A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809; CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited governing documents (CC&Rs/Rules) or state statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning street parking and contracting for vehicle booting/towing.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding violations of CC&Rs Amendments 1, 2, and 3, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. The ALJ found the July 2018 revised Rules, which banned parking, were controlling.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation regarding banning parking and use of towing/booting company.
Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly banned street parking and contracted with a towing/booting company, arguing this violated specific CC&R amendments, the Rules and Regulations, and A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809. He also claimed the 2018 revised Rules were invalid due to improper electronic notice instead of personal delivery or mail.
Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two
Executive Summary
This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.
Case Overview
Detail
Information
Case Name
William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two
Case Number
19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Petitioner
William P. Lee (Homeowner)
Respondent
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)
Hearing Date
April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)
Decision Date
April 22, 2019
Final Order
Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Presiding ALJ
Velva Moses-Thompson
Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments
William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:
• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:
◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).
◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).
◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).
• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.
◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.
◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.
• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”
Respondent’s Defense
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:
• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.
• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.
• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.
Analysis of Key Governing Documents
The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.
Document
Key Provision / Content
Relevance to Case
CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3
These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.
The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.
Bylaws, Article V, Section 1
“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”
The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.
Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8
“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.
This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions
The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.
Burden of Proof
The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Key Conclusions of Law
1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.
2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.
3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.
4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.
◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”
◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.
◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.
5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.
Final Order and Implications
Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.
• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”
• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918019-REL
Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.
Case Overview
This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.
Key Parties and Roles
Party/Role
Name / Entity
Description
Petitioner
William P. Lee
A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.
Respondent
Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two
The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.
Legal Counsel
Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.
Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.
Adjudicator
Velva Moses-Thompson
The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.
Timeline of Key Events
June 16, 1986
Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.
July 2, 1999
Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.
July 6, 2018
Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.
September 12, 2018
William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
December 13, 2018
The original hearing on the petition was conducted.
February 11, 2019
The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.
April 1, 2019
The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.
April 22, 2019
The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.
The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations
The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.
• Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).
• Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.
• Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.
• Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.
• Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.
• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.
• Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.
• No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.
• Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.
• No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.
Governing Documents and Legal Principles
• Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.
• Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.
• Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.
• Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”
• Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.
• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.
• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”
The Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:
1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.
2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.
3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.
4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.
5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.
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Quiz: Test Your Understanding
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.
1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?
2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?
3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?
4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?
5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?
6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?
7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?
8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?
9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?
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Answer Key
1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.
2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.
3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.
4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.
5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”
6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.
7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.
8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.
9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.
10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.
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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis
The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.
2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?
3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.
4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?
5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?
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Glossary of Key Terms
• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.
• Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.
• Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.
• Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.
• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.
• Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.
• Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.
• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”
• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.
• Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918019-REL
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19F-H1918019-REL-RHG
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This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between William P. Lee, a homeowner, and Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two, his Homeowners Association. The central issue revolved around the Greenlaw HOA’s implementation of a comprehensive ban on street parking and its contracting with a towing company to enforce the rule, which Mr. Lee contended violated the association’s governing documents, specifically amendments to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the proper notification procedures for revised rules. The findings of fact detail the history of the parking rules, the homeowner’s receipt of the electronic notification of the revised rules, and Mr. Lee’s arguments that the association failed to use the required postal mail or personal delivery methods for notice. The Conclusions of Law determined that the controlling rules were the revised July 2018 Rules and Regulations and that Mr. Lee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated either the CC&Rs or relevant Arizona statutes. Consequently, the Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
William P. Lee(petitioner) Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association member Testified on behalf of himself
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Timothy D. Butterfield(HOA attorney) Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
Barbara(board member) Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Contended by Lee to be the reason for the parking ban
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
partial
Filing Fees Refunded
$500.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Tom Barrs
Counsel
—
Respondent
Desert Ranch Homeowners' Association
Counsel
—
Alleged Violations
Bylaw 2.4
Outcome Summary
In the initial decision, Petitioner established violations of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (election materials disposal) and A.R.S. § 33-1804 (closed/improperly noticed meetings), but failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Issue 1). The rehearing only addressed Issue 1, which was ultimately dismissed.
Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 violation) because the ALJ found that while the Bylaw applied to Members, Petitioner failed to show it prohibited a Director from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned, and the investigation was initiated by a Board member immediately following the meeting.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Election Objection Waiver)
Whether Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on an objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting, given that the Bylaw requires members to object to irregularities 'at the meeting' to avoid waiver.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed as to Issue 1.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Dispute, Election Challenge, Bylaw Violation, Meeting Notice, Record Retention, Rehearing
This document synthesizes the findings and rulings from an administrative legal dispute between homeowner Tom Barrs (Petitioner) and the Desert Ranch Homeowners Association (Respondent) concerning the HOA’s board election of March 18, 2017. The core of the dispute involved the HOA board’s decision to investigate and ultimately overturn the initially announced election results, leading to a run-off election.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) overseeing the case and a subsequent rehearing issued a mixed final decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, successfully proved that the Desert Ranch HOA committed two statutory violations:
1. Destruction of Election Materials: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by destroying ballot envelopes shortly after the election, materials which are required to be retained for at least one year.
2. Improper Closed Meeting: The HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding a board meeting with its attorney at a private residence without providing the required notice to its members.
However, the Petitioner’s primary challenge—that the board violated its own Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned—was dismissed. The ALJ ruled that the bylaw’s waiver of claims applied to general “Members” but not to “Directors” acting in their official capacity. This ruling effectively upheld the board’s authority to investigate the election, which led to the discovery of invalid ballots and the eventual run-off election won by Brian Schoeffler.
As the prevailing party on two of the three issues, Mr. Barrs was awarded a reimbursement of his $1,000.00 filing fee. The judge, however, found that no civil penalty against the HOA was appropriate.
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I. Case Overview
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Tom Barrs
◦ Respondent: Desert Ranch HOA, represented by Catherine Overby (President) and Brian Schoeffler (Vice President)
• Case Number: 18F-H1818035-REL
• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
• Subject of Dispute: Alleged violations of Arizona statutes and HOA bylaws related to the handling and outcome of the March 18, 2017, annual board election.
II. Chronology of the Contested Election
The dispute originated from the following sequence of events surrounding the 2017 election for two vacant seats on the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors.
1. Pre-Election: Absentee ballots were distributed to members, listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates and providing a space for a write-in candidate.
2. March 18, 2017 (Annual Meeting): Ballots were submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger (a write-in) were announced as the winning candidates. No members present objected to the results before the meeting was adjourned.
3. Immediately Following the Meeting: Board member Patrick Rice gathered the ballots and “expressed his concerns with the election results.”
4. Circa March 18, 2017: All ballot envelopes from the election were destroyed.
5. March 19, 2017: Candidate Brian Schoeffler sent an email regarding the election, stating, “I’m asking you to review the situation and make a decision if there is enough concern that there should be a revote.”
6. March 20, 2017: Board President Catherine Overby emailed the members, announcing that the election had been “contested.” In the email, she asserted that the bylaws did not permit write-in candidates and declared that she and Mr. Schoeffler were the new directors.
7. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Ms. Overby and Mr. Rice, held an unannounced meeting with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s home. During this meeting, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot” had been improperly counted.
8. Post-March 29, 2017: After consulting the attorney, the board determined that the valid vote count resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board decided to hold a run-off election.
9. April 29, 2017: The run-off election was held, and Brian Schoeffler was announced as the winner.
10. May 10, 2017: The newly constituted Board of Directors held its organizational meeting.
III. Adjudicated Issues and Rulings
The petition, originally filed as a single issue, was converted to a multiple-issue case. At the hearing, the dispute was clarified into three distinct issues, each with a specific ruling from the ALJ.
Petitioner’s Allegation
Legal Basis
Final Ruling
The HOA improperly overturned the election results based on an objection raised after the annual meeting had adjourned.
Bylaw 2.4
Dismissed
The HOA unlawfully discarded ballot envelopes and related election materials.
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
Violation Found
The HOA held closed board meetings without providing proper notice to the membership.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Violation Found
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A. Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Improperly Overturning Election)
• Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs contended that the board was barred from investigating or acting on any concerns about the election after the meeting had concluded. His argument was based on Bylaw 2.4, which states:
• ALJ Finding: The petition on this issue was dismissed. The judge’s finding was affirmed after a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.
• ALJ Rationale:
1. Initiation of Investigation: Testimony established that Board member Patrick Rice expressed concerns “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” Therefore, Mr. Schoeffler’s email the following day did not initiate the board’s investigation.
2. Distinction Between “Member” and “Director”: The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. The waiver in Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member,” and the Petitioner failed to prove that a “Director” was prohibited from raising questions about the validity of an election after a meeting.
B. Issue 2: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (Destruction of Election Materials)
• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law mandates that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… for at least one year after completion of the election.”
