Jeff Lion vs. Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817009-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-01-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jeff Lion Counsel
Respondent Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

Article 8 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was dismissed because he failed to appear or provide an authorized representative at the scheduled hearing, resulting in the Respondent being deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing scheduled at his request and failed to provide an authorized representative (as appearances are considered the practice of law under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31).

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&Rs

Petitioner Jeff Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Dismissal, Failure to Appear, Unauthorized Representation, HOA, CC&R
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817009-REL Decision – 611264.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:53 (69.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817009-REL


Briefing Document: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA (Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion (Petitioner) versus Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s case, which alleged a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs, was dismissed due to the Petitioner’s failure to appear at the scheduled hearing on January 9, 2018.

The hearing had been rescheduled to this date at the Petitioner’s own request. On the day of the hearing, two witnesses for Mr. Lion appeared but were informed by the tribunal that they could not legally represent him as they were not licensed attorneys, a requirement under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31. Because no authorized representative for the Petitioner was present, no evidence could be presented to support the claim. Consequently, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden dismissed the petition and designated the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association as the prevailing party.

Case Background and Procedural History

The matter originated from a petition filed by Jeff Lion against the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.

Initial Allegation: Mr. Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Notice of Hearing: On October 2, 2017, the Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing, initially scheduling the matter for November 29, 2017, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix.

Continuance: Mr. Lion filed a Motion to Continue the hearing, which was rescheduled for 9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2018, without objection from the Respondent.

Analysis of the January 9, 2018 Hearing

The proceedings on the rescheduled hearing date were pivotal to the case’s outcome.

Petitioner’s Failure to Appear: Mr. Jeff Lion, the Petitioner, did not appear at the hearing at its scheduled time.

Attempted Representation by Non-Attorneys: Two witnesses named by Mr. Lion were present. They informed the tribunal that Mr. Lion would not be appearing and that they intended to represent him.

Tribunal’s Ruling on Representation: The tribunal advised the witnesses that they were legally prohibited from representing Mr. Lion. Citing Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, the judge clarified that appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings constitute the practice of law and require representation by an attorney licensed in Arizona. The witnesses confirmed they did not hold such licenses.

Consequences of Non-Appearance: As there was no authorized representative present for the Petitioner, no evidence was taken. The judge noted that the hearing had been continued to that specific date at Mr. Lion’s request and proceeded to vacate the matter based on his failure to appear.

Legal Findings and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was grounded in established legal principles and procedural rules.

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate was confirmed to have authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Burden of Proof: The decision reiterated that the party asserting a claim—in this case, Mr. Lion—carries the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Rationale for Dismissal: The central conclusion of law was that Mr. Lion failed to meet his burden of proof. By not appearing at the hearing he had requested, and by not securing authorized legal representation, he “failed to present any evidence in support of his petition.”

Final Order and Implications

The decision, issued on January 10, 2018, formally concluded the administrative hearing process with a definitive outcome.

Dismissal of Petition: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that “Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Post-Decision Options: The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.

Key Parties and Representatives

Name/Entity

Contact/Representation Information

Petitioner

Jeff Lion

PO Box 1350, Selma, CA 93662

Respondent

Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association

Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC, 373 S. Main Ave., Tucson, AZ 85701

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings

Overseeing Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Commissioner: Judy Lowe






Study Guide – 18F-H1817009-REL


Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms found within the document.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based entirely on the provided legal decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and respondent in this matter, and what was the petitioner’s central allegation?

2. Why was the administrative hearing held on January 9, 2018, instead of the originally scheduled date?

3. Describe the events that occurred at the scheduled hearing time on January 9, 2018.

4. What specific rule was cited by the tribunal to prevent the petitioner’s witnesses from representing him?

5. What is the standard of proof for this matter, and which party had the burden of proof?

6. According to the decision, what was the direct consequence of the petitioner’s failure to have an authorized representative present at the hearing?

7. How does the legal document define the term “preponderance of the evidence”?

8. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

9. Who was identified as the “prevailing party” and why?

10. What option was available to the parties if they disagreed with the judge’s order?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Jeff Lion, and the respondent was the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association. Mr. Lion alleged that the respondent had violated Article 8 of its CC&Rs.

2. The hearing was originally set for November 29, 2017. It was rescheduled to January 9, 2018, because the petitioner, Mr. Lion, filed a Motion to Continue, to which the respondent did not object.

3. On January 9, 2018, the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear for the hearing. Two witnesses appeared on his behalf and stated their intention to represent him, but they were not permitted to do so.

4. The tribunal cited Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, which governs the practice of law. Since the witnesses were not licensed attorneys in Arizona, they were not legally permitted to represent Mr. Lion at the hearing.

5. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The party asserting the claim, in this case, the petitioner Jeff Lion, had the burden of proof.

6. Because no authorized representative was present for Mr. Lion, no evidence was taken in support of his petition. This failure to present evidence was a key factor in the case’s dismissal.

7. The document defines “preponderance of the evidence” by quoting Black’s Law Dictionary as: “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

8. The final order was that Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed. The decision was issued on January 10, 2018.

9. The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party. This was because Mr. Lion failed to present any evidence in support of his petition, leading to its dismissal.

10. The parties could request a rehearing pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04. The request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to explore the procedural and legal principles of the case more deeply.

1. Analyze the significance of Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31 in the outcome of this case. How does the principle that appearances at administrative hearings constitute the “practice of law” affect how individuals can pursue claims?

2. Discuss the interrelated concepts of “burden of proof” and “standard of proof” as they apply to this case. Explain why Jeff Lion’s failure to appear made it legally impossible for him to meet the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

3. Evaluate the procedural fairness of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to dismiss the petition. Consider the timeline of events, including the petitioner’s own request to reschedule the hearing, in your analysis.

4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, construct an argument explaining the logical steps Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden took to arrive at the final order of dismissal.

5. Examine the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings as outlined in the document. How do these two entities interact in resolving a dispute initiated by a homeowner against a Homeowners Association?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency to resolve disputes.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Title 32, Chapter 20, Article 11 is cited as giving the Department of Real Estate authority.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Lion) had the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are rules governing a planned community or homeowners association. Mr. Lion alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.

Motion to Continue

A formal request made by a party to an administrative tribunal or court to postpone a scheduled hearing to a later date.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the hearing took place, which conducts hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Jeff Lion.

Practice of Law

The act of representing others in legal proceedings. The decision states that appearances at the OAH are considered the practice of law and are restricted to licensed attorneys under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. It is met when the evidence presented is more convincing and has greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue.

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal case or dispute. The Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to re-examine the issues and the decision. The parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.

Tribunal

A body established to settle certain types of dispute. In this context, it refers to the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the hearing.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817009-REL


How One Homeowner Lost His Case Against His HOA Before It Even Began

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath Story You Haven’t Heard

Disputes with a Homeowners Association (HOA) are a common source of frustration. It often feels like a David vs. Goliath battle, pitting an individual against a structured organization with rules and resources. When faced with what they believe is an unfair application of those rules, some homeowners decide to fight back.

This was the situation for Jeff Lion, who filed a petition against his HOA, Riggs Ranch Meadows, alleging a violation of Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). But this story didn’t end with a dramatic debate over property rights. Instead, it was over before it started, derailed by a simple but fatal procedural misstep. This case offers three critical lessons for anyone considering a formal dispute, revealing how understanding the basic rules of the game is far more important than just believing you have a good argument.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Most Important Step is Showing Up

The central, decisive event of the case was a stunning failure in participation: the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear at the hearing on January 9, 2018. The ultimate procedural irony? This was the exact hearing date that he himself had requested.

