Tag Archives: cc-and-rs

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Linda Greenberg and her neighbors, John and Eileen McGowan, own adjoining two-acre parcels in Inscription Canyon Ranch, a residential community in Williamson Valley, Arizona, that is governed by longstanding recorded Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). After the Inscription Canyon Ranch Architectural Review Committee (ICR ARC) approved the McGowans’ construction of a structure, Greenberg sued the McGowans, the ARC, and the ICR Water Users Association, Inc. The dispute centered on whether the structure was a permitted barn or a prohibited garage and whether the McGowans could keep two donkeys and a foal on their parcel. Greenberg’s operative complaint alleged breach of the CC&Rs and a violation of the homeowners’-association open-meetings statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The Yavapai County Superior Court granted summary judgment to all defendants, denied Greenberg’s requests to file a third amended complaint and for reconsideration, and awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. On appeal, Division One reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed, finding no genuine issue of material fact, no abuse of discretion in the procedural rulings, and no error in the fee award. The court also awarded the prevailing defendants their reasonable fees and taxable costs on appeal under the CC&Rs. The decision is an unpublished memorandum decision and is not precedential.

Reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, the court treated the interpretation of the CC&Rs as a question of law, giving effect to the parties’ intent as shown by the language of the document read in its entirety and the purpose for which the covenants were created (Powell v. Washburn). On the central animal question, the court rejected Greenberg’s premise that Paragraph 10 (“Livestock and Poultry”) created an exclusive list of permitted animals. Paragraph 10 expressly prohibits poultry, fowl, and swine and expressly permits horses and 4-H animal projects, but it never mentions donkeys and contains no catch-all establishing that the listed animals are the only ones allowed. Because the paragraph does not describe a class of prohibited animals, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius did not apply, and reading the covenant to bar donkeys would improperly render its broad references to “livestock,” “animals,” fences, and corrals superfluous. The court reinforced this reading with other provisions: Paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 contemplate barns and outbuildings for animals of all kinds; Paragraph 6 describes a bridle path expressly for horses, mules, and donkeys; and Paragraphs 8, 13, and 19 show the drafters knew how to write comprehensive, all-encompassing prohibitions when they intended one — something Paragraph 10 conspicuously lacks. The court also noted A.R.S. § 3-1201’s definition of “equine” as including donkeys. On the barn-versus-garage issue, Greenberg conceded the structure had to date been used only as a barn (the approved use), so her theory that it might later be used as a garage presented an unripe, hypothetical dispute on which courts do not issue advisory opinions. Her breach-of-contract claim independently failed because she never disclosed a computation or measure of damages as required by Rule 26.1(a)(7); merely stating she would testify at trial could not create a triable issue under Rule 56(e). The court found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to file a third amended complaint filed 20 months into the case after discovery closed and summary judgment was entered — the amendment came late, sought to add long-known parties, would have reopened discovery, and was partly futile — and no error in denying reconsideration that merely repackaged rejected CC&R arguments. Finally, because the CC&Rs entitle the prevailing party to reasonable fees and costs and A.R.S. § 12-341.01 also applies, and because the defendants’ fee affidavits complied with Rule 54(g)(4), the fee award (including to the ARC) was proper.

For Arizona homeowners’ associations and their members, the decision illustrates a recurring principle of covenant interpretation: restrictions on the use of land are construed from the text of the recorded document as a whole, and a list of prohibited or permitted items is not treated as exhaustive unless the drafters said so. Because Paragraph 10 barred only certain animals and lacked any catch-all, the court would not read it to prohibit donkeys, and it pointed to the drafters’ use of sweeping language elsewhere in the CC&Rs as proof they knew how to impose a comprehensive ban when they wanted one. Boards, architectural committees, and owners drafting or enforcing covenants should note that ambiguity and omission tend to be resolved in favor of the free use of property, and that courts will avoid readings that render covenant language superfluous.