• Respondent’s Action: The HOA destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election.
• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.
• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” presented at the hearing that established the destruction of the materials.
C. Issue 3: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Improper Closed Meetings)
• Statutory Requirement: Arizona law requires all HOA board meetings to be open to all members. A meeting can only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must provide notice and cite the legal authority for entering a closed session.
• Respondent’s Action: Certain board members met with an attorney at a private residence on March 29, 2017, to discuss the election. No notice was provided to the membership regarding this meeting.
• ALJ Finding: The Petitioner established that the HOA violated the statute.
• ALJ Rationale: The ruling was based on “uncontroverted evidence” that the meeting occurred and that the board “did not provide any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or provide notice that the meeting would be closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.”
IV. Final Order and Disposition
The final decision, issued on August 23, 2018, and upheld after a rehearing decision on December 26, 2018, ordered the following:
• Dismissal: The petition regarding Issue 1 (violation of Bylaw 2.4) was dismissed.
• Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Tom Barrs, was deemed the prevailing party as to Issue 2 and Issue 3.
• Monetary Award: The Respondent, Desert Ranch HOA, was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00.
• Civil Penalty: The judge determined that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”
• Finality: The decision after rehearing was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Study Guide:Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case Tom Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decisions issued on August 23, 2018, and December 26, 2018.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?
2. What were the initially announced results of the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors election on March 18, 2017?
3. What were the two primary procedural violations that the Desert Ranch HOA Board committed following the March 18, 2017 election?
4. What was the Petitioner’s central argument regarding the violation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4?
5. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismiss the Petitioner’s claim regarding Bylaw 2.4?
6. Explain the violation related to Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1812(A)(7) that the ALJ found the Respondent had committed.
7. Describe the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 concerning open meetings.
8. What was the final order from the initial hearing on August 23, 2018?
9. What was the specific focus of the rehearing held on December 6, 2018?
10. What was the ultimate outcome of the rehearing, and what legal recourse was available to the parties afterward?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Tom Barrs, who filed the dispute, and Respondent Desert Ranch HOA. The HOA was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
2. At the Annual Board Meeting on March 18, 2017, the ballots were counted and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates for the two vacant seats on the Board of Directors. No members present raised an objection before the meeting was adjourned.
3. The HOA Board committed two primary procedural violations. First, they destroyed the ballot envelopes at or around the time of the election, and second, certain Board members met with an attorney without providing notice to the association members that a meeting was being held or that it would be a closed session.
4. The Petitioner argued that candidate Brian Schoeffler’s challenge to the election was invalid because it was raised the day after the meeting adjourned. According to Bylaw 2.4, any “Member” who fails to object to an irregularity at the meeting waives their claim, and the Petitioner argued this rule should also apply to Board members.
5. The ALJ dismissed the claim because the investigation was initiated by Board member Patrick Rice, who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting, not by Mr. Schoeffler’s later email. The judge also determined that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific, non-interchangeable meanings, and the Petitioner failed to show that a Director was barred from raising concerns after a meeting.
6. The ALJ found that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) based on uncontroverted evidence presented at the hearing. This statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related election materials be retained for at least one year after an election, but the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.
7. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when certain Board members met with an attorney at Ms. Overby’s house on March 29, 2017. The HOA failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the members and did not announce that the meeting would be closed to discuss legal advice, as required by the statute.
8. In the initial order, the ALJ dismissed the petition as to Issue 1 (the Bylaw 2.4 violation) but found the Petitioner to be the prevailing party on Issues 2 and 3 (the statutory violations). The judge ordered the Respondent HOA to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000.00 but found that no civil penalty was appropriate.
9. The rehearing focused exclusively on the first issue from the initial hearing: whether the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on objections to the election results after the Annual Meeting had adjourned. The Petitioner did not seek reconsideration of the lack of penalties for the other two violations.
10. The rehearing upheld the original decision, dismissing the petition as to Issue 1. The decision from the rehearing was final and binding, and any party wishing to appeal the order was required to seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing upon specific facts and legal arguments presented in the source documents.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4, specifically the distinction between a “Member” and a “Director.” Discuss the strength of the Petitioner’s counter-argument and why the judge’s reasoning ultimately prevailed.
2. Examine the series of actions taken by the Desert Ranch HOA Board of Directors following the March 18, 2017 election announcement. Evaluate whether their actions to investigate irregularities, consult an attorney, and hold a run-off election were ultimately justified, despite the procedural violations they committed.
3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as the burden of proof in this case. For each of the three issues presented, explain how the Petitioner either met or failed to meet this standard, citing specific evidence mentioned in the decisions.
4. Based on the events described, from the initial election to the final administrative ruling, critique the effectiveness of the HOA’s internal governance and dispute resolution processes. What systemic failures are evident, and how did they lead to a formal administrative hearing?
5. Although the Petitioner was the “prevailing party” on two of the three issues, the remedy was limited to a refund of his filing fee, with no civil penalty imposed. Argue for or against the appropriateness of this remedy, considering the nature of the HOA’s violations and their impact on the integrity of the election process.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Statute
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision based on evidence and law. In this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
An Arizona Revised Statute requiring that all meetings of a homeowners’ association and its board of directors be open to all members. A meeting may only be closed for specific reasons, such as receiving legal advice, and the board must state the statutory reason for closing the meeting.
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
An Arizona Revised Statute that mandates the retention of election materials, including ballots and envelopes, in either electronic or paper format for at least one year after the completion of an election for member inspection.
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
An Arizona statute that permits an owner or a planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4
A provision in the HOA’s bylaws stating, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”
Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal proceeding against their HOA for alleged violations.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Tom Barrs.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this administrative hearing. It is defined as evidence that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to consider a decision that has already been made, typically granted if there are perceived errors of law, misconduct, or if the decision was not supported by the evidence.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Desert Ranch HOA.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
A Homeowner Sued His HOA Over a Botched Election—Here Are 3 Lessons Every Board Should Learn
Friction between homeowners and their Homeowners Association (HOA) board is a common feature of community living, and nowhere is that friction more apparent than in disputes over elections and rule enforcement. But what happens when a board, trying to correct an error, makes the situation exponentially worse?
This article is a deep dive into the real administrative law case of Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA, a seemingly straightforward dispute that reveals surprising and practical lessons for anyone living in or governing a planned community. It’s a story of a cascade of errors, where initial election confusion led to a panicked and procedurally flawed response, compounded by a pre-existing failure in record-keeping. As we’ll see, the outcome wasn’t what anyone expected, and the board’s biggest mistakes weren’t the ones they thought they were fighting.
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1. You Can Lose the Main Argument But Still Win the Case
The dispute began at the Desert Ranch HOA’s annual meeting, where election results were announced. The trouble started immediately after the meeting adjourned when a board Director, Patrick Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed concerns about irregularities. A day later, a losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, echoed those concerns via email. Citing the Director’s objection, the board overturned the initial results, prompting homeowner Tom Barrs to file a petition arguing this was a violation of the HOA’s own rules.
Barrs’ case hinged on Bylaw 2.4, which stated that any “Member” must object to irregularities during the meeting itself, or else they waive their right to complain. Barrs argued that since no one objected before adjournment, the results should stand. However, the judge disagreed, pointing to two critical distinctions in the evidence. First, the investigation was triggered by the concerns of a “Director,” not the losing candidate’s later email. Second, a close reading of the bylaws showed that the terms “Member” and “Director” were used as distinct categories and were not interchangeable. Since the bylaw only restricted “Members,” it did not prevent a Director from raising concerns after the meeting. Barrs lost his primary argument.
Despite this, in a counter-intuitive twist, the judge declared Barrs the “prevailing party” in the overall case and ordered the HOA to repay his $1,000 filing fee. Why? Because while investigating the petitioner’s main claim, the judge found the board had committed other clear violations of state law while trying to “fix” the election. This outcome underscores a critical principle for all boards: procedural integrity is paramount. The HOA won the battle over its right to review the election but lost the war because of its flawed process.
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2. Your Records (or Lack Thereof) Will Be Your Downfall
One of the board’s most significant errors was a simple but critical failure of administrative duty: they destroyed election materials in direct violation of state law. The HOA was found to have violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), which is unambiguous about an HOA’s responsibility.
According to A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7), “Ballots, envelopes and related materials…shall be retained…for at least one year after completion of the election.”
The legal decision states the evidence was “uncontroverted” that the HOA discarded the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. Because the HOA could not dispute this fact, it was an easy violation for the petitioner to prove.
This wasn’t just a minor administrative oversight; it was a catastrophic error. By destroying the envelopes, the board not only violated the law but also eliminated any possibility of independently verifying the vote count after their own director discovered irregularities. This single failure trapped them in a procedural corner of their own making. It made a definitive resolution of the election challenge impossible, leading to the messy and expensive situation of declaring a tie and holding a run-off, all of which could have been avoided if the primary evidence had been preserved as required by law.
