7 HOA).
QuorumThe minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Preponderance of the EvidenceA legal standard of proof meaning that the evidence as a whole shows the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)An official who presides over an administrative hearing and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Business DaysFor the purposes of records requests, these are the days during which the association must fulfill requests, excluding weekends and holidays (implied by the ten-day limit).
Governing DocumentsThe collective set of rules for the association, including CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Rules and Regulations.

Understanding Your Rights: A Lesson in HOA Accountability from Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7

1. Introduction: When Homeowners Take a Stand

As an expert in HOA compliance and an advocate for homeowner rights, I frequently see Boards of Directors acting as if state statutes are merely "suggestions." For many homeowners, dealing with an unresponsive association feels like shouting into a void. You pay your assessments and follow the CC&Rs, but when you ask for basic transparency, you’re met with silence or excuses.

The case of Michael D. Pursley vs. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc. is a landmark reminder that you do not have to accept Board negligence. This case demonstrates how a single, persistent homeowner held his association accountable through the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) dispute process. If your Board is skipping annual meetings or gatekeeping records, this ruling provides the roadmap for asserting your rights.

2. The Core Obligations: What the Law Requires

In Arizona, the operations of a Planned Community are governed by strict statutory mandates. Boards often plead ignorance, but as a homeowner, you must know that these requirements are non-negotiable legal duties.

Statute NumberMandatory Association Action
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)A meeting of the members' association shall be held at least once each year.
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)Fulfill requests to examine or provide copies of association records within ten business days.

Note for Homeowners: These statutes are part of the Arizona Planned Communities Act. They do not say a Board "should" hold a meeting; they say a meeting shall be held.

3. The Case Study: A Timeline of Non-Compliance

The dispute in Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 provides a textbook example of how "administrative friction" is used to discourage homeowners. Mr. Pursley’s journey to obtain basic governing documents spanned nearly half a year:

  • January 20, 2019: Initial request for CC&Rs sent to the management company.
  • April 6, 2019: After receiving no response, Pursley sent a certified letter repeating the request.
  • June 21, 2019: A second certified letter was sent, expanding the request to include Rules and Regulations, Bylaws, and Financial Statements.
  • June 27, 2019: The Association finally emailed the documents—five months after the initial request.

The "Expert" Insight on Deadlines: Interestingly, during the hearing, Mr. Pursley argued that the Association failed to provide documents within 20 business days. In a win for homeowners, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) corrected this: under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), the Association actually only has 10 business days to comply. The law is even stricter than the Petitioner realized.

4. The Judge’s Ruling: Transparency Prevails

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer found that the Association’s excuses did not hold up under legal scrutiny. The Petitioner successfully proved his case by a "preponderance of the evidence," meaning he showed it was more probable than not that the violations occurred.

Proven Violations:

  • Failure to Hold Meetings: The Association admitted it held no annual meetings in 2017 or 2018, a direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B).
  • Failure to Provide Timely Records: The Association failed the 10-business-day statutory deadline for record production.

The Financial Outcome: The Judge designated Mr. Pursley as the prevailing party and ordered the Association to pay his $1,000.00 filing fee within 30 days. However, as an expert consultant, I must set a realistic expectation: the ALJ noted that "No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate." This process is designed for compliance and cost recovery, not for homeowners to collect "damages" or punitive fines.

5. Why "Quorum" and "Development" Aren't Excuses

The Association attempted to justify its failure to hold meetings by claiming that because the lots were undeveloped and no one was living there, they believed they couldn't achieve a quorum. They only held a meeting in 2019 after a corporate entity purchased enough lots to guarantee a quorum.

The ALJ rejected this logic entirely. A Board cannot wait for a "friendly" corporate developer to arrive before fulfilling its duty to the individual homeowners already in the association. The statutory requirement to hold a meeting "at least once each year" is absolute. If you are the only resident in a sea of empty lots, you still have the right to an annual meeting.

6. Conclusion: Key Takeaways for Every Homeowner

The Pursley case is a victory for the "little guy," but it also highlights the necessity of a professional approach to disputes.

Expert Actionable Takeaways:

  1. Certified Mail is Your Best Friend: Mr. Pursley’s use of certified mail created an indisputable paper trail. Never rely on phone calls or unconfirmed emails.
  2. Maintain a Detailed Interaction Log: Beyond mail, keep a log of every date, time, and person you speak with regarding records. This is your "evidence" if you end up before a judge.
  3. The 10-Day Rule is Powerful: Do not let management companies tell you they need "a few weeks." The clock starts when they receive the request, and they have 10 business days. Period.
  4. Use the OAH Process: Traditional litigation is expensive and slow. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) provides access to specialized judges who understand HOA law, making it a more cost-effective and viable path for members.

Transparency is not a courtesy—it is a right. When Boards fail to follow state statutes, they undermine the community's trust. By knowing the law and documenting every step, you can ensure your association remains accountable to the people it serves.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael D. Pursley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Maxwell T. Riddiough (respondent representative)
    Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Represented the Respondent
  • Bradley P. Miller (Statutory Agent)
    Sycamore Vista No 7 HOA, Inc.
    Listed on transmission list

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on transmission list
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transmitted the decision

Vicky Glover v. Foothills Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID19F-H1919046-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-05-30
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding both the DRC's restriction on speaking during specific deliberations and the use of email communications for non-regularly scheduled committee business.
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerVicky GloverCounsel
RespondentFoothills Community AssociationCounselB. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding both the DRC's restriction on speaking during specific deliberations and the use of email communications for non-regularly scheduled committee business.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically because the DRC's restrictions on speaking were deemed reasonable, and email communications were not considered 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' requiring public access.

Key Issues & Findings

Open Meetings and Member Right to Speak (DRC and Email Meetings)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by denying her the ability to speak at DRC meetings on other members’ requests, and by conducting deliberations and making decisions via email outside of regularly scheduled meetings.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Design Review Committee, Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Email Meetings, A.R.S. 33-1804
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

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Video Overview

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Decision Documents

19F-H1919046-REL Decision – 712028.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:19:00 (94.0 KB)

Briefing Document: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (Case No. 19F-H1919046-REL)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Vicky Glover versus the Foothills Community Association (FCA), where the petitioner’s claims were denied. The petitioner alleged that the FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) violated Arizona’s open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on two fronts: first, by conducting unannounced “email meetings” to vote on non-emergency matters, and second, by preventing members from speaking at appropriate times during regularly scheduled DRC meetings.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Tammy L. Eigenheer, concluded that the petitioner failed to prove any statutory violation. The decision rested on a strict textual interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. Regarding speaking rights, the ALJ determined that while members have a right to speak at an “appropriate time” in committee meetings, the more specific right to speak on an agenda item before a formal vote applies exclusively to Board of Directors meetings, not committee meetings. The judge found it was reasonable for the DRC to rule that a member speaking on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”

Concerning the email communications, the ALJ ruled that they do not constitute “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as defined by the statute. Because the email discussions and decisions did not occur at a set weekly, monthly, or quarterly time, they are not subject to the open meeting requirements. The general state policy favoring open meetings was found to be subordinate to the specific statutory language. The petition was therefore denied in its entirety.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

This case involved a dispute between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the application of Arizona’s open meeting laws to a committee of the association.

Name / Entity

Representation / Title

Petitioner

Vicky Glover

Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent

Foothills Community Association (FCA)

B. Austin Baillio (Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.)

Adjudicator

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Administrative Law Judge

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings

Phoenix, Arizona

Case Timeline

December 13, 2018 & January 9, 2019: Petitioner attends and records DRC meetings where the alleged violations occurred.

January 23, 2019: Vicky Glover files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

January 28, 2019: The Department issues a notice to the FCA regarding the petition.

May 10, 2019: An administrative hearing is held.

May 30, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.

——————————————————————————–

Petitioner’s Allegations

The petitioner, Vicky Glover, alleged that the Foothills Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804 in two specific ways:

1. Improper Email Meetings: The FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) held unannounced meetings via email to vote on non-emergency matters, which should have been handled in open, public meetings.

2. Denial of Speaking Rights: The DRC refused to allow community members, including the petitioner, to speak at an appropriate time during its regularly scheduled meetings, specifically when she wished to speak on other members’ pending requests.

Key Factual Findings

The facts underlying the petition were not in dispute by the parties during the hearing. The key findings of fact established were:

Organizational Structure:

◦ The FCA Board of Directors is comprised of seven members and meets on the fourth Wednesday of the month at 6:00 p.m.

◦ The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, is comprised of five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets on the second Wednesday of the month at 2:00 p.m.

Events at DRC Meetings:

◦ On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Vicky Glover attended and recorded DRC meetings.

◦ During these meetings, she was not permitted to speak on issues being discussed related to other members’ pending requests.

Use of Email by the DRC:

◦ During meetings, DRC members mentioned that additional information for certain requests would be shared via email after the meeting.

◦ Based on this emailed information, DRC members would approve or deny the request.