The case is also a practical reminder about litigation mechanics in HOA disputes. A breach-of-contract claim, even one tied to CC&Rs, still requires the plaintiff to disclose a computation and measure of damages; a promise to testify at trial will not defeat summary judgment. Motions to amend brought late — after discovery has closed and judgment entered — face steep odds, especially when they add previously known parties and would reopen discovery. And most owners bringing or defending covenant suits should anticipate that the CC&Rs’ prevailing-party fee clause, reinforced by A.R.S. § 12-341.01, can shift substantial attorneys’ fees to the losing side both in the trial court and on appeal. As an unpublished memorandum decision, however, the ruling is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Greenberg v. McGowan (1 CA-CV 19-0061). Greenberg showed no error in the interpretation and enforcement of the recorded CC&Rs — the covenants did not… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Greenberg v. McGowan. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

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The rule in one sentence

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Viewpoint Lake sits in Sun City, Arizona, ringed by eighty-one single-family lots, the El Dorado of Sun City Condominiums, a recreation center, and a medical facility. A 1969 recorded Declaration of Restrictions made lake maintenance the responsibility of the surrounding lakefront owners but never specified how those costs should be split. After Recreation Centers of Sun City, Inc. took title to the lake and nearby golf courses in 1975 and agreed to pay half of maintenance, disputes arose over the rest. In 1979, Del Webb, Recreation Centers, and the Viewpoint Lake Homeowners Association signed an unrecorded agreement setting a $95 per-lot fee adjusted annually by the Consumer Price Index, and the parties followed that formula for nearly thirty years. In late 2008, Recreation Centers announced it would reduce its funding and proposed a lakeshore-frontage formula that more than tripled homeowner assessments. Six owners filed a certified class action, and El Dorado intervened, arguing the 1969 Declaration did not burden its condominium tract. The superior court granted summary judgment for the class and for Recreation Centers against El Dorado. On appeal, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Recreation Centers had waived any challenge to the 1979 Agreement through decades of acquiescence, that A.R.S. section 33-440 did not invalidate the agreement, that the agreement lasted as long as the 1969 Declaration, and that the recorded 1969 Declaration burdened El Dorado’s contiguous land. The court awarded the class its appellate attorneys’ fees. This is an unpublished memorandum decision and is not precedent.

Reviewing the summary judgments de novo, the court declined to resolve whether the 1979 Agreement was a substantive amendment to the 1969 Declaration that would have required the majority owner vote prescribed for amendments. It instead affirmed on the alternative ground that Recreation Centers had waived any right to challenge the agreement’s validity. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, and a party’s persistent failure to object to conduct under a covenant can result in waiver or abandonment of the restriction. Here Recreation Centers had knowingly performed under the 1979 Agreement for nearly thirty years — paying its share and accepting the CPI-based allocation without objection — so no remand for factfinding was necessary. The court reinforced this with the contract principle that a course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in interpreting an agreement (Abrams v. Horizon Corp.; Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 202(4)).

The court next rejected Recreation Centers’ argument that A.R.S. section 33-440, governing private covenants, precluded the 1979 Agreement. Because no statute is retroactive unless expressly declared (A.R.S. section 1-244) and section 33-440 took effect on September 26, 2008, the statute did not control a 1979 agreement. Even assuming it applied, the court found no conflict: the 1979 Agreement is a private covenant affecting real property under section 33-440(C)(2) and is expressly validated by section 33-440(A)(1), which recognizes pre-statute covenants and precludes only later covenants inconsistent with them. The court also declined to read section 33-440 as limited to planned communities; although declaration is defined by reference to the Planned Communities Act (section 33-1802), the separate definition of private covenant is not so limited.

Interpreting the 1979 Agreement as a question of law, the court held it was a binding settlement of a bona fide dispute rather than a terminable-at-will, short-term arrangement. The agreement adjusted assessments for any succeeding year, incorporated a Consumer Price Index escalator showing the parties contemplated future increases, and rested on the 1969 Declaration, which itself ran for thirty years with automatic ten-year renewals; the court therefore tied the agreement’s duration to that of the Declaration. The court also rejected the contention that the Viewpoint Lake Homeowners Association lacked legal capacity: a party that deals with an association as an entity and accepts value from it is estopped from later denying its capacity to contract, and nothing in the Declaration gave the Management Board the exclusive power to allocate maintenance costs.

Finally, the court held the recorded 1969 Declaration burdened El Dorado’s Tract C property. It refused to read the Declaration’s reference to future deed language as a condition precedent to imposing the burden absent clear and unequivocal language, and it found the Declaration satisfied the statute of frauds because it identified the burdened estate — Viewpoint Lake (Tract A) and all parcels adjacent to and contiguous with it — with sufficient certainty. Because Del Webb owned both tracts in 1969 and the 1971 amendment confirmed Tract C’s contiguity, anyone tracing title would have constructive notice that the Declaration encumbered Tract C from the moment of its execution.