The contrast on that day could not have been starker. While Mr. Lion was a no-show for the fight he started, the HOA—the “Goliath” in this story—arrived fully prepared, represented by its attorney, Nathan Tennyson, Esq. The judge’s decision was swift and absolute. Because Mr. Lion did not appear, no evidence was taken, and his petition was dismissed entirely.

This outcome is rooted in a core legal principle known as the “burden of proof.” Simply put, the person making a claim is responsible for presenting evidence to support it. As the one who filed the petition, it was Mr. Lion’s job to prove his case. By failing to appear, he presented zero evidence and could not possibly meet this fundamental burden. The merits of his specific complaint about Article 8 were never even heard, all because of a self-inflicted failure to participate in the process he initiated on the day he chose.

——————————————————————————–

2. Not Just Anyone Can Speak for You in Court

In a surprising turn, while Mr. Lion was absent, his two named witnesses did appear at the hearing. They informed the judge that the petitioner would not be attending and that they intended to represent him in his absence.

The Administrative Law Judge immediately shut down their attempt. The reason highlights a crucial rule that trips up many non-lawyers: the witnesses were not licensed attorneys, and the law strictly forbids such representation. Appearances at these administrative hearings are legally considered “the practice of law.”

The court’s decision was based on an unambiguous rule, which it cited in its legal conclusions:

Appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings are considered to be the practice of law. See Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.

This is a counter-intuitive lesson for many. You might assume a trusted friend, family member, or knowledgeable witness could speak on your behalf. This case demonstrates that the legal system has rigid rules about who is authorized to provide representation. Good intentions and a willingness to help are not enough to grant someone the legal authority to act as your advocate in a formal hearing.

——————————————————————————–

3. “Winning” is About Tipping the Scale of Evidence

In administrative hearings, the standard for winning is called “a preponderance of the evidence.” This doesn’t mean proving your case beyond all doubt. Think of it like a scale. “Preponderance of the evidence” simply means you have to provide enough evidence to make the scale tip, even just slightly, in your favor.

The formal definition clarifies this concept of relative weight:

The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Applying this standard to Mr. Lion’s case makes the outcome painfully clear. Since he failed to appear and no evidence was taken on his behalf, the “weight” of his evidence was zero. It was therefore impossible for him to tip the scale, no matter how strong his case might have been in theory. Because he presented nothing, Riggs Ranch Meadows was deemed the “prevailing party” by default. This demonstrates how the legal system is a structured process focused on evidence presented according to rules, not just on feelings or the theoretical rightness of a claim.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: The Rules of the Game Matter

The case of Jeff Lion provides a masterclass in legal procedure. The three key lessons are simple but absolute: you must show up to your own hearing, especially one you scheduled; only licensed attorneys can legally represent you; and you must present evidence to meet your burden of proof.

This case wasn’t ultimately about CC&Rs or neighborhood rules; it was about procedure. It serves as a stark reminder that before entering any formal dispute, the first question to ask isn’t “Am I right?” but “Do I understand the rules?”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jeff Lion (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (respondent attorney)
    BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (ADRE transmission signatory)
  • LDettorre (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Jeff Lion vs. Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817009-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-01-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jeff Lion Counsel
Respondent Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

Article 8 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was dismissed because he failed to appear or provide an authorized representative at the scheduled hearing, resulting in the Respondent being deemed the prevailing party.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to appear at the hearing scheduled at his request and failed to provide an authorized representative (as appearances are considered the practice of law under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31).

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of CC&Rs

Petitioner Jeff Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Dismissal, Failure to Appear, Unauthorized Representation, HOA, CC&R
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817009-REL Decision – 611264.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:07 (69.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817009-REL


Briefing Document: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA (Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion (Petitioner) versus Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s case, which alleged a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs, was dismissed due to the Petitioner’s failure to appear at the scheduled hearing on January 9, 2018.

The hearing had been rescheduled to this date at the Petitioner’s own request. On the day of the hearing, two witnesses for Mr. Lion appeared but were informed by the tribunal that they could not legally represent him as they were not licensed attorneys, a requirement under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31. Because no authorized representative for the Petitioner was present, no evidence could be presented to support the claim. Consequently, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden dismissed the petition and designated the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association as the prevailing party.

Case Background and Procedural History

The matter originated from a petition filed by Jeff Lion against the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.

Initial Allegation: Mr. Lion alleged that the Respondent violated Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Notice of Hearing: On October 2, 2017, the Arizona Department of Real Estate issued a Notice of Hearing, initially scheduling the matter for November 29, 2017, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix.

Continuance: Mr. Lion filed a Motion to Continue the hearing, which was rescheduled for 9:00 a.m. on January 9, 2018, without objection from the Respondent.

Analysis of the January 9, 2018 Hearing

The proceedings on the rescheduled hearing date were pivotal to the case’s outcome.

Petitioner’s Failure to Appear: Mr. Jeff Lion, the Petitioner, did not appear at the hearing at its scheduled time.

Attempted Representation by Non-Attorneys: Two witnesses named by Mr. Lion were present. They informed the tribunal that Mr. Lion would not be appearing and that they intended to represent him.

Tribunal’s Ruling on Representation: The tribunal advised the witnesses that they were legally prohibited from representing Mr. Lion. Citing Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, the judge clarified that appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings constitute the practice of law and require representation by an attorney licensed in Arizona. The witnesses confirmed they did not hold such licenses.

Consequences of Non-Appearance: As there was no authorized representative present for the Petitioner, no evidence was taken. The judge noted that the hearing had been continued to that specific date at Mr. Lion’s request and proceeded to vacate the matter based on his failure to appear.

Legal Findings and Conclusions of Law

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was grounded in established legal principles and procedural rules.

Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate was confirmed to have authority over the matter pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Burden of Proof: The decision reiterated that the party asserting a claim—in this case, Mr. Lion—carries the burden of proof. The standard required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Core Rationale for Dismissal: The central conclusion of law was that Mr. Lion failed to meet his burden of proof. By not appearing at the hearing he had requested, and by not securing authorized legal representation, he “failed to present any evidence in support of his petition.”

Final Order and Implications

The decision, issued on January 10, 2018, formally concluded the administrative hearing process with a definitive outcome.

Dismissal of Petition: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that “Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed.”

Prevailing Party: The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

Post-Decision Options: The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted. A request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, as stipulated by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.

Key Parties and Representatives

Name/Entity

Contact/Representation Information

Petitioner

Jeff Lion

PO Box 1350, Selma, CA 93662

Respondent

Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association

Represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Respondent’s Counsel

Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC, 373 S. Main Ave., Tucson, AZ 85701

Administrative Law Judge

Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings

Overseeing Body

Arizona Department of Real Estate

Commissioner: Judy Lowe






Study Guide – 18F-H1817009-REL


Study Guide for Administrative Law Judge Decision: Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows HOA

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Jeff Lion v. Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, Case No. 18F-H1817009-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms found within the document.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based entirely on the provided legal decision.

1. Who were the petitioner and respondent in this matter, and what was the petitioner’s central allegation?

2. Why was the administrative hearing held on January 9, 2018, instead of the originally scheduled date?

3. Describe the events that occurred at the scheduled hearing time on January 9, 2018.

4. What specific rule was cited by the tribunal to prevent the petitioner’s witnesses from representing him?

5. What is the standard of proof for this matter, and which party had the burden of proof?

6. According to the decision, what was the direct consequence of the petitioner’s failure to have an authorized representative present at the hearing?

7. How does the legal document define the term “preponderance of the evidence”?

8. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

9. Who was identified as the “prevailing party” and why?

10. What option was available to the parties if they disagreed with the judge’s order?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Jeff Lion, and the respondent was the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association. Mr. Lion alleged that the respondent had violated Article 8 of its CC&Rs.

