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Senol Pekin v. Artesian Ranch Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H037-REL
Agency —
Tribunal —
Decision Date 2023-04-10
Administrative Law Judge VMT
Outcome complete
Filing Fees Refunded —
Civil Penalties —

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Senol Pekin Counsel Pro Se
Respondent Artesian Ranch Community Association Counsel Ashley N. Moscarello, Esq., Daniel S. Francom, Esq., Goodman Law Group

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

23F-H037-REL Decision – 1037672.pdf

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23F-H037-REL Decision – 1041383.pdf

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23F-H037-REL Decision – 1044671.pdf

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23F-H037-REL Decision – 1044839.pdf

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23F-H037-REL Decision – 1048179.pdf

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23F-H037-REL Decision – 1054714.pdf

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Briefing: Dispute and Resolution – Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the legal proceedings and administrative decisions regarding the dispute between Petitioner Senol Pekin and Respondent Artesian Ranch Community Association. The matter, involving consolidated dockets No. 23F-H034-REL and No. 23F-H037-REL, was heard before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) on March 20, 2023, under the jurisdiction of Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

The Petitioner alleged five distinct violations of the Association’s Bylaws and the Arizona Planned Communities Act (A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that the Association violated its Bylaws by failing to hold its 2022 annual meeting on the prescribed date and violated state law by prohibiting members from recording open board sessions. Consequently, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party on these issues, and the Association was ordered to reimburse the $1,000 filing fee. Claims regarding the timing of organizational meetings, the authority of the HOA manager to schedule meetings, and the muting of members during Zoom calls were dismissed.

Detailed Analysis of Key Themes

1. Adherence to Governing Documents and Bylaws

A central theme of the dispute was the Association's failure to strictly follow its own Bylaws regarding meeting schedules.

  • Annual Meeting Requirement: Bylaws Article II, Section 2.3 requires the regular annual meeting to be held on the second Wednesday of April. In 2022, the Association held this meeting in May instead.
  • The "Technical Violation" Defense: The Association argued this was a "technical violation" with no harm to the Petitioner, citing A.R.S. § 10-3701(e). However, the ALJ ruled that while state statute may protect the validity of corporate actions taken during late meetings, it does not provide an exception for failing to adhere to the specific timing requirements set forth in the Bylaws.
2. Member Rights and Open Meeting Statutes

The case highlighted the tension between HOA management and member rights under A.R.S. § 33-1804.

  • Recording of Meetings: During an October 24, 2022, meeting, the Community Manager informed homeowners they could not record the session. The ALJ found this to be a direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which explicitly permits attendees to audiotape or videotape open portions of meetings.
  • Notice and Restrictions: The Association attempted to require advanced notice for recording, but the ALJ noted that the law prohibits boards from requiring such notice.
  • Participation and "Muting": The Petitioner alleged that the Association muted opposing viewpoints during Zoom meetings. The ALJ ruled in favor of the Association on this point, finding that the Petitioner was given several opportunities to speak and that the muting was a response to "generally aggressive" behavior rather than a systematic effort to silence dissent.
3. Governance and Administrative Authority

The proceedings clarified the roles of the Board versus the Community Manager (AAM, LLC).

  • Organizational Meetings: The Petitioner argued that officers must be elected in a separate, exclusively scheduled organizational meeting. The ALJ disagreed, noting that Bylaws do not require these meetings to be held separately from regular board meetings.
  • Managerial Agency: The Petitioner challenged the HOA Manager's authority to schedule board meetings. The ALJ ruled that a Community Manager, as an employee of the management firm (AAM, LLC), may act as an agent of the Board.
4. Evidentiary and Procedural Rulings
  • Subpoenas: The court managed multiple subpoenas for witnesses including Mandy Rogers, Susanne Roskens, and others. Notably, a subpoena for Dennis Berger was quashed, and the subpoena for Mandy Rogers was limited to her attendance, exempting her from producing documents.
  • Closure of Record: Following the March 20, 2023, hearing, the Petitioner attempted to file additional allegations and the Respondent filed a response. These were rejected by the ALJ as the record had officially closed at the conclusion of the hearing.

Important Quotes with Context

Quote Context
"Subsequent regular annual meetings shall be held on the second Wednesday of April of each year." Found in the Respondent’s Bylaws (Article II, Section 2.3), this served as the basis for the finding that the Association was in violation by holding its meeting in May.
"The board of directors of the association shall not require advance notice of the audiotaping or videotaping…" A critical excerpt from A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) used by the ALJ to determine that the Association's prohibition on recording was unlawful.
"The section does not provide an exception to the adherence to Bylaws that require a set time for an annual meeting." The ALJ’s rebuttal to the Association’s defense that their late annual meeting was merely a "technical violation."
"Ms. Rogers explained that she placed Petitioner on mute because he was generally aggressive." Testimony regarding the Association's conduct during the October 24, 2022, Zoom meeting, which the ALJ accepted as a reasonable management of the meeting.
"Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party regarding issues 1 and 4… Respondent pay Petitioner his filing fee of $1,000." The final order regarding the financial consequences of the Association's violations.

Actionable Insights

For Homeowners' Association Boards
  • Strict Bylaw Compliance: Boards must treat the specific dates and procedures outlined in their Bylaws as mandatory. "Technical violations" regarding meeting dates are still legally actionable and can result in the Association paying the Petitioner's filing fees.
  • Recording Policy Update: Associations should immediately cease any policy requiring advance notice for recording open meetings. While boards can adopt "reasonable rules" for recording, they cannot preclude the act of recording itself unless the Association provides its own unedited recording to members.
  • Managerial Conduct: Community managers should be trained to clearly distinguish between closed (executive) and open sessions when communicating rules about recording and participation to avoid inadvertently violating state statutes.
Regarding Dispute Resolution
  • Record Integrity: Once a hearing concludes, no further evidence or allegations can be introduced. Parties must ensure all relevant documentation and testimony are presented during the scheduled hearing.
  • Rehearing Procedures: If a party is dissatisfied with an ALJ decision, the request for a rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) within 30 days, as the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) loses jurisdiction once a decision is rendered.
  • Conflict of Interest in Meetings: As noted in internal Association communications, if a Board member has filed a petition against the Association, they may be required to recuse themselves or log off during executive sessions where their specific legal matter is being discussed with the Association's attorney.

Study Guide: Pekin v. Artesian Ranch Community Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative legal proceedings between Senol Pekin (Petitioner) and the Artesian Ranch Community Association (Respondent). It covers the legal framework, procedural history, specific allegations, and final rulings issued by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

I. Case Overview and Legal Framework

Jurisdiction and Authority

The matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) under the authority of the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE).

  • Governing Law: The proceedings are governed by Title 33, Chapter 16 of the Arizona Revised Statutes, known as the Planned Communities Act (A.R.S. §§ 33-1801 to 33-1818).
  • Adjudicator: Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Velva Moses-Thompson.
Case Identification
  • Petitioner: Senol Pekin.
  • Respondent: Artesian Ranch Community Association.
  • Docket Numbers: 23F-H034-REL and 23F-H037-REL (Consolidated).

II. Procedural History and Significant Events

Date Event Description
January 25, 2023 Notice of Hearing ADRE sets the initial hearing dates.
February 28, 2023 Consolidation Order The ALJ consolidates the two dockets and sets a single hearing for March 20, 2023.
February 28, 2023 Subpoena Issuance Subpoenas issued for Mandy Rogers, Susanne Roskens, Dennis Berger, Brock O’Neal, Julie Willoughby, Shelley Nelson, and Sherry Swanson.
March 13, 2023 Order on Subpoenas Dennis Berger's subpoena is quashed. Mandy Rogers' subpoena is limited to attendance (no document production). Other motions to quash are denied.
March 20, 2023 Administrative Hearing The hearing convenes at 9:00 AM.
March 28, 2023 Minute Entry The ALJ refuses to consider documents filed after March 20, 2023, as the record was closed.
April 10, 2023 Final Decision The ALJ issues the official Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
May 8, 2023 Rehearing Request A request for rehearing is filed but forwarded to the ADRE as the OAH loses jurisdiction after a decision is rendered.

III. Summary of Allegations and Judgments

The Petitioner raised five specific issues regarding the Association's adherence to its Bylaws and Arizona law.

Issue 1: Annual Meeting Frequency
  • Allegation: The Association violated Bylaws Article II, Paragraph 2.3 by failing to hold its 2022 annual meeting on the second Wednesday of April.
  • Evidence: The Association held the meeting in May 2022 instead of April.
  • Ruling: Violation Found. While A.R.S. § 10-3701(e) protects the validity of corporate actions despite timing errors, it does not exempt the Association from adhering to its own Bylaws.
Issue 2: Organizational Meetings
  • Allegation: Officers were not elected in a timely or exclusively scheduled Organizational Meeting as required by Bylaws.
  • Evidence: The Board appointed officers during a regular board meeting in August 2022.
  • Ruling: No Violation. The Bylaws do not require the organizational meeting to be held separately from other board meetings.
Issue 3: Authority to Call Meetings
  • Allegation: A meeting on September 22, 2022, was organized by the HOA Manager, who Petitioner argued lacked the authority to call meetings.
  • Evidence: Board President Susanne Roskens requested Mandy Rogers (Community Manager) to organize the meeting to address a landscaping issue.
  • Ruling: No Violation. The Community Manager acts as an agent of the Board.
Issue 4: Recording Open Sessions
  • Allegation: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) by prohibiting the recording of the open session on October 24, 2022.
  • Evidence: Mandy Rogers informed homeowners they could not record without clarifying that the rule only applied to closed sessions and stated that the Board required advanced notice.
  • Ruling: Violation Found. State law explicitly allows audio and video recording of open meetings and forbids the Board from requiring advance notice.
Issue 5: Participant Participation (Muting)
  • Allegation: The Association muted opposing sides during a Zoom meeting on October 24, 2022, preventing them from speaking.
  • Evidence: The Petitioner was muted due to "aggressive" behavior, but evidence showed he still had multiple opportunities to speak.
  • Ruling: No Violation. Boards may place reasonable time and conduct restrictions on speakers.

IV. Short-Answer Practice Questions

  1. What is the "Preponderance of the Evidence" standard?
  • Answer: It is a standard of proof where the evidence must show that a contention is "more probably true than not," or has the "most convincing force."
  1. Which party bears the burden of proof in an OAH hearing regarding a planned community dispute?
  • Answer: The Petitioner (Senol Pekin) bears the burden of proof to establish violations.
  1. Why did the ALJ refuse to consider the documents filed on March 27 and March 28, 2023?
  • Answer: The evidentiary record was closed on the day of the hearing, March 20, 2023.
  1. According to A.R.S. § 33-1804, what are the rules regarding advanced notice for recording a meeting?
  • Answer: The board of directors shall not require advance notice of audiotaping or videotaping of open portions of meetings.
  1. What was the financial penalty imposed on the Respondent for the violations found?
  • Answer: The Association was ordered to pay the Petitioner's $1,000 filing fee. No other civil penalty was deemed appropriate.

V. Essay Prompts for Deeper Exploration

  1. The Intersection of Corporate Validity and Bylaw Adherence: Analyze the ALJ's reasoning in Issue 1. How does the decision balance A.R.S. § 10-3701(e) (which validates corporate actions despite timing errors) with the mandatory nature of Association Bylaws?
  2. Agency and Authority in HOA Management: Discuss the ruling on Issue 3 regarding the Community Manager's role. To what extent can a third-party management firm (like AAM, LLC) exercise the powers of the Board of Directors?
  3. Open Meeting Rights vs. Orderly Conduct: Using Issue 5 as a reference, explore the legal limits of a Board's power to "mute" or restrict participants in a digital meeting format. Where is the line between "reasonable time restrictions" and the suppression of "opposing sides"?

VI. Glossary of Important Terms

  • Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over an administrative hearing and serves as the trier of fact and law.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804: The specific Arizona statute governing open meetings, the right to speak, and the right to record meetings within planned communities.
  • CAAM: Certified Arizona Association Manager (referencing the title of Mandy Rogers).
  • Consolidation: The legal process of joining two or more separate cases (dockets) into one when they involve common questions of law or fact.
  • Organizational Meeting: A meeting held within a reasonable time after directors take office to elect officers (e.g., President, Secretary).
  • Planned Communities Act: The section of Arizona law (Title 33, Chapter 16) that regulates the formation and management of HOAs.
  • Quash: A legal term meaning to nullify or void, specifically used here regarding a subpoena for Dennis Berger.
  • Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed (in this case, the Artesian Ranch Community Association).

HOA Accountability in Action: Key Lessons from the Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch Ruling

In the complex ecosystem of Arizona planned communities, the relationship between homeowners and their Board of Directors often fractures when governance becomes opaque or rules are applied inconsistently. While many disputes are settled through internal grievance processes, some reach a boiling point where legal intervention is the only path to clarity.

The case of Senol Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch Community Association (No. 23F-H034-REL) stands as a significant real-world example of a homeowner successfully seeking recourse through the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). This ruling stands as a cautionary tale for Boards who treat Bylaws as optional and a roadmap for homeowners seeking to enforce statutory transparency.

The Core Allegations: A Five-Point Dispute

The Petitioner’s challenge centered on five specific allegations, asserting that the Association repeatedly failed to adhere to its own governing documents and Arizona law. According to the Findings of Fact, the dispute involved:

  • Failure to Hold Annual Meetings: Violation of Bylaws Article II, Paragraph 2.3 by failing to hold the 2022 annual meeting on the required date.
  • Improper Election Procedures: Failure to elect officers during an exclusively and timely scheduled Organizational Meeting.
  • Unauthorized Meeting Organization: Alleging a September 2022 board meeting was invalid because it was organized by the Community Manager rather than the Board.
  • Prohibition of Recording: Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 by prohibiting a member from recording an open session on October 24, 2022.
  • Muting of Participants: Alleging that muting the Petitioner during a Zoom-based meeting prevented "the opposing side" from being heard, in violation of state law.

Victory for Transparency: The Ruling on Recording and Bylaws

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Petitioner on two critical issues, delivering a stern reminder that internal governing documents carry the weight of law.

Annual Meeting Violations

The Association’s Bylaws (Article II, Paragraph 2.3) explicitly mandate that regular annual meetings be held on the second Wednesday of April. In 2022, the Association unilaterally moved this meeting to May. The Association defended this as a "technical violation" that resulted in no harm, citing A.R.S. § 10-3701(e).

However, the ALJ rejected this defense with a nuance every Board must understand: while A.R.S. § 10-3701(e) protects the validity of corporate actions taken despite timing errors, it does not provide immunity from suit or an exception for associations to ignore their own Bylaws. Adherence to mandated timeframes is a requirement, not a suggestion.

The Right to Record

The most significant win for transparency involved the Board’s attempt to restrict meeting recordings.

STATUTORY PROTECTIONS: A.R.S. § 33-1804 Arizona law is clear: persons attending open board meetings may audiotape or videotape the proceedings. The Board of Directors cannot require advance notice for recording and cannot preclude it unless the Board itself provides its own unedited recordings to members upon request. Rules may be adopted to govern recording, but they cannot be used to effectively prohibit the practice.

The ALJ found the Association in direct violation after the Community Manager informed homeowners they could not record and falsely claimed the Board required advance notice.

Financial and Reputational Outcome

While the ALJ determined a civil penalty was not warranted, the Association was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner’s $1,000 filing fee. Beyond the dollar amount, the reputational cost of being declared the non-compliant party in a public ruling is a heavy burden for any Board.

The Limits of Claims: Where the Association Prevailed

The ruling also clarified the boundaries of Board authority, finding in favor of the Association on three counts:

  1. Organizational Meetings: The ALJ ruled that Bylaws do not require "organizational meetings" (where officers are elected) to be a standalone event; they may occur within the context of a regular board meeting.
  2. Management Agency: The Petitioner’s claim that a meeting was invalid because the HOA Manager organized it was dismissed. The evidence showed Board President Susanne Roskens specifically requested Manager Mandy Rogers (of AAM, LLC) to schedule the meeting to address urgent landscaping issues. The ALJ affirmed that management companies act as authorized agents of the Board.
  3. The "Muting" Threshold: Under A.R.S. § 33-1804, a Board must allow a "reasonable number of persons to speak on each side." While the Petitioner was muted during a Zoom session due to "aggressive behavior," the ALJ found no violation because the evidence showed Pekin still had several other opportunities to speak. Muting is not an automatic violation if the "opposing side" is still given a reasonable chance to be heard.

Procedural Reality Check: The Life Cycle of an HOA Dispute

This case illustrates the complex procedural hurdles involved in OAH litigation. For homeowners and boards alike, the timeline is everything:

  • February 28, 2023: The ALJ consolidated two separate dockets (23F-H034-REL and 23F-H037-REL) to streamline the hearing.
  • March 13, 2023: A significant discovery ruling occurred. The ALJ quashed the subpoena for Dennis Berger but maintained subpoenas for Susanne Roskens, Brock O’Neal, and others, demonstrating the limits of who can be compelled to testify.
  • March 20, 2023: The official Record Closing date. This is the "point of no return" for evidence.
  • March 27 & 28, 2023: The Petitioner attempted to file additional allegations and evidence. The ALJ issued a Minute Entry refusing to consider these filings, as they were submitted after the record had closed.
  • Post-Decision: After the final order in April, the Petitioner sought a rehearing. The OAH issued a Minute Entry stating it lost jurisdiction the moment the decision was rendered. Any further requests for rehearing must be directed to the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE).

Essential Takeaways for Homeowners and Boards

  1. Bylaws are Not Suggestions: Even "technical" timing shifts regarding annual meetings are actionable violations. Boards cannot use A.R.S. § 10-3701(e) as a shield to ignore their own governing documents.
  2. Recording is a Statutory Right: Boards cannot impose arbitrary hurdles, such as mandatory advance notice, on members wishing to record open meetings. Transparency is a protected right under A.R.S. § 33-1804.
  3. The Record is Final: In an administrative hearing, the window for evidence is narrow. As seen with the rejected March 27/28 filings, late submissions—no matter how relevant they seem—will be ignored once the record is closed.

Conclusion: Seeking Harmony Through Compliance

The Pekin vs. Artesian Ranch ruling serves as a vital reminder: transparency is not just a best practice; in Arizona, it is a legal mandate. While the Association prevailed on internal management issues, their failure to respect recording rights and bylaw-mandated schedules resulted in a $1,000 reimbursement order and a public record of non-compliance. To maintain community harmony and avoid the costs of litigation, both homeowners and board members must anchor their actions in a strict reading of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Senol Pekin (Petitioner)
    Testified on his own behalf
  • Julie Willoughby (Witness)
    Testified for Petitioner; also spelled Julie Willowby in hearing decision
  • Shelley Nelson (Witness)
    Testified for Petitioner; also spelled Shelly Nelson in hearing decision
  • Sherry Swanson (Witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Ashley N. Moscarello (Attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Artesian Ranch Community Association
  • Daniel S. Francom (Attorney)
    Goodman Law Group
    Listed in service records for Respondent
  • Susanne Easterday Roskens (Director of Board / Witness)
    Artesian Ranch Community Association
    Testified for Respondent; Board President
  • Mandy Rogers (Community Manager Employee / Witness)
    AAM, LLC
    Employee of Respondent's Community Manager; organized meetings and testified

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Assigned judge who issued the decision and orders
  • Susan Nicolson (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received administrative copies of orders and decisions

Other Participants

  • Dennis Berger (Subpoenaed Individual)
    Subpoena was quashed
  • Brock O'Neal (Subpoenaed Individual)
    Motion to quash his subpoena was denied

Anthony T Horn v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.

