David Y. Samuels v. The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 24F-H025-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2024-04-18
Administrative Law Judge Amy M. Haley
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner David Y. Samuels Counsel
Respondent The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association Counsel Ashley N. Turner

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803

Outcome Summary

The petition filed by David Y. Samuels against The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association was dismissed. The Tribunal found that Samuels lacked standing to bring the action as an individual, and the cited statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803 (Planned Community Act), was improper for this condominium dispute.

Why this result: Petitioner lacked standing because the property was owned by Daso Properties, LLC, not by David Y. Samuels individually. Additionally, the Petitioner brought the action under the incorrect statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803, which governs planned communities, not condominiums.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation concerning late fees, collection fees, and attorney fees for delinquent assessment payments

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 by charging unwarranted late fees, collection fees, and attorney fees for delinquent assessments.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed because Petitioner lacked standing as an individual owner, and the cause of action was brought under the improper statute (Planned Community Act) for a condominium property.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: standing, condominium, planned community act, statutory violation, late fees, collection fees, attorney fees, jurisdiction, dismissal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.A.C. R2-19-106(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1124651.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:03:59 (48.4 KB)

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1133120.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:04:01 (39.9 KB)

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1134423.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:04:05 (48.2 KB)

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1139633.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:04:08 (55.7 KB)

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1139646.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:04:12 (7.6 KB)

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1157271.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:04:17 (47.1 KB)

24F-H025-REL Decision – 1168680.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T18:04:22 (86.1 KB)

Questions

Question

If my property is owned by an LLC, can I file a petition against the HOA in my own name as the managing member?

Short Answer

No. The petition must be filed by the legal owner (the LLC), not an individual member, or it will be dismissed for lack of standing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that an individual managing member of an LLC does not have standing to bring an action on behalf of the property owned by the LLC. The dispute statute specifically applies to 'owners' and 'associations'.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal finds that, after taking testimony, Petitioner, as an individual, did not have standing to bring this action… The proper party to bring the action would have been Daso Properties, LLC.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • standing
  • LLC ownership
  • procedural requirements

Question

Can I use laws meant for Planned Communities (A.R.S. § 33-1803) to dispute charges if I live in a Condominium?

Short Answer

No. Condominiums are governed by a different set of statutes (Chapter 9) than Planned Communities (Chapter 16).

Detailed Answer

The ALJ dismissed the claim because the homeowner cited the Planned Community Act (A.R.S. § 33-1803) while the property was legally a condominium. Condominiums are not subject to the Planned Community Act.

Alj Quote

However, the Property is a condominium; therefore, Respondent is not subject to the Planned Community Act. … Chapter 9 governs condominiums.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • condominium vs planned community
  • statutory application

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction to hear a dispute if I am not the legal owner of the property?

Short Answer

No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to disputes specifically between an owner and an association.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that the administrative hearing process is strictly for disputes involving an 'owner' or 'association'. If the petitioner is not the legal owner (even if they manage the LLC that owns it), the Department lacks jurisdiction.

Alj Quote

The department does not have jurisdiction to hear a dispute that does not involve an owner or an association.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • standing
  • homeowner rights

Question

Who has the burden of proof when a homeowner claims an HOA violated state laws?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

In these administrative hearings, it is the responsibility of the person bringing the complaint to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 as alleged in his petition.

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I base my entire petition on a statute that doesn't apply to my type of property?

Short Answer

The petition will be dismissed because you have stated no claim upon which relief can be granted.

Detailed Answer

Because the petitioner cited the wrong statute (Planned Community Act for a Condominium), the judge ruled that there was no valid legal claim to rule on, resulting in dismissal.

Alj Quote

As such, Petitioner has stated no claim upon which relief can be granted under A.R.S. § 33-1801.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801

Topic Tags

  • dismissal
  • legal procedure
  • condominium act

Case

Docket No
24F-H025-REL
Case Title
David Y. Samuels vs The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association
Decision Date
2024-04-18
Alj Name
Amy M. Haley
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

If my property is owned by an LLC, can I file a petition against the HOA in my own name as the managing member?

