Tag Archives: Tammy L. Eigenheer

Robert L Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019018-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-29
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Bellasera Community Association, Inc. did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the homeowner received constructive notice of the violation and fine structure, satisfying statutory requirements. The petition was dismissed.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Robert L Greco Counsel —
Respondent Bellasera Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Bellasera Community Association, Inc. did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the homeowner received constructive notice of the violation and fine structure, satisfying statutory requirements. The petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proving Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), as the evidence showed Petitioner received sufficient constructive notice of the alleged violation and had an opportunity to be heard or appeal.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated statutory requirements regarding notice and imposition of monetary penalties/late fees, resulting in suspension of privileges.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by imposing fines and suspending gate/clubhouse access without providing adequate (actual) notice of the violation and hearing opportunity, and by improperly imposing late fees. The ALJ found the HOA provided constructive notice, satisfying the statute, and was entitled to impose cumulative fines for the ongoing violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1220
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1090

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fines, Constructive notice, Statutory violation, Access suspension, Maintenance violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019018-REL Decision – 766844.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:37 (133.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Robert L. Greco (Petitioner) versus the Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Respondent), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Homeowners Association (HOA).

The core dispute originated from a 2013 violation notice regarding a faded garage door. The Petitioner claimed he did not receive the initial notices and only became aware of the issue upon receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney. Despite subsequently painting the door, an outstanding balance of $750 in fines remained on his account. For six years, the Petitioner paid his quarterly dues but ignored the outstanding fine balance. In June 2019, after failed settlement negotiations, the HOA deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and clubhouse access, prompting him to file the formal dispute.

The judge’s decision rested on two key legal conclusions. First, the court rejected the Petitioner’s argument that “actual notice” was required for the fines to be valid. It ruled that the multiple notices mailed to the Petitioner’s residence constituted sufficient “constructive notice” under Arizona law, providing both notification of the violation and an opportunity to be heard. Second, the court determined that the $750 charge was not an improper late fee but rather three separate, legitimate fines of $250 each, levied for an ongoing, uncorrected violation as per the HOA’s enforcement policy.

Case Overview

Case Name

Robert L Greco, Petitioner, vs. Bellasera Community Association, Inc., Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2019018-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

January 9, 2020

Decision Date

January 29, 2020

Petitioner’s Core Allegation

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by imposing penalties and revoking privileges without providing proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Core Factual Issue

The denial of automatic gate and clubhouse access to the Petitioner on July 1, 2019, due to unpaid fines from 2013.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict between Mr. Greco and the Bellasera Community Association unfolded over six years, escalating from a minor maintenance issue to a formal legal dispute and revocation of privileges.

Initial Violation and Fines (2013)

Details

Feb. 5, 2013

Courtesy Notice

Respondent sent a notice to Petitioner’s address stating his garage door was faded and needed to be repainted, in violation of the Design Guidelines.

Mar. 14, 2013

Final Notice & First Fine

A follow-up notice was sent, stating a $250 fine was posted to Petitioner’s account. It warned that an additional $250 fine would be assessed automatically every 14 days if the violation remained uncorrected.

Apr. 2, 2013

Notice of Remedy & Second Fine

A third notice was sent, posting another $250 fine. This letter explicitly warned that the HOA had the “ability to suspend privileges for use of the Recreational Facilities” and informed the Petitioner of his right to appeal within 14 days.

May 7, 2013

Fourth Notice & Third Fine

A fourth notice was sent, posting another $250 fine to the account. It again noted the right to appeal the fine.

Jun. 5, 2013

Letter from HOA Counsel

Attorney Kelly Oetinger sent a letter demanding the garage door be repainted within 15 days. The letter explicitly stated, “If you do not repaint… the Association may disable the transponder you use to enter the community and may disable the fobs you use for the clubhouse.”

Petitioner’s Response and Aftermath (2013)

• July 4, 2013: Petitioner repainted the garage door.

• July 5, 2013: Petitioner sent a letter to the HOA stating the attorney’s letter was his “initial alert of the garage door condition.” He explained his delay by stating, “To effectively manage my workload, I dispose of unsolicited mail… In the future, I will exercise greater caution in disposing of unsolicited mail.”

• July 5, 2013: The HOA sent a letter acknowledging the repainting and offered to settle the $900 in fines for a payment of $500. The letter reiterated the threat to deactivate gate openers and fobs.

• July 17, 2013: The HOA sent a follow-up letter correcting an internal accounting error. The total fines were $750, not $900. A new settlement offer was made: pay $375, and the remaining $375 would be waived.

Period of Inaction (2013 – 2019)

From 2013 to 2019, the Petitioner received quarterly statements from the HOA indicating a $750 balance in addition to current assessments. Each quarter, the Petitioner would physically cross out the $750 balance and pay only the current assessment amount.

Escalation and Revocation of Privileges (2019)

• June 2019: Dennis Carson, a friend of the Petitioner serving on the HOA Board of Directors, informed him that his name was on a penalty list and the Board planned to deactivate his security gate and clubhouse access.

• June 2019: Settlement negotiations failed. The Petitioner offered $100; the Board countered with $250. The Petitioner then offered $251 ($250 for the fine and $1 to rent the clubhouse), which the Board declined.

• July 1, 2019: The Respondent deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and access to the clubhouse.

• October 11, 2019: The Petitioner filed the Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition, initiating the legal proceedings.

Key Arguments and Legal Findings

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of “notice” as required by state law and the legitimacy of the fines imposed by the HOA.

Petitioner’s Position

1. Lack of Proper Notice: The Petitioner argued that he had not received “actual notice” of the violation or the impending fines until the letter from the HOA’s counsel on June 5, 2013. He asserted that because he acted promptly after receiving that letter, the fines were unjust. His argument implied that warnings in mail he did not personally read could not be held against him.

2. Improper Fines: The Petitioner alleged that the additional $500 in charges on the original $250 fine constituted improper late fees.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The Judge systematically refuted the Petitioner’s arguments, concluding that the HOA acted within its rights and in accordance with the law.

1. On the Matter of Notice:

• The governing statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), requires “notice and an opportunity to be heard” before imposing penalties.

• The Judge found no legal authority requiring this to be “actual notice.” To accept this argument would create an unworkable standard where a homeowner could “avoid receiving ‘actual notice’ by simply refusing to sign for a certified mailing.”

• The decision established that the Petitioner received constructive notice through the “multiple mailings that were presumably delivered to his residential address.”

• The notices also informed the Petitioner how to appeal the matter, thereby satisfying the requirement for an “opportunity to be heard.”

• Conclusion: “Accordingly, Petitioner was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).”

2. On the Matter of Fines:

• The Judge differentiated between late fees and fines for an ongoing violation.

• The notices sent by the Respondent “clearly stated that an ongoing failure to remedy the violation would result in additional fines every 14 days.”

• The violation persisted from before March 14, 2013 (first fine) until July 5, 2013 (when the door was confirmed painted).

• Conclusion: The Respondent was entitled to impose three separate fines for the “ongoing condition of the garage door,” making the total of $750 legitimate.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis of the evidence and law, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

• Final Ruling: “This Tribunal concludes that Respondent did not violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).”

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

• Binding Nature: The order, dated January 29, 2020, is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Robert L. Greco (Petitioner) versus Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 20F-H2019018-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz to test your knowledge, an answer key for review, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was the Petitioner’s central complaint that initiated the legal action?

2. What specific violation of the community’s rules was the Petitioner initially accused of, and which governing documents were cited as being violated?

3. Describe the timeline of notices and fines issued by the Respondent between February and May 2013.

4. What was the Petitioner’s explanation for not responding to the initial violation notices from the Respondent before receiving a letter from the association’s attorney?

5. What actions did the Respondent take in or around June 2019 that led the Petitioner to file his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

6. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument regarding the “notice” required by the Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge differentiate between “actual notice” and “constructive notice” in her decision?

8. Why did the judge ultimately conclude that the Respondent had provided the Petitioner with adequate “notice and an opportunity to be heard”?

9. Explain the Petitioner’s allegation about improper late fees and the reason the judge rejected this argument.

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was homeowner Robert L. Greco, and the Respondent was the Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (the HOA). Greco’s central complaint, filed on October 11, 2019, was that the HOA had denied him automatic gate access and use of clubhouse facilities on July 1, 2019, despite his being a long-term resident with timely payment of all quarterly dues.

2. The Petitioner was accused of having a faded garage door that needed to be repainted. The violation was cited as being contrary to the CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions), specifically Article V, Section 5.2, and the community’s Design Guidelines, specifically Article III, Section J.

3. The Respondent sent an initial “Courtesy Notice” on February 5, 2013. This was followed by a “Final Notice” with a $250 fine on March 14, a “Notice of Remedy” with another $250 fine on April 2, and a “Fourth Notice of Non-Compliance” with another $250 fine on May 7, 2013.

4. The Petitioner claimed that the attorney’s letter, received around June 5, 2013, was his “initial alert” regarding the garage door condition. He stated that he routinely disposes of unsolicited mail without reading it and had inadvertently discarded the previous notices sent by the Respondent.

5. In June 2019, after failed settlement negotiations over the outstanding $750 in fines from 2013, the Respondent deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and his access to the clubhouse. This action prompted the Petitioner to file his dispute petition.

6. The Petitioner’s primary argument was that he did not receive “actual notice” of the violation until the attorney’s letter. He contended that because he acted promptly to correct the violation after receiving actual notice, he should not have been fined.

7. The judge used definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary. “Actual notice” was defined as notice given directly to, or personally received by, a party. “Constructive notice” was defined as notice arising by presumption of law from facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.

8. The judge concluded that the multiple notices mailed to the Petitioner’s residential address constituted “constructive notice” of the violation. Because the relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), does not explicitly require “actual notice,” and the mailings also advised him of his right to appeal, the judge found the Respondent had fulfilled its obligation to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.

9. The Petitioner alleged that the additional $500 in fines were improper late fees on the original $250 fine. The judge rejected this, clarifying that the Respondent’s notices stated that additional fines would be assessed every 14 days for an ongoing failure to remedy the violation. Therefore, the additional charges were three separate fines for the “ongoing condition of the garage door,” not late fees.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The parties were notified that this order was binding unless a request for rehearing was filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for favoring “constructive notice” over “actual notice” in the context of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B). Discuss the potential consequences for homeowners and HOAs if the ruling had required “actual notice.”

2. Trace the negotiation attempts between the Petitioner and the Respondent in 2013 and 2019. Evaluate the effectiveness of these attempts and discuss whether the dispute could have been resolved without formal legal proceedings.

3. The Petitioner argued that the fines imposed after the initial $250 were improper late fees. The judge, however, characterized them as new fines for an “ongoing condition.” Based on the evidence presented in the notices, construct an argument supporting both the Petitioner’s and the judge’s interpretation.

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and identify the key pieces of evidence that allowed the judge to conclude the Respondent did not violate the statute.

5. Examine the roles of the various community governing documents cited in this case (CC&Rs, Design Guidelines, Violation Enforcement policy). Explain how these documents worked together to grant the Respondent the authority to take action against the Petitioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

The Arizona Revised Statute central to this case, which permits an HOA board to impose reasonable monetary penalties for violations after providing “notice and an opportunity to be heard.”

Actual Notice

As defined in the decision, it is “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.”

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision. In this case, it was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners association (HOA) for the Bellasera Community in Arizona.

An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents for the community, which the Petitioner was found to have violated (specifically Article V, Section 5.2).

Constructive Notice

As defined in the decision, it is “[n]otice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.” The judge ruled that mail sent to a residence constitutes this form of notice.

Design Guidelines

A set of rules established by the HOA governing the aesthetic appearance of properties. The Petitioner was found in violation of Article III, Section J of these guidelines.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition seeking a ruling. In this case, it was the homeowner, Robert L. Greco.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, it was the HOA.

He Threw Away His Mail for Years. His HOA’s Response Is a Warning to Every Homeowner.

That official-looking envelope from your Homeowners Association sits on the counter, a silent challenge. It’s easy to dismiss it as a newsletter or a bland reminder, just another piece of paper to be sorted later. But what if it isn’t? What if that envelope is a legal summons in disguise, the first shot in a battle you don’t even know you’re fighting?

For Robert L. Greco, a resident in his community for 17 years, this hypothetical became a harsh reality. He learned that ignoring HOA correspondence can ignite a conflict that smolders for years before erupting into severe consequences. Originating from a maintenance issue as simple as a faded garage door, his case offers a masterclass in the powerful lessons every homeowner should heed.

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1. The “I Didn’t Read It” Defense Doesn’t Work

The central pillar of the homeowner’s defense was disarmingly simple: he claimed he never received the first four violation notices because he habitually throws away what he considers “unsolicited mail.” He argued that without having read the warnings, he couldn’t be held responsible for the fines.

The judge’s ruling, however, invoked a foundational legal concept that extends far beyond HOA disputes into areas like property deeds and public records: the difference between “actual notice” and “constructive notice.” While actual notice means you personally saw the information, constructive notice presumes you have knowledge of something because it was delivered properly—in this case, mailed to the correct address. Whether you open the envelope is irrelevant.

In a July 5, 2013 letter, the homeowner unwittingly sealed his own fate by describing his mail-handling routine:

Routinely, Saturdays are my mail-pick-up days, and invariably, I walk straight to the re-cyclable container, and deposit the mail in the receptacle… I was astonished to learn that my garage door failed inspection. This is my initial alert of the garage door condition.