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Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221017-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-08-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Anthony T Horn Counsel —
Respondent Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc. Counsel Emily H. Mann, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's single-issue petition, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) regarding the July 6, 2021 board meeting, and alternatively, any potential violation was cured by the proper notice and vote taken at the November 9, 2021 board meeting.

Why this result: The ALJ concluded that the HOA properly notified members of the matter to be discussed at the July 6, 2021 meeting (tennis court upgrade/repair). Furthermore, any potential violation was cured by the explicit notice and second unanimous vote taken at the November 9, 2021 board meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Open Meetings/Notice/Ability to Speak (July 6, 2021 Board Meeting)

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804(F) because the July 6, 2021 agenda item 'Tennis Courts Upgrade & Repair' did not adequately disclose the conversion of one tennis court into four pickleball courts. The ALJ found the initial notice was sufficient, and alternatively, any violation was cured by a subsequent November 9, 2021 meeting with explicit notice and a second vote.

Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) with respect to the July 6, 2021 board meeting. Petitioner's petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARS 33-1804(F)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meeting Violation, Notice and Agenda Requirement, Cure Doctrine, Tennis Court Conversion, Pickleball
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221017-REL Decision – 964044.pdf

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22F-H2221017-REL Decision – 970320.pdf

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22F-H2221017-REL Decision – 974011.pdf

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22F-H2221017-REL Decision – 982006.pdf

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22F-H2221017-REL Decision – 982097.pdf

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22F-H2221017-REL Decision – 994010.pdf

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22F-H2221017-REL Decision – 948254.pdf

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Briefing Document: Horn v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal dispute, procedural history, and final judgment in the case of Anthony T. Horn (Petitioner) versus Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc. (Respondent), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute centers on the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(F) by failing to provide adequate notice for its July 6, 2021, Board of Directors meeting.

The petitioner claimed that the agenda item “Tennis Courts Upgrade & Repair” was insufficient to inform members of the board’s plan to convert a tennis court into four pickleball courts, a decision that “blindsided” affected homeowners. In response, the HOA maintained a two-pronged defense: first, that the notice was legally sufficient, and second, that any potential procedural error was “unequivocally cured” by a subsequent board meeting on November 9, 2021, which featured an explicit agenda item detailing the conversion and at which the petitioner was present.

Following an initial dismissal and a subsequent rehearing, Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson strictly limited the scope of the proceedings to the single alleged statutory violation. Ultimately, the judge dismissed the petition, issuing a definitive two-part ruling: 1) the notice for the July 6, 2021, meeting did comply with state law, and 2) even if it had not, the violation was cured by the actions taken for the November 9, 2021, meeting.

Case Overview

Parties Involved

Name / Entity

Petitioner

Anthony T. Horn

Respondent

Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.

Respondent Counsel

Emily H. Mann, Esq.

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

Case Chronology

• July 6, 2021: The HOA Board of Directors holds an open meeting and unanimously approves “Motion 3: Tennis Courts Upgrade & Repair,” which includes the conversion of one tennis court to four pickleball courts.

• August 2021: Petitioner Anthony T. Horn files a dispute regarding the meeting.

• October 13, 2021: The Arizona Department of Real Estate receives Horn’s formal petition alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F).

• November 9, 2021: The HOA holds a second board meeting to vote again on the conversion. The agenda explicitly details the plan, and the board unanimously re-approves it. Horn attends this meeting.

• February 15, 2022: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) grants the HOA’s motion for summary judgment and dismisses the petition due to a lack of response from the petitioner.

• Post-February 15, 2022: Horn files a timely request for a rehearing.

• May 26, 2022: A telephonic pre-hearing conference is held to clarify issues and the scope of the rehearing.

• July 6, 2022: The ALJ issues an order limiting the rehearing to the single alleged violation concerning the July 6, 2021, meeting, while allowing the HOA’s “cure” defense related to the November 9 meeting.

• August 1, 2022: The evidentiary rehearing is conducted.

• August 22, 2022: The ALJ issues a final decision dismissing the petitioner’s petition.

Core Legal Dispute: A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)

The central legal question revolved around compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which establishes the state’s policy on open meetings for planned communities. The statute requires that:

“…notices and agendas be provided for those meetings that contain the information that is reasonably necessary to inform the members of the matters to be discussed or decided and to ensure that members have the ability to speak after discussion of agenda items, but before a vote of the board of directors or members is taken.”

The statute further mandates that its provisions be construed “in favor of open meetings.”

Petitioner’s Position and Arguments (Anthony T. Horn)

Primary Allegation: Insufficient Notice

The petitioner’s case was predicated on the argument that the agenda for the July 6, 2021, meeting was misleading. The motion was described as: Motion 3: Tennis Courts Upgrade & Repair – Fiscal Impact $76,439 from the Reserve Fund. Horn contended that this language failed to inform homeowners of the board’s intent to make a “major change” by converting a tennis court to pickleball courts.

• Key Quote: During the rehearing, Horn described his reaction at the July 6 meeting: “We were shocked. Just a complete uh something coming from the left field. We had no idea that anything like this was planned.”

Argument Against the “Cure” Defense

Horn argued that the November 9, 2021, meeting should not be considered a valid cure because it only occurred as a direct result of his formal dispute. He framed this as an unfair “catch 22.”

• Key Quote: In his closing argument, Horn stated: “The only reason that November 9th meeting and that motion ever showed up there was because of my dispute. So, it’s kind of a catch 22. Uh you in other words, I file a dispute and then they just change the language and then my dispute is nullified and I just lose my $500 and go away. That ain’t fair.”

Ancillary Issues Ruled Out of Scope

Throughout the proceedings, Horn attempted to introduce several related grievances, which the ALJ consistently ruled were outside the narrow scope of his single-issue petition. These included:

• Allegations of discrimination, claiming pickleball members were included in vendor discussions while tennis club members were excluded.

• Concerns about the HOA’s method of communication, arguing that “eblasts” are inappropriate for a senior community and that mail or hand delivery should be used.

• Disagreement with the soundness of the board’s decision itself.

Respondent’s Position and Defense (Sun Lakes HOA)

Defense of the July 6 Meeting

The HOA, through its counsel Emily Mann and witness Kelly Haynes, argued that the notice for the July 6 meeting was fully compliant with the statute. The term “upgrade and repair” was deemed sufficient to encompass the conversion. They presented the petitioner’s own attendance at the meeting as prime evidence that the notice was effective in informing members that tennis courts would be a topic of discussion.

Affirmative Defense of “Cure”

The HOA’s primary defense was that, even assuming a procedural flaw in the first meeting’s notice, the error was “unequivocally cured” by the November 9, 2021, meeting. The notice for that meeting was explicit: Motion #3 – Clarification of Motion 3 of the July 6, 2021 Board Meeting – Conversion of Court 1 to four Permanent Pickleball Courts. The petitioner attended, members were given the opportunity to speak, and the board voted again, removing any ambiguity.

Characterization of Petitioner’s Motive

Respondent’s counsel portrayed the petition as being driven by dissatisfaction with the board’s decision rather than a genuine concern for procedural integrity. It was noted that the association had spent thousands of dollars defending the petition and had twice offered to pay Horn $500—the maximum penalty available—to resolve the matter, both of which he rejected.

• Key Quote: In her opening statement, counsel stated: “This hearing today is about Mr. Horn seeking revenge against the association for the tennis court conversion. He couldn’t stop the conversion from taking place. So punishing the association by filing a meritless petition was the next best thing.”

Final Decision and Rationale

In the final decision dated August 22, 2022, ALJ Velva Moses-Thompson dismissed the petition. The ruling was based on a two-part conclusion that fully supported the respondent’s position.

1. The July 6 Notice Was Sufficient: The ALJ concluded that the “preponderance of the evidence” showed the notice provided the “information that was reasonably necessary.” The decision explicitly states: “Sun Lakes was not required to specify the method of upgrade: a conversion to pickleball courts.”

2. The Violation, If Any, Was Cured: The decision further established that, even if the first notice had been deficient, the HOA rectified the situation. “Even if Sun Lakes had violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) with respect to the July 6, 2021, Sun Lakes cured the violation when it provided timely notice that the tennis court conversion would be discussed and voted on at the November 9, 2021 board meeting.”

Based on these findings, the order was issued: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Anthony T. Horn’s petition against Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc., is dismissed.”

Study Guide: Horn v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.

This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative case between Petitioner Anthony T. Horn and Respondent Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc. It includes a quiz to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the case documents.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based solely on the provided source documents.

1. What was the specific statute and section that Petitioner Anthony T. Horn alleged the Sun Lakes HOA violated?

2. Describe the central disagreement over the agenda for the July 6, 2021, board meeting.

3. What was the Respondent’s primary legal defense, arguing that even if a violation occurred, it was later corrected?

4. Why was Mr. Horn’s initial petition dismissed in February 2022, leading to a request for a rehearing?

5. What ruling did the Administrative Law Judge make during the pre-hearing conference regarding Mr. Horn’s desire to introduce evidence of discrimination?

6. According to testimony, what methods did the Sun Lakes HOA use to provide notice of its board meetings to the membership?

7. What key difference existed between the agenda for the July 6, 2021 meeting and the agenda for the November 9, 2021 meeting?

8. During the August 1, 2022 rehearing, what was the fate of subpoenas that had been issued for the original, vacated hearing?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion in the August 22, 2022 decision regarding the alleged violation?

10. What did the Respondent’s counsel, Emily Mann, suggest was Mr. Horn’s true motivation for pursuing the petition?

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Answer Key

1. The petitioner, Anthony T. Horn, alleged that the Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc. had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(F). This statute pertains to the policy of open meetings and the requirement that notices and agendas contain information reasonably necessary to inform members of matters to be discussed.

2. The central disagreement was whether the agenda item “Motion 3: Tennis Courts Upgrade & Repair” provided sufficient notice that the board would be discussing and voting on the conversion of a tennis court into four pickleball courts. Mr. Horn argued this description was misleading and withheld critical information, while the HOA contended it was adequate.

3. The Respondent’s primary defense was that any potential procedural error or lack of clarity in the July 6, 2021 meeting notice was “unequivocally cured.” They argued this cure was accomplished through a subsequent board meeting on November 9, 2021, which had a more explicit agenda item about the court conversion.

4. The initial petition was dismissed because the Petitioner, Anthony T. Horn, did not file a response to the Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for Summary Disposition. The Administrative Law Judge granted these motions, leading Mr. Horn to file for a rehearing.

5. The judge ruled that the issue of alleged discrimination was a separate legal matter from the alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). To include the discrimination claim, Mr. Horn would have to file a separate petition and pay an additional $500 filing fee.

6. General Manager Kelly Haynes testified that the HOA provided notice via e-blasts to members who signed up for them, posting on monitors in the clubhouse, inclusion in the monthly newsletter (“The Laker”), and posting on the association’s website.

7. The agenda for the July 6 meeting listed “Tennis Courts Upgrade & Repair.” In contrast, the agenda for the November 9 meeting provided a much more specific item: “Clarification of Motion 3 of the July 6, 2021 Board Meeting – Conversion of Court 1 to four Permanent Pickleball Courts.”

8. The Administrative Law Judge informed Mr. Horn that the subpoenas issued for the original hearing would not apply to the new rehearing. To compel witness testimony, Mr. Horn was required to request and serve new subpoenas, which would be a significant additional expense.

9. The ALJ concluded that the Sun Lakes HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) with respect to the July 6, 2021 board meeting. The decision further stated that even if a violation had occurred, it was cured by the proper notice and subsequent vote at the November 9, 2021 board meeting.

10. The Respondent’s counsel stated that Mr. Horn’s petition was not about seeking justice or ensuring compliance with statutes, but was an act of “revenge against the association for the tennis court conversion.” She argued that since he could not stop the conversion, he filed a “meritless petition” to punish the association.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer-form analysis. Formulate your answers based on a comprehensive review of the case details and legal arguments presented in the source documents.

1. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). Discuss how each party applied the statute’s requirement for “information that is reasonably necessary to inform the members” to the facts of the case.

2. Trace the procedural history of the case from the initial petition filing in 2021 to the final decision in August 2022. Identify at least three key procedural moments or rulings and explain their significance to the case’s progression and ultimate outcome.

3. Discuss the legal concept of a “cure” as it applied in this administrative hearing. Evaluate the strength of the Respondent’s argument that the November 9, 2021 meeting cured any potential defects from the July 6, 2021 meeting, and explain how the Petitioner attempted to rebut this defense.

4. The scope of the hearing was a contentious issue. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge limited the scope of the case and excluded certain topics, such as alleged discrimination and the soundness of the board’s business decision. Why are such limitations important in legal proceedings?

5. Based on the testimony and arguments presented in the August 1, 2022 rehearing, compare and contrast the remedies sought by the Petitioner with the relief available in the administrative hearing venue. What does this reveal about the limitations of this specific legal process for a homeowner’s grievances?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions in disputes involving government agencies. In this case, Judge Velva Moses-Thompson from the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The collection of laws passed by the Arizona state legislature. The specific statute at issue was A.R.S. § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.

A legal concept where a party corrects a prior procedural error or violation. In this case, the Respondent argued that any deficiency in the July 6 meeting notice was corrected, or “cured,” by holding the November 9 meeting with a more explicit agenda.

Motion to Dismiss

A formal request made by a party to a court or tribunal to dismiss a case. The Respondent filed this motion, which was initially granted.

Motion for Summary Judgment

A request made by a party for a decision on the merits of a case before a full hearing, arguing that there are no genuine disputes as to material facts and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Motion for Summary Disposition

A request, similar to a motion for summary judgment, asking the tribunal to rule in a party’s favor without a full hearing.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this matter, Anthony T. Horn was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases. It requires the party with the burden of proof to convince the trier of fact that their contention is more probably true than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted after an initial decision has been made. Mr. Horn was granted a rehearing after his petition was initially dismissed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this matter, Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc. was the Respondent.

Sua Sponte Order

An order made by a judge on their own initiative, without a request from either party. The order to continue the rehearing to August 1, 2022, was a sua sponte order due to the judge’s jury duty.

Subpoena

A legal order compelling a person to attend a hearing to give testimony. The Petitioner had to request new subpoenas for the rehearing as the original ones were no longer valid.

Your HOA Did What? 4 Shocking Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Over a Tennis Court

Introduction: The Notice on the Bulletin Board

Anyone who lives in a planned community is familiar with the official notices from their Homeowners Association (HOA). Often tacked onto a bulletin board or sent in a mass email, these communications can be models of bureaucratic brevity, full of formal language that is both vague and oddly specific. It’s easy to glance at an agenda item and assume you know what it means. But what happens when you’re wrong?

This was the situation faced by Anthony T. Horn, a homeowner in Sun Lakes, Arizona. In 2021, he filed a formal dispute against his HOA over a meeting notice he believed was deceptive, kicking off a year-long legal battle. His story provides a rare look “under the hood” of HOA procedures and power dynamics. Here are four surprising and impactful takeaways from his fight that every homeowner should understand.

1. A Notice for “Repairs” Can Mean a Total Transformation

The dispute began simply enough. The HOA posted a notice for a July 6, 2021 board meeting with a specific agenda item: “Motion 3: Tennis Courts Upgrade & Repair – Fiscal Impact $76,439 from the Reserve Fund.”

Mr. Horn, an active tennis player, attended the meeting expecting a discussion about much-needed repairs to the community’s dangerous and unplayable courts. Instead, he testified that he was “shocked” when the board announced that the “upgrade” included permanently converting one tennis court into four pickleball courts.

His core legal argument was that this notice failed to provide information “reasonably necessary to inform the members” of the true matter being decided, a requirement under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). The final ruling from the Administrative Law Judge, however, was counter-intuitive.

Sun Lakes was not required to specify the method of upgrade: a conversion to pickleball courts.

This decision reveals a critical gap between a homeowner’s plain-language understanding and the law’s procedural interpretation. The ruling effectively places the burden on homeowners to be deeply skeptical of vague agenda items and to anticipate the broadest possible definition of terms like “upgrade.” As this case demonstrates, the law may not protect a resident’s more intuitive and narrow reading of a notice.

2. An HOA Can Get a “Mulligan” on Procedural Errors

After Mr. Horn filed his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the HOA board pursued a powerful defense strategy: a do-over. The board scheduled a second meeting for November 9, 2021.

The notice for this second meeting was far more specific. Its purpose was explicitly stated as a “Clarification of Motion 3 of the July 6, 2021 Board Meeting – Conversion of Court 1 to four Permanent Pickleball Courts.” At this meeting, the board held the vote again, and it passed again.

Legally, this is known as “curing” a potential violation. The HOA argued that even if their first notice was flawed (which they did not concede), this second, properly-noticed meeting made the original issue moot. The judge agreed.

Even if Sun Lakes had violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) with respect to the July 6, 2021, Sun Lakes cured the violation when it provided timely notice that the tennis court conversion would be discussed and voted on at the November 9, 2021 board meeting.

This reveals that “curing” is not just a simple correction; it is a powerful strategic tool for an HOA board. It creates a nearly risk-free path to test the limits of procedural compliance. A board can issue a vague notice, and only if a homeowner is willing to invest the time and money to file a formal complaint does the board need to “cure” the potential error with a more specific follow-up. This dynamic shifts the entire risk and cost of ensuring compliance onto the individual homeowner.

3. Fighting on Multiple Fronts Can Be Cost-Prohibitive

During the legal process, Mr. Horn wanted to introduce other arguments. He alleged discrimination against tennis players and claimed the board had ignored other viable locations for new pickleball courts.

The judge, however, repeatedly shut down these lines of argument. The hearing was strictly limited to the single issue identified in the original petition: the alleged violation of the open meeting notice statute. The reason for this limitation was procedural and financial. In the Arizona Department of Real Estate’s dispute system, each separate allegation requires its own petition and, crucially, a separate $500 filing fee.

This creates a significant financial barrier for the homeowner, as Mr. Horn explained during the hearing.

And I probably have five, six or seven of them inaccuracies and misstatements and what so would be $500 each.

This rule exposes a stark asymmetry of resources. The individual homeowner must pay out-of-pocket for each separate alleged violation, forcing them to pick only their single strongest—or most affordable—argument. The HOA, by contrast, defends itself using a legal fund paid for by the entire community, including the very homeowner who is filing the dispute.

4. You Can Win the Argument, Lose the Case, and Still Pay for It

The ultimate outcome presented a paradox, which Mr. Horn articulated in his closing argument. He laid out a sequence of events that created a frustrating “Catch-22” for the homeowner:

1. He identified what he believed was a clear procedural violation at the July 6th meeting.

2. He paid a $500 filing fee to formally dispute it.

3. His dispute directly caused the HOA to hold the second, more specific, and legally “cured” meeting on November 9th.

4. The HOA then used that very “cured” meeting as the legal basis to have his petition dismissed.

He saw it as a no-win situation where his own action to seek accountability provided the HOA with the tool to defeat his claim.

The only reason that November 9th meeting and that motion ever showed up there was because of my dispute. So, it’s kind of a catch 22. …I file a dispute and then they just change the language and then my dispute is nullified and I just lose my $500 and go away. That ain’t fair.

