Tag Archives: Bylaws Article III, Section 4

George Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H025-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-05-05
Administrative Law Judge Samuel Fox
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $150.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner George Wolchko Counsel —
Respondent Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association Counsel Christopher Duren

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805
Bylaws, Article III, Section 4
CC&Rs, Section 4.04
Bylaws, Article IV, Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner prevailed on three of the four issues: Violation of AZ Law on Delivery of Community Documents (A.R.S. § 33-1805), Failure to Uphold CCRs Regarding Common Wall Repairs (Bylaws/CC&R violation), and operating with fewer than the minimum required number of board members (Bylaws violation). The Petitioner did not prevail on the issue regarding the Failure to Hold a Special HOA Meeting.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for an “emergency meeting” regarding the wall repair was deemed technically insufficient to qualify as a formal 'special meeting' petition under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of AZ Law on Delivery of Community Documents

The HOA failed to provide the Kachina Management contract within the required ten business days for examination or copies, despite numerous requests.

Orders: Respondent failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 by not making documents available for examination within ten business days of request.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $50.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • Bylaws, Article X
  • CC&Rs, Section 9.07

Failure to Hold a Special HOA Meeting

The HOA failed to hold a special meeting requested by a valid petition signed by 25% of members, concerning common wall damage.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • Bylaws, Article III, Section 4

Failure to Uphold CCRs Regarding Common Wall Repairs

The HOA refused to repair a common wall designated as a Common Element after damage was caused by an HOA-sanctioned electrician, failing their maintenance obligation.

Orders: The Board failed to maintain a Common Element (electrical conduit/wall area) in good repair after its hired contractor caused damage, violating Bylaws and CC&R obligations.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $50.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs, Section 4.04
  • Bylaws, Article IV, Section 3
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)

Violations of HOA Elections Procedures and Community Documents (Failure to seat required number of board members)

The HOA Board violated governing documents by operating with only two members, failing to maintain the minimum required number of three directors.

Orders: Respondent violated Bylaws Article IV, Section 1 by not maintaining a Board of Directors composed of no fewer than three persons.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $50.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Bylaws, Article IV, Section 1
  • CC&Rs, Section 5.03

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, Document request, Board composition, Common elements maintenance, Filing fee refund, Civil penalty
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • Bylaws, Article IV, Section 1
  • CC&Rs, Section 4.04
  • Bylaws, Article IV, Section 3
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)




Briefing Doc – 25F-H025-REL


Briefing Document: Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key proceedings, arguments, and outcomes of the administrative case George Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association, Case No. 25F-H025-REL, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Petitioner, George Wolchko, a homeowner, filed a four-issue petition against the Respondent, his Homeowners Association (HOA), alleging violations of Arizona statutes and the community’s governing documents.

The hearing, held on April 14, 2025, resulted in a mixed but largely favorable outcome for the Petitioner. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the HOA in violation on three of the four claims:

1. Failure to Provide Documents: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by not making its management contract with Kachina Management available within the legally mandated ten-business-day period.

2. Failure to Repair Common Wall: The HOA violated its own Bylaws and CC&Rs by failing its duty to maintain and repair a common element (an exterior wall and electrical conduit) after its hired contractor performed improper work, leaving a hole that was not weatherproof.

3. Failure to Fill Board Vacancy: The HOA violated its Bylaws, which mandate a board of no fewer than three members, by operating with only two directors since October 2024.

The HOA prevailed on one claim, Failure to Hold a Special Meeting, as the ALJ determined the Petitioner’s request, while clear in intent, was technically deficient under the Bylaws. The final order deemed Mr. Wolchko the prevailing party on three issues, ordering the HOA to reimburse him $1,500.00 in filing fees, to comply with community documents going forward, and levying a civil penalty of $150.00 against the Association.

Case Overview

Case Number

25F-H025-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Samuel Fox

Hearing Date

April 14, 2025

Petitioner

George Wolchko

Respondent

Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Christopher Duren (of Gottlieb Law, PLC)

Key Parties and Witnesses

• George Wolchko: The Petitioner, owner of a home in the Victoria Manor community since 2018 and a former board member (2018-2023). Testified on his own behalf.

• Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association: The Respondent, a planned community in Mesa, Arizona, consisting of eight units and seven owners.

• Joseph Kidd: A current HOA board member, serving since November 2022. Testified for the Respondent.

• Michael Mott: A current HOA board member. Was present at the hearing but did not testify.

• Kachina Management, Inc.: The HOA’s management company, contracted in April 2024.

• Chris Jones: Elected to the board in September 2024 but resigned shortly thereafter, creating the board vacancy at the heart of Claim 4.

Analysis of Claims, Evidence, and Findings

Claim 1: Violation of AZ Law on Delivery of Community Documents

• Petitioner’s Allegation: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 and its governing documents by failing to provide a copy of the Kachina Management contract despite numerous requests beginning in May 2024.

• Petitioner’s Testimony & Evidence (Wolchko):

◦ Made his first formal email request for the contract on May 6, 2024. He followed up on May 12 and May 26.

◦ The management company, Kachina, responded on May 29, offering an in-person review on June 3 or 4.

◦ Wolchko testified that driving 45 minutes each way was not a “reasonably available” means of access, especially when a digital copy existed and he travels internationally. He noted the CC&Rs explicitly allow for delivery by mail.

◦ After canceling an in-person appointment due to an emergency, his repeated requests for a digital or mailed copy were met with insistence on in-person review.

◦ The contract was finally produced in February 2025, nearly a year after the initial request and only after the petition was filed.

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ Argued that by offering in-person inspection at their office, they fulfilled their statutory obligation to make records “reasonably available for examination.”

◦ Emails from Kachina Management to Wolchko confirmed they had prepared the documents for his review on the dates offered. They stated Wolchko canceled the appointment and never rescheduled.

• ALJ’s Finding: Violation Found. The ALJ concluded that more than ten business days passed between the initial request on May 6, 2024, and the date the documents were made available for examination on June 3, 2024. This delay constituted a failure to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Claim 2: Failure to Hold a Special HOA Meeting

• Petitioner’s Allegation: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and its Bylaws by failing to hold a special meeting requested via a valid petition signed by 25% of the members (Wolchko and Terrance Greer).

• Petitioner’s Testimony & Evidence (Wolchko):

◦ Submitted a formal, signed request on June 19, 2024, to hold an “emergency HOA meeting to address repairs on a community common wall.”

◦ He argued this was a valid petition for a special meeting and that the Board ignored it.

◦ The Respondent falsely claimed the meeting was held during the September annual meeting, but the annual meeting notice and minutes contained no mention of the special meeting’s purpose.

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ Argued the request was for an “emergency meeting,” which, under statute, can only be called by the Board of Directors, not by member petition.

◦ Contended there is no provision in the governing documents for 25% of members to call an emergency meeting.

◦ Noted that at the annual meeting in September, Wolchko was explicitly asked if he had any issues to discuss and he declined.

• ALJ’s Finding: No Violation. The ALJ found that although the intent was clearly to request a special meeting, the petition was technically deficient. It used the term “emergency meeting,” did not include a place for the meeting, and did not use the phrase “special meeting.” While a “mere technicality,” this was sufficient to deem the petition ineffective. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party on this issue.

Claim 3: Failure to Uphold CCRs Regarding Common Wall Repairs

• Petitioner’s Allegation: The HOA failed its duty to repair a common wall damaged by its own electrician in February 2024.

• Petitioner’s Testimony & Evidence (Wolchko):

◦ In February 2024, an HOA-hired contractor, Blue State Electric, performed work on an electrical conduit on his building’s exterior wall, which the board had previously designated a “true common area” with shared 50/50 maintenance costs.

◦ The work left a hole filled with foam that was not watertight. His immediate notification on March 15, 2024, was dismissed by board member Joseph Kidd, who claimed the hole was a pre-existing condition exposed by the work and therefore not the HOA’s responsibility.

◦ After months of the board refusing to act, he investigated the box himself, discovering an HOA wire running through his wall. He stated he only touched the box to prove it was an HOA issue after being told to “deal with it myself.”

◦ He disputed the validity of an $1,867 invoice from a second contractor (Canyon State), stating it was solicited by the board to blame him for damage he did not cause.