For homeowners, the takeaway is a stark one: in the eyes of the law, your recycling bin is not a valid legal defense. The burden doesn’t fall on an HOA to ensure you read your mail, only to send it. The responsibility to open and review all official correspondence rests squarely on the homeowner.

2. A Tiny Issue Can Snowball into a Years-Long Standoff

The timeline of this dispute reveals a classic case of conflict avoidance, where a minor, fixable problem was allowed to spiral into a major legal battle. The cost of a can of paint and a Saturday afternoon of work was ultimately dwarfed by a six-year, $750 dispute that cost the homeowner his access to his own community.

• February 5, 2013: The HOA sends its first “Courtesy Notice” regarding a faded garage door in need of repainting.

• March – May 2013: After no response, the HOA issues three more notices, levying escalating fines that total $750.

• 2013 to 2019: For six years, the homeowner receives quarterly statements showing the $750 balance. Each time, he would “cross out the $750.00 balance and pay the current assessment.”

• June/July 2019: The HOA finally forces the issue by deactivating his security gate fob and his access to the clubhouse.

This progression shows how a simple lack of communication transformed a weekend chore into a years-long standoff. By ignoring the notices and the subsequent fines, the homeowner allowed a molehill to grow into a mountain of conflict.

3. “Continuing Violation” Fines Are Not Late Fees

The homeowner contended that the HOA was improperly stacking late fees on top of an initial $250 penalty. However, the administrative law judge highlighted a critical distinction embedded in the association’s rules.

The HOA wasn’t charging late fees on a single, past-due penalty. It was levying new fines for a “continuing violation.” The notice sent on March 14, 2013, explicitly warned that “an additional fine of $250 will be assessed automatically every 14 days… if the violation remains uncorrected.”

This is a crucial detail found in many HOA bylaws. An unpainted garage door is not a one-time offense; it is an ongoing breach of community standards. A homeowner who thinks they are simply letting a single fine sit unpaid may actually be incurring entirely new violations over time, dramatically increasing their financial liability.

4. Failed Negotiations Can Cost More Than Money

Twice, this dispute could have been resolved. The breakdown in negotiations, however, reveals how ego and principle can prove more costly than the fines themselves.

The first attempt came in 2013, after the homeowner had finally painted the garage. The HOA initially offered to settle a supposed $900 balance for $500. This, however, was based on an “internal accounting error.” In a subsequent letter, the HOA apologized, corrected the record to show the true balance was $750, and made a formal offer: pay half—just $375—and the matter would be closed. The offer was not accepted. Including this error shows the HOA was not infallible, making the subsequent stalemate more complex.

The second negotiation occurred in 2019, prompted by a friend on the Board who urged a settlement. The homeowner offered $100. The Board countered with $250. The homeowner’s final offer was exquisitely specific: “$251.00, $250.00 to settle the outstanding fines and $1.00 to rent the clubhouse on a specific date.”

This offer was a tactical and psychological blunder. That extra dollar wasn’t about money; it was a message. Whether intended as a sarcastic jab or a principled stand to assert his rights as a member, it transformed a financial negotiation into a battle of wills. For a Board of Directors, accepting such an offer could be seen as capitulating to a petty gesture, setting a precedent that defiance works. They declined. Shortly after, the homeowner’s access to community facilities was cut off, leading to the legal petition he ultimately lost.

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Conclusion: A Lesson in Communication

This case serves as a powerful warning. The legal force of “constructive notice” makes you responsible for the mail you receive, not just the mail you read. The six-year standoff over a can of paint shows how inaction can have disproportionate consequences. And the failed $251 offer demonstrates that good-faith negotiation is paramount.

Ultimately, the homeowner was left still owing the money and locked out of his own amenities—a casualty of a battle he prolonged at every turn. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question to consider: in a dispute with your HOA, where is the line between standing on principle and causing yourself unnecessary harm?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert L Greco (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (attorney)
    Brown|Olcott, PLLC
  • David Reid (board member)
    Testified for Respondent
  • Annette McCarthy (manager)
    Acting Manager; Testified for Respondent
  • Kelly Oetinger (attorney)
    Counsel for Respondent in 2013
  • Dennis Carson (board member)

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE

Paul L Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-27
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul L Moffett Counsel Richard M. Rollman
Respondent Vistoso Community Association Counsel Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.

Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.

Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
  • CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:35 (48.3 KB)

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:23:39 (109.1 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

Executive Summary

On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.

The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.

The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.

Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.

Detail

Information

Case Name

Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association

Case Number

20F-H2019014-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petition Filed

On or about September 25, 2019

Hearing Date

December 16, 2019

Decision & Order Date

January 27, 2020

Petitioner

Paul L. Moffett

Petitioner’s Counsel

Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.

Respondent

Vistoso Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC

The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments

Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.

The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:

• Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.

• Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.

Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.

Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions

The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.

Key Governing Document Provisions

• Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.

Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)

The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:

• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.

• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.

• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.

Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)

The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:

• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.

• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.

• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.

Established Findings of Fact

The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.

• March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.

• March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

• August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.

• October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

• January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.

• March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.

• Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Legal Interpretation

The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.

The decision states:

“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”

The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.

Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy

The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”

Final Order

Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

• Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?

3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?

5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?

6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?

8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.

2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.

3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.

4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.

6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.

8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.

9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.

2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?

4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.

5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1

The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3

The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Declarant

The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.

Developer Owner

An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.

The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head

For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.

This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.

The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote

The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.

The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:

• Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.

• Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.

On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.

The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years

The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.

• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.

• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.

The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole

This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.

In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.

The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:

Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.

The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote

Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.

The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).

While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.

This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.

Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details

This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.

The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul L Moffett (petitioner)
    Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
  • Richard M. Rollman (petitioner attorney)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
  • Alyssa Leverette (legal staff)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
    Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
  • Kimberly Rubly (witness)
    Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
  • Sean K. Moynihan (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
    Recipient of Order

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order

Other Participants

  • Sarah Nelson (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Patrick Straney (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Dennis Ottley (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election

Michael D. Pursley vs. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association,

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-12-04
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner on both counts. It was found that the HOA violated statutes by failing to hold annual meetings in 2017 and 2018 and failing to timely respond to records requests. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $1,000.00 filing fee.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael D. Pursley Counsel —
Respondent Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Maxwell T. Riddiough

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner on both counts. It was found that the HOA violated statutes by failing to hold annual meetings in 2017 and 2018 and failing to timely respond to records requests. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $1,000.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to hold annual meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent failed to hold annual meetings. Respondent admitted to not holding meetings in 2017 and 2018 due to a belief that a quorum could not be established.

Orders: Violation found. Respondent ordered to comply (implied via prevailing party status).

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Failure to timely provide records

Petitioner alleged Respondent repeatedly failed to provide requested community documents within the statutory timeframe. Respondent eventually provided documents but not within the required time.

Orders: Violation found.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

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Decision Documents

20F-H2019004-REL Decision – 757066.pdf

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Briefing Document: Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document details the administrative law proceedings and subsequent decision in the case of Michael D. Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc. (Case No. 20F-H2019004-REL). The matter, heard on October 18, 2019, centered on allegations that the Respondent, Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc. (the HOA), violated Arizona Revised Statutes regarding the conduct of annual meetings and the timely provision of community records to its members.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Respondent failed to comply with its statutory obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Consequently, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party and the HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,000.00.

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Mandatory Annual Meeting Requirements

The primary legal dispute involved the HOA's failure to hold annual member meetings in 2017 and 2018. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), an association is strictly required to hold a meeting of the members at least once each year.

The Respondent acknowledged the failure but offered a defense based on practical constraints: because the subdivision's lots were largely undeveloped and uninhabited, the HOA believed it could not achieve a quorum. However, the ALJ found this defense insufficient to waive the statutory requirement. Compliance was eventually achieved in 2019 only after a corporate entity purchased enough lots to satisfy quorum requirements.

2. Timeliness of Records Production

The second core issue was the Respondent’s failure to provide governing documents and financial statements within the legally mandated timeframe. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) grants associations a maximum of ten business days to fulfill requests for the examination or copying of records.

The evidence demonstrated a significant delay in the HOA's response to the Petitioner:

Date of Request Method Content Requested
January 20, 2019 Letter CC&Rs
April 6, 2019 Certified Letter CC&Rs
June 21, 2019 Certified Letter CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Bylaws, Financial Statement

The HOA did not provide the documents via email until June 27, 2019—five months after the initial request and significantly beyond the ten-day limit following the final certified letter.

3. Burden of Proof and Legal Standards

In this administrative proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the allegations by a "preponderance of the evidence." The court applied the standard definition: evidence that shows the fact sought to be proved is "more probable than not." Given the Respondent's admissions regarding the lack of meetings and the documented timeline of the records requests, the ALJ determined the Petitioner successfully met this burden.

Important Quotes with Context

Statutory Mandates

"A meeting of the members' association shall be held at least once each year." — A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)

  • Context: This quote establishes the non-discretionary nature of annual meetings, which the Respondent failed to adhere to for two consecutive years.

"The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination. On request for purchase of copies of records… the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records." — A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

  • Context: This excerpt outlines the strict window of time an HOA has to respond to a member's request for information, a timeline the Respondent exceeded in this case.
Defense and Findings

"Respondent’s witness indicated that because the lots were undeveloped and no one was living in the association, Respondent believed it would be unable to have the number of owners present to make a quorum necessary to hold the annual meeting." — Findings of Fact, Paragraph 11

  • Context: This explains the Respondent’s rationale for skipping meetings, which the court ultimately found did not excuse the statutory violation.

"Petitioner initially denied having received the June 27, 2019 email that included the requested documents, but acknowledged that Respondent did email the documents to him even if he did not see them when they were sent to him." — Findings of Fact, Paragraph 10

  • Context: This clarifies that while documents were eventually provided, the provision occurred only after multiple requests and the initiation of the dispute process.

Actionable Insights

Based on the findings and the final order in this matter, the following insights are relevant for the management of homeowners associations:

  • Quorum Challenges Do Not Excuse Non-Compliance: HOAs must attempt to hold annual meetings regardless of development status or anticipated quorum issues to remain in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1804(B).
  • Strict Adherence to the 10-Day Records Rule: Once a member submits a written request for records, the association has a maximum of ten business days to provide the materials. Failure to do so, even if the records are eventually provided, constitutes a statutory violation.
  • Certified Mail as a Trigger: The use of certified mail by a member provides a clear, evidentiary timeline for records requests. Management companies should treat these as high-priority to avoid administrative litigation.
  • Financial Risk of Litigation: While the ALJ did not find a civil penalty appropriate in this specific case, the Respondent was still ordered to pay the Petitioner's $1,000 filing fee. This demonstrates the direct financial cost of failing to address member requests and statutory requirements in a timely manner.
  • Permissible Copying Fees: Per A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), while an association cannot charge for making materials available for review, they are entitled to charge a fee of no more than fifteen cents ($0.15) per page for physical copies.

Study Guide: Michael D. Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative law case Michael D. Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019004-REL). It covers key legal concepts regarding Arizona Homeowners Association (HOA) regulations, the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and the statutory requirements for association transparency and governance.

Key Legal Concepts and Statutes

The case centers on the interpretation and application of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) regarding the conduct of homeowners associations and the rights of their members.

1. Mandatory Annual Meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804)

Under Arizona law, specifically A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), a homeowners association is mandated to hold a meeting of the members at least once every year. The failure to hold such a meeting constitutes a violation of the statute, regardless of internal logistical challenges such as a lack of quorum.

2. Member Access to Records (A.R.S. § 33-1805)

Members of an association have a statutory right to examine and copy association records. Key provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) include:

  • Reasonable Availability: All financial and other records must be made available for examination by a member or their designated representative.
  • Response Timeframe: The association has exactly ten business days to fulfill a request for examination or to provide copies of requested records.
  • Cost Limitations: Associations are prohibited from charging for the review of materials. If a member requests copies, the association may charge a fee of no more than fifteen cents per page.
3. Burden of Proof and Legal Standards
  • Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) has the authority to hear disputes between property owners and associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • Preponderance of the Evidence: In these administrative proceedings, the Petitioner (the homeowner) bears the burden of proof. They must prove their case by a "preponderance of the evidence," meaning the evidence shows the facts sought to be proved are "more probable than not."

Case Summary: Findings and Conclusions

The Dispute

Petitioner Michael D. Pursley, a member of the Sycamore Vista No. 7 HOA, filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate alleging two primary violations:

  1. The Respondent failed to hold annual meetings in 2017 and 2018.
  2. The Respondent failed to timely provide requested community documents (CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Bylaws, and Financial Statements) after multiple requests made in early 2019.
The Respondent’s Defense

The HOA acknowledged it did not hold the 2017 and 2018 meetings. Their defense was based on the fact that the lots were undeveloped and no residents were living in the association, leading them to believe they could not achieve a quorum (the minimum number of members required to conduct business). By 2019, a corporate entity had purchased enough lots to meet quorum requirements.

The Tribunal’s Decision

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioner on both counts:

  • Meeting Violation: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold meetings for two consecutive years.
  • Records Violation: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide the requested records within the required ten-business-day window. While the records were eventually sent via email on June 27, 2019, this occurred months after the initial January and April requests.