This outcome reveals the ultimate procedural paradox. It is a system where a homeowner’s successful action—forcing the HOA to correct its error—becomes the very instrument of their legal defeat. The legal system, in this context, prioritized the correction of a procedural flaw over the merits of the original grievance or the fairness of the outcome for the individual who forced the correction.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power

The story of one homeowner’s fight over a tennis court reveals that the nuances of HOA law are complex and can often favor the established procedures of the board. From the broad interpretation of “reasonable notice” to the board’s ability to “cure” its own mistakes, the system contains mechanisms that can be challenging for an individual resident to overcome.

This case is not about taking sides on the issue of tennis versus pickleball. It is a valuable case study in the realities of community governance. It underscores the importance for homeowners to understand not just the rules, but the procedures that enforce them. This leads to a final, critical question for every member of an HOA to consider:

Given the systems in place, how can an individual homeowner ensure their voice is truly heard when the stakes feel this high?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Anthony T. Horn (petitioner)
    Homeowner and member of Sun Lakes HOA
  • Ralph Howlen (witness / homeowner)
    Spelled Howland in some transcript passages.
  • Felicia Kuba (potential witness / homeowner)
    Potential witness regarding court injury/conditions.
  • Ed Campy (former tennis club president)
    Notified Horn of the November meeting.
  • Robert Miller (homeowner)
    Former tennis club member who asked a question at the July 6 meeting.

Respondent Side

  • Emily H. Mann (HOA attorney)
    Phillips, Maceyko and Battock, PLLC
  • Chris Johnston (HOA representative / Account Manager)
    USI Insurance Services LLC
    Senior Account Manager; listed as point of contact for Respondent
  • Kelly Haynes (general manager / witness)
    Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.
  • Janice Cornoyer (HOA president / witness)
    Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.
  • Jimmy Burns (facilities maintenance manager / witness)
    Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.
  • Emily Jones (HOA employee)
    Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.
    Employee who works with computers in the HOA office.
  • Steve Howell (board member)
    Sun Lakes Homeowners Association #1, Inc.
    Read in the motion at the July 6 meeting.

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Miranda Alvarez (Legal Secretary)
    OAH/ADRE
    Transmitted documents.
  • c. serrano (Transmitting Agent)
    OAH/ADRE
    Transmitted documents.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as email recipient/attn.
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as email recipient/attn.
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as email recipient/attn.
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as email recipient/attn.
  • labril (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Listed as email recipient/attn.

Other Participants

  • Dennis Anderson (observer)
    Joined hearing via Google Meet.
  • Mark Gotman (observer)
    Joined hearing via Google Meet.

Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl v. Sabino Vista Townhouse

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Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-04-25
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Sam & Pipper O' Shaughnessy Stangl Counsel —
Respondent Sabino Vista Townhouse Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

Article VI of the CC&Rs

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge deemed Petitioners the prevailing party. Respondent HOA violated Article VI of the CC&Rs by failing to maintain and remove rubbish from the natural desert area within the Common Area up to the exterior building lines, as the Board's determination not to maintain the area lacked proper authority without a CC&R amendment. The Respondent was ordered to comply with the CC&Rs and refund the Petitioners' filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA maintenance obligations for common area up to exterior building lines

Petitioners alleged the HOA failed to maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior building lines and patio enclosures, specifically a natural desert area within the Common Area. The ALJ found that the CC&Rs require the Association to maintain and remove all rubbish within its property up to the exterior building lines, and the Board lacked the authority to refuse maintenance of the natural desert area without amending the CC&Rs.

Orders: Respondent is ordered to comply with the requirements of Article VI of the CC&Rs going forward and must pay Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Article VI of the CC&Rs
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Maintenance, CC&R Interpretation, Common Area Maintenance, Filing Fee Refund, Prevailing Party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376 (2006)
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75 (Colo. App. 1993)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 959583.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:38:59 (49.7 KB)

22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 964651.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:39:03 (18.7 KB)

22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 964655.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:39:07 (99.7 KB)

22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 927714.pdf

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22F-H2221009-REL Decision – 927747.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:39:19 (37.5 KB)

Stangl v. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association: A Dispute Over Common Area Maintenance

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the key facts, arguments, and legal decisions in the administrative case of Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl versus the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association. The central conflict revolves around the Association’s legal obligation, as defined by its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), to maintain a common area behind the Petitioners’ property.

The Petitioners alleged that the Association violated Article 6 of its CC&Rs by failing to maintain this area for over two decades, resulting in the accumulation of rubbish and the creation of a habitat for pests. The Association countered that the area in question was designated “natural desert” to serve as a buffer, and that maintaining it was not required and would be cost-prohibitive.

An initial hearing in November 2021 resulted in a decision in favor of the Petitioners. The Association was granted a rehearing, which took place in April 2022. Despite new arguments from the Association regarding budget constraints, historical precedent, and alleged interference by the Petitioners, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld the original decision.

The final ruling on April 25, 2022, found that the language of CC&R Article 6 is unambiguous and requires the Association to maintain “all property up to the exterior building lines.” The ALJ concluded that the Board of Directors does not have the authority to unilaterally designate a common area as “unmaintained” without formally amending the CC&Rs. Consequently, the Association was ordered to comply with Article 6 and reimburse the Petitioners’ filing fee.

Case Overview

Case Name

Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl, Petitioners, vs. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association, Respondent.

Case Numbers

22F-H2221009-REL (Initial Hearing)
22F-H2221009-REL-RHG (Rehearing)

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Key Dates

Petition Filed: August 6, 2021
Initial Hearing: November 8, 2021
Initial Decision: November 29, 2021
Rehearing: April 4, 2022
Final Decision: April 25, 2022

The Central Allegation: Violation of CC&R Article 6

The dispute is founded on the interpretation of Article 6 of the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association’s CC&Rs concerning “Common Maintenance.”

Key Provisions of Article 6:

• Maintenance Obligation: “The Association, or its duly authorized representative, shall maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior building lines and patio enclosures including but not limited to the landscaping… roofs, common elements, decorative walls, drainage… and be responsible for the rubbish removal of all areas within the common properties.”

• Standard of Care: “The Board of Directors of the Association shall use a reasonably high standard of care in providing for the repair, management and maintenance of said property, so that said townhouse project will reflect high pride of ownership.”

Petitioners’ Core Claim: Filed on August 6, 2021, the petition alleged that the Association violated Article 6 by failing to maintain the property behind their townhome unit. They asserted this neglect had persisted for the approximately 24 years they had lived there, leading to overgrowth and pest infestations.

The First Hearing and Decision (November 2021)

Summary of Arguments

• Petitioners (Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl):

◦ Alleged observing only 12 hours of landscaping work in their immediate back area over 24 years.

◦ Claimed the accumulated rubbish and overgrowth served as a habitat for pests, specifically mentioning “a pack rat for rattlesnakes.”

◦ Submitted a photograph of a rattlesnake skin found in their backyard as evidence.

• Respondent (Sabino Vista Townhouse Association):

◦ Testimony was provided by Charles Taylor Ostermeyer, secretary of the Board of Directors.

◦ Argued the area in question is a “natural desert area and underbrush” that begins 30 to 40 feet behind the homes.

◦ Initially claimed the Board had adopted a rule limiting maintenance to just 4 feet behind residences, citing Board meeting minutes. However, when pressed by the ALJ, Ostermeyer conceded that believing a formal rule was adopted “would be conjecture on my part.”

◦ Asserted it would be too costly to clear the entire region.

◦ Contended that the decision not to maintain the open desert area was a valid exercise of the “business judgment rule” applicable to non-profit organizations.

November 29, 2021 Decision

The ALJ, Velva Moses-Thompson, ruled in favor of the Petitioners.

• Finding: The preponderance of the evidence showed the Respondent failed to maintain the property as required by the unambiguous language of Article 6.

• Reasoning: The Respondent provided “no evidence of an Amendment to Article VI” and “no evidence of a rule properly adopted by the Board that would limit the common area to be maintained.”

• Order: The Petitioners were deemed the prevailing party, and the Association was ordered to reimburse their $500 filing fee and comply with Article 6 going forward.

The Rehearing and Final Decision (April 2022)

The Association’s request for a rehearing was granted, with the new hearing held on April 4, 2022. The Association was represented by Nathan Tennyson, Esq., and presented testimony from John Polasi, a Board member and Chairman of the Landscape Committee.

Rehearing Testimony and Arguments

Petitioner Arguments (Sam O’ Shaughnessy Stangl)

Respondent Arguments (John Polasi, HOA Board)

Core Issue is Deflection: Argued the Association’s narrative was a “deflection from the main issue.” Stated the HOA focused on irrelevant topics to circumvent the court’s correct original ruling.

Area is a “Natural Buffer”: The unmaintained area has existed since 1974 and serves as a natural buffer from Tanque Verde Creek, keeping wildlife out and preventing hikers/bikers from wandering into the neighborhood.

Tree Trimming Incident: Claimed the HOA falsely accused him of “singlehandedly” stopping all tree trimming. Clarified a December 2021 interaction with a contractor (Leon’s Tree Service) lasted only 30 seconds, where he refused permission to cut three shade branches in his private front courtyard.

Petitioner Hindrance: Alleged the Petitioners actively hindered tree trimming in December 2021 by refusing the contractor entry into their courtyard and blocking their driveway with an SUV to prevent the trimming of a low-hanging branch.

Pest Infestations: Maintained that pests are a significant problem, citing a recent rattlesnake sighting on his birthday (March 21) and his personal removal of “252 packrats in the last three years.”

Pest Control is Managed: Stated the HOA contracts “Mr. Packrat” to inspect the entire property quarterly. Polasi testified he had been chairman for a year and had “never heard of a single pack rider or rattlesnake anywhere.”

Misuse of Common Area: Dismissed accusations of misusing the common area as “pure deflection.” He stated his use (grilling, sitting outdoors) was adjudicated in court 18 years prior and found to be in compliance with CC&Rs.

Petitioner Misuse of Common Area: Accused the Petitioners of violating CC&Rs by placing personal items (barbecue, smoker, tables, chairs) in the common area and cutting a hole in their patio wall for water and electric lines.

Developer’s Intent: Cited a statement from Dale Chastine, the original developer, asserting the CC&Rs were written to “strictly forbid any unfettered wild growth” and require all common areas to be maintained in the same manner.

Board Authority and Historical Precedent: Cited 2020 Board Minutes that formally designated the area “35 ft to the south of southern homeowner rear wall” as “unmaintained natural desert landscape.” Referenced 1999 minutes indicating a 4-foot maintenance rule was previously in place.

New Issues: Attempted to introduce new evidence regarding a “complete drainage channel that… is now buried under debris and soil,” but the ALJ did not admit it as it was a new allegation not in the original petition.

Budgetary Constraints: Argued that maintaining the entire two-to-four-acre area would be excessively expensive. He noted the HOA had recently spent $15,000 on front-area tree trimming and $10,000 on tree repairs, and had other costs like a new pool pump.

April 25, 2022 Final Decision

The ALJ again ruled in favor of the Petitioners, affirming the initial decision.

• Core Conclusion: “Although the Board determined that it would not maintain the natural desert, the Board does not have authority under its CC&Rs to refuse to maintain any of the area of its property up to the exterior building lines.”

• Legal Reasoning: The CC&Rs are unambiguous and require the Association to maintain and remove rubbish from all property within its boundaries, including the area designated as “natural desert.”

• Path Forward for HOA: The ALJ explicitly stated, “If the Association does not want to maintain any area within its property up to the exterior building lines, the Association should amend its CC&Rs.”

• Final Order: The order from the November 29, 2021 decision was reiterated: Petitioners were deemed the prevailing party, the Respondent was ordered to pay the $500 filing fee, and the Respondent was directed to comply with Article VI of the CC&Rs.

Stangl v. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association: A Case Study Guide

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between homeowners Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl and the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with a corresponding answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the case documents.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What was the central violation alleged by the Petitioners in their August 6, 2021, petition?

2. According to Article 6 of the CC&Rs, what is the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association’s responsibility regarding property maintenance?

3. In the first hearing on November 8, 2021, what was the Respondent’s primary argument for not maintaining the area behind the Petitioners’ home?

4. What was the outcome of the first Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on November 29, 2021?

5. Who testified for the Respondent at the April 4, 2022, rehearing, and what were his roles within the Association?

6. What two historical documents did the Respondent present at the rehearing to support its maintenance policy for the area in question?

7. Describe the Respondent’s accusation against the Petitioners regarding the tree trimming service in December 2021.

8. What strategic reasons did the Respondent’s witness, John Polasi, give for leaving the desert area unmaintained?

9. In the final decision of April 25, 2022, why did the Administrative Law Judge rule against the Association despite its evidence of a board-approved maintenance plan?

10. What specific orders were issued to the Respondent in the final court decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioners alleged that the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association violated Article 6 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Specifically, they claimed the Association failed to maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior lines and patio enclosures, focusing on the unkempt two-acre area behind their townhome.

2. Article 6 requires the Association to “maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior building lines and patio enclosures.” This includes landscaping, common elements, and rubbish removal, and mandates that the Board of Directors use a “reasonably high standard of care” so the project reflects a high pride of ownership.

3. In the first hearing, the Respondent argued that it had applied the “business judgment rule” applicable to non-profit organizations. The Association contended it would be too costly to clear out the entire region, which it described as an open desert area with many trees and weeds.

4. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found the Petitioners to be the prevailing party. The ALJ ordered the Respondent to comply with Article 6 of the CC&Rs going forward and to pay the Petitioners their filing fee of $500.00.

5. John Polasi testified for the Respondent at the rehearing. He was identified as a member of the Respondent’s Board of Directors and the Chairman of the Landscaping Committee.

6. The Respondent presented minutes from a Board Meeting in February 1999, which stated that only 4 feet behind residences were maintained, with the remainder left natural. They also presented minutes from a 2020 Board Meeting that revised this policy, designating an area 35 feet from the southern homeowner walls as the maintenance boundary.

7. The Respondent alleged that the Petitioners interfered with and prevented a tree trimming project conducted by Leon’s Tree Service. The witness claimed the Petitioners refused entry into their front patio to trim overhanging limbs and moved a vehicle into their driveway to block the work.

8. John Polasi testified that the unmaintained desert area serves as a “natural buffer.” He stated it keeps animals from the adjacent Tanque Verde Creek area from coming onto homeowner property and also prevents bikers and hikers from wandering into the neighborhood.

9. The ALJ ruled that although the Board had determined it would not maintain the natural desert area, the Board does not have the authority under its CC&Rs to refuse maintenance. The judge concluded that the CC&Rs require the Association to maintain all property up to the exterior lines and that if the Association wishes to change this, it must formally amend its CC&Rs.

10. The final order deemed the Petitioners the prevailing party and directed the Respondent to pay the Petitioners’ $500.00 filing fee within thirty days. It further ordered the Respondent to comply with the requirements of Article VI of the CC&Rs going forward.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for essay-length responses to encourage a deeper analysis of the case. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning of the Administrative Law Judge in both the initial and final decisions. Why was Article 6 of the CC&Rs consistently interpreted as unambiguous, and how did this interpretation override the Respondent’s “business judgment” defense and subsequent board resolutions?

2. Compare and contrast the evidence and arguments presented by the Respondent in the first hearing versus the rehearing. How did the Association’s defense strategy evolve, and what new evidence did it introduce in the second hearing?

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case documents. Using specific examples from the testimony and exhibits, explain how the Petitioners met this burden of proof and why the Respondent’s affirmative defenses failed to meet the same standard in both hearings.

4. Examine the tension between a homeowners’ association’s governing documents (like CC&Rs) and the operational decisions made by its Board of Directors. How does this case illustrate the limits of a Board’s authority to interpret or modify its responsibilities without formally amending the core documents?

5. Evaluate the various pieces of evidence introduced during the rehearing, such as the Board Minutes from 1999 and 2020, the letter from Leon’s Tree Service, and the attempted introduction of the developer’s affidavit. What role did each piece of evidence play in shaping the arguments, and why was some evidence given more weight or deemed inadmissible by the judge?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Affidavit

A written statement confirmed by oath or affirmation, for use as evidence in court. An affidavit from the original developer, Dale Chastain, was presented but not admitted into evidence.

Affirmative Defense

A defense in which the defendant introduces evidence that, if found to be credible, will negate liability, even if it is proven that the defendant committed the alleged acts.

Arizona Dept. of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

Business Judgment Rule

A legal principle that grants directors of a corporation (or non-profit association) immunity from liability for losses incurred in corporate transactions if the directors acted in good faith. This was used as a defense by the Respondent in the first hearing.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision. The interpretation of Article 6 of the CC&Rs was the central issue of the case.

Common Area

Property in a planned community that is owned by the homeowners’ association and intended for the use and enjoyment of all members. The dispute centered on the maintenance of a common area behind the Petitioners’ home.

Conjecture

An opinion or conclusion formed on the basis of incomplete information. A witness for the Respondent admitted his belief about a maintenance rule was “conjecture.”

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding where parties present evidence and testimony before a judge to resolve a disputed issue.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium building that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. In this case, the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings are conducted by Administrative Law Judges.

Petitioners

The party that files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, Sam & Pipper O’ Shaughnessy Stangl.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The Petitioners had the burden of proving their case by this standard.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted upon request, to reconsider the original decision. The April 4, 2022, hearing was a rehearing, treated as a “complete and new hearing.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association.

Restrictive Covenant

A provision in a deed or other legal document that limits the use of real property. The court noted that unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.

Riparian Area

An area of land adjacent to a river or stream. The Respondent’s witness described the community as being in a riparian area next to Tanque Verde Creek.

He Sued His HOA Over Landscaping and Won. They Demanded a Do-Over. He Won Again. Here Are the Lessons.

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath Tale of a Homeowner and His HOA

For many homeowners, dealing with a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like a constant struggle. Disputes over rules, maintenance, and responsibilities are common frustrations. But what happens when a homeowner believes their HOA is fundamentally failing to uphold its end of the bargain?

This is the story of Sam O’ Shaughnessy Stangl, a homeowner who took his HOA to court over its failure to maintain a common area behind his home. The outcome was surprising enough: he won. But when the HOA was granted a complete “do-over” hearing to re-argue the case from scratch, he won a second time.

This case, Stangl vs. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association, offers a powerful case study in the hierarchy of governing documents and the legal principle of plain language in contract law. Here are the surprising and powerful lessons from the repeated legal victory that every homeowner should know.

1. An HOA Board Vote Can’t Override Its Own Founding Documents

The HOA’s core defense was that its Board of Directors had made a decision to leave the area behind the homes as an “unmaintained natural desert.” This argument, however, proved legally insufficient across two separate hearings.

In the first hearing, board secretary Charles Taylor Ostermeyer testified that the board had decided to limit maintenance. However, when pressed by the judge, he admitted that claiming this decision was a formal “rule” would be “conjecture on my part.” For the rehearing, the association presented board member John Polaski, who formalized the argument, claiming the unmaintained area served as a “natural buffer.” To support this, they presented minutes from a 2020 board meeting, arguing that the board’s decision recorded in those minutes effectively created a new policy for that common area.

In both instances, the Administrative Law Judge delivered a decisive counter-ruling. The judge found that the association’s primary governing documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were the superior legal authority. A simple board vote recorded in meeting minutes could not nullify the binding requirements of the CC&Rs. The judge’s final order from the rehearing was unequivocal:

Although the Board determined that it would not maintain the natural desert, the Board does not have authority under its CC&Rs to refuse to maintain any of the area of its property up to the exterior building lines. … If the Association does not want to maintain any area within its property up to the exterior building lines, the Association should amend its CC&Rs.