Short Answer

No. The petition must be filed by the legal owner (the LLC), not an individual member, or it will be dismissed for lack of standing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that an individual managing member of an LLC does not have standing to bring an action on behalf of the property owned by the LLC. The dispute statute specifically applies to 'owners' and 'associations'.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal finds that, after taking testimony, Petitioner, as an individual, did not have standing to bring this action… The proper party to bring the action would have been Daso Properties, LLC.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • standing
  • LLC ownership
  • procedural requirements

Question

Can I use laws meant for Planned Communities (A.R.S. § 33-1803) to dispute charges if I live in a Condominium?

Short Answer

No. Condominiums are governed by a different set of statutes (Chapter 9) than Planned Communities (Chapter 16).

Detailed Answer

The ALJ dismissed the claim because the homeowner cited the Planned Community Act (A.R.S. § 33-1803) while the property was legally a condominium. Condominiums are not subject to the Planned Community Act.

Alj Quote

However, the Property is a condominium; therefore, Respondent is not subject to the Planned Community Act. … Chapter 9 governs condominiums.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • condominium vs planned community
  • statutory application

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction to hear a dispute if I am not the legal owner of the property?

Short Answer

No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to disputes specifically between an owner and an association.

Detailed Answer

The decision clarifies that the administrative hearing process is strictly for disputes involving an 'owner' or 'association'. If the petitioner is not the legal owner (even if they manage the LLC that owns it), the Department lacks jurisdiction.

Alj Quote

The department does not have jurisdiction to hear a dispute that does not involve an owner or an association.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(A)

Topic Tags

  • jurisdiction
  • standing
  • homeowner rights

Question

Who has the burden of proof when a homeowner claims an HOA violated state laws?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) has the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

In these administrative hearings, it is the responsibility of the person bringing the complaint to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claims.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803 as alleged in his petition.

Legal Basis

Preponderance of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

What happens if I base my entire petition on a statute that doesn't apply to my type of property?

Short Answer

The petition will be dismissed because you have stated no claim upon which relief can be granted.

Detailed Answer

Because the petitioner cited the wrong statute (Planned Community Act for a Condominium), the judge ruled that there was no valid legal claim to rule on, resulting in dismissal.

Alj Quote

As such, Petitioner has stated no claim upon which relief can be granted under A.R.S. § 33-1801.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1801

Topic Tags

  • dismissal
  • legal procedure
  • condominium act

Case

Docket No
24F-H025-REL
Case Title
David Y. Samuels vs The Concorde Condominium Home Owners Association
Decision Date
2024-04-18
Alj Name
Amy M. Haley
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • David Y. Samuels (petitioner)
    Daso Properties, LLC
    Managing member of the property owner (Daso Properties, LLC); Appeared on his own behalf.

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Turner (HOA attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Council for respondent; Also appeared as Ashley N. Moscarello in earlier filings.
  • Alyssa Butler (community manager)
    The Management Trust (TMT)
    Witness for the association.
  • Stephanie Beck (HOA staff)
    Involved in prior HOA correspondence regarding fines.
  • Catherine Green (HOA staff)
    Involved in prior HOA correspondence regarding fines.

Neutral Parties

  • Amy M. Haley (ALJ)
    OAH
    Conducted the hearing and issued the final decision.
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Issued an order on March 19, 2024.
  • A. Hansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • V. Nunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • D. Jones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • L. Abril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • M. Neat (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • A. Kowaleski (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].
  • G. Osborn (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission via email [email protected].

Michael J Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-03-08
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Michael J Stoltenberg Counsel
Respondent Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 14.8

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's petition following a rehearing. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8, as that section applies only to the Association's notice obligation to members and not to assessment payments sent by members to the Association.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof because the CC&R provision cited was inapplicable to the dispute. Additionally, the Petitioner was found to have inadvertently caused delays in payment receipt by using restricted delivery, contrary to instructions.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Association violated CC&Rs 14.8.

Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&Rs Section 14.8 by failing to handle his monthly assessment payments correctly, resulting in late fees and threats of foreclosure. The ALJ found that Section 14.8 governs the Association's notice obligations to members and is inapplicable to the Petitioner's delivery of assessment payments to the Association.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied on rehearing.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&Rs, Assessments, Late Fees, Notice Provision, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020049-REL-RHG Decision – 861466.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:03 (145.6 KB)

20F-H2020049-REL-RHG Decision – ../20F-H2020049-REL/811290.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:56:54 (131.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Michael J. Stoltenberg (Petitioner) and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association (Respondent). The Petitioner’s complaint, alleging the Association violated its governing documents and acted in bad faith regarding the handling of his monthly assessment payments, was comprehensively reviewed and ultimately denied. This denial was subsequently affirmed in a rehearing.

The core of the dispute centered on the Petitioner’s unilateral decision to send his monthly payments via restricted U.S. Postal Service delivery to a specific, unpaid volunteer board member. This action, taken despite clear instructions to mail payments to the Association’s P.O. Box, resulted in delayed receipt and returned mail, leading to the imposition of late fees and threats of foreclosure against the Petitioner.

The Administrative Law Judge’s central finding was that the Petitioner fundamentally misinterpreted Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The judge concluded this section is unambiguously applicable only to notices sent from the Association to its members, and imposes no obligations on the Association regarding mail received from members. The payment delays and resulting penalties were determined to be the direct consequence of the Petitioner’s own “volitionally took” actions, for which the Association bore no responsibility. Furthermore, the Petitioner’s claims of “bad faith” under Arizona’s nonprofit corporation statutes were dismissed as falling outside the jurisdictional authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings.

I. Case Overview

The legal matter concerns a petition filed by a homeowner against his condominium association, alleging violations of the community’s governing documents and state law.

Case Number

20F-H2020049-REL / 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Michael J. Stoltenberg

Respondent

Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Jenna Clark

The Petitioner’s initial complaint, filed on March 2, 2020, alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith,” specifically citing violations of ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and Section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. He sought an order compelling the Association’s compliance and the issuance of a civil penalty.

II. Procedural History and Timeline

The dispute progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a granted request for rehearing, and a final binding order.

March 2, 2020: Petitioner files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate (“Department”).

March 24, 2020: Respondent files an ANSWER, denying all complaint items.

April 1, 2020: The Department refers the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing.

July 14, 2020: The initial evidentiary hearing is held.

August 3, 2020: An AMENDED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION is issued, denying the Petitioner’s petition.

August 28, 2020: Petitioner submits a request for a rehearing.

September 9, 2020: The Petitioner’s request for a rehearing is granted.

February 16, 2021: A rehearing is held before the same Administrative Law Judge.

March 8, 2021: A final ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DECISION is issued, again denying the Petitioner’s petition.

III. Central Dispute: Assessment Payments and CC&R Section 14.8

The conflict originated from the Petitioner’s method of submitting monthly assessment payments and his interpretation of the Association’s obligations under its CC&Rs.

The Petitioner’s Actions and Their Consequences

Instruction: On January 4, 2016, the Petitioner was advised that the Association’s “primary address for receiving all correspondence and all assessment payments from its members” was PO Box 4333, Yuma, Arizona 85366.

Unilateral Change in Method: Beginning in November 2019, the Petitioner began sending his monthly payments via restricted delivery through the United States Postal Service (USPS), designated for “board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.”

Petitioner’s Rationale: He took this action based on a belief that an agent of the Association’s property management company had previously thrown away one of his mailed payments.

Petitioner’s Acknowledged Awareness: The Petitioner was aware that the Association employed a property management company to collect mail and that Ms. Carlisle was an “unpaid volunteer board member,” not an employee of that company.

Resulting Delays and Penalties: This restricted delivery method caused significant issues.

◦ One payment was returned by USPS on January 25, 2020.

◦ Another was returned by USPS on June 8, 2020.

◦ Other payments were picked up late on various dates.

◦ For each instance where the payment was received late, the Petitioner was assessed a late fee and his residence was placed in danger of foreclosure.

The Disputed Provision: CC&Rs Section 14.8

The legal basis for the Petitioner’s claim rested on his interpretation of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Bylaws.