2. The hearing was originally set for November 29, 2017. It was rescheduled to January 9, 2018, because the petitioner, Mr. Lion, filed a Motion to Continue, to which the respondent did not object.

3. On January 9, 2018, the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear for the hearing. Two witnesses appeared on his behalf and stated their intention to represent him, but they were not permitted to do so.

4. The tribunal cited Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31, which governs the practice of law. Since the witnesses were not licensed attorneys in Arizona, they were not legally permitted to represent Mr. Lion at the hearing.

5. The standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence.” The party asserting the claim, in this case, the petitioner Jeff Lion, had the burden of proof.

6. Because no authorized representative was present for Mr. Lion, no evidence was taken in support of his petition. This failure to present evidence was a key factor in the case’s dismissal.

7. The document defines “preponderance of the evidence” by quoting Black’s Law Dictionary as: “The greater weight of the evidence…that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

8. The final order was that Petitioner Jeff Lion’s petition is dismissed. The decision was issued on January 10, 2018.

9. The Respondent, Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party. This was because Mr. Lion failed to present any evidence in support of his petition, leading to its dismissal.

10. The parties could request a rehearing pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.04. The request had to be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses to explore the procedural and legal principles of the case more deeply.

1. Analyze the significance of Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31 in the outcome of this case. How does the principle that appearances at administrative hearings constitute the “practice of law” affect how individuals can pursue claims?

2. Discuss the interrelated concepts of “burden of proof” and “standard of proof” as they apply to this case. Explain why Jeff Lion’s failure to appear made it legally impossible for him to meet the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence.”

3. Evaluate the procedural fairness of the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to dismiss the petition. Consider the timeline of events, including the petitioner’s own request to reschedule the hearing, in your analysis.

4. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, construct an argument explaining the logical steps Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden took to arrive at the final order of dismissal.

5. Examine the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings as outlined in the document. How do these two entities interact in resolving a dispute initiated by a homeowner against a Homeowners Association?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official (Thomas Shedden in this case) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency to resolve disputes.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. Section R2-19-119 is cited as establishing the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. Title 32, Chapter 20, Article 11 is cited as giving the Department of Real Estate authority.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Lion) had the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are rules governing a planned community or homeowners association. Mr. Lion alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.

Motion to Continue

A formal request made by a party to an administrative tribunal or court to postpone a scheduled hearing to a later date.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state agency where the hearing took place, which conducts hearings for other state agencies.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Jeff Lion.

Practice of Law

The act of representing others in legal proceedings. The decision states that appearances at the OAH are considered the practice of law and are restricted to licensed attorneys under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. It is met when the evidence presented is more convincing and has greater weight than the evidence offered in opposition, inclining a fair mind to one side of the issue.

Prevailing Party

The party who wins a legal case or dispute. The Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to re-examine the issues and the decision. The parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Riggs Ranch Meadows Homeowners Association.

Tribunal

A body established to settle certain types of dispute. In this context, it refers to the Administrative Law Judge presiding over the hearing.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817009-REL


How One Homeowner Lost His Case Against His HOA Before It Even Began

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath Story You Haven’t Heard

Disputes with a Homeowners Association (HOA) are a common source of frustration. It often feels like a David vs. Goliath battle, pitting an individual against a structured organization with rules and resources. When faced with what they believe is an unfair application of those rules, some homeowners decide to fight back.

This was the situation for Jeff Lion, who filed a petition against his HOA, Riggs Ranch Meadows, alleging a violation of Article 8 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). But this story didn’t end with a dramatic debate over property rights. Instead, it was over before it started, derailed by a simple but fatal procedural misstep. This case offers three critical lessons for anyone considering a formal dispute, revealing how understanding the basic rules of the game is far more important than just believing you have a good argument.

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1. The Most Important Step is Showing Up

The central, decisive event of the case was a stunning failure in participation: the petitioner, Jeff Lion, did not appear at the hearing on January 9, 2018. The ultimate procedural irony? This was the exact hearing date that he himself had requested.

The contrast on that day could not have been starker. While Mr. Lion was a no-show for the fight he started, the HOA—the “Goliath” in this story—arrived fully prepared, represented by its attorney, Nathan Tennyson, Esq. The judge’s decision was swift and absolute. Because Mr. Lion did not appear, no evidence was taken, and his petition was dismissed entirely.

This outcome is rooted in a core legal principle known as the “burden of proof.” Simply put, the person making a claim is responsible for presenting evidence to support it. As the one who filed the petition, it was Mr. Lion’s job to prove his case. By failing to appear, he presented zero evidence and could not possibly meet this fundamental burden. The merits of his specific complaint about Article 8 were never even heard, all because of a self-inflicted failure to participate in the process he initiated on the day he chose.

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2. Not Just Anyone Can Speak for You in Court

In a surprising turn, while Mr. Lion was absent, his two named witnesses did appear at the hearing. They informed the judge that the petitioner would not be attending and that they intended to represent him in his absence.

The Administrative Law Judge immediately shut down their attempt. The reason highlights a crucial rule that trips up many non-lawyers: the witnesses were not licensed attorneys, and the law strictly forbids such representation. Appearances at these administrative hearings are legally considered “the practice of law.”

The court’s decision was based on an unambiguous rule, which it cited in its legal conclusions:

Appearances at the Office of Administrative Hearings are considered to be the practice of law. See Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31.

This is a counter-intuitive lesson for many. You might assume a trusted friend, family member, or knowledgeable witness could speak on your behalf. This case demonstrates that the legal system has rigid rules about who is authorized to provide representation. Good intentions and a willingness to help are not enough to grant someone the legal authority to act as your advocate in a formal hearing.

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3. “Winning” is About Tipping the Scale of Evidence

In administrative hearings, the standard for winning is called “a preponderance of the evidence.” This doesn’t mean proving your case beyond all doubt. Think of it like a scale. “Preponderance of the evidence” simply means you have to provide enough evidence to make the scale tip, even just slightly, in your favor.

The formal definition clarifies this concept of relative weight:

The greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

Applying this standard to Mr. Lion’s case makes the outcome painfully clear. Since he failed to appear and no evidence was taken on his behalf, the “weight” of his evidence was zero. It was therefore impossible for him to tip the scale, no matter how strong his case might have been in theory. Because he presented nothing, Riggs Ranch Meadows was deemed the “prevailing party” by default. This demonstrates how the legal system is a structured process focused on evidence presented according to rules, not just on feelings or the theoretical rightness of a claim.

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Conclusion: The Rules of the Game Matter

The case of Jeff Lion provides a masterclass in legal procedure. The three key lessons are simple but absolute: you must show up to your own hearing, especially one you scheduled; only licensed attorneys can legally represent you; and you must present evidence to meet your burden of proof.

This case wasn’t ultimately about CC&Rs or neighborhood rules; it was about procedure. It serves as a stark reminder that before entering any formal dispute, the first question to ask isn’t “Am I right?” but “Do I understand the rules?”


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jeff Lion (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (respondent attorney)
    BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (ADRE transmission signatory)
  • LDettorre (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE recipient)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ decision, certified as the final administrative decision, dismissed the Petitioner's claim after rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The challenged $660 fee was determined to be a permissible working capital contribution under the CC&Rs, not a fee restricted by the statutory cap on resale disclosure services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in question was determined to be a working capital fee/assessment governed by the CC&Rs and ARS § 33-1242(A)(2), and not subject to the limitation set forth in ARS § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged excessive fee collection for resale disclosure/transfer services

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 fee, which he argued exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure/transfer services. The Association argued the $660 fee was a working capital contribution mandated by CC&R section 8.13 and was mislabeled, and therefore not subject to the statutory limitations of § 33-1260.