This is a critical lesson for every homeowner. The CC&Rs function as a legally binding contract between the association and its members. A simple board resolution, a new rule, or a long-standing “tradition” cannot legally contradict the foundational covenants.

2. When the Contract is Clear, “All” Simply Means All

The entire case ultimately hinged on a single sentence in Article VI of the Sabino Vista Townhouse Association CC&Rs. This piece of text was so clear and powerful that the judge cited it as the deciding factor in both the original hearing and the rehearing. The language stated:

“The Association, or its duly authorized representative, shall maintain and otherwise manage all property up to the exterior building lines and patio enclosures including but not limited to the landscaping…”

The HOA attempted to argue around this plain language. Its representatives claimed that maintaining the entire area was too costly, that it had been unmaintained since the community was built in 1974, and that it was a “riparian area” (land adjacent to a river or stream) that should be left wild.

In both hearings, the judge rejected these arguments. The word “all” was not open to interpretation. The language of the CC&Rs was unambiguous and therefore had to be enforced as it was written. This illustrates a fundamental legal principle: when contract language is clear, arguments about convenience, cost, or past practice often fail when pitted against the plain text of a governing legal document.

3. Facts are Stubborn, Even in a “Complete New Hearing”

In a highly unusual procedural twist, after losing the first hearing in November 2021, the HOA was granted a “re-hearing” in April 2022. This was not an appeal, which reviews an original decision for errors, but a complete strategic reset. The judge explained its legal significance:

“And this is a re-hearing. So it is a complete and new hearing. … as if the first hearing didn’t happen.”

The HOA used this second chance to launch a new strategy. While the first hearing’s defense centered on cost and a vague, unwritten policy, the second hearing featured a new witness and a new, two-pronged approach: formalizing the “natural buffer” argument and adding an ad hominem strategy that attempted to portray Mr. Stangl as an uncooperative resident who had personally interfered with tree trimming.

But while the HOA’s tactics shifted, the central fact of the case could not be changed. The text of the CC&Rs was the same in April 2022 as it was in November 2021. The final outcome was identical to the first. The judge once again ruled in favor of the homeowner, ordering the HOA to comply with its own CC&Rs and to reimburse Mr. Stangl’s $500 filing fee.

This demonstrates a key legal reality: while procedural tactics can create new opportunities for argument, they cannot alter the foundational text of a contract. The HOA’s strategy shifted, but the CC&Rs—the central fact of the case—remained immutable.

Conclusion: A Final Takeaway for Every Homeowner

The case of Stangl vs. Sabino Vista Townhouse Association offers three profound takeaways for homeowners: the CC&Rs are supreme over board decisions, the plain language of those documents is incredibly powerful, and a fact-based argument is resilient. It serves as a potent reminder that an association’s governing documents are not just suggestions—they are enforceable contracts.

The next time you question an HOA policy, will you stop at their latest newsletter, or will you go back to the source?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sam O' Shaughnessy Stangl (petitioner)
  • Pipper O' Shaughnessy Stangl (petitioner)
  • Dale Chastine (developer/witness)
    Original developer who provided an affidavit supporting petitioners
  • Lisa Chastine (witness)
    Signed father's affidavit as a witness

Respondent Side

  • Blake R. Johnson (HOA attorney)
    The Brown Law Group, PLLC
  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    The Brown Law Group, PLLC
    Appeared for rehearing; also referred to as Nathan Henderson in transcript
  • Charles Taylor Ostermeyer (board member)
    Sabino Vista Townhouse Association
    Secretary of Board; testified at original hearing
  • John Polasi (board member)
    Sabino Vista Townhouse Association
    Chairman of the Landscaping Committee; testified at rehearing
  • Leon (contractor)
    Leon's Tree Service
    Tree trimmer hired by HOA; provided a signed statement/testimony

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email recipient
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Transmitted order
  • Miranda Alvarez (clerk)
    Transmitted order

Other Participants

  • Barbara Barski (property manager)
    Former manager of the association

Nicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC) v. Desert Mountain Master

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Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2121055-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-01-31
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Nicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC) Counsel —
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

No violations listed

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge vacated the hearing from the docket because the Petitioner voluntarily withdrew.

Why this result: The Petitioner voluntarily withdrew the request for hearing, leading to the matter being vacated from the docket.

Key Issues & Findings

statute

The party requesting the hearing voluntarily withdrew the matter.

Orders: The matter was vacated from the docket of the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: respondent_win

Analytics Highlights

Topics: voluntary withdrawal, vacated hearing, continuance granted

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2121055-REL Decision – 934279.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:13 (49.2 KB)

21F-H2121055-REL Decision – 934302.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:18 (8.1 KB)

21F-H2121055-REL Decision – 942918.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:22 (42.0 KB)

21F-H2121055-REL Decision – 909217.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:36:25 (113.1 KB)

This summary focuses on the procedural history and final administrative disposition of the matter, Case No. 21F-H2121055-REL-RHG, before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Key Facts and Parties

The case involved Petitioner Nicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC) and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association. The proceedings were conducted under the authority of the OAH, with Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson presiding over the entries.

Hearing Proceedings and Main Issues

The primary procedural actions documented are two Minute Entries concerning the scheduling and eventual removal of the case from the docket.

  1. Granting Continuance (December 22, 2021): The OAH issued a minute entry granting a continuance of the scheduled hearing, noting that good cause appearing. The matter was reset for February 23, 2022, at 9:00 AM. The hearing was scheduled to be conducted either by video conferencing or telephone participation through Google Meet, though parties retained the option to appear in person at the OAH in Phoenix if they advised the office seven days prior. In-person attendance required adherence to social distancing and masking guidelines.
  1. Vacating Hearing (January 31, 2022): Before the continued hearing date, a subsequent Minute Entry was filed vacating the hearing from the OAH docket.

Outcome and Legal Points

The most significant legal outcome was the termination of the proceedings at the administrative level. The matter was vacated because "The party requesting the hearing has voluntarily withdrawn". This voluntary withdrawal by the petitioner rendered the scheduled hearing unnecessary and led to the closure of the case on the OAH docket.

Questions

Question

Can my HOA refuse to provide records if I am currently suing them?

Short Answer

Yes, the HOA may withhold records if they relate to pending litigation between the homeowner and the association.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, an association is permitted to withhold books and records if the disclosure relates to pending litigation. In this decision, the ALJ ruled that the HOA could withhold documents regarding a keyless entry system because it related to an ongoing lawsuit regarding short-term rental restrictions (since the entry system controlled renter access).

Alj Quote

Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent was permitted to withhold documentation and communication related to the keyless entry program from Petitioner, due to pending litigation regarding the CC&Rs amendment that prohibits short-term rentals.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • pending litigation
  • withholding records

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the law during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner filing the petition is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the statutes or governing documents. They must prove this by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Section 5.10 of the Association’s CC&Rs, Article III, Section 1 of the Association’s Bylaws, and A.R.S. § 33-1805 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • procedure

Question

How much evidence do I need to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You need a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning your claim is more likely true than not.

Detailed Answer

The standard of proof in these administrative hearings is 'preponderance of the evidence.' This is defined as evidence that makes a contention 'more probably true than not' or carries the greater weight of convincing force.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

How long does the HOA have to respond to my request to inspect records?

Short Answer

The HOA has 10 business days to fulfill a request.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute mandates that an association must make financial and other records reasonably available for examination within ten business days of a request.

Alj Quote

The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • timelines
  • HOA obligations

Question

Can the HOA charge me for copies of the records I request?

Short Answer

Yes, they can charge a fee for copies.

Detailed Answer

While the association cannot charge a member for making material available for review, they may charge a fee for providing actual copies of the records. The statute caps this fee.

Alj Quote

An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • fees
  • HOA obligations

Question

What specific types of information can an HOA legally keep private?

Short Answer

The HOA can withhold privileged attorney communications, pending litigation records, closed meeting minutes, and personal or employee information.

Detailed Answer

The law lists specific categories of records that do not have to be disclosed. These include attorney-client privilege, pending litigation, minutes from executive sessions, personal/health/financial records of members or employees, and records related to employee job performance or complaints.

Alj Quote

Books and records kept by or on behalf of the association and the board may be withheld from disclosure to the extent that the portion withheld relates to any of the following: 1. Privileged communication… 2. Pending litigation… 3. Meeting minutes… of a board meeting that is not required to be open… 4. Personal, health or financial records… 5. Records relating to the job performance…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)

Topic Tags

  • privacy
  • exemptions
  • records request

Question

Does a records request have to be directly about the lawsuit to be denied?

Short Answer

Not necessarily directly, but it must 'relate to' the pending litigation.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner requested records about a security entry system. Even though the lawsuit was about short-term rentals, the ALJ found the records could be withheld because the entry system controlled renter access, making the records related to the litigation.

Alj Quote

The evidence presented at hearing shows that the keyless entry program controls renters’ access to Desert Mountain. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent was permitted to withhold documentation and communication related to the keyless entry program… due to pending litigation regarding the CC&Rs amendment that prohibits short-term rentals.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Topic Tags

  • pending litigation
  • records request
  • scope of discovery

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121055-REL
Case Title
Nicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC) vs. Desert Mountain Master Association
Decision Date
2021-09-07
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can my HOA refuse to provide records if I am currently suing them?

Short Answer

Yes, the HOA may withhold records if they relate to pending litigation between the homeowner and the association.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, an association is permitted to withhold books and records if the disclosure relates to pending litigation. In this decision, the ALJ ruled that the HOA could withhold documents regarding a keyless entry system because it related to an ongoing lawsuit regarding short-term rental restrictions (since the entry system controlled renter access).

Alj Quote

Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent was permitted to withhold documentation and communication related to the keyless entry program from Petitioner, due to pending litigation regarding the CC&Rs amendment that prohibits short-term rentals.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • pending litigation
  • withholding records

Question

Who has to prove that the HOA violated the law during a hearing?

Short Answer

The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The homeowner filing the petition is responsible for proving that the HOA violated the statutes or governing documents. They must prove this by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.

Alj Quote

Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated Section 5.10 of the Association’s CC&Rs, Article III, Section 1 of the Association’s Bylaws, and A.R.S. § 33-1805 by a preponderance of the evidence.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • procedure

Question

How much evidence do I need to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

You need a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning your claim is more likely true than not.

Detailed Answer

The standard of proof in these administrative hearings is 'preponderance of the evidence.' This is defined as evidence that makes a contention 'more probably true than not' or carries the greater weight of convincing force.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Legal Basis

Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • evidence
  • legal standards

Question

How long does the HOA have to respond to my request to inspect records?

Short Answer

The HOA has 10 business days to fulfill a request.

Detailed Answer

Arizona statute mandates that an association must make financial and other records reasonably available for examination within ten business days of a request.

Alj Quote

The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • timelines
  • HOA obligations

Question

Can the HOA charge me for copies of the records I request?

Short Answer

Yes, they can charge a fee for copies.

Detailed Answer

While the association cannot charge a member for making material available for review, they may charge a fee for providing actual copies of the records. The statute caps this fee.

Alj Quote

An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • fees
  • HOA obligations

Question

What specific types of information can an HOA legally keep private?

Short Answer

The HOA can withhold privileged attorney communications, pending litigation records, closed meeting minutes, and personal or employee information.

Detailed Answer

The law lists specific categories of records that do not have to be disclosed. These include attorney-client privilege, pending litigation, minutes from executive sessions, personal/health/financial records of members or employees, and records related to employee job performance or complaints.

Alj Quote

Books and records kept by or on behalf of the association and the board may be withheld from disclosure to the extent that the portion withheld relates to any of the following: 1. Privileged communication… 2. Pending litigation… 3. Meeting minutes… of a board meeting that is not required to be open… 4. Personal, health or financial records… 5. Records relating to the job performance…

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)

Topic Tags

  • privacy
  • exemptions
  • records request

Question

Does a records request have to be directly about the lawsuit to be denied?

Short Answer

Not necessarily directly, but it must 'relate to' the pending litigation.

Detailed Answer

In this case, the homeowner requested records about a security entry system. Even though the lawsuit was about short-term rentals, the ALJ found the records could be withheld because the entry system controlled renter access, making the records related to the litigation.

Alj Quote

The evidence presented at hearing shows that the keyless entry program controls renters’ access to Desert Mountain. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that Respondent was permitted to withhold documentation and communication related to the keyless entry program… due to pending litigation regarding the CC&Rs amendment that prohibits short-term rentals.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)(2)

Topic Tags

  • pending litigation
  • records request
  • scope of discovery

Case

Docket No
21F-H2121055-REL
Case Title
Nicole Armsby (NICDON 10663 LLC) vs. Desert Mountain Master Association
Decision Date
2021-09-07
Alj Name
Velva Moses-Thompson
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nicole Armsby (petitioner)
    NICDON 10663 LLC
    Appeared on behalf of herself, also referred to as Nikki,
  • Jon Dessaules (petitioner attorney)
    Armsby's attorney, referred to as 'Dom',
  • Matthew Hoxsie (petitioner attorney)
    Greenberg Traurig, LLP
    Associate, Armsby's attorney
  • Jordan (related party)
    Party referenced in communications between counsel regarding conditional approval to speak,

Respondent Side

  • Mark Sahl (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP
  • Kevin C. Pollock (Executive Director)
    Desert Mountain Master Association
    Also referred to as community manager
  • Curtis Ekmark (HOA attorney)
    Respondent's attorney, listed as Curtis S. Ekmark in later filing
  • Stephen Prall (witness)
    Desert Mountain Master Association (implied)
    Presented testimony for Respondent
  • Carlotta L. Turman (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter Hazlewood Delgado & Bolen, LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner as of September 7, 2021
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Commissioner as of December 22, 2021
  • c. serrano (administrative clerk)
    OAH/ADRE (transmittal)
    Signed transmittal notices,,

Lee & Kim Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 21F-H2120028-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-07-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lee & Kim Edwards Counsel Terry Foster, Esq.
Respondent Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association Counsel —

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated its CC&Rs, Bylaws, or A.R.S. § 33-1255, ruling that the statute was inapplicable due to the specific provisions in the Declaration regarding the 1/26 assessment calculation.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the ALJ determined A.R.S. § 33-1255 was superseded by the Declaration, which mandated assessments based on the undivided 1/26 interest in the common elements.

Key Issues & Findings

Assessment calculation based on undivided interest in common areas

Petitioner challenged the Association's decision to change assessments from a historical square footage basis to a 1/26 interest calculation, arguing that this method violates A.R.S. § 33-1255 by charging for limited common elements (patios/parking).

Orders: The petition of Lee & Kim Edwards is dismissed; Respondent is deemed the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • Declaration Article I, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 5
  • Declaration Article II, Section 7
  • Declaration Article IV, Section 4
  • Declaration Article VI, Section 9

Analytics Highlights

Topics: condominium, assessment, cc&r, statutory interpretation, common elements, limited common elements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 899379.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:32:11 (123.6 KB)

21F-H2120028-REL Decision – 856603.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:32:19 (98.1 KB)

Assessment Methodology Dispute: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal dispute between homeowners Lee & Kim Edwards (Petitioners) and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association (Respondent) concerning a change in the methodology for calculating homeowner assessments. The core of the conflict was the Association’s decision to shift from a historical practice of assessments based on unit square footage to a uniform rate where each of the 26 units pays an equal 1/26 share of the common expenses.

The dispute was adjudicated by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in two separate hearings. In both instances, the ALJ ruled in favor of the Association, dismissing the petitions filed by the Edwards.

Key Takeaways:

• Change in Methodology: The Association’s Board, acting on legal advice received in January 2020, concluded that its 40-year practice of using a square-footage-based assessment violated the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Board subsequently implemented a 1/26 equal-share assessment method after a majority of homeowners selected this option.

• Initial Ruling on “Uniform Rate”: In the first hearing in February 2021, the Petitioners argued that the historical square footage method was a “uniform rate” and that the Association had waived its right to change the long-standing practice. The ALJ rejected this, finding that the new 1/26 rate complied with the CC&Rs’ requirement for a “uniform rate” (Article VI, Section 9) and aligned with each unit’s specified 1/26 undivided interest in the common elements (Article VI, Section 4(d)).

• Rehearing Ruling on State Statute: The Petitioners were granted a rehearing in July 2021, where they argued that the 1/26 method violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1255 by improperly charging all owners for “limited common elements” like patios and parking spaces. The ALJ again ruled against the Petitioners, concluding that the state statute did not apply. The ruling was based on a key provision in the statute: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” The judge found that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise by defining patios and parking as general common elements and explicitly mandating that costs be shared based on each unit’s 1/26 interest.

• Final Outcome: The petition was definitively dismissed after the rehearing, making the ALJ’s order binding. The Association’s adoption of the 1/26 assessment rate was upheld as compliant with its governing documents.

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Background of the Dispute

The legal conflict originated from a single-issue petition filed on November 20, 2020, by Lee and Kim Edwards, owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development. The petition, filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleged that the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association had violated its CC&Rs, specifically Article VI, Section 9, and Article IV, Section 1.

The central issue was the Association Board’s decision to change the long-standing method of calculating homeowner assessments. For over 40 years, assessments had been based on the square footage of each unit. In 2020, the Board implemented a new system where the Association’s annual budget was divided equally among the 26 units, with each owner paying a 1/26 share. The Petitioners sought to enforce the historical calculation method unless and until the CC&Rs were properly amended.

Chronology of the Assessment Change

• Historical Practice: For more than four decades, the Association calculated and charged member assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit.

• Legal Consultation (January 2020): Two members of the Association’s Board consulted with an attorney regarding the legality of the historical assessment method.

• Attorney Recommendation (January 24, 2020): The attorney advised the Association that, to ensure compliance with the CC&Rs, it should calculate assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas. The attorney’s letter stated:

• Homeowner Consultation: Following the legal advice, the Board informed homeowners that the prior square-footage method violated the CC&Rs. The Board sought input on three potential assessment methods: the 1/26 rate, a variable blended rate, or continuing with the square footage rate. A majority of homeowners selected the 1/26 rate. The Board noted that any method other than the 1/26 rate would require a formal amendment to the CC&Rs.

• Implementation (September 26, 2020): The Board officially notified homeowners that it would begin charging assessments based on the 1/26 rate and that an amendment to the CC&Rs was not necessary to implement this change.

Initial Hearing and Decision (February 2021)

An evidentiary hearing was held on February 9, 2021, before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

Arguments Presented

Petitioners (Edwards)

1. The historical square footage rate qualified as a “uniform rate” and was compliant with the CC&Rs.
2. By using the square footage rate for over 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different method like the 1/26 rate.

Respondent (Association)

1. The plain language of the CC&Rs requires that each homeowner pay an assessment based on the 1/26 rate.
2. It is not legally possible to waive a mandatory CC&R requirement through past practice.

On February 19, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the petition. The judge’s conclusions of law were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs:

• Uniform Rate Compliance: The ALJ determined that the “preponderance of the evidence” showed that the Association’s 1/26 rate was a uniform rate that complied with Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs.

• Burden of Proof: The Petitioners failed to meet their burden to prove that the Association had violated its governing documents.

• Outcome: The Association was deemed the prevailing party, and the petition was dismissed.