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3. “Private” Board Business Can Be an Illegal Secret Meeting
In an attempt to resolve the election dispute correctly, the board took what it likely considered a responsible step: seeking legal advice. After the election was contested, certain board members met with an attorney at a board member’s house to figure out how to proceed. However, the way they did it constituted another clear violation of state law.
This private meeting violated Arizona’s open meeting law, A.R.S. § 33-1804. While the statute does allow a board to enter a closed session to receive legal advice, it has strict procedural requirements. The board must first provide notice of the meeting to all members and then, at that public meeting, officially vote to enter the closed session for that specific, legally permissible reason. The evidence was “uncontroverted” that the board failed to provide any notice of this meeting to the association members.
The board’s desire for confidential legal advice was understandable, but their method created an unforced legal error. The correct procedure—notifying members of a meeting and then voting to enter a closed session—protects the board by demonstrating procedural propriety. The shortcut they took exposed them to a clear-cut violation that was impossible to defend. For an HOA board, transparency is the default, and secrecy is a narrow, legally defined exception. The process of going private matters as much as the reason for doing so.
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Conclusion: It’s Not Just What You Do, It’s How You Do It
The Desert Ranch HOA board, in its attempt to correct a perceived election error, committed two clear statutory violations. In their haste, they held an illegal secret meeting and were hamstrung by their prior failure to properly retain election records—the very evidence needed for a clean resolution. These procedural missteps ultimately cost them the case.
The ultimate lesson from Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA is that for any governing body, procedural correctness is just as important as substantive correctness. This case serves as a stark reminder that good intentions are no defense against procedural law. When a crisis hits, does your board have the discipline to follow procedure, or will the rush to find a solution lead you to commit unforced errors that are far worse than the original problem?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Tom Barrs(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Stephen Barrs(witness) Testified for Petitioner
Respondent Side
Catherine Overby(board president, witness) Desert Ranch HOA Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Brian Schoeffler(board vice president, witness) Desert Ranch HOA Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Patrick Rice(board member) Desert Ranch HOA Board member who expressed concerns with election results
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Jerome Klinger(board member) Desert Ranch HOA Director elected in disputed election
The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.
Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.
The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
• Parties Involved:
◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.
◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.
• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.
• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.
Background and Timeline of the Dispute
The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).
• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):
◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.
◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.
◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.
◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.
• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:
◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.
◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.
◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.
• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.
• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.
• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.
• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.
• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.
Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)
The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”
• Specific Violations Alleged:
◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.
◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.
◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.
• Evidence Presented at Hearing:
◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.
◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).
◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.
◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.
Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)
The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.
• Core Arguments:
◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.
◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.
◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.
• Actions Taken by MCIII:
◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.
◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.
◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.
◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.
◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.
Governing Rules and CC&Rs
The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.
Document
Article/Rule
Provision
Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)
Rule 3
Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.12
Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.13
States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.14
Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.
• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.
• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.
◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.
◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”
◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.
◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.
• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL
Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?
3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?
4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.
5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?
6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?
7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?
9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.
2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.
3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.
4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.
5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.
6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.
7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.
9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.
2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.
4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.
Common Elements
Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.
Community Manager
An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.
Inoperable Vehicle
A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.
A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.
A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.
Prevailing Party
The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL
He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.
Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking
For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.
This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.
The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.
1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work
The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.
The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.
The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:
MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.
2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon
John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:
• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.
• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.
• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.
The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.
3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures
In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.
The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.
This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.
4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis
Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.
Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.
The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:
Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.
The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.
5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient
Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:
• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.
• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.
The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.
For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.
Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One
The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John W. Gray(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Austin Baillio(attorney) Maxwell & Morgan PC Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
Andrea Lacombe(community manager) Curtiss Management Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.
Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.
The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
• Parties Involved:
◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.
◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.
• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.
• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.
Background and Timeline of the Dispute
The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).
• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):
◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.
◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.
◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.
◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.
• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:
◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.
◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.
◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.
• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.
• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.
• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.
• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.
• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.
Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)
The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”
• Specific Violations Alleged:
◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.
◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.
◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.
• Evidence Presented at Hearing:
◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.
◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).
◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.
◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.
Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)
The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.
• Core Arguments:
◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.
◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.
◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.
• Actions Taken by MCIII:
◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.
◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.
◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.
◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.
◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.
Governing Rules and CC&Rs
The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.
Document
Article/Rule
Provision
Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)
Rule 3
Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.12
Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.13
States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.14
Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.
• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.
• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.
◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.
◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”
◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.
◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.
• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL
Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?
3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?
4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.
5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?
6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?
7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?
9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.
2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.
3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.
4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.
5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.
6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.
7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.
9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.
2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.
4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.
Common Elements
Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.
Community Manager
An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.
Inoperable Vehicle
A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.
A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.
A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.
Prevailing Party
The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL
He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.
Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking
For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.
This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.
The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.
1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work
The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.
The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.
The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:
MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.
2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon
John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:
• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.
• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.
• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.
The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.
3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures
In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.
The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.
This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.
4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis
Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.
Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.
The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:
Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.
The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.
5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient
Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:
• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.
• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.
The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.
For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.
Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One
The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John W. Gray(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Austin Baillio(attorney) Maxwell & Morgan PC Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
Andrea Lacombe(community manager) Curtiss Management Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association
Counsel
Paul K. Frame, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs § 3.1(a)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.
Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.
Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association
Counsel
Paul K. Frame, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs § 3.1(a)
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.
Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.
Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the dispute was Blue Ridge’s repeated denial of Mr. Mandela’s requests to construct a 150-square-foot cedar patio structure on his property.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied Mr. Mandela’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation of the association’s governing documents. The ALJ’s decisions affirmed that Blue Ridge acted within its authority and correctly applied its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and architectural regulations.
Key takeaways from the rulings include:
• Violation of Detached Structure Limit: Mr. Mandela’s request for a detached patio was denied because he already had a tool shed, and the HOA rules explicitly permit only one detached structure per property.
• Improper “Play Structure” Request: An initial request framing the patio as a “play structure” was correctly denied as its proposed 150 sq. ft. size exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit for certain play structures.
• Insufficient Plans for Attached Structure: A separate request to attach the structure to his home was denied due to Mr. Mandela’s failure to provide the required detailed architectural plans and construction drawings, which the HOA deemed necessary for approval.
• Arguments Found Lacking: Mr. Mandela’s arguments—including claims of selective enforcement, discrimination against homeowners without children, and misinterpretation of the term “temporary structure”—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded the structure would be a prohibited temporary structure as the proposed concrete pavers do not constitute a permanent foundation under the HOA’s definition.
Case Overview
Parties Involved
Description
Petitioner
Charles P. Mandela
A homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.
Respondent
Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County
The governing homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development.
Adjudicator
Velva Moses-Thompson
Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.
Timeline of Key Events
c. Feb 1, 2018
Mr. Mandela submits his first request for a 150 sq. ft. patio, using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form. Blue Ridge denies it for exceeding the size limit.
c. Mar 2, 2018
Mr. Mandela submits a second request, this time to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans and materials.
c. Mar 8, 2018
Blue Ridge denies the request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information,” instructing Mr. Mandela to provide formal drawings as per CC&R guidelines.
c. Mar 23, 2018
Mr. Mandela files an internal appeal with Blue Ridge, which is subsequently denied for the same reason of incomplete construction information.
Post-Mar 23, 2018
Mr. Mandela submits a third request for a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. Blue Ridge denies it because he already has a detached tool shed.
c. Jul 31, 2018
Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a) by denying his request while allowing another member a Tuff Shed.
Oct 17, 2018
An evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Nov 6, 2018
The ALJ issues the initial decision, denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.
Dec 12, 2018
The Arizona Department of Real Estate orders a rehearing of the matter.
Feb 8, 2019
The rehearing is held before the same ALJ.
Feb 28, 2019
The ALJ issues the final decision, again finding in favor of Blue Ridge and denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.
Analysis of Construction Requests and Denials
Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure, each of which was denied for different reasons based on the HOA’s governing documents.
Request 1: Detached “Play Structure”
Mr. Mandela’s initial application on February 1, 2018, was submitted using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form.
• HOA Rule: The form, based on modified Rules and Regulations from April 6, 2016, states: “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”
• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied the request because the proposed 150 sq. ft. size of the structure exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit specified for this type of structure.
Request 2: Attached Cedar Patio Shade
On March 2, 2018, Mr. Mandela submitted a new request to attach the structure to his home.
• HOA Action: The committee chairman, John Hart, requested documents showing the structure would not be free-standing, such as plans and material specifications.
• Mandela’s Response: In a March 3 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof.” He asserted that photos of other attached structures were sufficient.
• Denial Rationale: The request was denied on March 8 due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter explicitly instructed Mr. Mandela to submit all required documents, including drawings that “match exactly what you are going to build,” per CC&R Section 10.3. His subsequent appeal was also denied, with Blue Ridge noting that a manufacturer’s representative stated they would not warranty the product if the design was altered and reiterating the need for detailed elevation drawings.