Final Order:

  • Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party.
  • The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $1,000.00 filing fee.
  • No additional civil penalty was assessed.

Short-Answer Practice Questions

Q1: According to A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), how frequently must an HOA hold a members' meeting?

  • A: At least once each year.

Q2: What is the maximum per-page fee an HOA can charge for copies of records?

  • A: Fifteen cents ($0.15) per page.

Q3: How many business days does an association have to fulfill a request for records examination or copies?

  • A: Ten business days.

Q4: What reason did Sycamore Vista No. 7 HOA provide for not holding meetings in 2017 and 2018?

  • A: The lots were undeveloped and no one was living there, so the HOA believed it could not reach a quorum.

Q5: Who bears the burden of proof in an HOA dispute hearing, and what is the required standard of evidence?

  • A: The Petitioner bears the burden of proof by a "preponderance of the evidence."

Q6: What was the specific financial penalty/reimbursement ordered by the ALJ in this case?

  • A: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner his $1,000.00 filing fee.

Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. Statutory Compliance vs. Practical Constraints: Analyze the HOA’s defense regarding the lack of quorum due to undeveloped lots. Why did the ALJ find this defense insufficient to excuse the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)? Discuss the importance of maintaining statutory governance even in the early stages of a development.
  1. The Significance of Timely Disclosure: In this case, the Petitioner eventually received the requested documents. Explore why the law mandates a strict ten-business-day response time under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and the potential impact on homeowners when associations fail to meet this timeline.
  1. The Role of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): Based on the document, describe the process of an administrative hearing for HOA disputes. Evaluate how the ALJ weighs evidence (such as the "preponderance of the evidence" standard) to reach a conclusion when facts—such as the receipt of an email—are initially contested.

Glossary of Important Terms

Term Definition
A.R.S. Arizona Revised Statutes; the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
CC&Rs Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules for a planned community.
Petitioner The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition (in this case, Michael D. Pursley).
Respondent The party against whom a petition is filed (in this case, Sycamore Vista No. 7 HOA).
Quorum The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.
Preponderance of the Evidence A legal standard of proof meaning that the evidence as a whole shows the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) An official who presides over an administrative hearing and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Business Days For the purposes of records requests, these are the days during which the association must fulfill requests, excluding weekends and holidays (implied by the ten-day limit).
Governing Documents The collective set of rules for the association, including CC&Rs, Bylaws, and Rules and Regulations.

Understanding Your Rights: A Lesson in HOA Accountability from Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7

1. Introduction: When Homeowners Take a Stand

As an expert in HOA compliance and an advocate for homeowner rights, I frequently see Boards of Directors acting as if state statutes are merely "suggestions." For many homeowners, dealing with an unresponsive association feels like shouting into a void. You pay your assessments and follow the CC&Rs, but when you ask for basic transparency, you’re met with silence or excuses.

The case of Michael D. Pursley vs. Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc. is a landmark reminder that you do not have to accept Board negligence. This case demonstrates how a single, persistent homeowner held his association accountable through the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) dispute process. If your Board is skipping annual meetings or gatekeeping records, this ruling provides the roadmap for asserting your rights.

2. The Core Obligations: What the Law Requires

In Arizona, the operations of a Planned Community are governed by strict statutory mandates. Boards often plead ignorance, but as a homeowner, you must know that these requirements are non-negotiable legal duties.

Statute Number Mandatory Association Action
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) A meeting of the members' association shall be held at least once each year.
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) Fulfill requests to examine or provide copies of association records within ten business days.

Note for Homeowners: These statutes are part of the Arizona Planned Communities Act. They do not say a Board "should" hold a meeting; they say a meeting shall be held.

3. The Case Study: A Timeline of Non-Compliance

The dispute in Pursley v. Sycamore Vista No. 7 provides a textbook example of how "administrative friction" is used to discourage homeowners. Mr. Pursley’s journey to obtain basic governing documents spanned nearly half a year:

  • January 20, 2019: Initial request for CC&Rs sent to the management company.
  • April 6, 2019: After receiving no response, Pursley sent a certified letter repeating the request.
  • June 21, 2019: A second certified letter was sent, expanding the request to include Rules and Regulations, Bylaws, and Financial Statements.
  • June 27, 2019: The Association finally emailed the documents—five months after the initial request.

The "Expert" Insight on Deadlines: Interestingly, during the hearing, Mr. Pursley argued that the Association failed to provide documents within 20 business days. In a win for homeowners, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) corrected this: under A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), the Association actually only has 10 business days to comply. The law is even stricter than the Petitioner realized.

4. The Judge’s Ruling: Transparency Prevails

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer found that the Association’s excuses did not hold up under legal scrutiny. The Petitioner successfully proved his case by a "preponderance of the evidence," meaning he showed it was more probable than not that the violations occurred.

Proven Violations:

  • Failure to Hold Meetings: The Association admitted it held no annual meetings in 2017 or 2018, a direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B).
  • Failure to Provide Timely Records: The Association failed the 10-business-day statutory deadline for record production.

The Financial Outcome: The Judge designated Mr. Pursley as the prevailing party and ordered the Association to pay his $1,000.00 filing fee within 30 days. However, as an expert consultant, I must set a realistic expectation: the ALJ noted that "No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate." This process is designed for compliance and cost recovery, not for homeowners to collect "damages" or punitive fines.

5. Why "Quorum" and "Development" Aren't Excuses

The Association attempted to justify its failure to hold meetings by claiming that because the lots were undeveloped and no one was living there, they believed they couldn't achieve a quorum. They only held a meeting in 2019 after a corporate entity purchased enough lots to guarantee a quorum.

The ALJ rejected this logic entirely. A Board cannot wait for a "friendly" corporate developer to arrive before fulfilling its duty to the individual homeowners already in the association. The statutory requirement to hold a meeting "at least once each year" is absolute. If you are the only resident in a sea of empty lots, you still have the right to an annual meeting.

6. Conclusion: Key Takeaways for Every Homeowner

The Pursley case is a victory for the "little guy," but it also highlights the necessity of a professional approach to disputes.

Expert Actionable Takeaways:

  1. Certified Mail is Your Best Friend: Mr. Pursley’s use of certified mail created an indisputable paper trail. Never rely on phone calls or unconfirmed emails.
  2. Maintain a Detailed Interaction Log: Beyond mail, keep a log of every date, time, and person you speak with regarding records. This is your "evidence" if you end up before a judge.
  3. The 10-Day Rule is Powerful: Do not let management companies tell you they need "a few weeks." The clock starts when they receive the request, and they have 10 business days. Period.
  4. Use the OAH Process: Traditional litigation is expensive and slow. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) provides access to specialized judges who understand HOA law, making it a more cost-effective and viable path for members.

Transparency is not a courtesy—it is a right. When Boards fail to follow state statutes, they undermine the community's trust. By knowing the law and documenting every step, you can ensure your association remains accountable to the people it serves.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael D. Pursley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Maxwell T. Riddiough (respondent representative)
    Sycamore Vista No. 7 Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Represented the Respondent
  • Bradley P. Miller (Statutory Agent)
    Sycamore Vista No 7 HOA, Inc.
    Listed on transmission list

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed on transmission list
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Transmitted the decision

Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla vs. Village of Oakcreek Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-01-09
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla Counsel —
Respondent Village of Oakcreek Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.

Why this result: Petitioner waived the right to object to the ballot defect (Issue 2) by allowing the vote to proceed without objection, and failed to prove the claims for Issues 1 and 3.

Key Issues & Findings

Vote count required to amend declaration

Petitioner requested an order declaring the amendment invalid due to insufficient vote count.

Orders: Claim failed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Absence of separate voting opportunity for proposed actions

Petitioner sought an order declaring the amendment invalid because the ballot improperly required a single vote on two separate actions.

Orders: Claim denied on rehearing. Petition denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
  • Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297
  • Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114

Unauthorized fines in excess of $50

Petitioner requested an order that the Association cannot levy fines in excess of $50 per violation.

Orders: Claim failed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA elections, absentee ballots, waiver doctrine, amendment procedure, fines
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2)
  • Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297
  • Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114

Related election workflow tool

Many HOA election disputes start with preventable workflow problems: unclear ballot language, separate-vote issues, quorum tracking, paper/online reconciliation, proxy handling, or incomplete records. HOABallot is a separate platform built to document the voting workflow from notice through certification.

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 673729.pdf

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18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 673828.pdf

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18F-H1817018-REL-RHG Decision – 680738.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:22:34 (103.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association (Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Scott S. Servilla versus the Village of Oakcreek Association. The final order, issued on January 9, 2019, following a rehearing, denied the petitioner’s claims. The central issue revolved around a homeowners association vote held on November 10, 2016, where two distinct amendments—one concerning property leasing and another a schedule of fines—were combined into a single item on the ballot.

The petitioner argued this ballot format violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A), which requires a separate opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action. However, the ALJ’s decision did not rule on the merits of this statutory violation. Instead, the petition was denied based on the legal doctrine of waiver. The ALJ concluded that the petitioner, having received the allegedly defective ballot more than a month before the vote, had forfeited his right to challenge the procedure by failing to raise any objection until after the vote was completed and the unfavorable outcome was known. The decision heavily relies on the precedent set by the Arizona Supreme Court in Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, which established that a party cannot knowingly allow a flawed election to proceed and then protest only after receiving an undesirable result. The ALJ’s decision is binding, with any appeal required to be filed in superior court.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was a dispute brought before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the validity of an amendment to the association’s governing documents.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1817018-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla

Respondent

Village of Oakcreek Association

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

November 29, 2018

Record Held Open Until

December 20, 2018

Decision Issued

January 9, 2019

II. Procedural History

1. Initial Petition: On or about November 13, 2017, Scott S. Servilla filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Village of Oakcreek Association, an HOA with 2436 homeowners.

2. Expansion of Claims: The petitioner initially filed a single-issue petition with a $500 fee but was ordered by the ALJ to either specify the single issue or pay for a multi-issue hearing. The petitioner paid an additional $1,000 and proceeded with three distinct claims.

3. First ALJ Decision: Following an initial hearing, the ALJ found that the petitioner failed to prove two of his three claims. On the second claim—the improper ballot format—the judge found a statutory violation had occurred but concluded that “because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism to the Administrative Law Judge, no remedy could be ordered.”

4. Request for Rehearing: The petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration, arguing that the conclusion of “no remedy” was contrary to law.

5. Rehearing Granted: On or about September 21, 2018, the Commissioner for the Arizona Department of Real Estate granted the request for a rehearing, which was held on November 29, 2018.

III. The Central Dispute: The November 10, 2016 Vote

The core of the dispute was the validity of a vote taken during a Special Meeting of Members on November 10, 2016.

• Bundled Amendments: The vote’s stated purpose was to approve the “Leasing and Schedule of Fines Assessment.” This single proposal combined two separate and substantive changes to the Master Declaration:

1. Addition of Section 4.23: Leasing of Lots and Units; Restrictions and Limitations, which established a minimum lease term of 30 days and prohibited leasing less than an entire unit.

2. Replacement of Section 5.08: Schedule of Fines, which permitted the association’s committee to adopt a new schedule specifying fines for violations.

• Ballot Format: The absentee ballot provided members with only a single voting choice: “FOR THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT” or “AGAINST THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT.”

• Statutory Violation Alleged: The petitioner contended this format violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A), which requires that a ballot “shall set forth each proposed action” and “shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

• Vote Outcome: A total of 1,067 ballots were received (approximately 44% of members). Of those, 564 voted in favor of the amendment, constituting approximately 53% of the votes cast.

IV. Key Arguments at Rehearing

• Statutory Violation: The ballot was legally defective because it combined two distinct proposed actions into one vote, denying members the right to vote on each separately as required by statute.

• Evidence of Dissent: The petitioner argued that a subsequent vote in April 2017, in which members rejected a proposal to eliminate the By-Laws’ $50 fine limit, demonstrated that “had the proposed amendment been broken into two parts, the part of the proposed amendment dealing with the fines most likely would have failed.”

• Requested Remedy: The petitioner argued that based on case law, the ALJ was authorized to declare the entire amendment void and unenforceable.

• Waiver of Objection: The respondent’s primary argument was that the petitioner had waived any right to object to the ballot format. The petitioner received the absentee ballot on or about October 4, 2016, but did not raise an objection until April 2017, long after the November 10, 2016 vote was completed.

• Lack of Enforcement Provision: The respondent also maintained its earlier position that even if a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(2) occurred, the statute itself provides no enforcement mechanism or remedy.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ’s final decision denied the petitioner’s petition in its entirety, based solely on the legal principle of waiver.

The ALJ found that the petitioner’s failure to object to the ballot’s format in a timely manner was fatal to his claim.

• Awareness of Defect: The petitioner received the absentee ballot on October 4, 2016, over a month before the November 10, 2016 vote. This provided sufficient time to identify the procedural issue and raise an objection.

• Failure to Act: By not objecting before the vote, the petitioner allowed the flawed process to proceed. He only lodged a complaint after the results were not in his favor.

• Forfeiture of Rights: The ALJ concluded, “As Petitioner was or should have been aware of the alleged issues with the ballot, he waived his right to bring forth a complaint about the ballot when he allowed the vote to proceed on November 10, 2016.”