Rehearing and Final Decision (July 2021)

The Petitioners filed a request for a rehearing on March 30, 2021, which was granted. The rehearing was held on July 8, 2021. The Respondent did not appear at this hearing, as its counsel had withdrawn from representation without formally notifying the tribunal.

In the rehearing, the Petitioners introduced a new argument, alleging that the 1/26 assessment method violated Arizona state law, specifically A.R.S. § 33-1255.

• The core of this argument was that the 1/26 rate improperly included charges for “limited common elements,” such as patios and assigned parking spaces.

• The Petitioners contended that this forced all homeowners to pay for the maintenance of elements that were assigned to and benefited fewer than all units, in direct violation of the statute.

On July 28, 2021, the ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition. The ruling hinged on the precise wording of both the state statute and the Association’s Declaration.

• Applicability of A.R.S. § 33-1255: The judge found that the statute did not apply to this matter. The relevant section of the law, A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), begins with the critical phrase: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

• Supremacy of the Declaration: The ALJ concluded that the Association’s Declaration did provide otherwise. The CC&Rs explicitly:

◦ Define “Common Elements” broadly to include patios and parking areas (Article I, Section 3).

◦ Establish that each unit has an “undivided interest in the general common areas” of 1/26 (Article I, Section 5).

◦ Mandate that each unit’s share of costs for repair and maintenance of common areas is the “same as its undivided interest in the common elements” (Article IV, Section 4(d)).

• Final Outcome: Because the Declaration’s specific provisions overrode the general terms of the state statute, the Association was found to be in compliance. The petition was dismissed, and the order was deemed binding on the parties.

Key Legal Principles and Definitions

Concept

Definition / Application in Case

Burden of Proof

The Petitioners were required to establish their claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

Defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.” The ALJ found the Petitioners failed to meet this standard in both hearings.

Restrictive Covenants

Arizona law requires that unambiguous restrictive covenants be enforced to give effect to the parties’ intent and be interpreted as a whole. The ALJ’s decisions were based on a direct interpretation of the CC&Rs’ language.

Common Elements (per CC&Rs)

A broad definition including multifamily structures, land, roofs, ceilings, foundations, storage spaces, patios, parking areas, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and conduits.

Unit (per CC&Rs)

A freehold estate consisting of the interior space of an apartment. The definition explicitly states that common elements are not part of the unit.

Undivided Interest (per CC&Rs)

Article I, Section 5 clearly establishes that “The undivided interest in the general common areas… which shall be conveyed with each respective units shall be 1/26.” This provision was central to the final ruling.

Study Guide: Edwards v. Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Lee & Kim Edwards and the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association, based on the provided legal decisions. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a detailed glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. What was the central conflict between the Petitioners (Lee & Kim Edwards) and the Respondent (Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association)?

2. For over 40 years, how did the Association historically calculate assessments for homeowners?

3. What specific event in January 2020 prompted the Association’s Board to change the assessment method?

4. In the first hearing on February 9, 2021, what were the two main arguments presented by Mr. Edwards?

5. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the “uniform rate” requirement from CC&Rs Article VI, Section 9 in the initial decision?

6. Upon what new legal grounds did the Petitioners base their March 30, 2021, request for a re-hearing?

7. According to the CC&Rs, what is the defined undivided interest in the general common areas for each unit?

8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately conclude that Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255 did not apply in this case?

9. What legal standard of proof did the Petitioners need to meet to successfully prove their case?

10. What was the final, binding outcome of the re-hearing held on July 8, 2021?

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Answer Key

1. The central conflict concerned the method for calculating homeowner assessments. The Petitioners argued for the historical method based on unit square footage, while the Respondent implemented a new method where each of the 26 units paid an equal share (1/26 rate) of the Association’s costs.

2. For over 40 years, the Association historically calculated assessments based on the square footage of each condominium unit. This practice was changed by the Board in 2020.

3. In January 2020, two Board members met with an attorney who advised that to comply with the CC&Rs, the Association should charge assessments based on each homeowner’s 1/26 interest in the common areas, not on square footage.

4. Mr. Edwards argued that the historical square footage rate was a “uniform rate” that complied with the CC&Rs. He also contended that by using this method for 40 years, the Association had waived its right to enforce a different assessment method like the 1/26 rate.

5. The Judge concluded that the Respondent’s assessment method, based on a uniform rate of 1/26 of the Association’s costs for each unit, did comply with Article VI, Section 9. Therefore, the Petitioners failed to prove the Association had violated the CC&Rs.

6. The Petitioners based their request for a re-hearing on the new allegation that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1255. They argued the 1/26 rate improperly required members to pay for limited common elements, such as patios and parking spaces, not assigned to them.

7. According to Article I, Section 5 of the Declaration (CC&Rs), the undivided interest in the general common areas established and conveyed with each respective unit is 1/26.

8. The Judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1255 did not apply because the statute itself contains an exception: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” In this case, the Association’s Declaration explicitly required that each member be charged an assessment equivalent to their 1/26 interest in the total costs, which included patios and parking areas.

9. The Petitioners bore the burden of proof to establish their claims by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

10. Following the re-hearing, the Administrative Law Judge again ordered that the petition of Lee & Kim Edwards be dismissed. The Respondent was deemed the prevailing party, and the order was declared binding on the parties.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Answers are not provided.

1. Trace the evolution of the Petitioners’ legal strategy from the initial petition filed on November 20, 2020, to the arguments made during the re-hearing on July 8, 2021. How did their core arguments change, and what new evidence or legal statutes were introduced?

2. Analyze the concept of a “uniform rate” as required by Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs. Discuss how both the Petitioners and the Respondent interpreted this phrase to support their respective assessment methods (square footage vs. 1/26 rate).

3. Explain in detail the role of A.R.S. § 33-1255 in the re-hearing. Why did the Petitioners believe it supported their case, and what specific language in both the statute and the Association’s Declaration led the Administrative Law Judge to rule that it did not apply?

4. Evaluate the actions taken by the Association’s Board of Directors in 2020. Consider their consultation with an attorney, their communication with homeowners, and their final decision to implement the 1/26 rate. Discuss whether these actions were consistent with the powers and obligations outlined in the CC&Rs.

5. Discuss the legal argument of “waiver” raised by Mr. Edwards in the first hearing. Explain what he meant by this and why the Association’s 40-year history of using a square-footage-based assessment was central to this claim. Why did this argument ultimately fail?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

1/26 Rate

The assessment method where the Association’s annual budget is divided 26 ways, with each unit responsible for paying an equal portion. This is based on each unit’s 1/26 undivided interest in the common areas as specified in the CC&Rs.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The independent judicial officer who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and issues a decision. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 32-2199(1)

The Arizona Revised Statute that permits a condominium unit owner to file a petition with the Department of Real Estate for a hearing regarding alleged violations of the Condominium Act.

A.R.S. § 33-1255

The Arizona Revised Statute concerning common expenses. It states that unless the declaration provides otherwise, expenses for a limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which it is assigned, and expenses benefitting fewer than all units shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.

Arizona Department of Real Estate

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of condominium associations in Arizona.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to establish its claims by a required standard of evidence. In this case, the Petitioners bore the burden of proof.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or condominium. Also referred to as the “Declaration” in the provided documents.

Common Area / Common Elements

As defined in Article I, Section 3 of the CC&Rs, this includes the multifamily structure (except for the units), land, air space, bearing walls, roofs, storage spaces, patios, recreational facilities, lawns, pipes, and other premises designed for common use.

Declaration

Another term for the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

Lee & Kim Edwards

The Petitioners in the case and owners of unit 6937 in the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium development.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency to which the Department of Real Estate refers petitions for evidentiary hearings.

Petitioners

The party that initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, Lee & Kim Edwards.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to be met by the Petitioners. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association.

Restricted Common Area

As defined in Article I, Section 3(b) of the CC&Rs, this refers to a separately designed and exclusive parking area for each unit as assigned by the Board of Directors.

Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association

The Respondent in the case; the condominium unit owners’ association for the development.

Square Footage Rate

The historical method of calculating assessments for over 40 years, where each unit’s assessment was based on its square footage.

Uniform Rate

A requirement from Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs that states both regular and special assessments must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units. The interpretation of this term was central to the dispute.

As defined in Article I, Section 4 of the CC&Rs, a separately designated freehold estate consisting of the space bounded by the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceilings, windows, and floors of each apartment. It does not include common elements.

Waiver

A legal argument made by the Petitioners that because the Association had charged assessments based on square footage for 40 years, it had relinquished or “waived” its right to enforce a different method.

4 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Lawsuit That Could Upend How You See Your Fees

Introduction: The 40-Year Mistake

If you live in a condominium or a community governed by a Homeowners Association (HOA), you likely operate under a simple assumption: the way things have always been done is the correct and legal way. Monthly fees, maintenance schedules, and community rules that have been in place for decades feel permanent and unassailable. But what if they aren’t?

This was the central question in the case of Lee & Kim Edwards versus the Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association. For over 40 years, the Association calculated homeowner fees based on the square footage of each unit—a practice that seemed fair and logical, and one that was never questioned by residents.

Then came the twist. In January 2020, after consulting with an attorney, the HOA board announced a shocking revelation: their 40-year-old assessment method was a direct violation of the community’s own governing documents. The board presented the legal findings to the community and sought their input on how to proceed. After being given the choice between the old method, a blended rate, or a new flat-rate fee that complied with the rules, most homeowners voted for the compliant flat-rate system for every single unit, regardless of its size.

Homeowners sued to keep the old method, sparking a legal battle that went all the way to an administrative court. The resulting decisions offer surprising and crucial lessons for every homeowner paying HOA dues. Here are the four most impactful takeaways from the case that could change how you view your own community’s rules.

1. “Past Practice” Means Nothing if It Violates the Rules

The primary argument made by the petitioners, Mr. and Mrs. Edwards, was that the Association had “waived its right” to change the assessment method. After all, by using the square-footage calculation for four decades, hadn’t they established an unbreakable precedent? It seemed like a common-sense argument rooted in history and consistency.

The court, however, completely rejected this line of reasoning. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision was not based on historical practice but on the clear, written rules found in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Association argued that it’s “not possible to waive the CC&R requirement,” and the court agreed.

The Lesson: This case powerfully demonstrates that tradition or “how things have always been done” cannot override the explicit language of an HOA’s governing documents. The CC&Rs are a contract. The lesson is clear: if your HOA’s practice contradicts its documents, the practice is invalid. The board has a fiduciary duty to follow the written rules, not a 40-year-old mistake.

2. Your CC&Rs Are a Binding Contract—Read Them

Throughout the legal proceedings, the Administrative Law Judge consistently referred back to the specific text of the CC&Rs to make a final decision. The entire case ultimately hinged on the interpretation of a few key sentences written decades ago.

The most critical passage, which decided the outcome, was from Article VI, Section 4(d) of the community’s governing documents:

“Each unit’s share shall be the same as its undivided interest in the common elements of the total amount determined under the subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) above.” —Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association CC&Rs, Article VI, Section 4(d)

This single sentence was the linchpin. It explicitly linked each unit’s assessment share to its “undivided interest in the common elements.” Another section of the document, Article I, Section 5, had already established that interest as an equal 1/26 for all 26 units.

The Lesson: This is a classic example of legal cross-referencing in a contract. Section 4(d) provided the instruction (base fees on “undivided interest”), while Article I, Section 5 provided the specific value (1/26). With both parts present and unambiguous, the court had no choice but to enforce them exactly as written, leaving no room for interpretations based on fairness or history. The contract was the contract.

3. A “Uniform Rate” Might Not Mean What You Think

One of the central points of contention was the term “uniform rate.” Article VI, Section 9 of the CC&Rs required that all assessments “must be fixed at a uniform rate for all units.”

The homeowners argued that the square footage rate was, in fact, a “uniform rate”—a consistent price per square foot applied to every unit. It’s an interpretation many of us might find reasonable.

However, the HOA Board and the court had a different interpretation. The judge found that the flat 1/26 rate was the correct interpretation of a “uniform rate” because it was uniformly applied to every unit’s established 1/26 interest in the common areas. In the court’s view, the “rate” being applied uniformly was the 1/26 fraction of the total budget. The fact that this resulted in different dollar amounts for square-footage fees was irrelevant; the legal share was what had to be uniform.

The Lesson: Common-sense terms like “uniform” can have very specific legal meanings within the context of your governing documents. The true definition is found not in a dictionary, but in how the term is defined and applied by the rest of the document’s provisions.

4. Your HOA’s Rules Can Sometimes Override State Law

In a final attempt to overturn the decision, the petitioners filed for a re-hearing. This time, they cited a specific Arizona state law, A.R.S. 33-1255. This statute says that expenses for “limited common elements”—things like assigned patios or parking spaces that only benefit specific units—should be assessed only against those units that benefit from them. The homeowners argued that the new 1/26 flat fee unfairly forced them to pay for their neighbors’ patios and parking spots, a direct violation of state law.

Surprisingly, this argument also failed. The reason is found in the crucial introductory clause of the state law itself: “Unless otherwise provided for in the declaration…”

Because the Scottsdale Embassy’s Declaration did provide otherwise—by explicitly rolling all general and restricted common area costs into the total budget before calculating each unit’s 1/26 share—the community’s own rules legally superseded the default state statute. The judge concluded that the state law “does not apply to this matter because the Declaration requires” a different method.

The Lesson: This is perhaps the most counter-intuitive lesson of all. This demonstrates a key principle of contract law and planned community governance: state statutes often provide a “default” rule for situations a community’s documents don’t address. However, they also grant communities the power to create their own specific rules, which, if legally permissible, will take precedence. Homeowners cannot assume that a state law automatically protects them if their community’s own governing documents have a more specific rule in place.

Conclusion: Are You Sure You Know What You Agreed To?

The central message from the Scottsdale Embassy case is undeniable: in an HOA, the written word is law. The CC&Rs and other governing documents are a binding contract that dictates the rules, regardless of 40 years of history, common-sense assumptions, or even some default state laws. What you believe is fair or standard practice is irrelevant if the document you agreed to upon purchase says otherwise.

This case was decided by a few sentences written decades ago. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents from cover to cover?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lee Edwards (petitioner, witness)
  • Kim Edwards (petitioner)
  • Teresa H. Foster (petitioner attorney)
    Ellis & Baker, P.C.
    Also referred to as Terri Foster and Terry Foster

Respondent Side

  • Lauren Vie (respondent attorney)
    Appeared for initial hearing; later noted as withdrawn
  • Caleb Koch (board president, witness)
    Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
  • Mary Edinburgh (board member, witness)
    Scottsdale Embassy Condominium Association
  • Beth Mulcahy (respondent attorney)
    Mulcahy Law Firm, PC
    Recipient of transmission; noted as withdrawn counsel prior to rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Electronic transmission recipient

Other Participants

  • Miranda Alvarez (unknown)
    Associated with transmission for petitioner's attorney

Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel —
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:21:58 (69.0 KB)

19F-H1919071-REL Decision – 741807.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:22:08 (78.9 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch HOA

Executive Summary

This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), case number 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG. The dispute centered on the HOA’s prohibition of a “Trump 2020” flag displayed by Mr. Van Dan Elzen at his property. The petitioner alleged this prohibition violated Arizona state law.

The ALJ ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Carter Ranch HOA. The decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was inconsistent with its foundational Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) or that the rule was improperly adopted. Crucially, the ALJ found that the petitioner had not sufficiently alleged a direct violation of the relevant state statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ruling effectively upholds the HOA’s authority, granted by its CC&Rs, to regulate the display of flags not explicitly protected by Arizona law.

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I. Case Overview

• Case Name: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, Petitioner, vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, Respondent.

• Case Number: 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG

• Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson

• Hearing Date: January 10, 2020

• Decision Date: January 30, 2020

• Subject of Dispute: The validity of an HOA rule prohibiting the display of a “Trump 2020” political flag, which the petitioner claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

II. Chronology of Key Events

• May 21, 2019: Carter Ranch HOA notifies petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates Association Rules.

• June 14, 2019: Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

• November 18, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues an order setting the matter for a rehearing.

• January 10, 2020: The rehearing is held before an Administrative Law Judge.

III. Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s case was predicated on the argument that the HOA’s rules regarding flags were inconsistent with its own governing documents, specifically the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

• Core Allegation: The HOA’s enforcement action violated A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and signs.

• Primary Argument: Mr. Van Dan Elzen contended that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag.” He argued that the relevant section of the governing documents, DCC&R 3.14, only defines “SIGNS.”

• Direct Quotation from Petition: The petition stated the following, highlighting the perceived discrepancy:

IV. Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was valid, properly enacted, and did not violate state law or its own governing documents.

• The “Flag Display Rule”: The HOA’s rules explicitly prohibit flying any flag other than those on an approved list, which includes:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ An Arizona Indian National flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

• Authority to Regulate: The HOA asserted its authority to create this rule stemmed from Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to “the health, safety or welfare of the owners… or restrictions on the use of Lots.” It also specifies that such rules are “enforceable in the same manner” as the CC&Rs themselves.

• Defense Arguments: The HOA contended that the petition should be dismissed because:

1. The Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

2. The rule was properly adopted under the authority granted in the CC&Rs.

3. The petitioner failed to allege that the HOA had actually violated a specific statute or provision of its governing documents.

V. Analysis of Governing Law: A.R.S. § 33-1808

This Arizona Revised Statute was central to the dispute. It places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to regulate the display of certain flags and political signs.

Provision

Description of Regulation

Subsection A: Protected Flags

An HOA cannot prohibit the outdoor display of: The American flag (if displayed consistent with federal code), official U.S. military flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, or the Gadsden flag.

Subsection C: Political Signs

An HOA cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but may regulate them. Permissible regulations include:
• Time: Prohibiting display earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election.
• Size & Number: Regulations must be no more restrictive than applicable city/county ordinances. If no such ordinance exists, the HOA cannot limit the number of signs, but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

• Definition of “Political Sign”: The statute defines a political sign as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

The ALJ concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the required burden of proof, which is to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. Rule Consistency: The ALJ concluded that the “Petitioner has not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

2. Rule Adoption: The ALJ found that the “Petitioner has not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.”

3. Failure to Allege Violation: The judge noted that the “Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” This indicates a failure in the petition’s framing to connect the HOA’s actions to a specific statutory prohibition.

4. Final Determination: Based on these conclusions, the judge determined that “Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and the Respondent be deemed to be the prevailing party in this matter.”

• Dismissal: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

• Binding Nature: The order is binding on the parties as it resulted from a rehearing.

• Appeal Rights: Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within 35 days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG). The guide includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in two to three sentences each, based on the information in the provided source text.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action taken by Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen initiated the dispute with the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association?

3. What was Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument for why the HOA’s Flag Display Rule was invalid?

4. On what authority did the Carter Ranch HOA claim it had the right to create and enforce its Flag Display Rule?

5. According to the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule,” which specific flags are homeowners permitted to fly?

6. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this hearing, and how is it defined in the decision?

7. What protection does Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1808(C) provide for “political signs”?

8. What were the two key failures of the petitioner’s case, as identified in the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law?

9. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

10. What are the next steps for a party wishing to challenge the Administrative Law Judge’s order?

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Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Van Dan Elzen represented himself, while the HOA was represented by its attorney, Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

2. The dispute began on or about May 21, 2019, when the Carter Ranch HOA notified Mr. Van Dan Elzen that he had violated its rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag in his front yard. This notice of violation prompted Mr. Van Dan Elzen to file a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

3. Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s central argument was that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the community’s Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). He contended that because CC&R section 3.14 only defines “SIGNS” and makes no reference to “Flags,” the HOA had no basis in the CC&Rs to regulate his flag.