Orders: Brian D. Sopatyk’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fee dispute, Working capital fee, Transfer fee, Resale disclosure, Statutory interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:41 (67.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:17:44 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing: Sopatyk v. Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and outcomes of an administrative legal case brought by petitioner Brian Sopatyk against The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute was Mr. Sopatyk’s allegation that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660 upon the sale of a condominium unit, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at an aggregate of $400.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition on both occasions. The central finding was that the petitioner failed to prove a statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 charge was not a resale disclosure fee governed by A.R.S. § 33-1260, but rather a “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association admitted that this fee had been historically mislabeled as a “transfer fee,” an error it had since identified and corrected. The actual fee charged for resale disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “statement fee.” The ALJ’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision in the matter on August 10, 2017.

Case Overview

Case Number

17F-H1716004-REL (Initial Hearing)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Jurisdiction

State of Arizona, Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Core Allegation

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits fees for resale disclosure services to a maximum of $400.

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a disclosure statement for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, showing a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

May 18, 2016

Prompted by Mr. Sopatyk, the Association’s Board discusses the fee structure. It concludes the $660 fee is a mislabeled “working capital fee” and not a statutory violation.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the violation.

November 14, 2016

The initial administrative hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate adopts the ALJ’s recommendation, issuing a Final Order to dismiss the petition.

Post-Dec. 2016

Mr. Sopatyk requests a rehearing of the matter.

June 9, 2017

The rehearing is conducted, again before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, once again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 10, 2017

With no modifying action from the Department of Real Estate, the ALJ’s June 26 decision is certified as the final administrative decision.

Core Dispute Analysis

The case centered on the interpretation and classification of two fees charged by the Association during the sale of Mr. Sopatyk’s condominium unit.

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Allegation of Violation: Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660, which directly contravened the $400 statutory maximum established by A.R.S. § 33-1260 for services related to resale disclosure.

Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted a March 2, 2015 disclosure form from the Association listing both a “660transferfee”anda”30 statement fee.” A HUD-1 disclosure statement for the purchase was also entered, showing the $660 “Transfer Fee” was split, with $330 paid from the buyer’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the seller’s funds.

Contradictory Testimony: The ALJ noted a discrepancy in the petitioner’s statements. The sworn petition stated the $660 fee was split between him and the seller, while his testimony at the rehearing claimed he “had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price.” The ALJ decision stated, “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Requested Remedies: Mr. Sopatyk requested that the Association be ordered to comply with the statute, that refunds be paid to those who paid fees in excess of the statutory maximum, and that a civil penalty be imposed against the Association.

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc.)

Distinction Between Fees: The Association’s central argument was that two separate and legally distinct fees were assessed:

1. A $30 Resale Statement Fee: This was the charge for preparing documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260 and was well within the $400 limit.

2. A $660 Working Capital Fee: This fee was authorized under a separate provision, Section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, which mandates an assessment from each new owner equal to two monthly installments to fund the Association’s working capital (reserve) fund.

“Mislabeled” Fee: The Association acknowledged that the $660 working capital fee was incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee.” Association Manager Amy Telnes testified that she received erroneous information from the prior manager and had been using the wrong label.

Board Action and Corrective Measures: The minutes from the May 18, 2016 Board meeting show that the Board, after reviewing a legal opinion, concluded the issue was one of “labeling, not violating the statute.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected into the Reserve Account. To prevent future confusion, the Board also voted to assess a single $400 transfer fee on all future transactions, with no other fees.

Fund Allocation: Ms. Telnes testified that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, consistent with its purpose as a working capital contribution, while the $30 fee was the charge pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260(C).

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

ALJ Thomas Shedden presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing, reaching the same conclusion in both instances.

Key Rulings and Legal Reasoning

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Core Finding: The evidence demonstrated that the Association charged two distinct fees. The $30 fee was for document preparation under A.R.S. § 33-1260, while the $660 fee was a working capital assessment authorized by CC&R Section 8.13. The ALJ concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1260 was not applicable to the $660 fee.

Conclusion on Violation: Based on the evidence, including the testimony of the Association manager and the board meeting minutes, the ALJ found that the $660 fee was mislabeled but was not collected for services related to resale disclosure. Therefore, Mr. Sopatyk did not meet his burden to show that the Association violated the statute.

Rejection of Harm-Based Argument: The ALJ did not accept the Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Mr. Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400. The judge clarified that A.R.S. § 33-2199.01 “does not require this type of particularized harm, but rather applies to all statutory violations.”

Dismissal of Petition: In both the November 29, 2016 decision and the June 26, 2017 decision, the order was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition and deem the Association the prevailing party.

Final Disposition and Legal Status

The decision issued by ALJ Shedden on June 26, 2017, was transmitted to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The Department had until August 1, 2017, to accept, reject, or modify the decision. As no action was taken by the deadline, the Office of Administrative Hearings issued a Certification of Decision of Administrative Law Judge on August 10, 2017. This certification established the ALJ’s decision as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate in the matter.

Key Legal Citations and Definitions

A.R.S. § 33-1260 (Resale of Units; Information Required): This Arizona statute governs the information a condominium association must provide to a prospective purchaser. It explicitly limits the fees an association can charge for these services:

CC&R Section 8.13 (Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund): This section of The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association’s governing documents provides the authority to collect a fee from new owners for a different purpose:

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof required for the petitioner to prevail, defined in the legal decisions as:






Study Guide – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and state the core legal violation the petitioner alleged.

2. What specific fees were charged during the petitioner’s condominium purchase that became the central point of the dispute?

3. According to the Association, what was the true nature of the $660 fee, and how did it explain the “transfer fee” label on the disclosure documents?

4. What role did Amy Telnes, the Association manager, play in explaining the history of the disputed fee?

5. What actions did the Association’s Board take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, to address the petitioner’s concerns and correct its internal procedures?

6. Who held the burden of proof in this matter, and what was the legal standard required to meet that burden?

7. What was the official outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?

8. Why was a re-hearing conducted, and what was the final outcome of that hearing on June 9, 2017?

9. According to the re-hearing decision, there was a significant contradiction between the petitioner’s sworn petition and his later testimony. What was this contradiction?

10. What was the legal basis, according to the Association’s CC&Rs, for collecting the $660 working capital fee?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Brian Sopatyk, and the respondent was The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 by charging a transfer fee in excess of the statutory maximum of $400.

2. The disputed fees were a $660 “transfer fee,” which was split between the buyer (Mr. Sopatyk) and the seller, and a separate $30 “statement fee” or “Resale Statement Fee.” The petitioner’s claim focused on the $660 fee being above the legal limit for resale disclosure services.

3. The Association argued the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was a “working capital fee” authorized by its CC&Rs. It explained that the fee had been mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to an error passed down from a previous property manager.

4. Amy Telnes testified that when she became the Association manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She further testified that the $660 was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, and the actual fee charged for disclosure under the statute was the separate $30 statement fee.

5. At the May 18, 2016, meeting, the Board concluded it was not in violation of the law but that its fee labeling was confusing. The Board directed Amy Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all mislabeled fees into the Reserve Account and voted to assess a single, correctly labeled $400 transfer fee on all future transactions.

6. The petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

7. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The judge ordered that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition be dismissed.

8. A re-hearing was conducted after Mr. Sopatyk requested one following the initial decision. The final outcome of the June 9, 2017, re-hearing was the same as the first: the Administrative Law Judge found the petitioner did not meet his burden of proof and ordered the petition to be dismissed.

9. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 transfer fee was split between him and the seller. However, during his testimony at the re-hearing, he stated that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.

10. The legal basis was Section 8.13 of the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section, titled “Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund,” called for an assessment from each new owner of two monthly installments of the annual fee to be deposited into the working capital fund.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, incorporating specific facts, legal arguments, and procedural details from the source documents.

1. Trace the complete timeline of the case, beginning with the filing of the petition. Include key dates of filings, hearings, decisions, and final certifications, and describe the significance of each event in the legal process.

2. Analyze the central legal argument of the Respondent, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association. Explain how the distinction between a “transfer fee” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 and a “working capital fee” under the Association’s CC&Rs was crucial to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain why the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the re-hearing, citing specific evidence presented by the Association.

4. Evaluate the importance of the Association’s Board Meeting Minutes from May 18, 2016, as a piece of evidence. Detail the specific findings and resolutions from that meeting and explain how they were used to build the Association’s defense.

5. Examine the roles of the key individuals and entities in this administrative action. Describe the functions and contributions of Brian Sopatyk (Petitioner), Amy Telnes (Association Manager), Michael Cibellis (Association President), Thomas Shedden (Administrative Law Judge), and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to provide certain disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser. It also limits the fee an association can charge for the preparation of these documents to an aggregate of four hundred dollars.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. In this case, section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs authorized the collection of a fee from new owners for a working capital fund.

Final Administrative Decision

The ultimate, legally binding decision in the administrative matter. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision became the final administrative decision after the Department of Real Estate did not act to accept, reject, or modify it within the statutory time limit.

HUD-1 Disclosure Statement

A document used in the petitioner’s property purchase that itemized all charges imposed upon a borrower and seller for a real estate transaction. It was used as evidence to show how the $660 “Transfer Fee” and $30 “Resale Statement Fee” were assessed and paid.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Brian Sopatyk was the petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Reserve Fund

An account maintained by the Condominium Association. The Association referred to its “working capital fund” as the Reserve Fund, into which the disputed $660 fees were deposited.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. was the respondent.

Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee

A $30 fee charged by the Association for the preparation of disclosure documents. The Association argued this was the fee governed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260, which was compliant with the $400 statutory cap.

Transfer Fee

In the context of the petitioner’s allegation, a fee charged for resale disclosure services, limited to $400 by statute. In the context of the Association’s defense, this was the erroneous label applied to the working capital fee.

Working Capital Fee

A fee authorized by section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, assessed to each new owner to be deposited into the working capital fund (or Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 fee was this type of fee, not one for resale disclosure.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute

We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?

For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.

1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm

A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.

The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.

Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.

The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.

2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form

Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.

The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.

3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War

How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.

Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.

In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”

As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.

4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase

What it really means to have to prove your case.

In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.

5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility

When every word you say (and write) is on the record.

A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.

There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”

The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.

Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details

This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.

The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brian Sopatyk (petitioner)
    Represented himself at the initial hearing; sought rehearing
  • Nathan Andrews (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Jill M. Kennedy (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Judy Sopatyk (petitioner's wife)
    Co-purchaser of the condominium unit,
  • Chance Peterson (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group

Respondent Side

  • Bradley R. Jardine (HOA attorney)
    Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston
  • Amy Telnes (property manager/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Association manager who testified,
  • Michael Cibellis (Association president/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Testified at the rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Contact for requests for rehearing
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    OAH
    Signed the Certification of Decision,

Other Participants

  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (administrative staff)
    Administrative staff for transmission/mailing,

Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:43 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:43 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:44 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:56:44 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The ALJ found that the $660 charge was a working capital fee authorized by the CC&Rs and was not subject to the statutory fee cap for disclosure documents.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in dispute was deemed a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a resale disclosure fee capped by A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum transfer/disclosure fee

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 transfer fee, exceeding the $400 statutory maximum for disclosure documents. The Association argued the $660 was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, which had been mislabeled.

Orders: The petition was dismissed. Petitioner's request for orders requiring compliance, refunds, and civil penalties was denied. The Association was deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory limit, mislabeled fee, ARS 33-1260
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:50 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:51 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:51 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:00:52 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

——————————————————————————–

Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

——————————————————————————–

Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

——————————————————————————–

Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatyk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The ALJ decision, certified as the final administrative decision, dismissed the Petitioner's claim after rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The challenged $660 fee was determined to be a permissible working capital contribution under the CC&Rs, not a fee restricted by the statutory cap on resale disclosure services.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof; the fee in question was determined to be a working capital fee/assessment governed by the CC&Rs and ARS § 33-1242(A)(2), and not subject to the limitation set forth in ARS § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged excessive fee collection for resale disclosure/transfer services

Petitioner alleged the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging a $660 fee, which he argued exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure/transfer services. The Association argued the $660 fee was a working capital contribution mandated by CC&R section 8.13 and was mislabeled, and therefore not subject to the statutory limitations of § 33-1260.

Orders: Brian D. Sopatyk’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fee dispute, Working capital fee, Transfer fee, Resale disclosure, Statutory interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:41:29 (67.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:41:30 (154.0 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 571793.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (96.8 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 580965.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (61.2 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593042.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:30:59 (100.9 KB)

17F-H1716004-REL-RHG Decision – 593045.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:00 (59.2 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Briefing: Sopatyk v. Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and outcomes of an administrative legal case brought by petitioner Brian Sopatyk against The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. The core of the dispute was Mr. Sopatyk’s allegation that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660 upon the sale of a condominium unit, in violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at an aggregate of $400.

Following an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition on both occasions. The central finding was that the petitioner failed to prove a statutory violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 charge was not a resale disclosure fee governed by A.R.S. § 33-1260, but rather a “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association admitted that this fee had been historically mislabeled as a “transfer fee,” an error it had since identified and corrected. The actual fee charged for resale disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “statement fee.” The ALJ’s decision from the rehearing was certified as the final administrative decision in the matter on August 10, 2017.

Case Overview

Case Number

17F-H1716004-REL (Initial Hearing)
17F-H1716004-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Jurisdiction

State of Arizona, Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Core Allegation

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits fees for resale disclosure services to a maximum of $400.

Final Outcome

Petition Dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a disclosure statement for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, showing a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

May 18, 2016

Prompted by Mr. Sopatyk, the Association’s Board discusses the fee structure. It concludes the $660 fee is a mislabeled “working capital fee” and not a statutory violation.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging the violation.

November 14, 2016

The initial administrative hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate adopts the ALJ’s recommendation, issuing a Final Order to dismiss the petition.

Post-Dec. 2016

Mr. Sopatyk requests a rehearing of the matter.

June 9, 2017

The rehearing is conducted, again before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, once again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 10, 2017

With no modifying action from the Department of Real Estate, the ALJ’s June 26 decision is certified as the final administrative decision.

Core Dispute Analysis

The case centered on the interpretation and classification of two fees charged by the Association during the sale of Mr. Sopatyk’s condominium unit.

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Allegation of Violation: Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association charged a “transfer fee” of $660, which directly contravened the $400 statutory maximum established by A.R.S. § 33-1260 for services related to resale disclosure.

Evidence Presented: The petitioner submitted a March 2, 2015 disclosure form from the Association listing both a “660transferfee”anda”30 statement fee.” A HUD-1 disclosure statement for the purchase was also entered, showing the $660 “Transfer Fee” was split, with $330 paid from the buyer’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the seller’s funds.

Contradictory Testimony: The ALJ noted a discrepancy in the petitioner’s statements. The sworn petition stated the $660 fee was split between him and the seller, while his testimony at the rehearing claimed he “had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price.” The ALJ decision stated, “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Requested Remedies: Mr. Sopatyk requested that the Association be ordered to comply with the statute, that refunds be paid to those who paid fees in excess of the statutory maximum, and that a civil penalty be imposed against the Association.