The decision rested on the Arizona Supreme Court case Zajac v. City of Casa Grande (2004), which itself relied on Allen v. State (1913). This precedent establishes that a party cannot remain silent about a known procedural defect in an election process and then challenge the process only after an unfavorable outcome.

• Key Principle: The ALJ articulated the principle from Zajac: “one cannot knowingly let a defective vote proceed only to complain and seek redress if the results are not to the individual’s liking.”

• Direct Quotation: The decision directly quotes the ruling in Zajac to finalize its point: “He cannot have it both ways; that is, he cannot allow the [vote] to proceed without objection, and then be permitted thereafter to assert his protest.”

• Petition Denied: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

• Binding Decision: As the decision was issued as a result of a rehearing, it is legally binding on the parties.

• Appeal Process: Any party wishing to appeal the order must file for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served (January 9, 2019).

Study Guide: Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association (Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal case involving Petitioner Scott Servilla and Respondent Village of Oakcreek Association, as detailed in the Administrative Law Judge Decision of January 9, 2019. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, a corresponding answer key, suggested essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based entirely on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what roles did they play?

2. What were the two distinct proposed changes that were combined into a single voting item on the November 10, 2016 absentee ballot?

3. Which specific Arizona Revised Statute did the Petitioner allege was violated by the format of the ballot, and what does that statute require?

4. What was the numerical outcome of the November 10, 2016 vote on the proposed amendment?

5. What was the Respondent’s primary legal argument for why the Petitioner’s complaint about the faulty ballot should be dismissed?

6. What key legal precedent, specifically the case of Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rely upon in the final decision?

7. According to the decision, when did the Petitioner receive the ballot, and why was this date critical to the ALJ’s final ruling?

8. What was the finding in the initial Administrative Law Judge Decision regarding the ballot issue, and why did it lead to a request for a rehearing?

9. Describe the separate vote that occurred in April 2017 and explain how the Petitioner used it to support his argument regarding the 2016 vote.

10. What was the final order issued by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer on January 9, 2019, and what was the legal basis for this order?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Scott S. Servilla (who appeared on his own behalf), and the Respondent, the Village of Oakcreek Association (a homeowners association represented by Mark Sahl). The Petitioner filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

2. The two proposed changes were the addition of a new section, 4.23, concerning “Leasing of Lots and Units; Restrictions and Limitations,” and the complete replacement of an existing section, 5.08, titled “Schedule of Fines.” The ballot presented these as a single item called the “LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT.”

3. The Petitioner alleged a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(2) and A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2). The statute requires that an absentee ballot “shall set forth each proposed action” and “shall provide an opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action.”

4. A total of 1067 ballots were received, representing approximately 44 percent of the members. Of those who voted, 564 (approximately 53 percent) voted in favor of the proposed amendment.

5. The Respondent’s primary argument was that the Petitioner had waived any right to object to the ballot’s format. The Respondent contended that the Petitioner should have raised his objection before the vote occurred, rather than waiting until after the results were known.

6. The ALJ relied on the precedent set in Zajac v. City of Casa Grande. This Arizona Supreme Court case established the principle that an individual aware of a procedural issue with an election cannot wait to see the results before lodging a complaint.

7. The Petitioner acknowledged receiving the absentee ballot on or about October 4, 2016, more than a month before the November 10, 2016 vote. This date was critical because it demonstrated that the Petitioner had ample time to object to the ballot’s format before the vote took place, supporting the ALJ’s waiver finding.

8. In the initial decision, the ALJ found that a violation of the statute had occurred regarding the ballot but concluded that no remedy could be ordered because the statute lacked an enforcement mechanism. The Petitioner requested a rehearing, alleging that this conclusion was contrary to the law and that the ALJ did have the authority to declare the amendment void.

9. In April 2017, a separate proposed amendment to eliminate the By-Laws’ $50 fine limitation was voted down by the members. The Petitioner argued this subsequent vote demonstrated that the fines portion of the November 2016 amendment would likely have failed if members had been given a separate opportunity to vote on it.

10. The final order, issued January 9, 2019, denied the Petitioner’s petition. The legal basis was the doctrine of waiver; the ALJ ruled that because the Petitioner was aware of the alleged issues with the ballot before the vote and failed to object, he waived his right to complain about it after the results were announced.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive essay responses based on the details and legal reasoning presented in the source documents.

1. Explain the legal doctrine of waiver as applied in this case. How did the timeline of events, from the receipt of the ballot to the filing of the petition, support the Administrative Law Judge’s application of the principles from Zajac v. City of Casa Grande?

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of “proposed action” under A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Although the Judge ultimately ruled on procedural grounds, which party’s interpretation of the statute appears more consistent with the law’s text and intent?

3. Discuss the procedural history of this case, from the initial filing with the Arizona Department of Real Estate through the first decision, the request for reconsideration, and the final ruling on rehearing. What does this progression reveal about the administrative hearing process and the remedies available to petitioners?

4. The Petitioner attempted to use the results of an April 2017 vote to argue that the fines portion of the November 2016 amendment would likely have failed if voted on separately. Evaluate the strength and relevance of this argument within the legal context of the case.

5. Imagine the Petitioner had raised his objection to the ballot format before the November 10, 2016 vote. Based on the information in the decision, how might the proceedings and the ultimate outcome have been different?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The Petitioner alleged violations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 and § 33-1812.

Absentee Ballot

A ballot that allows a member to vote without being physically present at a meeting. The format of this ballot was the central issue of the rehearing.

By-Laws

The rules that govern the internal operations of an association. The Petitioner cited a violation of By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII concerning a $50 fine limit.

Department (The Department)

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency where the Petitioner first filed his petition against the homeowners association.

Master Declaration

A core governing document for a homeowners association that establishes rules, restrictions, and obligations for homeowners. The November 10, 2016 vote was to amend this document.

A formal, binding decision issued by a judge. The final document in this case was an order denying the Petitioner’s petition.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Scott Servilla & Heidi H. Servilla.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It means the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than the evidence offered in opposition.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case granted to reconsider the initial decision. A rehearing was granted after the Petitioner argued that the initial finding of “no remedy” was contrary to law.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Village of Oakcreek Association.

Waiver

A legal doctrine where a party intentionally or through inaction gives up a known right or claim. The ALJ ruled the Petitioner waived his right to object to the ballot by not raising the issue before the vote.

Zajac v. City of Casa Grande

An Arizona Supreme Court case that established a key legal precedent used in this decision. It holds that a party cannot knowingly allow a defective vote to proceed and then complain only if the results are unfavorable.

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}

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{ “rehearing”: { “is_rehearing”: true, “base_case_id”: “18F-H1817018-REL”, “original_decision_status”: “affirmed”, “original_decision_summary”: “In the original decision, the Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to prove claims regarding issues one and three1. For issue two (faulty ballot), the ALJ established a statutory violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2), but concluded that no remedy could be ordered because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism1.”, “rehearing_decision_summary”: “The Commissioner granted the rehearing to address the legal conclusion that no remedy could be ordered for the violation found in Issue 22. Following the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition3, concluding that Petitioner waived the right to complain about the faulty ballot because he was aware of the alleged issues but allowed the November 10, 2016 vote to proceed without objection4….”, “issues_challenged”: [ { “issue_number”: 2, “description”: “Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2) because the written ballot used did not provide a separate opportunity to vote for or against each proposed action7.”, “challenge”: “Petitioner challenged the original conclusion that no remedy could be ordered, alleging this was contrary to the law and arguing that the Administrative Law Judge was authorized to declare the amendment void and unenforceable28.”, “rehearing_outcome”: “Denied/Failed. The claim failed because the ALJ ruled that Petitioner waived his right to bring forth a complaint about the ballot by allowing the vote to proceed without objection36.” } ] } }

{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “18F-H1817018-REL-RHG”,
“case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla, Petitioner, vs. Village of Oakcreek Association, Respondent.”,
“decision_date”: “January 9, 2019”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“individuals”: [
{
“name”: “Scott Servilla”,
“role”: “petitioner”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Also referred to as Scott S. Servilla”
},
{
“name”: “Heidi H Servilla”,
“role”: “petitioner”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”,
“role”: “ALJ”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Office of Administrative Hearings”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Mark K. Sahl”,
“role”: “attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Judy Lowe”,
“role”: “commissioner”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “c. serrano”,
“role”: “staff”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitted documents”
},
{
“name”: “Felicia Del Sol”,
“role”: “staff”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitted documents”
}
]
}

This document summarizes the administrative law judge decision in the rehearing case of Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla v. Village of Oakcreek Association, Case No. 18F-H1817018-REL-RHG1. This matter was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer on November 29, 2018, with the record held open until December 20, 20181.

Procedural History (Original Decision vs. Rehearing)

Petitioner Scott Servilla filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) against the Village of Oakcreek Association (Respondent) alleging multiple violations of statute and the community’s Master Declaration2,3.

Original Decision: The Administrative Law Judge initially ruled on three issues4. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to prove two claims5. However, the ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2) regarding the written ballot, but concluded that because the statute did not provide an enforcement mechanism, no remedy could be ordered5.

Rehearing Grant: Following this initial decision, Petitioner filed a Request for Reconsideration, arguing the conclusion that no remedy existed was contrary to law6. The ADRE Commissioner granted the request for rehearing6.

Key Facts and Issue for Rehearing

The central issue during the rehearing concerned the statutory violation found in the original decision: whether the November 10, 2016 vote to amend the Master Declaration was invalid because the absentee ballot failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)4,7.

The Ballot Violation: A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) requires that absentee ballots set forth “each proposed action” and provide an opportunity to vote for or against “each proposed action”7. The Respondent’s proposed amendment bundled two distinct actions: the addition of leasing restrictions and the complete replacement of the Schedule of Fines8,9,10. The ballot only allowed members to vote “FOR” or “AGAINST THE LEASING AND SCHEDULE OF FINES AMENDMENT” as a single package9.

Key Legal Argument and Decision

At the rehearing, the core legal debate shifted from whether a violation occurred to whether the Petitioner was entitled to relief, specifically whether the ALJ could declare the amendment void and unenforceable6,11.

Respondent’s Defense and the Doctrine of Waiver: Respondent argued that Petitioner had waived the right to object because he did not raise any complaint about the defective ballot prior to the vote12. Petitioner received the ballot more than one month before the November 10, 2016 vote13.

ALJ Legal Conclusion: Drawing on Arizona Supreme Court precedent (Zajac v. City of Casa Grande)10,14, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that an individual cannot allow a known defective vote to proceed and only complain afterward if dissatisfied with the results15,16. Because Petitioner failed to raise an objection to the faulty ballot prior to the scheduled vote, he waived his right to bring a subsequent complaint about the ballot16.

Based on the application of the waiver doctrine, the ALJ found that Petitioner’s claim as to the ballot must fail16. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner’s petition is denied17. This order, resulting from the rehearing, is binding on the parties17.

{
“case”: {
“agency”: “ADRE”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“docket_no”: “18F-H1817018-REL-RHG”,
“case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla vs. Village of Oakcreek Association”,
“decision_date”: “2019-01-09”,
“alj_name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”
},
“parties”: [
{
“party_id”: “P1”,
“role”: “petitioner”,
“name”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla”,
“party_type”: “homeowner”,
“email”: null,
“phone”: null,
“attorney_name”: null,
“attorney_firm”: null,
“attorney_email”: null,
“attorney_phone”: null
},
{
“party_id”: “R1”,
“role”: “respondent”,
“name”: “Village of Oakcreek Association”,
“party_type”: “HOA”,
“email”: null,
“phone”: null,
“attorney_name”: “Mark K. Sahl”,
“attorney_firm”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”,
“attorney_email”: null,
“attorney_phone”: null
}
],
“issues”: [
{
“issue_id”: “ISS-001”,
“type”: “statute”,
“citation”: “A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)”,
“caption”: “Vote count required to amend declaration”,
“violation(s)”: “Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) and Declaration regarding the required majority vote (1173 votes) for the November 10, 2016 amendment.”,
“summary”: “Petitioner requested an order declaring the amendment invalid due to insufficient vote count.”,
“outcome”: “respondent_win”,
“filing_fee_paid”: 500.0,
“filing_fee_refunded”: false,
“civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0,
“orders_summary”: “Claim failed.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner failed to prove the claim.”,
“cited”: []
},
{
“issue_id”: “ISS-002”,
“type”: “statute”,
“citation”: “A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“caption”: “Absence of separate voting opportunity for proposed actions”,
“violation(s)”: “The written ballot used for the November 10, 2016 amendment violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A) and (B)(2) because it bundled two distinct proposed actions (Leasing Restrictions and Schedule of Fines) into a single vote.”,
“summary”: “Petitioner sought an order declaring the amendment invalid because the ballot improperly required a single vote on two separate actions.”,
“outcome”: “respondent_win”,
“filing_fee_paid”: 500.0,
“filing_fee_refunded”: false,
“civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0,
“orders_summary”: “Claim denied on rehearing. Petition denied.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner waived the right to object to the faulty ballot by receiving it over a month prior and allowing the vote to proceed on November 10, 2016, without raising a complaint.”,
“cited”: [
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”,
“Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114”
]
},
{
“issue_id”: “ISS-003”,
“type”: “governing_document”,
“citation”: “By-Laws Section 8, Article VIII”,
“caption”: “Unauthorized fines in excess of $50”,
“violation(s)”: “Respondent allegedly violated By-Laws by imposing fines in excess of $50 per violation, especially after a proposed amendment to raise the fines was voted down.”,
“summary”: “Petitioner requested an order that the Association cannot levy fines in excess of $50 per violation.”,
“outcome”: “respondent_win”,
“filing_fee_paid”: 500.0,
“filing_fee_refunded”: false,
“civil_penalty_amount”: 0.0,
“orders_summary”: “Claim failed.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner failed to prove the claim.”,
“cited”: []
}
],
“money_summary”: {
“issues_count”: 3,
“total_filing_fees_paid”: 1500.0,
“total_filing_fees_refunded”: 0.0,
“total_civil_penalties”: 0.0
},
“outcomes”: {
“petitioner_is_hoa”: false,
“petitioner_win”: “loss”,
“summarize_judgement”: “The Administrative Law Judge denied the entire petition. Although the Respondent used a faulty ballot (Issue 2), the Petitioner waived the right to object by failing to raise a complaint prior to the vote. Petitioner also failed to prove his claims for issues 1 and 3.”,
“why_the_loss”: “Petitioner waived the right to object to the ballot defect (Issue 2) by allowing the vote to proceed without objection, and failed to prove the claims for Issues 1 and 3.”,
“cited”: [
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”
]
},
“analytics”: {
“cited”: [
“A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1)”,
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)”,
“A.R.S. § 33-1812(B)(2)”,
“Zajac v. City of Casa Grande, 209 Ariz. 357, 102 P.3d 297”,
“Allen v. State, 14 Ariz. 458, 130 P. 1114”
],
“tags”: [
“HOA elections”,
“absentee ballots”,
“waiver doctrine”,
“amendment procedure”,
“fines”
]
}
}

