Paul L Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association

Posted on January 28, 2020 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	20F-H2019014-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2020-01-27
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Paul L Moffett	Counsel	Richard M. Rollman
Respondent	Vistoso Community Association	Counsel	Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.

Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.

Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199
CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:33 (48.3 KB)

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:33 (109.1 KB)

Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019014-REL

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

Executive Summary

On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.

The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.

The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.

Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.

Detail

Information

Case Name

Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association

Case Number

20F-H2019014-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petition Filed

On or about September 25, 2019

Hearing Date

December 16, 2019

Decision & Order Date

January 27, 2020

Petitioner

Paul L. Moffett

Petitioner’s Counsel

Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.

Respondent

Vistoso Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC

The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments

Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.

The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:

• Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.

• Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.

Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.

Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions

The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.

Key Governing Document Provisions

• Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.

Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)

The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:

• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.

• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.

• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.

Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)

The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:

• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.

• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.

• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.

Established Findings of Fact

The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.

• March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.

• March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

• August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.

• October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

• January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.

• March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.

• Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Legal Interpretation

The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.

The decision states:

“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”

The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.

Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy

The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”

Final Order

Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

• Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide – 20F-H2019014-REL

Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?

3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?

5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?

6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?

8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.

2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.

3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.

4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.

6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.

8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.

9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.

2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?

4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.

5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.

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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1

The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3

The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Declarant

The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.

Developer Owner

An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.

Blog Post – 20F-H2019014-REL

The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head

For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.

This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.

The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote

The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.

The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:

• Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.

• Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.

On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.

The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years

The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.

• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.

• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.

The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole

This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.

In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.

The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:

Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.

The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote

Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.

The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).

While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.

This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.

Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details

This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.

The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Paul L Moffett (petitioner)
Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
Richard M. Rollman (petitioner attorney)
Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
Alyssa Leverette (legal staff)
Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list

Respondent Side

Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
Kimberly Rubly (witness)
Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
Sean K. Moynihan (respondent attorney)
CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
Recipient of Order

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of Order
AHansen (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of Order
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of Order
DGardner (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of Order
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of Order

Other Participants

Sarah Nelson (board member (elected))
Vistoso Community Association
Recipient of votes in disputed election
Patrick Straney (board member (elected))
Vistoso Community Association
Recipient of votes in disputed election
Dennis Ottley (board member (elected))
Vistoso Community Association
Recipient of votes in disputed election

Joan A. Tober, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

Posted on January 16, 2020 by [email protected]

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1918042-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge	Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$0.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Joan A. Tober	Counsel	—
Respondent	Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association	Counsel	Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA) was the prevailing party. The ALJ found that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B) because the specific attorney letter requested was privileged and could be withheld,, and Petitioner's request for additional 'background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified,.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) as the HOA lawfully withheld privileged documents under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B) and was not required to guess what records were requested due to the vague nature of the demand for 'any and all documentation'.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of requirement to provide association records.

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide all requested documentation, specifically an attorney letter concerning the North Ridge wall, and failed to comply with the 10-business day response period required for record requests.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party on rehearing and Petitioner's appeal was dismissed. The HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B). The requested attorney letter was privileged communication and could be withheld.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – 764197.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:01 (187.4 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/714863.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:51:35 (51.7 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/725808.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:51:36 (89.7 KB)

Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG

Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”

The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.

The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.

Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.

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Case Overview

This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Name

Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1918042-REL

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Kay A. Abramsohn

Core Issue

Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.

Initial Hearing Date

June 5, 2019

Initial Decision Date

July 29, 2019

Rehearing Date

December 11, 2019

Final Decision Date

January 15, 2020

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Key Parties and Individuals

• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober

◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.

◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.

◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.

◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.

◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.

• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)

◦ The governing body for the planned community.

◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn

◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Chronology of the Dispute

Nov 20, 2018

At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.

Nov 26, 2018

Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.

Nov 27, 2018

Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.

Nov 29, 2018

At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

Nov 29, 2018

At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.

Dec 13, 2018

Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”

Dec 26, 2018

Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jan 15-16, 2019

The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.

June 5, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

July 29, 2019

Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.

Aug 5, 2019

Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”

Aug 23, 2019

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

Dec 11, 2019

The rehearing is conducted.

Jan 15, 2020

Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.

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Core Dispute and Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)

1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”

2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.