◦ Decisions made via email between meetings were formally “ratified” at the subsequent DRC meeting.

◦ FCA Manager Pat Wontor testified, denying that the DRC took initial action via email, asserting instead that emails were only used to gather additional information on matters that had already been discussed in an open meeting.

DRC Policies: A request submitted to the DRC is deemed approved if it is not denied within 60 days.

——————————————————————————–

Legal Analysis and Judge’s Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on a strict interpretation of the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The petitioner bore the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so on both counts.

I. Member Speaking Rights at Committee Meetings

The judge analyzed the petitioner’s claim that she was wrongfully denied the right to speak at DRC meetings.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) states that at “any regularly scheduled committee meetings… all members… shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge found a critical distinction within the statute’s text. A later clause specifies that “the board… shall permit a member… to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item.”

Conclusion: The judge ruled that this specific right to speak on an item before a vote applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors, not to committee meetings. For committee meetings, the standard is the more general “appropriate time.” The ALJ concluded it was reasonable for the DRC to determine that having one member speak on another member’s private application was not an “appropriate time.” Therefore, the DRC’s refusal to allow the petitioner to speak did not violate the statute.

II. Email Deliberations and “Meetings”

The judge next addressed the claim that email communications constituted illegal, non-public meetings.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) mandates that open meeting rules apply to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.”

ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge concluded that the email discussions, deliberations, and decisions among DRC members did not meet the definition of “regularly scheduled.” These communications did not occur at a set time on a recurring basis (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly). While they could be considered a form of meeting, they were not regularly scheduled ones.

Effect of State Policy: The judge acknowledged the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which expresses a legislative preference for open meetings. However, the judge ruled that this general policy “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

Conclusion: Because the email communications were not regularly scheduled, they did not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, and no violation occurred.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal analysis, the Administrative Law Judge found that the petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties. A party may file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.

Study Guide: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (No. 19F-H1919046-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Vicky Glover (Petitioner) and the Foothills Community Association (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the source document.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions based on the provided legal decision. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two specific violations of state statutes that the Petitioner alleged?

3. Describe the composition and meeting schedules of the Board of Directors and the Design Review Committee (DRC).

4. What specific action did the Petitioner take during the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019?

5. According to the decision, what was the DRC’s practice regarding decisions made via email between meetings?

6. What is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how does the decision define it?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statutory phrase “an appropriate time” for a member to speak during a committee meeting?

8. Why did the Judge conclude that the DRC’s email communications did not violate the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804?

9. What was the final ruling, or Order, issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

10. What recourse did the parties have if they disagreed with the Judge’s order?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Vicky Glover, the Petitioner who filed the complaint, and the Foothills Community Association (FCA), the Respondent homeowners association. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer in the Office of Administrative Hearings.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated state statutes by holding unannounced email meetings to vote on non-emergency matters. She also alleged that the Respondent would not allow community members to speak at appropriate times during Design Review Committee (DRC) meetings.

3. The Board of Directors has seven members and meets at 6:00 p.m. on the fourth Wednesday of the month. The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, has five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets at 2:00 p.m. on the second Wednesday of the month.

4. During the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, the Petitioner attended and recorded the proceedings. She was not allowed to speak on other members’ pending requests during these meetings.

5. The DRC would gather additional information via email after a meeting and members would then approve or deny the request via email. Any decisions made via email between DRC meetings were then “ratified” at the next formal DRC meeting.

6. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.

7. The Judge determined that the statute does not define what constitutes “an appropriate time” to speak at a committee meeting. Therefore, it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that the deliberation regarding a different member’s request was not an appropriate time for the Petitioner to speak.

8. The Judge concluded that email communications are not “regularly scheduled committee meetings” because they do not occur at a set time on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Since A.R.S. § 33-1804 only requires regularly scheduled committee meetings to be open, the email discussions were not a violation.

9. The final Order was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), the order is binding unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer-form essay responses to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case details and legal reasoning. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s statutory construction of A.R.S. § 33-1804. How does the judge distinguish between the open meeting requirements for Board of Directors meetings versus committee meetings, and what role does the “plain language” of the statute play in this interpretation?

2. Discuss the two central allegations made by Vicky Glover. For each allegation, detail the undisputed facts of the events and explain the specific legal reasoning the judge used to conclude that no statutory violation occurred.

3. Examine the conflict between the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)) and the specific statutory language governing committee meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)). How did the judge resolve this apparent conflict in her final decision?

4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the operational procedures of the Design Review Committee, including its use of email for decision-making and subsequent ratification. How did these procedures become central to the legal dispute?

5. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the standard of “preponderance of the evidence” shape the proceedings, and why was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Petitioner “did not establish” a violation critical to the final order?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer, the judge who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The Arizona Revised Statute that the Petitioner alleged was violated. It governs open meetings for planned communities, including member associations, boards of directors, and regularly scheduled committees.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed her petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the Foothills Community Association, comprised of seven members. It appoints the Design Review Committee.

Design Review Committee (DRC)

A five-member committee appointed by the Board of Directors. Two of its members are also on the Board. The DRC’s meetings were the subject of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Foothills Community Association (FCA)

The Respondent in the case. An association of homeowners located in Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

Vicky Glover, who filed a petition on January 23, 2019, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Foothills Community Association.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof required of the Petitioner. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Ratified

The term used to describe the process where decisions made by the DRC via email between meetings were formally approved at the next DRC meeting.

Regularly scheduled committee meetings

The specific type of meeting subject to the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that email communications do not meet this definition as they do not occur at a set time.

Respondent

The Foothills Community Association (FCA), against which the petition was filed. Represented in the hearing by B. Austin Baillio.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting a statute. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the plain text of the statute.

3 Shocking Loopholes in HOA ‘Open Meeting’ Laws This Homeowner Discovered the Hard Way

Introduction: The Illusion of Transparency

For anyone living in a homeowner’s association (HOA), there’s a fundamental expectation: the business of the community is conducted in the open. We assume that as members, we have a right to attend meetings, understand the decisions being made, and voice our opinions before our board takes action.

But a startling court decision from an Arizona Administrative Law Judge throws a wrench in that assumption. One homeowner’s legal challenge against her association didn’t just fail—it inadvertently created a roadmap for how HOAs can legally operate behind closed doors, affecting millions of residents in planned communities.

This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from this legal battle, revealing how the specific wording of the law can create major gaps in transparency and challenge everything you thought you knew about your rights as a homeowner.

1. Your Right to Speak is Weaker Than You Think—Especially in Committee Meetings

Most homeowners believe they have a protected right to speak on any agenda item at any official HOA meeting. The case of petitioner Vicky Glover shows this is a dangerous assumption.

On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Ms. Glover attended meetings of her community’s Design Review Committee (DRC) and was not permitted to speak about other members’ pending architectural requests. She argued this violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities (A.R.S. § 33-1804).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), however, pointed out a critical distinction in the law’s text. The statute explicitly guarantees a member the right “to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action.” This specific right, the ALJ concluded, applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors.

For committee meetings, the law sets a much vaguer standard, requiring only that members “be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The ALJ found it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that having Ms. Glover speak on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”

This is a crucial distinction because committees—like architectural, design, or finance committees—often make the decisions that most directly impact homeowners’ property and daily lives. Yet, this ruling clarifies that the guaranteed right to be heard before a vote is taken is significantly weaker in those very forums.

2. “Email Meetings” Can Be a Legal Way to Sidestep Open Meeting Rules

The common understanding of open meeting laws is that they exist to prevent boards and committees from deliberating and making decisions in private. But what if the meeting doesn’t happen in a room, but in an email chain?

Ms. Glover’s second claim was that the DRC was conducting business and making decisions via email between its official meetings. Evidence showed that after a meeting, additional information would be shared with committee members who could then “approve or deny the request… via email.” The association’s manager, Pat Wontor, denied this, claiming emails were only used to gather information on matters already discussed in a meeting.

The ALJ’s conclusion on this matter was stunning and sidestepped the conflicting testimony entirely. The Arizona open meeting law in question only applies to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” Because email exchanges do not occur at a set, scheduled time—like the second Wednesday of the month—the judge ruled they do not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, regardless of their content.

The implication of this loophole is profound. It allows a committee to conduct significant deliberation and decision-making entirely outside of public view. This practice can turn the open meeting into a hollow formality. A committee can present a “done deal” for public ratification, rendering the member’s right to observe and speak effectively meaningless. The public meeting becomes a theatrical rubber stamp for a decision already made in secret.

3. The “Spirit of the Law” Doesn’t Beat the Letter of the Law

Many laws contain a policy statement that outlines their overarching goal—the “spirit of the law.” Arizona’s statute on HOA meetings has an exceptionally strong one, stating that all meetings should be open and that the law should be interpreted to favor transparency. The text explicitly declares:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.” (from A.R.S. § 33-1804(F))

Ms. Glover and many homeowners would read this and assume it guarantees broad transparency. The ALJ, however, ruled that this powerful policy statement “does not override the specific provisions” of the law.

