The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Solera was in compliance with its governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1, concluding that the Board is the 'sole judge' regarding appropriate maintenance of AREAS. The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the Rehearing Petition was dismissed.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to sustain her burden to establish a violation. The governing documents grant the Board 'the sole judge' authority over maintenance, and Petitioner did not provide legal support requiring the HOA to meet the homeowner maintenance standard.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times
Petitioner alleged that Solera failed to maintain Areas of Association Responsibility (AREAS) in good condition and repair at all times, arguing that the same strict maintenance standard applied to homeowners (CC&R 7.2) should apply to the HOA (CC&R 7.1). The issue was heard on rehearing after the initial decision dismissed the petition.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded Solera was in compliance with its governing documents and was the prevailing party. Petitioner's appeal (Rehearing Petition) was dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. 33-1801 et seq.
A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
CC&R Article 7, Section 7.1
CC&R Article 7, Section 7.2
CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-116
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Dispute, CC&R Violation, Maintenance Standard, Areas of Association Responsibility, Rehearing, Sole Judge
Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.
Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)
Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).
Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].
Administrative Law Judge Decision: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Executive Summary
This briefing document outlines the findings and decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the cross-petitions between Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP). The central dispute revolves around the validity of a 2018 Amendment to the community’s Declaration and MacLeod’s alleged violation of this Amendment by residing full-time in an aircraft hangar.
MacLeod (Petition #19) contended that the Amendment was invalid because it was not unanimously approved by all lot owners, as he argued was required by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) since it applied to fewer than all properties. MAP (Petition #34) argued the Amendment was properly adopted with the required 75% approval and that MacLeod was in violation by living in his Tract G hangar, which also allegedly failed to meet the minimum living space requirement.
The ALJ ruled decisively in favor of Mogollon Airpark, Inc., deeming it the prevailing party. The judge concluded that the Amendment was properly adopted under the 75% approval threshold outlined in the community’s Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), thereby dismissing MacLeod’s petition. On MAP’s petition, the ALJ found that MacLeod had indeed violated the Amendment by living full-time in the hangar, affirming that part of the petition. However, the ALJ dismissed MAP’s claim regarding the hangar’s living space size due to insufficient evidence. The final order dismisses Petition #19, partially affirms and partially dismisses Petition #34, and orders each party to bear their own filing fees.
Case Overview
Case Numbers
No. 20F-H2019019-REL (Root), No. 20F-H2019034-REL
Parties
Petitioner: Magnus L.D. MacLeod Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)
Jurisdiction
Arizona Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Kay Abramsohn
Hearing Date
June 19, 2020
Decision Date
July 28, 2020
The Cross-Petitions
The legal conflict originated from two separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Petition #19: Filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod
• Filing Date: On or about October 15, 2019.
• Core Allegation: MAP violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), (A)(2)(a), and (A)(2)(b) in its adoption of the October 18, 2018 “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…”
• MacLeod’s Argument: The Amendment could not be enforced because it lacked the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which it applied. He specifically noted that three of the nine Real Property Tracts (Tract G, Tract H, and Tract M) did not provide an affirmative vote and that he personally did not sign it. He argued the amendment required unanimous approval.
Petition #34: Filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)
• Filing Date: On or about December 16, 2019.
• Core Allegations:
1. Violation of the Amendment: MacLeod was in continued violation of the properly adopted Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar.
2. Violation of Square Footage Requirement: MAP alleged, upon information and belief, that the living space in the hangar was “only 549 square feet,” which violated the Declaration’s requirement that structures for living purposes contain no less than 1,200 square feet.
• Requested Relief: MAP sought enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, including injunctive relief to compel MacLeod’s compliance, and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.
Analysis of the Disputed Amendment
The conflict centers on an amendment recorded on October 18, 2018. This amendment introduced several significant changes to the community’s governing documents.
Key Provisions of the Amendment
• Creates Two Lot Categories: The Amendment establishes “Residential lots” (lots #178 through #213) and “Hangar Tracts” (Tracts E through M).
• Regulates Hangar Use: It designates Tracts E through M for the purpose of “aircraft storage only.”
• Restricts Occupancy: While guest quarters may be constructed within a hangar, they are for “temporary living only.” “Temporary” is explicitly defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” An owner can request an extension in special circumstances.
• Maintains Living Space Requirement: It affirms that any single-family structure or combination hangar/house must have a living area of “not less than 1,200 square feet.”
• Adds Taxiway Access: The Amendment adds Lot 213 to the list of properties authorized to use the aircraft taxiway. This change was necessitated by a fence MacLeod had erected that blocked the Lot 213 owner’s access.