{
“case”: {
“docket_no”: “18F-H1817018-REL-RHG”,
“case_title”: “Scott Servilla & Heidi H Servilla, vs. Village of Oakcreek Association”,
“decision_date”: “2019-01-09”,
“tribunal”: “OAH”,
“agency”: “ADRE”
},
“individuals”: [
{
“name”: “Scott Servilla”,
“role”: “petitioner”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Appeared on his own behalf at the hearing; also listed as Scott S. Servilla [1], [2]”
},
{
“name”: “Heidi H Servilla”,
“role”: “petitioner”,
“side”: “petitioner”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: null
},
{
“name”: “Tammy L. Eigenheer”,
“role”: “ALJ”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Office of Administrative Hearings”,
“notes”: “Administrative Law Judge [3], [4], [1], [2]”
},
{
“name”: “Mark K. Sahl”,
“role”: “HOA attorney”,
“side”: “respondent”,
“affiliation”: “CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP”,
“notes”: “Represented Village of Oakcreek Association [2]”
},
{
“name”: “Judy Lowe”,
“role”: “commissioner”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Granted the request for rehearing [5]”
},
{
“name”: “c. serrano”,
“role”: “staff”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitted documents on November 29, 2018 [6], [7]”
},
{
“name”: “Felicia Del Sol”,
“role”: “staff”,
“side”: “unknown”,
“affiliation”: null,
“notes”: “Transmitted documents on January 9, 2019 [8]”
},
{
“name”: “LDettorre”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “AHansen”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “djones”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “DGardner”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
},
{
“name”: “ncano”,
“role”: “ADRE staff”,
“side”: “neutral”,
“affiliation”: “Arizona Department of Real Estate”,
“notes”: “Recipient of transmittal [3], [4]”
}
]
}

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Scott Servilla (petitioner)
    Also referred to as Scott S. Servilla
  • Heidi H Servilla (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • c. serrano (staff)
    Transmitted documents
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted documents

George E Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918013-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-17
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner George E Lord Counsel —
Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association Counsel Maria Kupillas

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, and CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition in its entirety, concluding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1242, A.R.S. § 33-1260.01, or the association's CC&Rs.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of any statute or covenant alleged. The core findings supported the HOA's position that the lessee was engaging in prohibited business activity and subletting, and that the charged attorney fees were permissible.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violations concerning notice procedures, leasing restrictions, prohibited business use, and excessive fees.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 by failing to include proper citations in violation notices, violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 and CC&Rs by imposing illegal restrictions on occupancy dates and prohibiting tenant guests, and violated fee limits under A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) by charging $250 in attorney fees.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, HOA dispute, leasing restrictions, short-term rental, business use, notice procedure, attorney fees
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1242
  • A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 7.21
  • CC&Rs Section 7.3

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:51 (115.9 KB)

19F-H1918013-REL Decision – 677040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-26T09:47:54 (47.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1918013-REL, involving Petitioner George E. Lord and Respondent The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association. The judge ultimately dismissed all claims brought by the Petitioner, ruling that the Association acted within the bounds of Arizona statutes and its governing documents.

The core of the dispute centered on Mr. Lord’s leasing of three condominium units to an individual, Barrie Shepley, who used the properties to house participants for his commercial fitness training camps. The Association contended this arrangement constituted a prohibited short-term sublease and an improper business use of the units, leading them to suspend amenity access for the occupants.

The judge’s decision affirmed the Association’s position on all counts. Key takeaways include:

• Substance Over Form: The judge concluded that despite the absence of a formal sublease agreement, the nature of the arrangement—specifically a camp pricing structure that varied based on the number of occupants per condo—was effectively a sublet designed to house an “itinerant population,” contrary to the “spirit and purpose” of the community’s rules.

• Business Use Violation: The operation was found to be a business activity that violated the CC&Rs by requiring persons (camp participants) to come to the residential units.

• Procedural Compliance: The Association’s violation notices were deemed compliant with Arizona law. The judge noted that the statute only requires a detailed citation of the violated rule after the owner responds to the initial notice, which the Petitioner failed to do.

• Legality of Fees: A $250 charge levied by the Association’s counsel was determined to be a permissible charge for attorney’s fees related to potential collection, not an illegal penalty for leasing information as the Petitioner alleged.

As a result of these findings, the Petitioner’s request for relief was denied, and the petition was dismissed in its entirety.

I. Case Overview

• Parties:

◦ Petitioner: George E. Lord (unit owner)

◦ Respondent: The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

• Case Number: 19F-H1918013-REL

• Venue: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

• Hearing Date: November 26, 2018

• Decision Date: December 17, 2018

• Final Disposition: The petition filed by George E. Lord was dismissed.

II. Factual Background and Timeline of Events

1. Lease Agreements: On or about December 4, 2017, Petitioner George Lord, through his management company, leased two units at The Boulders to Barrie Shepley for a term from March 7, 2018, to April 30, 2018. A third unit was subsequently leased to Mr. Shepley on or about January 15, 2018.

2. Commercial Use: Mr. Shepley operated a Canadian fitness business, “Personal Best,” which offered training camps in Tucson. Accommodations at The Boulders were included in the camp packages. The price for a camp varied based on occupancy:

◦ $950.00 each for four campers in a condo

◦ $1075.00 each for three campers in a condo

◦ $1299.00 each for two campers in a condo

3. Occupancy Begins: On March 7, 2018, guests of Mr. Shepley (camp participants) began arriving to occupy the three leased units.

4. Association Intervention: On March 9, 2018, Community Manager Danielle Morris emailed Mr. Lord, stating the Association’s belief that he was in violation of the CC&Rs by allowing subleasing for periods less than the 30-day minimum. Ms. Morris informed him that amenity access cards for the three units were deactivated.

5. Dispute Escalation: Mr. Lord contended that the occupants were merely “guests” of Mr. Shepley, not subletters. Ms. Morris countered that the Association required the names of all occupants and the duration of their stays, and that each occupant must stay for a minimum of 30 days.

6. Information Provided: On March 13, 2018, Mr. Lord provided the names of the occupants and their dates of occupancy, requesting that amenities be restored.

7. Violation Reiterated: On March 16, 2018, Ms. Morris stated the violation was ongoing, as occupants staying from March 7 to March 31 did not meet the 30-day minimum stay requirement.

8. Formal Notice of Violation: On March 18, 2018, Mr. Lord received formal Notices of Violations for the three units. The notices stated that amenity access was suspended because the HOA was not provided with the names of adult occupants and their timeframes. The notice warned that a $300 fine could be applied. Mr. Lord did not respond to these notices.

9. Attorney Involvement: On March 22, 2018, Mr. Lord received a letter from the Association’s legal counsel outlining its legal position and noting an amount due of $250 for attorney’s fees already incurred.

10. Lease Cancellation & Financial Loss: On April 2, 2018, Mr. Shepley cancelled the remainder of the leases due to the lack of amenities for his guests. Mr. Lord asserted a resulting financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018.

11. Petition Filing: On August 31, 2018, Mr. Lord filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the Association violated state statutes and its own CC&Rs.

III. Petitioner’s Allegations and Arguments

Mr. Lord’s petition was based on three primary allegations against the Association:

• Allegation 1: Defective Violation Notice (A.R.S. § 33-1242): The Petitioner argued that the Notices of Violations were legally deficient because they failed to cite the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

• Allegation 2: Unlawful Occupancy Requirements (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 & CC&Rs): The Petitioner asserted that the Association overstepped its authority by demanding that each occupant, whom he characterized as a “guest” of the primary lessee, must stay for a minimum of 30 days. He argued the 30-day minimum lease term applied only to the primary lease with Mr. Shepley, not to the occupants.

• Allegation 3: Improper Fees (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)): The Petitioner claimed that the $250 charge from the Association’s attorney constituted an illegal fee, penalty, or charge related to providing leasing information, which he argued was prohibited by statute.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof for any of his allegations and dismissed the petition. The judge’s reasoning is detailed below.

Finding 1: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 (Violation Notice)

The judge determined that the Association’s initial Notices of Violations were legally sufficient.

• Legal Reasoning: A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) requires an association to cite the specific provision of the condominium documents that has been violated. However, this obligation is only triggered after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail.

• Factual Basis: The Petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the formal Notices of Violations he received.

• Conclusion: Because the Petitioner did not take the legally required step to trigger the Association’s duty to provide a specific citation, the Association did not violate the statute.

Finding 2: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 or CC&Rs (Leasing Rules)

The judge concluded that the Association was justified in its actions regarding the occupancy of the units.

• The Arrangement was a “Form” of Subletting: The judge ruled against the Petitioner’s argument that the occupants were merely “guests.” The fact that the price of the fitness camp changed based on how many people shared a unit was seen as evidence that Mr. Shepley was, in effect, subletting the units for his business.

• Prohibited Business Activity: The judge found that Mr. Shepley was operating a business from the units in a manner prohibited by Section 7.3 of the CC&Rs, which disallows business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.”

• Spirit of the Law: The decision acknowledged that the specific facts of the case “falls between the cracks of the specific language of the statutes and the regulations.” However, the judge emphasized that the Association’s actions were consistent with the broader intent of its rules, stating, “given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.”

• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association violated leasing statutes or its own CC&Rs.

Finding 3: No Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E) (Fees)

The judge found that the $250 charge was not an illegal penalty.

• Nature of the Charge: The evidence showed that no fines for the lease policy violation had actually been assessed. The $250 charge was explicitly for attorney’s fees related to the potential collection of assessments.

• Legal Reasoning: The judge stated, “Nothing in the cited statute or the CC&Rs prohibits such a charge being implemented.” The fee was not a penalty for “incomplete or late information” as covered by the statute, but a charge for legal costs incurred by the Association.

• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to establish a violation regarding the assessed fees.

V. Referenced Statutes and Governing Documents

Reference

Provision Summary

Relevance to Case

A.R.S. § 33-1242(B)&(C)

Outlines the process for a unit owner to respond to a violation notice and the association’s subsequent duty to provide specific details of the violation.

The judge found no violation because the Petitioner did not follow the procedure to trigger the association’s duty.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(C)

Limits the information an association can require about a tenant to names, contact info for adults, lease period, and vehicle information.

The Petitioner’s case rested on interpreting this statute; the judge found the Association’s inquiries justified by the unique circumstances.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E)

Prohibits an association from imposing fees greater than $15 for incomplete or late leasing information.

The Petitioner argued the $250 attorney fee violated this, but the judge found it was a permissible charge for legal costs, not a penalty.

CC&R Section 7.21

Requires leases to be in writing, for a term of not less than 30 days, and requires owners to provide lessee names and lease dates.

The Association argued the arrangement violated the 30-day minimum stay rule for occupants, which the judge upheld in spirit.

CC&R Section 7.3

Prohibits business activities within a unit that involve persons coming to the unit.

The judge found Mr. Shepley’s fitness camp, which housed participants in the units, was a clear violation of this provision.

Leasing Policy

States a $300 fine may be imposed for violations of the 30-day minimum lease policy.

The Notice of Violation referenced this potential fine, though it was never actually assessed.

VI. Final Order and Procedural Notes

• Order: Based on the above findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be dismissed.

• Binding Nature: The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

• Related Filings: On the same day the decision was issued, December 17, 2018, the court also issued a separate “Order Vacating Hearing,” likely a procedural filing to cancel a future hearing that was rendered unnecessary by the dismissal of the case.

Study Guide: Lord v. The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918013-REL, heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The case involves a dispute between a condominium unit owner, George E. Lord, and his condominium association, The Boulders at La Reserve, concerning leasing policies, occupant regulations, and alleged statutory violations.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. Describe the business arrangement that Barrie Shepley, the petitioner’s lessee, was operating from the leased condominium units.