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc.)

Distinction Between Fees: The Association’s central argument was that two separate and legally distinct fees were assessed:

1. A $30 Resale Statement Fee: This was the charge for preparing documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260 and was well within the $400 limit.

2. A $660 Working Capital Fee: This fee was authorized under a separate provision, Section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, which mandates an assessment from each new owner equal to two monthly installments to fund the Association’s working capital (reserve) fund.

“Mislabeled” Fee: The Association acknowledged that the $660 working capital fee was incorrectly labeled as a “transfer fee.” Association Manager Amy Telnes testified that she received erroneous information from the prior manager and had been using the wrong label.

Board Action and Corrective Measures: The minutes from the May 18, 2016 Board meeting show that the Board, after reviewing a legal opinion, concluded the issue was one of “labeling, not violating the statute.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected into the Reserve Account. To prevent future confusion, the Board also voted to assess a single $400 transfer fee on all future transactions, with no other fees.

Fund Allocation: Ms. Telnes testified that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, consistent with its purpose as a working capital contribution, while the $30 fee was the charge pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260(C).

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings

ALJ Thomas Shedden presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing, reaching the same conclusion in both instances.

Key Rulings and Legal Reasoning

Burden of Proof: The ALJ established that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the burden of proving the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Core Finding: The evidence demonstrated that the Association charged two distinct fees. The $30 fee was for document preparation under A.R.S. § 33-1260, while the $660 fee was a working capital assessment authorized by CC&R Section 8.13. The ALJ concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1260 was not applicable to the $660 fee.

Conclusion on Violation: Based on the evidence, including the testimony of the Association manager and the board meeting minutes, the ALJ found that the $660 fee was mislabeled but was not collected for services related to resale disclosure. Therefore, Mr. Sopatyk did not meet his burden to show that the Association violated the statute.

Rejection of Harm-Based Argument: The ALJ did not accept the Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Mr. Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400. The judge clarified that A.R.S. § 33-2199.01 “does not require this type of particularized harm, but rather applies to all statutory violations.”

Dismissal of Petition: In both the November 29, 2016 decision and the June 26, 2017 decision, the order was to dismiss Mr. Sopatyk’s petition and deem the Association the prevailing party.

Final Disposition and Legal Status

The decision issued by ALJ Shedden on June 26, 2017, was transmitted to the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The Department had until August 1, 2017, to accept, reject, or modify the decision. As no action was taken by the deadline, the Office of Administrative Hearings issued a Certification of Decision of Administrative Law Judge on August 10, 2017. This certification established the ALJ’s decision as the final administrative decision of the Department of Real Estate in the matter.

Key Legal Citations and Definitions

A.R.S. § 33-1260 (Resale of Units; Information Required): This Arizona statute governs the information a condominium association must provide to a prospective purchaser. It explicitly limits the fees an association can charge for these services:

CC&R Section 8.13 (Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund): This section of The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association’s governing documents provides the authority to collect a fee from new owners for a different purpose:

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof required for the petitioner to prevail, defined in the legal decisions as:






Study Guide – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.

1. Identify the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and state the core legal violation the petitioner alleged.

2. What specific fees were charged during the petitioner’s condominium purchase that became the central point of the dispute?

3. According to the Association, what was the true nature of the $660 fee, and how did it explain the “transfer fee” label on the disclosure documents?

4. What role did Amy Telnes, the Association manager, play in explaining the history of the disputed fee?

5. What actions did the Association’s Board take during its meeting on May 18, 2016, to address the petitioner’s concerns and correct its internal procedures?

6. Who held the burden of proof in this matter, and what was the legal standard required to meet that burden?

7. What was the official outcome of the initial administrative hearing held on November 14, 2016?

8. Why was a re-hearing conducted, and what was the final outcome of that hearing on June 9, 2017?

9. According to the re-hearing decision, there was a significant contradiction between the petitioner’s sworn petition and his later testimony. What was this contradiction?

10. What was the legal basis, according to the Association’s CC&Rs, for collecting the $660 working capital fee?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner was Brian Sopatyk, and the respondent was The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. Mr. Sopatyk alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 by charging a transfer fee in excess of the statutory maximum of $400.

2. The disputed fees were a $660 “transfer fee,” which was split between the buyer (Mr. Sopatyk) and the seller, and a separate $30 “statement fee” or “Resale Statement Fee.” The petitioner’s claim focused on the $660 fee being above the legal limit for resale disclosure services.

3. The Association argued the $660 fee was not a transfer fee for disclosure services but was a “working capital fee” authorized by its CC&Rs. It explained that the fee had been mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to an error passed down from a previous property manager.

4. Amy Telnes testified that when she became the Association manager, she was incorrectly told the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She further testified that the $660 was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund, and the actual fee charged for disclosure under the statute was the separate $30 statement fee.

5. At the May 18, 2016, meeting, the Board concluded it was not in violation of the law but that its fee labeling was confusing. The Board directed Amy Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all mislabeled fees into the Reserve Account and voted to assess a single, correctly labeled $400 transfer fee on all future transactions.

6. The petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

7. Following the initial hearing, Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden found that Mr. Sopatyk had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute. The judge ordered that Mr. Sopatyk’s petition be dismissed.

8. A re-hearing was conducted after Mr. Sopatyk requested one following the initial decision. The final outcome of the June 9, 2017, re-hearing was the same as the first: the Administrative Law Judge found the petitioner did not meet his burden of proof and ordered the petition to be dismissed.

9. In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated that the $660 transfer fee was split between him and the seller. However, during his testimony at the re-hearing, he stated that he had in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.

10. The legal basis was Section 8.13 of the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section, titled “Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund,” called for an assessment from each new owner of two monthly installments of the annual fee to be deposited into the working capital fund.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more synthesized understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each prompt, incorporating specific facts, legal arguments, and procedural details from the source documents.

1. Trace the complete timeline of the case, beginning with the filing of the petition. Include key dates of filings, hearings, decisions, and final certifications, and describe the significance of each event in the legal process.

2. Analyze the central legal argument of the Respondent, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association. Explain how the distinction between a “transfer fee” under ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260 and a “working capital fee” under the Association’s CC&Rs was crucial to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain why the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, failed to meet this standard of proof in both the initial hearing and the re-hearing, citing specific evidence presented by the Association.

4. Evaluate the importance of the Association’s Board Meeting Minutes from May 18, 2016, as a piece of evidence. Detail the specific findings and resolutions from that meeting and explain how they were used to build the Association’s defense.

5. Examine the roles of the key individuals and entities in this administrative action. Describe the functions and contributions of Brian Sopatyk (Petitioner), Amy Telnes (Association Manager), Michael Cibellis (Association President), Thomas Shedden (Administrative Law Judge), and the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

The Arizona statute that requires a condominium association to provide certain disclosure documents to a prospective purchaser. It also limits the fee an association can charge for the preparation of these documents to an aggregate of four hundred dollars.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the petitioner, Brian Sopatyk, bore the burden of proof.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. In this case, section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs authorized the collection of a fee from new owners for a working capital fund.

Final Administrative Decision

The ultimate, legally binding decision in the administrative matter. In this case, the Administrative Law Judge’s decision became the final administrative decision after the Department of Real Estate did not act to accept, reject, or modify it within the statutory time limit.