3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)

1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.

4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.

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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence

The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.

• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”

• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.

• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:

◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.

◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”

◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”

◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.

• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.

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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law

Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)

• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.

• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”

• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.

Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)

• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.

• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”

• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”

• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”

• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”

• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.

Study Guide – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG

Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?

2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?

3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?

6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?

7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?

8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?

9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.

10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?

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Answer Key

1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.

4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.

6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.

8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.

9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.

10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?

5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.

Attorney-Client Privilege

A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.

Executive Session

A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.

Petition

The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

The Letter

The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.

Blog Post – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG

She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.

Introduction: The Fight for Information

Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.

This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.

1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.

The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.

The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.

2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.

Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.

After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”

In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:

An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.

The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.

3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.

What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.

But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:

Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.

Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.

Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort

The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.

This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Joan A. Tober (petitioner)
Former Board member; current Finance Committee member

Respondent Side

Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Mr. Mastrosimone (Board President)
Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
Testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
c. serrano (Clerk)
Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
LDettorre (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
AHansen (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
djones (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
DGardner (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal
ncano (ADRE staff)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Addressed in transmittal

Marc D Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.

Posted on September 3, 2019 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1919063-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-09-03
Administrative Law Judge	Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome	no
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Marc D. Archer	Counsel	—
Respondent	PMPE Community Association, Inc.	Counsel	Nichols C. Hogami

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1817(3)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Respondent (HOA) and dismissed the petition. The HOA's rejection of the flat roof design was found to be reasonable and consistent with the architectural rules requiring pitched roofs to predominate and designs to be harmonious with surrounding structures.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the statute; the evidence showed the HOA's decision was based on valid architectural rules.

Key Issues & Findings

Unreasonable withholding of architectural approval

Petitioner sought approval for a garage addition with a flat roof. The Board denied final approval because the design was not harmonious with surrounding structures (pitched roofs) and did not meet the exception for hidden flat roofs.

Orders: The petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1817(3)
A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Decision Documents

19F-H1919063-REL Decision – 733775.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:16:55 (86.0 KB)

**Case Summary: Archer v. PMPE Community Association, Inc.**
**Case No.** 19F-H1919063-REL
**Forum:** Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)
**Date of Decision:** September 3, 2019

**Background and Facts**
Petitioner Marc D. Archer, a member of the PMPE Community Association in Glendale, Arizona, submitted plans in September 2017 to construct a garage addition. Although the Board initially issued preliminary approval, it withheld final approval upon learning that Archer intended to build a flat roof enclosed on all sides that would exceed the height of the adjoining 9-foot wall.

Archer's existing garage featured an arched (pitched) roof, but he wished to avoid a pitched roof on the addition. The Association Board notified Archer that he could construct a flat roof only if it was lower than the adjacent wall—and thus not "Visible From Neighboring Property"—pursuant to Article 1.34 of the community’s CC&Rs.

**Legal Issue**
Archer filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE), alleging that the Association violated **A.R.S. § 33-1817(3)** by unreasonably withholding approval of his construction plans. The matter was referred for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the Board's denial was unreasonable,.

**Key Arguments**
* **Petitioner (Archer):** Archer argued that his design was harmonious with surrounding structures, noting that another side of his home featured a flat-top patio. He further alleged that the Association’s enforcement was arbitrary and discriminatory, claiming they had allowed other non-harmonious patios and failed to enforce rules against a neighbor who kept a kitchen countertop in their front yard for a year,.
* **Respondent (Association):** The Association denied the allegations of arbitrary enforcement. They argued that the denial was based on Section 4.4 of the Architectural Rules, which states that "pitched roofs predominate" as they are an important part of the visual environment. They maintained that requiring a pitched roof was reasonable to ensure the addition remained harmonious with Archer's existing pitched-roof garage.

**Findings and Conclusions of Law**
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson presided over the hearing. The decision was based on the following legal principles and findings:
* **Burden of Proof:** The burden was on the Petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated state law.
* **Contractual Obligations:** CC&Rs are treated as a contract between the parties, and their unambiguous terms must be enforced to effectuate the parties' intent.
* **Reasonableness:** While an association cannot unreasonably withhold approval, the evidence showed that PMPE's Architectural Rules explicitly encourage pitched roofs. The ALJ found that Archer’s plan for a visible flat roof was not harmonious with the surrounding structures, specifically his own existing garage.