4. The Carter Ranch HOA asserted its authority based on Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. This section grants the HOA Board the power to adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to the health, safety, or welfare of the owners and restrictions on the use of Lots.

5. The HOA’s Flag Display Rule prohibits flying any flag other than the American Flag, an official replica of a U.S. military flag (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), a POW/MIA flag, an Arizona Indian National flag, the Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

6. The petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The decision defines this as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

7. A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) prevents an HOA from prohibiting the display of political signs on a member’s property, although it allows for regulation. An HOA cannot prohibit political signs earlier than 71 days before an election or later than three days after, and its rules on size and number can be no more restrictive than applicable city or county ordinances.

8. The Judge concluded that the petitioner failed to establish that the Flag Display Rule was improperly adopted or inconsistent with the CC&Rs. Furthermore, the Judge concluded that the petitioner had not actually alleged that Carter Ranch violated the specific statute he cited, A.R.S. § 33-1808.

9. The final Order was that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. The Judge also deemed the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, to be the prevailing party in the matter.

10. A party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review by filing an appeal with the superior court. This appeal must be filed within thirty-five days from the date the order was served upon the parties, as prescribed by state statutes.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are designed to encourage a more in-depth analysis of the case. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the petitioner’s argument that the Flag Display Rule was invalid because the word “flag” does not appear in the CC&Rs. Why was this argument ultimately unconvincing to the Administrative Law Judge?

2. Explain the legal distinction between a “flag” and a “political sign” as presented in A.R.S. § 33-1808. How might the petitioner’s case have differed if he had argued his “Trump 2020” flag was a “political sign” instead of a flag?

3. Discuss the authority granted to the Carter Ranch HOA Board by Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. How did the HOA use this section to justify its Flag Display Rule, and why was this justification accepted by the court?

4. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion that the petitioner “has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.” How can this be true when the petitioner’s initial filing explicitly cited this statute?

5. Based on the provided text of A.R.S. § 33-1808, under what specific circumstances could a homeowner in Carter Ranch successfully challenge the HOA’s rules on outdoor displays?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ in the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. The case centered on an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or subdivision. The Carter Ranch CC&Rs grant the HOA Board the authority to adopt rules and regulations.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.

Flag Display Rule

The specific rule created by the Carter Ranch HOA that prohibits flying any flag other than the American, military, POW/MIA, Arizona Indian National, Arizona State, and Gadsden flags.

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Carter Ranch Homeowners Association is the Respondent in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, the petitioner is Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Political Sign

Defined by A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.” HOAs are restricted in their ability to prohibit the display of such signs.

Preponderance of the evidence

The burden of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it,” meaning the fact is more probable than not.

Prevailing Party

The party who wins the legal case. The Administrative Law Judge deemed the Respondent (Carter Ranch HOA) to be the prevailing party.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the issues. This case was decided as a result of a rehearing held on January 10, 2020.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the complaint. In this case, the respondent is the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

He Fought the HOA Over a Political Flag—And Lost. Here Are 3 Surprising Reasons Why.

Introduction: The Pride and the Problem

Imagine this: You want to display a flag on your own property to support a political candidate. It feels like a fundamental right, an expression of free speech on your home turf. But then, a letter arrives from your Homeowners Association (HOA) citing you for a violation. This exact scenario happened to Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, who displayed a “Trump 2020” flag and promptly received a violation notice from the Carter Ranch HOA in Arizona.

Believing the HOA was overstepping its authority, Mr. Van Dan Elzen took them to court. He lost. The outcome might seem counter-intuitive, but the court’s decision reveals crucial lessons for any homeowner living under an HOA. Here are the three surprising legal reasons why the HOA won.

1. The Power of the Fine Print: Why a “Loophole” Wasn’t Enough

Mr. Van Dan Elzen built his case on a clever textual argument. He alleged that the HOA’s rule against his flag was invalid because the section of the master community documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—he believed it was based on only regulated “SIGNS” and made no mention of “FLAGS.” He argued that since the document didn’t explicitly prohibit flags, the rule against his was unenforceable.

This seemingly logical “loophole” argument failed. The HOA countered by pointing to a different, much broader clause in their CC&Rs. Article V, Section 5.3, gave the HOA board expansive power to create new rules.

The Board may, from time to time, adopt, amend and repeal rules and regulations pertaining to: … (iii) the health, safety or welfare of the owners, Lessees and Residence, or (iv) restrictions on the use of Lots…

This general power to create rules for the “welfare of the owners” was enough to give the HOA the legal authority to regulate flags, even if the word “flag” wasn’t in the specific section the homeowner cited. The broad power to govern trumped the narrow, semantic argument.

2. A Flag Is Not a Sign (At Least, Not According to the Law)

While the homeowner’s flag was political in nature, it did not receive the legal protections granted to “political signs” under Arizona law. This distinction proved fatal to his case.

The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1808, is highly specific about which flags an HOA is forbidden from prohibiting. The protected list includes: the American flag, official military branch flags, the POW/MIA flag, the Arizona state flag, Arizona Indian nations flags, and the Gadsden flag. Critically, the Carter Ranch HOA’s own Flag Display Rule mirrored this state-approved list exactly, demonstrating they had aligned their regulations with the law. A political campaign flag, like “Trump 2020,” is not on this protected list.

The same law does protect political signs, but it defines them very precisely:

“political sign” means a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing the recall of a public officer or supporting or opposing the circulation of a petition for a ballot measure, question or proposition or the recall of a public officer.

The key takeaway is that the law treats a political flag differently from a political sign. Because the “Trump 2020” item was a flag and not on the state’s protected flag list, the HOA was well within its rights to restrict its display based on its own community rules.

3. A Critical Misstep: Arguing the Wrong Point

The most decisive reason for the loss was not a procedural error, but a substantive legal failure. Mr. Van Dan Elzen filed his petition with the state on the grounds that the HOA had violated a specific state law, A.R.S. § 33-1808, which governs flags and political signs.

However, his entire case was built on arguing that the HOA’s internal rules were inconsistent with its own CC&Rs—the “sign” versus “flag” argument. This was the wrong legal target. To win, he had to prove that the HOA had violated the state statute. But the statute explicitly allows an HOA to regulate any flag not on the protected list. By regulating his “Trump 2020” flag, the HOA was doing exactly what the state law permitted. His argument about internal documents, even if correct, did not add up to a violation of the state law he sued under.

The Administrative Law Judge recognized this fundamental flaw, concluding that the homeowner hadn’t actually made a case for a statutory violation at all.

Moreover, Petitioner has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.

This is a crucial lesson: it’s not enough to feel wronged. Your argument must directly prove that the specific law you cite in your complaint has actually been broken. The homeowner’s claim was dismissed because his central argument was irrelevant to the law he needed to prove was violated.

Conclusion: Know Your Rights, and Your Rules

The case of the “Trump 2020” flag is a powerful illustration for homeowners everywhere. It highlights three critical realities of living in an HOA: the broad rule-making power granted by community documents can override perceived loopholes; state laws make very specific and narrow distinctions between protected items like signs and flags; and a sound legal strategy is paramount.

This case is a stark reminder that in an HOA, your property rights are defined not by what you feel is right, but by what is written down. Before you make a stand, are you certain you’re fighting the right battle on the right legal ground?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Augustus H. Shaw IV (attorney)
    Shaw & Lines LLC
    Appeared for Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Dustin Snow (property manager)
    SNOW PROPERTY SERVICES
    Recipient of order transmission

William P Lee vs. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918019-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-04-22
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William P. Lee Counsel —
Respondent Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association Counsel Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, & 3; Greenlaw Rules and Regulations; A.R.S. §§ 33-1803, 33-1809

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition after rehearing, concluding the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated its CC&Rs, controlling Rules and Regulations (revised July 2018), or relevant statutes (A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809) by banning parking on association streets and implementing a booting/towing contract.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations of community documents or A.R.S. statutes by a preponderance of the evidence.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community documents and statutes regarding parking ban and vehicle booting/towing

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated its CC&Rs amendments 1, 2, and 3, and Rules and Regulations, by banning all parking on association streets and contracting for vehicle booting/towing. Petitioner also contested the validity of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations due to improper notice and alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 33-1803 and 1809.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, 556 ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 373, 376
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 75

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Rule Enforcement, Parking Restrictions, CC&Rs, Rules and Regulations, Towing/Booting, Notice Requirement
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803
  • A.R.S. § 33-1809
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553
  • Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 678471.pdf

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19F-H1918019-REL Decision – 703187.pdf

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Administrative Hearing Briefing: William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Executive Summary

This document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG, where Petitioner William P. Lee’s complaint against the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association (Greenlaw) was denied. Mr. Lee, a homeowner, alleged that Greenlaw’s complete ban on street parking and its contract with a towing company to enforce the ban violated the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Lee failed to meet the required burden of proof. The central conclusion was that Greenlaw’s revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, are the controlling authority and explicitly permit a total ban on street parking. The ALJ determined that the specific parking prohibitions detailed in the CC&R amendments—concerning fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles—do not preclude the association from enacting a more comprehensive ban via its rules. Furthermore, the petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence that Greenlaw had actually taken the alleged enforcement actions (booting or towing) against any member’s vehicle.

Case Overview

Detail

Information

Case Name

William P. Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

Case Number

19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Petitioner

William P. Lee (Homeowner)

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Homeowners Association)

Hearing Date

April 1, 2019 (Rehearing)

Decision Date

April 22, 2019

Final Order

Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Presiding ALJ

Velva Moses-Thompson

Petitioner’s Core Allegations and Arguments

William P. Lee’s petition, filed on September 12, 2018, centered on the claim that Greenlaw acted outside its authority by banning all street parking and contracting with a towing company for enforcement. His arguments were:

• Violation of CC&Rs: The total parking ban directly contradicted CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. Mr. Lee contended these amendments established an exhaustive list of permissible parking restrictions, limited to:

◦ Designated fire lanes (Amendment #1).

◦ Periods of snow removal (Amendment #2).

◦ Vehicles in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours (Amendment #3).

• Invalidity of Revised Rules: Mr. Lee argued that the July 2018 revised Rules and Regulations, which contain the parking ban, were not valid or controlling due to improper notification.

◦ He contended that Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required that such notices be delivered personally or by postal mail.

◦ He received notice only via a July 6, 2018 email, which he claimed did not clearly indicate that the rules had been substantively changed.

• Improper Motive: Mr. Lee contended that “the only reason that the Association banned parking was to please Barbara, a board member who did not want anyone to park behind her property.”

Respondent’s Defense

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two asserted that its actions were proper and within the scope of its authority as an HOA. Its defense included the following points:

• Controlling Authority: Greenlaw maintained that its revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018, were the controlling documents governing parking.

• Notice Protocol: The association contended that the Bylaw provision requiring personal or postal mail notice applies only to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs. Greenlaw argued there is no such requirement for providing notice of amendments to the Rules and Regulations.

• Sufficient Notice: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee received actual notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

Analysis of Key Governing Documents

The case revolved around the interpretation of and interplay between several of Greenlaw’s governing documents.

Document

Key Provision / Content

Relevance to Case

CC&R Amendments 1, 2, & 3

These amendments, added to Article II (Permitted Uses), establish specific, conditional parking prohibitions related to fire lanes, snow removal, and abandoned vehicles.

The petitioner argued these amendments represented the only circumstances under which parking could be banned. The ALJ found they were not an exhaustive list.

Bylaws, Article V, Section 1

“Notices to directors and lot owners shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed to the directors or lot owners at their addresses appearing on the books of the corporation.”

The petitioner cited this to argue that the email notice for the revised rules was improper, thus invalidating the rules. The ALJ sided with the Respondent’s interpretation.

Rules and Regulations (July 2018), Section 8

“Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time… cars parked in violation may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company.” The rule specifies that the streets (Eva, Heidi, Jeffrey Loops) are private and owned by the HOA.

This document contains the explicit, total parking ban at the heart of the dispute. The ALJ found this rule to be the valid and controlling authority.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ’s decision was based on a comprehensive review of the evidence and legal standards, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Burden of Proof

The decision established that Mr. Lee bore the burden of proof “to establish that Greenlaw violated amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, and the Greenlaw Rules and Regulations by a preponderance of the evidence.” A preponderance of the evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Key Conclusions of Law

1. Validity of the 2018 Rules: The ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence presented at hearing shows that Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations were revised effective July 2018 and are the controlling Rules and Regulations of Greenlaw.” Mr. Lee failed to establish that any prior version remained in effect.

2. Scope of CC&R Amendments: The decision found that the CC&R amendments only “provide specific scenarios in which parking on the streets is banned.” They do not restrict the association from implementing a broader ban through its Rules and Regulations. Therefore, the total ban did not violate the CC&Rs.

3. No Violation of Rules: Because the July 2018 rules were found to be controlling, and they explicitly authorize a total parking ban, the ALJ concluded that Greenlaw’s decision did not violate its own Rules and Regulations.

4. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: A critical failure in the petitioner’s case was the lack of evidence.

◦ The decision notes, “Mr. Lee provided no evidence that Greenlaw booted or towed any of the vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members.”

◦ His testimony about observing a booted jeep was dismissed as insufficient, as he “did not know who owned the jeep, nor who was responsible for booting the jeep.” The Greenlaw manager’s subsequent comment was not found to be an admission of responsibility.

◦ Mr. Lee did not allege that any of his own vehicles had been booted or towed.

5. No Statutory Violation: The judge found that Mr. Lee failed to establish any violation of Arizona Revised Statutes §§ 33-1803 and 33-1809.

Final Order and Implications

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge issued a final, binding order.

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.”

• Appeal Process: As the order resulted from a rehearing, it is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal must seek judicial review in the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Lee v. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two (Case No. 19F-H1918019-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between William P. Lee and the Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association. It covers the central conflict, the arguments presented by both parties, the key legal documents involved, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Case Overview

This case centers on a dispute between a homeowner, William P. Lee, and his Homeowners Association (HOA), Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two. Mr. Lee filed a petition alleging that the HOA’s decision to ban all parking on association streets and contract with a towing company violated the community’s governing documents. The matter was decided by an Administrative Law Judge following a rehearing on April 1, 2019.

Key Parties and Roles

Party/Role

Name / Entity

Description

Petitioner

William P. Lee

A homeowner in Greenlaw Unit Two and member of the HOA who filed the petition against the association.

Respondent

Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two

The Homeowners Association (HOA) responsible for governing the community, against which the petition was filed.

Legal Counsel

Timothy D. Butterfield, Esq.

Appeared on behalf of the Respondent, Greenlaw Townhouses.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

The Administrative Law Judge from the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over the rehearing and issued the decision.

Timeline of Key Events

June 16, 1986

Greenlaw Bylaws were recorded at the Coconino County Recorder.

July 2, 1999

Greenlaw Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) was recorded.

July 6, 2018

Greenlaw sent an email to members with an attachment containing the revised Rules and Regulations, effective July 2018.

September 12, 2018

William P. Lee filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

December 13, 2018

The original hearing on the petition was conducted.

February 11, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issued an order for a rehearing.

April 1, 2019

The rehearing was held at the Office of Administrative Hearings.

April 22, 2019

The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision, denying the petitioner’s petition.

The Central Conflict: Parking Regulations

The core of the dispute was Mr. Lee’s allegation that Greenlaw’s comprehensive ban on street parking, as stated in its revised 2018 Rules and Regulations, violated the more specific parking restrictions outlined in the community’s CC&Rs. The validity of the 2018 Rules and Regulations, and the method by which they were distributed to homeowners, was also a key point of contention.

• Violation of CC&Rs: The general ban on street parking violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs, which only banned parking in specific situations (fire lanes, snow removal, abandoned vehicles).

• Improper Notice: Greenlaw failed to provide proper notice of the revised Rules and Regulations. Mr. Lee argued that the HOA’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, not by email.

• Unclear Communication: The email sent on July 6, 2018, did not clearly state that the rules had been recently changed.

• Invalidity of New Rules: Due to the improper notice, Mr. Lee contended that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid or controlling.

• Improper Motivation: Mr. Lee alleged the only reason for the ban was to appease a board member named Barbara who did not want anyone parking behind her property.

• Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee testified that he observed a jeep being booted in a driveway and that the Greenlaw manager’s response implied the HOA’s contracted towing company could boot vehicles in violation.

• Notice Was Sufficient: Greenlaw contended that the Bylaw’s requirement for mail or personal delivery only applied to notices mandated by statute or the CC&Rs.

• No Notice Requirement: The HOA argued that it was not required by law or the CC&Rs to provide homeowners with notice of an amendment to the Rules and Regulations.

• Notice Was Received: Greenlaw asserted that Mr. Lee did, in fact, receive notice of the revised rules via the email sent on July 6, 2018.

• No Proof of Harm: Greenlaw pointed out that Mr. Lee provided no evidence that any vehicles belonging to Greenlaw members had been booted or towed by the association, nor did he allege that one of his own vehicles had been affected.

Governing Documents and Legal Principles

• Amendment #1: Bans parking in designated fire lanes.

• Amendment #2: Bans parking on subdivision roads during snow removal periods.

• Amendment #3: Allows for the towing of vehicles parked at the curb in an obvious state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

• Article V, Section 1: States that notices to directors and lot owners “shall be in writing and delivered personally or mailed.”

• Section 8: Explicitly states, “Parking is not allowed on any association street or alleyway at any time.” It identifies the streets (Eva, Heidi, and Jeffrey Loops) as “Private Fire Access Lanes” owned by the HOA and states that vehicles in violation may be booted and/or towed.

• The petitioner, Mr. Lee, bore the burden of proof to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.

• The source defines preponderance of the evidence as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and as evidence with “the most convincing force.”

The Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, denied Mr. Lee’s petition. The key conclusions of law were:

1. Controlling Document: The 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were found to be the valid and controlling rules for the Greenlaw HOA.

2. Authority to Ban Parking: The 2018 Rules and Regulations explicitly allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to enforce this rule by booting or towing vehicles.

3. No Violation of CC&Rs: The judge concluded that Mr. Lee failed to prove that the general parking ban violated the specific, situational bans outlined in CC&R Amendments 1, 2, and 3. The amendments did not preclude the HOA from enacting a broader rule.

4. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Mr. Lee did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Greenlaw’s actions violated either the CC&Rs or the Rules and Regulations.

5. Insufficient Evidence of Enforcement: Mr. Lee failed to provide any evidence that Greenlaw was actually responsible for booting the jeep he observed. His testimony was not sufficient to prove the HOA had taken action against any member.

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Quiz: Test Your Understanding

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information in the study guide.

1. What was the central allegation in William P. Lee’s petition against the Greenlaw HOA?

2. What three specific scenarios for parking restrictions are outlined in Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the Greenlaw CC&Rs?

3. On what grounds did Mr. Lee argue that the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations were not valid?

4. How did Greenlaw defend its use of email to distribute the revised Rules and Regulations to homeowners?

5. According to Section 8 of the revised Rules and Regulations, what are the potential consequences for parking on an association street?

6. What was the judge’s conclusion regarding the validity and authority of the 2018 revised Rules and Regulations?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and who bore the burden of proof to meet it in this case?

8. Why did the judge find Mr. Lee’s testimony about a booted jeep to be insufficient evidence?

9. Did the judge find that Greenlaw’s general parking ban violated Amendments 1, 2, and 3 of the CC&Rs? Explain why or why not.