Full Text of Section 14.8, Notices:

Respondent’s Argument: The Association argued that this section was “inapplicable to the facts as presented” because it governs the Association’s obligation when sending notices to homeowners, not the other way around.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

Across two separate decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) consistently found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof and that his interpretation of the governing documents was incorrect.

Initial Decision (August 3, 2020)

Inapplicability of Section 14.8: The ALJ’s primary conclusion was a complete rejection of the Petitioner’s legal argument.

Petitioner’s Culpability: The ALJ placed the responsibility for the late payments squarely on the Petitioner.

Outcome: The petition was denied.

Rehearing Decision (March 8, 2021)

The rehearing was granted on the Petitioner’s grounds of an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law” and that the initial decision was “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.” The ALJ found no merit in these claims.

Reaffirmation of Core Finding: The ALJ reiterated and strengthened the conclusion regarding Section 14.8.

Jurisdictional Ruling: The ALJ explicitly addressed the Petitioner’s “bad faith” claim by citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers of nonprofit corporations.

Failure to Support Rehearing Claims: The ALJ noted a complete lack of new evidence to justify the rehearing.

Final Outcome: The petition was again denied. The order was made final and binding, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided legal documents.

1. Who are the two primary parties in case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?

3. Why did the Petitioner, beginning in November 2019, change the way he mailed his monthly assessment payments?

4. What is the specific subject of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

5. What were the consequences for the Petitioner each time the Association received his monthly assessment payment late?

6. According to the Administrative Law Judge, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs inapplicable to the facts of this case?

7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and what is its definition?

8. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge dismiss the Petitioner’s argument regarding Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842 during the rehearing?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on July 14, 2020, and the rehearing on February 16, 2021?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael J Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner is a condominium owner and member of the Association who filed a petition alleging violations, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association that governs the development.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”

3. The Petitioner changed his mailing method because he believed an agent of the Association’s property management company had thrown away one of his mailed payments. As a result, he began sending payments via restricted delivery by the USPS, for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.

4. Section 14.8, titled “Notices,” pertains to any notice permitted or required by the Declaration or Bylaws. It specifically addresses the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information, outlining when such notices are deemed delivered.

5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence put his residence in danger of foreclosure by the Association.

6. The Judge concluded Section 14.8 was inapplicable because its language speaks specifically to the Association’s obligation to provide notice to its members. The section has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.

7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.

8. The Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” He also claimed that the initial findings of fact or decision were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”

9. The argument regarding ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers, was dismissed because it falls outside of the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction. The Petitioner had been advised of the Department’s jurisdictional limitations when he first filed his petition.

10. In both the initial decision (dated August 03, 2020) and the final order after the rehearing (dated March 08, 2021), the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to be answered in a detailed essay format, synthesizing information from across the provided documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark to deny the Petitioner’s claims in both the initial hearing and the rehearing. Discuss the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8, the concept of burden of proof, and jurisdictional limitations.

2. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 20F-H2020049-REL from the filing of the petition to the final order. Include all key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Department, and the specific reasons for each major step, such as the granting of the rehearing.

3. Evaluate the actions taken by the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, regarding his assessment payments. Explain why his unilateral decision to use restricted mail delivery, despite being aware of the Association’s procedures, ultimately caused the negative outcomes he sought to avoid.

4. Explain the contractual relationship between a homeowners’ association and a property owner as described in the legal documents. How do the CC&Rs function as an enforceable contract, and how was this concept central to the dispute?

5. Discuss the roles and authorities of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in resolving HOA disputes, as demonstrated by this case. What are their powers, and what specific limitations on their jurisdiction are identified in the text?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Association

The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association whose membership is comprised of the condominium owners in the Rancho Del Oro residential real estate development in Yuma, Arizona.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The body that oversees the Homeowners Association.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their contention. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These governing documents form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers matters for an evidentiary hearing. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret the contract (CC&Rs) between parties.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg, a homeowner and member of the Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Statutory Agent

An individual listed as an official agent for an entity. For the years 2019 and 2020, Diana Crites was listed as the Association’s Statutory Agent.

Abbreviation for the United States Postal Service.






Blog Post – 20F-H2020049-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Stoltenberg v. Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided legal documents.