The Judge determined that the Board reasonably concluded the plans were inconsistent with the CC&Rs and Architectural Rules. Consequently, Archer failed to prove that the Association acted unreasonably.

**Final Outcome**
The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the petition be **dismissed**. The Respondent, PMPE Community Association, Inc., was deemed the prevailing party.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Marc D. Archer (petitioner)
PMPE Community Association, Inc. (Member)
Appeared on behalf of himself; testified

Respondent Side

Nichols C. Hogami (respondent attorney)
Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Keith Scott Kauffman (witness)
PMPE Board of Directors
Member of the PMPE Board of Directors; testified

Neutral Parties

Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate
Recipient of transmitted order

Vicky Glover v. Foothills Community Association

Posted on May 30, 2019 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1919046-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-05-30
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Vicky Glover	Counsel	—
Respondent	Foothills Community Association	Counsel	B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 regarding both the DRC's restriction on speaking during specific deliberations and the use of email communications for non-regularly scheduled committee business.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically because the DRC's restrictions on speaking were deemed reasonable, and email communications were not considered 'regularly scheduled committee meetings' requiring public access.

Key Issues & Findings

Open Meetings and Member Right to Speak (DRC and Email Meetings)

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by denying her the ability to speak at DRC meetings on other members’ requests, and by conducting deliberations and making decisions via email outside of regularly scheduled meetings.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Design Review Committee, Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Email Meetings, A.R.S. 33-1804

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919046-REL Decision – 712028.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:53 (94.0 KB)

Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919046-REL

Briefing Document: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (Case No. 19F-H1919046-REL)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Vicky Glover versus the Foothills Community Association (FCA), where the petitioner’s claims were denied. The petitioner alleged that the FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) violated Arizona’s open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804) on two fronts: first, by conducting unannounced “email meetings” to vote on non-emergency matters, and second, by preventing members from speaking at appropriate times during regularly scheduled DRC meetings.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Tammy L. Eigenheer, concluded that the petitioner failed to prove any statutory violation. The decision rested on a strict textual interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804. Regarding speaking rights, the ALJ determined that while members have a right to speak at an “appropriate time” in committee meetings, the more specific right to speak on an agenda item before a formal vote applies exclusively to Board of Directors meetings, not committee meetings. The judge found it was reasonable for the DRC to rule that a member speaking on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”

Concerning the email communications, the ALJ ruled that they do not constitute “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as defined by the statute. Because the email discussions and decisions did not occur at a set weekly, monthly, or quarterly time, they are not subject to the open meeting requirements. The general state policy favoring open meetings was found to be subordinate to the specific statutory language. The petition was therefore denied in its entirety.

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Case Overview

This case involved a dispute between a homeowner and a homeowners association regarding the application of Arizona’s open meeting laws to a committee of the association.

Name / Entity

Representation / Title

Petitioner

Vicky Glover

Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent

Foothills Community Association (FCA)

B. Austin Baillio (Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.)

Adjudicator

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Administrative Law Judge

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings

Phoenix, Arizona

Case Timeline

• December 13, 2018 & January 9, 2019: Petitioner attends and records DRC meetings where the alleged violations occurred.

• January 23, 2019: Vicky Glover files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

• January 28, 2019: The Department issues a notice to the FCA regarding the petition.

• May 10, 2019: An administrative hearing is held.

• May 30, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.

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Petitioner’s Allegations

The petitioner, Vicky Glover, alleged that the Foothills Community Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804 in two specific ways:

1. Improper Email Meetings: The FCA’s Design Review Committee (DRC) held unannounced meetings via email to vote on non-emergency matters, which should have been handled in open, public meetings.

2. Denial of Speaking Rights: The DRC refused to allow community members, including the petitioner, to speak at an appropriate time during its regularly scheduled meetings, specifically when she wished to speak on other members’ pending requests.

Key Factual Findings

The facts underlying the petition were not in dispute by the parties during the hearing. The key findings of fact established were:

• Organizational Structure:

◦ The FCA Board of Directors is comprised of seven members and meets on the fourth Wednesday of the month at 6:00 p.m.