MacLeod’s Objections to the Amendment
In his petition, MacLeod argued the Amendment fundamentally and unreasonably altered the original covenants:
• It “substantially alters” the covenants for Tract Hangar/Homes by imposing the new four-month temporary living limit where unrestricted usage was previously allowed.
• It replaced the allowance for “Guest Homes with Kitchens” with “Guest Quarters without Kitchens,” impacting Tract G.
• It created a “large burden upon me to buy or build an additional home that I do not want and do not need.”
Background and History of the Dispute
• Property Acquisition: MacLeod purchased Tract G from his brother, Pat MacLeod, in February 2017 with the stated expectation of living in the hangar/home full-time.
• Occupancy: After acquiring the property, MacLeod made interior improvements and began living full-time in the aircraft hangar.
• Conflict Origin: The issue of MacLeod’s full-time residency first arose in May 2017 when he requested to build a group home for disabled veterans, a request that drew opposition from other lot owners.
• Initial Violation Notice: On September 18, 2017, MAP’s Architectural Committee sent MacLeod a letter notifying him that living full-time in a hangar intended for aircraft storage was a violation and requested he vacate within 60 days.
• Formal Non-Compliance Notices & Fines:
◦ December 29, 2018: MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance,” imposing a $100 fine.
◦ April 29, 2019: MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.
Legal Framework and Adjudicated Issues
The central legal question was the standard of approval required to pass the Amendment. The parties stipulated that the core dispute was whether a 75% approval or a unanimous approval was necessary.
Stipulated Fact #11
The parties agreed to the following crucial point, which narrowed the scope of the legal argument:
“The AMENDMENT contains at least the required minimum signatures and authorizations from the Lot Owners in Unit IVB to adopt the AMENDMENT, provided that unanimous approval of all affected property owners was not required.”
Conflicting Legal Standards
• Declaration Requirement (75% Rule): The original Declaration states it can be amended “by an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision…”
• Arizona Statute (Unanimous Rule): A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) requires unanimous “affirmative vote or written consent of all of the owners of the lots or property to which the amendment applies” if the amendment “apply to fewer than all of the lots or less than all of the property that is bound by the Declaration.”
Parties’ Core Arguments
• MacLeod’s Position: The Amendment required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) because it applied to “fewer than all the lots,” specifically pointing out that Tract B (a common area) was not included.
• MAP’s Position: The 75% rule under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable standard. MAP argued that Tract B was a common area not subject to the Declaration’s conditions, so its exclusion from an amendment concerning residential use was irrelevant and did not trigger the unanimity requirement.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s conclusions systematically addressed each petition.
Ruling on Petition #19 (Amendment Validity)
• Conclusion: The Amendment was properly adopted.
• Rationale: The ALJ concluded that the 75% approval threshold, as specified in the Declaration and permitted by A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1), was the correct standard. Because the parties stipulated that the 75% threshold had been met, MAP was not in violation of the statute.
• Outcome: Petition #19 was dismissed.
Ruling on Petition #34 (MacLeod’s Violations)
• Conclusion on Full-Time Occupancy: MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home.
• Rationale: MacLeod acknowledged living there full-time. His testimony regarding when he ceased this practice was found to be “widely inconsistent,” and the ALJ could not conclude that the violation had stopped by the time MAP filed its petition.
• Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was affirmed.
• Conclusion on Living Space Requirement: MAP failed to prove its allegation that the living space was less than the required 1,200 square feet.
• Rationale: MAP did not clearly document or otherwise prove its claim that the living space was only 549 square feet. MacLeod, in contrast, cited a 2007 architectural committee sign-off indicating 1,656 square feet.
• Outcome: This allegation in Petition #34 was dismissed.
• Conclusion on Injunctive Relief: The Tribunal lacked the authority to grant the requested relief.
• Rationale: MAP “cited no statutory authority of this Tribunal with regard to ‘enforcement’ of a homeowner’s association governing documents or with regard to any injunctive relief.”
Final Order
1. Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) is deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.
2. Petition #19 (MacLeod v. MAP): Dismissed.
3. Petition #34 (MAP v. MacLeod):
◦ Partially affirmed as to the allegation of MacLeod living full-time in the Tract G Hangar/Home in violation of the Amendment.
◦ Partially dismissed as to the allegation regarding the amount of living space within the hangar.
4. Filing Fees: Each party shall bear their own filing fee.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019019-REL
Study Guide: MacLeod v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Short-Answer Quiz
1. What were the two primary allegations made by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) in its petition (Petition #34) against Magnus L.D. MacLeod?