In other words, the literal, specific text—like the distinction between “board” and “committee” meetings, or the “regularly scheduled” requirement—takes precedence over the law’s general intent.

This is perhaps the most important lesson for all homeowners. Relying on the assumed purpose or “spirit” of a rule is not enough. In a legal dispute, the precise, technical wording is what matters most. It highlights the critical importance for homeowners to read and understand the exact text of state statutes and their own governing documents, because the loopholes are often found in the fine print.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense

While Vicky Glover lost her petition, her case provides an invaluable education for every member of a community association. It is a stark warning that transparency in an HOA is not a guaranteed principle but a legal standard with specific, and at times counter-intuitive, boundaries that can be exploited.

The loopholes her case exposed reveal a sobering reality: your right to speak is conditional, “meetings” can legally occur out of sight in an email chain, and the stated “spirit” of the law can be rendered toothless by its literal text. HOA governance is not guided by general principles of fairness, but by very specific legal language.

Given these loopholes, it’s worth asking: How many of the most important decisions in your community are happening in an inbox instead of the boardroom?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Vicky Glover (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • B. Austin Baillio (respondent attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
  • Pat Wontor (manager)
    Manager for DRC/Foothills Community Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Del Sol (staff/clerk)
    Transmitting staff

Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla vs. Village of Oakcreek Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID18F-H1817018-REL-RHG
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-01-09
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.
Filing Fees Refunded$1,500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerScott Servilla & Heidi H ServillaCounsel
RespondentVillage of Oakcreek AssociationCounselMark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.

Why this result: Petitioner waived the right to object to the ballot defect (Issue 2) by allowing the vote to proceed without objection, and failed to prove the claims for Issues 1 and 3.

Key Issues & Findings

Vote count required to amend declaration

Petitioner requested an order declaring the amendment invalid due to insufficient vote count.

Orders: Claim failed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Absence of separate voting opportunity for proposed actions

Petitioner sought an order declaring the amendment invalid because the ballot improperly required a single vote on two separate actions.

Orders: Claim denied on rehearing. Petition denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
  • Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297
  • Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114

Unauthorized fines in excess of $50

Petitioner requested an order that the Association cannot levy fines in excess of $50 per violation.

Orders: Claim failed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA elections, absentee ballots, waiver doctrine, amendment procedure, fines
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2)
  • Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297
  • Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 673729.pdf

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18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 673828.pdf

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18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 680738.pdf

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Briefing Document: Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association (Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Scott S. Servilla versus the Village of Oakcreek Association. The final order, issued on January 9, 2019, following a rehearing, denied the petitioner’s claims. The central issue revolved around a homeowners association vote held on November 10, 2016, where two distinct amendments—one concerning property leasing and another a schedule of fines—were combined into a single item on the ballot.

The petitioner argued this ballot format violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A), which requires a separate opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action. However, the ALJ’s decision did not rule on the merits of this statutory violation. Instead, the petition was denied based on the legal doctrine of waiver. The ALJ concluded that the petitioner, having received the allegedly defective ballot more than a month before the vote, had forfeited his right to challenge the procedure by failing to raise any objection until after the vote was completed and the unfavorable outcome was known. The decision heavily relies on the precedent set by the Arizona Supreme Court in Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, which established that a party cannot knowingly allow a flawed election to proceed and then protest only after receiving an undesirable result. The ALJ’s decision is binding, with any appeal required to be filed in superior court.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was a dispute brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the validity of an amendment to the association’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla

Respondent

Village of Oakcreek Association

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

November 29, 2018

Record Held Open Until

December 20, 2018

Decision Issued

January 9, 2019

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Petition: On or about November 13, 2017, Scott S. Servilla filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Village of Oakcreek Association, an HOA with 2436 homeowners.

2. Expansion of Claims: The petitioner initially filed a single-issue petition with a $500 fee but was ordered by the ALJ to either specify the single issue or pay for a multi-issue hearing. The petitioner paid an additional $1,000 and proceeded with three distinct claims.

3. First ALJ Decision: Following an initial hearing, the ALJ found that the petitioner failed to prove two of his three claims. On the second claim—the improper ballot format—the judge found a statutory violation had occurred but concluded that “because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism to the Administrative Law Judge, no remedy could be ordered.”

4. Request for Rehearing: The petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration, arguing that the conclusion of “no remedy” was contrary to law.

5. Rehearing Granted: On or about September 21, 2018, the Commissioner for the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing, which was held on November 29, 2018.

III. The Central Dispute: The November 10, 2016 Vote

The core of the dispute was the validity of a vote taken during a Special Meeting of Members on November 10, 2016.

Bundled Amendments: The vote’s stated purpose was to approve the “Leasing and Schedule of Fines Assessment.” This single proposal combined two separate and substantive changes to the Master Declaration:

1. Addition of Section 4.23: Leasing of Lots and Units; Restrictions and Limitations, which established a minimum lease term of 30 days and prohibited leasing less than an entire unit.

2. Replacement of Section 5.08: Schedule of Fines, which permitted the association’s committee to adopt a new schedule specifying fines for violations.

Ballot Format: The absentee ballot provided members with only a single voting choice: “FOR THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT” or “AGAINST THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT.”

Statutory Violation Alleged: The petitioner contended this format violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A), which requires that a ballot “shall set forth each proposed action” and “shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

Vote Outcome: A total of 1,067 ballots were received (approximately 44% of members). Of those, 564 voted in favor of the amendment, constituting approximately 53% of the votes cast.

IV. Key Arguments at Rehearing

Statutory Violation: The ballot was legally defective because it combined two distinct proposed actions into one vote, denying members the right to vote on each separately as required by statute.

Evidence of Dissent: The petitioner argued that a subsequent vote in April 2017, in which members rejected a proposal to eliminate the By-Laws’ $50 fine limit, demonstrated that “had the proposed amendment been broken into two parts, the part of the proposed amendment dealing with the fines most likely would have failed.”

Requested Remedy: The petitioner argued that based on case law, the ALJ was authorized to declare the entire amendment void and unenforceable.

Waiver of Objection: The respondent’s primary argument was that the petitioner had waived any right to object to the ballot format. The petitioner received the absentee ballot on or about October 4, 2016, but did not raise an objection until April 2017, long after the November 10, 2016 vote was completed.

Lack of Enforcement Provision: The respondent also maintained its earlier position that even if a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(2) occurred, the statute itself provides no enforcement mechanism or remedy.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s final decision denied the petitioner’s petition in its entirety, based solely on the legal principle of waiver.

The ALJ found that the petitioner’s failure to object to the ballot’s format in a timely manner was fatal to his claim.

Awareness of Defect: The petitioner received the absentee ballot on October 4, 2016, over a month before the November 10, 2016 vote. This provided sufficient time to identify the procedural issue and raise an objection.

Failure to Act: By not objecting before the vote, the petitioner allowed the flawed process to proceed. He only lodged a complaint after the results were not in his favor.

Forfeiture of Rights: The ALJ concluded, “As Petitioner was or should have been aware of the alleged issues with the ballot, he waived his right to bring forth a complaint about the ballot when he allowed the vote to proceed on November 10, 2016.”

The decision rested on the Arizona Supreme Court case Zajac v. City of Casa Grande (2004), which itself relied on Allen v. State (1913). This precedent establishes that a party cannot remain silent about a known procedural defect in an election process and then challenge the process only after an unfavorable outcome.

Key Principle: The ALJ articulated the principle from Zajac: “one cannot knowingly let a defective vote proceed only to complain and seek redress if the results are not to the individual’s liking.”

Direct Quotation: The decision directly quotes the ruling in Zajac to finalize its point: “He cannot have it both ways; that is, he cannot allow the [vote] to proceed without objection, and then be permitted thereafter to assert his protest.”

Petition Denied: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

Binding Decision: As the decision was issued as a result of a rehearing, it is legally binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any party wishing to appeal the order must file for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served (January 9, 2019).

Study Guide: Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association (Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal case involving Petitioner Scott Servilla and Respondent Village of Oakcreek Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision of January 9, 2019. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, a corresponding answer key, suggested essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based entirely on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what roles did they play?

2. What were the two distinct proposed changes that were combined into a single voting item on the November 10, 2016 absentee ballot?

3. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute did the Petitioner allege was violated by the format of the ballot, and what does that statute require?

4. What was the numerical outcome of the November 10, 2016 vote on the proposed amendment?

5. What was the Respondent’s primary legal argument for why the Petitioner’s complaint about the faulty ballot should be dismissed?

6. What key legal precedent, specifically the case of Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rely upon in the final decision?

7. According to the decision, when did the Petitioner receive the ballot, and why was this date critical to the ALJ’s final ruling?

8. What was the finding in the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision regarding the ballot issue, and why did it lead to a request for a rehearing?

9. Describe the separate vote that occurred in April 2017 and explain how the Petitioner used it to support his argument regarding the 2016 vote.