3. What was the first official action the Condominium Association’s management took in response to the arrival of Barrie Shepley’s guests, and what was their stated reason?

4. According to the Association, what two specific provisions of the governing documents were being violated by the petitioner and his lessee?

5. What was the petitioner’s central argument for why the occupants of the units were not in violation of the Association’s 30-day minimum stay requirement?

6. On what procedural grounds did the petitioner, George Lord, claim that the Association’s “Notice of Violations” was itself a violation of Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242)?

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately rule that the Association did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1242?

8. How did the judge interpret the fact that the price for Barrie Shepley’s fitness camps varied based on the number of people sharing a condo?

9. What financial loss did the petitioner claim to have suffered, and what was the direct cause of this loss?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were George E. Lord, the petitioner and owner of multiple condominium units, and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association, the respondent and governing body for the community. The case was adjudicated by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.

2. Barrie Shepley operated a fitness business called “Personal Best” that offered training camps in the Tucson area. The price for these camps included accommodations at The Boulders, with the cost per person varying based on how many campers shared a condominium unit.

3. The Association’s first action was to deactivate the amenity access cards for the three units leased by Shepley. Danielle Morris, the Community Manager, stated this was due to a belief that the petitioner’s lessee was subleasing the units for periods of less than the 30-day minimum in violation of the CC&Rs.

4. The Association alleged violations of the CC&Rs related to subleasing for less than the 30-day minimum timeframe. The formal Notices of Violations also cited the failure to provide the names of all adult occupants and the timeframes of their stays to the HOA.

5. The petitioner argued that because his lessee, Mr. Shepley, was not charging a specific rental fee to the occupants, they were merely “guests” and not sub-lessees. Therefore, the 30-day minimum stay requirement applicable to leases did not apply to them.

6. The petitioner alleged that the Association’s failure to include a citation to the specific statute or CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated in the initial Notice of Violations was a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242.

7. The judge ruled against the petitioner because A.R.S. § 33-1242 only requires an association to provide the specific provision violated after the unit owner sends a written response to the initial notice by certified mail. The petitioner admitted that he did not respond to the Notices of Violations.

8. The judge found that the tiered pricing structure supported the conclusion that Mr. Shepley was, “in a form, subletting the units.” The fact that the camp price decreased as more people shared a unit indicated that the occupants were paying for their accommodations, not simply staying as guests.

9. The petitioner asserted a financial loss of $6,900 in rental fees for April 2018. This loss was directly caused by Barrie Shepley canceling the remainder of his leases due to the lack of amenities for his occupants.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s final order was that the Petition filed by George E. Lord be dismissed. This decision was binding unless a rehearing was granted.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, citing specific facts, arguments, and legal interpretations from the case file.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for concluding that Barrie Shepley was “in a form, subletting” the units. Discuss the evidence cited and the concept of the “spirit and purpose” of the rules versus their literal interpretation.

2. Examine the procedural misstep made by the petitioner, George Lord, after receiving the Notices of Violations. How did this action directly impact the judge’s ruling on his claim regarding A.R.S. § 33-1242?

3. Discuss the conflict between a unit owner’s right to lease their property and a condominium association’s right to enforce its governing documents, using the specific provisions of the CC&Rs (Sections 7.21 and 7.3) and state law (A.R.S. § 33-1260.01) as examples from the case.

4. Explain the distinction the judge made between the $300 potential fine mentioned in the Notice of Violations and the $250 attorney’s fee charged to the petitioner. How did this distinction relate to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(E), and why was the Association’s action deemed permissible?

5. Evaluate the concept of an “itinerant population” as mentioned by the judge. How did Barrie Shepley’s business model contribute to this concern for the Association, and how did it ultimately weigh into the judge’s decision to dismiss the petition?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Term / Name

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings on disputes involving government agencies. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified body of laws for the state of Arizona. The petitioner alleged violations of specific statutes within this code, namely A.R.S. § 33-1242 and § 33-1260.01.

A.R.S. § 33-1242

A state law governing the process for notifying a unit owner of a violation of condominium documents and the procedures for the owner to respond and contest the notice.

A.R.S. § 33-1260.01

A state law that places limitations on what information an association can require from a unit owner regarding a tenant and caps certain fees or penalties for incomplete information at $15.

Amenity

A feature or facility of a property that provides comfort, convenience, or pleasure. In this case, access to amenities was controlled by key cards, which the Association deactivated.

Barrie Shepley

The individual who leased three condominium units from the petitioner. He operated a fitness business, “Personal Best,” and used the units to house clients attending his training camps.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or condominium. The Association alleged Shepley’s use of the units violated Sections 7.21 (leasing limitations) and 7.3 (business use limitations).

George E. Lord

The Petitioner in the case. He was the owner of multiple condominium units at The Boulders at La Reserve and filed the petition against the Association.

Itinerant population

A term used by the judge to describe a population of short-term, transient occupants. The judge concluded that the purpose of the Association’s rules was, in part, to prevent this type of occupancy.

Notice of Violations

A formal written document sent by the Association to the petitioner informing him of alleged violations of the governing documents and outlining potential consequences, such as fines.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, George E. Lord.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means that the petitioner had the burden of showing that the facts they sought to prove were “more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association.

Subletting

The practice of a tenant leasing a rented property to a third party. The Association contended Shepley was subletting the units to his campers, while the petitioner argued they were merely guests.

The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case. The homeowners’ association (HOA) responsible for governing the condominium community in Oro Valley, Arizona.

The $6,900 ‘Guest’ Mistake: 3 Hard Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit

A $6,900 loss in rental income and a losing legal battle with his HOA—all because of a dispute over the definition of a “guest.” This case between owner George Lord and The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association is a masterclass in how quickly and completely an owner can lose when they misinterpret the rules and underestimate an association’s power.

For any homeowner or landlord, this dispute provides three crucial lessons distilled from the administrative court’s decision. Understanding these precedents is essential before you ever find yourself at odds with your own HOA.

Lesson 1: The “Spirit of the Rule” Can Outweigh Your Clever Workaround

The dispute began when the property owner, Mr. Lord, leased three condos to Barrie Shepley, who ran fitness training camps. Mr. Shepley then used the condos to house his camp attendees, often for periods shorter than the HOA’s 30-day minimum lease term.

The owner argued his arrangement complied with the rules. He claimed his tenant, Mr. Shepley, was not subleasing the units; the attendees were merely “guests,” and therefore not subject to the 30-day minimum. It was a clever workaround, but it fell apart under scrutiny for two distinct reasons.

First, the judge looked past the “guest” label to the financial substance of the arrangement. A key piece of evidence was the camp’s pricing: the cost changed based on how many campers shared a condo ($950 each for four campers vs. $1299 each for two). The judge saw this as clear proof that housing was being paid for, making it a form of subletting.

Second, the judge found that the arrangement constituted a prohibited business activity. The association’s CC&Rs (Section 7.3) explicitly forbade any business activity that “involve[s] persons coming to the Unit.” Since the fitness camp required attendees to come to the condos for lodging, it was a direct violation. The judge’s decision was therefore not just based on a subjective interpretation, but was also grounded in a concrete rule violation.

The court looked at the “totality of the circumstances” to make its ruling, a point powerfully summarized in the final decision:

However, given the totality of the circumstances, the spirit and purpose of the applicable rules is to allow an association to know who is in the community and to prevent an itinerant population.

Pro Tip: Before implementing a workaround, ask yourself: “Does this honor the community’s stated goal?” If the answer is no, you’re on thin ice, even if you think you’ve found a loophole.

Lesson 2: You Must Follow Procedure to the Letter, Or You Forfeit Your Rights

Confident in his “guest” interpretation, the homeowner made his next critical error by underestimating the importance of legal procedure. He argued that the HOA’s initial “Notice of Violations” was invalid because it failed to cite the specific CC&R provision that had allegedly been violated.

This argument was swiftly dismissed due to a simple but fatal mistake: the owner never sent a formal written response to the notice by certified mail.

Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1242), an owner’s formal written response via certified mail triggers the HOA’s obligation to provide the specific provision that was violated. Without that trigger, the HOA’s duty to explain further is never activated. The homeowner failed to pull the trigger. Because he did not follow this exact procedure, his claim was thrown out, and the HOA had no further legal obligation to detail its case.

Analyst’s Takeaway: In a legal dispute, communication that isn’t sent via the officially mandated channel (like certified mail) is legally equivalent to communication that never happened.

Lesson 3: The HOA’s Legal Fees Can Hit Your Wallet Sooner Than You Think

Early in the dispute, the owner received a letter from the HOA’s legal counsel. The letter outlined the association’s position and included a charge for $250.00. This was not a fine for the violation. It was a fee for the lawyer’s time, as explained in the letter:

“As you know, the Association is entitled to recover its costs and attorneys’ fees from you, including $250.00 already incurred for the preparation of this letter.”

Many governing documents contain clauses that allow an HOA to recover its “costs of enforcement.” This letter was an enforcement action, and the legal fee was the cost. The judge found that nothing in the law or CC&Rs prohibited the HOA from immediately passing this expense to the owner.

This initial charge was a precursor to a much larger financial blow. As an enforcement tool for the violations discussed in Lesson 1, the HOA suspended the tenants’ access to community amenities. This pressure tactic worked perfectly. The tenant, Mr. Shepley, cancelled his leases due to the lack of amenity access, leading to the owner’s stated loss of $6,900 in rental fees.

Pro Tip: Assume your HOA’s first legal letter starts a running tab. Budget for legal costs from day one of a formal dispute, not just for potential fines.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense

The case of Lord vs. The Boulders at La Reserve establishes three clear precedents for owners: a rule’s intent can supersede its literal interpretation, procedural shortcuts void your rights, and the financial clock starts ticking the moment an HOA retains counsel.

This case is a firm reminder of an HOA’s power to enforce its rules, but it also highlights the owner’s responsibility to understand them. It begs the question: In our own communities, are we fully aware of the rules we’ve agreed to live by?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • George E. Lord (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Maria Kupillas (respondent attorney)
    Law offices of Farley, Choate & Bergin
  • Danielle Morris (community manager)
    The Boulders at La Reserve Condominium Association

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Barrie Shepley (renter/key individual)

Brent J Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818050-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-11
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brent J. Mathews Counsel —
Respondent American Ranch Community Association Counsel Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik

Alleged Violations

American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.

Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).

Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:13:46 (112.4 KB)

Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.

The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.

1. Case Overview

Case Number

18F-H1818050-REL

Petitioner

Brent J. Mathews

Respondent

American Ranch Community Association

Hearing Date

September 21, 2018

Decision Date

October 11, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.

2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation

After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:

“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”

The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.

3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events

The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.

A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.

June 2011

The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.

November 23, 2013

Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.

July 30, 2016

Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.

August 2016

Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.

August 9, 2016

The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.

4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning

The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.

A. Burden of Proof

The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.

B. Variance vs. Amendment

The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.

• Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.

• Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”

The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.

C. The Board’s Delegated Authority

The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:

1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.

2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”

3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.

5. Final Order

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:

• Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.

• Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”

The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.

Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?

3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?

4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?

5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?

6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?

7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?

8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?

9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.

2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.

3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.

4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.

5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.

6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.

7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.

8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.

9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.

10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.

2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?

4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.

5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.

Architectural Review Committee

A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.

Bylaws

The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.

Petition

The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Petitioner

The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.

Variance

An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.

Well Agreement 1

A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.

Well Agreement 2

An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.

Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown

1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome

It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.

That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.

The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.

2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone

Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.

However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.

3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees

This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.

This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.

According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.

“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”

This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.

4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution

While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.

The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.

When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”

The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.

5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them

The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.

This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brent J. Mathews (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Lynn Krupnik (attorney)
    Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Timothy Krupnik (attorney)
    Krupnik & Speas, PLLC
    Represented Respondent
  • Tiffany Taylor (community manager)
    American Ranch Community Association
    Testified for Respondent
  • Brad Baker (board member)
    American Ranch Community Association
    Respondent Vice President; testified at hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Signed transmission page
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision recipient

Other Participants

  • Mark Kaplan (owner)
    Lot 2
    Executed Well Agreement 2
  • Diane Kaplan (owner)
    Lot 2
    Executed Well Agreement 2
  • Steven Galliano (former owner)
    Lot 2
  • Frances Galliano (former owner)
    Lot 2

Thomas P. Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas P. Satterlee Counsel —
Respondent Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association Counsel James A. Robles

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

Outcome Summary

The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.

Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status

This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, Rehearing, HOA Dispute, Statutory Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1802
  • Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
  • Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
  • Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
  • Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
  • Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:02 (130.3 KB)

Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA

Executive Summary

This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.

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Case Overview and Procedural History

The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.

• January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).

• March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.

• April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.

• September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.

• September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Central Jurisdictional Question

The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.

The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.

Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:

“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”

A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.

Arguments of the Parties

The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.

Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)

The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.

• Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

• “Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.

• Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”

• Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:

◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.

◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).

◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.

◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”

◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.

Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)

The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.

• Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”

• Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.

• Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision

The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.

The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.

To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”

Source

Definition of “Roadway”

English Oxford Living Dict.

“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”

Merriam-Webster

“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”

Dictionary.com

“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”

Cambridge Dictionary

“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”

American Heritage Dictionary

“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”

Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries

“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”

The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:

“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”

The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”

• Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”

• Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).

• Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”

These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.

• Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.

• Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.

• Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.

• Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association

This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.

1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?

2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?

3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?

4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?

5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?

6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?

7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?

9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?

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Answer Key

1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.

2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.

3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.

4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.

5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.

6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.

7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.

8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”

9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.

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Essay Questions

Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.

2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?

3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.

4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?

5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.

A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)

The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.

Complete Streets

An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.

Covenant

A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.

Petitioner

The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.

Planned Community

As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.

Right-of-Way

The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”

Roadway

Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.

  • don't play in the street

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • James A. Robles (attorney)
    Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del sol (staff)
    Clerk/Distribution staff

Other Participants

  • Ana M. Olivares (Director)
    Pima County Transportation
    Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance

Annette Cohen vs. CBS 136 Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-06-26
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party because Respondent established a technical violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested documents within the 10-day limit. However, the Administrative Law Judge found a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Annette Cohen Counsel —
Respondent CBS 136 Homeowners Association Counsel Brian E. Ditsch

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party because Respondent established a technical violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested documents within the 10-day limit. However, the Administrative Law Judge found a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide requested association records within 10 business days

Petitioner requested sign-in sheets for the January 10, 2018, and February 15, 2018, CBS HOA meetings. Respondent acknowledged a technical violation of the statute by failing to provide the requested documents within the required 10-day timeframe, although they were ultimately provided prior to the hearing.

Orders: Respondent must comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future, and pay Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, failure to provide documents, condominium owners association, filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 642888.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:47 (74.5 KB)

18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 655537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:50 (83.3 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision from the administrative hearing case Annette Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association (No. 18F-H1818033-REL). The core of the dispute was the Homeowners Association’s (HOA) failure to provide requested documents—specifically, meeting sign-in sheets—to a member, Annette Cohen, within the ten-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1258.

At the hearing, the Respondent HOA acknowledged this “technical violation,” attributing the delay to operational difficulties arising from a recent change in management companies. The Petitioner, Ms. Cohen, argued the delay was intentional and warranted a civil penalty.

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, found that the HOA did violate the statute. In the final order, the Judge declared Ms. Cohen the prevailing party and mandated future compliance by the HOA. While a civil penalty was deemed inappropriate under the circumstances, the Judge ordered the HOA to reimburse Ms. Cohen’s $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

Annette Cohen

Respondent

CBS 136 Homeowners Association (CBS)

Respondent’s Counsel

Brian Ditsch, Sacks Tierney P.A.

Respondent’s Mgmt. Co.

Key Witness

Susan Rubin (PRM)

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Case Number

18F-H1818033-REL

Hearing Date

June 6, 2018

Decision Date

June 26, 2018

Chronology of the Dispute

The dispute centered on two separate sets of document requests made by Petitioner Annette Cohen.

• Request 1 (January 10 Meeting):

◦ On or about Jan. 10, 2018: Ms. Cohen requested the sign-in sheets from the annual meeting held on this date.

◦ Jan. 2018: The management company PRM took over management of the CBS 136 HOA.

◦ Feb. 15, 2018: After more than a month, and after two scheduled review appointments were cancelled by the management company, the sign-in sheets were finally provided to Ms. Cohen by email.

• Request 2 (February 15 Meeting):

◦ Feb. 19, 2018: Ms. Cohen requested the sign-in sheets from the February 15, 2018 HOA meeting. Receipt of this request was acknowledged by PRM.

◦ Feb. 21, 26, 27 & March 5, 2018: Ms. Cohen made repeated follow-up requests for the same information.

• Formal Proceedings:

◦ March 9, 2018: Ms. Cohen filed a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

◦ April 10, 2018: The Respondent HOA filed an answer denying all allegations.

◦ June 6, 2018: An administrative hearing was held. The documents had been provided to Ms. Cohen at some point prior to this hearing.

◦ June 26, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision.

Core Allegation and Legal Framework

Petitioner’s Allegation

Annette Cohen alleged that the CBS 136 Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Section 33-1258 by failing to provide association records for review and copying within the statutorily required timeframe.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

The legal basis for the petition is Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1258(A), which governs a member’s right to access association records. The statute states, in relevant part:

“all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member… The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination. On request for purchase of copies of records by any member… the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records. An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.”

The petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence that “shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Arguments and Evidence Presented at Hearing

Once the Respondent acknowledged the delay, the hearing focused solely on determining the appropriate remedy.

Petitioner’s Position (Annette Cohen)

• Intentional Negligence: Ms. Cohen argued that the Respondent “intentionally ignored her request for the documents.”

• Request for Penalty: Based on the belief of intentional neglect, she asserted that a civil penalty was an appropriate remedy.

• Unreasonable Delay: She noted that the documents “could have easily been emailed to her within the 10 day deadline,” but that the HOA’s management company did not present this as an option until after the deadline had already passed.

Respondent’s Position (CBS 136 HOA)

• Acknowledged Violation: At the June 6, 2018 hearing, the Respondent “acknowledged that the requested documents were not provided within the 10 day timeframe set forth in statute.”

• Mitigating Circumstances: The defense centered on testimony from Susan Rubin of the management company, PRM. Ms. Rubin testified to the following:

◦ No requests are “ever purposefully ignored.”

◦ PRM had only taken over management of the HOA in January 2018.

◦ At the time of the requests, PRM was “still getting documents from the former management company.”

◦ The delay was not due to ignoring the request, but because it “took a little longer than expected to provide the documents.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

Findings and Conclusions

• Violation Established: The Judge concluded there was “no dispute that Respondent failed to provide the requested documents within 10 days.” Therefore, the Petitioner “established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).”

• Rejection of Civil Penalty: Despite the Petitioner’s argument, the Administrative Law Judge did “not find such a penalty to be appropriate given the circumstances in this matter.”

Final Order

The Judge issued a three-part order binding on the parties:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Annette Cohen, is “deemed the prevailing party.”

2. Future Compliance: The Respondent, CBS 136 Homeowners Association, is ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future.”

3. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: The Respondent must pay the Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 directly to her within thirty (30) days of the order.

Study Guide: Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Please answer the following ten questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 18F-H1818033-REL, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific documents did the Petitioner, Annette Cohen, request from the Respondent?

3. According to the petition, what was the core legal violation alleged by Ms. Cohen against the Homeowners Association?

4. What was the timeline for the Respondent’s failure to produce the sign-in sheets from the January 10, 2018 meeting?

5. How did the Respondent initially respond to the petition after it was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

6. What admission did the Respondent make at the June 6, 2018 hearing?

7. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the delay in providing the requested documents to the Petitioner?

8. What remedy did the Petitioner argue was appropriate for the violation, and on what grounds?

9. What legal standard of proof was the Petitioner required to meet, and did the judge find that she met it?

10. What were the three components of the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Annette Cohen, who was the Petitioner, and the CBS 136 Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the party against whom the complaint was filed.

2. The Petitioner requested the sign-in sheets from two separate meetings. She requested the sign-in sheets from the January 10, 2018 annual meeting and the sign-in sheets from the February 15, 2018 CBS HOA meeting.

3. The core legal violation alleged by Ms. Cohen was that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Title 33, Chapter 16, Section 33-1258. This statute requires homeowner associations to provide requested records to members for examination or copying within a ten-business-day timeframe.

4. Ms. Cohen requested the January 10, 2018 sign-in sheets on or about that same date (January 10). She did not receive them via email until February 15, 2018, which is well beyond the ten-business-day limit stipulated by law.

5. On or about April 10, 2018, the Respondent filed an answer to the petition. In this official response, the Respondent denied all of the allegations made by the Petitioner.

6. At the June 6, 2018 hearing, the Respondent acknowledged its failure to comply with the law. The Respondent admitted that the requested documents were not provided within the 10-day timeframe set forth in the statute, constituting a technical violation.

7. The Respondent, through the testimony of Susan Rubin from its management company PRM, explained the delay was not intentional. Ms. Rubin stated that PRM had just taken over management of the HOA in January 2018 and was still in the process of getting documents from the former management company.

8. The Petitioner argued that a civil penalty was the appropriate remedy. She contended that the Respondent intentionally ignored her requests and could have easily emailed the documents within the deadline, but failed to do so until after the deadline had passed.

9. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The judge found that she successfully met this standard because there was no dispute that the Respondent failed to provide the documents within the required 10 days.

10. The three components of the final Order were: 1) The Petitioner, Annette Cohen, was deemed the prevailing party; 2) The Respondent was ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future; and 3) The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-format responses. Use the provided case documents to formulate a comprehensive analysis.

1. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the appropriate remedy for the acknowledged statutory violation. Evaluate the mitigating circumstances offered by the Respondent and discuss why the Administrative Law Judge may have found them persuasive enough to deny a civil penalty while still finding in favor of the Petitioner.

2. Discuss the legal framework governing disputes between property owners and condominium associations in Arizona as outlined in the case documents. Explain the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, and detail the specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).

3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the judge’s decision. Explain how the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof, particularly in light of the Respondent’s initial denial of all allegations versus its later admission at the hearing.

4. Deconstruct the final Order issued by Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer. What were the three distinct parts of the Order, and what legal and practical purpose did each part serve in resolving the dispute, compensating the Petitioner, and ensuring future compliance by the Respondent?

5. Trace the procedural history of this case, creating a timeline of key events from Ms. Cohen’s first document request to the issuance of the final Order. Discuss the significance of each step, including the multiple requests, the petition filing, the Respondent’s answer, the hearing, and the final decision.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

The specific section of Arizona Revised Statutes cited in the case. It mandates that a homeowners association must make records available for member examination within ten business days and may charge up to fifteen cents per page for copies.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to prove their assertions. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the statute.

CBS 136 Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; an association of condominium owners located in Sun City West, Arizona.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that outlines the factual history and evidence presented in the case, as determined by the judge.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state office where the formal hearing on the petition was conducted.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Annette Cohen.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

The management company that took over management of the CBS 136 Homeowners Association in January 2018.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the CBS 136 Homeowners Association.

Technical Violation

An acknowledged infringement of a rule or statute where the substance of the rule may not have been maliciously violated. The Respondent admitted to a technical violation of the 10-day timeframe for document production.

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18F-H1818033-REL

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Both documents are identical excerpts from an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, concerning a dispute between Annette Cohen (Petitioner) and the CBS 136 Homeowners Association (Respondent). The case, No. 18F-H1818033-REL, addressed the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested association meeting sign-in sheets within the mandated ten-day period. Though the Respondent acknowledged a technical violation of the statute, the Administrative Law Judge determined that a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances, such as the change in management. Ultimately, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, and the Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute in the future and reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

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NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Annette Cohen (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Brian Ditsch (respondent attorney)
    Sacks Tierney P.A.
  • Susan Rubin (witness)
    PRM (management company)
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision notice

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (clerical staff)
    Transmitted the decision

John Paul Holyoak vs. Camelback Country Club Estates I & II

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818030-REL, 18F-H1818031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition related to landscaping (18F-H1818030-REL), but deemed Petitioner the prevailing party and ordered the refund of the $500 filing fee regarding the petition concerning the additional mailbox (18F-H1818031-REL) because the HOA improperly based the fine on CC&R Section 12.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak Counsel —
Respondent Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston, J. Gary Linder

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 12

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition related to landscaping (18F-H1818030-REL), but deemed Petitioner the prevailing party and ordered the refund of the $500 filing fee regarding the petition concerning the additional mailbox (18F-H1818031-REL) because the HOA improperly based the fine on CC&R Section 12.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the olive tree was alive, and a dead tree could be reasonably considered a violation of CC&R Section 28 requiring neatly trimmed/properly cultivated plantings (Case 18F-H1818030-REL).

Key Issues & Findings

Improper fine regarding additional freestanding mailbox

Petitioner challenged fines for an additional mailbox lacking architectural approval. The ALJ found that CC&R Section 12 (related to 'building') could not be applied to a mailbox, rendering the fine imposed under that section a violation by the Respondent. Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party in this docket number (18F-H1818031-REL).

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $500.00 filing fee refund within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 8
  • CC&Rs Section 12
  • CC&Rs Section 27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: landscape_maintenance, architectural_review, fines, mailbox, ccrs, consolidated_cases, prevailing_party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 8
  • CC&Rs Section 12
  • CC&Rs Section 27
  • CC&Rs Section 28

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 636748.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:41:00 (130.5 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637227.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:41:12 (57.9 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637433.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:41:23 (56.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Holyoak v. Camelback Country Club Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning two consolidated petitions filed by homeowner Jon Paul Holyoak against the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (HOA). The disputes centered on HOA-issued violations for landscaping maintenance and the presence of a freestanding mailbox.

The final judgment produced a split decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Holyoak, failed to prove the HOA acted improperly in the landscaping case and his petition was denied. However, he was deemed the prevailing party in the mailbox case, with the judge concluding the HOA had violated its own community documents (CC&Rs) by imposing a fine based on an inapplicable section. As the prevailing party in one of the two matters, Mr. Holyoak was awarded his $500 filing fee, to be paid by the HOA. The initial decision document required two subsequent nunc pro tunc orders to correct typographical errors.

Key Takeaways:

• Landscaping Petition (Denied): Mr. Holyoak was cited for failing to remove a “dead” olive tree. He argued the tree was merely “in distress.” The judge ruled that a reasonable person would consider the tree dead and that Mr. Holyoak failed to provide sufficient evidence to the contrary. A dead tree was found to be a potential violation of CC&R Section 28, which requires plantings to be “neatly trimmed” and “properly cultivated.”