2. What was the core argument presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod in his petition (Petition #19) regarding the October 18, 2018 Amendment?
3. According to the original Declaration, what was the minimum approval threshold required to amend it?
4. How did the Amendment of October 18, 2018 change the rules regarding residency in Hangar Tracts like Tract G?
5. What was the central legal question that the parties stipulated to regarding the adoption of the Amendment?
6. Describe the two notices that MAP issued to MacLeod prior to filing its petition.
7. What argument did MacLeod make regarding A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2) and why he believed the Amendment required unanimous approval?
8. Why was MAP’s allegation regarding the living space in MacLeod’s Tract G hangar (that it was only 549 sq. ft.) dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge?
9. What was MacLeod’s testimony regarding his occupancy of the Tract G hangar, and how did the Administrative Law Judge view this testimony?
10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge regarding Petition #19 and Petition #34, and which party was deemed the prevailing party?
Answer Key
1. In Petition #34, MAP first alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his Tract G aircraft storage hangar. Second, MAP requested enforcement of the Declaration and Amendment, seeking injunctive relief and an award of its attorney’s fees and costs.
2. MacLeod’s petition alleged that the Amendment was unenforceable because it was not properly adopted pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817. He argued it did not receive the affirmative vote or written consent of all owners of the property to which the amendment applied, specifically noting that owners of three of the nine affected tracts (G, H, and M) did not consent.
3. The original Declaration stipulated that it could be amended by “an instrument in writing, executed and acknowledged by the owners of not less than three-fourths of the lots in said subdivision.” This represents a 75% approval threshold.
4. The Amendment established that guest quarters in aircraft storage hangars (Tracts E through M) were for “temporary living only,” which was defined as “not longer than four months per calendar year.” It also specified that such quarters could not be used as a permanent residence.
5. The parties stipulated that the central dispute was whether the Amendment required 75% approval from lot owners as specified in the Declaration, or if it required unanimous approval from all affected property owners pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).
6. On December 29, 2018, MAP issued a “First Notice of Non-Compliance” with a $100 fine for living full-time in the hangar. On April 29, 2019, MAP issued a “Second Notice: Non-Compliance,” imposing an additional $200 fine if the violation was not remedied.
7. MacLeod argued that pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2), unanimous approval was required because the Amendment applied to fewer than all the lots bound by the Declaration. He specifically pointed out that Tract B, a common area, was not included in the Amendment.
8. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed this part of MAP’s petition because MAP failed to clearly document or prove its allegation. The judge concluded that MAP did not sufficiently demonstrate that the living space within the Tract G Hangar/Home was less than the required 1,200 square feet.
9. MacLeod gave widely inconsistent dates for his full-time occupancy of the hangar and testified that he had moved to Concho in January 2019. The Administrative Law Judge found his testimony inconsistent and could not conclude that MacLeod had stopped living in the hangar at the time Petition #34 was filed.
10. The judge ordered that MacLeod’s Petition #19 be dismissed entirely. The judge partially dismissed MAP’s Petition #34 regarding the living space allegation but affirmed the allegation that MacLeod was living in the hangar in violation of the Amendment. MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions.
Essay Questions
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of A.R.S. § 33-1817 presented by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately sided with MAP’s interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) was the applicable statute.
2. Trace the timeline of the dispute, starting with MacLeod’s purchase of Tract G and his proposal for a group home. Discuss how the actions and reactions of both parties escalated the conflict, leading to the filing of cross-petitions with the Department of Real Estate.
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both parties. How did the parties’ joint stipulation of facts narrow the central legal issue? Discuss the impact of MacLeod’s inconsistent testimony on the judge’s final decision regarding his residency.
4. MacLeod argued that MAP had waived its right to enforce the Amendment due to “longstanding and widespread utilization of Tract Hanger/Homes as full-time residences.” Although the Judge did not address this argument due to jurisdictional limits, construct an argument for or against this claim based on the facts available in the decision.
5. Discuss the scope and limitations of the Administrative Law Judge’s authority in this case. Why was the Judge able to rule on the validity of the Amendment’s adoption and MacLeod’s violation, but not grant MAP’s request for injunctive relief and enforcement?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The judicial authority, Kay Abramsohn, who presided over the hearing and issued the decision in this case.
A.R.S. § 33-1817
Arizona Revised Statute governing the amendment of a planned community’s Declaration. Subsection (A)(1) allows amendment by the vote specified in the Declaration, while (A)(2) requires unanimous consent of affected owners if the amendment applies to fewer than all lots.