10. What was the final order issued by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer on January 9, 2019, and what was the legal basis for this order?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Scott S. Servilla (who appeared on his own behalf), and the Respondent, the Village of Oakcreek Association (a homeowners association represented by Mark Sahl). The Petitioner filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. The two proposed changes were the addition of a new section, 4.23, concerning “Leasing of Lots and Units; Restrictions and Limitations,” and the complete replacement of an existing section, 5.08, titled “Schedule of Fines.” The ballot presented these as a single item called the “LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT.”

3. The Petitioner alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(2) and A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2). The statute requires that an absentee ballot “shall set forth each proposed action” and “shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

4. A total of 1067 ballots were received, representing approximately 44 percent of the members. Of those who voted, 564 (approximately 53 percent) voted in favor of the proposed amendment.

5. The Respondent’s primary argument was that the Petitioner had waived any right to object to the ballot’s format. The Respondent contended that the Petitioner should have raised his objection before the vote occurred, rather than waiting until after the results were known.

6. The ALJ relied on the precedent set in Zajac v. City of Casa Grande. This Arizona Supreme Court case established the principle that an individual aware of a procedural issue with an election cannot wait to see the results before lodging a complaint.

7. The Petitioner acknowledged receiving the absentee ballot on or about October 4, 2016, more than a month before the November 10, 2016 vote. This date was critical because it demonstrated that the Petitioner had ample time to object to the ballot’s format before the vote took place, supporting the ALJ’s waiver finding.

8. In the initial decision, the ALJ found that a violation of the statute had occurred regarding the ballot but concluded that no remedy could be ordered because the statute lacked an enforcement mechanism. The Petitioner requested a rehearing, alleging that this conclusion was contrary to the law and that the ALJ did have the authority to declare the amendment void.

9. In April 2017, a separate proposed amendment to eliminate the By-Laws’ $50 fine limitation was voted down by the members. The Petitioner argued this subsequent vote demonstrated that the fines portion of the November 2016 amendment would likely have failed if members had been given a separate opportunity to vote on it.

10. The final order, issued January 9, 2019, denied the Petitioner’s petition. The legal basis was the doctrine of waiver; the ALJ ruled that because the Petitioner was aware of the alleged issues with the ballot before the vote and failed to object, he waived his right to complain about it after the results were announced.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive essay responses based on the details and legal reasoning presented in the source documents.

1. Explain the legal doctrine of waiver as applied in this case. How did the timeline of events, from the receipt of the ballot to the filing of the petition, support the Administrative Law Judge’s application of the principles from Zajac v. City of Casa Grande?

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of “proposed action” under A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Although the Judge ultimately ruled on procedural grounds, which party’s interpretation of the statute appears more consistent with the law’s text and intent?

3. Discuss the procedural history of this case, from the initial filing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate through the first decision, the request for reconsideration, and the final ruling on rehearing. What does this progression reveal about the administrative hearing process and the remedies available to petitioners?

4. The Petitioner attempted to use the results of an April 2017 vote to argue that the fines portion of the November 2016 amendment would likely have failed if voted on separately. Evaluate the strength and relevance of this argument within the legal context of the case.

5. Imagine the Petitioner had raised his objection to the ballot format before the November 10, 2016 vote. Based on the information in the decision, how might the proceedings and the ultimate outcome have been different?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The Petitioner alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 and § 33-1812.

Absentee Ballot

A ballot that allows a member to vote without being physically present at a meeting. The format of this ballot was the central issue of the rehearing.

By-Laws

The rules that govern the internal operations of an association. The Petitioner cited a violation of By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII concerning a $50 fine limit.

Department (The Department)

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency where the Petitioner first filed his petition against the homeowners association.

Master Declaration

A core governing document for a homeowners association that establishes rules, restrictions, and obligations for homeowners. The November 10, 2016 vote was to amend this document.

A formal, binding decision issued by a judge. The final document in this case was an order denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Scott Servilla & Heidi H. Servilla.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than the evidence offered in opposition.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case granted to reconsider the initial decision. A rehearing was granted after the Petitioner argued that the initial finding of “no remedy” was contrary to law.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Village of Oakcreek Association.

Waiver

A legal doctrine where a party intentionally or through inaction gives up a known right or claim. The ALJ ruled the Petitioner waived his right to object to the ballot by not raising the issue before the vote.

Zajac v. City of Casa Grande

An Arizona Supreme Court case that established a key legal precedent used in this decision. It holds that a party cannot knowingly allow a defective vote to proceed and then complain only if the results are unfavorable.

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{ “case”: { “agency”: “ADRE”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “docket_no”: “18F-H1817018-REL-RHG”, “case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla vs. Village of Oakcreek Association”, “decision_date”: “2019-01-09”, “alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer” }, “parties”: [ { “party_id”: “P1”, “role”: “petitioner”, “name”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla”, “party_type”: “homeowner”, “email”: null, “phone”: null, “attorney_name”: null, “attorney_firm”: null, “attorney_email”: null, “attorney_phone”: null }, { “party_id”: “R1”, “role”: “respondent”, “name”: “Village of Oakcreek Association”, “party_type”: “HOA”, “email”: null, “phone”: null, “attorney_name”: “Mark K. Sahl”, “attorney_firm”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”, “attorney_email”: null, “attorney_phone”: null } ], “issues”: [ { “issue_id”: “ISS-001”, “type”: “statute”, “citation”: “A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”, “caption”: “Failure to provide separate voting opportunity for each proposed action in absentee ballot”, “violation(s)”: “Written ballot used did not provide a separate opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action, violating A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2) and the Declaration12.”, “summary”: “Petitioner alleged the November 10, 2016 vote was invalid because the absentee ballot combined two distinct proposed amendments (Leasing restrictions and Schedule of Fines) into a single vote, contravening the requirement that ballots set forth and provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action1….”, “outcome”: “respondent_win”, “filing_fee_paid”: 500.0, “filing_fee_refunded”: false, “civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0, “orders_summary”: “Claim failed because Petitioner waived the right to object to the faulty ballot by allowing the vote to proceed without objection45.”, “why_the_loss”: “Petitioner was aware of the alleged issue with the ballot prior to the November 10, 2016 vote but failed to raise an objection, thus waiving the right to complain thereafter46.”, “cited”: [ “Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297” ] } ], “money_summary”: { “issues_count”: 3, “total_filing_fees_paid”: 1500.0, “total_filing_fees_refunded”: 0.0, “total_civil_penalties”: 0.0 }, “outcomes”: { “petitioner_is_hoa”: false, “petitioner_win”: “loss”, “summarize_judgement”: “The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition, finding that the Petitioner waived the right to challenge the outcome of the November 10, 2016 vote concerning the faulty ballot (Issue 2) because he failed to object before the vote proceeded. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims regarding the required vote count (Issue 1) and unauthorized fines (Issue 3)4….”, “why_the_loss”: “Petitioner waived the right to object to the ballot defect (Issue 2) by allowing the vote to proceed without objection after receiving the ballot, and failed to prove the claims for issues 1 and 34….” }, “analytics”: { “cited”: [ “A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)”, “A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2)”, “A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”, “Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”, “Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114” ], “tags”: [ “HOA elections”, “absentee ballots”, “waiver doctrine”, “amendment procedure”, “fines” ] } }

{ “rehearing”: { “is_rehearing”: true, “base_case_id”: “18F-H1817018-REL”, “original_decision_status”: “affirmed”, “original_decision_summary”: “In the original decision, the Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to prove claims regarding issues one and three1. For issue two (faulty ballot), the ALJ established a statutory violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2), but concluded that no remedy could be ordered because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism1.”, “rehearing_decision_summary”: “The Commissioner granted the rehearing to address the legal conclusion that no remedy could be ordered for the violation found in Issue 22. Following the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition3, concluding that Petitioner waived the right to complain about the faulty ballot because he was aware of the alleged issues but allowed the November 10, 2016 vote to proceed without objection4….”, “issues_challenged”: [ { “issue_number”: 2, “description”: “Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2) because the written ballot used did not provide a separate opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action7.”, “challenge”: “Petitioner challenged the original conclusion that no remedy could be ordered, alleging this was contrary to the law and arguing that the Administrative Law Judge was authorized to declare the amendment void and unenforceable28.”, “rehearing_outcome”: “Denied/Failed. The claim failed because the ALJ ruled that Petitioner waived his right to bring forth a complaint about the ballot by allowing the vote to proceed without objection36.” } ] } }

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “18F-H1817018-REL-RHG”, “case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla, Petitioner, vs. Village of Oakcreek Association, Respondent.”, “decision_date”: “January 9, 2019”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “individuals”: [ { “name”: “Scott Servilla”, “role”: “petitioner”, “side”: “petitioner”, “affiliation”: null, “notes”: “Also referred to as Scott S. Servilla” }, { “name”: “Heidi H Servilla”, “role”: “petitioner”, “side”: “petitioner”, “affiliation”: null, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”, “role”: “ALJ”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Office of Administrative Hearings”, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “Mark K. Sahl”, “role”: “attorney”, “side”: “respondent”, “affiliation”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “Judy Lowe”, “role”: “commissioner”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “c. serrano”, “role”: “staff”, “side”: “unknown”, “affiliation”: null, “notes”: “Transmitted documents” }, { “name”: “Felicia Del Sol”, “role”: “staff”, “side”: “unknown”, “affiliation”: null, “notes”: “Transmitted documents” } ] }

This document summarizes the administrative law judge decision in the rehearing case of Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association, Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG1. This matter was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer on November 29, 2018, with the record held open until December 20, 20181.