1. Who are the two primary parties in case No. 20F-H2020049-REL, and what are their respective roles?

2. What was the specific allegation Michael Stoltenberg made against the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association in his petition?

3. Why did the Petitioner, beginning in November 2019, change the way he mailed his monthly assessment payments?

4. What is the specific subject of Section 14.8 of the Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

5. What were the consequences for the Petitioner each time the Association received his monthly assessment payment late?

6. According to the Administrative Law Judge, why was Section 14.8 of the CC&Rs inapplicable to the facts of this case?

7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and what is its definition?

8. On what grounds did the Petitioner request and receive a rehearing after the initial decision was issued?

9. Why did the Administrative Law Judge dismiss the Petitioner’s argument regarding Arizona Revised Statutes § 10-3842 during the rehearing?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing on July 14, 2020, and the rehearing on February 16, 2021?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties are Michael J Stoltenberg, the “Petitioner,” and the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, the “Respondent.” The Petitioner is a condominium owner and member of the Association who filed a petition alleging violations, while the Respondent is the homeowners’ association that governs the development.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 10-3842 and 10-801, and section 14.8 of the Association’s CC&Rs. Specifically, he alleged that the Association “fail to do their job, and are acting in bad faith.”

3. The Petitioner changed his mailing method because he believed an agent of the Association’s property management company had thrown away one of his mailed payments. As a result, he began sending payments via restricted delivery by the USPS, for board member Rhea Carlisle’s pickup only.

4. Section 14.8, titled “Notices,” pertains to any notice permitted or required by the Declaration or Bylaws. It specifically addresses the Association’s notice obligation to its members when mailing them information, outlining when such notices are deemed delivered.

5. Each time the Petitioner’s monthly assessment was received late, he was assessed a late fee by the Association. Additionally, each late payment occurrence put his residence in danger of foreclosure by the Association.

6. The Judge concluded Section 14.8 was inapplicable because its language speaks specifically to the Association’s obligation to provide notice to its members. The section has no binding authority or control over homeowners sending mail to the Association.

7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with the most convincing force that inclines an impartial mind to one side of an issue.

8. The Petitioner’s rehearing request was granted on the grounds that there was an alleged “Error in the admission or rejection of evidence or other errors of law occurring during the proceeding.” He also claimed that the initial findings of fact or decision were “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”

9. The argument regarding ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, which concerns standards of conduct for officers, was dismissed because it falls outside of the Department of Real Estate’s jurisdiction. The Petitioner had been advised of the Department’s jurisdictional limitations when he first filed his petition.

10. In both the initial decision (dated August 03, 2020) and the final order after the rehearing (dated March 08, 2021), the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The Judge concluded in both instances that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to be answered in a detailed essay format, synthesizing information from across the provided documents. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark to deny the Petitioner’s claims in both the initial hearing and the rehearing. Discuss the interpretation of CC&R Section 14.8, the concept of burden of proof, and jurisdictional limitations.

2. Trace the complete procedural history of case No. 20F-H2020049-REL from the filing of the petition to the final order. Include all key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Department, and the specific reasons for each major step, such as the granting of the rehearing.

3. Evaluate the actions taken by the Petitioner, Michael Stoltenberg, regarding his assessment payments. Explain why his unilateral decision to use restricted mail delivery, despite being aware of the Association’s procedures, ultimately caused the negative outcomes he sought to avoid.

4. Explain the contractual relationship between a homeowners’ association and a property owner as described in the legal documents. How do the CC&Rs function as an enforceable contract, and how was this concept central to the dispute?

5. Discuss the roles and authorities of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) in resolving HOA disputes, as demonstrated by this case. What are their powers, and what specific limitations on their jurisdiction are identified in the text?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. In this case, the ALJ was Jenna Clark.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide petitions for hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Association

The Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association, a condominium association whose membership is comprised of the condominium owners in the Rancho Del Oro residential real estate development in Yuma, Arizona.

Board of Directors (the Board)

The body that oversees the Homeowners Association.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their contention. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the CC&Rs.

An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These governing documents form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, empowering the Association to control certain aspects of property use.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers matters for an evidentiary hearing. The OAH has the authority to hear and decide contested cases and interpret the contract (CC&Rs) between parties.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Michael J Stoltenberg, a homeowner and member of the Association.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and is considered the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association.