Amendment
The “Amendment to Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions…” recorded on October 18, 2018. It created categories for Residential and Hangar lots and restricted hangar occupancy to temporary living of no more than four months per year.
A colloquial acronym used by the Petitioner to refer to the original “Declaration of Establishment of Conditions, Reservations and Restrictions and Mutual and Reciprocal Covenants and Liens Running with the Land.”
Declaration
The original governing document for Mogollon Airpark, Inc., establishing conditions, reservations, and restrictions for the properties. It required a three-fourths (75%) vote of lot owners to be amended.
Hangar Tracts
Tracts E through M, inclusive, as designated by the Amendment for the primary purpose of aircraft storage, though guest quarters for temporary living are permitted.
Magnus L.D. MacLeod
The Petitioner in Petition #19 and Respondent in Petition #34. He is the owner of Tract G and resided in the hangar on that property.
Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP)
The Respondent in Petition #19 and Petitioner in Petition #34. It is the planned community association responsible for administering the Declaration.
Petition #19
The petition filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod on October 15, 2019, alleging MAP improperly adopted the Amendment in violation of Arizona statute.
Petition #34
The petition filed by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. on December 16, 2019, alleging MacLeod was violating the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof required in the hearing, defined as evidence that is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Residential Lots
Lots numbered 178 through 213, inclusive, as categorized by the Amendment.
Tract G
An aircraft storage hangar lot in Unit 4B owned by Magnus L.D. MacLeod, which was the central property in the dispute.
Unit 4B
The specific subdivision within Mogollon Airpark subject to the Declaration and Amendment. It includes Lots 178-213 and Tracts B, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, and M.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019019-REL
Select all sources
810246.pdf
No emoji found
Loading
20F-H2019019-REL
1 source
This administrative law judge decision concerns cross-petitions filed by Magnus L.D. MacLeod and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (MAP) regarding disputes within a planned community association in Arizona. MacLeod’s petition challenged the validity of an amendment to the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs), arguing it was improperly adopted and unreasonably altered prior usage rights for hangar/homes, specifically his Tract G property. MAP’s petition alleged that MacLeod was in continued violation of the amendment by living full-time in his aircraft storage hangar and requested injunctive relief to compel compliance. The judge ruled to dismiss MacLeod’s petition, finding the amendment was properly adopted, and partially affirmed MAP’s petition, concluding that MacLeod had violated the amendment by residing full-time in the hangar. Ultimately, MAP was deemed the prevailing party in the proceedings.
What were the central legal issues and findings in this property dispute case?
How did the contested amendment change the community’s declaration and rules?
What were the core arguments and outcomes for each party involved in this hearing?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Jeffrey M. Proper(attorney) JEFFREY M. PROPER, PLLC Counsel for Magnus L.D. MacLeod
Respondent Side
Gregory A. Stein(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP Counsel for Mogollon Airpark, Inc.
Craig Albright(board member) MAP Board of Directors Then President of the MAP Board of Directors
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Magnus L.D. MacLeod(party) Petitioner in 20F-H2019019-REL and Respondent in 20F-H2019034-REL
Pat MacLeod(HOA president) HOA Brother of Petitioner; previous owner of Tract G; appeared to be HOA President around 2017
Petitioner MacLeod's challenge to the HOA's Amendment (Petition #19) was dismissed. The HOA's cross-petition (Petition #34) was partially affirmed, finding MacLeod in violation of the Amendment by living full-time in his hangar/home. The HOA (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.) was deemed the prevailing party in the cross-petitions, and each party was ordered to bear its own filing fee.
Why this result: Petitioner MacLeod failed to prove the Amendment was improperly adopted, and the HOA successfully proved MacLeod was in violation of the Amendment regarding full-time residency.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to the proper adoption of the October 18, 2018 Amendment to the Declaration (Petition #19)
Petitioner MacLeod alleged that the Amendment substantially altering residential usage in Tract Hangar/Homes was improperly adopted because it applied to fewer than all lots and thus required unanimous approval under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(2).
Orders: Petition #19 was dismissed because the Amendment was found to be properly adopted requiring 75% approval pursuant to the Declaration and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)(1) [40, 44a].
The petition was granted, finding that the HOA violated its own CC&Rs regarding enforcement procedures, particularly by failing to follow Section 18 requirements and by attempting to collect inappropriate legal fees under Section 1.1. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee.