Request 3: Detached Cedar Patio Structure
Following the denial of his appeal, Mr. Mandela submitted a third request for a detached version of the patio.
• HOA Rule: According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D), “One detached structure may… be constructed on a property.”
• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied this request because Mr. Mandela already had one detached structure—a tool shed—on his property. The rules permit only one such structure.
Key Arguments and Rulings from Administrative Hearings
At the initial hearing and subsequent rehearing, both parties presented arguments regarding the application of the HOA’s rules. The ALJ systematically addressed and ruled on each point, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.
Petitioner’s Core Arguments (Charles P. Mandela)
• Definition of “Detached Structure”: He argued that his proposed patio was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, based on his misinterpretation of a prior administrative ruling, a detached structure is one that can be easily converted into a second residence.
• Selective Enforcement: He alleged that Blue Ridge approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member and was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. play structure size limit against other homeowners, thus discriminating against him.
• Discriminatory Rules: He contended that the rule allowing a second detached structure if it is a “play structure” violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people without children. He stated he wanted the patio for his mother.
• Definition of “Temporary Structure”: He asserted the structure was not a prohibited temporary structure because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he claimed constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules, and the materials had a 5-year warranty.
• One Detached Structure Rule: The rules unambiguously limit homeowners to one detached structure, and Mr. Mandela already had one.
• Incomplete Submissions: The request for an attached structure lacked the necessary architectural details to ensure it was properly and safely constructed, as required by the CC&Rs. Joseph Hancock, Vice President of Blue Ridge and a former contractor, testified that Mr. Mandela failed to consider critical factors like height and width differentials.
• Temporary Structure Violation: Mr. Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.” Therefore, the proposed structure would be a prohibited temporary structure under the CC&Rs.
• No Selective Enforcement: Mr. Hancock refuted Mr. Mandela’s claims of selective enforcement, testifying that the lots Mr. Mandela cited either had structures built before 2003 (predating certain rules) or had no detached structures at all.
Administrative Law Judge’s Final Conclusions
The ALJ found that Mr. Mandela failed to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The final order denied his petition based on the following conclusions of law:
• Burden of Proof: The petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that Blue Ridge violated CC&R Article III, Section 3.1(a).
• Second Detached Structure: It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela had a shed on his property. The proposed 150 sq. ft. patio therefore constituted a barred second detached structure.
• Prior Rulings Not Precedent: The ALJ noted that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior administrative decision he cited and, furthermore, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.”
• Temporary Structure: The preponderance of the evidence showed the proposed structure is a temporary structure under the CC&Rs because “concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”
• Denial of Attached Structure: The denial of the request to attach the structure was proper, as the “Petitioner failed to provide sufficient details to illustrate how he would attach the cedar patio structure to his home.”
• No Evidence of Discrimination: The petitioner failed to establish that Blue Ridge approved other oversized play structures or that the denial of his requests was discriminatory. The ALJ also noted the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over potential constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Relevant HOA Governing Documents
Document/Section
Key Provision / Definition
CC&R § 3.1
Permitted Uses and Restrictions – Single Family: “No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage…”
Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)
Detached Structures: “One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property.”
CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Standard
Temporary Structures: Prohibits temporary structures. A temporary structure is defined as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”
Modified Rules and Regulations (April 6, 2016)
Play Structures: Allows up to two play structures but specifies they “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”
CC&R § 3.24
Architectural Approval: “No building, fence, wall, screen, residence or other structure shall be commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered… without the prior written approval of the… Architectural Committee.”
CC&R § 10.3
Architectural Submission Guidelines: Specifies the format and information required for submittals to the architectural committee.
CC&R § 12.2
Declaration Amendments: Requires an affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least 75% of all lots to amend the Declaration.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918006-REL
Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. The case revolves around Mr. Mandela’s multiple attempts to gain approval for a patio structure on his property and the subsequent legal proceedings. The material is drawn from two Administrative Law Judge Decisions, dated November 6, 2018, and February 28, 2019.
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Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing your information directly from the provided case documents.
1. What were the three distinct requests Mr. Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA, and what was the outcome of each?
2. Explain the HOA’s rule regarding detached structures and why Mr. Mandela’s third request for a detached patio was denied under this rule.
3. On what grounds did the HOA deny Mr. Mandela’s second request to attach a cedar patio shade to his home?
4. What was Mr. Mandela’s primary allegation in his initial petition filed with the Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?
5. How do the Blue Ridge rules define a “temporary structure,” and why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude Mr. Mandela’s proposed patio fell into this category?
6. Describe Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s policy on play structures.
7. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this case, and what does this standard mean?
8. Mr. Mandela cited a prior administrative law judge decision to support his case. What was his interpretation of that decision, and how did the presiding judge respond to this line of argument?
9. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key pieces of testimony did he provide on behalf of the HOA during the rehearing?
10. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the Declaration (the CC&Rs themselves) versus adopting new “Rules and Regulations”?
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Answer Key
1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot size limit for such structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied due to incomplete information and a lack of adequate plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio structure, which was denied because he already had another detached structure on his property.
2. According to CC&Rs § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), a property is permitted to have only one detached structure. Mr. Mandela’s third request was denied because it was undisputed that he already had a tool shed on his property. The proposed detached patio would have constituted a prohibited second detached structure.
3. The HOA denied the request to attach the patio shade because Mr. Mandela submitted incomplete information and failed to provide sufficient plans. The HOA requested detailed elevation drawings showing construction methods, dimensions, foundation details, and attachment methods, which Mr. Mandela did not provide.
4. In his petition of July 31, 2018, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a). His specific claim was that the HOA discriminated against him by denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.
5. The Architectural Committee rules define a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” The judge concluded the proposed patio was a temporary structure because Mr. Mandela planned to use concrete pavers, which, according to the credible testimony of Joseph Hancock, are not the equivalent of a permanent cement or block foundation.
6. Mr. Mandela argued that the modified rule allowing a second detached play structure (up to 80 sq ft) violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people who do not have children. He asserted the policy was unfair because he wanted to build the structure for his mother to rest outside, not for children’s play.
7. The petitioner, Mr. Mandela, had the burden of proof to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.
8. Mr. Mandela argued that a prior administrative law judge decision had found that a “detached structure” under Blue Ridge CC&Rs is a structure that can be easily converted into a second residence, which his patio could not. The presiding judge dismissed this by stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future decisions.
9. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of the Blue Ridge HOA and a former general, electrical, and HVAC contractor. He testified that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or block foundation, that Mr. Mandela’s plans for attaching the structure were insufficient, and that he had investigated lots Mr. Mandela cited for alleged violations and found none.
10. According to the CC&Rs, adopting, amending, or repealing “Rules and Regulations” can be done by a majority vote of the Board (§ 4.2). In contrast, amending the Declaration of CC&Rs themselves is a much more stringent process, requiring the affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all lots (§ 12.2).
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate your answers in a standard essay format, using specific evidence from the source documents to support your arguments.
1. Analyze the progression of Mr. Mandela’s three distinct requests to the HOA. How did the denial of his first request (as a “Play Structure”) appear to influence his subsequent applications and legal arguments?
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies in this case. Explain why Mr. Mandela ultimately failed to convince the Administrative Law Judge that the HOA violated its own rules, citing specific examples of his failed arguments (e.g., the temporary structure definition, claims of selective enforcement, and the adequacy of his submitted plans).
3. Examine the distinction made in the Blue Ridge Estates governing documents between the core CC&Rs and the “Rules and Regulations” adopted by the Board. How did this distinction allow the HOA to have a rule permitting a second “play structure” while the main CC&Rs seem to limit properties to a single residence and one other detached structure (a garage)?
4. The HOA denied Mr. Mandela’s request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information.” Based on the evidence presented in the decisions, evaluate the reasonableness of the HOA’s request for detailed plans versus Mr. Mandela’s assertion that he had provided sufficient information for approval.
5. Trace Mr. Mandela’s various claims of unfair treatment, including selective enforcement (the Tuff Shed), discrimination (the play structure rule), and his interpretation of key terms like “detached structure.” For each claim, explain the HOA’s counter-position or the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings for state agencies, such as the one between Mr. Mandela and the HOA. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.
Architectural Committee
A committee within the HOA granted authority by CC&R § 10.2 to approve or deny proposed construction and promulgate regulations aligned with the CC&Rs. It denied all of Mr. Mandela’s requests.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Mandela) bore the burden of proof.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the primary governing documents for the Blue Ridge Estates community, outlining land use, permitted structures, and rules members must follow.
Detached Structure
A building or structure on a property that is separate from the main single-family residence. According to Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one such structure is permitted per lot.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela is the petitioner.