Procedural History (Original Decision vs. Rehearing)

Petitioner Scott Servilla filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) against the Village of Oakcreek Association (Respondent) alleging multiple violations of statute and the community’s Master Declaration2,3.

Original Decision: The Administrative Law Judge initially ruled on three issues4. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to prove two claims5. However, the ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2) regarding the written ballot, but concluded that because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism, no remedy could be ordered5.

Rehearing Grant: Following this initial decision, Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration, arguing the conclusion that no remedy existed was contrary to law6. The ADRE Commissioner granted the request for rehearing6.

Key Facts and Issue for Rehearing

The central issue during the rehearing concerned the statutory violation found in the original decision: whether the November 10, 2016 vote to amend the Master Declaration was invalid because the absentee ballot failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)4,7.

The Ballot Violation: A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) requires that absentee ballots set forth “each proposed action” and provide an opportunity to vote for or against “each proposed action”7. The Respondent’s proposed amendment bundled two distinct actions: the addition of leasing restrictions and the complete replacement of the Schedule of Fines8,9,10. The ballot only allowed members to vote “FOR” or “AGAINST THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT” as a single package9.

Key Legal Argument and Decision

At the rehearing, the core legal debate shifted from whether a violation occurred to whether the Petitioner was entitled to relief, specifically whether the ALJ could declare the amendment void and unenforceable6,11.

Respondent’s Defense and the Doctrine of Waiver: Respondent argued that Petitioner had waived the right to object because he did not raise any complaint about the defective ballot prior to the vote12. Petitioner received the ballot more than one month before the November 10, 2016 vote13.

ALJ Legal Conclusion: Drawing on Arizona Supreme Court precedent (Zajac v. City of Casa Grande)10,14, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that an individual cannot allow a known defective vote to proceed and only complain afterward if dissatisfied with the results15,16. Because Petitioner failed to raise an objection to the faulty ballot prior to the scheduled vote, he waived his right to bring a subsequent complaint about the ballot16.

Based on the application of the waiver doctrine, the ALJ found that Petitioner’s claim as to the ballot must fail16. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner’s petition is denied17. This order, resulting from the rehearing, is binding on the parties17.

{ “case”: { “agency”: “ADRE”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “docket_no”: “18F-H1817018-REL-RHG”, “case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla vs. Village of Oakcreek Association”, “decision_date”: “2019-01-09”, “alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer” }, “parties”: [ { “party_id”: “P1”, “role”: “petitioner”, “name”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla”, “party_type”: “homeowner”, “email”: null, “phone”: null, “attorney_name”: null, “attorney_firm”: null, “attorney_email”: null, “attorney_phone”: null }, { “party_id”: “R1”, “role”: “respondent”, “name”: “Village of Oakcreek Association”, “party_type”: “HOA”, “email”: null, “phone”: null, “attorney_name”: “Mark K. Sahl”, “attorney_firm”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”, “attorney_email”: null, “attorney_phone”: null } ], “issues”: [ { “issue_id”: “ISS-001”, “type”: “statute”, “citation”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)”, “caption”: “Vote count required to amend declaration”, “violation(s)”: “Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and Declaration regarding the required majority vote (1173 votes) for the November 10, 2016 amendment.”, “summary”: “Petitioner requested an order declaring the amendment invalid due to insufficient vote count.”, “outcome”: “respondent_win”, “filing_fee_paid”: 500.0, “filing_fee_refunded”: false, “civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0, “orders_summary”: “Claim failed.”, “why_the_loss”: “Petitioner failed to prove the claim.”, “cited”: [] }, { “issue_id”: “ISS-002”, “type”: “statute”, “citation”: “A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”, “caption”: “Absence of separate voting opportunity for proposed actions”, “violation(s)”: “The written ballot used for the November 10, 2016 amendment violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) and (B)(2) because it bundled two distinct proposed actions (Leasing Restrictions and Schedule of Fines) into a single vote.”, “summary”: “Petitioner sought an order declaring the amendment invalid because the ballot improperly required a single vote on two separate actions.”, “outcome”: “respondent_win”, “filing_fee_paid”: 500.0, “filing_fee_refunded”: false, “civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0, “orders_summary”: “Claim denied on rehearing. Petition denied.”, “why_the_loss”: “Petitioner waived the right to object to the faulty ballot by receiving it over a month prior and allowing the vote to proceed on November 10, 2016, without raising a complaint.”, “cited”: [ “A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”, “Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”, “Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114” ] }, { “issue_id”: “ISS-003”, “type”: “governing_document”, “citation”: “By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII”, “caption”: “Unauthorized fines in excess of $50”, “violation(s)”: “Respondent allegedly violated By-Laws by imposing fines in excess of $50 per violation, especially after a proposed amendment to raise the fines was voted down.”, “summary”: “Petitioner requested an order that the Association cannot levy fines in excess of $50 per violation.”, “outcome”: “respondent_win”, “filing_fee_paid”: 500.0, “filing_fee_refunded”: false, “civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0, “orders_summary”: “Claim failed.”, “why_the_loss”: “Petitioner failed to prove the claim.”, “cited”: [] } ], “money_summary”: { “issues_count”: 3, “total_filing_fees_paid”: 1500.0, “total_filing_fees_refunded”: 0.0, “total_civil_penalties”: 0.0 }, “outcomes”: { “petitioner_is_hoa”: false, “petitioner_win”: “loss”, “summarize_judgement”: “The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.”, “why_the_loss”: “Petitioner waived the right to object to the ballot defect (Issue 2) by allowing the vote to proceed without objection, and failed to prove the claims for Issues 1 and 3.”, “cited”: [ “A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”, “Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297” ] }, “analytics”: { “cited”: [ “A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)”, “A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”, “A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2)”, “Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”, “Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114” ], “tags”: [ “HOA elections”, “absentee ballots”, “waiver doctrine”, “amendment procedure”, “fines” ] } }

{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “18F-H1817018-REL-RHG”, “case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla, vs. Village of Oakcreek Association”, “decision_date”: “2019-01-09”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “individuals”: [ { “name”: “Scott Servilla”, “role”: “petitioner”, “side”: “petitioner”, “affiliation”: null, “notes”: “Appeared on his own behalf at the hearing; also listed as Scott S. Servilla [1], [2]” }, { “name”: “Heidi H Servilla”, “role”: “petitioner”, “side”: “petitioner”, “affiliation”: null, “notes”: null }, { “name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”, “role”: “ALJ”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Office of Administrative Hearings”, “notes”: “Administrative Law Judge [3], [4], [1], [2]” }, { “name”: “Mark K. Sahl”, “role”: “HOA attorney”, “side”: “respondent”, “affiliation”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”, “notes”: “Represented Village of Oakcreek Association [2]” }, { “name”: “Judy Lowe”, “role”: “commissioner”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Granted the request for rehearing [5]” }, { “name”: “c. serrano”, “role”: “staff”, “side”: “unknown”, “affiliation”: null, “notes”: “Transmitted documents on November 29, 2018 [6], [7]” }, { “name”: “Felicia Del Sol”, “role”: “staff”, “side”: “unknown”, “affiliation”: null, “notes”: “Transmitted documents on January 9, 2019 [8]” }, { “name”: “LDettorre”, “role”: “ADRE staff”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]” }, { “name”: “AHansen”, “role”: “ADRE staff”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]” }, { “name”: “djones”, “role”: “ADRE staff”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]” }, { “name”: “DGardner”, “role”: “ADRE staff”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]” }, { “name”: “ncano”, “role”: “ADRE staff”, “side”: “neutral”, “affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”, “notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]” } ] }

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Scott Servilla (petitioner)
    Also referred to as Scott S. Servilla
  • Heidi H Servilla (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmitted documents
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted documents

George E Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Summary

Case ID19F-H1918013-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2018-12-17
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerGeorge E LordCounsel
RespondentThe Boulders at La Reserve Condominium AssociationCounselMaria Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, and CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any statute or covenant alleged. The core findings supported the HOA's position that the lessee was engaging in prohibited business activity and subletting, and that the charged attorney fees were permissible.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations concerning notice procedures, leasing restrictions, prohibited business use, and excessive fees.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to include proper citations in violation notices, violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 and CC&Rs by imposing illegal restrictions on occupancy dates and prohibiting tenant guests, and violated fee limits under A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) by charging $250 in attorney fees.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, HOA dispute, leasing restrictions, short-term rental, business use, notice procedure, attorney fees
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:51 (115.9 KB)

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:54 (47.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918013-REL, involving Petitioner George E. Lord and Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association. The judge ultimately dismissed all claims brought by the Petitioner, ruling that the Association acted within the bounds of Arizona statutes and its governing documents.