• Mailbox Petition (Upheld): Mr. Holyoak was cited for an “additional mailbox” that was present when he purchased the property in 2012. The judge found the HOA’s enforcement problematic for two primary reasons:

1. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections across multiple notices.

2. The fine was ultimately based on Section 12, which pertains to “buildings” and was deemed inapplicable to a mailbox.

• Final Order: The HOA was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee. The decision is binding on the parties.

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Case Overview

The matter involves two petitions filed on February 2, 2018, by Petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Respondent, Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association. The petitions alleged that the HOA had improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for violations of the community’s Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The two cases were consolidated for a single hearing.

Detail

Information

Case Numbers

18F-H1818030-REL (Landscaping)
18F-H1818031-REL (Mailbox)

Petitioner

Jon Paul Holyoak

Respondent

Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (represented by Gary Linder and Diana Elston)

Hearing Date

May 2, 2018

Decision Date

May 25, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Legal Framework

The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the community CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

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Petition 1: Landscaping Violations (Case No. 18F-H1818030-REL)

This petition alleged that the HOA improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for violating Section 28 of the CC&Rs, which governs landscape maintenance.

HOA Actions and Timeline

The HOA, through its inspection team Associa Arizona, issued a series of notices regarding the landscaping on Mr. Holyoak’s property.

Notice Type

Description

Oct 17, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the dead foliage on your lot.”

Dec 13, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the dead olive tree in the front yard.”

Dec 13, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“There are several other trees that need to be removed as they have dead branches including the cassia…”

Jan 25, 2018

Notice of Violation

“2nd notice…There are several other trees that need to be removed as they have dead branches…” (Included photo of backyard).

Arguments Presented

• Petitioner’s Position (Holyoak):

◦ The olive tree in the front yard was not “dead” but rather “in distress,” and he was actively trying to nurse it back to health. He eventually had the tree removed on April 25, 2018, after months of effort.

◦ Regarding the backyard photo attached to the fine notice, he argued that the olive tree visible was healthy and that no dead trees were depicted.

◦ He requested that the fine be abated.

• Respondent’s Position (HOA):

◦ Board member Terry Rogers testified that the front yard olive tree had no leaves, appeared dead from the roadway, and was therefore not “properly trimmed” as required.

◦ He stated the backyard notice referred to a eucalyptus tree with several dead branches visible from the sidewalk bordering the property.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The judge ruled in favor of the HOA in this matter.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence, beyond “his self-serving statements,” that the olive tree was alive.

• Reasonable Interpretation: The judge concluded that “Any reasonable person viewing the olive tree, as depicted in the photographs presented, would understand the tree to be dead.”

• Violation of CC&Rs: A dead tree could reasonably be considered as not being “neatly trimmed” or “properly cultivated” in accordance with Section 28.

• Verdict: The Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge found that the HOA had not improperly fined him for the landscaping violation.

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Petition 2: Unapproved Structure/Mailbox (Case No. 18F-H1818031-REL)

This petition alleged that the HOA improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for having an “additional mailbox” in violation of the CC&Rs.

HOA Actions and Timeline

The HOA’s notices for the mailbox cited three different sections of the CC&Rs over time.

Notice Type

Description

CC&R Section Cited

Oct 17, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the additional mailbox on your lot.”

Section 27

Dec 14, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“…there is an additional mailbox on your lot. In research of our files, there is no architectural application on file for the modification.”

Section 12

Jan 25, 2018

Notice of Violation

“2nd notice…Please remove the mailbox or provide the approved architectural application.” (Mailbox was painted bright pink and yellow at this time).

Section 12

Jan 25, 2018¹

Notice of Violation

“3rd notice…Please remove the mailbox or provide the approved architectural application.”

Section 8

¹The decision document states this notice was sent on January 25, 2018, but references a violation noted on March 15, 2018. The judge’s conclusions later clarify a notice referencing Section 8 was issued April 11, 2018, and was not properly before the tribunal.

Arguments Presented

• Petitioner’s Position (Holyoak):

◦ The freestanding mailbox was already in place when he purchased the home in 2012.

◦ At the time of purchase, he received a statement that there were no known covenant violations on the property.

◦ He argued the mailbox is required by the United States Postal Service (USPS), which no longer provides walking delivery and requires mailboxes to be reachable from a vehicle. The home’s other mailbox, built into a monument, is approximately 15 feet from the curb.

◦ A USPS mail carrier had confirmed this delivery requirement.

• Respondent’s Position (HOA):

◦ Board member Terry Rogers testified that the USPS mail carrier told him he would prefer to deliver to the permanent monument mailbox because the freestanding one was not secure.

◦ The mailbox had become an “eyesore,” as it was faded, peeling, and “listing to one side.”

◦ Of the 61 homes in the community, only three have freestanding mailboxes, and the Petitioner is the only one with two mailboxes.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner in this matter.

• Inconsistent Enforcement: The judge found it “problematic” that the HOA relied on three different sections of the CC&Rs in its notices.

• Pre-existing Structure: The Petitioner established that the mailbox was present at the time of his 2012 home purchase and that he was told of no existing violations. Therefore, the HOA’s argument regarding the lack of an architectural approval was “without merit.”

• Inapplicable CC&R Section: The fine was imposed based on Section 12 of the CC&Rs. The judge determined the plain language of this section relates to a “building” and “cannot be read to apply to Petitioner’s mailbox.”

• Violation by HOA: By imposing a fine based on an inapplicable section, the HOA was in violation of the CC&Rs.

• Verdict: The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The judge noted that the HOA could potentially impose fines for failure to maintain the mailbox or for painting it without approval, but those specific violations were not before the court.

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Final Order and Subsequent Corrections

• Order of May 25, 2018:

1. Petitioner’s petition in Case Number 18F-H1818030-REL (Landscaping) is denied.

2. Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818031-REL (Mailbox).

3. Respondent (HOA) is ordered to pay Petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.

• Order Nunc Pro Tunc of May 30, 2018:

◦ This order corrected a typographical error in the original decision. The original text mistakenly stated the petition for the mailbox case (31-REL) was denied.

◦ Correction: The denial was correctly applied to the landscaping case: “it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition in Case Number 18F-H1818031-REL 18F-H1818030-REL is denied.”

• Order Nunc Pro Tunc of May 31, 2018:

◦ This order corrected a typographical error in the May 30 order, which had misstated the date of the original decision.

◦ Correction: “On April 26 May 25, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge issued the Administrative Law Judge Decision…”

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Key CC&R Sections Cited

• Section 8 (Architectural Control): Requires written approval from the Committee before any “building or other structure” is erected, altered, or repaired. This includes exterior finish, color, and architectural style.

• Section 12 (Buildings): States that “No building may be erected or maintained upon any Lot except one single family dwelling with private appurtenant garage and customary outbuildings” without prior written approval.

• Section 27 (Maintenance): Prohibits any building or structure from falling into disrepair and requires owners to keep them in good condition and adequately painted.

• Section 28 (Landscaping): Requires the owner of each lot to “at all times keep shrubs, trees, grass and plantings of every kind, on his lot mostly trimmed, properly cultivated, and free of trash, weeds and other unsightly material.”

Study Guide: Holyoak v. Camelback Country Club Estates I & II HOA

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing case between petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak and the respondent, Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association. It covers the core disputes, arguments, legal interpretations, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this administrative case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the two distinct case numbers, and what violation did each one address?

3. According to Section 28 of the CC&Rs, what is the responsibility of a lot owner regarding landscaping?

4. What was the petitioner’s primary defense regarding the citation for a “dead” olive tree in his front yard?

5. What was the respondent’s argument for why the olive tree was a violation of the CC&Rs?

6. What key fact did the petitioner establish regarding the freestanding mailbox that was central to the judge’s decision in that matter?

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondent’s enforcement actions regarding the mailbox to be “problematic”?

8. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge rule that the respondent violated the CC&Rs by fining the petitioner for the mailbox under Section 12?

9. What was the final outcome and financial penalty ordered in the consolidated cases?

10. What is an “Order Nunc Pro Tunc,” and why were two such orders issued after the initial decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jon Paul Holyoak, the homeowner, who acted as the Petitioner. The Respondent was the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association, which was represented by Gary Linder and Diana Elston.

2. The first case, No. 18F-H1818030-REL, addressed alleged landscaping violations under Section 28 of the CC&Rs concerning dead trees and foliage. The second case, No. 18F-H1818031-REL, addressed an alleged violation for an additional freestanding mailbox, primarily under Section 12 of the CC&Rs.

3. Section 28 of the CC&Rs requires that the owner of each lot shall at all times keep shrubs, trees, grass, and plantings neatly trimmed, properly cultivated, and free of trash, weeds, and other unsightly material.

4. The petitioner testified that the olive tree was not “dead” but was “in distress,” and that he and his landscaper were actively trying to nurse it back to health. He argued he should not be forced to remove a tree with dead branches while attempting to save it.

5. The respondent’s board member, Terry Rogers, testified that the olive tree had no leaves and appeared dead from the roadway. He contended that a dead tree could not be considered “properly trimmed” as required by the CC&Rs.

6. The petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the freestanding mailbox was already in place when he purchased the property in 2012. Furthermore, at the time of purchase, he was notified that there were no known covenant violations on the property.

7. The Judge found the respondent’s actions problematic because, over the course of four notices sent to the petitioner about the mailbox, the respondent relied on three different sections of the CC&Rs (Sections 27, 12, and 8). This inconsistency weakened the respondent’s position.

8. The Judge ruled that the plain language of Section 12 of the CC&Rs relates to a “building,” such as a single-family dwelling or garage. The Judge concluded that a mailbox cannot be considered a “building” under this section, making the fine imposed under this rule a violation of the CC&Rs by the respondent.

9. The petitioner’s petition regarding landscaping (18F-H1818030-REL) was denied. However, the petitioner was deemed the prevailing party in the mailbox case (18F-H1818031-REL), and the respondent was ordered to pay the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

10. “Nunc Pro Tunc” is a legal term for an order that corrects a clerical error in a prior court decision, with the correction being retroactive. The first order corrected the case number in the final ruling, and the second order corrected a date referenced in the first corrective order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate a detailed response that synthesizes facts and arguments from the case documents to support your position.

1. Explain the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision and analyze how the petitioner met this burden of proof in the mailbox case but failed to meet it in the landscaping case.

2. Discuss the legal significance of the HOA’s inconsistent application of its CC&Rs in the mailbox dispute. Why did citing three different sections (27, 12, and 8) undermine the HOA’s case?

3. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Section 12 of the CC&Rs. How does the “plain language” of the rule factor into the decision that a mailbox is not a “building”?

4. Examine the arguments presented by both parties regarding the freestanding mailbox, including the conflicting accounts of conversations with the USPS mail carrier. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s position.

5. The Judge noted that while the fine under Section 12 was improper, the HOA could potentially impose fines for failure to maintain the mailbox or for painting it without approval. Based on the facts presented, construct a hypothetical argument the HOA could have made that might have been successful.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

To reduce or remove. In the context of the hearing, the Petitioner asked that the fines be abated, meaning he requested they be cancelled or removed.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, similar to a judge in a court of law. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set forth the rules and regulations for a planned community or subdivision. The petitioner and respondent both based their arguments on interpretations of these documents.

Conclusions of Law

The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and rules (like the CC&Rs and state statutes) to the facts of the case to reach a final judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of a legal decision that establishes the factual record of the case based on the evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Arizona Department of Real Estate was determined to have jurisdiction to hear disputes between a property owner and a homeowners association.

Nunc Pro Tunc

A Latin phrase meaning “now for then.” It refers to a legal order that corrects a clerical error in a previous order, making the correction retroactive to the original date of the decision.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Jon Paul Holyoak was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It means the greater weight of the evidence shows that a fact is more likely than not to be true. The Petitioner bore this burden of proof.

Prevailing Party

The party in a lawsuit who is found to have won the legal dispute. In case 18F-H1818031-REL, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, which entitled him to have his filing fee reimbursed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association was the Respondent.

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636748.pdf
637227.pdf
637433.pdf

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18F-H1818030-REL

3 sources

The sources document an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning a dispute between Jon Paul Holyoak (Petitioner) and the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (Respondent), along with subsequent orders correcting clerical errors. The initial decision addresses two consolidated petitions: one regarding landscaping violations (dead trees) under CC&R Section 28, and a second concerning a disputed mailbox under various CC&R sections, particularly Section 12. While the Petitioner failed to prove the association improperly fined him for the dead tree, the judge determined the association was in violation of the CC&Rs for improperly citing Section 12 for the mailbox issue, leading the Petitioner to be deemed the prevailing party in the mailbox case and awarded his $500 filing fee. The subsequent documents, titled Order Nunc Pro Tunc, are procedural corrections to typographical errors found in the original decision’s text and date.

3 sources

Based on 3 sources

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John Paul Holyoak (petitioner)
    Also appears as 'Jon Paul Holyoak'

Respondent Side

  • Terry Rogers (board member)
    Camelback Country Club Estates I & II HOA
    Testified at hearing
  • Gary Linder (attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
    Also listed as 'J. Gary Linder'
  • Diana J. Elston (attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk)
    Transmitting agent
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)