Play Structure
A structure defined by the HOA’s modified rules to include items like Swing Sets, Jungle Gyms, Tree Houses, and Ground Placed Play Houses/Forts. Play Houses/Forts and Tree Houses are limited to 80 square feet.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association is the respondent.
Rules and Regulations
Rules that can be adopted, amended, or repealed by a majority vote of the HOA Board, as distinct from the CC&Rs which require a 75% vote of all lot owners to amend. The “Play Structure” rules are an example.
Temporary Structure
As defined by the Architectural Committee regulations, a structure “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” Such structures are prohibited by CC&R § 3.6.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918006-REL
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19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
2 sources
These sources document two decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association (HOA). The first document presents the initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision which denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, finding he failed to prove the HOA violated its governing documents by denying his request to build a patio structure. The second document is the ALJ Decision following a rehearing, which reaffirms the initial denial, concluding that Mr. Mandela’s proposed structure was either a prohibited second detached structure or a temporary structure lacking a proper foundation, and that he failed to provide sufficient plans for an attached structure. Both sources establish that Mr. Mandela did not meet his burden of proof to show the HOA discriminated against him or otherwise violated the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
What were the specific reasons the HOA denied Charles Mandela’s requests?
How did the HOA Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions govern detached structures?
What was the ultimate outcome of Charles Mandela’s petition and subsequent rehearing?
Based on 2 sources
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Charles P. Mandela(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Paul Frame(HOA attorney) FRAME LAW PLLC
John Hart(HOA Chairman) Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association Reviewed petitioner's requests
Joseph Hancock(HOA Vice President, witness) Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association Presented testimony
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(ADRE Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of transmitted decision
Other Participants
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).
Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:00 (112.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818050-REL
Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.
The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.
1. Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1818050-REL
Petitioner
Brent J. Mathews
Respondent
American Ranch Community Association
Hearing Date
September 21, 2018
Decision Date
October 11, 2018
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.
2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation
After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:
“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”
The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.
3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events
The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.
A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.
June 2011
The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.
November 23, 2013
Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.
July 30, 2016
Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.
August 2016
Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.
August 9, 2016
The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.
4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning
The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.
A. Burden of Proof
The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.
B. Variance vs. Amendment
The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.
• Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.
• Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”
The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.
C. The Board’s Delegated Authority
The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:
1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.
2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”
3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.
5. Final Order
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:
• Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.
• Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”
The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818050-REL
Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?
3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?
4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?
5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?
6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?
7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?
8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?
9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.
2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.
3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.
4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.
5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.
6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.
7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.
8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.
9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.
10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.
2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”
3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?
4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.
5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.
Architectural Review Committee
A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.
Bylaws
The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).
Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.
Petition
The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.
Variance
An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.
Well Agreement 1
A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.
Well Agreement 2
An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818050-REL
Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown
1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome
It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.
That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.
The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.
2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone
Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.
However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.
3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees
This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.
This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.
According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.
“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”
This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.
4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution
While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.
The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.
When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”
The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.
5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them
The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.
This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Brent J. Mathews(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to prove the Respondent Board violated the Bylaws. The Board was found to have the necessary authority under Bylaws Section 3.11 to enter into the Well Agreement 2 as a variance, and this action did not constitute an improper amendment of the CC&Rs.
Why this result: The Board was authorized to grant a variance to the CC&Rs regarding the well on Lot 2, a power delegated to the Association, meaning the Board did not exceed its authority under the Bylaws.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11, when the Board entered into the 'Well Agreement' (Well Agreement 2).
Petitioner asserted that the Board violated the Bylaws by entering into Well Agreement 2, claiming the Board lacked the authority to grant exceptions or variances to the CC&Rs regarding the use of a private water well on Lot 2. The Board agreed the well existed in violation of CC&Rs Section 3.26, but argued Well Agreement 2 constituted a variance, not an amendment.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA authority, Bylaws 3.11, CC&Rs, Variance, Amendment, Well Agreement, Burden of Proof, Dismissal
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818050-REL Decision – 664186.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:56 (112.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818050-REL
Briefing Document: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision in case number 18F-H1818050-REL, a dispute between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and the American Ranch Community Association (HOA). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, concluding that Mr. Mathews failed to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
The central issue was whether the HOA’s Board of Directors violated Article 3.11 of its Bylaws by entering into a “Well Agreement” with the owners of Lot 2 on August 9, 2016. The Petitioner argued that this agreement constituted an unauthorized amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) because the Board does not have the power to grant exceptions.
The judge found this argument “faulty,” determining that the agreement was not an amendment but a variance. The CC&Rs explicitly grant the authority to issue variances to the Architectural Review Committee. Per the Bylaws, the Board is empowered to exercise any authority delegated to the Association that is not specifically reserved for the general membership. Therefore, the judge concluded that the Board acted within its authority when it executed the agreement. The decision was based on the Board’s need to resolve a problematic prior agreement under time-sensitive circumstances related to a property sale.
1. Case Overview
Case Number
18F-H1818050-REL
Petitioner
Brent J. Mathews
Respondent
American Ranch Community Association
Hearing Date
September 21, 2018
Decision Date
October 11, 2018
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
The dispute originated from a petition filed by Brent J. Mathews on May 16, 2018, with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The core of the complaint was an alleged Open Meeting Violation concerning an “Action Outside of Meeting” that resulted in a “Well Agreement” between the Association and homeowners Mark and Diane Kaplan.
2. Petitioner’s Core Allegation
After being directed to clarify his petition to a single issue, Mr. Mathews submitted the following statement on August 23, 2018:
“When the Board entered into the ‘Well Agreement’ they may have assumed they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. The American Ranch Community Association Bylaws do not empower the Board to grant exceptions to the CC&R’s. Therefore the single complaint is an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11.”
The Petitioner’s legal argument was that the Board’s action in creating the “Well Agreement 2” was effectively an amendment of the CC&Rs. According to Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, amendments require the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners. Since this did not occur, the Petitioner concluded the Board lacked the authority to enter into the agreement.
3. Factual Background and Chronology of Events
The case revolves around a water well on Lot 2 of the American Ranch community, which was installed in violation of the governing documents.
A water well is installed on Lot 2. This installation violates Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs, which prohibits wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots and, even then, only with prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) for specific purposes.
June 2011
The owners of Lot 2 and the HOA Board enter into the first “Well and Easement Agreement” (Well Agreement 1). This agreement permitted the continued use of the well for irrigation but required the owners to install a water meter and pay the HOA for water usage at the same rate as the local water district.
November 23, 2013
Lot 2 is sold to Steven and Frances Galliano.
July 30, 2016
Mark and Diane Kaplan, who are in escrow to purchase Lot 2, email the Community Manager, Tiffany Taylor. They express concern over Well Agreement 1 and state they cannot proceed with the purchase without clarity on the HOA’s position. They also note that the Gallianos told them they had never been charged for water from the well.
August 2016
Facing a time-sensitive situation due to the pending property sale, the HOA Board decides to enter into a new agreement to invalidate Well Agreement 1. The Board’s decision was based in part on the belief that it lacked the authority to enter into the original agreement, specifically because it had no power to bill residents for water usage—a function of the water district.
August 9, 2016
The HOA Board and the Kaplans execute a new “Well Agreement” (Well Agreement 2). This agreement permits the continued use of the well for irrigation purposes but explicitly states the owners will not be billed for the water used.
4. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Legal Reasoning
The Judge’s decision rested on a critical distinction between a CC&R amendment and a variance, and a detailed analysis of the powers granted to the Board by the governing documents.
A. Burden of Proof
The Petitioner, Brent J. Mathews, bore the burden of proof to establish that the HOA committed the alleged violation by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that a contention is more probably true than not.
B. Variance vs. Amendment
The central point of the Judge’s legal conclusion was the rejection of the Petitioner’s argument.
• Petitioner’s Argument: Well Agreement 2 was an amendment to the CC&Rs.
• Judge’s Finding: The argument is “faulty.” The decision states, “A variance granted to an individual owner from a restriction under the CC&Rs does not constitute an amendment of the CC&Rs.”
The Judge found that the CC&Rs themselves, in Section 3.31, provide a specific mechanism for granting variances. The ARC is authorized to grant variances in “extenuating circumstances” if a restriction creates an “unreasonable hardship or burden” and the variance does not have a “substantial adverse effect” on the community.
C. The Board’s Delegated Authority
The Judge established a clear chain of authority that empowered the Board to act as it did:
1. CC&R Section 3.31: Delegates the power to grant variances to the Architectural Review Committee.
2. Bylaw Section 3.11.8: States the Board shall have the power to “Exercise for the Association all powers, duties and authority vested in or delegated to the Association and not reserved to the membership by other provisions of the Project Documents.”
3. Conclusion: Because the power to grant variances was delegated to the ARC (and thus to the Association) and not reserved for the membership, the Board had the authority to grant the variance embodied in Well Agreement 2.