Statutory Agent

An individual listed as an official agent for an entity. For the years 2019 and 2020, Diana Crites was listed as the Association’s Statutory Agent.

Abbreviation for the United States Postal Service.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael J Stoltenberg (petitioner)
    Rancho Del Oro condominium owner
    Appeared on his own behalf,

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Appeared on behalf of Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association,,
  • Rhea Carlisle (board member)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Unpaid volunteer board member; Petitioner directed mail specifically to her,,,
  • Diana Crites (statutory agent)
    Rancho Del Oro Homeowners Association
    Statutory Agent for 2019 and 2020,
  • Lydia Peirce (HOA attorney staff/contact)
    Linsmeier Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
    Listed as contact for Respondent in 2020 decision transmission

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner receiving the OAH order,
  • Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    HOA Coordinator contact for the Commissioner

Warren R. Brown vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc(ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818045-REL (Consolidated with 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818054-REL)
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner Brown prevailed in the 045 matter regarding the excessive late fee ($25 instead of $15 or 10%) in violation of ARS 33-1803(A). However, both petitioners (Brown in 029, Stevens in 054) failed to prove a violation of ARS 33-1803(A) regarding the overall 39.4% assessment increase, resulting in those petitions being dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioners lost the challenge to the assessment increase because their definition of “regular assessment” was not supported by principles of statutory construction, which would have rendered the word “regular” trivial or void in the statute.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA charging excessive late payment fees and interest.

Mogollon charged a $25 late fee, exceeding the statutory limit set in ARS 33-1803(A), which limits late charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Orders: Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee assessed against Mr. Brown and must pay to Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment increase, Late fees, Statutory interpretation, Regular vs Special assessment, Homeowner petition
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:50 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:04:51 (144.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG


Administrative Law Decision Briefing: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document provides a detailed analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision from October 18, 2018, concerning three consolidated petitions filed by homeowners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The core of the dispute centers on Mogollon’s 2018 financial actions, specifically a 39.4% increase in total annual assessments and the imposition of new late payment penalties.

The case produced a split decision. The ALJ ruled in favor of Mogollon Airpark on the primary issue of the assessment increase. The judge determined that the statutory 20% cap on annual increases, as defined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies exclusively to “regular assessments” and not to “special assessments.” Mogollon had structured its $325 increase as a combination of a compliant 14.1% regular assessment hike and a separate $209 special assessment, a practice the ALJ found permissible under the law.

Conversely, the ALJ ruled in favor of Petitioner Brown regarding the HOA’s $25 late fee. The judge found this fee to be in direct violation of § 33-1803(A), which limits such charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The ALJ’s rationale was that this statutory limit applies to all “assessments” without qualification, not just regular ones.

While the hearing was limited to these specific statutory violations, the petitions were underpinned by serious allegations from Brown and Stevens of deceptive accounting practices and financial mismanagement by Mogollon’s leadership, intended to create a “fabricated shortfall” to justify the fee increases. These underlying allegations were not substantively addressed in the hearing.

Case Overview

This consolidated matter combines three separate petitions heard before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on September 28, 2018, with Thomas Shedden serving as the Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioners: Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Docket Numbers:

◦ 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG (“029 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818045-REL (“045 matter”), Petitioner: Warren R. Brown

◦ 18F-H1818054-REL (“054 matter”), Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Core Issues Contested

The dispute arose from Mogollon Airpark’s 2018 decision to increase assessments and institute new fees for late payments and past-due accounts.

1. The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central conflict involved the legality of a significant increase in annual homeowner assessments.

Financial Details:

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017): $825

2018 Total Increase: $325

Total Percentage Increase: 39.4%

Mogollon’s Breakdown of the Increase:

Regular Assessment Increase: $116 (a 14.1% increase over $825)

Special Assessment: $209

Argument on the Assessment Increase

Petitioners (Brown & Stevens)

Argued that the entire $325 increase constituted a single assessment action. Because the 39.4% increase exceeded the 20% annual cap stipulated in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), it was unlawful. They contended that the term “regular assessment” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote), not a specific type of assessment. They further alleged that Mogollon’s governing documents provided no authority to levy a “special assessment.”