For Arizona homeowners and associations, this decision illustrates how a long-standing course of conduct can lock in a cost-sharing arrangement even when the original governing documents are silent or arguably require a formal amendment. Recreation Centers could not escape the 1979 assessment formula it had followed for three decades: by knowingly performing under the agreement year after year, it waived any argument that the agreement was an invalid amendment or was terminable at will. The case is a reminder that boards and owners who want to preserve the right to challenge a governing arrangement must object promptly rather than acquiesce, because Arizona courts give great weight to a settled course of performance and may treat decades of acceptance as an intentional relinquishment of the right to complain.

The decision also shows how recorded declarations can bind property that never received a separate, tailored recording. The 1969 Declaration encumbered every parcel adjacent to and contiguous with Viewpoint Lake, and the court held that this description gave constructive notice to anyone tracing title to El Dorado’s condominium tract — so the burden attached from the Declaration’s execution, not from some later filing. For buyers, associations, and title examiners, the case underscores the importance of tracing the full chain of title for recorded lake-, common-area-, or subdivision-wide restrictions, and it confirms that A.R.S. section 33-440 (effective in 2008) does not retroactively unsettle covenants and agreements that predate it. Because the opinion is an unpublished memorandum decision, it is not binding precedent, but it is a useful educational example of assessment, covenant, and waiver principles in the HOA context.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Cropley v. Recreation Centers of Sun City, Inc. (1 CA-CV 10-0034). Affirmed. Recreation Centers waived any right to challenge the validity or interpretation of the 1979 Agreement… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Cropley v. Recreation Centers of Sun City, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

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The rule in one sentence

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What happened and why it matters

Casita de Castilian, Inc., the non-profit corporation serving as the Council of Co-owners for a condominium (horizontal property regime) created under A.R.S. Section 33-551 et seq., sued unit owners Kenneth and Mary Elizabeth Kamrath to recover $4,397 in unpaid assessments plus $765 in late-payment penalties. The Kamraths counterclaimed, asserting that the association was obligated to repair and maintain the roof over their units, a general common element, and was liable for the roughly $2,393 cost of the needed repairs. The case was tried to the court on stipulated facts. The association’s original 1970 bylaws had made the corporation responsible for maintaining all common elements, but a 1975 amendment, adopted by a 92-to-14 vote of the membership and recorded, shifted roof-maintenance responsibility to the individual unit owners. The trial court ruled for the association on both its complaint and the counterclaim and awarded assessments, penalties, and attorney fees; the owners appealed only the counterclaim ruling. The Court of Appeals, Division Two, affirmed. It held that bylaws are a proper instrument for allocating maintenance responsibility, that only a majority (not unanimous) vote was required, and that assigning roof upkeep to individual owners satisfied A.R.S. Section 33-561’s requirement that the council ‘make provisions for’ maintenance. Finding no inequitable or disproportionate burden, the court denied the owners’ claimed setoff.

The Court of Appeals framed three questions: whether the corporation’s bylaws are a proper instrument for providing for maintenance of common elements; if so, whether all co-owners must agree to such a provision; and whether requiring each owner to maintain his own roof satisfies A.R.S. Section 33-561. On the first question, the court observed that A.R.S. Section 33-551(6)(b) makes roofs ‘general common elements’ unless the recorded declaration provides otherwise, and that A.R.S. Section 33-553(4) requires the declaration to describe the common elements. Here the declaration described the common elements as all real property except the individual units, so the roofs were common elements, but neither the statutes nor the declaration fixed responsibility for maintaining them. The articles of incorporation were likewise silent. The bylaws, however, did fix responsibility: the original 1970 bylaws made the corporation responsible, and the amended 1975 bylaws made each member liable for the roof covering of the apartment owned. Rejecting the owners’ argument that Article IV(A) of the declaration (which obligates owners to pay assessments to meet common-element expenses) required the association to perform the work, the court held that the provision merely obligated owners to pay assessments and did not impose a maintenance duty on the council. It therefore held the bylaws were a proper instrument.

On unanimity, the court found nothing in the statute requiring agreement of all co-owners; the only statutory unanimity requirement (A.R.S. Section 33-556) concerns withdrawing property from the regime. The court distinguished Makeever v. Lyle, then the only reported Arizona decision interpreting the condominium law, in which a majority could not convert general common elements to one owner’s exclusive use because that amounted to a taking of the other co-owners’ interests. Reallocating upkeep of a single common element was not such a taking. Reading the declaration (which called for majority approval of decisions), the articles (which let a majority change bylaws), and the statute together, the court concluded a simple majority could adopt or amend maintenance bylaws.