The core of the dispute centered on Mr. Lord’s leasing of three condominium units to an individual, Barrie Shepley, who used the properties to house participants for his commercial fitness training camps. The Association contended this arrangement constituted a prohibited short-term sublease and an improper business use of the units, leading them to suspend amenity access for the occupants.

The judge’s decision affirmed the Association’s position on all counts. Key takeaways include:

Substance Over Form: The judge concluded that despite the absence of a formal sublease agreement, the nature of the arrangement—specifically a camp pricing structure that varied based on the number of occupants per condo—was effectively a sublet designed to house an “itinerant population,” contrary to the “spirit and purpose” of the community’s rules.

Business Use Violation: The operation was found to be a business activity that violated the CC&Rs by requiring persons (camp participants) to come to the residential units.

Procedural Compliance: The Association’s violation notices were deemed compliant with Arizona law. The judge noted that the statute only requires a detailed citation of the violated rule after the owner responds to the initial notice, which the Petitioner failed to do.

Legality of Fees: A $250 charge levied by the Association’s counsel was determined to be a permissible charge for attorney’s fees related to potential collection, not an illegal penalty for leasing information as the Petitioner alleged.

As a result of these findings, the Petitioner’s request for relief was denied, and the petition was dismissed in its entirety.

I. Case Overview

Parties:

Petitioner: George E. Lord (unit owner)

Respondent: The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Case Number: 19F-H1918013-REL

Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date: November 26, 2018

Decision Date: December 17, 2018

Final Disposition: The petition filed by George E. Lord was dismissed.

II. Factual Background and Timeline of Events

1. Lease Agreements: On or about December 4, 2017, Petitioner George Lord, through his management company, leased two units at The Boulders to Barrie Shepley for a term from March 7, 2018, to April 30, 2018. A third unit was subsequently leased to Mr. Shepley on or about January 15, 2018.

2. Commercial Use: Mr. Shepley operated a Canadian fitness business, “Personal Best,” which offered training camps in Tucson. Accommodations at The Boulders were included in the camp packages. The price for a camp varied based on occupancy:

◦ $950.00 each for four campers in a condo

◦ $1075.00 each for three campers in a condo

◦ $1299.00 each for two campers in a condo

3. Occupancy Begins: On March 7, 2018, guests of Mr. Shepley (camp participants) began arriving to occupy the three leased units.

4. Association Intervention: On March 9, 2018, Community Manager Danielle Morris emailed Mr. Lord, stating the Association’s belief that he was in violation of the CC&Rs by allowing subleasing for periods less than the 30-day minimum. Ms. Morris informed him that amenity access cards for the three units were deactivated.

5. Dispute Escalation: Mr. Lord contended that the occupants were merely “guests” of Mr. Shepley, not subletters. Ms. Morris countered that the Association required the names of all occupants and the duration of their stays, and that each occupant must stay for a minimum of 30 days.

6. Information Provided: On March 13, 2018, Mr. Lord provided the names of the occupants and their dates of occupancy, requesting that amenities be restored.

7. Violation Reiterated: On March 16, 2018, Ms. Morris stated the violation was ongoing, as occupants staying from March 7 to March 31 did not meet the 30-day minimum stay requirement.

8. Formal Notice of Violation: On March 18, 2018, Mr. Lord received formal Notices of Violations for the three units. The notices stated that amenity access was suspended because the HOA was not provided with the names of adult occupants and their timeframes. The notice warned that a $300 fine could be applied. Mr. Lord did not respond to these notices.

9. Attorney Involvement: On March 22, 2018, Mr. Lord received a letter from the Association’s legal counsel outlining its legal position and noting an amount due of $250 for attorney’s fees already incurred.

10. Lease Cancellation & Financial Loss: On April 2, 2018, Mr. Shepley cancelled the remainder of the leases due to the lack of amenities for his guests. Mr. Lord asserted a resulting financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018.

11. Petition Filing: On August 31, 2018, Mr. Lord filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association violated state statutes and its own CC&Rs.

III. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Lord’s petition was based on three primary allegations against the Association:

Allegation 1: Defective Violation Notice (A.R.S. § 33-1242): The Petitioner argued that the Notices of Violations were legally deficient because they failed to cite the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

Allegation 2: Unlawful Occupancy Requirements (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 & CC&Rs): The Petitioner asserted that the Association overstepped its authority by demanding that each occupant, whom he characterized as a “guest” of the primary lessee, must stay for a minimum of 30 days. He argued the 30-day minimum lease term applied only to the primary lease with Mr. Shepley, not to the occupants.

Allegation 3: Improper Fees (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)): The Petitioner claimed that the $250 charge from the Association’s attorney constituted an illegal fee, penalty, or charge related to providing leasing information, which he argued was prohibited by statute.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for any of his allegations and dismissed the petition. The judge’s reasoning is detailed below.

Finding 1: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Violation Notice)

The judge determined that the Association’s initial Notices of Violations were legally sufficient.

Legal Reasoning: A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) requires an association to cite the specific provision of the condominium documents that has been violated. However, this obligation is only triggered after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail.

Factual Basis: The Petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the formal Notices of Violations he received.

Conclusion: Because the Petitioner did not take the legally required step to trigger the Association’s duty to provide a specific citation, the Association did not violate the statute.

Finding 2: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 or CC&Rs (Leasing Rules)

The judge concluded that the Association was justified in its actions regarding the occupancy of the units.

The Arrangement was a “Form” of Subletting: The judge ruled against the Petitioner’s argument that the occupants were merely “guests.” The fact that the price of the fitness camp changed based on how many people shared a unit was seen as evidence that Mr. Shepley was, in effect, subletting the units for his business.

Prohibited Business Activity: The judge found that Mr. Shepley was operating a business from the units in a manner prohibited by Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs, which disallows business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.”

Spirit of the Law: The decision acknowledged that the specific facts of the case “falls between the cracks of the specific language of the statutes and the regulations.” However, the judge emphasized that the Association’s actions were consistent with the broader intent of its rules, stating, “given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.”

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association violated leasing statutes or its own CC&Rs.

Finding 3: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) (Fees)

The judge found that the $250 charge was not an illegal penalty.

Nature of the Charge: The evidence showed that no fines for the lease policy violation had actually been assessed. The $250 charge was explicitly for attorney’s fees related to the potential collection of assessments.

Legal Reasoning: The judge stated, “Nothing in the cited statute or the CC&Rs prohibits such a charge being implemented.” The fee was not a penalty for “incomplete or late information” as covered by the statute, but a charge for legal costs incurred by the Association.

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish a violation regarding the assessed fees.

V. Referenced Statutes and Governing Documents

Reference

Provision Summary

Relevance to Case

A.R.S. § 33-1242(B)&(C)

Outlines the process for a unit owner to respond to a violation notice and the association’s subsequent duty to provide specific details of the violation.

The judge found no violation because the Petitioner did not follow the procedure to trigger the association’s duty.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(C)

Limits the information an association can require about a tenant to names, contact info for adults, lease period, and vehicle information.

The Petitioner’s case rested on interpreting this statute; the judge found the Association’s inquiries justified by the unique circumstances.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)

Prohibits an association from imposing fees greater than $15 for incomplete or late leasing information.

The Petitioner argued the $250 attorney fee violated this, but the judge found it was a permissible charge for legal costs, not a penalty.

CC&R Section 7.21

Requires leases to be in writing, for a term of not less than 30 days, and requires owners to provide lessee names and lease dates.

The Association argued the arrangement violated the 30-day minimum stay rule for occupants, which the judge upheld in spirit.

CC&R Section 7.3

Prohibits business activities within a unit that involve persons coming to the unit.

The judge found Mr. Shepley’s fitness camp, which housed participants in the units, was a clear violation of this provision.

Leasing Policy

States a $300 fine may be imposed for violations of the 30-day minimum lease policy.

The Notice of Violation referenced this potential fine, though it was never actually assessed.

VI. Final Order and Procedural Notes

Order: Based on the above findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be dismissed.

Binding Nature: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Related Filings: On the same day the decision was issued, December 17, 2018, the court also issued a separate “Order Vacating Hearing,” likely a procedural filing to cancel a future hearing that was rendered unnecessary by the dismissal of the case.

Study Guide: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918013-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The case involves a dispute between a condominium unit owner, George E. Lord, and his condominium association, The Boulders at La Reserve, concerning leasing policies, occupant regulations, and alleged statutory violations.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. Describe the business arrangement that Barrie Shepley, the petitioner’s lessee, was operating from the leased condominium units.

3. What was the first official action the Condominium Association’s management took in response to the arrival of Barrie Shepley’s guests, and what was their stated reason?

4. According to the Association, what two specific provisions of the governing documents were being violated by the petitioner and his lessee?