Respondent (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Asserted that § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.” They argued that their regular assessment increase of $116 (14.1%) was well within the 20% limit. The $209 portion was a “special assessment,” which they described as a “term of art in the industry” not subject to the 20% cap. They cited the use of the term “special assessment” in another statute, § 33-1806, as evidence of legislative intent to differentiate between assessment types.

2. Late Payment Charges

Petitioner Brown separately challenged the legality of newly instituted penalties for late payments.

Charges Implemented by Mogollon:

◦ A flat $25 fee for late payments.

◦ 18% interest on past-due accounts.

Petitioner’s Argument (Brown): The $25 late fee violated the plain language of § 33-1803(A), which explicitly limits late payment charges to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” Brown provided an invoice showing he was charged a $25 late fee and $1.57 in interest.

Respondent’s Argument (Mogollon): The HOA argued that the statutory limits on late fees did not apply in this case because the fee was charged on a special assessment, which they contended was outside the scope of § 33-1803(A).

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

Although the hearing was limited to the narrow legal questions above, the petitioners’ filings contained extensive allegations of financial impropriety against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. These claims formed the motive for the contested assessments.

Core Allegation: The petitioners asserted that the HOA leadership engaged in “numerous accounting improprieties” and used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods, including keeping two sets of books.”

Alleged Purpose: The goal was to create a “fabricated shortfall” and present an “inaccurate picture of the HOA finances.” This was done, according to Mr. Brown, “ostensibly to show that the 2016 board of directors left office showing a loss of funds,” when in fact they had improved the treasury by approximately $200,000.

Justification for Increase: This artificially created financial need was then used “to convince the Board that a 39.4% increase in dues was required.”

Evidence and Testimony: Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged accounting practices. He testified that Mogollon possessed over $1 million and did not need an assessment increase. He also stated his belief that the $209 special assessment was a “trial run” for future assessments for purposes not authorized by the governing documents.

ALJ’s Position: The judge noted these underlying allegations but stated, “the substance of their allegations was not addressed in this hearing.” A footnote suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The ALJ issued a split decision, ruling for the Respondent on the assessment increase and for the Petitioner on the late fee. The decision was based on established principles of statutory construction.

Legal Principles Applied

Burden of Proof: Placed on Petitioners Brown and Stevens to prove their allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Construction:

1. Statutes must be interpreted to yield a “fair and sensible result” and avoid “absurd and unreasonable construction.”

2. Every word and phrase in a statute must be given meaning so that no part is “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

3. When a term is used in one part of a statute but omitted in another, it should not be read into the section where it is absent.

Conclusion on the Assessment Increase (Matters 029 & 054)

Verdict: The petitions of Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens were dismissed. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. was deemed the prevailing party.

Rationale: The ALJ rejected the petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment.” The judge reasoned that if “regular” simply meant passed by a regular process (motion, second, vote), then the word would be meaningless (“trivial or void”), as all assessments are assumed to follow that process. This would violate a core principle of statutory construction. Therefore, the legislature must have intended “regular assessment” to be a specific type of assessment, distinct from others like “special assessments.” Because the 20% cap in § 33-1803(A) explicitly applies only to regular assessments, Mogollon’s $209 special assessment was not subject to that limit.

Conclusion on the Late Fee (Matter 045)

Verdict: Petitioner Warren R. Brown was deemed the prevailing party.

Rationale: The ALJ found that the statutory clause limiting late fees applies to “assessments” in general, not specifically to “regular assessments.” The legislature’s omission of the word “regular” in this part of the statute was deliberate. Mogollon’s argument that the limit only applied to regular assessments required reading a word into the statute that was not there, which “violates principles of statutory construction.” The $25 fee clearly exceeded the allowable limit.

Final Orders

The ALJ issued separate orders for each consolidated docket, reflecting the split decision.

Docket Number

Petitioner

Primary Issue

Outcome

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed. Mogollon deemed prevailing party.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

Late Fee Charge

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party. Mogollon ordered to rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown’s $500 filing fee.