Why this result: The HOA failed to follow the mandatory enforcement procedure requirements set forth in CC&Rs Section 18 (written notice, 30 days to appear before the Board) and inappropriately applied CC&Rs Section 1.1 to pursue attorney fees against the owner rather than a lessee, rendering its subsequent enforcement actions unreasonable.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA enforcement action regarding CC&R violations and associated legal fees
Petitioner challenged the HOA's enforcement actions and resulting demands for legal fees related to short-term and partial-property rentals. The ALJ found the HOA proceeded inappropriately, did not follow the enforcement requirements set forth in CC&Rs Section 18, and improperly utilized Section 1.1 for actions against the owner, thus establishing a violation by the HOA.
Orders: HOA must reimburse Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee. Asserted legal fees sought by the HOA were determined not to be assignable to the Petitioner.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1806.01
CC&Rs Section 1.1
CC&Rs Section 18
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Enforcement, Short-Term Rentals, CC&R Violation, Legal Fees, Due Process
Briefing Document: Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Steven D. Stienstra (Petitioner) and the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association (HOA/Respondent). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s enforcement actions and subsequent demand for attorney’s fees related to alleged violations of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) prohibiting short-term rentals.
The ALJ ultimately ruled in favor of the Petitioner in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The decisions established that the HOA violated its own CC&Rs by employing an incorrect and unreasonable enforcement procedure. Specifically, the HOA misapplied Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs, which governs an owner’s failure to take action against a non-compliant tenant, instead of following the prescribed due process for owner violations outlined in Section 18. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that the attorney’s fees demanded by the HOA were not assignable to the Petitioner. The final order required the HOA to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, affirming that the HOA’s actions, including a series of escalating cease and desist letters, were procedurally flawed and unreasonable given the circumstances.
Case Overview and Core Dispute
The case, No. 19F-H1918033-REL, involved a petition filed by Steven D. Stienstra in November 2018 with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. Mr. Stienstra alleged that the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association, a voluntary board in Sedona, Arizona, violated A.R.S. § 33-1806.01 and Sections 1.1 and 18 of its own CC&Rs.
The dispute originated from short-term rental activity at Mr. Stienstra’s property, which he purchased in August 2017. While the Petitioner admitted to the initial violations, he contended that he ceased the activity immediately after a phone call from the HOA President in April 2018. Despite his assurances, the HOA, acting on legal advice, pursued enforcement through a series of cease and desist letters, culminating in a demand for $2,600 in attorney’s fees.
The central issue before the Office of Administrative Hearings was whether the HOA’s enforcement process was proper under its governing documents and, consequently, whether Mr. Stienstra was liable for the legal fees incurred by the HOA.
Chronology of the Dispute
Details
Aug 2017
Property Purchase
Steven D. Stienstra purchases the residence. He acknowledges the CC&R restrictions on short-term rentals.
Jan-Apr 2018
Rental Activity
Stienstra’s son uses VRBO to manage stays for friends and family, which expands to produce some revenue from rentals of less than 30 days.
Apr 3, 2018
Motor Home Incident
HOA Secretary Vic Burolla calls Stienstra about a motor home parked in the driveway, a separate CC&R violation.
April 2018
Ferguson’s Phone Call
HOA President Bill Ferguson calls Stienstra about the short-term rentals. Recollections vary, but Stienstra claims he agreed to cease the activity. Ferguson’s impression was that Stienstra was not going to stop.
Apr 26, 2018
HOA Retains Counsel
The first noted contact between the HOA and its law firm occurs after the phone call with Stienstra.
May 11, 2018
First Cease & Desist Letter
The HOA’s attorney sends a letter demanding Stienstra cease all rentals of less than 30 days and rentals of less than the entire property within ten days, threatening a lawsuit under Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs.
June 1, 2018
Second Cease & Desist Letter
The HOA rejects Stienstra’s explanation of compliance. The letter demands payment of $1,500.00 by July 2, 2018, described as a “flat amount to resolve the matter.”
June 17, 2018
Third Cease & Desist Letter
Citing a new Facebook Marketplace post by Stienstra’s son (offering to lease bedrooms separately), the HOA sends another letter. The demand for attorney’s fees increases to $2,600.00.
Sep 4, 2018
Informal Meeting
At Stienstra’s request, three HOA board members meet with him in an unofficial capacity to discuss the dispute. The meeting transcript reflects a tense relationship.
Nov 2018
Petition Filed
Stienstra files his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Oct 7, 2019
Initial Hearing
The Office of Administrative Hearings conducts a hearing on the matter.
Nov 15, 2019
Initial Decision
ALJ Kay Abramsohn issues a decision finding the HOA violated its CC&Rs and grants Stienstra’s petition.