On the third question, the court emphasized that A.R.S. Section 33-561 requires only that the council ‘make provisions for’ maintenance and does not itself make the council responsible for the work. Surveying the 1962 FHA Model Act, the 1977 Uniform Condominium Act (which Arizona did not adopt), and comparative state statutes, the court found nothing supporting the owners’ reading. It distinguished the Florida case Thiess v. Island House Association, where an amendment shifted a disproportionate repair burden onto a minority of owners; here the owners raised no claim that the amendment was unfair, disproportionate, or inequitable. Accordingly, absent such an inequitable result, the majority could place maintenance of a common element on the individual owners, and the counterclaim failed.

This 1981 published decision is one of the earliest Arizona appellate opinions interpreting the state’s condominium (horizontal property regime) statute, and it remains instructive on how maintenance duties are allocated within a community association. The key lesson is that, under Arizona’s particular statutory language, the law does not automatically make the association responsible for maintaining every common element. A.R.S. Section 33-561 requires only that the council of co-owners ‘make provisions for’ maintenance, and the court read that phrasing to permit an association to place upkeep of a specific common element, such as each unit’s roof, on the individual owners through the governing documents. Owners and boards reviewing who is responsible for a repair should therefore look closely at the declaration, articles, and especially the bylaws rather than assuming the association must perform all common-element work.

The decision also illustrates two recurring themes in association governance disputes. First, governing documents can generally be amended by the vote specified in those documents and the statute (here a simple majority), and unanimity is required only in narrow circumstances such as withdrawing property from the regime; a maintenance reallocation is not treated as a ‘taking’ of the other owners’ interests the way converting common area to one owner’s exclusive use would be. Second, the court signaled an equitable limit: an amendment that shifts a disproportionate or unfair burden onto a minority of owners (as in the Florida Thiess case) could be vulnerable, even though the reallocation here was upheld because no such inequity was shown. Because this is a published opinion in which the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, it is binding precedent for how these older condominium instruments and statutes are construed.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Casita de Castilian, Inc. v. Kenneth K. Kamrath and Mary Elizabeth Kamrath (129 Ariz. 146, 629 P.2d 562 (App. 1981)). A condominium council of co-owners may, through a validly adopted majority-vote bylaw amendment, shift… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Casita de Castilian, Inc. v. Kenneth K. Kamrath and Mary Elizabeth Kamrath. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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The rule in one sentence

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What happened and why it matters

Keith and Kathy Campbell own property in the Florence Gardens Mobile Home Association community, a Pinal County non-profit governed by CC&Rs recorded in 1998. In March 2019 the board mailed owners a letter, a proposed Amended and Restated Declaration, and a written-concurrence form, explaining that adoption required the written concurrence of 878 owners (two-thirds of the assessed lots) and asking owners to return the form within thirty days. The Association reached the required number of concurrences “shortly after the 30-day window” and counted them all; Keith Campbell, then board president, objected that late concurrences should not count, and resigned. The Campbells sued for breach of contract, negligence per se under the Planned Community Act, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court dismissed the fiduciary-duty claim under Rule 12(b)(6), ordered a more definite statement identifying the specific meeting date, then struck the amended complaint and dismissed the case with prejudice when no date was supplied. Division Two affirmed dismissal of the fiduciary-duty claim as conclusory and outside the fund-related duty recognized in Divizio, but held that ordering a more definite statement was error because the Association’s own motion admitted no relevant meeting ever occurred, making a meeting date impossible to provide. The court vacated the striking and dismissal, remanded, and awarded no fees or costs on appeal.

Reviewing the dismissals de novo under Coleman v. City of Mesa, the court analyzed the two rulings separately. On the fiduciary-duty claim, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only where, as a matter of law, plaintiffs could not obtain relief under any provable interpretation of the facts, and the court may look only to the pleading itself. The Campbells alleged the Association “acts as a fiduciary with the fees collected from its members” and breached that duty by labeling the vote a “concurrence” and counting it past the statutory time frames. The court held these were merely conclusory statements insufficient under Cullen v. Auto-Owners Insurance: even assuming the collection of member fees could create a fiduciary relationship, the Campbells never alleged how the Association’s actions amounted to an improper use of funds. It distinguished Divizio v. Kewin Enterprises, where mobile-home-park members were entitled to accountings of dues collected for community upkeep; here the challenged conduct — collecting signed concurrences after the 30-day deadline — did not involve the collection or use of funds to which the Divizio duty would extend. Merely paying dues does not convert every alleged wrong into a breach of fiduciary duty.