• Respondent’s Testimony & Evidence (Kidd):

◦ The electrical box and conduit are common elements that serve four buildings.

◦ Wolchko is not a licensed Arizona electrician and had no authorization to touch the common element.

◦ Kidd testified that after Wolchko sent a video of himself pulling the box out, the board hired Canyon State to inspect it.

◦ He acknowledged offering to help Wolchko patch the stucco but denied authorizing any electrical work.

• ALJ’s Finding: Violation Found. The ALJ determined that the preponderance of evidence supported that the “Board-hired electrician installed the wrong kind of box and left a section of the wall exposed without proper weather proofing.” Because the wall and electrical conduit were common elements, the board had a duty to maintain them in good repair. The board “declined to correct the problem its contractor caused,” thus violating the Bylaws and CC&Rs.

Claim 4: Failure to Maintain Required Number of Board Members

• Petitioner’s Allegation: The HOA violated its Bylaws (Article IV, Section 1), which require a board of “no less than three (3) persons,” by operating with only two members.

• Petitioner’s Testimony & Evidence (Wolchko):

◦ Following the September 19, 2024 election, three members were elected: Joseph Kidd, Michael Mott, and Chris Jones.

◦ Chris Jones resigned almost immediately, leaving the board with two members.

◦ He argued that while the bylaws state a vacancy “may be filled” by the remaining directors, this grants authority, it does not waive the fundamental requirement of having at least three members.

◦ He noted that two other owners (himself and Terrance Greer), representing 25% of the HOA, were willing to serve, so the vacancy could be filled.

• Respondent’s Testimony & Evidence (Kidd):

◦ Confirmed Jones resigned by early October 2024.

◦ Stated the board reached out to other members who expressed no interest in serving.

◦ Testified that Kachina Management advised them that filling the seat was at their discretion.

◦ The Respondent’s legal argument was that the Bylaw’s use of the word “may” (“may be filled”) makes filling the vacancy optional, not mandatory.

• ALJ’s Finding: Violation Found. The ALJ was “not persuasive” by the Respondent’s argument. The decision states: “This provision allows for the appointment, rather than the election, of a Director to a vacant seat. It does not absolve the Board from having the minimum number of Directors.” The preponderance of evidence established that the HOA violated its Bylaws by not having enough Board members.

Final Decision and Order

• Prevailing Party: George Wolchko was deemed the prevailing party on Petition Issues 1, 3, and 4. Victoria Manor was deemed the prevailing party on Issue 2.

• Reimbursement: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner $1,500.00 for filing fees within thirty days.

• Compliance: The Respondent was directed to “comply with the requirements of its Community Documents going forward.”

• Civil Penalty: A civil penalty of $150.00 was levied against the Respondent.

• Decision Date: May 5, 2025.


Questions

Question

How long does the HOA have to provide records after I request them?

Short Answer

The HOA has ten business days to fulfill a request to examine or provide copies of records.

Detailed Answer

Under A.R.S. § 33-1805, an association must strictly adhere to a ten-business-day timeframe. In this case, providing access nearly a month after the initial request was found to be a violation of state law.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 33-1805 provides an association 'ten business days to fulfill a request for examination' or 'to provide copies of the requested records.' … More than ten business days passed between May 6, 2024, and June 3, 2024. Petitioner demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent, through Kachina, failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • deadlines
  • HOA obligations

Question

Can homeowners call an 'emergency meeting' regarding repairs?

Short Answer

Generally, no. Homeowners should request a 'special meeting' instead, as 'emergency meetings' are typically reserved for the Board.

Detailed Answer

While homeowners may petition for a meeting, using the correct terminology is critical. In this case, a petition for an 'emergency meeting' was deemed ineffective because that specific type of meeting is a Board function, whereas homeowners are authorized to request 'special meetings'.

Alj Quote

In the context of the communications about this meeting, it is clear that Petitioner was requesting a 'special meeting' not an 'emergency meeting,' which can only be called by the Board.

Legal Basis

Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • procedure
  • homeowner rights

Question

What specific details must be included in a petition for a special meeting?

Short Answer

The petition must usually include the date, hour, place of the meeting, and the specific purpose or topic.

Detailed Answer

Failure to include all technical details required by the Bylaws—such as the specific place of the meeting or the correct label ('special meeting')—can render a petition invalid, even if it has the required number of signatures.

Alj Quote

The petition did not include a place for the meeting, the topic to be discussed, or the phrase 'special meeting.' … Petitioner’s special meeting request did not fully comply with the requirements of the Bylaws. Although it is a mere technicality, it is sufficient to deem the petition for a special meeting ineffective.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • petitions
  • technicalities

Question

Is the HOA responsible if a contractor they hired does poor work on a common element?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA has a duty to maintain common elements and correct problems caused by their contractors.

Detailed Answer

If an HOA-hired contractor installs incorrect equipment or leaves a common element exposed to damage (like weather), the Board cannot decline to fix it. They retain the obligation to maintain the area in good repair.

Alj Quote

The preponderance of the evidence supports that the Board-hired electrician installed the wrong kind of box and left a section of the wall exposed without proper weather proofing… The Board declined to correct the problem its contractor caused… The preponderance of the evidence supports that the Board failed to maintain this area in good repair in violation of the Bylaws and CC&R.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3; CC&R Section 4.05(2)

Topic Tags

  • maintenance
  • common elements
  • contractors

Question

Can the HOA Board operate with fewer members than the Bylaws require?

Short Answer

No. If the Bylaws state a minimum number of directors, the Board must maintain that number.

Detailed Answer

The Board cannot choose to operate with fewer directors than mandated. In this case, operating with two directors when the Bylaws required a minimum of three was a violation.

Alj Quote

Article IV, section 1 of the Bylaws require a Board of no fewer than three people. The preponderance of the evidence established that the Board has consisted of two people for some time… The preponderance of the evidence supports that Respondent violated the Bylaws by not having enough Board members.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

Topic Tags

  • board composition
  • bylaws
  • vacancies

Question

Does a Bylaw saying a vacancy 'may be filled' mean the Board can choose to leave a seat empty?

Short Answer

No. That language typically describes the method of filling the seat (appointment) rather than permission to leave it vacant below the required minimum.

Detailed Answer

HOAs cannot use the word 'may' in vacancy provisions to justify ignoring minimum board size requirements. The provision allows for appointment rather than election to fill the spot, but does not absolve the Board of the duty to have the required number of members.

Alj Quote

Respondent argued that Section 5, Vacancies does not require the Board to fill a vacant position… This argument was not persuasive. This provision allows for the appointment, rather than the election, of a Director to a vacant seat. It does not absolve the Board from having the minimum number of Directors.

Legal Basis

Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • legal interpretation
  • board vacancies
  • bylaws

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the HOA was ordered to pay the $1,500.00 filing fee directly to the homeowners within 30 days because the homeowners prevailed on the majority of their issues.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioners the filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioners within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • reimbursement
  • fees
  • penalties

Question

Can the HOA be fined for these violations?

Short Answer

Yes, a civil penalty may be levied, though it may be a nominal amount compared to the filing fees.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ has the authority to levy civil penalties for violations of statutes or community documents. In this specific case, a penalty of $150.00 was deemed appropriate.

Alj Quote

A Civil Penalty of $150.00 is found to be appropriate in this matter.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • fines
  • civil penalty
  • enforcement

Case

Docket No

25F-H025-REL

Case Title

George Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association

Decision Date

2025-05-05

Alj Name

Samuel Fox

Tribunal

OAH

Agency

ADRE

Questions

Question

How long does the HOA have to provide records after I request them?

Short Answer

The HOA has ten business days to fulfill a request to examine or provide copies of records.

Detailed Answer

Under A.R.S. § 33-1805, an association must strictly adhere to a ten-business-day timeframe. In this case, providing access nearly a month after the initial request was found to be a violation of state law.

Alj Quote

A.R.S. § 33-1805 provides an association 'ten business days to fulfill a request for examination' or 'to provide copies of the requested records.' … More than ten business days passed between May 6, 2024, and June 3, 2024. Petitioner demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent, through Kachina, failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • deadlines
  • HOA obligations

Question

Can homeowners call an 'emergency meeting' regarding repairs?