Dec 19, 2019
Rehearing Request
The HOA requests a rehearing, arguing the ALJ’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.”
Mar 12, 2020
Rehearing
A rehearing is conducted where the HOA introduces new arguments, including that its board acted in good faith on legal advice.
Apr 1, 2020
Rehearing Decision
The ALJ issues a final decision affirming the original order, finding Stienstra to be the prevailing party and ordering the HOA to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Steven D. Stienstra)
• Compliance: Stienstra argued that he and his son ceased all short-term rental activity immediately following the April 2018 phone call from HOA President Bill Ferguson.
• Improper Procedure: The core of his argument was that the HOA failed to follow the enforcement procedures mandated by Section 18 of the CC&Rs. This section requires the Board to provide written notice of a breach, a 30-day period for the owner to appear before the Board, and a reasonable time (up to 60 days) to remedy the breach before levying fines.
• Misapplication of CC&Rs: Stienstra contended the HOA incorrectly proceeded under Section 1.1, which he argued applies to an owner’s failure to take legal action against a non-compliant tenant, not direct violations by the owner themselves.
• Unjustified Fees: Because the HOA did not provide due process and followed an improper enforcement path, Stienstra argued he should be released from any liability for the attorney’s fees the HOA incurred.
Respondent’s Position (Cedar Ridge HOA)
• Reasonable Belief of Violation: The HOA argued it had reason to believe violations were ongoing. It cited the continued presence of a VRBO listing (which Stienstra’s son claimed was inactive for booking) and observations of “multiple cars parked there daily” as evidence.
• Reliance on Legal Counsel: The HOA maintained that its actions were reasonable because it sought and followed the advice of its attorney. At the rehearing, it cited A.R.S. § 10-3830, arguing it discharged its duties in good faith.
• Discretion in Enforcement: The Board believed it had the discretion to enforce the CC&Rs under either Section 1.1 or Section 18. Board Secretary Vic Burolla testified at the rehearing that Section 1.1 was chosen because it “seemed more expeditious, to be able to collect” legal fees.
• “Unclean Hands” Doctrine: At the rehearing, the HOA argued for the first time that because Stienstra had admittedly violated the CC&Rs initially, he had “unclean hands” and was not entitled to seek relief regarding the HOA’s subsequent actions.
Key Evidence Presented
• CC&Rs: The text of Section 1.1 (“Leasing”) and Section 18 (“Enforcement of Covenants”) were central to the case.
• Cease & Desist Letters: The series of three letters from the HOA’s attorney documented the escalating demands and the HOA’s legal strategy.
• Testimony of Board Members: Testimony from Bill Ferguson and Vic Burolla provided insight into the Board’s decision-making process, including their impression of the April 2018 phone call and their justification for hiring an attorney. Vic Burolla provided conflicting testimony, stating in the initial hearing he was “not aware of any specific instructions in the CC&Rs” for notifications, but stating in the rehearing that the Board had discussed the benefits of proceeding under either Section 1.1 or Section 18.
• VRBO and Facebook Listings: Printouts of the online rental listings were used as evidence by the HOA to demonstrate ongoing or attempted violations.
• Meeting Transcript: A transcript of the informal September 4, 2018 meeting revealed the “tense relationship” and communication breakdown between the parties. When asked who was in the house if not tenants, Stienstra replied, “It’s not anybody’s business who’s in our house, really.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
The ALJ’s conclusions were consistent across both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, ultimately finding that the Petitioner had proven his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Interpretation of Governing CC&Rs
• Section 1.1 vs. Section 18: The ALJ decisively concluded that the two sections govern different circumstances.
◦ Section 1.1 applies when an occupant or lessee violates the CC&Rs. It requires the owner to take legal action against that occupant within 10 days of a written demand from the Board. If the owner fails, the Board may act “on behalf of such owner against owner’s occupant.” The ALJ found these were “not the circumstances in this case.”
◦ Section 1.8 is the proper procedure for violations committed directly by the owner. It provides a clear due process framework: written notice, an opportunity to be heard by the Board, and a period to cure the breach.
• Conclusion: The ALJ ruled that the “appropriate action that was required to be taken by Respondent was set forth in Section 18 of the CC&Rs.” By using Section 1.1, the HOA committed a procedural violation.
Assessment of HOA Enforcement Actions
• Verbal Warning: The ALJ characterized the April 2018 phone call from Mr. Ferguson as “appropriate in the nature of education” but clarified it “is not an ‘enforcement’ action under the CC&Rs.”