On the striking of the amended complaint, the court explained that a defendant may move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) only when a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that it cannot frame a response, and a court may strike a pleading for disobeying such an order. But the Association’s own motion, while demanding that the Campbells identify the meeting date of the alleged statutory violations, candidly admitted that “there was no such meeting” and “no meeting of the membership related to the collection of the concurrences.” Because it was clear from the Association’s own filing that it was impossible for the Campbells to state a meeting date that never existed, ordering a more definite statement was error — and, that order being error, striking the amended complaint and dismissing the remaining claims for noncompliance with it was likewise error. Because neither party completely prevailed, the court declined to award appellate fees or costs and left the Association’s fee cross-appeal for the trial court on remand.

The decision is a mixed result that highlights two recurring HOA-litigation pressure points: whether a board owes homeowners a fiduciary duty, and how much factual specificity a complaint about governance procedures must contain. On the fiduciary-duty question, the court did not announce a categorical rule that HOA boards never owe fiduciary duties; instead it treated the claim as a pleading failure, distinguishing Divizio and emphasizing that a fiduciary theory tied to member dues requires concrete allegations of improper use of funds, not a general assertion that the board mishandled a vote. Homeowners advancing fiduciary-duty claims should therefore plead specific, fund-related misconduct rather than relabeling a covenant or voting dispute.

The striking ruling is the more consequential procedural lesson: a defendant cannot use a motion for a more definite statement to force a plaintiff to allege a fact the defendant itself concedes does not exist. Because the Association admitted no relevant meeting occurred, the trial court could not condition the survival of the suit on the Campbells’ identifying a meeting date, and dismissal on that basis was reversible. The case also confirms that CC&Rs constitute a contract among owners, so disputes over amendment and concurrence procedures can support contract-based claims and fee awards under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 — though here, with neither side fully prevailing, the court awarded no appellate fees. As an unpublished memorandum decision, it is not precedential and may be cited only as authorized by rule.

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The rule in one sentence

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What happened and why it matters

The Arizona Biltmore Estates Association, the homeowners association for a Phoenix-area subdivision, sued lot owners Robert and Nancy Tezak seeking an injunction to remove a large customized bus—weighing more than 29,000 pounds and resembling a commercial bus—that the Tezaks began parking at the back of their residential lot around September 1989. The Association contended the vehicle violated a recorded deed restriction (Article XI, Section 6) barring any “trailer, camper, boat or similar equipment” from being kept on the property without approval from the Architectural Committee. The Maricopa County Superior Court denied the injunction and granted the Tezaks summary judgment, reasoning that the bus was not covered by the covenant, and awarded the Tezaks their attorney’s fees. On appeal, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. The court acknowledged that restrictive covenants are strictly construed in favor of the free use of property, but explained that the paramount principle is the intent of the parties who drafted the declaration, determined by reading the document as a whole. Considering the “or similar equipment” language together with the declaration’s stated purpose of protecting the value and attractiveness of the property and its many other use restrictions, the court concluded the drafters intended to restrict large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances, and the Tezaks’ bus plainly qualified. The court distinguished a Missouri decision the Tezaks relied on, followed a Washington case reaching the same result on similar facts, reversed, and remanded for entry of summary judgment and an injunction for the Association, while awarding the Association its attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Because the interpretation of the deed restrictions presented a question of law, the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo and was not bound by its conclusions of law. The court treated the recorded restrictions as a covenant running with the land that forms a contract between the subdivision’s owners as a whole and each individual lot owner (citing Divizio v. Kewin Enterprises). It first observed that Article XI, Section 6 does not categorically ban the listed conveyances; it bars them only when they have not been approved by the Architectural Committee, and no such approval had been sought or given for the Tezaks’ bus.

The Association conceded the bus was neither a trailer, a camper, nor a boat, and argued instead that it was “similar equipment.” The Tezaks invoked the rule of ejusdem generis—that general words following a specific enumeration are limited by that enumeration unless a contrary intent is clearly shown—and contended that trailers and campers share a feature of temporary living arrangements that their bus lacked. They also urged strict construction, under which ambiguities in restrictive covenants are resolved in favor of the free use of property (citing Duffy v. Sunburst Farms East).