HUD-1 Disclosure Statement

A document used in the petitioner’s property purchase that itemized all charges imposed upon a borrower and seller for a real estate transaction. It was used as evidence to show how the $660 “Transfer Fee” and $30 “Resale Statement Fee” were assessed and paid.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Brian Sopatyk was the petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence… that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Reserve Fund

An account maintained by the Condominium Association. The Association referred to its “working capital fund” as the Reserve Fund, into which the disputed $660 fees were deposited.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. was the respondent.

Statement Fee / Resale Statement Fee

A $30 fee charged by the Association for the preparation of disclosure documents. The Association argued this was the fee governed by ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260, which was compliant with the $400 statutory cap.

Transfer Fee

In the context of the petitioner’s allegation, a fee charged for resale disclosure services, limited to $400 by statute. In the context of the Association’s defense, this was the erroneous label applied to the working capital fee.

Working Capital Fee

A fee authorized by section 8.13 of the Association’s CC&Rs, assessed to each new owner to be deposited into the working capital fund (or Reserve Fund). The Association successfully argued that the disputed $660 fee was this type of fee, not one for resale disclosure.






Blog Post – 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG


How a $660 Fee Sparked a Legal Showdown: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Homeowner vs. HOA Dispute

We sign, we initial, we pay—assuming every line item on our closing documents is gospel. When buying a home in a condominium association, the stack of paperwork and list of fees can feel overwhelming. But what if one of those “standard” fees wasn’t standard at all?

For homeowner Brian Sopatyk, a single $660 charge from The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association wasn’t just a number; it was a thread he pulled that unraveled a surprising story of HOA governance, legal strategy, and the power of asking “why?” This post breaks down the five most impactful takeaways from a seemingly minor dispute that went all the way through a formal hearing and re-hearing.

1. A Simple Label Can Ignite a Legal Firestorm

A clerical error triggers a full-blown legal dispute.

The entire case hinged on a single, crucial mistake: the HOA mislabeled a “working capital fee” as a “transfer fee” on its disclosure forms.

Why was this one word so important? Because Mr. Sopatyk’s formal petition alleged that by charging a “$660 transfer fee,” the HOA violated Arizona statute 33-1260, which caps fees for resale disclosure services at a maximum of $400. On its face, the $660 charge looked like a clear violation of state law.

The Association’s manager, Amy Telnes, testified that when she took over her position, she was given erroneous information that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. As a result, the charge had been incorrectly labeled ever since. This simple administrative error was enough to trigger a formal petition to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, a full administrative hearing, and eventually, a re-hearing, proving how a small clerical mistake can escalate into a significant legal conflict.

2. In the Eyes of the Law, Substance Can Trump Form

Why the fee’s purpose mattered more than its name.

The Association’s core defense was that while the name of the fee was wrong, its purpose and authority were legitimate. The $660 charge, they argued, wasn’t for resale documents (the service capped by state law), but was a “working capital fee” authorized by an entirely different rule: the Association’s own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Specifically, Section 8.13 of the CC&Rs allowed for this assessment, with the funds designated for the Association’s reserve fund. This working capital fee, in contrast, was an assessment on the new owner as mandated by the CC&Rs to ensure the association’s financial health. The actual fee for the statutory disclosure documents was a separate, compliant $30 “Resale Statement Fee,” which was paid by the seller.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately agreed. The fee’s underlying purpose and the HOA’s authority to collect it (its substance) were deemed more important than its incorrect name on the form (its form). This is a crucial lesson for any homeowner challenging an HOA: it’s not enough to find a mistake on a form. You must be prepared to argue against the underlying authority and purpose of the action itself.

3. You Can Lose the Battle but Win the War

How a dismissed case led to a major policy victory.

Perhaps the most counter-intuitive outcome is that although Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed, his actions were the direct catalyst for a significant and positive policy change by the HOA.

In a summary of the Association’s May 18, 2016, Board Meeting, which was entered as evidence, the judge noted that the Board reviewed the very issue Mr. Sopatyk had raised. Under the pressure of his legal challenge, they came to a powerful conclusion about their own system, determining it was “confusing and unfair.”

As a direct result of this internal review prompted by the dispute, the Board voted to simplify its process. It resolved to assess a single, clear transfer fee of $400 on all future transactions, eliminating the other confusing fees. This proves that even an unsuccessful legal challenge can be a powerful tool, forcing an organization to confront and correct its own problematic practices for the benefit of all future members.

4. The ‘Burden of Proof’ Is More Than Just a Phrase

What it really means to have to prove your case.

In both the original decision and the re-hearing, the judge repeatedly stated that Mr. Sopatyk, as the petitioner, bore the “burden of proof.” This legal standard was critical to the outcome. It meant he had to prove his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence,” which the court documents defined as:

The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.

In this case, it meant Mr. Sopatyk’s job was to prove that the $660 fee was, more likely than not, an illegal charge for resale documents. The HOA’s defense—that it was a legally separate “working capital fee” that was simply mislabeled—created enough doubt that he couldn’t clear this hurdle.

5. A Small Contradiction Can Damage Credibility

When every word you say (and write) is on the record.

A fascinating detail appeared in the re-hearing decision, highlighting how every word matters in a legal proceeding.

There was a discrepancy in Mr. Sopatyk’s statements. His sworn petition, filed on August 9, 2016, stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660.”

The judge noted this contradiction directly in footnote 3 of the re-hearing decision, stating: “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.” While not the deciding factor, this kind of inconsistency can subtly erode a petitioner’s standing. Remember the “burden of proof” from Takeaway 4? It requires convincing a judge to “incline a fair and impartial mind” to your side. Contradictions, even small ones, make that inclination much harder to achieve.

Conclusion: The Devil Is in the Details

This case is the perfect microcosm of community association disputes. It began with a clerical error (form), was adjudicated on intent (substance), was lost on a technicality (the burden of proof), yet resulted in a victory for transparency. Mr. Sopatyk may not have won his case, but he won a better system for his neighbors.

The ultimate lesson? In an HOA, the most powerful tool isn’t always a lawsuit—sometimes, it’s a magnifying glass. It leaves us with a thought-provoking question: When is it worth challenging the system for clarity and fairness, even if the outcome isn’t a clear ‘win’ on paper?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Brian Sopatyk (petitioner)
    Represented himself at the initial hearing; sought rehearing
  • Nathan Andrews (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Jill M. Kennedy (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group
  • Judy Sopatyk (petitioner's wife)
    Co-purchaser of the condominium unit,
  • Chance Peterson (petitioner attorney)
    ASU Alumni Law Group

Respondent Side

  • Bradley R. Jardine (HOA attorney)
    Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston
  • Amy Telnes (property manager/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Association manager who testified,
  • Michael Cibellis (Association president/witness)
    The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc.
    Testified at the rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Abby Hansen (HOA Coordinator)
    Contact for requests for rehearing
  • Greg Hanchett (Interim Director)
    OAH
    Signed the Certification of Decision,

Other Participants

  • Rosella J. Rodriguez (administrative staff)
    Administrative staff for transmission/mailing,

Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:51:51 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

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Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

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Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

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Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.


Brian Sopatk vs. The Lakeshore Village Condo. Assoc., Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1716004-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-08-10
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brian Sopatyk Counsel Nathan Andrews, Esq. and Jill Kennedy, Esq.
Respondent The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association, Inc. Counsel Bradley R. Jardine, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1260. The contested $660 fee was determined to be a working capital contribution authorized by the Association's CC&Rs (section 8.13), which is distinct from the resale disclosure fees limited by statute.

Why this result: The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to show a statutory violation because the fee in question was a valid working capital fee collected under the CC&Rs, not an illegal transfer fee under A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory maximum fee for resale disclosure/transfer documents.