5. Final Order
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order:
• Decision: The Petition filed by Brent J. Mathews is dismissed.
• Reasoning: “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into Well Agreement 2. Thus, Petitioner failed to sustain his burden to establish a violation of Section 3.11 of the Bylaws.”
The order was finalized and transmitted to the parties on October 11, 2018.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818050-REL
Study Guide: Mathews v. American Ranch Community Association (Case No. 18F-H1818050-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Brent J. Mathews and Respondent American Ranch Community Association. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling presented in the source document.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the initial, overarching subject of Brent J. Mathews’s complaint filed on May 16, 2018?
3. After being asked to clarify, what single issue did the Petitioner choose to proceed with for the hearing?
4. According to the CC&Rs, what are the specific rules regarding the use of water wells on lots within American Ranch?
5. What were the key terms of “Well Agreement 1,” established in June 2011 with the original owners of Lot 2?
6. Why did the American Ranch Board of Directors believe they lacked the authority to enforce “Well Agreement 1”?
7. What were the terms of “Well Agreement 2,” which was executed on August 9, 2016, with the new owners of Lot 2, the Kaplans?
8. What was Petitioner Mathews’s primary legal argument against the Board’s authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2”?
9. How did the Administrative Law Judge distinguish between a “variance” and an “amendment” to the CC&Rs in the final decision?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2018?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Brent J. Mathews, who filed the complaint, and Respondent American Ranch Community Association (HOA), which was the subject of the complaint. Mathews represented himself, while the Association was represented by Lynn Krupnik and Timothy Krupnik.
2. The initial complaint’s subject was an “Open Meeting Violation regarding an ‘Action Outside of Meeting’” that took place on August 6, 2016. This action concerned the Association entering into a “Well Agreement” with Mark and Diane Kaplan.
3. The Petitioner clarified his single issue was an alleged violation of the American Ranch Bylaws, Article 3.11. He argued that the Board entered into the “Well Agreement” assuming they had the power to grant exceptions to the CC&Rs, a power he claimed the Bylaws did not grant them.
4. Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs prohibits water wells on all lots except Equestrian Lots. On Equestrian Lots, wells are permitted only with prior written approval from the Architectural Review Committee and must be used solely to irrigate pasture land and provide drinking water for horses.
5. “Well Agreement 1” acknowledged that the owners of Lot 2 were using their well for irrigation in violation of the CC&Rs. The agreement allowed them to continue this use, provided they installed a water meter and paid the Association the same per-gallon charge as other owners paid to the water district.
6. The Board of Directors believed they did not have the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 1” because they had no ability or authority to bill the lot owners for water used from a private well. They reasoned that billing for water was the responsibility of the water district, not the HOA.
7. “Well Agreement 2” stated that the private water well on Lot 2 would continue to be used for irrigation purposes. Crucially, it specified that the owners (the Kaplans) would not be billed for the water used from this well.
8. Petitioner Mathews argued that “Well Agreement 2” constituted an amendment of the CC&Rs. He contended that under Section 9.3.1 of the CC&Rs, an amendment requires the written approval or affirmative vote of 75 percent of the total owners, and therefore the Board acted outside its authority.
9. The Judge ruled that “Well Agreement 2” was a variance granted to an individual owner, not an amendment to the CC&Rs. The CC&Rs specifically provide a method for granting variances via the Architectural Review Committee, and this power is delegated to the Association and thus exercisable by the Board.
10. The final order, issued on October 11, 2018, was that the Petition be dismissed. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Board of Directors lacked the authority to enter into “Well Agreement 2.”
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the case document to construct a thorough and well-supported argument for each prompt. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the evolution of the dispute, from the initial installation of the well on Lot 2 to the final Administrative Law Judge Decision. Discuss the key events and agreements (Well Agreement 1 and Well Agreement 2) and explain how each contributed to the legal conflict.
2. Explain the legal reasoning used by the Administrative Law Judge to dismiss the Petitioner’s claim. Detail the specific sections of the Bylaws and CC&Rs cited (3.11, 3.26, 3.31, 9.3.1) and explain the distinction the Judge made between a “variance” and an “amendment.”
3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Who held the burden of proof, what was the required standard (“preponderance of the evidence”), and why did the Petitioner ultimately fail to meet this standard?
4. Evaluate the actions of the American Ranch Community Association Board of Directors regarding Lot 2’s well. Discuss their reasoning for invalidating Well Agreement 1 and creating Well Agreement 2, and analyze whether their actions were consistent with the powers granted to them by the community’s governing documents.
5. Based on the procedural history outlined in the “Findings of Fact,” describe the process of an HOA dispute in this jurisdiction, from the initial filing of a petition to the final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) who presides over administrative hearings and issues a decision on the matter.
A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)
The statutory laws of the state of Arizona, sections of which regulate planned communities and the administrative hearing process.
Architectural Review Committee
A body within the Association delegated the authority by the CC&Rs (Section 3.31) to grant variances from certain restrictions in extenuating circumstances.
Board of Directors
The governing body of the American Ranch Community Association, which has the powers and duties necessary for administering the Association’s affairs.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their claims. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish the alleged violations.
Bylaws
The rules governing the internal administration of the Association. Petitioner alleged a violation of Bylaw 3.11, which outlines the powers and duties of the Board.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that set rules for properties within the community, such as the prohibition of certain water wells (Section 3.26).
Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the agency with which the initial Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency to which the Department refers HOA dispute cases for a formal hearing.
Petition
The formal document filed by Brent J. Mathews to initiate the HOA dispute process with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who brings the legal action or complaint. In this case, Brent J. Mathews.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the American Ranch Community Association.
Variance
An officially granted exception from a restriction in the CC&Rs for an individual owner. The Judge determined Well Agreement 2 was a variance, not an amendment.
Well Agreement 1
A June 2011 agreement that allowed the owners of Lot 2 to use a non-compliant well for irrigation, provided they paid the Association for the water.
Well Agreement 2
An August 2016 agreement that invalidated Well Agreement 1 and allowed the new owners of Lot 2 (the Kaplans) to continue using the well for irrigation without being billed for the water.
Blog Post – 18F-H1818050-REL
Your HOA Board Might Be More Powerful Than You Think: 3 Lessons from a Legal Showdown
1.0 Introduction: The Predictable Fight with an Unpredictable Outcome
It’s a scenario familiar to many homeowners: you suspect your Homeowners Association (HOA) board is playing favorites, bending the rules for one resident while holding everyone else to the letter of the law. This feeling of frustration often leads to heated disputes, but what happens when a homeowner decides to take that fight to court? You might expect a simple verdict based on the community’s clear, written rules.
That’s exactly what homeowner Brent J. Mathews thought. He discovered his HOA board had made a special agreement with a neighbor, allowing a water well that clearly violated the community’s governing documents. He filed a formal complaint, arguing the board had illegally overstepped its authority.
The case that followed, however, didn’t turn on one obvious rule. Instead, the judge’s decision hinged on how different governing documents—the CC&Rs and the Bylaws—interact. The outcome reveals some surprising and counter-intuitive truths about where power really lies within an HOA, offering critical lessons for every homeowner.
2.0 Takeaway 1: A Special Exception Isn’t the Same as Changing the Rules for Everyone
Mr. Mathews’ central argument was straightforward and, on its face, perfectly logical. He contended that the board’s “Well Agreement 2” with his neighbor was effectively an amendment to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
According to the community’s CC&Rs (Section 9.3.1), amending the rules is a serious undertaking that requires the written approval of 75 percent of all homeowners. The board clearly did not have this approval, so it seemed to be a clear-cut case of an illegal action. Many homeowners would have made the same reasonable assumption: the board can’t just change the rules on its own.
However, the judge found a critical distinction. The board’s action was not an “amendment”—a permanent change to the rules for the entire community. Instead, it was legally considered a “variance”—a one-time exception granted to a single homeowner. Because the CC&Rs contained a separate, specific process for granting variances (Section 3.31), the board was not illegally rewriting the rulebook; it was simply using a different, pre-existing tool in the governing documents.
3.0 Takeaway 2: The Board Can Wield Powers Given to Its Own Committees
This distinction raised another logical objection. The CC&Rs (Section 3.31) explicitly state that the power to grant variances belongs to the “Architectural Review Committee” (ARC), not the Board of Directors. It appeared Mr. Mathews had found his checkmate: even if the action was a variance, the wrong body had granted it.
This is where the case took its most surprising turn. The judge looked beyond the CC&Rs and consulted a different governing document: the Bylaws. This document contained a foundational clause about the board’s authority that proved decisive.
According to Bylaw 3.11.8, the Board of Directors is empowered to exercise any authority of the Association that is not specifically and exclusively reserved for the members themselves. Since the power to grant variances was delegated to a committee (the ARC) and not reserved for a vote by the general membership, the Board had the authority to step in and exercise that power itself. The judge’s decision made this clear.
“As the power to grant variances was delegated to the Architectural Review Committee and was not reserved to the membership, the Board had the authority to grant such a variance.”
This finding reveals a crucial principle of HOA governance: powers delegated to a committee are not the same as powers reserved for the entire membership. Unless a power is explicitly reserved for a member vote, the Bylaws can grant the Board ultimate authority over it.
4.0 Takeaway 3: A Messy History Can Justify an Unusual Solution
While the legal arguments are complex, the context behind the board’s decision is equally important. The board wasn’t making a special deal out of the blue; it was trying to solve a messy problem it had inherited.
The well on Lot 2 was originally installed around 2007 in violation of Section 3.26 of the CC&Rs. The board’s first attempt to fix this, “Well Agreement 1” in or about June 2011, allowed the well’s use but required the owner to pay the association for the water consumed. This arrangement, however, was deeply flawed.
When new buyers (the Kaplans) were in escrow to purchase the property in 2016, the situation came to a head. The Kaplans discovered the unusual agreement and informed the board they would be “unable to proceed with the purchase” unless its status was clarified. With the real estate deal on the line, the board recognized that “time was of the essence.”
The board’s decision to execute “Well Agreement 2” was driven by two realities. First, they believed the original agreement was legally invalid, as the board had no authority to bill a resident for water. Second, the agreement was a failure in practice; the Kaplans had been told by the prior owners that “they had never been charged for the water used from the well.” Facing an unenforceable and un-enforced agreement that was now threatening a home sale, the board acted pragmatically to resolve the decade-old violation once and for all.
5.0 Conclusion: Know the Rules—And Who Has the Power to Bend Them
The core lesson from this case is that HOA governance is a complex web of interlocking documents. The rules you read in the CC&Rs might not tell the whole story. Power and authority can be defined, and even transferred, by provisions buried in the Bylaws or other governing texts. What may seem like an obvious violation can be justified by a clause a homeowner might easily overlook.
This case is a powerful reminder for every homeowner. It’s not enough to know the rules of your community. You also need to understand the system of governance that enforces, interprets, and sometimes, grants exceptions to them. It prompts a critical question: Do you know not just the rules in your community, but who really has the authority to grant exceptions?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Brent J. Mathews(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.
Key Issues & Findings
Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:06 (107.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL
Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”
The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”
The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.
Case Overview
This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
18F-H1818053-REL
Petitioner
Travis Prall
Respondent
Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Initial Hearing
September 4, 2018
Initial Decision
September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)
Rehearing
January 11, 2019
Final Decision
January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)
Timeline of Key Events
• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.
• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.
• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.
• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.
• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.
Central Allegation and Dispute
The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.
Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)
The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.
• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.
• Inferences about Original Landscaping:
◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.
◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.
◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.
Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)
The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.
• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.
• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.
• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.
◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.
◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.
◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”
Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections
The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.
Section
Provision
Significance in the Case
The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“
This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”
“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…
This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.
“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…
This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.
Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.
Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)
• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”
• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”
• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.
Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)
• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”
• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”
• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”
• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.
Study Guide – 18F-H1818053-REL
Study Guide: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal decisions. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition?
3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing.
4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request?
5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent.
6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion?
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision?
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case?
9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter?
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019?
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Answer Key
1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what were their respective roles? The Petitioner was Travis Prall, the homeowner who filed the dispute. The Respondent was the Villas at Tierra Buena Homeowners Association (HOA), which was defending against the Petitioner’s claims. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer.
2. What specific section of the governing documents did the Petitioner allege was violated, and what was the central claim of his petition? The Petitioner alleged a violation of Section 7.1.4 of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). His central claim was that the HOA violated this section by neglecting its duty to perform yard maintenance in his backyard, which he argued was a “visible public yard.”
3. Describe the key physical differences between the “interior homes” and “exterior homes” within the Villas at Tierra Buena community as detailed in the hearing. The exterior homes feature six to seven-foot-tall block wall fences enclosing their backyards. In contrast, the interior homes, including the Petitioner’s, have a shorter back wall consisting of a two-foot block wall topped with a two-foot aluminum fence, making the total height approximately four feet and more visible from a common walkway.
4. What incident in 2018 prompted the HOA to issue a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, and what action did the letter request? In 2018, the HOA had a “pony wall” in the Petitioner’s backyard repaired and was informed by the repair company, Sun King Fencing & Gates, that the wall had buckled due to tree roots. Consequently, the HOA issued a Courtesy Letter on May 3, 2018, requesting that the Petitioner “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
5. Explain the two conflicting interpretations of the term “Private Yard” as argued by the Petitioner and the Respondent. The Respondent argued that a yard is considered a “Private Yard” if it is enclosed or shielded from view, meaning any enclosed yard qualified. The Petitioner argued that the definition should be read to mean a yard is private only if it is enclosed so that it is not generally visible from neighboring property, implying visibility was the key factor.
6. What was the Petitioner’s claim regarding the HOA’s past maintenance practices in his backyard, and how did the Respondent counter this assertion? The Petitioner testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA had provided landscaping maintenance for his backyard. The Respondent denied this claim, stating that it had never provided any landscaping maintenance to any backyards in the community and raised liability concerns about entering residents’ enclosed yards.
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is this standard defined in the legal decision? The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of evidence.
8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s decisions, what was the single most critical point the Petitioner failed to prove, which ultimately led to the dismissal of his case? The judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to present evidence proving that the tree in his backyard was “originally installed by the Declarant” (the developer). According to Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs, the HOA’s maintenance responsibility only applied to landscaping and improvements installed by the original community developer.
9. During the rehearing, what crucial testimony was provided by the HOA’s witness, Maureen Karpinski, and why was it deemed the “only credible evidence” on the matter? Maureen Karpinski testified that none of the homes in the community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the backyards and that they were “just dirt” at the time of purchase. Her testimony was considered credible because she was a real estate agent involved in the initial sales, had walked the community with many buyers during construction, and was herself an original buyer.
10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on September 4, 2018, and the subsequent rehearing on January 11, 2019? In both the initial decision issued on September 24, 2018, and the final decision issued after the rehearing on January 31, 2019, the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. The judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner had failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA had violated the CC&Rs.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style answers. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard” as defined in Section 1.38 of the CC&Rs. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found it unnecessary to rule on this specific issue to reach a decision.
2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard shape the proceedings, and what specific types of evidence (or lack thereof) were most influential in the judge’s final decision?
3. Trace the timeline of the dispute over the tree in Travis Prall’s backyard, from the 2014 storm to the final legal decision in 2019. How did each key event contribute to the escalation of the conflict and the arguments presented at the hearings?
4. Compare the evidence presented by Travis Prall with the evidence presented by the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA at the rehearing. Why did the judge characterize Prall’s evidence as “suppositions and inferences” while deeming the HOA’s evidence “credible”?
5. Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs contains the phrase “as originally installed by Declarant.” Explain the critical importance of this phrase to the outcome of the case and how it became the dispositive legal issue, overshadowing all other arguments.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Tammy L. Eigenheer.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition was filed.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements, which are the governing legal documents for a planned community.
Common Area
Areas within the community maintained by the HOA for the benefit of all residents. The HOA provides landscaping for these areas.
Courtesy Letter
A formal notice sent by the HOA to a homeowner regarding a potential violation or required action. In this case, it requested the removal of a tree causing damage.
Declarant
The original developer of the planned community who installed the initial infrastructure and landscaping.
HOA Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate by a homeowner to initiate a legal hearing regarding an alleged violation by their HOA.
Improvements
A term used in the CC&Rs referring to any additions to a lot other than the main residential dwelling, including landscaping.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, the homeowner Travis Prall.
Pony Wall
A term used to describe the short, two-foot-tall block wall in the backyards of the interior homes, which was buckling due to tree roots.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other,” making a contention “more probably true than not.”
Private Yard
As defined in the CC&Rs, a portion of a yard “which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property.” The interpretation of this definition was a point of contention.
Public Yard
As defined in the CC&Rs, the portion of a yard “which is generally visible from Neighboring Property,” regardless of its location on the lot. The HOA is responsible for maintaining landscaping originally installed by the Declarant in Public Yards.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party that must respond to the claims. In this case, the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA.
Visible from Neighboring Property
A term defined in the CC&Rs to mean an object that would be visible to a six-foot-tall person standing on a neighboring property. It includes a specific exception for objects visible only through a wrought iron fence.
As defined in the CC&Rs, “the portion of the Lot devoted to Improvements other than the Residential Dwelling.”
Blog Post – 18F-H1818053-REL
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18F-H1818053-REL-RHG
2 sources
These documents are two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Travis Prall, the Petitioner, and the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA, the Respondent. The first document outlines the initial decision, dated September 24, 2018, which dismissed Mr. Prall’s petition arguing the HOA violated their Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements (CC&Rs) by neglecting yard maintenance. The second document is the decision following a rehearing requested by the Petitioner, dated January 31, 2019, which reaffirmed the initial dismissal, concluding that Mr. Prall failed to prove that the landscaping in question was originally installed by the Declarant, a prerequisite for the HOA’s maintenance responsibility under the CC&Rs. Both decisions rely heavily on interpreting sections of the CC&Rs, particularly the definitions of “Public Yard” versus “Private Yard,” to determine the HOA’s obligation. Ultimately, both rulings found that the Petitioner did not meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Travis Prall(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Lydia Pierce Linsmeier(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Nicole Payne(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Represented Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Maureen Karpinski(board member) Villas at Tierra Buena HOA President of the Board; testified
Frank Peake(property manager) Pride Community Management Owner of Pride Community Management; testified
Rebecca Stowers(community manager) Community Manager; testified at initial hearing
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition following a rehearing, concluding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the CC&Rs because there was no credible evidence that the disputed landscaping (tree) had been originally installed by the developer.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the landscaping was originally installed by the Declarant, which was a prerequisite for HOA maintenance responsibility under the relevant CC&R section.
Key Issues & Findings
Neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R Section 7.1.4 by failing to maintain a tree in his back yard, arguing the back yard qualified as a 'Public Yard' and the tree was originally installed by the Declarant.
Orders: The Petition was dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA maintenance, CC&R interpretation, burden of proof, landscaping
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1818053-REL Decision – 661820.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:14 (107.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818053-REL
Briefing: Prall v. Villas at Tierra Buena HOA Dispute
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the findings and legal rationale from a homeowners’ association dispute between Petitioner Travis Prall and Respondent Villas at Tierra Buena HOA. The case centered on whether the HOA was responsible for maintaining a tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by neglecting maintenance in what he defined as a “Public Yard.”
The dispute was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, resulting in two decisions, an initial ruling and a subsequent ruling on rehearing, both of which dismissed the Petitioner’s case. The critical takeaway is that the case was decided not on the ambiguous definition of “Public” versus “Private” yards, but on a crucial qualifying clause in the CC&Rs. Section 7.1.4 obligates the HOA to maintain landscaping only “as originally installed by Declarant.”
The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that the tree in question was part of the original developer’s landscaping. Conversely, the HOA presented credible testimony from an early homeowner and board member stating that all backyards in the community were sold as “just dirt,” with no developer-installed landscaping or irrigation. The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner’s arguments were based on “suppositions and inferences” and did not meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim.
Case Overview
This dispute was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings. The core issue was the interpretation of HOA maintenance responsibilities as defined in the community’s governing documents.
Case Detail
Information
Case Number
18F-H1818053-REL
Petitioner
Travis Prall
Respondent
Villas at Tierra Buena HOA
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Initial Hearing
September 4, 2018
Initial Decision
September 24, 2018 (Petition Dismissed)
Rehearing
January 11, 2019
Final Decision
January 31, 2019 (Petition Dismissed)
Timeline of Key Events
• 2010: Petitioner Travis Prall purchases his home, an “interior” unit, and believes the HOA is responsible for both front and backyard maintenance.
• July 26, 2014: A storm knocks over a large tree in the Petitioner’s backyard. He pays for its removal while asserting it was the HOA’s responsibility.
• Post-2014: The tree regrows from its remaining trunk.
• 2018: The HOA observes that the regrown tree’s roots are causing a “pony wall” to buckle and hires Sun King Fencing & Gates to perform repairs. The repair company recommends removing the tree to prevent recurrence.
• May 3, 2018: The HOA issues a “Courtesy Letter” to the Petitioner, requesting he “trim or remove the tree in the back yard causing damage to the pony wall.”
• June 4, 2018: In response, the Petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, initiating the legal proceedings.
Central Allegation and Dispute
The Petitioner alleged that the Villas at Tierra Buena HOA violated Section 7.1.4 of its CC&Rs by “neglecting yard maintenance in visible public yards.” His central claim was that his backyard, though enclosed, qualifies as a “Public Yard” under the CC&Rs and that the HOA was therefore responsible for the maintenance and removal of the problematic tree. The HOA’s demand that he handle the tree himself constituted, in his view, a violation of their duties.
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
The case presented conflicting interpretations of the CC&Rs and opposing accounts of historical maintenance practices.
Petitioner’s Position (Travis Prall)
The Petitioner’s case was built on his interpretation of the CC&Rs and inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that his backyard is a “Public Yard” because, while enclosed by a four-foot wall (two-foot block plus two-foot aluminum fence), it is “generally visible from Neighboring Property” via a community walkway.
• Claim of Prior Maintenance: Testified that from 2010 to 2013, the HOA did provide landscaping maintenance for his backyard.
• Inferences about Original Landscaping:
◦ Posited that the large size of the tree in 2010 indicated it must have been planted by the original developer around 2000.
◦ Argued that the similar design of irrigation systems across the community suggested they were all installed during original construction, including those in backyards.
◦ Noted that the sprinkler system in his backyard wrapped around the tree, further suggesting they were installed together by the developer.
Respondent’s Position (Villas at Tierra Buena HOA)
The Respondent’s defense relied on its own interpretation of the CC&Rs, consistent historical practice, and direct testimony regarding the community’s development.
• CC&R Interpretation: Argued that an “enclosed” yard is, by definition, a “Private Yard,” making the homeowner responsible for its maintenance.
• Denial of Prior Maintenance: Stated unequivocally that it had never provided landscaping services for any resident’s backyard. Its responsibility is limited to front yards and common areas.
• Practical and Liability Concerns: Argued that it has no access to control backyard irrigation systems and that its workers entering enclosed yards would create liability issues, such as pets escaping.
• Crucial Rehearing Testimony: Presented testimony from Maureen Karpinski, the HOA Board President.
◦ Ms. Karpinski, a real estate agent, purchased her home from the developer in 2002 and was involved with the community during its construction phase.
◦ She testified with certainty that her backyard was “just dirt” with no landscaping or irrigation when she purchased it.
◦ She stated that, to the best of her knowledge, “none of the homes in Respondent’s community were sold with any landscaping or irrigation in the back yards and were just dirt.”
Interpretation of Governing CC&R Sections
The dispute revolved around the specific language in the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.
Section
Provision
Significance in the Case
The HOA must “Replace and maintain all landscaping and other Improvements as originally installed by Declarant on the Public Yards of Lots…“
This became the dispositive clause. The Petitioner’s entire claim depended on proving the tree was “originally installed by Declarant.”
“Private Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is enclosed or shielded from view… so that it is not generally Visible from Neighboring Property. “Public Yard” means that portion of a Yard which is generally visible from Neighboring Property…
This created a central point of interpretive conflict. The Petitioner argued the clause meant “enclosed and not visible,” while the HOA argued it meant “enclosed or shielded.” The Judge ultimately did not rule on this ambiguity.
“Visible from Neighboring Property” means… visible to a person six feet tall standing on any part of such neighboring property…
This definition supported the Petitioner’s claim that his backyard was, in fact, “visible” from the common area walkway.
Administrative Law Judge’s Rulings and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the Petitioner’s case in both the initial hearing and the rehearing, focusing on the burden of proof related to a single, critical phrase in the CC&Rs.
Initial Decision (September 24, 2018)
• Avoidance of Ambiguity: The ALJ acknowledged the potential merit of the Petitioner’s interpretation of “Public Yard,” stating “the language of the CC&Rs may lend itself to a reading that Respondent is responsible for the maintenance of the enclosed back yards of the interior homes.” However, the ALJ concluded the tribunal was “not required to reach that issue in this matter.”
• Focus on “Originally Installed by Declarant”: The decision hinged entirely on Section 7.1.4. The ALJ found that the “Petitioner failed to present any evidence that the tree at issue was originally installed by the Declarant.”
• Lack of Proof: The ALJ noted that the tree’s rapid regrowth from 2013 to 2018 made it impossible to conclude that the original tree must have been planted by the developer in 2000.
• Conclusion: The Petitioner failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof, and the petition was dismissed.
Rehearing Decision (January 31, 2019)
• Rejection of Petitioner’s Inferences: The ALJ characterized the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the tree’s age and the irrigation system as “suppositions and inferences.”
• Credibility of Respondent’s Testimony: In contrast, the ALJ found the testimony of HOA President Maureen Karpinski to be “the only credible evidence offered regarding the landscaping of the homes.”
• Definitive Factual Finding: Based on Ms. Karpinski’s testimony, the ALJ concluded there was “no evidence there was any landscaping or improvements originally installed by Declarant.”
• Final Conclusion: As the precondition of Section 7.1.4 (that landscaping be “originally installed by Declarant”) was not met, the HOA had no maintenance duty for the Petitioner’s backyard. The Petitioner again failed to establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and the petition was dismissed with finality.