The court rejected the “temporary living arrangements” limitation as implausible, noting that boats are expressly enumerated yet usually contain no living quarters, so adopting that limitation would mean boats should never have been listed. It then explained that although strict construction applies in some circumstances, the cardinal principle in construing restrictive covenants is the paramount intent of the parties, ascertained by reading the declaration as a whole, and that a covenant should not be read to defeat its plain and obvious meaning. The declaration’s recitals stated that the covenants existed to enhance and protect the value, desirability, and attractiveness of the property and the quality of life within the Village, and Section 6 was one of eleven provisions restricting uses that would be unsightly or annoying. Read together, these provisions showed the drafters intended to restrict the display of large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances, and the Tezaks’ very large bus unquestionably fell within that class. The court followed Krein v. Smith (Wash. App.), where a motor home was held covered by a similar restriction after construing the document as a whole, and distinguished Lake St. Louis Community Association v. Leidy (Mo. App.), reasoning that the phrase “or similar equipment” is broader and less limiting than the Missouri covenant’s “trailers of every other description,” and that size was not the only characteristic the drafters intended to restrict. Having found the parking covenant violated, the court did not reach the Association’s alternative argument that the bus also breached the covenant against business or non-residential use.

Tezak is an Arizona illustration of how courts reconcile two competing canons that govern deed-restriction disputes: the rule that restrictive covenants are strictly construed in favor of the free use of land, and the overriding principle that the drafters’ intent—gathered from the declaration read as a whole—controls. The decision shows that a catch-all phrase like “or similar equipment,” when read alongside a declaration’s stated purposes and its other use restrictions, can reach vehicles the drafters never specifically named, so long as the vehicle shares the essential character the restriction targets (here, large, bulky, nonstandard conveyances).

For associations and owners alike, the case is a practical reminder that a covenant’s general language is not automatically neutralized by strict construction or by ejusdem generis; the outcome turns on what the governing documents, taken together, were plainly designed to prevent. It also highlights the role of an architectural-approval mechanism—the restriction bars unapproved conveyances rather than banning them outright—and confirms that a prevailing association in a covenant-enforcement action may recover attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. This summary is educational and neutral; it is not legal advice, and results in other disputes will depend on the specific covenant language and facts.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Arizona Biltmore Estates Association v. Tezak (177 Ariz. 447, 868 P.2d 1030 (App. 1993)). Declaration text and purpose controlled whether architectural covenants barred a second-story addition. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Arizona Biltmore Estates Association v. Tezak. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

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The rule in one sentence

Case Participants

What happened and why it matters

The Ahwatukee Custom Estates Management Association, Inc. (ACEMA), an Arizona non-profit homeowners association, sued lot owners George and Betty Turner after the Turners were denied board permission to install a swimming pool and then threatened to build it without approval. ACEMA sought to enjoin the pool and also asked for a mandatory injunction directing the Turners to correct three past violations of the subdivision’s CC&Rs and Architectural Committee Guidelines: adding fill and grading their lot without board approval, and building two fences without board approval. A special master heard three days of testimony, visited the site, and found the Turners had violated the CC&Rs in each respect, but concluded ACEMA suffered no irreparable injury and was not entitled to corrective relief. The trial court adopted those findings and denied both sides’ attorneys’ fees for lack of a prevailing party. On appeal, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals treated the CC&Rs as a contract among the subdivision’s owners and reviewed the injunction and fee rulings for abuse of discretion. It affirmed. The court held that a mandatory retrospective injunction should not issue to enforce approval requirements the board had applied arbitrarily and unreasonably, especially where the interrelated, largely invisible violations caused no material harm and ACEMA had delayed until after construction. Invoking the maxim that one who seeks equity must do equity, the court left the board with prospective authority to require approval of any future pool, and affirmed the denial of fees under the CC&Rs’ fee clause and A.R.S. section 12-341.01 because neither party prevailed.

The court began with the governing framework: CC&Rs constitute a contract between the subdivision’s property owners as a whole and the individual lot owners, so their interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo (Arizona Biltmore Estates Ass’n v. Tezak). Factual findings are binding unless clearly erroneous (Lee Dev. Co. v. Papp), and the grant or denial of both injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court (Financial Associates v. Hub Properties; A.R.S. section 12-341.01).