• Unreasonable Continuation: The Judge found the HOA’s continued actions after the May 11 letter to be unreasonable. The decision notes that the HOA’s characterization of Stienstra “intentionally” continuing to violate the CC&Rs “simply demonstrates that the Board members did not and were not going to believe Petitioner or his son no matter what information they provided.”
• Distrust: The decision highlights the Board’s fundamental distrust, quoting Mr. Burolla’s testimony that even if the HOA had called to clarify the situation, “there’s no reason to suspect we would have been told the truth.”
Ruling on Attorney’s Fees
• Not Assignable to Petitioner: Because the HOA violated its own CC&Rs by following an improper enforcement procedure, the ALJ ruled that the “asserted legal fees are not assigned to Petitioner.”
• Improper Demand: The ALJ specifically analyzed the demand in the June 1, 2018 letter for “$1,500.00… authorized by the Board as a flat amount to resolve the matter.” The ruling states this amount “could only be looked at as either a settlement offer or as some sort of fine, which is not authorized under Section 1.1 but only under Section 18.” It was not a legitimate accounting of actual fees incurred as permitted by the CC&Rs.
• No Expenses Incurred Under Section 1.1: The Judge found that since Stienstra took action to stop the leasing, no legal action by the HOA “on behalf of the owner against the occupant” was required. Therefore, no expenses were actually incurred pursuant to the parameters of Section 1.1.
Final Decisions and Order
• Initial Decision (Nov 15, 2019): The petition was granted, and the HOA was ordered to reimburse Mr. Stienstra the $500.00 filing fee.
• Rehearing Decision (Apr 1, 2020): The ALJ affirmed the original order. The HOA’s new arguments regarding “good faith” and “unclean hands” did not alter the core finding of procedural failure. The final order declared the Petitioner the prevailing party and re-stated the requirement for the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918033-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing and rehearing decisions in the case between petitioner Steven D. Stienstra and respondent Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a series of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the legal decisions.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central issue that prompted the administrative hearing?
2. What specific violations of the CC&Rs did the homeowner, Steven Stienstra, or his son commit that initiated the dispute?
3. Describe the initial action taken by HOA President Bill Ferguson in April 2018 and explain why the Administrative Law Judge did not consider it a formal enforcement action.
4. The HOA’s attorneys sent three Cease & Desist letters. What was the primary demand of the first letter, and what financial demands were added in the second and third letters?
5. What were the two key sections of the CC&Rs at the center of the dispute, and what did each section generally govern?
6. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclude that the HOA’s decision to proceed under Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs was inappropriate for the violations committed by the owner?
7. According to the ALJ’s decision, what specific procedural steps should the HOA have followed under Section 18 of the CC&Rs to properly enforce the covenants against an owner?
8. On what grounds did the Cedar Ridge HOA request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued in favor of the petitioner?
9. During the rehearing, the HOA introduced an “unclean hands” argument. What did this argument claim, and how did the ALJ respond to it?
10. What was the final, binding outcome of this case after the rehearing, including the ruling on attorney’s fees and the petitioner’s filing fee?
——————————————————————————–
Quiz Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra, and the Respondent, Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association (HOA). While the dispute began over rental violations, the central issue at the hearing was the liability for legal fees the HOA incurred and asserted were owed by the Petitioner.
2. The Petitioner’s son violated Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs by listing the property on VRBO for short-term rentals (less than 30 consecutive days) and producing revenue from January to April 2018. He also later posted on Facebook Marketplace offering to rent separate units within the home, which violated the rule requiring the lease of an “owner’s entire lot.”
3. HOA President Bill Ferguson made a phone call to Mr. Stienstra in April 2018 to bring the short-term rental violations to his attention. The ALJ characterized this as a “courtesy or informational call” and not a formal enforcement action because it did not comply with the written notice procedures required by either Section 1.1 or Section 18 of the CC&Rs.
4. The first letter (May 11, 2018) demanded that Stienstra cease all rentals of less than 30 days. The second letter (June 1, 2018) added a demand for $1,500 in attorney’s fees, and the third letter (June 17, 2018) increased this demand to $2,600.
5. The key sections were Section 1.1 and Section 18. Section 1.1 governed leasing requirements (e.g., minimum 30-day term) and detailed a process for an owner to take action against a non-compliant tenant (occupant). Section 18, titled “Enforcement of Covenants,” provided the formal process for the HOA Board to take action against a non-compliant owner.
6. The ALJ concluded that Section 1.1 was inappropriate because its enforcement mechanism empowers the HOA to act “on behalf of such owner against owner’s occupant” if the owner fails to do so. In this case, the HOA was taking direct action against the owner (Stienstra) for his own violations, a scenario that the ALJ determined was governed by Section 18.