◦ The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, is comprised of five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets on the second Wednesday of the month at 2:00 p.m.

• Events at DRC Meetings:

◦ On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Vicky Glover attended and recorded DRC meetings.

◦ During these meetings, she was not permitted to speak on issues being discussed related to other members’ pending requests.

• Use of Email by the DRC:

◦ During meetings, DRC members mentioned that additional information for certain requests would be shared via email after the meeting.

◦ Based on this emailed information, DRC members would approve or deny the request.

◦ Decisions made via email between meetings were formally “ratified” at the subsequent DRC meeting.

◦ FCA Manager Pat Wontor testified, denying that the DRC took initial action via email, asserting instead that emails were only used to gather additional information on matters that had already been discussed in an open meeting.

• DRC Policies: A request submitted to the DRC is deemed approved if it is not denied within 60 days.

——————————————————————————–

Legal Analysis and Judge’s Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on a strict interpretation of the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The petitioner bore the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence and failed to do so on both counts.

I. Member Speaking Rights at Committee Meetings

The judge analyzed the petitioner’s claim that she was wrongfully denied the right to speak at DRC meetings.

• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) states that at “any regularly scheduled committee meetings… all members… shall be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time during the deliberations and proceedings.”

• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge found a critical distinction within the statute’s text. A later clause specifies that “the board… shall permit a member… to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action on that item.”

• Conclusion: The judge ruled that this specific right to speak on an item before a vote applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors, not to committee meetings. For committee meetings, the standard is the more general “appropriate time.” The ALJ concluded it was reasonable for the DRC to determine that having one member speak on another member’s private application was not an “appropriate time.” Therefore, the DRC’s refusal to allow the petitioner to speak did not violate the statute.

II. Email Deliberations and “Meetings”

The judge next addressed the claim that email communications constituted illegal, non-public meetings.

• Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) mandates that open meeting rules apply to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.”

• ALJ’s Interpretation: The judge concluded that the email discussions, deliberations, and decisions among DRC members did not meet the definition of “regularly scheduled.” These communications did not occur at a set time on a recurring basis (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly). While they could be considered a form of meeting, they were not regularly scheduled ones.

• Effect of State Policy: The judge acknowledged the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which expresses a legislative preference for open meetings. However, the judge ruled that this general policy “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

• Conclusion: Because the email communications were not regularly scheduled, they did not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, and no violation occurred.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal analysis, the Administrative Law Judge found that the petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

• Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.”

• Next Steps: The decision is binding on the parties. A party may file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order, pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04 and § 41-1092.09.

Study Guide – 19F-H1919046-REL

Study Guide: Glover v. Foothills Community Association (No. 19F-H1919046-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Vicky Glover (Petitioner) and the Foothills Community Association (Respondent). It includes a quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms as defined and used within the source document.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions based on the provided legal decision. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two specific violations of state statutes that the Petitioner alleged?

3. Describe the composition and meeting schedules of the Board of Directors and the Design Review Committee (DRC).

4. What specific action did the Petitioner take during the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019?

5. According to the decision, what was the DRC’s practice regarding decisions made via email between meetings?

6. What is the standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how does the decision define it?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge interpret the statutory phrase “an appropriate time” for a member to speak during a committee meeting?

8. Why did the Judge conclude that the DRC’s email communications did not violate the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804?

9. What was the final ruling, or Order, issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

10. What recourse did the parties have if they disagreed with the Judge’s order?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Vicky Glover, the Petitioner who filed the complaint, and the Foothills Community Association (FCA), the Respondent homeowners association. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer in the Office of Administrative Hearings.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated state statutes by holding unannounced email meetings to vote on non-emergency matters. She also alleged that the Respondent would not allow community members to speak at appropriate times during Design Review Committee (DRC) meetings.

3. The Board of Directors has seven members and meets at 6:00 p.m. on the fourth Wednesday of the month. The Design Review Committee (DRC) is appointed by the Board, has five members (two of whom are also on the Board), and meets at 2:00 p.m. on the second Wednesday of the month.

4. During the DRC meetings on December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, the Petitioner attended and recorded the proceedings. She was not allowed to speak on other members’ pending requests during these meetings.