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. Mr. Lee’s central allegation was that the Greenlaw HOA had violated its CC&Rs and Rules and Regulations. Specifically, he claimed the association’s decision to ban all parking on its streets and to contract with a company to boot vehicles was improper.

2. The CC&R amendments outline three specific parking restrictions. Amendment 1 bans parking in designated fire lanes, Amendment 2 bans parking on roads during snow removal, and Amendment 3 allows for the towing of abandoned vehicles in a state of disrepair for over 72 hours.

3. Mr. Lee argued the 2018 rules were invalid because he was not given proper notice. He contended that the HOA’s Bylaws required notice to be delivered personally or by postal mail, and that the email he received was not a valid method of distribution.

4. Greenlaw defended its use of email by arguing that the Bylaw’s requirement for personal or mail delivery only applied to notices that were required by statute or the CC&Rs. The HOA contended it was not required by law to provide notice for an amendment to its Rules and Regulations.

5. Section 8 states that cars parked in violation on an association street may be booted and/or towed by a contracted independent towing company. The rule identifies the streets as “Private Fire Access Lanes.”

6. The judge concluded that the Rules and Regulations revised in July 2018 were the controlling rules for Greenlaw. Furthermore, the judge found that these rules do allow the association to ban all parking on its streets and to tow or boot cars in violation.

7. A “preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof that convinces a judge that a contention is more probably true than not. In this case, the petitioner, William P. Lee, bore the burden of proving his claims by this standard.

8. The evidence was insufficient because Mr. Lee did not know who owned the jeep or who was responsible for booting it. There was no direct evidence provided that proved Greenlaw or its contractor was responsible for the action.

9. No, the judge did not find that the ban violated the CC&Rs. The judge reasoned that the amendments only provided specific scenarios where parking was banned and did not prevent the HOA from enacting a broader, more general parking ban in its Rules and Regulations.

10. The final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner’s (Mr. Lee’s) petition is denied.

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Essay Questions for Deeper Analysis

The following questions are for further reflection. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the conflict between Greenlaw’s Bylaws (Article V, Section 1) regarding notice and its 2018 distribution of revised Rules and Regulations. Discuss both parties’ arguments and explain how the judge’s ultimate decision implies a resolution to this conflict.

2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. How did William P. Lee’s failure to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard affect the outcome of his claims regarding both the parking ban and the alleged booting/towing incidents?

3. Compare and contrast the parking restrictions detailed in the CC&R Amendments with the broader ban instituted in Section 8 of the 2018 Rules and Regulations. Explain why the existence of the specific amendments did not prevent the HOA from enacting a more general rule.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by Mr. Lee. What were the strengths and weaknesses of his arguments and testimony, particularly concerning the booted jeep and the motivation behind the parking ban?

5. Imagine you are legal counsel for the Greenlaw HOA. Based on the arguments and outcome of this case, what advice would you give the Board of Directors regarding future amendments to its Rules and Regulations to avoid similar disputes?

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Glossary of Key Terms

• Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over hearings at administrative agencies. In this case, Velva Moses-Thompson served as the ALJ for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

• Affirmative Defenses: Arguments made by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the petitioner’s claim. The Respondent (Greenlaw) bears the burden to establish these defenses.

• Burden of Proof: The obligation of a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, Mr. Lee had the burden of proof to establish his claims.

• Bylaws: A set of rules adopted by an organization, such as an HOA, for governing its internal operations. Greenlaw’s bylaws addressed the method for providing notices to members.

• Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs): A set of rules governing the use of land in a planned community or subdivision. Owners agree to be bound by the CC&Rs.

• Homeowners Association (HOA): An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the HOA in this case.

• Petitioner: The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. William P. Lee is the Petitioner.

• Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as “the greater weight of the evidence.”

• Respondent: The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the claims. Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two is the Respondent.

• Rules and Regulations: A set of rules established by the HOA, in addition to the CC&Rs and Bylaws, that govern the day-to-day life and conduct within the community. The 2018 revised parking ban was located in Greenlaw’s Rules and Regulations.

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19F-H1918019-REL-RHG

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This document presents an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between William P. Lee, a homeowner, and Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two, his Homeowners Association. The central issue revolved around the Greenlaw HOA’s implementation of a comprehensive ban on street parking and its contracting with a towing company to enforce the rule, which Mr. Lee contended violated the association’s governing documents, specifically amendments to the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the proper notification procedures for revised rules. The findings of fact detail the history of the parking rules, the homeowner’s receipt of the electronic notification of the revised rules, and Mr. Lee’s arguments that the association failed to use the required postal mail or personal delivery methods for notice. The Conclusions of Law determined that the controlling rules were the revised July 2018 Rules and Regulations and that Mr. Lee failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated either the CC&Rs or relevant Arizona statutes. Consequently, the Judge ordered that the petitioner’s petition be denied.

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William P. Lee (petitioner)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association member
    Testified on behalf of himself

Respondent Side

  • Mark K. Sahl (HOA attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Timothy D. Butterfield (HOA attorney)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
  • Barbara (board member)
    Greenlaw Townhouses Unit Two Homeowners Association
    Contended by Lee to be the reason for the parking ban

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Rogelio A. Garcia vs. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918009-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-04
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rogelio A. Garcia Counsel —
Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition for rehearing, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the statutory details or the notice of the right to petition ADRE because the Petitioner failed to submit a written response by certified mail within 21 days of the violation notices.

Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1242. The HOA was not required to provide the information listed in A.R.S. § 33-1242 (C) or the notice of right to petition in (D) because the Petitioner did not submit a written response by certified mail within twenty-one days, which is the triggering requirement for those obligations.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of statutory requirements for homeowner association violation notices.

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1242 requirements regarding violation notices. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to establish the violation because he did not respond by certified mail within the 21-day statutory period, meaning the HOA was not triggered to fulfill its obligations under § 33-1242(C) and (D).

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Notice Violation, A.R.S. 33-1242, Statutory Construction, Homeowner Petition Dismissed
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. City of Scottsdale, 187 Ariz. 479, 483, 930 P.2d 993, 997(1997)
  • Canon School Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 177 Ariz. 526, 529, 869 P.2d 500, 503 (1994)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 692638.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-25T09:58:56 (89.4 KB)

19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf

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19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 692638.pdf

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19F-H1918009-REL Decision – 671673.pdf

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Briefing Document: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The core of the case is Mr. Garcia’s allegation that the HOA violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1242 by failing to follow specific procedures after issuing notices for a violation of its short-term rental policy.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The central finding was that Mr. Garcia failed to meet a critical prerequisite outlined in the statute: he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the 21-day period. This failure meant that the HOA’s corresponding statutory obligations—such as providing the name of the person who observed the violation—were never triggered.

Furthermore, the judge determined that the HOA was not required to inform Mr. Garcia of his right to an administrative hearing because the violation notices themselves included instructions on the HOA’s internal process for contesting the matter. Mr. Garcia’s argument that the HOA’s rapid issuance of fines and subsequent notices prevented him from responding was found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The decisions underscore a strict interpretation of the statute, placing the initial burden of response on the unit owner.

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I. Case Overview

This matter was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings after a petition was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. The case involved an initial hearing and a rehearing requested by the Petitioner.

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

Rogelio A. Garcia

Respondent

Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (“Villagio”)

Respondent’s Counsel

Nathan Tennyson, Esq.

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Velva Moses-Thompson

Case Number (Initial)

19F-H1918009-REL

Case Number (Rehearing)

19F-H1918009-REL-RHG

Core Allegation

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1242 by the Respondent.

II. Chronology of Events

• March 8, 2018: Villagio mails the first letter to Mr. Garcia, alleging a violation of short-term lease provisions in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The letter instructs him to file an appeal with the Board of Directors within 10 days of receipt.

• March 22, 2018: Villagio mails a second notice for the same violation, informing Mr. Garcia that a $1,000 fine has been posted to his account. This notice also contains instructions for contesting the violation.

• April 5, 2018: Villagio mails a third notice, informing Mr. Garcia that a $2,000 fine has been posted to his account for the continuing violation.

• Response from Garcia: Mr. Garcia did not respond to any of the three notices within the 21-calendar-day period specified by statute. He did, at some point, file an appeal directly with Villagio, which held a hearing but did not change its position.

• August 17, 2018 (approx.): Mr. Garcia files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, formally initiating the administrative hearing process.

• October 30, 2018: The first evidentiary hearing is held before Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

• November 19, 2018: The initial Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

• January 3, 2019 (approx.): The Arizona Department of Real Estate issues an order setting a rehearing for the matter, following a request from Mr. Garcia.

• February 12, 2019: The rehearing is held. Mr. Garcia testifies on his own behalf, and Villagio presents testimony from Community Manager Tom Gordon.

• March 4, 2019: The final Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, again dismissing Mr. Garcia’s petition.

III. Central Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1242

The entire dispute centered on the procedural requirements laid out in A.R.S. § 33-1242, which governs how an HOA must handle notices of violation to a unit owner. The key provisions are:

• Unit Owner’s Responsibility (Subsection B): A unit owner who receives a written notice of violation may provide the association with a written response. This response must be sent by certified mail within twenty-one calendar days after the date of the notice.

• Association’s Obligations upon Response (Subsection C): Within ten business days after receiving the certified mail response, the association must provide a written explanation that includes:

1. The specific provision of the condominium documents allegedly violated.

2. The date the violation occurred or was observed.

3. The first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

4. The process the unit owner must follow to contest the notice.

• Association’s Obligation Regarding Administrative Hearings (Subsection D): An association must provide written notice of the owner’s option to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department unless the information required in Subsection C, paragraph 4 (the contest process) is provided in the initial notice of violation.

IV. Analysis of Arguments and Evidence

Petitioner’s Position (Rogelio A. Garcia)

Mr. Garcia’s arguments, presented across both hearings, focused on three primary claims of statutory violation by Villagio:

1. Failure to Provide Required Information: Villagio violated the statute by not providing him with the first and last name of the person who observed the violation.

2. Failure to Notify of Hearing Rights: Villagio did not inform him of his right to petition for an administrative hearing with the state real estate department.

3. Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio effectively prevented him from responding via certified mail within the 21-day statutory period. He argued that the notices’ demand for compliance within 10 days, combined with the issuance of a second notice and a fine just 14 days after the first, led him to believe he only had 10 days to act before incurring another violation.

Respondent’s Position (Villagio at Tempe HOA)

Villagio presented a defense based on a direct reading of the statute and Mr. Garcia’s inaction:

1. Statutory Obligations Not Triggered: Villagio’s central argument was that its obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C)—including the duty to name the observer—are only triggered after a unit owner submits a written response by certified mail within 21 days. Since Mr. Garcia never sent such a response, these obligations never came into effect.

2. Internal Contest Process Satisfied Statute: Per A.R.S. § 33-1242(D), the duty to notify an owner of their right to an administrative hearing only applies if the HOA fails to provide its own contest process. Villagio argued that because all three notices explicitly stated the process for appealing to the Board of Directors, it had fulfilled its statutory duty.

3. No Prevention of Response: Mr. Garcia was never legally or physically prevented from sending a certified letter. During cross-examination, he admitted he was not under any court order prohibiting him from responding.

4. Statute Inapplicability (Argument from Rehearing): Villagio further contended that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies specifically to violations concerning the “condition of the property,” not the “use” of the property. Since short-term renting is a use, Villagio argued the statute did not apply to this situation at all.

Key Testimony from Rehearing

During the February 12, 2019 rehearing, Villagio’s Community Manager, Tom Gordon, testified.

• On direct examination, Mr. Gordon stated that Villagio does not restrict homeowners from responding to violation notices within the 21-day period.

• On cross-examination, when asked by Mr. Garcia if Villagio would have abided by “this statute” had he responded in 21 days, Mr. Gordon replied, “No.” He explained this by stating that homeowners are given 10 days to contest a notice with Villagio pursuant to its own short-term rental policy.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decisions and Rationale

The judge’s findings were consistent across both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, leading to the same conclusion in each instance.

Initial Decision (November 19, 2018)

• Finding of Fact: It was undisputed that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the March 8, March 22, or April 5, 2018 notices within 21 calendar days.

• Conclusion 1: Because Mr. Garcia did not respond within the 21-day period, Villagio was not required to provide him with the first and last name of the person(s) who observed the violation.

• Conclusion 2: Because Villagio notified Mr. Garcia of the process for contesting the notice, it was not required under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D) to provide him with notice of the right to petition for an administrative hearing.

• Outcome: Mr. Garcia failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The petition was dismissed.

Rehearing Decision (March 4, 2019)

The judge reaffirmed the initial findings and addressed Mr. Garcia’s argument that he was prevented from responding.

• Finding on “Prevention”: The judge found no evidence that Villagio informed Mr. Garcia he could not respond within 21 days or otherwise prevented him from doing so. The issuance of a second notice 14 days after the first was not deemed a preventative act that nullified Mr. Garcia’s statutory window to respond to the first notice.

• Statutory Construction: The decision invoked the legal principle that “what the Legislature means, it will say,” indicating a strict, literal interpretation of the statute’s requirements.

• Reaffirmed Conclusions: The judge again concluded that because Mr. Garcia failed to submit a written response by certified mail, Villagio’s obligations under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) were not triggered, and its inclusion of an internal appeal process satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1242(D).

• Outcome: Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed for a second time, with Villagio deemed the prevailing party.

VI. Final Disposition

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Mr. Garcia’s petition be dismissed. The decision issued after the rehearing on March 4, 2019, is binding on the parties. Any party wishing to appeal the order must seek judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.

Study Guide: Garcia v. Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

This guide is designed to review the key facts, legal arguments, and outcomes of the administrative case between Rogelio A. Garcia and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, as detailed in case number 19F-H1918009-REL.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the provided source context.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association initially accuse Mr. Garcia of committing?

3. What was the core of Mr. Garcia’s legal complaint against the Homeowners Association?

4. According to the court’s findings, what crucial step did Mr. Garcia fail to take after receiving the violation notices?

5. What was Villagio’s main argument for why it was not obligated to provide Mr. Garcia with the name of the person who observed the violation?

6. Under what circumstance did Villagio argue it was not required to provide Mr. Garcia with notice of his right to petition for an administrative hearing?

7. What new fines were imposed on Mr. Garcia in the notices dated March 22, 2018, and April 5, 2018?

8. At the rehearing, what was Mr. Garcia’s explanation for why he was unable to respond to the notices within the statutory 21-day period?

9. What argument did Villagio introduce at the rehearing concerning the distinction between a property’s “condition” and its “use”?

10. What was the final outcome of both the initial hearing and the subsequent rehearing?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Rogelio A. Garcia, the Petitioner who brought the complaint, and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association, the Respondent defending against the complaint. The case was heard by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.

2. Villagio accused Mr. Garcia of violating the short-term lease provisions located in the association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The association alleged that Mr. Garcia’s unit was being rented in violation of its short-term rental policy.

3. Mr. Garcia alleged that Villagio violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242. He claimed Villagio failed to provide him the opportunity to respond by certified mail within 21 days, did not inform him of his right to an administrative hearing, and did not provide the name of the person who observed the violation.

4. The court found that Mr. Garcia did not respond to the violation notices sent on March 8, March 22, and April 5, 2018. Specifically, he failed to provide the association with a written response by sending it via certified mail within 21 calendar days after the date of the notices.

5. Villagio argued that its obligation to provide the observer’s name under A.R.S. § 33-1242(C) is only triggered if the unit owner first submits a written response by certified mail within the 21-day period. Because Mr. Garcia did not do so, Villagio was not required to provide that information.

6. Villagio argued it was not required to provide notice of the right to petition for a hearing because it had already fulfilled its legal obligation under A.R.S. § 33-1242(D). The violation notices it sent to Mr. Garcia contained instructions on the process for contesting the notice with the Board of Directors.

7. The notice dated March 22, 2018, informed Mr. Garcia that a fine of $1,000 had been posted to his account. The subsequent notice on April 5, 2018, stated that an additional $2,000 fine had been posted for the same violation.

8. Mr. Garcia contended that Villagio prevented him from responding because it did not wait 21 days before issuing subsequent notices and fines. He believed he only had 10 days to comply based on language in the notices, which created confusion and pressure.

9. At the rehearing, Villagio argued that A.R.S. § 33-1242 did not apply because the statute addresses violations related to the “condition of the property.” Villagio asserted its notices concerned the “use” of Mr. Garcia’s property (short-term renting), not its physical condition.

10. In both the initial hearing decision issued on November 19, 2018, and the rehearing decision issued on March 4, 2019, the Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove Villagio had violated the statute. Consequently, Mr. Garcia’s petition was dismissed in both instances.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to provoke deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each, drawing evidence and reasoning exclusively from the case documents.

1. Analyze the legal reasoning used by Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson to dismiss Mr. Garcia’s petition. How did the judge interpret and apply the specific subsections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1242 to the facts presented in the initial hearing and the rehearing?

2. Trace the progression of arguments made by both Rogelio A. Garcia and Villagio from the initial petition through the rehearing. How did their claims and defenses evolve, and what new evidence or legal theories were introduced in the second hearing?

3. Discuss the significance of the “burden of proof” in this case, which rested upon Mr. Garcia. Explain the standard of a “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the legal decision and detail why the judge concluded Mr. Garcia failed to meet this standard.

4. Evaluate the strength and potential implications of Villagio’s argument, introduced at the rehearing, that A.R.S. § 33-1242 applies only to the “condition” of a property and not its “use.” Although the judge did not base the final decision on this point, discuss how this interpretation could affect future disputes between homeowners and associations.

5. Based on the dates and actions described in the two decisions, construct a detailed procedural timeline of this case. Begin with the first violation letter from Villagio and conclude with the notice of the right to appeal the rehearing decision, including all key notices, filings, hearings, and fines.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)

The Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The central statute in this case was A.R.S. § 33-1242.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this matter, Mr. Garcia bore the burden of proof to show that Villagio committed the alleged violation.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)

The governing documents that dictate how a condominium or planned community must be operated and maintained, and which contain the rules that unit owners must follow. Mr. Garcia was accused of violating the short-term lease provisions of Villagio’s CC&Rs.

Certified Mail

A type of mail service that provides the sender with a mailing receipt and electronic verification that an article was delivered or that a delivery attempt was made. A.R.S. § 33-1242(B) specifies this method for a unit owner’s written response to a violation notice.

Evidentiary Hearing

A formal proceeding, similar to a trial, where parties present evidence (such as testimony and documents) to a neutral decision-maker. Hearings were held in this case on October 30, 2018, and February 12, 2019.

Office of Administrative Hearings

A state agency that conducts impartial hearings for other state agencies, boards, and commissions. This office was responsible for conducting the hearings in this case.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, Rogelio A. Garcia was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the original decision, often granted to review the evidence or arguments. Mr. Garcia requested and was granted a rehearing after the initial decision was issued.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association was the Respondent.

Unit Owner

A person who owns a unit within a condominium or planned community and is subject to the association’s governing documents. Mr. Garcia is a unit owner in the Villagio at Tempe community.