On the grading-and-fill violation, the court agreed the Turners had filled and graded without board approval in breach of the CC&Rs and Guidelines, but held no equitable relief was warranted. The Turners had graded to conform to the developer’s FS-20 Grading and Drainage Plan; the CC&Rs did not clearly say whether the proper grade was the FS-20 plan or the condition at time of purchase, and ambiguities in restrictive covenants are resolved in favor of the free use of property. The board could not even establish the grade at time of purchase, the City had issued permits based on the FS-20 plan, ACEMA proved no drainage disruption or irreparable injury, and it waited until after the house and fences were built to sue. Enforcement of restrictive covenants by injunction is not a matter of right but is governed by equity, weighing relative hardships, the public interest, party misconduct, delay, and the adequacy of other remedies (McRae v. Lois Grunow Memorial Clinic). A mandatory injunction should not issue to enforce an approval requirement withheld arbitrarily and unreasonably (Young v. Tortoise Island; Donoghue v. Prynnwood), and ‘one who seeks equity must do equity.’ The board’s grading demands were arbitrary and unreasonable.

The fencing violations followed the same logic. The 6796/6795 fence had been restored to a height compliant with the Phoenix City Code (which measures pool-fence height from the higher adjacent lot); forcing the Turners to lower it would have reinstated a code violation, an arbitrary demand. The 6796/6794 fence atop the retaining wall was the closest question, and in isolation ACEMA might have shown adequate harm under Continental Oil Co. v. Fennemore by pointing to the diluted protection of the deed restrictions. But the court declined to view it in isolation: it was one of a cluster of interrelated violations arising from the arbitrary grading dispute, the changes were invisible to the public and caused no material harm, and the board’s future enforcement authority was adequately preserved by the judgment’s requirement that any future pool obtain board approval. The court also upheld denial of a new trial under Rule 59(A)(4) because ACEMA failed to show it could not have discovered the neighbors’ withdrawn consent with reasonable diligence. Finally, under CC&R Article IX and A.R.S. section 12-341.01, neither party prevailed: ACEMA established the violations and preserved prospective authority but lost its principal claim for retrospective relief, so each side bore its own fees.

The decision is a leading Arizona statement that enforcing CC&Rs and architectural-approval requirements through a mandatory injunction is an equitable remedy, not an automatic right. Even when a board proves that an owner technically violated the governing documents, a court may withhold retrospective relief where the board itself acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, where the violations caused no material or irreparable harm, and where the association delayed enforcement until after the improvements were built. The maxim that ‘one who seeks equity must do equity’ gives trial courts broad discretion to deny an order compelling removal of structures that are invisible to the community and harmless in fact.

For associations and owners alike, the case underscores several practical points: approval standards must be applied consistently and reasonably; a board that takes an unreasonable position on one issue may find its related enforcement demands treated as part of a single, tainted ‘cluster’; and prevailing-party fee clauses cut both ways, so a mixed result where the association proves violations but loses its main remedy can leave each side paying its own attorneys’ fees. Because the opinion is published, it remains citable precedent on the equitable limits of covenant enforcement and on when a homeowners association is, and is not, a ‘prevailing party.’

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Ahwatukee Custom Estates Management Association, Inc. v. George M. Turner and Betty C. Turner (196 Ariz. 631, 2 P.3d 1276 (App. 2000) (Nos. 1 CA-CV 98-0233, 1 CA-CV 98-0528)). Although the homeowners violated the association’s CC&Rs and Architectural Committee Guidelines, the trial court did… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Ahwatukee Custom Estates Management Association, Inc. v. George M. Turner and Betty C. Turner. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

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What happened

Michael Urbano purchased a house in the Lakewood Estates community in 2005. In doing so, he agreed to the recorded covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) running with the property and promised to pay assessments used to maintain the community’s common areas.

In 2014, the Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association sued Urbano in justice court, alleging he had failed to pay assessments. The parties settled, and the justice court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice. That 2014 order stated that any and all future liens, encumbrances, and assessments against Urbano would be deemed void and invalid.

Six years later, the HOA again sued Urbano in justice court for unpaid assessments. Urbano contended that the 2014 order and a confidential settlement agreement relieved him of any obligation to pay, and he counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, abuse of process, and punitive damages. The matter was transferred to the superior court.

While the lawsuit was pending, Urbano had an altercation with the HOA’s property manager over tree trimmings; police were called and a report was filed, but nothing further came of it. Urbano then asserted tort claims (harassment, defamation, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress) against the HOA and two third-party defendants — property manager Susan Smith and management company AAM — and added them to his abuse-of-process and punitive-damages claims.