5. The DRC would gather additional information via email after a meeting and members would then approve or deny the request via email. Any decisions made via email between DRC meetings were then “ratified” at the next formal DRC meeting.

6. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposing evidence, showing the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.

7. The Judge determined that the statute does not define what constitutes “an appropriate time” to speak at a committee meeting. Therefore, it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that the deliberation regarding a different member’s request was not an appropriate time for the Petitioner to speak.

8. The Judge concluded that email communications are not “regularly scheduled committee meetings” because they do not occur at a set time on a weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. Since A.R.S. § 33-1804 only requires regularly scheduled committee meetings to be open, the email discussions were not a violation.

9. The final Order was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner did not establish any violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

10. Pursuant to A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B), the order is binding unless a rehearing is granted. A request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer-form essay responses to encourage a deeper synthesis of the case details and legal reasoning. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s statutory construction of A.R.S. § 33-1804. How does the judge distinguish between the open meeting requirements for Board of Directors meetings versus committee meetings, and what role does the “plain language” of the statute play in this interpretation?

2. Discuss the two central allegations made by Vicky Glover. For each allegation, detail the undisputed facts of the events and explain the specific legal reasoning the judge used to conclude that no statutory violation occurred.

3. Examine the conflict between the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)) and the specific statutory language governing committee meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)). How did the judge resolve this apparent conflict in her final decision?

4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the operational procedures of the Design Review Committee, including its use of email for decision-making and subsequent ratification. How did these procedures become central to the legal dispute?

5. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the standard of “preponderance of the evidence” shape the proceedings, and why was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the Petitioner “did not establish” a violation critical to the final order?

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition from Source Context

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer, the judge who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The Arizona Revised Statute that the Petitioner alleged was violated. It governs open meetings for planned communities, including member associations, boards of directors, and regularly scheduled committees.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed her petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the Foothills Community Association, comprised of seven members. It appoints the Design Review Committee.

Design Review Committee (DRC)

A five-member committee appointed by the Board of Directors. Two of its members are also on the Board. The DRC’s meetings were the subject of the Petitioner’s complaint.

Foothills Community Association (FCA)

The Respondent in the case. An association of homeowners located in Phoenix, Arizona.

Petitioner

Vicky Glover, who filed a petition on January 23, 2019, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Foothills Community Association.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof required of the Petitioner. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Ratified

The term used to describe the process where decisions made by the DRC via email between meetings were formally approved at the next DRC meeting.

Regularly scheduled committee meetings

The specific type of meeting subject to the open meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that email communications do not meet this definition as they do not occur at a set time.

Respondent

The Foothills Community Association (FCA), against which the petition was filed. Represented in the hearing by B. Austin Baillio.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting a statute. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, first by looking at the plain text of the statute.

Blog Post – 19F-H1919046-REL

3 Shocking Loopholes in HOA ‘Open Meeting’ Laws This Homeowner Discovered the Hard Way

Introduction: The Illusion of Transparency

For anyone living in a homeowner’s association (HOA), there’s a fundamental expectation: the business of the community is conducted in the open. We assume that as members, we have a right to attend meetings, understand the decisions being made, and voice our opinions before our board takes action.

But a startling court decision from an Arizona Administrative Law Judge throws a wrench in that assumption. One homeowner’s legal challenge against her association didn’t just fail—it inadvertently created a roadmap for how HOAs can legally operate behind closed doors, affecting millions of residents in planned communities.

This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from this legal battle, revealing how the specific wording of the law can create major gaps in transparency and challenge everything you thought you knew about your rights as a homeowner.

1. Your Right to Speak is Weaker Than You Think—Especially in Committee Meetings

Most homeowners believe they have a protected right to speak on any agenda item at any official HOA meeting. The case of petitioner Vicky Glover shows this is a dangerous assumption.

On December 13, 2018, and January 9, 2019, Ms. Glover attended meetings of her community’s Design Review Committee (DRC) and was not permitted to speak about other members’ pending architectural requests. She argued this violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities (A.R.S. § 33-1804).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), however, pointed out a critical distinction in the law’s text. The statute explicitly guarantees a member the right “to speak once after the board has discussed a specific agenda item but before the board takes formal action.” This specific right, the ALJ concluded, applies only to meetings of the Board of Directors.