5. What was the petitioner’s central argument for why the occupants of the units were not in violation of the Association’s 30-day minimum stay requirement?

6. On what procedural grounds did the petitioner, George Lord, claim that the Association’s “Notice of Violations” was itself a violation of Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242)?

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1242?

8. How did the judge interpret the fact that the price for Barrie Shepley’s fitness camps varied based on the number of people sharing a condo?

9. What financial loss did the petitioner claim to have suffered, and what was the direct cause of this loss?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were George E. Lord, the petitioner and owner of multiple condominium units, and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association, the respondent and governing body for the community. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. Barrie Shepley operated a fitness business called “Personal Best” that offered training camps in the Tucson area. The price for these camps included accommodations at The Boulders, with the cost per person varying based on how many campers shared a condominium unit.

3. The Association’s first action was to deactivate the amenity access cards for the three units leased by Shepley. Danielle Morris, the Community Manager, stated this was due to a belief that the petitioner’s lessee was subleasing the units for periods of less than the 30-day minimum in violation of the CC&Rs.

4. The Association alleged violations of the CC&Rs related to subleasing for less than the 30-day minimum timeframe. The formal Notices of Violations also cited the failure to provide the names of all adult occupants and the timeframes of their stays to the HOA.

5. The petitioner argued that because his lessee, Mr. Shepley, was not charging a specific rental fee to the occupants, they were merely “guests” and not sub-lessees. Therefore, the 30-day minimum stay requirement applicable to leases did not apply to them.

6. The petitioner alleged that the Association’s failure to include a citation to the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated in the initial Notice of Violations was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242.

7. The judge ruled against the petitioner because A.R.S. § 33-1242 only requires an association to provide the specific provision violated after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail. The petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the Notices of Violations.

8. The judge found that the tiered pricing structure supported the conclusion that Mr. Shepley was, “in a form, subletting the units.” The fact that the camp price decreased as more people shared a unit indicated that the occupants were paying for their accommodations, not simply staying as guests.

9. The petitioner asserted a financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018. This loss was directly caused by Barrie Shepley canceling the remainder of his leases due to the lack of amenities for his occupants.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s final order was that the Petition filed by George E. Lord be dismissed. This decision was binding unless a rehearing was granted.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts, arguments, and legal interpretations from the case file.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Barrie Shepley was “in a form, subletting” the units. Discuss the evidence cited and the concept of the “spirit and purpose” of the rules versus their literal interpretation.

2. Examine the procedural misstep made by the petitioner, George Lord, after receiving the Notices of Violations. How did this action directly impact the judge’s ruling on his claim regarding A.R.S. § 33-1242?

3. Discuss the conflict between a unit owner’s right to lease their property and a condominium association’s right to enforce its governing documents, using the specific provisions of the CC&Rs (Sections 7.21 and 7.3) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01) as examples from the case.

4. Explain the distinction the judge made between the $300 potential fine mentioned in the Notice of Violations and the $250 attorney’s fee charged to the petitioner. How did this distinction relate to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E), and why was the Association’s action deemed permissible?

5. Evaluate the concept of an “itinerant population” as mentioned by the judge. How did Barrie Shepley’s business model contribute to this concern for the Association, and how did it ultimately weigh into the judge’s decision to dismiss the petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Name

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings on disputes involving government agencies. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified body of laws for the state of Arizona. The petitioner alleged violations of specific statutes within this code, namely A.R.S. § 33-1242 and § 33-1260.01.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

A state law governing the process for notifying a unit owner of a violation of condominium documents and the procedures for the owner to respond and contest the notice.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01

A state law that places limitations on what information an association can require from a unit owner regarding a tenant and caps certain fees or penalties for incomplete information at $15.

Amenity

A feature or facility of a property that provides comfort, convenience, or pleasure. In this case, access to amenities was controlled by key cards, which the Association deactivated.

Barrie Shepley

The individual who leased three condominium units from the petitioner. He operated a fitness business, “Personal Best,” and used the units to house clients attending his training camps.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Association alleged Shepley’s use of the units violated Sections 7.21 (leasing limitations) and 7.3 (business use limitations).

George E. Lord

The Petitioner in the case. He was the owner of multiple condominium units at The Boulders at La Reserve and filed the petition against the Association.

Itinerant population

A term used by the judge to describe a population of short-term, transient occupants. The judge concluded that the purpose of the Association’s rules was, in part, to prevent this type of occupancy.

Notice of Violations

A formal written document sent by the Association to the petitioner informing him of alleged violations of the governing documents and outlining potential consequences, such as fines.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, George E. Lord.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means that the petitioner had the burden of showing that the facts they sought to prove were “more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association.

Subletting

The practice of a tenant leasing a rented property to a third party. The Association contended Shepley was subletting the units to his campers, while the petitioner argued they were merely guests.

The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case. The homeowners’ association (HOA) responsible for governing the condominium community in Oro Valley, Arizona.

The $6,900 ‘Guest’ Mistake: 3 Hard Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit

A $6,900 loss in rental income and a losing legal battle with his HOA—all because of a dispute over the definition of a “guest.” This case between owner George Lord and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association is a masterclass in how quickly and completely an owner can lose when they misinterpret the rules and underestimate an association’s power.

For any homeowner or landlord, this dispute provides three crucial lessons distilled from the administrative court’s decision. Understanding these precedents is essential before you ever find yourself at odds with your own HOA.

Lesson 1: The “Spirit of the Rule” Can Outweigh Your Clever Workaround

The dispute began when the property owner, Mr. Lord, leased three condos to Barrie Shepley, who ran fitness training camps. Mr. Shepley then used the condos to house his camp attendees, often for periods shorter than the HOA’s 30-day minimum lease term.

The owner argued his arrangement complied with the rules. He claimed his tenant, Mr. Shepley, was not subleasing the units; the attendees were merely “guests,” and therefore not subject to the 30-day minimum. It was a clever workaround, but it fell apart under scrutiny for two distinct reasons.

First, the judge looked past the “guest” label to the financial substance of the arrangement. A key piece of evidence was the camp’s pricing: the cost changed based on how many campers shared a condo ($950 each for four campers vs. $1299 each for two). The judge saw this as clear proof that housing was being paid for, making it a form of subletting.

Second, the judge found that the arrangement constituted a prohibited business activity. The association’s CC&Rs (Section 7.3) explicitly forbade any business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.” Since the fitness camp required attendees to come to the condos for lodging, it was a direct violation. The judge’s decision was therefore not just based on a subjective interpretation, but was also grounded in a concrete rule violation.

The court looked at the “totality of the circumstances” to make its ruling, a point powerfully summarized in the final decision:

However, given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.

Pro Tip: Before implementing a workaround, ask yourself: “Does this honor the community’s stated goal?” If the answer is no, you’re on thin ice, even if you think you’ve found a loophole.

Lesson 2: You Must Follow Procedure to the Letter, Or You Forfeit Your Rights

Confident in his “guest” interpretation, the homeowner made his next critical error by underestimating the importance of legal procedure. He argued that the HOA’s initial “Notice of Violations” was invalid because it failed to cite the specific CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

This argument was swiftly dismissed due to a simple but fatal mistake: the owner never sent a formal written response to the notice by certified mail.

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242), an owner’s formal written response via certified mail triggers the HOA’s obligation to provide the specific provision that was violated. Without that trigger, the HOA’s duty to explain further is never activated. The homeowner failed to pull the trigger. Because he did not follow this exact procedure, his claim was thrown out, and the HOA had no further legal obligation to detail its case.

Analyst’s Takeaway: In a legal dispute, communication that isn’t sent via the officially mandated channel (like certified mail) is legally equivalent to communication that never happened.

Lesson 3: The HOA’s Legal Fees Can Hit Your Wallet Sooner Than You Think

Early in the dispute, the owner received a letter from the HOA’s legal counsel. The letter outlined the association’s position and included a charge for $250.00. This was not a fine for the violation. It was a fee for the lawyer’s time, as explained in the letter:

“As you know, the Association is entitled to recover its costs and attorneys’ fees from you, including $250.00 already incurred for the preparation of this letter.”

Many governing documents contain clauses that allow an HOA to recover its “costs of enforcement.” This letter was an enforcement action, and the legal fee was the cost. The judge found that nothing in the law or CC&Rs prohibited the HOA from immediately passing this expense to the owner.

This initial charge was a precursor to a much larger financial blow. As an enforcement tool for the violations discussed in Lesson 1, the HOA suspended the tenants’ access to community amenities. This pressure tactic worked perfectly. The tenant, Mr. Shepley, cancelled his leases due to the lack of amenity access, leading to the owner’s stated loss of $6,900 in rental fees.

Pro Tip: Assume your HOA’s first legal letter starts a running tab. Budget for legal costs from day one of a formal dispute, not just for potential fines.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense

The case of Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve establishes three clear precedents for owners: a rule’s intent can supersede its literal interpretation, procedural shortcuts void your rights, and the financial clock starts ticking the moment an HOA retains counsel.