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These sources consist of two Administrative Law Judge Decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Rogelio A. Garcia (Petitioner) and the Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association (Respondent). The first document records the initial decision from October 2018, which dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition alleging the HOA violated Arizona statute § 33-1242 by not providing required information following a notice of violation for short-term leasing. The second document details the rehearing decision from February 2019, which again found that Mr. Garcia failed to prove the HOA violated the statute because he did not respond to the violation notices by certified mail within the mandatory 21-day period to trigger the HOA’s legal obligations. Both rulings concluded that since the HOA provided him with the process for contesting the notices, they were not required to provide written notice of his option to petition for an administrative hearing. Consequently, both decisions dismissed Mr. Garcia’s petition and designated the HOA as the prevailing party.

2 sources

What are the legal requirements concerning notice and response for HOA violations?
How did the unit owner’s failure to respond impact their statutory rights?
What legal interpretation was key to dismissing the homeowner’s administrative petition?

Based on 2 sources

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Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rogelio A. Garcia (petitioner)
    Appeared on behalf of himself,

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (HOA attorney)
    Brown Olcott, PLLC
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association,
  • Tom Gordon (Community Manager/witness)
    AAM LLC
    Community Manager for Villagio; testified on behalf of Villagio

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge,
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of electronic transmission of the decision,

Other Participants

  • Amanda Shaw (Representative/Contact)
    AAM LLC
    Listed as c/o for service of process for Villagio at Tempe Homeowners Association

Charles P Mandela vs. Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918006-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-02-28
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Charles P. Mandela Counsel —
Respondent Blue Ridge Estates of Coconino County Homeowners' Association Counsel Paul K. Frame, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs § 3.1(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the homeowner's petition in its entirety, finding the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to show the HOA violated CC&R § 3.1(a) when denying the construction of a cedar patio structure.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the HOA violated CC&R 3.1(a). The proposed structure was found to be a second detached structure and/or a temporary structure barred by the community documents, and the Petitioner had previously failed to submit sufficient information for an attached structure proposal.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of CC&Rs § 3.1(a) by denying request for patio structure while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

Petitioner alleged the HOA improperly denied his request for a detached cedar patio structure (150 sq ft) based on CC&R § 3.1(A) which limits properties to one detached structure (Petitioner already had a tool shed). The ALJ found Petitioner failed to establish the violation, concluding the proposed structure was a second barred detached structure or a temporary structure (as concrete pavers were not equivalent to a required cement/block foundation). Petitioner also failed to provide sufficient architectural details for an attached structure request.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA rules enforcement, architectural review, detached structures, temporary structures, rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • CC&R § 3.1(a)
  • Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918006-REL Decision – 692294.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:26 (119.5 KB)

19F-H1918006-REL Decision – 669528.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:15:30 (91.9 KB)

Briefing Document: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law hearings concerning a dispute between homeowner Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County (“Blue Ridge”). The core of the dispute was Blue Ridge’s repeated denial of Mr. Mandela’s requests to construct a 150-square-foot cedar patio structure on his property.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately denied Mr. Mandela’s petition in both an initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing, finding that the homeowner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish any violation of the association’s governing documents. The ALJ’s decisions affirmed that Blue Ridge acted within its authority and correctly applied its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and architectural regulations.

Key takeaways from the rulings include:

• Violation of Detached Structure Limit: Mr. Mandela’s request for a detached patio was denied because he already had a tool shed, and the HOA rules explicitly permit only one detached structure per property.

• Improper “Play Structure” Request: An initial request framing the patio as a “play structure” was correctly denied as its proposed 150 sq. ft. size exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit for certain play structures.

• Insufficient Plans for Attached Structure: A separate request to attach the structure to his home was denied due to Mr. Mandela’s failure to provide the required detailed architectural plans and construction drawings, which the HOA deemed necessary for approval.

• Arguments Found Lacking: Mr. Mandela’s arguments—including claims of selective enforcement, discrimination against homeowners without children, and misinterpretation of the term “temporary structure”—were found to be unsubstantiated by evidence. The ALJ concluded the structure would be a prohibited temporary structure as the proposed concrete pavers do not constitute a permanent foundation under the HOA’s definition.

Case Overview

Parties Involved

Description

Petitioner

Charles P. Mandela

A homeowner and member of the Blue Ridge Estates HOA.

Respondent

Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County

The governing homeowners’ association for the Blue Ridge Estates development.

Adjudicator

Velva Moses-Thompson

Administrative Law Judge, Office of Administrative Hearings.

Timeline of Key Events

c. Feb 1, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits his first request for a 150 sq. ft. patio, using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form. Blue Ridge denies it for exceeding the size limit.

c. Mar 2, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits a second request, this time to attach a cedar patio shade to his home. Blue Ridge requests detailed plans and materials.

c. Mar 8, 2018

Blue Ridge denies the request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information,” instructing Mr. Mandela to provide formal drawings as per CC&R guidelines.

c. Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela files an internal appeal with Blue Ridge, which is subsequently denied for the same reason of incomplete construction information.

Post-Mar 23, 2018

Mr. Mandela submits a third request for a detached 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure. Blue Ridge denies it because he already has a detached tool shed.

c. Jul 31, 2018

Mr. Mandela files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging Blue Ridge violated CC&R § 3.1(a) by denying his request while allowing another member a Tuff Shed.

Oct 17, 2018

An evidentiary hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Nov 6, 2018

The ALJ issues the initial decision, denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Dec 12, 2018

The Arizona Department of Real Estate orders a rehearing of the matter.

Feb 8, 2019

The rehearing is held before the same ALJ.

Feb 28, 2019

The ALJ issues the final decision, again finding in favor of Blue Ridge and denying Mr. Mandela’s petition.

Analysis of Construction Requests and Denials

Mr. Mandela made three distinct applications to the Blue Ridge Architectural Committee for his proposed 150 sq. ft. cedar patio structure, each of which was denied for different reasons based on the HOA’s governing documents.

Request 1: Detached “Play Structure”

Mr. Mandela’s initial application on February 1, 2018, was submitted using a “Play Structure Approval Request” form.

• HOA Rule: The form, based on modified Rules and Regulations from April 6, 2016, states: “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”

• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied the request because the proposed 150 sq. ft. size of the structure exceeded the 80 sq. ft. limit specified for this type of structure.

Request 2: Attached Cedar Patio Shade

On March 2, 2018, Mr. Mandela submitted a new request to attach the structure to his home.

• HOA Action: The committee chairman, John Hart, requested documents showing the structure would not be free-standing, such as plans and material specifications.

• Mandela’s Response: In a March 3 email, Mr. Mandela stated: “I am building this myself. I am not an Architect, I have not software to show (6) 2 by 4”s to attach from the single family roof lie to the roof lien of the same roof.” He asserted that photos of other attached structures were sufficient.

• Denial Rationale: The request was denied on March 8 due to “incomplete information.” The denial letter explicitly instructed Mr. Mandela to submit all required documents, including drawings that “match exactly what you are going to build,” per CC&R Section 10.3. His subsequent appeal was also denied, with Blue Ridge noting that a manufacturer’s representative stated they would not warranty the product if the design was altered and reiterating the need for detailed elevation drawings.

Request 3: Detached Cedar Patio Structure

Following the denial of his appeal, Mr. Mandela submitted a third request for a detached version of the patio.

• HOA Rule: According to CC&R § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D), “One detached structure may… be constructed on a property.”

• Denial Rationale: Blue Ridge denied this request because Mr. Mandela already had one detached structure—a tool shed—on his property. The rules permit only one such structure.

Key Arguments and Rulings from Administrative Hearings

At the initial hearing and subsequent rehearing, both parties presented arguments regarding the application of the HOA’s rules. The ALJ systematically addressed and ruled on each point, ultimately concluding that the petitioner failed to prove his case.

Petitioner’s Core Arguments (Charles P. Mandela)

• Definition of “Detached Structure”: He argued that his proposed patio was not a “detached structure” under the CC&Rs because, based on his misinterpretation of a prior administrative ruling, a detached structure is one that can be easily converted into a second residence.

• Selective Enforcement: He alleged that Blue Ridge approved a “Tuff Shed” for another member and was not enforcing the 80 sq. ft. play structure size limit against other homeowners, thus discriminating against him.

• Discriminatory Rules: He contended that the rule allowing a second detached structure if it is a “play structure” violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people without children. He stated he wanted the patio for his mother.

• Definition of “Temporary Structure”: He asserted the structure was not a prohibited temporary structure because he planned to use concrete pavers, which he claimed constituted a “cement foundation” under the rules, and the materials had a 5-year warranty.

Respondent’s Core Arguments (Blue Ridge Estates HOA)

• One Detached Structure Rule: The rules unambiguously limit homeowners to one detached structure, and Mr. Mandela already had one.

• Incomplete Submissions: The request for an attached structure lacked the necessary architectural details to ensure it was properly and safely constructed, as required by the CC&Rs. Joseph Hancock, Vice President of Blue Ridge and a former contractor, testified that Mr. Mandela failed to consider critical factors like height and width differentials.

• Temporary Structure Violation: Mr. Hancock testified that a concrete paver is not the equivalent of a “cement or slab foundation.” Therefore, the proposed structure would be a prohibited temporary structure under the CC&Rs.

• No Selective Enforcement: Mr. Hancock refuted Mr. Mandela’s claims of selective enforcement, testifying that the lots Mr. Mandela cited either had structures built before 2003 (predating certain rules) or had no detached structures at all.

Administrative Law Judge’s Final Conclusions

The ALJ found that Mr. Mandela failed to establish his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The final order denied his petition based on the following conclusions of law:

• Burden of Proof: The petitioner did not meet his burden to prove that Blue Ridge violated CC&R Article III, Section 3.1(a).

• Second Detached Structure: It was undisputed that Mr. Mandela had a shed on his property. The proposed 150 sq. ft. patio therefore constituted a barred second detached structure.

• Prior Rulings Not Precedent: The ALJ noted that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior administrative decision he cited and, furthermore, that “prior administrative law judge decisions are not precedent or binding on future administrative law decisions.”

• Temporary Structure: The preponderance of the evidence showed the proposed structure is a temporary structure under the CC&Rs because “concrete pavers are not the equivalent of cement or block foundation.”

• Denial of Attached Structure: The denial of the request to attach the structure was proper, as the “Petitioner failed to provide sufficient details to illustrate how he would attach the cedar patio structure to his home.”

• No Evidence of Discrimination: The petitioner failed to establish that Blue Ridge approved other oversized play structures or that the denial of his requests was discriminatory. The ALJ also noted the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over potential constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Relevant HOA Governing Documents

Document/Section

Key Provision / Definition

CC&R § 3.1

Permitted Uses and Restrictions – Single Family: “No building or structure shall be erected or maintained separate from the Single Family Residence located on any Lot, other than a garage…”

Architectural Committee Aligned Standard 3(D)

Detached Structures: “One detached structure may, with Architectural Committee approval, be constructed on a property.”

CC&R § 3.6 & Aligned Standard

Temporary Structures: Prohibits temporary structures. A temporary structure is defined as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.”

Modified Rules and Regulations (April 6, 2016)

Play Structures: Allows up to two play structures but specifies they “Cannot exceed 80 SF if it’s a Tree House, Tree Viewing Stand, Play House/Fort.”

CC&R § 3.24

Architectural Approval: “No building, fence, wall, screen, residence or other structure shall be commenced, erected, maintained, improved or altered… without the prior written approval of the… Architectural Committee.”

CC&R § 10.3

Architectural Submission Guidelines: Specifies the format and information required for submittals to the architectural committee.

CC&R § 12.2

Declaration Amendments: Requires an affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least 75% of all lots to amend the Declaration.

Study Guide: Mandela v. Blue Ridge Estates HOA

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal dispute between petitioner Charles P. Mandela and respondent Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association of Coconino County. The case revolves around Mr. Mandela’s multiple attempts to gain approval for a patio structure on his property and the subsequent legal proceedings. The material is drawn from two Administrative Law Judge Decisions, dated November 6, 2018, and February 28, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing your information directly from the provided case documents.

1. What were the three distinct requests Mr. Mandela submitted to the Blue Ridge Estates HOA, and what was the outcome of each?

2. Explain the HOA’s rule regarding detached structures and why Mr. Mandela’s third request for a detached patio was denied under this rule.

3. On what grounds did the HOA deny Mr. Mandela’s second request to attach a cedar patio shade to his home?

4. What was Mr. Mandela’s primary allegation in his initial petition filed with the Department of Real Estate on July 31, 2018?

5. How do the Blue Ridge rules define a “temporary structure,” and why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude Mr. Mandela’s proposed patio fell into this category?

6. Describe Mr. Mandela’s discrimination argument regarding the HOA’s policy on play structures.

7. What is the legal standard of proof the petitioner was required to meet in this case, and what does this standard mean?

8. Mr. Mandela cited a prior administrative law judge decision to support his case. What was his interpretation of that decision, and how did the presiding judge respond to this line of argument?

9. Who is Joseph Hancock, and what key pieces of testimony did he provide on behalf of the HOA during the rehearing?

10. According to the CC&Rs, what is the procedural difference between amending the Declaration (the CC&Rs themselves) versus adopting new “Rules and Regulations”?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. Mr. Mandela first submitted a “Play Structure Approval Request” for a 150-square-foot patio, which was denied for exceeding the 80-square-foot size limit for such structures. His second request was to attach a cedar patio shade to his home, which was denied due to incomplete information and a lack of adequate plans. His third request was for a detached 150-square-foot patio structure, which was denied because he already had another detached structure on his property.

2. According to CC&Rs § 3.1(A) and Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), a property is permitted to have only one detached structure. Mr. Mandela’s third request was denied because it was undisputed that he already had a tool shed on his property. The proposed detached patio would have constituted a prohibited second detached structure.

3. The HOA denied the request to attach the patio shade because Mr. Mandela submitted incomplete information and failed to provide sufficient plans. The HOA requested detailed elevation drawings showing construction methods, dimensions, foundation details, and attachment methods, which Mr. Mandela did not provide.

4. In his petition of July 31, 2018, Mr. Mandela alleged that the Blue Ridge HOA had violated CC&Rs § 3.1(a). His specific claim was that the HOA discriminated against him by denying his request to place a patio structure in his backyard while allowing another member to erect a Tuff Shed.

5. The Architectural Committee rules define a temporary structure as one “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” The judge concluded the proposed patio was a temporary structure because Mr. Mandela planned to use concrete pavers, which, according to the credible testimony of Joseph Hancock, are not the equivalent of a permanent cement or block foundation.

6. Mr. Mandela argued that the modified rule allowing a second detached play structure (up to 80 sq ft) violates CC&R 3.1 because it discriminates against people who do not have children. He asserted the policy was unfair because he wanted to build the structure for his mother to rest outside, not for children’s play.

7. The petitioner, Mr. Mandela, had the burden of proof to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that has the most convincing force and is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue rather than the other, meaning the contention is more probably true than not.

8. Mr. Mandela argued that a prior administrative law judge decision had found that a “detached structure” under Blue Ridge CC&Rs is a structure that can be easily converted into a second residence, which his patio could not. The presiding judge dismissed this by stating that Mr. Mandela misinterpreted the prior ruling and, more importantly, that prior administrative law judge decisions are not binding precedent for future decisions.

9. Joseph Hancock is the Vice President of the Blue Ridge HOA and a former general, electrical, and HVAC contractor. He testified that concrete pavers are not equivalent to a cement or block foundation, that Mr. Mandela’s plans for attaching the structure were insufficient, and that he had investigated lots Mr. Mandela cited for alleged violations and found none.

10. According to the CC&Rs, adopting, amending, or repealing “Rules and Regulations” can be done by a majority vote of the Board (§ 4.2). In contrast, amending the Declaration of CC&Rs themselves is a much more stringent process, requiring the affirmative vote or written consent of members owning at least seventy-five percent (75%) of all lots (§ 12.2).

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate your answers in a standard essay format, using specific evidence from the source documents to support your arguments.

1. Analyze the progression of Mr. Mandela’s three distinct requests to the HOA. How did the denial of his first request (as a “Play Structure”) appear to influence his subsequent applications and legal arguments?

2. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies in this case. Explain why Mr. Mandela ultimately failed to convince the Administrative Law Judge that the HOA violated its own rules, citing specific examples of his failed arguments (e.g., the temporary structure definition, claims of selective enforcement, and the adequacy of his submitted plans).

3. Examine the distinction made in the Blue Ridge Estates governing documents between the core CC&Rs and the “Rules and Regulations” adopted by the Board. How did this distinction allow the HOA to have a rule permitting a second “play structure” while the main CC&Rs seem to limit properties to a single residence and one other detached structure (a garage)?

4. The HOA denied Mr. Mandela’s request for an attached structure due to “incomplete information.” Based on the evidence presented in the decisions, evaluate the reasonableness of the HOA’s request for detailed plans versus Mr. Mandela’s assertion that he had provided sufficient information for approval.

5. Trace Mr. Mandela’s various claims of unfair treatment, including selective enforcement (the Tuff Shed), discrimination (the play structure rule), and his interpretation of key terms like “detached structure.” For each claim, explain the HOA’s counter-position or the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent judge who presides over administrative hearings for state agencies, such as the one between Mr. Mandela and the HOA. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

Architectural Committee

A committee within the HOA granted authority by CC&R § 10.2 to approve or deny proposed construction and promulgate regulations aligned with the CC&Rs. It denied all of Mr. Mandela’s requests.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner (Mr. Mandela) bore the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the primary governing documents for the Blue Ridge Estates community, outlining land use, permitted structures, and rules members must follow.

Detached Structure

A building or structure on a property that is separate from the main single-family residence. According to Architectural Committee regulation 3(D), only one such structure is permitted per lot.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, Charles P. Mandela is the petitioner.

Play Structure

A structure defined by the HOA’s modified rules to include items like Swing Sets, Jungle Gyms, Tree Houses, and Ground Placed Play Houses/Forts. Play Houses/Forts and Tree Houses are limited to 80 square feet.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” representing the greater weight of the evidence.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association is the respondent.

Rules and Regulations

Rules that can be adopted, amended, or repealed by a majority vote of the HOA Board, as distinct from the CC&Rs which require a 75% vote of all lot owners to amend. The “Play Structure” rules are an example.

Temporary Structure

As defined by the Architectural Committee regulations, a structure “without a cement or block foundation to which the structure or building is permanently attached.” Such structures are prohibited by CC&R § 3.6.

Select all sources
669528.pdf
692294.pdf

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19F-H1918006-REL-RHG

2 sources

These sources document two decisions from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between Charles P. Mandela and the Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association (HOA). The first document presents the initial Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision which denied Mr. Mandela’s petition, finding he failed to prove the HOA violated its governing documents by denying his request to build a patio structure. The second document is the ALJ Decision following a rehearing, which reaffirms the initial denial, concluding that Mr. Mandela’s proposed structure was either a prohibited second detached structure or a temporary structure lacking a proper foundation, and that he failed to provide sufficient plans for an attached structure. Both sources establish that Mr. Mandela did not meet his burden of proof to show the HOA discriminated against him or otherwise violated the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

2 sources

What were the specific reasons the HOA denied Charles Mandela’s requests?
How did the HOA Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions govern detached structures?
What was the ultimate outcome of Charles Mandela’s petition and subsequent rehearing?

Based on 2 sources

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00:00

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Charles P. Mandela (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Paul Frame (HOA attorney)
    FRAME LAW PLLC
  • John Hart (HOA Chairman)
    Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association
    Reviewed petitioner's requests
  • Joseph Hancock (HOA Vice President, witness)
    Blue Ridge Estates Homeowners Association
    Presented testimony

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (administrative staff)
    Transmitted decision electronically