For committee meetings, the law sets a much vaguer standard, requiring only that members “be permitted to attend and speak at an appropriate time.” The ALJ found it was reasonable for the DRC to decide that having Ms. Glover speak on another member’s application was not an “appropriate time.”

This is a crucial distinction because committees—like architectural, design, or finance committees—often make the decisions that most directly impact homeowners’ property and daily lives. Yet, this ruling clarifies that the guaranteed right to be heard before a vote is taken is significantly weaker in those very forums.

2. “Email Meetings” Can Be a Legal Way to Sidestep Open Meeting Rules

The common understanding of open meeting laws is that they exist to prevent boards and committees from deliberating and making decisions in private. But what if the meeting doesn’t happen in a room, but in an email chain?

Ms. Glover’s second claim was that the DRC was conducting business and making decisions via email between its official meetings. Evidence showed that after a meeting, additional information would be shared with committee members who could then “approve or deny the request… via email.” The association’s manager, Pat Wontor, denied this, claiming emails were only used to gather information on matters already discussed in a meeting.

The ALJ’s conclusion on this matter was stunning and sidestepped the conflicting testimony entirely. The Arizona open meeting law in question only applies to “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” Because email exchanges do not occur at a set, scheduled time—like the second Wednesday of the month—the judge ruled they do not fall under the open meeting requirements of the statute, regardless of their content.

The implication of this loophole is profound. It allows a committee to conduct significant deliberation and decision-making entirely outside of public view. This practice can turn the open meeting into a hollow formality. A committee can present a “done deal” for public ratification, rendering the member’s right to observe and speak effectively meaningless. The public meeting becomes a theatrical rubber stamp for a decision already made in secret.

3. The “Spirit of the Law” Doesn’t Beat the Letter of the Law

Many laws contain a policy statement that outlines their overarching goal—the “spirit of the law.” Arizona’s statute on HOA meetings has an exceptionally strong one, stating that all meetings should be open and that the law should be interpreted to favor transparency. The text explicitly declares:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.” (from A.R.S. § 33-1804(F))

Ms. Glover and many homeowners would read this and assume it guarantees broad transparency. The ALJ, however, ruled that this powerful policy statement “does not override the specific provisions” of the law.

In other words, the literal, specific text—like the distinction between “board” and “committee” meetings, or the “regularly scheduled” requirement—takes precedence over the law’s general intent.

This is perhaps the most important lesson for all homeowners. Relying on the assumed purpose or “spirit” of a rule is not enough. In a legal dispute, the precise, technical wording is what matters most. It highlights the critical importance for homeowners to read and understand the exact text of state statutes and their own governing documents, because the loopholes are often found in the fine print.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Your Best Defense

While Vicky Glover lost her petition, her case provides an invaluable education for every member of a community association. It is a stark warning that transparency in an HOA is not a guaranteed principle but a legal standard with specific, and at times counter-intuitive, boundaries that can be exploited.

The loopholes her case exposed reveal a sobering reality: your right to speak is conditional, “meetings” can legally occur out of sight in an email chain, and the stated “spirit” of the law can be rendered toothless by its literal text. HOA governance is not guided by general principles of fairness, but by very specific legal language.

Given these loopholes, it’s worth asking: How many of the most important decisions in your community are happening in an inbox instead of the boardroom?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Vicky Glover (petitioner)

Respondent Side

B. Austin Baillio (respondent attorney)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Pat Wontor (manager)
Manager for DRC/Foothills Community Association

Neutral Parties

Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

Del Sol (staff/clerk)
Transmitting staff

Vicky Glover v. Foothills Community Association

Posted on May 30, 2019 by [email protected]

Case Summary

Case ID	19F-H1919046-REL
Agency	ADRE
Tribunal	OAH
Decision Date	2019-05-30
Administrative Law Judge	Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome	loss
Filing Fees Refunded	$500.00
Civil Penalties	$0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner	Vicky Glover	Counsel	—
Respondent	Foothills Community Association	Counsel	B. Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

Key Issues & Findings

Open Meetings and Member Right to Speak (DRC and Email Meetings)

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Design Review Committee, Open Meetings, Right to Speak, Email Meetings, A.R.S. 33-1804

Additional Citations:

A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919046-REL Decision – 712028.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:06 (94.0 KB)