Petitioner alleged the Association charged a $660 transfer fee, plus a $30 statement fee, violating A.R.S. § 33-1260, which limits aggregate fees for resale disclosure and transfer services to $400. The ALJ found the $660 fee was a working capital fee authorized by CC&R section 8.13, not a statutory disclosure fee, despite being mislabeled by the Association.

Orders: Petitioner Brian D. Sopatyk's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fees, transfer fee, working capital fund, statutory compliance, burden of proof, condominium association, resale disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1260
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242(A)(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 1-243

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 531040.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:23 (67.9 KB)

17f-H1716004-REL Decision – 540004.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:24 (154.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17f-H1716004-REL


Briefing Document: Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Brian Sopatyk v. The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc. (Case No. 17F-H1716004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Brian Sopatyk’s allegation that the Respondent Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1260 by charging a $660 “transfer fee” upon the sale of a condominium unit, which exceeded the statutory maximum of $400 for resale disclosure services.

The Association’s defense centered on the argument that the $660 charge was not a disclosure fee but a separate “working capital fee” authorized by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association contended that this fee had been erroneously mislabeled as a “transfer fee” due to a clerical error inherited by its current manager. The actual statutory fee for disclosure documents, the Association argued, was a separate $30 charge paid by the seller.

After an initial hearing in November 2016 and a subsequent re-hearing in June 2017, the Administrative Law Judge consistently found that Mr. Sopatyk failed to prove the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence supported the Association’s claim of a mislabeled working capital fee. Consequently, Mr. Sopatyk’s petition was dismissed on both occasions, and the Association was deemed the prevailing party.

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Case Overview

Parties and Jurisdiction

Representation

Petitioner

Brian Sopatyk

On his own behalf (Initial Hearing); Nathan Andrews, Esq. & Jill Kennedy, Esq. (Re-Hearing)

Respondent

The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association, Inc.

Bradley R. Jardine, Esq. (Both Hearings)

Jurisdiction

Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Authority under A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11.

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, AZ

Core Allegation and Governing Statute

Allegation: Brian Sopatyk alleged that The Lakeshore Village Condominium Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260 by charging fees exceeding the statutory maximum for resale disclosure services. Specifically, a $660 fee labeled as a “transfer fee” was charged when he purchased his unit.

Petitioner’s Request: Mr. Sopatyk sought an order for the Association to comply with the statute, issue refunds to all who paid fees in excess of the maximum, and for a civil penalty to be imposed.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1260 stipulates that a condominium association “may charge the unit owner a fee of no more than an aggregate of four hundred dollars to compensate the association for the costs incurred in the preparation of a statement or other documents furnished… for purposes of resale disclosure, lien estoppel and any other services related to the transfer or use of the property.” The statute explicitly forbids charging any other fees for these services except as authorized.

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Chronology of Legal Proceedings

March 2, 2015

The Association issues a “Disclosure Form” for Mr. Sopatyk’s purchase, listing a $660 transfer fee and a $30 statement fee.

May 18, 2016

The Association’s Board of Directors meets to address Mr. Sopatyk’s claim. They conclude the $660 fee was a mislabeled working capital fee and direct corrective accounting.

August 9, 2016

Mr. Sopatyk files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

November 14, 2016

The initial hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

November 29, 2016

ALJ Shedden issues a decision dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

December 13, 2016

The ADRE Commissioner, Judy Lowe, adopts the ALJ’s decision, issuing a Final Order dismissing the case.

February 7, 2017

A Notice of Re-Hearing is issued after Mr. Sopatyk requests one.

June 9, 2017

A re-hearing is conducted before ALJ Thomas Shedden.

June 26, 2017

ALJ Shedden issues a new decision, again dismissing Mr. Sopatyk’s petition.

August 1, 2017

The deadline passes for the ADRE to accept, reject, or modify the ALJ’s re-hearing decision. No action is taken.

August 10, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings certifies the ALJ’s decision from the re-hearing as the final administrative decision in the matter.

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Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Brian Sopatyk)

Primary Argument: The Association’s own documents, specifically the Disclosure Form and the HUD-1 settlement statement, explicitly labeled the $660 charge as a “Transfer Fee.” This amount is a prima facie violation of the $400 statutory cap in A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Evidence Presented:

March 2, 2015 Disclosure Form: Showed a required payment of a $660 “transfer fee” and a $30 “statement fee.”

HUD-1 Settlement Statement: Documented that the $660 Transfer Fee was paid to the Association, with $330 paid from the Borrower’s (Sopatyk’s) funds and $330 from the Seller’s funds. It also showed the Seller paid a separate $30 Resale Statement Fee.

Contradictory Testimony: In his sworn petition, Mr. Sopatyk stated the $660 fee was “split between the seller and the buyer.” However, during the re-hearing, he testified that he had “in fact paid the entire $660 as part of the negotiated price of the unit.” The ALJ noted this discrepancy, stating “either Mr. Sopatyk’s sworn statement or his testimony must be false.”

Respondent’s Position (The Lakeshore Village Condo. Association)

Primary Argument: The $660 fee was not for resale disclosure services but was a working capital fee authorized by the Association’s CC&Rs. The “transfer fee” label was a historical clerical error that the Board had since identified and corrected.

Evidence and Testimony:

CC&R Section 8.13 (“Transfer Fee and Working Capital Fund”): This provision authorizes the Association to assess each new owner a fee of “at least twice the average monthly assessment” to be deposited into the working capital fund (referred to as the Reserve Fund). The monthly assessment was $328.83, making the $660 fee consistent with this rule.

Testimony of Amy Telnes (Association Manager): Ms. Telnes testified that when she became manager, she was incorrectly informed that the working capital fee was the transfer fee. She affirmed that the $660 fee was deposited into the Association’s reserve fund and that the separate $30 fee was the one charged pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1260.

May 18, 2016 Board Meeting Minutes: These minutes, entered into evidence, documented the Board’s conclusion that it was collecting a working capital contribution but “erroneously calling it a transfer fee.” The Board directed Ms. Telnes to perform an accounting and transfer all such fees collected after October 1, 2013, to the Reserve Account. The minutes also show the Board voted to change its fee structure moving forward to a single $400 fee to avoid future confusion.

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Judicial Findings and Final Disposition

Standard and Burden of Proof

Across both hearings, the ALJ established that the standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence with “the most convincing force” that is “sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.” The burden of proof rested entirely on the petitioner, Mr. Sopatyk, to demonstrate that a violation had occurred.

Initial Hearing Decision (November 29, 2016)

Findings of Fact: The ALJ found that the Association was charging a $660 working capital fee in accordance with its CC&Rs but had been mislabeling it. It was also charging a separate $30 document preparation fee.

Conclusion of Law: Mr. Sopatyk did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1260.

Order: The petition was dismissed, and the decision was adopted as final by the ADRE Commissioner on December 13, 2016.

Re-Hearing Decision (June 26, 2017)

Findings of Fact: The re-hearing produced more detailed findings but led to the same conclusion. The ALJ found that the Association had authority under its CC&Rs to collect the $660 working capital fee and that the statutory disclosure statute did not apply to this charge. The fee applicable to the statute was the $30 charge paid by the seller.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ reiterated that Mr. Sopatyk failed to meet his burden of proof. The Association’s argument that the claim should fail because Sopatyk did not personally pay over $400 was deemed “not persuasive,” as the statute applies to all violations regardless of particularized harm.

Order: The petition was again ordered to be dismissed.

Final Administrative Disposition

The ADRE took no action to modify or reject the ALJ’s re-hearing decision by the statutory deadline of August 1, 2017. As a result, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the June 26, 2017 decision as the final administrative decision on August 10, 2017, concluding the matter in favor of the Respondent Association.