Short Answer

Generally, no. Homeowners should request a 'special meeting' instead, as 'emergency meetings' are typically reserved for the Board.

Detailed Answer

While homeowners may petition for a meeting, using the correct terminology is critical. In this case, a petition for an 'emergency meeting' was deemed ineffective because that specific type of meeting is a Board function, whereas homeowners are authorized to request 'special meetings'.

Alj Quote

In the context of the communications about this meeting, it is clear that Petitioner was requesting a 'special meeting' not an 'emergency meeting,' which can only be called by the Board.

Legal Basis

Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • procedure
  • homeowner rights

Question

What specific details must be included in a petition for a special meeting?

Short Answer

The petition must usually include the date, hour, place of the meeting, and the specific purpose or topic.

Detailed Answer

Failure to include all technical details required by the Bylaws—such as the specific place of the meeting or the correct label ('special meeting')—can render a petition invalid, even if it has the required number of signatures.

Alj Quote

The petition did not include a place for the meeting, the topic to be discussed, or the phrase 'special meeting.' … Petitioner’s special meeting request did not fully comply with the requirements of the Bylaws. Although it is a mere technicality, it is sufficient to deem the petition for a special meeting ineffective.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Topic Tags

  • meetings
  • petitions
  • technicalities

Question

Is the HOA responsible if a contractor they hired does poor work on a common element?

Short Answer

Yes. The HOA has a duty to maintain common elements and correct problems caused by their contractors.

Detailed Answer

If an HOA-hired contractor installs incorrect equipment or leaves a common element exposed to damage (like weather), the Board cannot decline to fix it. They retain the obligation to maintain the area in good repair.

Alj Quote

The preponderance of the evidence supports that the Board-hired electrician installed the wrong kind of box and left a section of the wall exposed without proper weather proofing… The Board declined to correct the problem its contractor caused… The preponderance of the evidence supports that the Board failed to maintain this area in good repair in violation of the Bylaws and CC&R.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 3; CC&R Section 4.05(2)

Topic Tags

  • maintenance
  • common elements
  • contractors

Question

Can the HOA Board operate with fewer members than the Bylaws require?

Short Answer

No. If the Bylaws state a minimum number of directors, the Board must maintain that number.

Detailed Answer

The Board cannot choose to operate with fewer directors than mandated. In this case, operating with two directors when the Bylaws required a minimum of three was a violation.

Alj Quote

Article IV, section 1 of the Bylaws require a Board of no fewer than three people. The preponderance of the evidence established that the Board has consisted of two people for some time… The preponderance of the evidence supports that Respondent violated the Bylaws by not having enough Board members.

Legal Basis

Bylaws Article IV, Section 1

Topic Tags

  • board composition
  • bylaws
  • vacancies

Question

Does a Bylaw saying a vacancy 'may be filled' mean the Board can choose to leave a seat empty?

Short Answer

No. That language typically describes the method of filling the seat (appointment) rather than permission to leave it vacant below the required minimum.

Detailed Answer

HOAs cannot use the word 'may' in vacancy provisions to justify ignoring minimum board size requirements. The provision allows for appointment rather than election to fill the spot, but does not absolve the Board of the duty to have the required number of members.

Alj Quote

Respondent argued that Section 5, Vacancies does not require the Board to fill a vacant position… This argument was not persuasive. This provision allows for the appointment, rather than the election, of a Director to a vacant seat. It does not absolve the Board from having the minimum number of Directors.

Legal Basis

Bylaws

Topic Tags

  • legal interpretation
  • board vacancies
  • bylaws

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, the HOA was ordered to pay the $1,500.00 filing fee directly to the homeowners within 30 days because the homeowners prevailed on the majority of their issues.

Alj Quote

IT IS ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioners the filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioners within thirty (30) days of this Order.

Legal Basis

Administrative Order

Topic Tags

  • reimbursement
  • fees
  • penalties

Question

Can the HOA be fined for these violations?

Short Answer

Yes, a civil penalty may be levied, though it may be a nominal amount compared to the filing fees.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ has the authority to levy civil penalties for violations of statutes or community documents. In this specific case, a penalty of $150.00 was deemed appropriate.

Alj Quote

A Civil Penalty of $150.00 is found to be appropriate in this matter.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • fines
  • civil penalty
  • enforcement

Case

Docket No

25F-H025-REL

Case Title

George Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association

Decision Date

2025-05-05

Alj Name

Samuel Fox

Tribunal

OAH

Agency

ADRE

George Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 25F-H025-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2025-05-05
Administrative Law Judge Samuel Fox
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $150.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner George Wolchko Counsel —
Respondent Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association Counsel Christopher Duren

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805
Bylaws, Article III, Section 4
CC&Rs, Section 4.04
Bylaws, Article IV, Section 1

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner prevailed on three of the four issues: Violation of AZ Law on Delivery of Community Documents (A.R.S. § 33-1805), Failure to Uphold CCRs Regarding Common Wall Repairs (Bylaws/CC&R violation), and operating with fewer than the minimum required number of board members (Bylaws violation). The Petitioner did not prevail on the issue regarding the Failure to Hold a Special HOA Meeting.

Why this result: Petitioner's request for an “emergency meeting” regarding the wall repair was deemed technically insufficient to qualify as a formal 'special meeting' petition under the Bylaws.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of AZ Law on Delivery of Community Documents

The HOA failed to provide the Kachina Management contract within the required ten business days for examination or copies, despite numerous requests.

Orders: Respondent failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 by not making documents available for examination within ten business days of request.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $50.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • Bylaws, Article X
  • CC&Rs, Section 9.07

Failure to Hold a Special HOA Meeting

The HOA failed to hold a special meeting requested by a valid petition signed by 25% of members, concerning common wall damage.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)
  • Bylaws, Article III, Section 4

Failure to Uphold CCRs Regarding Common Wall Repairs

The HOA refused to repair a common wall designated as a Common Element after damage was caused by an HOA-sanctioned electrician, failing their maintenance obligation.

Orders: The Board failed to maintain a Common Element (electrical conduit/wall area) in good repair after its hired contractor caused damage, violating Bylaws and CC&R obligations.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $50.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs, Section 4.04
  • Bylaws, Article IV, Section 3
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)

Violations of HOA Elections Procedures and Community Documents (Failure to seat required number of board members)

The HOA Board violated governing documents by operating with only two members, failing to maintain the minimum required number of three directors.

Orders: Respondent violated Bylaws Article IV, Section 1 by not maintaining a Board of Directors composed of no fewer than three persons.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $50.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Bylaws, Article IV, Section 1
  • CC&Rs, Section 5.03

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA governance, Document request, Board composition, Common elements maintenance, Filing fee refund, Civil penalty
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • Bylaws, Article IV, Section 1
  • CC&Rs, Section 4.04
  • Bylaws, Article IV, Section 3
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

25F-H025-REL Decision – 1268559.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:15:49 (55.5 KB)

25F-H025-REL Decision – 1276022.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:15:55 (57.0 KB)

25F-H025-REL Decision – 1276027.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:16:00 (7.3 KB)

25F-H025-REL Decision – 1282178.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:16:05 (49.3 KB)

25F-H025-REL Decision – 1288973.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:16:09 (52.0 KB)

25F-H025-REL Decision – 1290761.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:16:13 (50.5 KB)

25F-H025-REL Decision – 1301417.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:16:17 (224.5 KB)





Briefing Doc – 25F-H025-REL


Briefing Document: Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key proceedings, arguments, and outcomes of the administrative case George Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association, Case No. 25F-H025-REL, adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Petitioner, George Wolchko, a homeowner, filed a four-issue petition against the Respondent, his Homeowners Association (HOA), alleging violations of Arizona statutes and the community’s governing documents.

The hearing, held on April 14, 2025, resulted in a mixed but largely favorable outcome for the Petitioner. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the HOA in violation on three of the four claims:

1. Failure to Provide Documents: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by not making its management contract with Kachina Management available within the legally mandated ten-business-day period.

2. Failure to Repair Common Wall: The HOA violated its own Bylaws and CC&Rs by failing its duty to maintain and repair a common element (an exterior wall and electrical conduit) after its hired contractor performed improper work, leaving a hole that was not weatherproof.

3. Failure to Fill Board Vacancy: The HOA violated its Bylaws, which mandate a board of no fewer than three members, by operating with only two directors since October 2024.

The HOA prevailed on one claim, Failure to Hold a Special Meeting, as the ALJ determined the Petitioner’s request, while clear in intent, was technically deficient under the Bylaws. The final order deemed Mr. Wolchko the prevailing party on three issues, ordering the HOA to reimburse him $1,500.00 in filing fees, to comply with community documents going forward, and levying a civil penalty of $150.00 against the Association.

Case Overview

Case Number

25F-H025-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Samuel Fox

Hearing Date

April 14, 2025

Petitioner

George Wolchko

Respondent

Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Christopher Duren (of Gottlieb Law, PLC)

Key Parties and Witnesses

• George Wolchko: The Petitioner, owner of a home in the Victoria Manor community since 2018 and a former board member (2018-2023). Testified on his own behalf.

• Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association: The Respondent, a planned community in Mesa, Arizona, consisting of eight units and seven owners.

• Joseph Kidd: A current HOA board member, serving since November 2022. Testified for the Respondent.

• Michael Mott: A current HOA board member. Was present at the hearing but did not testify.

• Kachina Management, Inc.: The HOA’s management company, contracted in April 2024.

• Chris Jones: Elected to the board in September 2024 but resigned shortly thereafter, creating the board vacancy at the heart of Claim 4.

Analysis of Claims, Evidence, and Findings

Claim 1: Violation of AZ Law on Delivery of Community Documents

• Petitioner’s Allegation: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 and its governing documents by failing to provide a copy of the Kachina Management contract despite numerous requests beginning in May 2024.

• Petitioner’s Testimony & Evidence (Wolchko):

◦ Made his first formal email request for the contract on May 6, 2024. He followed up on May 12 and May 26.

◦ The management company, Kachina, responded on May 29, offering an in-person review on June 3 or 4.

◦ Wolchko testified that driving 45 minutes each way was not a “reasonably available” means of access, especially when a digital copy existed and he travels internationally. He noted the CC&Rs explicitly allow for delivery by mail.

◦ After canceling an in-person appointment due to an emergency, his repeated requests for a digital or mailed copy were met with insistence on in-person review.

◦ The contract was finally produced in February 2025, nearly a year after the initial request and only after the petition was filed.

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ Argued that by offering in-person inspection at their office, they fulfilled their statutory obligation to make records “reasonably available for examination.”

◦ Emails from Kachina Management to Wolchko confirmed they had prepared the documents for his review on the dates offered. They stated Wolchko canceled the appointment and never rescheduled.

• ALJ’s Finding: Violation Found. The ALJ concluded that more than ten business days passed between the initial request on May 6, 2024, and the date the documents were made available for examination on June 3, 2024. This delay constituted a failure to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805.

Claim 2: Failure to Hold a Special HOA Meeting

• Petitioner’s Allegation: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and its Bylaws by failing to hold a special meeting requested via a valid petition signed by 25% of the members (Wolchko and Terrance Greer).

• Petitioner’s Testimony & Evidence (Wolchko):

◦ Submitted a formal, signed request on June 19, 2024, to hold an “emergency HOA meeting to address repairs on a community common wall.”

◦ He argued this was a valid petition for a special meeting and that the Board ignored it.

◦ The Respondent falsely claimed the meeting was held during the September annual meeting, but the annual meeting notice and minutes contained no mention of the special meeting’s purpose.

• Respondent’s Position:

◦ Argued the request was for an “emergency meeting,” which, under statute, can only be called by the Board of Directors, not by member petition.

◦ Contended there is no provision in the governing documents for 25% of members to call an emergency meeting.

◦ Noted that at the annual meeting in September, Wolchko was explicitly asked if he had any issues to discuss and he declined.

• ALJ’s Finding: No Violation. The ALJ found that although the intent was clearly to request a special meeting, the petition was technically deficient. It used the term “emergency meeting,” did not include a place for the meeting, and did not use the phrase “special meeting.” While a “mere technicality,” this was sufficient to deem the petition ineffective. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party on this issue.

Claim 3: Failure to Uphold CCRs Regarding Common Wall Repairs

• Petitioner’s Allegation: The HOA failed its duty to repair a common wall damaged by its own electrician in February 2024.

• Petitioner’s Testimony & Evidence (Wolchko):

◦ In February 2024, an HOA-hired contractor, Blue State Electric, performed work on an electrical conduit on his building’s exterior wall, which the board had previously designated a “true common area” with shared 50/50 maintenance costs.

◦ The work left a hole filled with foam that was not watertight. His immediate notification on March 15, 2024, was dismissed by board member Joseph Kidd, who claimed the hole was a pre-existing condition exposed by the work and therefore not the HOA’s responsibility.

◦ After months of the board refusing to act, he investigated the box himself, discovering an HOA wire running through his wall. He stated he only touched the box to prove it was an HOA issue after being told to “deal with it myself.”

◦ He disputed the validity of an $1,867 invoice from a second contractor (Canyon State), stating it was solicited by the board to blame him for damage he did not cause.

• Respondent’s Testimony & Evidence (Kidd):

◦ The electrical box and conduit are common elements that serve four buildings.

◦ Wolchko is not a licensed Arizona electrician and had no authorization to touch the common element.

◦ Kidd testified that after Wolchko sent a video of himself pulling the box out, the board hired Canyon State to inspect it.

◦ He acknowledged offering to help Wolchko patch the stucco but denied authorizing any electrical work.

• ALJ’s Finding: Violation Found. The ALJ determined that the preponderance of evidence supported that the “Board-hired electrician installed the wrong kind of box and left a section of the wall exposed without proper weather proofing.” Because the wall and electrical conduit were common elements, the board had a duty to maintain them in good repair. The board “declined to correct the problem its contractor caused,” thus violating the Bylaws and CC&Rs.

Claim 4: Failure to Maintain Required Number of Board Members

• Petitioner’s Allegation: The HOA violated its Bylaws (Article IV, Section 1), which require a board of “no less than three (3) persons,” by operating with only two members.

• Petitioner’s Testimony & Evidence (Wolchko):

◦ Following the September 19, 2024 election, three members were elected: Joseph Kidd, Michael Mott, and Chris Jones.

◦ Chris Jones resigned almost immediately, leaving the board with two members.

◦ He argued that while the bylaws state a vacancy “may be filled” by the remaining directors, this grants authority, it does not waive the fundamental requirement of having at least three members.

◦ He noted that two other owners (himself and Terrance Greer), representing 25% of the HOA, were willing to serve, so the vacancy could be filled.

• Respondent’s Testimony & Evidence (Kidd):

◦ Confirmed Jones resigned by early October 2024.

◦ Stated the board reached out to other members who expressed no interest in serving.

◦ Testified that Kachina Management advised them that filling the seat was at their discretion.

◦ The Respondent’s legal argument was that the Bylaw’s use of the word “may” (“may be filled”) makes filling the vacancy optional, not mandatory.

• ALJ’s Finding: Violation Found. The ALJ was “not persuasive” by the Respondent’s argument. The decision states: “This provision allows for the appointment, rather than the election, of a Director to a vacant seat. It does not absolve the Board from having the minimum number of Directors.” The preponderance of evidence established that the HOA violated its Bylaws by not having enough Board members.

Final Decision and Order

• Prevailing Party: George Wolchko was deemed the prevailing party on Petition Issues 1, 3, and 4. Victoria Manor was deemed the prevailing party on Issue 2.

• Reimbursement: The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner $1,500.00 for filing fees within thirty days.

• Compliance: The Respondent was directed to “comply with the requirements of its Community Documents going forward.”

• Civil Penalty: A civil penalty of $150.00 was levied against the Respondent.

• Decision Date: May 5, 2025.






Study Guide – 25F-H025-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “25F-H025-REL”, “case_title”: “George Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association”, “decision_date”: “2025-05-05”, “alj_name”: “Samuel Fox”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “How long does the HOA have to provide records after I request them?”, “short_answer”: “The HOA has ten business days to fulfill a request to examine or provide copies of records.”, “detailed_answer”: “Under A.R.S. § 33-1805, an association must strictly adhere to a ten-business-day timeframe. In this case, providing access nearly a month after the initial request was found to be a violation of state law.”, “alj_quote”: “A.R.S. § 33-1805 provides an association ‘ten business days to fulfill a request for examination’ or ‘to provide copies of the requested records.’ … More than ten business days passed between May 6, 2024, and June 3, 2024. Petitioner demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent, through Kachina, failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1805”, “topic_tags”: [ “records request”, “deadlines”, “HOA obligations” ] }, { “question”: “Can homeowners call an ’emergency meeting’ regarding repairs?”, “short_answer”: “Generally, no. Homeowners should request a ‘special meeting’ instead, as ’emergency meetings’ are typically reserved for the Board.”, “detailed_answer”: “While homeowners may petition for a meeting, using the correct terminology is critical. In this case, a petition for an ’emergency meeting’ was deemed ineffective because that specific type of meeting is a Board function, whereas homeowners are authorized to request ‘special meetings’.”, “alj_quote”: “In the context of the communications about this meeting, it is clear that Petitioner was requesting a ‘special meeting’ not an ’emergency meeting,’ which can only be called by the Board.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws”, “topic_tags”: [ “meetings”, “procedure”, “homeowner rights” ] }, { “question”: “What specific details must be included in a petition for a special meeting?”, “short_answer”: “The petition must usually include the date, hour, place of the meeting, and the specific purpose or topic.”, “detailed_answer”: “Failure to include all technical details required by the Bylaws—such as the specific place of the meeting or the correct label (‘special meeting’)—can render a petition invalid, even if it has the required number of signatures.”, “alj_quote”: “The petition did not include a place for the meeting, the topic to be discussed, or the phrase ‘special meeting.’ … Petitioner’s special meeting request did not fully comply with the requirements of the Bylaws. Although it is a mere technicality, it is sufficient to deem the petition for a special meeting ineffective.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article III, Section 4”, “topic_tags”: [ “meetings”, “petitions”, “technicalities” ] }, { “question”: “Is the HOA responsible if a contractor they hired does poor work on a common element?”, “short_answer”: “Yes. The HOA has a duty to maintain common elements and correct problems caused by their contractors.”, “detailed_answer”: “If an HOA-hired contractor installs incorrect equipment or leaves a common element exposed to damage (like weather), the Board cannot decline to fix it. They retain the obligation to maintain the area in good repair.”, “alj_quote”: “The preponderance of the evidence supports that the Board-hired electrician installed the wrong kind of box and left a section of the wall exposed without proper weather proofing… The Board declined to correct the problem its contractor caused… The preponderance of the evidence supports that the Board failed to maintain this area in good repair in violation of the Bylaws and CC&R.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article IV, Section 3; CC&R Section 4.05(2)”, “topic_tags”: [ “maintenance”, “common elements”, “contractors” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA Board operate with fewer members than the Bylaws require?”, “short_answer”: “No. If the Bylaws state a minimum number of directors, the Board must maintain that number.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Board cannot choose to operate with fewer directors than mandated. In this case, operating with two directors when the Bylaws required a minimum of three was a violation.”, “alj_quote”: “Article IV, section 1 of the Bylaws require a Board of no fewer than three people. The preponderance of the evidence established that the Board has consisted of two people for some time… The preponderance of the evidence supports that Respondent violated the Bylaws by not having enough Board members.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article IV, Section 1”, “topic_tags”: [ “board composition”, “bylaws”, “vacancies” ] }, { “question”: “Does a Bylaw saying a vacancy ‘may be filled’ mean the Board can choose to leave a seat empty?”, “short_answer”: “No. That language typically describes the method of filling the seat (appointment) rather than permission to leave it vacant below the required minimum.”, “detailed_answer”: “HOAs cannot use the word ‘may’ in vacancy provisions to justify ignoring minimum board size requirements. The provision allows for appointment rather than election to fill the spot, but does not absolve the Board of the duty to have the required number of members.”, “alj_quote”: “Respondent argued that Section 5, Vacancies does not require the Board to fill a vacant position… This argument was not persuasive. This provision allows for the appointment, rather than the election, of a Director to a vacant seat. It does not absolve the Board from having the minimum number of Directors.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal interpretation”, “board vacancies”, “bylaws” ] }, { “question”: “If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this decision, the HOA was ordered to pay the $1,500.00 filing fee directly to the homeowners within 30 days because the homeowners prevailed on the majority of their issues.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioners the filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioners within thirty (30) days of this Order.”, “legal_basis”: “Administrative Order”, “topic_tags”: [ “reimbursement”, “fees”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA be fined for these violations?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, a civil penalty may be levied, though it may be a nominal amount compared to the filing fees.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ has the authority to levy civil penalties for violations of statutes or community documents. In this specific case, a penalty of $150.00 was deemed appropriate.”, “alj_quote”: “A Civil Penalty of $150.00 is found to be appropriate in this matter.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02”, “topic_tags”: [ “fines”, “civil penalty”, “enforcement” ] } ] }






Blog Post – 25F-H025-REL


{ “case”: { “docket_no”: “25F-H025-REL”, “case_title”: “George Wolchko v. Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association”, “decision_date”: “2025-05-05”, “alj_name”: “Samuel Fox”, “tribunal”: “OAH”, “agency”: “ADRE” }, “questions”: [ { “question”: “How long does the HOA have to provide records after I request them?”, “short_answer”: “The HOA has ten business days to fulfill a request to examine or provide copies of records.”, “detailed_answer”: “Under A.R.S. § 33-1805, an association must strictly adhere to a ten-business-day timeframe. In this case, providing access nearly a month after the initial request was found to be a violation of state law.”, “alj_quote”: “A.R.S. § 33-1805 provides an association ‘ten business days to fulfill a request for examination’ or ‘to provide copies of the requested records.’ … More than ten business days passed between May 6, 2024, and June 3, 2024. Petitioner demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent, through Kachina, failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 33-1805”, “topic_tags”: [ “records request”, “deadlines”, “HOA obligations” ] }, { “question”: “Can homeowners call an ’emergency meeting’ regarding repairs?”, “short_answer”: “Generally, no. Homeowners should request a ‘special meeting’ instead, as ’emergency meetings’ are typically reserved for the Board.”, “detailed_answer”: “While homeowners may petition for a meeting, using the correct terminology is critical. In this case, a petition for an ’emergency meeting’ was deemed ineffective because that specific type of meeting is a Board function, whereas homeowners are authorized to request ‘special meetings’.”, “alj_quote”: “In the context of the communications about this meeting, it is clear that Petitioner was requesting a ‘special meeting’ not an ’emergency meeting,’ which can only be called by the Board.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws”, “topic_tags”: [ “meetings”, “procedure”, “homeowner rights” ] }, { “question”: “What specific details must be included in a petition for a special meeting?”, “short_answer”: “The petition must usually include the date, hour, place of the meeting, and the specific purpose or topic.”, “detailed_answer”: “Failure to include all technical details required by the Bylaws—such as the specific place of the meeting or the correct label (‘special meeting’)—can render a petition invalid, even if it has the required number of signatures.”, “alj_quote”: “The petition did not include a place for the meeting, the topic to be discussed, or the phrase ‘special meeting.’ … Petitioner’s special meeting request did not fully comply with the requirements of the Bylaws. Although it is a mere technicality, it is sufficient to deem the petition for a special meeting ineffective.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article III, Section 4”, “topic_tags”: [ “meetings”, “petitions”, “technicalities” ] }, { “question”: “Is the HOA responsible if a contractor they hired does poor work on a common element?”, “short_answer”: “Yes. The HOA has a duty to maintain common elements and correct problems caused by their contractors.”, “detailed_answer”: “If an HOA-hired contractor installs incorrect equipment or leaves a common element exposed to damage (like weather), the Board cannot decline to fix it. They retain the obligation to maintain the area in good repair.”, “alj_quote”: “The preponderance of the evidence supports that the Board-hired electrician installed the wrong kind of box and left a section of the wall exposed without proper weather proofing… The Board declined to correct the problem its contractor caused… The preponderance of the evidence supports that the Board failed to maintain this area in good repair in violation of the Bylaws and CC&R.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article IV, Section 3; CC&R Section 4.05(2)”, “topic_tags”: [ “maintenance”, “common elements”, “contractors” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA Board operate with fewer members than the Bylaws require?”, “short_answer”: “No. If the Bylaws state a minimum number of directors, the Board must maintain that number.”, “detailed_answer”: “The Board cannot choose to operate with fewer directors than mandated. In this case, operating with two directors when the Bylaws required a minimum of three was a violation.”, “alj_quote”: “Article IV, section 1 of the Bylaws require a Board of no fewer than three people. The preponderance of the evidence established that the Board has consisted of two people for some time… The preponderance of the evidence supports that Respondent violated the Bylaws by not having enough Board members.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws Article IV, Section 1”, “topic_tags”: [ “board composition”, “bylaws”, “vacancies” ] }, { “question”: “Does a Bylaw saying a vacancy ‘may be filled’ mean the Board can choose to leave a seat empty?”, “short_answer”: “No. That language typically describes the method of filling the seat (appointment) rather than permission to leave it vacant below the required minimum.”, “detailed_answer”: “HOAs cannot use the word ‘may’ in vacancy provisions to justify ignoring minimum board size requirements. The provision allows for appointment rather than election to fill the spot, but does not absolve the Board of the duty to have the required number of members.”, “alj_quote”: “Respondent argued that Section 5, Vacancies does not require the Board to fill a vacant position… This argument was not persuasive. This provision allows for the appointment, rather than the election, of a Director to a vacant seat. It does not absolve the Board from having the minimum number of Directors.”, “legal_basis”: “Bylaws”, “topic_tags”: [ “legal interpretation”, “board vacancies”, “bylaws” ] }, { “question”: “If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my filing fee back?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, the Administrative Law Judge can order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.”, “detailed_answer”: “In this decision, the HOA was ordered to pay the $1,500.00 filing fee directly to the homeowners within 30 days because the homeowners prevailed on the majority of their issues.”, “alj_quote”: “IT IS ORDERED that Respondent pay Petitioners the filing fee of $1,500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioners within thirty (30) days of this Order.”, “legal_basis”: “Administrative Order”, “topic_tags”: [ “reimbursement”, “fees”, “penalties” ] }, { “question”: “Can the HOA be fined for these violations?”, “short_answer”: “Yes, a civil penalty may be levied, though it may be a nominal amount compared to the filing fees.”, “detailed_answer”: “The ALJ has the authority to levy civil penalties for violations of statutes or community documents. In this specific case, a penalty of $150.00 was deemed appropriate.”, “alj_quote”: “A Civil Penalty of $150.00 is found to be appropriate in this matter.”, “legal_basis”: “A.R.S. § 32-2199.02”, “topic_tags”: [ “fines”, “civil penalty”, “enforcement” ] } ] }


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • George Wolchko (petitioner)
  • Terrance Greer (owner/petitioner supporter)
    Signed special meeting petition

Respondent Side

  • Christopher Duren (HOA attorney)
    GOTTLIEB LAW, PLC
    Appeared as counsel for Respondent; referenced as Mr. Duran/Durham
  • Joseph Kidd (board member/witness)
    Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association
  • Michael Mott (board member)
    Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association
  • Benjamin L. Gottlieb (HOA attorney)
    GOTTLIEB LAW, PLC
  • Mark Rounsaville (HOA representative)
    Kachina Management
    Also referred to as R. Mark Rounsaville; filed written answer for Respondent
  • Chris Jones (former board member)
    Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association
    Elected September 2024, resigned shortly thereafter
  • Ashley Love (property manager)
    Tri City Property Management
  • Deja Rabone (property manager)
    Tri City Property Management
  • Amy (law firm staff)
    GOTTLIEB LAW, PLC
  • Joshua (law firm staff)
    GOTTLIEB LAW, PLC
  • Chris (law firm staff)
    GOTTLIEB LAW, PLC
    Distinct from Christopher Duren
  • Karen F. (law firm staff)
    GOTTLIEB LAW, PLC

Neutral Parties

  • Samuel Fox (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Alexis Madrid (ALJ)
    OAH

Other Participants

  • Ron Owen (former board member)
    Victoria Manor Management & Property Owners Association
  • V. Nunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • L. Abril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • M. Neat (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • L. Recchia (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • G. Osborn (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – 814023.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:02 (99.2 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772795.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:06 (42.4 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772833.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:09 (67.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties Involved

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

John R. Ashley

Respondent

Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Attorney for Respondent

Wendy Erlich, Esq.

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Oversight Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation

The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.

Procedural Timeline

• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.

• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.

• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.

• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.

• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.

Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation

The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.

Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)

• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.

• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.

• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.

Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)

• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.

• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.

Controlling Bylaw Provisions

Article

Pertinent Text / Description

Article III, Section 4

Meetings of Members; Quorum

“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”

Article VI, Section 3

Meetings of Directors; Quorum

Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.

Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)

In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:

• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.

• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”

• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.

Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)

The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:

• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.

• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.

• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:

◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.

◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”

• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.






Study Guide – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?

2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?

3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?

4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?

6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?

8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.

3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.

4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.

5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.

6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.

8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.

9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.

10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.

1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.

2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?

3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?

4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?

5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.






Blog Post – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG


4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association

Introduction: The Rules We All Live By

If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.

But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.

A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.

The Takeaways

Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.

The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:

and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.

A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.

Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”

A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.

In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.

However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.

Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.

During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.

The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print

The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.

When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (respondent attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission

Other Participants

  • A. Leverette (clerical staff)
    Signed document transmission in initial order

John R. Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because the provision does not require a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof, as Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws was found to be unambiguous in not requiring a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Dismissal, Rehearing, Contract Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – 814023.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:45 (99.2 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772795.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:54:59 (42.4 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2019032-REL/772833.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:55:00 (67.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal rulings in the administrative case of John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019032-REL). The central issue revolved around Petitioner John R. Ashley’s allegation that the Respondent, his homeowners’ association, violated its bylaws by conducting member meetings without a quorum of its Board of Directors present.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, a decision that was upheld after a full rehearing. The core of the ruling rested on a plain-text interpretation of the association’s bylaws. The ALJ found that Bylaws Article III, Section 4 unambiguously defines a quorum for member meetings as one-tenth (1/10th) of the general membership, with no requirement for a Board quorum. The separate requirements for a Board quorum are distinctly located in Article VI, which governs meetings of the Directors.

The Petitioner’s arguments—that the Board constituted a separate “class of member” requiring a quorum and that Robert’s Rules of Order should apply—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof, and the Respondent association was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties Involved

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

John R. Ashley

Respondent

Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Attorney for Respondent

Wendy Erlich, Esq.

Tribunal

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Oversight Agency

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Core Allegation

The petitioner, John R. Ashley, filed a single-issue petition on or around December 9, 2019. He alleged that the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. violated its bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by failing to establish a quorum of its Board of Directors at the annual membership meetings held in December 2017 and December 2018.

Procedural Timeline

• c. December 9, 2019: John R. Ashley files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• February 10, 2020: The Respondent files a Motion to Dismiss Petition, arguing that the cited bylaw does not require a Board quorum at member meetings.

• February 18, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a notice confirming his single issue is the alleged violation of Article III, Section 4.

• March 3, 2020: The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, grants the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020 is vacated.

• March 10, 2020: Mr. Ashley files a Request for Rehearing with the Department of Real Estate.

• March 27, 2020: The Department of Real Estate issues an Order Granting Rehearing.

• July 28, 2020: A full rehearing is conducted at the OAH. Mr. Ashley testifies on his own behalf; the Respondent is represented by counsel but presents no witnesses.

• August 11, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision after the rehearing, once again dismissing Mr. Ashley’s petition.

Analysis of the Central Dispute: Bylaw Interpretation

The case hinged entirely on the interpretation of the quorum requirements as defined in the association’s bylaws. The Petitioner and Respondent presented conflicting views on the applicability of these rules to member meetings versus director meetings.

Petitioner’s Position (John R. Ashley)

• Primary Argument: Mr. Ashley asserted that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at all meetings of the general membership.

• “Board Membership Class” Theory: He argued that the Board of Directors constituted a third “class of member” alongside homeowners and the original developers. Under this theory, this “class” would need its own quorum at member meetings. The ALJ found no substantial evidence to support the existence of this class in the bylaws.

• Reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order: Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position. However, he presented no evidence to show that these rules were incorporated into the association’s Articles of Incorporation, Declaration, or Bylaws, making them inapplicable under the tribunal’s statutory authority.

Respondent’s Position (Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.)

• Plain Text Interpretation: The Respondent argued that Article III, Section 4 is unambiguous and applies solely to the quorum requirements for the general membership, not the Board of Directors.

• Distinct Quorum Rules: The association contended that the bylaws clearly separate the rules for member meetings (Article III) from the rules for director meetings (Article VI). Article VI, Section 3 explicitly sets the quorum for the transaction of business by the Board of Directors.

Controlling Bylaw Provisions

Article

Pertinent Text / Description

Article III, Section 4

Meetings of Members; Quorum

“The presence at the meeting of Members entitled to cast, or of proxies entitled to cast, one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership will constitute a quorum for any action except as otherwise provided…”

Article VI, Section 3

Meetings of Directors; Quorum

Sets out the quorum requirements specifically for Board of Director meetings, showing that a majority of Directors constitutes a quorum for the transaction of business.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

The ALJ’s decisions, both in the initial dismissal and the final order after rehearing, were consistent and based on established principles of contract law and the evidence presented.

Initial Dismissal (March 3, 2020)

In the initial order, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss based on a direct reading of the bylaws. The ruling stated:

• The bylaws are a contract between the parties.

• The terms of Article III, Section 4 are unambiguous and contain “no requirement for a quorum of Board members to be present at a meeting of the membership.”

• Because the bylaw does not contain the requirement alleged by Mr. Ashley, a violation could not have occurred.

Rehearing Decision (August 11, 2020)

The rehearing allowed for a more extensive review but ultimately affirmed the initial conclusion. The ALJ made several key Conclusions of Law:

• Burden of Proof: Mr. Ashley, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Bylaws as Contract: Citing legal precedent (McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.), the decision reiterated that bylaws function as a binding contract.

• Unambiguous Terms: The tribunal is required to give effect to the unambiguous terms of a contract. Article III, Section 4 was found to be clear and unambiguous in its meaning.

• Lack of Evidence: Mr. Ashley failed to present substantial evidence for his key claims:

◦ He did not show that Robert’s Rules of Order were applicable to the matter.

◦ He did not show that the bylaws included a “Board membership class.”

• Final Conclusion: Because Article III, Section 4 does not require a quorum of Board members at a member meeting, Mr. Ashley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated it.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the findings from the rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order on August 11, 2020.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner John R. Ashley’s petition is dismissed.”

• Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

• Appeal Rights: The order noted that, as a decision resulting from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any further appeal must be sought through judicial review by filing with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service, as prescribed by Arizona Revised Statutes.






Study Guide – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Case No. 20F-H2019032-REL

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and procedural history of the administrative case involving John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, using only the information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in case No. 20F-H2019032-REL, and what was the primary institution hearing the case?

2. What was the central allegation made by John R. Ashley in his initial petition filed on December 9, 2019?

3. According to the provided documents, what did Bylaws Article III, Section 4 actually require to establish a quorum for a meeting of the members?

4. On what grounds did the Respondent, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc., file its Motion to Dismiss?

5. What was the initial outcome of Mr. Ashley’s petition, as decided in the Administrative Law Judge Decision dated March 3, 2020?

6. Upon what legal standard did the Administrative Law Judge state that bylaws should be interpreted, and what two court cases were cited to support this principle?

7. During the rehearing, Mr. Ashley introduced an argument about different “classes of membership.” What was this argument, and why was it rejected?

8. What role did Robert’s Rules of Order play in Mr. Ashley’s arguments, and what was the tribunal’s official position on construing these rules?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?

10. What was the final order issued on August 11, 2020, and what was the specified recourse for a party wishing to appeal it?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was John R. Ashley, and the Respondent was Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. The case was heard in the State of Arizona’s Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

2. Mr. Ashley’s central allegation was that the Respondent violated its own Bylaws, specifically Article III, Section 4, by conducting member meetings in December 2017 and December 2018 without a quorum of Board members present.

3. Bylaws Article III, Section 4 required the presence of members or proxies entitled to cast one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership. It contained no provision requiring a quorum of the Board of Directors to be present at a member meeting.

4. The Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the petition should be dismissed because Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws is unambiguous and does not require a quorum of Board members to be present for a meeting of the members.

5. The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss in an order dated March 3, 2020. Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed, and the hearing scheduled for March 16, 2020, was vacated.

6. The judge stated that the Bylaws are a contract between the parties, and unambiguous terms must be given effect. The cases cited were McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc. and Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C.

7. Mr. Ashley argued that a “Board membership class” existed and that Article III, Section 4 required a quorum of this class. The argument was rejected because he presented no substantial evidence that the Bylaws included such a class.

8. Mr. Ashley argued that Robert’s Rules of Order supported his position. The tribunal determined that construing these rules was not within the scope of its authority and noted that Mr. Ashley failed to provide evidence showing the rules were part of the association’s governing documents.

9. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The Petitioner, Mr. Ashley, bore the burden of proof on all issues in the matter.

10. The final order, issued after the rehearing, was that Mr. Ashley’s petition was dismissed and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. A party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the details in the source documents.

1. Discuss the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the petition, referencing the specific bylaws (Article III, Section 4 and Article VI, Section 3) and legal precedents cited in the decision.

2. Analyze the evolution of John R. Ashley’s arguments from his initial petition to the rehearing. How did his claims change, and why were they ultimately unsuccessful according to the final decision?

3. Explain the distinction between a quorum for a “Meeting of Members” and a “Meeting of Directors” as outlined in the Rancho Reyes II Community Association’s Bylaws. How was this distinction central to the case’s outcome?

4. Describe the procedural timeline of the case from the initial filing on December 9, 2019, to the final order after rehearing on August 11, 2020. What were the key procedural steps and decisions made by the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate?

5. Based on the legal standards cited in the decision, explain the concepts of “burden of proof” and “preponderance of the evidence.” How did these standards apply to Mr. Ashley’s case and contribute to its dismissal?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, such as Thomas Shedden in this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, John R. Ashley.

Bylaws

A set of rules governing the internal management of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, they are treated as a binding contract between the association and its members.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency that has authority over planned communities and homeowner associations, and which granted Mr. Ashley’s request for a rehearing.

Judicial Review

The process by which a party can appeal a decision from an administrative agency (like the OAH) to a court of law (the superior court).

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request filed by a party asking for a case to be dismissed. In this matter, the Respondent filed one arguing that the petitioner’s claim had no legal basis under the Bylaws.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies. The OAH is located at 1740 West Adams Street, Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, John R. Ashley.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal dispute. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party in the final order.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this matter by the Department of Real Estate after the initial petition was dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.






Blog Post – 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG


4 Surprising Legal Lessons from One Man’s Fight With His Homeowners Association

Introduction: The Rules We All Live By

If you live in a planned community, condominium, or cooperative, you live by a set of rules. For the most part, we assume these governing documents—like the bylaws of a Homeowners Association (HOA)—are straightforward. We pay our dues, keep our lawns tidy, and expect the association to manage the common areas.

But what happens when there’s a disagreement over what those rules actually mean? Disputes can arise from simple misunderstandings, and the consequences can be more complex than anyone anticipates.

A close look at a real administrative case, the dispute between John R. Ashley and the Rancho Reyes II Community Association, reveals some surprisingly impactful lessons about how community rules are interpreted in a legal setting. His fight provides a playbook of critical legal principles, revealing how the literal text of community documents can override common assumptions and even procedural standards.

The Takeaways

Here are the core lessons that emerged from the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions in the case.

The most fundamental principle guiding the judge’s decision was simple: an HOA’s bylaws are not just a set of community guidelines. They are a formal, legally binding contract between the association and its members. This concept was directly referenced from a previous case, McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc.

This contractual nature means that the exact terms must be followed to the letter by both parties—the homeowners and the association’s board. This means that when a document’s language is unambiguous, a court will not consider outside evidence or ‘common sense’ understandings to alter its meaning. The words on the page are all that matters. The judge’s decision underscored this point with a powerful statement:

and the parties are required to comply with the terms of that contract.

A core legal principle is that when the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. You cannot add requirements that simply aren’t there.

Mr. Ashley’s entire case rested on his belief that a quorum of the Board of Directors was required to be present at member meetings. However, the Administrative Law Judge dismissed this argument by pointing directly to the text of the bylaws. Article III, Section 4, which governs member meetings, only required a quorum of “one-tenth (1/10th) of the votes of each class of membership.”

A separate section, Article VI, set the quorum requirements for Board meetings. The judge noted this clear distinction, stating that the tribunal is required to “give effect to those unambiguous terms.” This demonstrates a crucial principle of contract law: the structure of the document is part of its meaning. A requirement located under the ‘Meetings of Directors’ article cannot be unilaterally applied to the ‘Meetings of Members’ article.

In his petition, Mr. Ashley referenced Robert’s Rules of Order to support his position on meeting procedures. Many organizations use this manual as a standard for conducting business, and it’s often assumed to be a universal default.

However, the judge found this argument irrelevant. Why? Because Mr. Ashley “presented no evidence to show that Roberts Rules are part of the ‘Articles of Incorporation, the Declaration, or [the] Bylaws.'” The judge also noted that interpreting such external rules was not within the tribunal’s authority. This provides a critical lesson: external standards, no matter how common, only apply if an organization’s own governing documents explicitly adopt them.

Just as external rules can’t be imported without being explicitly adopted, internal rules cannot be invented out of thin air, as Mr. Ashley’s next argument demonstrated.

During a rehearing, Mr. Ashley presented a creative but ultimately unsuccessful argument. He claimed that the Board of Directors constituted a “third class of member” and, therefore, required its own separate quorum at member meetings according to the language in Article III, Section 4.

The Administrative Law Judge swiftly rejected this novel interpretation. The decision concluded that Mr. Ashley “did not present substantial evidence that the Bylaws include a ‘Board membership class.'” This final point reinforces the central theme: arguments must be grounded in the literal text of the contract (the bylaws). This underscores the ultimate lesson: the burden of proof was on Mr. Ashley to show his interpretations were supported by the text. His failure to do so, both in referencing Robert’s Rules and in proposing a new ‘Board membership class,’ was the foundation of the judge’s decision.

Conclusion: Read the Fine Print

The dismissal of John R. Ashley’s petition is a stark reminder for every homeowner living under association rules. In the world of community governance, good intentions, common practices, and creative interpretations take a back seat. Precision, clarity, and—above all—the literal text of the governing documents are paramount.

When was the last time you read the specific documents that govern your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (respondent attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Represented Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of final order transmission

Other Participants

  • A. Leverette (clerical staff)
    Signed document transmission in initial order

John R Ashley v. Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019032-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-08-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John R Ashley Counsel —
Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc. Counsel Wendy Erlich

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition upon rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4, because that provision is unambiguous and applies only to member quorums, not requiring a quorum of Board members at membership meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof. The Bylaws were interpreted as a contract whose unambiguous terms (Article III, Section 4) do not support the Petitioner's claim regarding Board quorum at member meetings.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to establish a quorum of Board members at membership meetings

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated Bylaws Article III, Section 4 by conducting member-meetings without a quorum of Board members present. The ALJ concluded the cited Bylaw provision was unambiguous and imposed no such requirement, only defining a quorum as 1/10th of the membership votes for action at a member meeting.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition following the rehearing, concluding the Petitioner had not shown the Respondent violated the cited Bylaws provision.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Quorum, Contract Interpretation, Dismissal, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc. v. 407417 B.C., L.L.C., 213 Ariz. 83, 138 P.3d 1210 (App. 2006)
  • Rowland v. Union Hills Country Club, 157 Ariz. 301, 757 P.2d 105 (1988 App.)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 32-2199.01

Decision Documents

20F-H2019032-REL Decision – 772795.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:18:24 (42.4 KB)

20F-H2019032-REL Decision – 772833.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:18:24 (67.3 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John R Ashley (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf at the rehearing,.

Respondent Side

  • Wendy Erlich (HOA attorney)
    Wendy Erlich Attorney PLLC
    Counsel for Respondent Rancho Reyes II Community Association, Inc.,.

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge who issued the original decision and the rehearing decision,,.
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the final orders,.
  • A. Leverette (ADRE staff)
    Signed the transmission of the original order dated March 3, 2020.
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.
  • djones (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.
  • DGardner (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.
  • ncano (ADRE staff recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient of the final order.

Richard P Quinn vs. Homestead North Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019040-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-05-05
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Richard P. Quinn Counsel —
Respondent Homestead North Homeowners Association Counsel Quinten T. Cupps

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article III, Section III, Item 4

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition. The ruling clarified that while the Bylaws mention automatic resignation for delinquency, it is only effective upon Board acceptance. The Petitioner's attempt to accept the resignation via email did not constitute a valid Board action/vote.

Why this result: The Bylaws explicitly state resignation is effective when the Board accepts it. The Petitioner's email action was not a valid Board act under the Bylaws regarding meetings and quorums.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to accept automatic resignation of delinquent director

Petitioner alleged that a Board member's delinquency constituted an automatic resignation under the Bylaws and that he, as a Board member, accepted it via email. The ALJ determined that the Bylaws require the Board to accept the resignation for it to be effective. The Petitioner's email did not constitute an act of the Board as it was not done at a duly held meeting with a quorum.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Bylaws Article III, Section 4
  • Bylaws Article III, Section 9

Decision Documents

20F-H2019040-REL Decision – 787679.pdf

Uploaded 2026-02-13T17:29:30 (108.8 KB)

**Case Summary: Richard P. Quinn vs. Homestead North Homeowners Association**
**Case No.:** 20F-H2019040-REL
**Date:** May 5, 2020

**Overview**
This Administrative Law Judge Decision concerns a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition filed by Richard P. Quinn (Petitioner) against Homestead North Homeowners Association (Respondent). The dispute centered on whether a Board member, Karen Igo, had been automatically removed from her position due to alleged delinquent assessments. The case was decided via written briefs in lieu of an in-person hearing.

**Key Facts**
* **The Debt:** On March 13, 2019, a "Wall Charge" of $3,925.00 was posted to the account of Board member Karen Igo. Between April and October 2019, Ms. Igo made regular payments, paying the balance in full by October 21, 2019.
* **Petitioner's Actions:** Petitioner, also a Board member, contended that Ms. Igo’s debt triggered an automatic resignation under the Bylaws. On October 18, 2019, Petitioner sent an email to the Board stating he "accepted" Ms. Igo’s resignation. He argued that because no other Board members responded to the email, his solitary vote constituted a majority acceptance.
* **Bylaws Provisions:**
* *Article III, Section 4:* States that a director's delinquency constitutes a resignation which is "effective when the Board of Directors accepts such resignation".
* *Article III, Section 9:* Defines a valid act of the Board as a decision made by a majority of directors present at a "duly held meeting" where a quorum is present.

**Main Legal Issues**
The proceedings were bifurcated to address a specific legal question: **Did the Board accept the resignation?**. The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board had validly accepted Ms. Igo's resignation.

**Legal Analysis & Findings**
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer ruled against the Petitioner based on the plain language of the Association's Bylaws:
1. **Effectiveness of Resignation:** The Judge affirmed that under Article III, Section 4, a resignation based on delinquency is not automatic; it requires Board acceptance to become effective.
2. **Invalidity of Email Action:** The Judge determined that Petitioner’s email did not constitute a "duly held meeting" of the Board. Consequently, an email correspondence could not establish a quorum, and the Petitioner’s "vote" could not be considered a majority decision or a valid act of the Board.
3. **Lack of Quorum:** The Petitioner failed to provide evidence that a quorum of the Board ever voted to accept Ms. Igo’s resignation at a proper meeting.

**Outcome**
The Judge found that Petitioner failed to prove the Board accepted the resignation. As the acceptance condition in the Bylaws was never met, the resignation was not effective. The petition was dismissed.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Richard P. Quinn (Petitioner)
    Homestead North Homeowners Association (Board Member)
    Appeared on his own behalf; member of the Board

Respondent Side

  • Quinten T. Cupps (Respondent Attorney)
    Represented Homestead North Homeowners Association
  • Karen Igo (Board member)
    Homestead North Homeowners Association
    Subject of the resignation dispute; had delinquent 'Wall Charge'

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the order