The HOA and the third-party defendants moved for summary judgment, which the superior court granted. The court found the 2014 order void because the justice court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to relieve Urbano of all future assessments. After an evidentiary hearing, the court awarded attorney fees of $31,830 to the HOA and $83,413 to the third-party defendants.

Urbano appealed. The Court of Appeals, Division One, affirmed the rulings voiding the 2014 order, granting the HOA summary judgment, and awarding the HOA’s fees, and it granted the HOA’s appellate fees under the CC&Rs. It reversed the award of attorney fees to the third-party defendants because Urbano’s tort claims against them did not arise out of the contract.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Michael A. Urbano, Defendant/Appellant (1 CA-CV 24-0377). Justice court lacked jurisdiction to void all future HOA assessments in a small-claims collection case. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Lakewood Estates Homeowners Association, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Michael A. Urbano, Defendant/Appellant. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Procedural timeline

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What happened

Daniel and Toni Mason own a home in the La Glorieta residential subdivision in Chandler, two lots away from a home owned by Yinong Chen and Hongyan Shi. A drainage swale runs in front of both properties, designed to route runoff from the Masons’ lot to an outlet grate on the Chen and Shi lot. In September 2014, a severe thunderstorm flooded the Masons’ basement, causing roughly $2,000 in damage. The day after, Mr. Mason found water still pooling and concluded an obstruction on the neighbors’ lot was blocking the flow.

Over the next several years the Masons tried to resolve the issue by talking to the neighbors, raising it at two HOA meetings, and filing a written complaint with the HOA. In mid-2019 the HOA’s counsel sent the neighbors a letter noting that work on their lot may have contributed to water backups up the street. City of Chandler officials told the Masons the HOA, not the city, was responsible for subdivision drainage, and a civil engineer the Masons hired reported obstructions in the swale on the neighbors’ lot. The home has not flooded since 2014.

In September 2020 the Masons sued the HOA, Chen, and Shi for breach of contract and declaratory judgment, claiming the neighbors’ pathway blocked drainage in violation of CC&Rs § 12.17 and that the HOA was required to enforce the covenants. The HOA moved for summary judgment; the superior court granted it and dismissed all claims against the HOA (the neighbors were denied summary judgment, and that ruling was not appealed).

After a procedural detour — the Court of Appeals initially stayed the appeal because the superior court had not yet ruled on the HOA’s fee request, defeating Rule 54(b) certification — the superior court denied reconsideration, awarded the HOA its attorneys’ fees, and entered final judgment. The Masons appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the CC&Rs gave the HOA enforcement power but no duty to enforce.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Daniel Mason, et al. v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association, et al. (1 CA-CV 23-0437). An HOA has no duty to enforce its CC&Rs against a violating owner unless the governing documents expressly obligate… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Daniel Mason, et al. v. La Glorieta Homeowners Association, et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

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The takeaway

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What happened

Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association governs an active-adult residential community in Buckeye, Arizona. In one part of the community, a wall separates the common area from eight adjoining private lots that contain single-family homes. The wall straddles the property lines, sitting partly on the common area and partly on the owners’ lots. About a year before suit, water damage to the wall was discovered, prompting repair efforts.

In 2022, the Association filed a complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking, among other things, a declaration that the owners of the eight bordering lots were responsible for contributing half the cost of repairing and replacing the wall. In 2023, both sides moved for summary judgment. In 2024, after a hearing, the superior court granted the homeowners’ motion and denied the Association’s, ruling that the Association was responsible for repairing the entire wall absent a showing that the homeowners caused the damage.

The Association appealed. On January 6, 2026, Division Two of the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished memorandum decision, holding that the wall is part of the common area the Association must repair, that a conflicting 2012 architectural guideline could not be enforced because it would amend the Declaration without the required vote, and that the homeowners, as the prevailing party, were entitled to their attorney fees and costs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association v. Elliott (2 CA-CV 2024-0314). HOA had to repair a common-area wall; architectural guidelines could not shift the cost to owners. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Sundance Adult Village Homeowners Association v. Elliott. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Procedural timeline

Case Dossier

This dossier combines the case metadata, linked court sources, and the explanatory sections below. It distinguishes court rulings from party filings, allegations, and requested relief.

Case Summary

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Key Issues & Findings