This case is a firm reminder of an HOA’s power to enforce its rules, but it also highlights the owner’s responsibility to understand them. It begs the question: In our own communities, are we fully aware of the rules we’ve agreed to live by?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • George E. Lord (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Maria Kupillas (respondent attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
  • Danielle Morris (community manager)
    The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barrie Shepley (renter/key individual)

Brent J Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID18F-H1818050-REL
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2018-10-11
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Filing Fees Refunded$500.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerBrent J. MathewsCounsel
RespondentAmerican Ranch Community AssociationCounselLynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik

Alleged Violations

American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.

Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).

Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:13:46 (112.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.

The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.

1. Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1818050-REL

Petitioner

Brent J. Mathews

Respondent

American Ranch Community Association

Hearing Date

September 21, 2018

Decision Date

October 11, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.

2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation

After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:

“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”

The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.

3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events

The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.

A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.

June 2011

The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.

November 23, 2013

Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.

July 30, 2016

Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.

August 2016

Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.

August 9, 2016

The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.

4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning

The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.

A. Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.

B. Variance vs. Amendment

The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.

Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.

Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”

The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.

C. The Board’s Delegated Authority

The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:

1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.

2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”

3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.

5. Final Order

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:

Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.

Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”

The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.

Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?

3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?

4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?

5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?

6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?

7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?

8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?

9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.

2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.

3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.

4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.

5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.

6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.

7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.

8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.

9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.

10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.

2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?

4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.

5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.

Architectural Review Committee

A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.

Bylaws

The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.

Petition

The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.

Variance

An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.

Well Agreement 1

A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.

Well Agreement 2

An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.

Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown

1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome

It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.

That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.

The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.

2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone

Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.

However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.

3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees

This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.

This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.

According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.

“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”

This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.

4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution

While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.

The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.

When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”

The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them

The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.

This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brent J. Mathews (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Lynn Krupnik (attorney)
    Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Timothy Krupnik (attorney)
    Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Tiffany Taylor (community manager)
    American Ranch Community Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Brad Baker (board member)
    American Ranch Community Association
    Respondent Vice President; testified at hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Signed transmission page
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient

Other Participants

  • Mark Kaplan (owner)
    Lot 2
    Executed Well Agreement 2
  • Diane Kaplan (owner)
    Lot 2
    Executed Well Agreement 2
  • Steven Galliano (former owner)
    Lot 2
  • Frances Galliano (former owner)
    Lot 2

Travis Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Case Summary

Case ID18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
AgencyADRE
TribunalOAH
Decision Date2019-01-31
Administrative Law JudgeTammy L. Eigenheer
OutcomeThe Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.
Filing Fees Refunded$0.00
Civil Penalties$0.00

Parties & Counsel

PetitionerTravis PrallCounsel
RespondentVillas at Tierra Buena Homeowners AssociationCounselLydia Pierce Linsmeier

Alleged Violations

Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.

Key Issues & Findings

Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 686236.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:46:58 (116.2 KB)

18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:00 (107.3 KB)

Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”

The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”

The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.

Case Overview

This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818053-REL

Petitioner

Travis Prall

Respondent

Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Initial Hearing

September 4, 2018

Initial Decision

September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)

Rehearing

January 11, 2019

Final Decision

January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)

Timeline of Key Events

2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.

July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.

Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.

2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.

May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.

Central Allegation and Dispute

The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.

Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)

The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.

CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.

Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.

Inferences about Original Landscaping:

◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.

◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.

◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.

Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)

The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.

CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.

Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.

Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.

Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.

◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.

◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.

◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”

Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections

The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Provision

Significance in the Case

The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…

This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”

“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property

This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.

“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…

This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.

Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.

Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)

Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”

Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”

Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.

Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)

Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”

Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”

Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”

Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.

Study Guide: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal decisions. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition?

3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing.

4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request?

5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent.

6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?

9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019?

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Answer Key

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles? The Petitioner was Travis Prall, the homeowner who filed the dispute. The Respondent was the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association (HOA), which was defending against the Petitioner’s claims. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition? The Petitioner alleged a violation of Section 7.1.4 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). His central claim was that the HOA violated this section by neglecting its duty to perform yard maintenance in his backyard, which he argued was a “visible public yard.”

3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing. The exterior homes feature six to seven-foot-tall block wall fences enclosing their backyards. In contrast, the interior homes, including the Petitioner’s, have a shorter back wall consisting of a two-foot block wall topped with a two-foot aluminum fence, making the total height approximately four feet and more visible from a common walkway.

4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request? In 2018, the HOA had a “pony wall” in the Petitioner’s backyard repaired and was informed by the repair company, Sun King Fencing & Gates, that the wall had buckled due to tree roots. Consequently, the HOA issued a Courtesy Letter on May 3, 2018, requesting that the Petitioner “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”

5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent. The Respondent argued that a yard is considered a “Private Yard” if it is enclosed or shielded from view, meaning any enclosed yard qualified. The Petitioner argued that the definition should be read to mean a yard is private only if it is enclosed so that it is not generally visible from neighboring property, implying visibility was the key factor.

6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion? The Petitioner testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA had provided landscaping maintenance for his backyard. The Respondent denied this claim, stating that it had never provided any landscaping maintenance to any backyards in the community and raised liability concerns about entering residents’ enclosed yards.

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision? The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case? The judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to present evidence proving that the tree in his backyard was “originally installed by the Declarant” (the developer). According to Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs, the HOA’s maintenance responsibility only applied to landscaping and improvements installed by the original community developer.

9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter? Maureen Karpinski testified that none of the homes in the community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards and that they were “just dirt” at the time of purchase. Her testimony was considered credible because she was a real estate agent involved in the initial sales, had walked the community with many buyers during construction, and was herself an original buyer.

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019? In both the initial decision issued on September 24, 2018, and the final decision issued after the rehearing on January 31, 2019, the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated the CC&Rs.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style answers. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard” as defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found it unnecessary to rule on this specific issue to reach a decision.

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard shape the proceedings, and what specific types of evidence (or lack thereof) were most influential in the judge’s final decision?

3. Trace the timeline of the dispute over the tree in Travis Prall’s backyard, from the 2014 storm to the final legal decision in 2019. How did each key event contribute to the escalation of the conflict and the arguments presented at the hearings?

4. Compare the evidence presented by Travis Prall with the evidence presented by the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA at the rehearing. Why did the judge characterize Prall’s evidence as “suppositions and inferences” while deeming the HOA’s evidence “credible”?

5. Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs contains the phrase “as originally installed by Declarant.” Explain the critical importance of this phrase to the outcome of the case and how it became the dispositive legal issue, overshadowing all other arguments.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community.

Common Area

Areas within the community maintained by the HOA for the benefit of all residents. The HOA provides landscaping for these areas.

Courtesy Letter

A formal notice sent by the HOA to a homeowner regarding a potential violation or required action. In this case, it requested the removal of a tree causing damage.

Declarant

The original developer of the planned community who installed the initial infrastructure and landscaping.

HOA Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal hearing regarding an alleged violation by their HOA.

Improvements

A term used in the CC&Rs referring to any additions to a lot other than the main residential dwelling, including landscaping.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the homeowner Travis Prall.

Pony Wall

A term used to describe the short, two-foot-tall block wall in the backyards of the interior homes, which was buckling due to tree roots.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention “more probably true than not.”

Private Yard

As defined in the CC&Rs, a portion of a yard “which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property.” The interpretation of this definition was a point of contention.

Public Yard

As defined in the CC&Rs, the portion of a yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property,” regardless of its location on the lot. The HOA is responsible for maintaining landscaping originally installed by the Declarant in Public Yards.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the claims. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA.

Visible from Neighboring Property

A term defined in the CC&Rs to mean an object that would be visible to a six-foot-tall person standing on a neighboring property. It includes a specific exception for objects visible only through a wrought iron fence.

As defined in the CC&Rs, “the portion of the Lot devoted to Improvements other than the Residential Dwelling.”

These documents are two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Travis Prall, the Petitioner, and the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, the Respondent. The first document outlines the initial decision, dated September 24, 2018, which dismissed Mr. Prall’s petition arguing the HOA violated their Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements (CC&Rs) by neglecting yard maintenance. The second document is the decision following a rehearing requested by the Petitioner, dated January 31, 2019, which reaffirmed the initial dismissal, concluding that Mr. Prall failed to prove that the landscaping in question was originally installed by the Declarant, a prerequisite for the HOA’s maintenance responsibility under the CC&Rs. Both decisions rely heavily on interpreting sections of the CC&Rs, particularly the definitions of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard,” to determine the HOA’s obligation. Ultimately, both rulings found that the Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Travis Prall (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Lydia Pierce Linsmeier (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
  • Maureen Karpinski (board member)
    Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
    President of the Board; testified
  • Frank Peake (property manager)
    Pride Community Management
    Owner of Pride Community Management; testified
  • Rebecca Stowers (community manager)
    Community Manager; testified at initial hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate