The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.
Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803; Bylaws Article IV, Section 6
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the HOA's action to uniformly assess all CR-1 Lots (including Petitioner's two uncombined lots) adhered to the Association Bylaws, which require uniform rates, and did not violate ARS § 33-1803. The governing documents took precedence over any prior reduced assessment granted by a previous Board Order.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association’s interpretation of the Bylaws requiring uniform assessment for all CR-1 lots was incorrect or unlawful, as her lots remained separate parcels according to the county map.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements.
Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% (full rate for two lots) based on the Association's interpretation that the Bylaws require uniform assessment rates for all CR-1 lots, arguing the new rate violated a long-standing prior Board Order (2003) granting her a reduced rate.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Bylaws Article IV, Covenant For Maintenance Assessments, Section 6
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918017-REL Decision – 698354.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:33:35 (137.2 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918017-REL
Briefing Document: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918017-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Loraine Brokaw versus the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (POA). The central conflict concerned the POA Board’s decision to increase Ms. Brokaw’s annual assessment from 150% to 200% for a single residence constructed across two separate lots.
The Petitioner, Ms. Brokaw, argued that this increase was unlawful and capricious, violating a nearly thirty-year practice that had been formalized by a 2003 Board decision granting her a reduced assessment. The POA contended that its action, taken on the advice of counsel, was necessary to comply with the Association’s governing documents, which mandate uniform assessments for all lots.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the homeowner’s petition. The decision established a critical legal precedent for the Association: the unambiguous language of the governing Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) takes precedence over any past Board decisions, informal agreements, or long-standing practices, regardless of their duration. Because the Petitioner owns two distinct, legally unconsolidated lots, the ALJ found that the Board’s action to assess each lot at the full, uniform rate was not a violation, but rather a correct and required application of the community’s Bylaws.
——————————————————————————–
I. Case Overview
• Parties: Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) vs. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent).
• Jurisdiction: Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), State of Arizona.
• Case Number: 19F-H1918017-REL.
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark.
• Hearing Date: March 25, 2019.
• Decision Date: April 01, 2019.
II. Central Issue of the Dispute
The hearing was convened to address the following issue, as stated in the NOTICE OF HEARING:
“Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements based on utterly flawed legal theory, which, in fact, changed from attorney to attorney.”
The core of the dispute was the Association Board’s decision in 2017 to increase the annual assessment for the Petitioner’s property—a single home built across two adjacent lots—from 150% to 200% of the standard single-lot assessment rate. The Petitioner sought to compel the Board to revert to the 150% assessment schedule and reimburse her for costs associated with the petition.
III. Petitioner’s Position and Key Testimony
• Property History: The Petitioner testified that her husband first bought property in Sin Vacas in 1979. In 2003, the couple purchased an adjacent lot and constructed a new home that spanned across both properties (Lots 156 and 157).
• Claim of Lot Combination: The Petitioner claimed to have legally combined the two lots but presented no supporting documentation to the tribunal.
• Historical Assessment Practice: The Petitioner testified that as of 2003, the Association’s practice was to assess properties as follows:
◦ 100%: For a home on a single lot.
◦ 25%: For an undeveloped vacant lot.
◦ 150%: For a residence situated on two lots.
• 2003 Board Decision: On March 24, 2003, the Petitioner received written confirmation from the Board that it had voted to grant her a reduced assessment of 150%, formalizing the existing practice for her property.
• 2017 Assessment Change: On or about December 4, 2017, the Petitioner received a letter from the Association’s management company advising that the Board had decided to raise her assessment to 200%, citing “advice of counsel.”
• Rationale for Increase: The Petitioner stated she was given varying reasons for the change but was ultimately informed that the Board determined all plats needed to be assessed uniformly according to the Association’s governing documents. She was also told that to be assessed as a single lot, she would need to formally combine the lots on the county plat map, a process estimated to cost between $3,000 and $10,000 and require the permission of every other homeowner in the community.
IV. Respondent’s Position
The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association declined to present witnesses or exhibits. Its position at the hearing was that the dispute arose from differing interpretations of the language within the governing Bylaws. The Association’s counsel stated that the matter would be resolved based on the tribunal’s interpretation of the relevant governing texts.
V. Analysis of Governing Documents
The decision rested heavily on the interpretation of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), recorded on April 13, 1978.
Document Section
Key Provision
Relevance to the Case
Bylaws Article I, Section 5
Defines a “Lot” as “any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map of the Sin Vacas Properties.”
This established that the Petitioner’s two properties, being separately numbered on the subdivision map, constitute two distinct lots for assessment purposes.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 6
“Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”
This clause was central to the Judge’s decision. It establishes a clear mandate for uniformity in assessments across all lots of the same type (CR-1), which the 150% rate violated by treating two CR-1 lots differently from others.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 7
States the Board of Directors shall “fix the amount of the annual assessment against each Lot.”
This empowers the Board to set assessments but reinforces that they must do so on a per-lot basis, consistent with the uniformity requirement.
VI. Judge’s Findings and Conclusions of Law
The Administrative Law Judge made the following key determinations, leading to the denial of the petition:
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated community documents or Arizona statutes.
• Undisputed Material Facts: The Judge found it undisputed that:
1. The Petitioner owns two distinct CR-1 lots (Lot 156 and Lot 157).
2. The lots have never been legally combined or consolidated on the Pima County Assessor’s plat map.
3. The Petitioner’s residence is constructed across both lots.
• Primacy of Governing Documents: The central conclusion of the decision was that the Association’s governing documents supersede any past Board decisions or long-standing informal agreements. The Judge stated:
• Uniformity is Mandatory: The Bylaws require that the Association assess all developed CR-1 lots at a uniform rate. By assessing both of the Petitioner’s lots at the same full rate as every other developed CR-1 lot, the Association was found to be complying with the Declaration.
• Board’s Action as Corrective: The 2017 Board’s action was not a breach of contract or an unlawful act. Instead, it was an appropriate correction of the previous Board’s 2003 order, which was inconsistent with the Bylaws’ uniformity mandate. The Petitioner’s argument that the 2003 order should supersede the 2017 order was deemed inaccurate.
VII. Final Order
Based on the findings and legal conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.
The decision affirmed that the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association Board’s action to uniformly assess all CR-1 lots did not violate Arizona state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803) or the Association’s Bylaws.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918017-REL
Study Guide: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
This guide reviews the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling in the administrative hearing case No. 19F-H1918017-REL, Loraine Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in the hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific relief did the Petitioner request from the Office of Administrative Hearings?
3. What specific action taken by the Respondent prompted the Petitioner to file her petition?
4. Describe the assessment practice that the Sin Vacas Board had in place for the Petitioner’s property from 2003 until the change in 2017.
5. What was the Association’s stated reason for increasing the Petitioner’s assessment from 150% to 200%?
6. According to the Association’s Bylaws, what is the rule for how special assessments must be fixed and apportioned?
7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge determine that the Petitioner owned two separate lots?
8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and did the Petitioner successfully meet it?
9. Why did the Judge rule that the 2003 Board Order reducing the Petitioner’s assessment was not a binding contract?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Loraine Brokaw, the Petitioner, who brought the action, and the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, the Respondent. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
2. The Petitioner requested that the Association’s Board be compelled to honor the 30-year assessment schedule and charge her the 150% assessment rate. She also requested that the Board reimburse her for the costs of bringing the petition.
3. The Petitioner filed her petition after receiving a letter on or about December 4, 2017, from the Association’s management company. This letter advised her that the Board had decided to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% based on “advice of counsel.”
4. Beginning in 2003, the Association assessed a home on a single lot at 100%, an undeveloped vacant lot at 25%, and a residence spanning two lots, like the Petitioner’s, at 150%. The Petitioner received written confirmation of her reduced 150% assessment from the Board on March 24, 2003.
5. The Association’s Board increased the assessment after determining that all plats needed to be assessed uniformly, per the Association’s Restatement. The increase was meant to bring her two lots into compliance with the governing documents.
6. Bylaws Article IV, Section 6 states that “Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”
7. The Judge’s conclusion was based on the undisputed fact that the Petitioner’s two properties, Lots 156 and 157, have never been officially combined or consolidated into a single numbered lot on the Pima County Assessor’s Office plat map.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means proving a contention is more probably true than not. The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof.
9. The Judge ruled that the 2003 Board Order was not a binding contract because the Petitioner provided no proof of consideration tendered to the Association. Therefore, the Association’s governing documents took precedence over the informal agreement.
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge concluded that the Board’s action to uniformly assess all CR-1 lots did not violate state statutes or the Association’s Bylaws.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Discuss the hierarchy of authority between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs) and a Board Order, as interpreted in this case.
2. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” in the context of this hearing. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard lead to the denial of her petition?
3. The Petitioner’s case relied heavily on past practice and a 2003 Board decision to grant her a reduced assessment. Discuss why this argument was ultimately insufficient to overcome the explicit language of the Association’s governing documents.
4. Examine the contractual nature of a homeowners’ association’s CC&Rs as described in the Findings of Fact. How does this contractual relationship between the Association and each property owner shape the obligations and rights of both parties?
5. The Respondent (Sin Vacas POA) declined to present witnesses or exhibits, taking a passive stance at the hearing. Discuss the potential legal strategy behind this approach and how the undisputed material facts of the case made this a viable option.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and issues orders.
Association
The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, a homeowners’ association for the Sin Vacas subdivision in Tucson, Arizona, responsible for managing, maintaining, and improving the property.
Assessment
A fee levied by the Association on property owners to promote the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of residents and for the improvement and maintenance of common areas and private streets.
Bylaws
The specific articles and sections within the CC&Rs that govern the Association’s operations, including definitions, assessment rules, and voting procedures.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing documents for the Association, recorded with Pima County on April 13, 1978. They form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, which is authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.
Any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map of the Sin Vacas Properties, with the exception of the Common Area. This case deals specifically with CR-1 lots.
OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)
An independent state agency to which the Department refers matters for evidentiary hearings. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret contracts between parties.
Petitioner
Loraine Brokaw, a property owner in the Sin Vacas subdivision and member of the Association who filed the petition against the Association.
Planned Community
A real estate development where owners of separately owned lots are mandatory members of a nonprofit association and are required to pay assessments for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win her case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents the greater weight of evidence.
Respondent
The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, the entity against whom the petition was filed.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918017-REL
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19F-H1918017-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) and the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner challenged the Association’s decision to raise her annual assessment, arguing that the increase was arbitrary and contravened a decades-long practice of assessing her two lots at a combined 150% rate, rather than the new 200% rate. The decision outlines the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, confirming that the Association is governed by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Bylaws, which require uniform assessment rates for all developed lots. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated any community documents or statutes, reasoning that the governing documents take precedence over any prior informal agreement, and denied the Petitioner’s request.
What was the core legal basis for rejecting the petitioner’s assessment challenge?
How did the Association’s governing documents dictate uniform assessment requirements?
What legal implications arose from the Board’s decision to change long-standing practice?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Loraine Brokaw(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Jason Smith(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Counsel for Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
Sean Moynihan(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Counsel for Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803; Bylaws Article IV, Section 6
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the HOA's action to uniformly assess all CR-1 Lots (including Petitioner's two uncombined lots) adhered to the Association Bylaws, which require uniform rates, and did not violate ARS § 33-1803. The governing documents took precedence over any prior reduced assessment granted by a previous Board Order.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the Association’s interpretation of the Bylaws requiring uniform assessment for all CR-1 lots was incorrect or unlawful, as her lots remained separate parcels according to the county map.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements.
Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% (full rate for two lots) based on the Association's interpretation that the Bylaws require uniform assessment rates for all CR-1 lots, arguing the new rate violated a long-standing prior Board Order (2003) granting her a reduced rate.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802(4)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Bylaws Article IV, Covenant For Maintenance Assessments, Section 6
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1918017-REL Decision – 698354.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:26:53 (137.2 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918017-REL
Briefing Document: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1918017-REL)
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Loraine Brokaw versus the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (POA). The central conflict concerned the POA Board’s decision to increase Ms. Brokaw’s annual assessment from 150% to 200% for a single residence constructed across two separate lots.
The Petitioner, Ms. Brokaw, argued that this increase was unlawful and capricious, violating a nearly thirty-year practice that had been formalized by a 2003 Board decision granting her a reduced assessment. The POA contended that its action, taken on the advice of counsel, was necessary to comply with the Association’s governing documents, which mandate uniform assessments for all lots.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied the homeowner’s petition. The decision established a critical legal precedent for the Association: the unambiguous language of the governing Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) takes precedence over any past Board decisions, informal agreements, or long-standing practices, regardless of their duration. Because the Petitioner owns two distinct, legally unconsolidated lots, the ALJ found that the Board’s action to assess each lot at the full, uniform rate was not a violation, but rather a correct and required application of the community’s Bylaws.
——————————————————————————–
I. Case Overview
• Parties: Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) vs. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent).
• Jurisdiction: Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), State of Arizona.
• Case Number: 19F-H1918017-REL.
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark.
• Hearing Date: March 25, 2019.
• Decision Date: April 01, 2019.
II. Central Issue of the Dispute
The hearing was convened to address the following issue, as stated in the NOTICE OF HEARING:
“Whether Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent) arbitrarily and capriciously raised annual assessments for some homeowners and not others in contravention of decades of past board practice and contractual agreements based on utterly flawed legal theory, which, in fact, changed from attorney to attorney.”
The core of the dispute was the Association Board’s decision in 2017 to increase the annual assessment for the Petitioner’s property—a single home built across two adjacent lots—from 150% to 200% of the standard single-lot assessment rate. The Petitioner sought to compel the Board to revert to the 150% assessment schedule and reimburse her for costs associated with the petition.
III. Petitioner’s Position and Key Testimony
• Property History: The Petitioner testified that her husband first bought property in Sin Vacas in 1979. In 2003, the couple purchased an adjacent lot and constructed a new home that spanned across both properties (Lots 156 and 157).
• Claim of Lot Combination: The Petitioner claimed to have legally combined the two lots but presented no supporting documentation to the tribunal.
• Historical Assessment Practice: The Petitioner testified that as of 2003, the Association’s practice was to assess properties as follows:
◦ 100%: For a home on a single lot.
◦ 25%: For an undeveloped vacant lot.
◦ 150%: For a residence situated on two lots.
• 2003 Board Decision: On March 24, 2003, the Petitioner received written confirmation from the Board that it had voted to grant her a reduced assessment of 150%, formalizing the existing practice for her property.
• 2017 Assessment Change: On or about December 4, 2017, the Petitioner received a letter from the Association’s management company advising that the Board had decided to raise her assessment to 200%, citing “advice of counsel.”
• Rationale for Increase: The Petitioner stated she was given varying reasons for the change but was ultimately informed that the Board determined all plats needed to be assessed uniformly according to the Association’s governing documents. She was also told that to be assessed as a single lot, she would need to formally combine the lots on the county plat map, a process estimated to cost between $3,000 and $10,000 and require the permission of every other homeowner in the community.
IV. Respondent’s Position
The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association declined to present witnesses or exhibits. Its position at the hearing was that the dispute arose from differing interpretations of the language within the governing Bylaws. The Association’s counsel stated that the matter would be resolved based on the tribunal’s interpretation of the relevant governing texts.
V. Analysis of Governing Documents
The decision rested heavily on the interpretation of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), recorded on April 13, 1978.
Document Section
Key Provision
Relevance to the Case
Bylaws Article I, Section 5
Defines a “Lot” as “any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map of the Sin Vacas Properties.”
This established that the Petitioner’s two properties, being separately numbered on the subdivision map, constitute two distinct lots for assessment purposes.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 6
“Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”
This clause was central to the Judge’s decision. It establishes a clear mandate for uniformity in assessments across all lots of the same type (CR-1), which the 150% rate violated by treating two CR-1 lots differently from others.
Bylaws Article IV, Section 7
States the Board of Directors shall “fix the amount of the annual assessment against each Lot.”
This empowers the Board to set assessments but reinforces that they must do so on a per-lot basis, consistent with the uniformity requirement.
VI. Judge’s Findings and Conclusions of Law
The Administrative Law Judge made the following key determinations, leading to the denial of the petition:
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated community documents or Arizona statutes.
• Undisputed Material Facts: The Judge found it undisputed that:
1. The Petitioner owns two distinct CR-1 lots (Lot 156 and Lot 157).
2. The lots have never been legally combined or consolidated on the Pima County Assessor’s plat map.
3. The Petitioner’s residence is constructed across both lots.
• Primacy of Governing Documents: The central conclusion of the decision was that the Association’s governing documents supersede any past Board decisions or long-standing informal agreements. The Judge stated:
• Uniformity is Mandatory: The Bylaws require that the Association assess all developed CR-1 lots at a uniform rate. By assessing both of the Petitioner’s lots at the same full rate as every other developed CR-1 lot, the Association was found to be complying with the Declaration.
• Board’s Action as Corrective: The 2017 Board’s action was not a breach of contract or an unlawful act. Instead, it was an appropriate correction of the previous Board’s 2003 order, which was inconsistent with the Bylaws’ uniformity mandate. The Petitioner’s argument that the 2003 order should supersede the 2017 order was deemed inaccurate.
VII. Final Order
Based on the findings and legal conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.
The decision affirmed that the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association Board’s action to uniformly assess all CR-1 lots did not violate Arizona state law (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803) or the Association’s Bylaws.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918017-REL
Study Guide: Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
This guide reviews the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling in the administrative hearing case No. 19F-H1918017-REL, Loraine Brokaw v. Sin Vacas Property Owners Association.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each question in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in the hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific relief did the Petitioner request from the Office of Administrative Hearings?
3. What specific action taken by the Respondent prompted the Petitioner to file her petition?
4. Describe the assessment practice that the Sin Vacas Board had in place for the Petitioner’s property from 2003 until the change in 2017.
5. What was the Association’s stated reason for increasing the Petitioner’s assessment from 150% to 200%?
6. According to the Association’s Bylaws, what is the rule for how special assessments must be fixed and apportioned?
7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge determine that the Petitioner owned two separate lots?
8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and did the Petitioner successfully meet it?
9. Why did the Judge rule that the 2003 Board Order reducing the Petitioner’s assessment was not a binding contract?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Loraine Brokaw, the Petitioner, who brought the action, and the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, the Respondent. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark from the Office of Administrative Hearings.
2. The Petitioner requested that the Association’s Board be compelled to honor the 30-year assessment schedule and charge her the 150% assessment rate. She also requested that the Board reimburse her for the costs of bringing the petition.
3. The Petitioner filed her petition after receiving a letter on or about December 4, 2017, from the Association’s management company. This letter advised her that the Board had decided to raise her assessment from 150% to 200% based on “advice of counsel.”
4. Beginning in 2003, the Association assessed a home on a single lot at 100%, an undeveloped vacant lot at 25%, and a residence spanning two lots, like the Petitioner’s, at 150%. The Petitioner received written confirmation of her reduced 150% assessment from the Board on March 24, 2003.
5. The Association’s Board increased the assessment after determining that all plats needed to be assessed uniformly, per the Association’s Restatement. The increase was meant to bring her two lots into compliance with the governing documents.
6. Bylaws Article IV, Section 6 states that “Special assessments must be fixed and apportioned at a uniform rate for all CR-1 lots, SR lots, and each 20,000 square feet of TR lots.”
7. The Judge’s conclusion was based on the undisputed fact that the Petitioner’s two properties, Lots 156 and 157, have never been officially combined or consolidated into a single numbered lot on the Pima County Assessor’s Office plat map.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means proving a contention is more probably true than not. The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to sustain her burden of proof.
9. The Judge ruled that the 2003 Board Order was not a binding contract because the Petitioner provided no proof of consideration tendered to the Association. Therefore, the Association’s governing documents took precedence over the informal agreement.
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge concluded that the Board’s action to uniformly assess all CR-1 lots did not violate state statutes or the Association’s Bylaws.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Discuss the hierarchy of authority between the Association’s governing documents (CC&Rs) and a Board Order, as interpreted in this case.
2. Explain the concept of “burden of proof” in the context of this hearing. How did the Petitioner’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard lead to the denial of her petition?
3. The Petitioner’s case relied heavily on past practice and a 2003 Board decision to grant her a reduced assessment. Discuss why this argument was ultimately insufficient to overcome the explicit language of the Association’s governing documents.
4. Examine the contractual nature of a homeowners’ association’s CC&Rs as described in the Findings of Fact. How does this contractual relationship between the Association and each property owner shape the obligations and rights of both parties?
5. The Respondent (Sin Vacas POA) declined to present witnesses or exhibits, taking a passive stance at the hearing. Discuss the potential legal strategy behind this approach and how the undisputed material facts of the case made this a viable option.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official, in this case Jenna Clark, who presides over administrative hearings, reviews evidence, makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and issues orders.
Association
The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, a homeowners’ association for the Sin Vacas subdivision in Tucson, Arizona, responsible for managing, maintaining, and improving the property.
Assessment
A fee levied by the Association on property owners to promote the recreation, health, safety, and welfare of residents and for the improvement and maintenance of common areas and private streets.
Bylaws
The specific articles and sections within the CC&Rs that govern the Association’s operations, including definitions, assessment rules, and voting procedures.
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing documents for the Association, recorded with Pima County on April 13, 1978. They form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, which is authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations.
Any numbered lot shown upon any recorded subdivision map of the Sin Vacas Properties, with the exception of the Common Area. This case deals specifically with CR-1 lots.
OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)
An independent state agency to which the Department refers matters for evidentiary hearings. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret contracts between parties.
Petitioner
Loraine Brokaw, a property owner in the Sin Vacas subdivision and member of the Association who filed the petition against the Association.
Planned Community
A real estate development where owners of separately owned lots are mandatory members of a nonprofit association and are required to pay assessments for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win her case. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents the greater weight of evidence.
Respondent
The Sin Vacas Property Owners Association, the entity against whom the petition was filed.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918017-REL
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19F-H1918017-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Loraine Brokaw (Petitioner) and the Sin Vacas Property Owners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner challenged the Association’s decision to raise her annual assessment, arguing that the increase was arbitrary and contravened a decades-long practice of assessing her two lots at a combined 150% rate, rather than the new 200% rate. The decision outlines the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, confirming that the Association is governed by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and Bylaws, which require uniform assessment rates for all developed lots. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove the Association violated any community documents or statutes, reasoning that the governing documents take precedence over any prior informal agreement, and denied the Petitioner’s request.
What was the core legal basis for rejecting the petitioner’s assessment challenge?
How did the Association’s governing documents dictate uniform assessment requirements?
What legal implications arose from the Board’s decision to change long-standing practice?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Loraine Brokaw(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Jason Smith(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Counsel for Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
Sean Moynihan(HOA attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Counsel for Sin Vacas Property Owners Association
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Thomas P. Satterlee
Counsel
—
Respondent
Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association
Counsel
James A. Robles
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Outcome Summary
The petition was dismissed with prejudice due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Respondent Property Owner's Association was not found to be a 'planned community' under the applicable Arizona statute.
Why this result: The ALJ determined that the Respondent HOA did not meet the definition of a 'planned community' because its maintenance of landscaping did not constitute maintaining 'roadways' as required by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
Key Issues & Findings
Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status
The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing it was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because it did not maintain 'roadways'. Petitioner argued that maintaining landscaping around the entrance sign satisfied the 'covenant to maintain roadways' requirement by defining 'roadway' as the entire 'right-of-way'. The ALJ found that 'roadway' means the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Jurisdiction, Planned Community, A.R.S. 33-1802, Roadway Definition, HOA Dispute
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:22 (130.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA
Executive Summary
This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.
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Case Overview and Procedural History
The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.
• January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
• March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.
• April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.
• September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.
• September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Central Jurisdictional Question
The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.
The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.
Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:
“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”
A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.
Arguments of the Parties
The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.
Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)
The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.
• Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
• “Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.
• Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”
• Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:
◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.
◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).
◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.
◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”
◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.
Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)
The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.
• Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”
• Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.
• Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision
The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.
The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.
To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”
Source
Definition of “Roadway”
English Oxford Living Dict.
“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”
Merriam-Webster
“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”
Dictionary.com
“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”
Cambridge Dictionary
“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”
American Heritage Dictionary
“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”
Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries
“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”
The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:
“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”
The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”
• Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”
• Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).
• Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”
These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.
• Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.
• Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.
• Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.
• Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association
This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.
1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?
2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?
3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?
4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?
5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?
7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?
8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?
9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?
10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?
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Answer Key
1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.
2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.
3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.
4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.
5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.
6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.
8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”
9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.
10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
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Essay Questions
Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.
2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?
3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.
4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?
5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.
Complete Streets
An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.
Covenant
A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.
Petitioner
The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.
Planned Community
As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.
Right-of-Way
The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”
Roadway
Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
This Homeowner’s Case Collapsed Over One Word — Here’s Why It Matters
Dealing with a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) can sometimes feel like navigating a maze of rules and regulations. But what happens when a dispute isn’t about a rule, but about the definition of a single, common word? In the Arizona case of Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association, a major legal conflict hinged on one seemingly simple question: What, exactly, is a “roadway”?
The answer would determine whether a state agency had the power to hear the case at all. The judge’s decision provides a masterclass in how the law interprets language, revealing practical lessons about why a single word can make or break an entire legal argument.
1. A Legal Battle Can Hinge on a Dictionary Definition
The core issue of the case was jurisdiction—whether the Arizona Department of Real Estate had the authority to hear the dispute. For the department to have jurisdiction, the HOA had to qualify as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). A key part of that definition required the HOA to have a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
This is where the entire case pivoted.
The Homeowner’s Argument: The petitioner, Mr. Satterlee, argued that the HOA’s responsibility to maintain the walls, sign, and surrounding landscaping at the community entrance fulfilled this requirement. He contended that “roadway” should be interpreted broadly as a “roadway system,” which would include the entire right-of-way, landscaping and all.
The HOA’s Argument: The respondent HOA argued for a much narrower definition. They stated that a “roadway” is only the part of the road used for vehicle traffic. Since maintaining walls and landscaping is not maintaining a roadway, they argued they were not a “planned community” under the law, and therefore the state had no jurisdiction.
The entire legal question of whether the case could even proceed came down to the plain meaning of this one word.
2. Judges Don’t Guess — They Have a Method for Meaning
When a legal dispute depends on the meaning of a word in a law, judges don’t simply pick the definition they prefer. Legal interpretation follows a clear principle: start with the “plain meaning” of the words the legislature chose to use. This wasn’t just a casual search; it was a methodical application of the “plain meaning rule,” a cornerstone of statutory interpretation where judges prioritize the common, ordinary meaning of words over specialized or re-imagined definitions.
To determine the plain meaning of “roadway,” the Administrative Law Judge in this case conducted a thorough review of its common definition by consulting numerous dictionaries:
• English Oxford Living Dictionaries
• Merriam-Webster
• Dictionary.com
• Cambridge Dictionary
• American Heritage Dictionary
• Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries
The collective conclusion was overwhelming. The dictionaries consistently defined a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicles, explicitly contrasting it with sidewalks, shoulders, or adjacent landscaping. This methodical approach demonstrated that the common, established meaning of the word supported the HOA’s narrow interpretation, not the homeowner’s broad one.
3. Your Own Evidence Can Be Used Against You
In a classic case of legal irony, the very evidence the homeowner presented to support his case became the primary tool the judge used to dismantle it. The homeowner submitted several official documents from Pima County, but these exhibits ended up undermining his own argument.
The judge pointed to several instances where the homeowner’s own evidence made a clear distinction between a “roadway” and the surrounding area:
• A Pima County ordinance referred to the “right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway,” treating the two as separate things. The judge noted that the petitioner tried to argue that the “shoulder of an existing roadway” referred not to the paved edge for vehicles, but to the landscaped areas beyond it—an interpretation that defies common understanding and the county’s own official language.
• County planning documents used different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’), showing they are considered distinct components.
• Another county rule stated that the “installation of landscaping” must begin after the formal completion of the “roadway project.”
The judge concluded that these documents demonstrated that in official use, “roadway” and “right-of-way” are treated as different concepts. The very evidence intended to support the homeowner’s case ended up directly contradicting it.
4. Modern Concepts Don’t Automatically Change Old Laws
The homeowner’s central supporting idea was the “Complete Streets” approach—a modern civil engineering concept that views streets as integrated systems for all users, including cars, bicyclists, and pedestrians. He argued this modern understanding should apply to the word “roadway.”
The judge rejected this argument based on a crucial point of legal reasoning: legislative intent.
The judge noted that the “Complete Streets” concept was already well-known in 2014 when the Arizona legislature amended the statute in question. The legislature could have used broader terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets” but deliberately chose not to. Instead, they specifically chose the narrower, more traditional term “roadway.” The judge inferred that this was a deliberate choice, and the court’s job was to interpret the word the legislature actually used, not one it could have used.
The judge even noted that the sheer volume of evidence the homeowner presented to redefine “roadway” was itself proof that his interpretation was not the “plain meaning”—if it were, such extensive explanation wouldn’t be necessary.
To illustrate the point with a simple, real-world example of plain meaning, the judge wrote:
One would be hard pressed to interpret that phrase [“don’t play in the street”] as a warning not to play on the sidewalk or landscaping area bordering a paved thoroughfare.
Conclusion: In Law, Precision Is Everything
The overarching lesson from this case is that in legal interpretation, every word matters. Whether it’s the dictionary definition of “roadway,” the precise language in county ordinances, or the specific terms chosen by lawmakers, the plain, established meaning of words carries immense weight.
Ultimately, the homeowner’s petition was dismissed. Because the HOA’s duty to maintain landscaping did not qualify as a “covenant to maintain roadways,” it was not a “planned community” under the statute. As a result, the state agency lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
This case shows how the specific words chosen by lawmakers years ago can have major consequences today. What common words might we be using every day that have a completely different and critical meaning in a legal context?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Thomas P. Satterlee(petitioner)
Respondent Side
James A. Robles(attorney) Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del sol(staff) Clerk/Distribution staff
Other Participants
Ana M. Olivares(Director) Pima County Transportation Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance
Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association
Counsel
James A. Robles
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Outcome Summary
The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.
Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.
Key Issues & Findings
Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status
This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Decision Documents
18F-H1817022-REL Decision – 661827.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:16:14 (130.3 KB)
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Thomas P. Satterlee(petitioner)
Respondent Side
James A. Robles(HOA attorney) Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del sol(staff/clerk) Staff responsible for decision distribution
Other Participants
Ana M. Olivares(Director) Pima County Transportation Authored May 18, 2018 letter presented as documentation by Petitioner
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-09-25
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Thomas P. Satterlee
Counsel
—
Respondent
Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association
Counsel
James A. Robles
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Outcome Summary
The petition was dismissed with prejudice upon rehearing because the Administrative Law Judge confirmed that the Respondent HOA did not meet the statutory definition of a 'planned community,' thereby depriving the OAH and ADRE of subject matter jurisdiction.
Why this result: The ALJ narrowly interpreted the statutory term 'roadway' to mean the part of the road intended for vehicles, excluding the landscaping maintenance performed by the HOA.
Key Issues & Findings
Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status
This issue was heard on rehearing. Petitioner argued that the maintenance of entrance landscaping constituted maintaining 'roadways' by interpreting the statutory term broadly, citing the 'Complete Streets' approach and Pima County right-of-way documents. The ALJ affirmed the original decision, holding that the plain meaning of 'roadway' is the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1802
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:02 (130.3 KB)
Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA
Executive Summary
This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.
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Case Overview and Procedural History
The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.
• January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
• March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.
• April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.
• September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.
• September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Central Jurisdictional Question
The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.
The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.
Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:
“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”
A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.
Arguments of the Parties
The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.
Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)
The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.
• Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
• “Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.
• Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”
• Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:
◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.
◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).
◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.
◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”
◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.
Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)
The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.
• Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”
• Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.
• Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision
The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.
The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.
To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”
Source
Definition of “Roadway”
English Oxford Living Dict.
“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”
Merriam-Webster
“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”
Dictionary.com
“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”
Cambridge Dictionary
“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”
American Heritage Dictionary
“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”
Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries
“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”
The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:
“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”
The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”
• Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”
• Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).
• Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”
These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.
• Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.
• Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.
• Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.
• Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association
This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.
1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?
2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?
3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?
4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?
5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?
7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?
8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?
9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?
10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?
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Answer Key
1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.
2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.
3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.
4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.
5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.
6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.
8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”
9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.
10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
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Essay Questions
Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.
2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?
3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.
4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?
5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.
Complete Streets
An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.
Covenant
A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.
Petitioner
The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.
Planned Community
As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.
Right-of-Way
The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”
Roadway
Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.
don't play in the street
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Thomas P. Satterlee(petitioner)
Respondent Side
James A. Robles(attorney) Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del sol(staff) Clerk/Distribution staff
Other Participants
Ana M. Olivares(Director) Pima County Transportation Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Gary W. Moselle
Counsel
—
Respondent
Desert Mountain Master Association
Counsel
Curtis Ekmark
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1804
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, ruling that the DMMA Communication Committee was not subject to the open meetings law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because it did not hold 'regularly scheduled meetings',,,.
Why this result: The committee met too infrequently and without regular intervals to be deemed 'regularly scheduled' for the purposes of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether a Communications Committee meeting must be open to members under the open meetings law.
Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated the open meetings statute by closing the September 6, 2017 meeting of the Communications Committee. The issue was whether this committee constituted a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,,,.
Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the DMMA Communication committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings, meaning it was not subject to the open meetings law under A.R.S. § 33-1804,,,.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Open Meetings Law, Committee Meetings, Statutory Interpretation, Planned Community
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1804
A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818
A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
A.A.C. R2-19-119
State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
Briefing on the Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association Case
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions regarding a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA or Respondent). The core of the case, No. 18F-H1817005-REL, is the legal interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as it appears in Arizona’s open meeting statute for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.
The conflict arose when the DMMA Communications Committee held a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, which Mr. Moselle was barred from attending. He contended this violated the statute’s open meeting requirements. The DMMA argued the committee was exempt because its meetings were infrequent and not held at fixed intervals.
In two separate decisions—an initial ruling on December 7, 2017, and a second after a rehearing on May 10, 2018—Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer consistently ruled in favor of the DMMA. The judge concluded that “regularly scheduled” applies to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly). Since the Communications Committee met only four times in two years without a set schedule, it was not subject to the open meeting law. The judge determined that the statute’s general policy favoring openness does not override its more specific provisions. Ultimately, the petitioner’s petition was denied.
Case Background and Timeline
The dispute proceeded through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, culminating in a definitive ruling after a granted rehearing.
September 1, 2017
Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging DMMA violated open meeting laws.
September 6, 2017
The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Mr. Moselle is not permitted to attend.
September 18, 2017
DMMA files an answer denying all allegations.
November 17, 2017
An initial hearing is conducted before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Tammy L. Eigenheer.
December 7, 2017
The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.
January 4, 2018
Mr. Moselle files a request for rehearing, citing “newly discovered material evidence” and arguing the decision was contrary to law.
January 26, 2018
The Department of Real Estate grants the request for a rehearing.
April 20, 2018
A rehearing is conducted before the ALJ.
May 10, 2018
The ALJ issues a final decision after rehearing, again denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.
Core Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804
The central legal question was whether the DMMA Communications Committee was subject to the open meeting requirements mandated by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804. The resolution of the case hinged on the interpretation of specific language within the statute.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
• A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”
• A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): “It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.”
Arguments Presented by the Parties
The petitioner and respondent presented starkly different interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled.”
Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Mr. Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting scheduled in a “normal manner” or “ordinary fashion,” not necessarily one that recurs at fixed intervals.
• Primacy of Openness Policy: He emphasized the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), asserting that the statute’s clear preference for open meetings should guide the interpretation of any ambiguous terms.
• Arguments for Rehearing: In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Moselle cited newly discovered evidence (an email sent by the DMMA after the first hearing) and suggested the ALJ should evaluate whether the DMMA had misled the court regarding the Board’s actions on the committee’s recommendation.
Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)
• Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA contended that the phrase “regularly scheduled” plainly refers to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals, “such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”
• Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: As evidence, the DMMA testified that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed pattern, holding only four meetings in 2016 and 2017 (twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and the contested meeting of September 6, 2017).
• Lack of Board Action: The DMMA further argued that a recommendation from the committee to the Board of Directors was not acted upon, which it presented as evidence that the committee was not “conducting any actual business of the Board.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Rulings
Across both decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided a consistent legal analysis that ultimately favored the respondent’s interpretation of the statute.
Initial Decision (December 7, 2017)
• The ALJ concluded that the DMMA Communications Committee does not hold “regularly scheduled meetings.”
• Based on this finding, the committee was deemed not subject to the open meetings law.
• The decision to hold a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, was therefore ruled not to be a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.
• The petitioner’s petition was denied.
Decision After Rehearing (May 10, 2018)
• Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ reaffirmed the conclusion that the “plain language” of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) applies to meetings that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the ALJ settled on this interpretation.
• Policy vs. Specifics: The decision explicitly states that the general policy favoring open meetings in subsection (F) “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”
• Petitioner’s Testimony: The ALJ noted that during the rehearing, Mr. Moselle’s own testimony on cross-examination appeared to support the court’s interpretation. When questioned about other DMMA committees, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”
• Final Ruling: The ALJ again concluded that the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings at the time of the incident and was therefore not in violation of the statute. The petition was denied for a final time.
Final Disposition
The petition filed by Gary W. Moselle against the Desert Mountain Master Association was denied. The Administrative Law Judge’s order of May 10, 2018, issued after the rehearing, was declared binding on the parties. As per the final notice, any further appeal would require a party to seek judicial review in superior court within thirty-five days of the order.
Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (Respondent) concerning Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific event on September 6, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file his complaint?
3. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?
4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for why its Communications Committee was not subject to the open meetings law?
5. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the key statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?
6. What evidence did the Respondent present regarding the frequency of the Communications Committee’s meetings in 2016 and 2017?
7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party had the responsibility to meet it?
8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the meaning of “regularly scheduled” in the context of the statute?
9. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued on December 7, 2017?
10. How did the judge weigh the general policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) against the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Gary W. Moselle, the Petitioner, and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), the Respondent. Mr. Moselle was a homeowner who filed a petition against the DMMA, which is the homeowners association for the community.
2. The Petitioner filed his complaint after he was not allowed to attend a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee that was held on September 6, 2017. He alleged this violated Arizona’s open meeting statute.
3. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804. This statute governs open meetings for planned communities, such as homeowners associations.
4. The Respondent argued that the Communications Committee did not meet at regular, established intervals and therefore its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” as required by the statute to be open. They also asserted that the committee’s recommendation was not acted upon by the Board, suggesting it was not conducting official business.
5. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting that was scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He asserted this interpretation was supported by the statute’s general policy favoring open meetings.
6. The Respondent provided testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set interval, having held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017. These meetings occurred twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and on September 6, 2017.
7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring evidence to show that a fact is more probable than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, bore the burden of proving the Respondent’s violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the plain language of the statute meant “regularly scheduled” referred to meetings that occur at regular intervals, such as monthly, quarterly, or annually. The judge rejected the Petitioner’s alternate interpretation.
9. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing by citing newly discovered material evidence (an email sent after the first hearing) and arguing the need to evaluate whether the Respondent had misled the judge. He also contended that the initial decision was contrary to law.
10. The judge acknowledged the state’s policy favoring open meetings as stated in subsection (F). However, the judge ruled that this general policy statement did not override the specific provision in subsection (A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing upon the facts, arguments, and legal reasoning presented in the case documents.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the principles of statutory construction used by the Administrative Law Judge to resolve this dispute and explain why one interpretation was favored over the other.
2. Examine the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to the final order issued after the rehearing. What were the key legal steps, decisions, and turning points in the process?
3. Discuss the evidence presented by the Desert Mountain Master Association to support its case. How did testimony regarding meeting frequency and the Board’s actions on committee recommendations contribute to the final outcome?
4. Explain the legal relationship between A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). Based on the judge’s decision, what is the hierarchy between a statute’s specific provisions and its general policy declarations?
5. During the rehearing, the Petitioner’s own testimony about other committees was noted by the Administrative Law Judge. Explain this apparent contradiction in the Petitioner’s argument and discuss its potential impact on the case.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions on behalf of a government agency.
A.R.S. § 33-1804
The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the dispute, which governs open meetings for planned communities and their boards of directors and committees.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the burden was on the Petitioner.
Conclusions of Law
The judge’s application of legal principles to the facts of the case to reach a decision.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and homeowners associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA)
The Respondent in the case; a homeowners association located in Scottsdale, Arizona, classified as a Planned Unit Development.
Findings of Fact
The determination of factual events made by a judge from the evidence presented in a trial or hearing.
Gary W. Moselle
The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner within the DMMA who filed the complaint.
Jurisdiction
The official power of a court or agency to hear a case and make legal decisions and judgments.
Open Meetings Law
A law, in this case A.R.S. § 33-1804, that requires meetings of certain entities to be open to all members or the public.
Petition
The formal written request filed with an administrative body or court to initiate a case.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition and initiates a legal action.
Planned Unit Development (PUD)
A type of real estate development and community governed by specific state laws, such as those in A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows a fact is more probable than not.
Rehearing
A second hearing of a case to reconsider the previous decision, typically granted due to new evidence or an argument of legal error.
Regularly Scheduled
The key statutory phrase in dispute. The judge interpreted it to mean meetings that occur at regular, established intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly).
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party defending against the complaint.
Statutory Construction
The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, starting with the plain text of the statute.
Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Your HOA Committee Might Be Meeting in Secret—And It Could Be Perfectly Legal
As a homeowner in a planned community, you likely know you have the right to attend your HOA’s board of directors meetings. But what about the committee meetings? The finance, architectural, or communications committees often lay the critical groundwork for decisions that ultimately affect your property and fees. Do you have a right to observe their deliberations?
A recent legal case in Scottsdale, Arizona, hinged on the interpretation of a single, seemingly straightforward phrase and exposed a surprising rule about HOA transparency. The case, Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association, reveals critical lessons for any homeowner about the letter of the law and how it can sometimes create legal loopholes that allow committee meetings to happen behind closed doors.
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1. The Crucial Loophole: “Regularly Scheduled” Doesn’t Mean What You Think
The entire dispute rested on how to interpret the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as written in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.
The Homeowner’s Argument The petitioner, homeowner Gary Moselle, argued that when the Communications Committee of the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA) scheduled a meeting for September 6, 2017, it should be open to all members. His logic was simple: a meeting that is formally scheduled and placed on the calendar is, by any common-sense definition, a “regularly scheduled” meeting.
The HOA’s Counter-Argument The DMMA countered with a different interpretation. They argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” implies a recurring, predictable pattern, such as meetings held monthly, quarterly, or on the third Thursday of every month. The association presented evidence that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set pattern, having convened only four times in 2016 and 2017. Because the meetings were sporadic, the HOA contended they were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore not subject to the open meeting law.
To bolster its case, the HOA added a second point: the committee’s work wasn’t essential to board business anyway. They noted that a recommendation from the committee was never acted upon by the board, suggesting the committee was not conducting “any actual business of the Board” and thus did not require the same level of transparency.
The Surprising Verdict Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer sided with the HOA. The final decision concluded that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings that occur at regular intervals. This created a legal distinction: HOA committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule must be open, but those that meet on an as-needed basis may not be.
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2. A Law’s “Spirit” Can Be Trumped by Its “Letter”
Adding another layer to the case was the law’s own powerful statement about its intent. The petitioner pointed to a specific section of the statute designed to ensure transparency.
The Policy Statement The Arizona law contains a strong policy statement declaring that all HOA meetings should be conducted openly. It explicitly directs anyone interpreting the law to favor open meetings.
It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.
The Legal Reasoning Despite this clear declaration, Judge Eigenheer ruled that a general policy statement does not override the specific and explicit language of the law. The statute does not say all committee meetings must be open; it says “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open. The judge concluded that this specific wording created a clear exception, and the broad policy in favor of transparency could not erase it.
The Impact This is a critical takeaway for understanding how laws are interpreted. This outcome reflects a fundamental principle of statutory construction: while the “spirit” or stated policy of a law provides guidance, it cannot override the plain meaning of the specific words—the “letter”—that the legislature chose to write.
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3. A Cautionary Tale: How a Petitioner Undermined His Own Case
The petitioner was granted a rehearing, giving him another chance to argue his case. However, a statement he made during his own testimony dramatically weakened his position.
The Key Testimony During the rehearing on April 20, 2018, the petitioner was asked about other committees within the DMMA. In explaining how they operated, he unintentionally adopted the very definition of “regularly scheduled” that the HOA was using against him. The judge recorded his exact words in the final decision:
…five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”
The Consequence The judge seized on this admission in the final ruling. The decision notes that while “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the petitioner himself used the phrase to differentiate between committees that meet at fixed intervals and those that do not. By describing committees that “meet at the request of the chair” as being “not regularly scheduled,” he validated the very interpretation the court was now adopting.
The Lesson This moment serves as a dramatic lesson in the power and precision of language in legal proceedings. In an attempt to describe the function of other committees, the petitioner inadvertently validated his opponent’s core legal argument.
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Conclusion: A Question of Transparency
The ruling in Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association clarifies a significant point in HOA governance. Under this legal interpretation, committees that meet on an ad-hoc basis or “at the call of the chair” may not be subject to open meeting laws. Only those committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule are explicitly required to be open to homeowners.
This ruling draws a bright line between standing committees with fixed schedules and ad-hoc committees that meet “at the call of the chair.” Homeowners should now ask: Which of our committees fall into this second category, and are we comfortable with decisions being shaped behind closed doors?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Gary W. Moselle(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Desert Mountain Master Association(respondent) Organizational party (HOA)
The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to timely provide access to association records
The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.
Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf
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17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf
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17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf
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Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL
Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.
Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.
The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.
Case Timeline and Factual Background
The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.
February 6, 2017
William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.
February 14, 2017
Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.
Post-Feb. 6, 2017
Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
April 13, 2017
The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.
May 2, 2017
Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.
May 3, 2017
The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
June 26, 2017
The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.
July 14, 2017
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.
July 24, 2017
Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.
Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805
The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”
Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)
Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.
• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.
• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.
• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.
Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)
Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.
• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.
• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine
The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:
“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”
Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.
The Correct Interpretation of the Law
The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:
“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”
Final Conclusion
The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:
1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.
2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.
3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.
Final Order and Mandates
The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.
The key directives of the order were:
• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.
• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.
• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.
• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.
Study Guide – 17F-H1717032-REL
Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (No. 17F-H1717032-REL), heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It covers the central conflict, the legal arguments, the statutory interpretations, and the final resolution of the dispute.
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Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.
1. What was the initial action taken by William M. Brown on February 6, 2017, and what was Terravita Country Club’s response?
2. On what legal grounds did Terravita justify its refusal to provide the requested records?
3. What was William M. Brown’s primary legal argument against Terravita’s position during the hearing?
4. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Terravita’s argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2), and why was it rejected?
5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this case?
6. What key fact regarding the “pending litigation” was central to the Judge’s final decision?
7. What was the final conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Terravita’s actions?
8. Identify the three specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Recommended Order.”
9. What state department adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, making it a “Final Order”?
10. Besides complying with the records request and paying the filing fee, what specific penalty was explicitly not levied against Terravita?
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Answer Key
1. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown requested records from Terravita Country Club. On February 14, 2017, Terravita responded via email, refusing to disclose the records because they were allegedly part of pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.
2. Terravita justified its refusal by citing Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805(B)(2). The club argued that this statute allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”
3. Mr. Brown’s primary argument was that Terravita had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide records within 10 business days. He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” in § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only when the association itself is a party to that litigation, which Terravita was not in his criminal case.
4. The Judge interpreted Terravita’s argument to mean that an association could deny any records request if the documents related to pending litigation between any two parties anywhere. This interpretation was rejected because it would lead to the “absurd result” of broadly denying access to records, which was not the statute’s intent.
5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the evidentiary standard where the trier of fact must be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that Terravita violated the statute, while the Respondent (Terravita) bore the burden of proving its affirmative defenses.
6. The central fact was that Terravita Country Club was not a party to the criminal case brought against Mr. Brown by the City of Scottsdale. Because the association was not a party, the judge ruled that the statutory exemption for withholding records related to pending litigation did not apply.
7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Brown had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his records request within the required 10 business days. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.
8. The Judge ordered that: (1) the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) be deemed the prevailing party; (2) Terravita must comply with the records request within 10 days of the Order; and (3) Terravita must pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within 30 days of the Order.
9. The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This action, dated July 24, 2017, made the decision a binding Final Order.
10. The Recommended Order, which was adopted as the Final Order, explicitly states that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal principles, and arguments presented in the source documents.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) presented by William M. Brown and Terravita Country Club. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to resolve this dispute, including the principle of avoiding “absurd results.”
2. Describe the complete timeline of the case, from the initial records request to the issuance of the Final Order. For each key date, explain the event’s significance to the progression and outcome of the dispute.
3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain how this standard was applied to both the Petitioner’s claim and the Respondent’s affirmative defense and why the Judge ultimately found that the Petitioner had met this burden.
4. Examine the role of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in resolving disputes within planned communities, as demonstrated by this case. How does the process flow from an initial petition to a binding order?
5. Based on the Judge’s decision, formulate an argument about the balance between a homeowner’s right to access association records and an association’s right to protect its interests in legal matters. How does A.R.S. § 33-1805 attempt to strike this balance, and how did the ruling in this case clarify its limits?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ.
Affirmative Defense
A set of facts or legal arguments raised by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. Terravita’s claim that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) exempted them was their affirmative defense.
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that requires a planned community association to make financial and other records available for member examination within 10 business days.
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that allows an association to withhold books and records from disclosure if the portion withheld relates to “pending litigation.”
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
The Arizona statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of statutes or community documents.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. The Petitioner bore the burden to prove the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden to establish its defense.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency that received the Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown and ultimately adopted the ALJ’s decision, making it final.
Final Order
The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which adopted the ALJ’s Recommended Order. This order is an administrative action and is effective immediately upon service.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct hearings on disputes, such as the one between Mr. Brown and Terravita.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or hearing by filing a petition. In this case, William M. Brown was the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents “the greater weight of the evidence.”
Prevailing Party
The party who is successful in a legal case. The Final Order deemed William M. Brown the prevailing party.
Recommended Order
The initial decision and orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. This decision is then sent to the relevant state agency (in this case, the Department of Real Estate) for adoption.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. In this case, Terravita Country Club, Inc. was the Respondent.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717032-REL
Your HOA Can’t Use “Pending Litigation” to Hide Records. This Homeowner Proved It.
Introduction: The Wall of Secrecy
For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like confronting an organization that operates with total authority and little transparency. Board decisions can seem arbitrary, and getting straight answers or access to official documents can be a frustrating, uphill battle. But what happens when an HOA flatly denies a simple request for records, citing a vague legal reason?
One homeowner decided to find out. The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a fascinating look at how a single individual challenged his HOA’s interpretation of state law. In doing so, he not only won access to the records he sought but also revealed a crucial limit on an HOA’s power to operate in secret.
The Takeaways: Four Lessons from a Landmark HOA Dispute
This case offers several powerful and practical lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt stonewalled by their association’s board.
Takeaway 1: “Pending Litigation” Isn’t a Blank Check to Deny Records
At the heart of the dispute was a simple request. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown asked his HOA, Terravita, for access to association records. The HOA denied the request, citing an exemption in Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)) that allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”
Terravita’s argument was that this exemption applied because of a pending criminal case against Mr. Brown. Crucially, they argued this was not just any unrelated case; the criminal charges stemmed from allegations that Mr. Brown had threatened the HOA’s board members and property. From their perspective, the records request was directly linked to a hostile legal situation involving the association’s leadership. However, the critical fact remained that the HOA itself was not a formal party to the criminal case.
The judge’s ruling was definitive and clear: the “pending litigation” exemption can only be used to withhold records if the litigation is between the association and the member. Because Terravita was not a party to Mr. Brown’s criminal case, it had no legal grounds to use that case as an excuse to withhold its records from him. This ruling draws a bright line: The “pending litigation” shield cannot be borrowed from a separate case, even one that feels highly relevant to the HOA.
Takeaway 2: Legal Interpretations Must Be Sensible, Not Absurd
The HOA argued for a literal interpretation of the law, claiming the statute didn’t explicitly state that the association had to be a party to the litigation. Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson rejected this line of reasoning, stating that it would lead to an “absurd result.”
This is a critical lesson for homeowners. Judges are tasked with ensuring laws are applied sensibly. When an HOA’s interpretation of a rule would create an illogical or unfair outcome, it is vulnerable to legal challenge. The judge highlighted the flaw in the HOA’s logic with a powerful statement in her decision:
Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.
Takeaway 3: A Single Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge Their HOA
Perhaps the most empowering aspect of this case is who argued it. The court documents show that while the HOA was represented by legal counsel (“Joshua Bolen, Esq. appeared on behalf of Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.”), Mr. Brown represented himself (“Petitioner William M. Brown appeared on behalf of himself”).
Despite being outmatched on paper, Mr. Brown successfully researched the law, presented a logical argument, and held his ground. His victory demonstrates that the legal process is not just for lawyers. A well-researched, logical argument from a homeowner can be more powerful than a law firm’s flawed interpretation of a statute. The judge ultimately found that “Mr. Brown established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within 10 business days.”
Takeaway 4: Misapplying the Law Can Have Financial Consequences
This wasn’t just a moral victory. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017, came with tangible consequences for the HOA. For its failure to correctly apply the law, Terravita faced direct and tangible consequences.
• The HOA was ordered to provide the requested records within 10 days.
• The homeowner, Mr. Brown, was deemed the “prevailing party.”
• The HOA, Terravita, was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.
This outcome underscores a critical point: when an HOA oversteps its authority or misinterprets the law, it can be held financially responsible for the costs incurred by the homeowner forced to challenge its actions.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power
The story of William M. Brown’s dispute with his HOA serves as a powerful reminder that HOAs do not have unlimited power. They are governed by specific state laws, and understanding those laws is the most effective tool a homeowner possesses.
The central lesson is that an HOA’s authority is not absolute, and its interpretation of its own rules—and, more importantly, state law—must be reasonable and sensible. This case affirms the right of members to transparency and proves that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully stand up for those rights.
After seeing how one homeowner held his board accountable, will you take the time to learn your rights before you need them?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
William M. Brown(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of himself
The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to timely provide access to association records
The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.
Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:09 (79.9 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:12 (726.4 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:20:15 (95.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL
Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.
Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.
The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.
Case Timeline and Factual Background
The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.
February 6, 2017
William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.
February 14, 2017
Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.
Post-Feb. 6, 2017
Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
April 13, 2017
The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.
May 2, 2017
Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.
May 3, 2017
The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
June 26, 2017
The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.
July 14, 2017
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.
July 24, 2017
Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.
Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805
The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”
Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)
Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.
• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.
• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.
• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.
Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)
Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.
• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.
• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine
The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:
“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”
Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.
The Correct Interpretation of the Law
The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:
“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”
Final Conclusion
The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:
1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.
2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.
3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.
Final Order and Mandates
The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.
The key directives of the order were:
• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.
• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.
• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.
• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.
Study Guide – 17F-H1717032-REL
Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (No. 17F-H1717032-REL), heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. It covers the central conflict, the legal arguments, the statutory interpretations, and the final resolution of the dispute.
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Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.
1. What was the initial action taken by William M. Brown on February 6, 2017, and what was Terravita Country Club’s response?
2. On what legal grounds did Terravita justify its refusal to provide the requested records?
3. What was William M. Brown’s primary legal argument against Terravita’s position during the hearing?
4. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Terravita’s argument regarding A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2), and why was it rejected?
5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof in this case?
6. What key fact regarding the “pending litigation” was central to the Judge’s final decision?
7. What was the final conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Terravita’s actions?
8. Identify the three specific orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge in the “Recommended Order.”
9. What state department adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, making it a “Final Order”?
10. Besides complying with the records request and paying the filing fee, what specific penalty was explicitly not levied against Terravita?
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Answer Key
1. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown requested records from Terravita Country Club. On February 14, 2017, Terravita responded via email, refusing to disclose the records because they were allegedly part of pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.
2. Terravita justified its refusal by citing Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1805(B)(2). The club argued that this statute allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”
3. Mr. Brown’s primary argument was that Terravita had violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide records within 10 business days. He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” in § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only when the association itself is a party to that litigation, which Terravita was not in his criminal case.
4. The Judge interpreted Terravita’s argument to mean that an association could deny any records request if the documents related to pending litigation between any two parties anywhere. This interpretation was rejected because it would lead to the “absurd result” of broadly denying access to records, which was not the statute’s intent.
5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the evidentiary standard where the trier of fact must be convinced that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) bore the burden of proving that Terravita violated the statute, while the Respondent (Terravita) bore the burden of proving its affirmative defenses.
6. The central fact was that Terravita Country Club was not a party to the criminal case brought against Mr. Brown by the City of Scottsdale. Because the association was not a party, the judge ruled that the statutory exemption for withholding records related to pending litigation did not apply.
7. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. Brown had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his records request within the required 10 business days. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that Terravita violated the charged provision of A.R.S. § 33-1805.
8. The Judge ordered that: (1) the Petitioner (Mr. Brown) be deemed the prevailing party; (2) Terravita must comply with the records request within 10 days of the Order; and (3) Terravita must pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within 30 days of the Order.
9. The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. This action, dated July 24, 2017, made the decision a binding Final Order.
10. The Recommended Order, which was adopted as the Final Order, explicitly states that “No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.”
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing upon the facts, legal principles, and arguments presented in the source documents.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) presented by William M. Brown and Terravita Country Club. Explain the legal reasoning the Administrative Law Judge used to resolve this dispute, including the principle of avoiding “absurd results.”
2. Describe the complete timeline of the case, from the initial records request to the issuance of the Final Order. For each key date, explain the event’s significance to the progression and outcome of the dispute.
3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Explain how this standard was applied to both the Petitioner’s claim and the Respondent’s affirmative defense and why the Judge ultimately found that the Petitioner had met this burden.
4. Examine the role of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in resolving disputes within planned communities, as demonstrated by this case. How does the process flow from an initial petition to a binding order?
5. Based on the Judge’s decision, formulate an argument about the balance between a homeowner’s right to access association records and an association’s right to protect its interests in legal matters. How does A.R.S. § 33-1805 attempt to strike this balance, and how did the ruling in this case clarify its limits?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An independent judge who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ.
Affirmative Defense
A set of facts or legal arguments raised by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. Terravita’s claim that A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) exempted them was their affirmative defense.
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that requires a planned community association to make financial and other records available for member examination within 10 business days.
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
The section of Arizona Revised Statutes that allows an association to withhold books and records from disclosure if the portion withheld relates to “pending litigation.”
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
The Arizona statute that permits an owner or planned community organization to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing concerning violations of statutes or community documents.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a trial to produce the evidence that will prove the claims they have made against the other party. The Petitioner bore the burden to prove the violation, and the Respondent bore the burden to establish its defense.
Department of Real Estate
The Arizona state agency that received the Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown and ultimately adopted the ALJ’s decision, making it final.
Final Order
The binding decision issued by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, which adopted the ALJ’s Recommended Order. This order is an administrative action and is effective immediately upon service.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency in Arizona where administrative law judges conduct hearings on disputes, such as the one between Mr. Brown and Terravita.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or hearing by filing a petition. In this case, William M. Brown was the Petitioner.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and represents “the greater weight of the evidence.”
Prevailing Party
The party who is successful in a legal case. The Final Order deemed William M. Brown the prevailing party.
Recommended Order
The initial decision and orders issued by the Administrative Law Judge following a hearing. This decision is then sent to the relevant state agency (in this case, the Department of Real Estate) for adoption.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. In this case, Terravita Country Club, Inc. was the Respondent.
Blog Post – 17F-H1717032-REL
Your HOA Can’t Use “Pending Litigation” to Hide Records. This Homeowner Proved It.
Introduction: The Wall of Secrecy
For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like confronting an organization that operates with total authority and little transparency. Board decisions can seem arbitrary, and getting straight answers or access to official documents can be a frustrating, uphill battle. But what happens when an HOA flatly denies a simple request for records, citing a vague legal reason?
One homeowner decided to find out. The case of William M. Brown versus the Terravita Country Club provides a fascinating look at how a single individual challenged his HOA’s interpretation of state law. In doing so, he not only won access to the records he sought but also revealed a crucial limit on an HOA’s power to operate in secret.
The Takeaways: Four Lessons from a Landmark HOA Dispute
This case offers several powerful and practical lessons for any homeowner who has ever felt stonewalled by their association’s board.
Takeaway 1: “Pending Litigation” Isn’t a Blank Check to Deny Records
At the heart of the dispute was a simple request. On February 6, 2017, William M. Brown asked his HOA, Terravita, for access to association records. The HOA denied the request, citing an exemption in Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)) that allows an association to withhold records related to “pending litigation.”
Terravita’s argument was that this exemption applied because of a pending criminal case against Mr. Brown. Crucially, they argued this was not just any unrelated case; the criminal charges stemmed from allegations that Mr. Brown had threatened the HOA’s board members and property. From their perspective, the records request was directly linked to a hostile legal situation involving the association’s leadership. However, the critical fact remained that the HOA itself was not a formal party to the criminal case.
The judge’s ruling was definitive and clear: the “pending litigation” exemption can only be used to withhold records if the litigation is between the association and the member. Because Terravita was not a party to Mr. Brown’s criminal case, it had no legal grounds to use that case as an excuse to withhold its records from him. This ruling draws a bright line: The “pending litigation” shield cannot be borrowed from a separate case, even one that feels highly relevant to the HOA.
Takeaway 2: Legal Interpretations Must Be Sensible, Not Absurd
The HOA argued for a literal interpretation of the law, claiming the statute didn’t explicitly state that the association had to be a party to the litigation. Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson rejected this line of reasoning, stating that it would lead to an “absurd result.”
This is a critical lesson for homeowners. Judges are tasked with ensuring laws are applied sensibly. When an HOA’s interpretation of a rule would create an illogical or unfair outcome, it is vulnerable to legal challenge. The judge highlighted the flaw in the HOA’s logic with a powerful statement in her decision:
Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.
Takeaway 3: A Single Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge Their HOA
Perhaps the most empowering aspect of this case is who argued it. The court documents show that while the HOA was represented by legal counsel (“Joshua Bolen, Esq. appeared on behalf of Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc.”), Mr. Brown represented himself (“Petitioner William M. Brown appeared on behalf of himself”).
Despite being outmatched on paper, Mr. Brown successfully researched the law, presented a logical argument, and held his ground. His victory demonstrates that the legal process is not just for lawyers. A well-researched, logical argument from a homeowner can be more powerful than a law firm’s flawed interpretation of a statute. The judge ultimately found that “Mr. Brown established by a preponderance of the evidence that Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within 10 business days.”
Takeaway 4: Misapplying the Law Can Have Financial Consequences
This wasn’t just a moral victory. The final order, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017, came with tangible consequences for the HOA. For its failure to correctly apply the law, Terravita faced direct and tangible consequences.
• The HOA was ordered to provide the requested records within 10 days.
• The homeowner, Mr. Brown, was deemed the “prevailing party.”
• The HOA, Terravita, was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00.
This outcome underscores a critical point: when an HOA oversteps its authority or misinterprets the law, it can be held financially responsible for the costs incurred by the homeowner forced to challenge its actions.
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power
The story of William M. Brown’s dispute with his HOA serves as a powerful reminder that HOAs do not have unlimited power. They are governed by specific state laws, and understanding those laws is the most effective tool a homeowner possesses.
The central lesson is that an HOA’s authority is not absolute, and its interpretation of its own rules—and, more importantly, state law—must be reasonable and sensible. This case affirms the right of members to transparency and proves that a single, well-prepared homeowner can successfully stand up for those rights.
After seeing how one homeowner held his board accountable, will you take the time to learn your rights before you need them?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
William M. Brown(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of himself
The Tribunal concluded that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute within 10 days and refund the $500.00 filing fee. No civil penalty was found appropriate.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to timely provide access to association records
The Respondent failed to fulfill the Petitioner's February 6, 2017, records request within 10 business days. The Respondent argued that disclosure was prohibited under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) due to pending criminal litigation against the Petitioner. The ALJ determined that the exception applies only to pending litigation between the association and the member, not a criminal case in which the association was not a party.
Orders: Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days and pay the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee within 30 days.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: records request, access to records, pending litigation exception, HOA records, planned community
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 575932.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:52 (79.9 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 578529.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (726.4 KB)
17F-H1717032-REL Decision – 586360.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:57:53 (95.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717032-REL
Briefing Document: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document analyzes the administrative case of William M. Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc., focusing on a homeowner association’s (HOA) obligation to provide records to a member under Arizona law. The core issue was the interpretation of the “pending litigation” exemption within A.R.S. § 33-1805, which allows an association to withhold certain records.
Terravita Country Club, Inc. (“Terravita”) denied a records request from its member, William M. Brown, citing a pending criminal case against him. However, Terravita was not a party to this criminal litigation. Mr. Brown contended this denial violated state law, arguing the exemption only applies when the association itself is a party to the litigation. Terravita argued for a broader interpretation, claiming the statute did not require the association to be a party.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled decisively in favor of Mr. Brown. The judge concluded that Terravita’s interpretation would lead to an “absurd result,” effectively allowing any HOA to deny records related to any litigation anywhere. The judge established that the sensible and plain meaning of the statute is that the exemption for “pending litigation” applies only to legal disputes between the association and the member.
The Arizona Department of Real Estate adopted the ALJ’s decision in a Final Order. Terravita was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, ordered to produce the requested records, and mandated to reimburse Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.
Case Timeline and Factual Background
The dispute followed a clear sequence of events, beginning with the records request and culminating in a final administrative order.
February 6, 2017
William M. Brown, a member of Terravita, formally requests records from the association.
February 14, 2017
Terravita sends an email to Mr. Brown denying the request. The denial cites a “pending criminal litigation” against him and invokes A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) as justification.
Post-Feb. 6, 2017
Terravita fails to fulfill the records request within the statutory 10-business-day deadline.
April 13, 2017
The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives a Petition for Hearing from Mr. Brown, alleging Terravita’s failure to timely respond.
May 2, 2017
Terravita files its response, formally asserting as an affirmative defense that it was not required to disclose the records due to the pending criminal litigation against Mr. Brown.
May 3, 2017
The Department issues a Notice of Hearing, setting the matter for June 26, 2017, before the Office of Administrative Hearings.
June 26, 2017
The administrative hearing is conducted. Both parties present their arguments.
July 14, 2017
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson issues a decision finding in favor of the Petitioner, Mr. Brown.
July 24, 2017
Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issues a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s decision in its entirety.
Core Dispute: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805
The central conflict was the proper application of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1805, which governs a member’s right to access association records. Subsection (A) mandates that records be made available for examination within 10 business days. Subsection (B) provides exemptions, including for records related to “pending litigation.”
Petitioner’s Position (William M. Brown)
Mr. Brown’s argument was straightforward and focused on a narrow interpretation of the statutory exemption.
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A): Terravita failed to fulfill his February 6, 2017 records request within the legally mandated 10 business days.
• Limited Scope of Exemption: He contended that the exemption for “pending litigation” under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) applies only to litigation in which the association itself is a party.
• Factual Basis: Since Terravita was not a party to the criminal case brought against him by the City of Scottsdale, the exemption was inapplicable.
• Legislative Intent: Mr. Brown noted that the statute had been amended to remove the phrase “contemplated litigation,” suggesting the legislature intended to narrow, not broaden, the scope of the exemption.
Respondent’s Position (Terravita Country Club, Inc.)
Terravita argued for a broader interpretation of the statute, asserting that its non-party status was irrelevant.
• “Plain Meaning” of the Statute: Terravita’s position was that the plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) does not explicitly require the association to be a party to the pending litigation.
• Relevance of the Litigation: The association argued the criminal case was germane because it was “based upon an allegation that Mr. Brown threated Terravita’s board members and property.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s decision provided a comprehensive legal analysis, ultimately rejecting Terravita’s interpretation of the law and finding that Mr. Brown had established his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Statutory Interpretation and the “Absurd Result” Doctrine
The decision hinged on the principle that legislation must be given a “sensible construction that avoids absurd results.” The judge analyzed the consequences of Terravita’s interpretation:
“Terravita’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) would allow the association to deny records request of documents that relate to pending litigation between any parties. Such an interpretation would lead to the absurd result of denying records requests of all documents that relate to pending litigation anywhere, between any two parties.”
Based on this reasoning, the judge rejected Terravita’s argument and established a clear standard for applying the exemption.
The Correct Interpretation of the Law
The ALJ articulated the “plain meaning” of the statute, establishing a critical precedent for its application:
“The plain meaning of A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2) is that while homeowners’ associations must provide access to financial and other documents to its members within 10 business days, an association may withhold documents that relate to pending litigation between the association and the member.”
Final Conclusion
The judge applied this correct interpretation to the undisputed facts of the case:
1. At the time of Mr. Brown’s request, he was facing criminal charges initiated by the City of Scottsdale.
2. Terravita was not a party to that criminal case.
3. Therefore, the exemption did not apply, and Terravita violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill the records request within 10 business days.
Final Order and Mandates
The decision issued by the ALJ on July 14, 2017, became the basis for the Final Order issued by the Arizona Department of Real Estate on July 24, 2017. The Commissioner accepted and adopted the ALJ’s decision, making its mandates binding and effective immediately.
The key directives of the order were:
• Prevailing Party: Petitioner William M. Brown was formally deemed the prevailing party.
• Compliance: Terravita was ordered to comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805 regarding the records request within 10 days of the order.
• Reimbursement of Fees: Terravita was ordered to pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 directly within 30 days of the order.
• No Civil Penalty: The judge found that a civil penalty was not appropriate in the matter.