7. Under Section 18, the HOA was required to notify the owner “in writing of the breach,” provide the owner 30 days to appear before the Board to respond, and then grant a reasonable time period (not to exceed 60 days) to remedy the breach before it could levy a fine.
8. The HOA requested a rehearing on the grounds that the ALJ’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and was not support by the evidence.” The HOA specifically alleged the ALJ had not considered evidence that it had reason to believe violations were continuing and had erred in interpreting the CC&Rs.
9. The HOA argued that because the Petitioner had admittedly violated the CC&Rs, he had “unclean hands” and therefore was not entitled to seek relief from the Department regarding the HOA’s actions. The ALJ noted that the remedy sought by the Petitioner was monetary (release from fees), not equitable, and the core issue remained whether the HOA’s enforcement actions were valid under its own governing documents.
10. The final outcome, upheld on rehearing, was that the Petitioner’s petition was granted. The HOA was ordered to reimburse Mr. Stienstra for his $500 filing fee, and the ALJ concluded that the asserted legal fees were not assignable to him due to the HOA’s failure to follow its own CC&R enforcement procedures.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each question using only the facts and arguments presented in the provided legal decisions.
1. Analyze the procedural missteps made by the Cedar Ridge HOA Board in its enforcement actions against Steven Stienstra. How did its choice to proceed under Section 1.1 instead of Section 18 fundamentally undermine its position, according to the Administrative Law Judge?
2. Discuss the role of communication and miscommunication in escalating the conflict between Stienstra and the HOA. Use specific examples from the text, such as the Ferguson phone call, the continued VRBO listing, the HOA’s internal distrust, and the unofficial board meeting, to illustrate your points.
3. Evaluate the HOA’s argument on rehearing that its actions were protected because they acted in good faith based on the advice of their attorney, as allowed under A.R.S. § 10-3830. Why was this argument ultimately unpersuasive to the Administrative Law Judge?
4. The central issue in this case evolved from CC&R violations to a dispute over attorney’s fees. Trace this evolution, explaining how each Cease & Desist letter escalated the financial stakes and why the ALJ ultimately determined the fees were not assignable to Stienstra.
5. Compare and contrast the enforcement mechanisms detailed in Section 1.1 and Section 18 of the Cedar Ridge CC&Rs. Explain the specific purpose of each section and why applying the correct one was critical to the outcome of this case.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary
Definition
A.R.S. § 33-1806.01
An Arizona Revised Statute providing that a planned community property owner may use their property as a rental unless prohibited in the declaration and must abide by the declaration’s rental time period restrictions.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and rulings. In this case, the ALJ was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the HOA’s violations by a preponderance of the evidence.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.
Cease & Desist Letter
A formal written demand from an attorney or party to stop (cease) and not restart (desist) an allegedly illegal or infringing activity.
Declaration
The legal document that creates a homeowners association and its CC&Rs.
Forcible Entry and Detainer
A legal action, often used for eviction, to recover possession of real property from someone who is in wrongful possession. Section 1.1 mentions this as an action an owner could take against a non-compliant tenant.
A legal claim or right against a property to secure the payment of a debt. Section 18 of the CC&Rs allows the HOA to place a lien on a property for an unpaid special assessment or fine.
Occupant
As used in Section 1.1, refers to a tenant or lessee under a lease agreement, distinct from the property owner.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, meaning that the evidence as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association.
Special Assessment
A charge levied by an HOA against an owner for a specific purpose, such as repaying attorney’s fees incurred by the HOA or as a fine, as described in Sections 1.1 and 18.
Unclean Hands
A legal doctrine arguing that a party who has acted unethically or in bad faith in relation to the subject of a complaint should not be entitled to seek relief. The HOA raised this argument against the Petitioner on rehearing.
An Expedia Group website containing listings for vacation property rentals, which the Petitioner’s son used to list the property.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918033-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing and rehearing decisions in the case between petitioner Steven D. Stienstra and respondent Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a series of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the legal decisions.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central issue that prompted the administrative hearing?
2. What specific violations of the CC&Rs did the homeowner, Steven Stienstra, or his son commit that initiated the dispute?
3. Describe the initial action taken by HOA President Bill Ferguson in April 2018 and explain why the Administrative Law Judge did not consider it a formal enforcement action.
4. The HOA’s attorneys sent three Cease & Desist letters. What was the primary demand of the first letter, and what financial demands were added in the second and third letters?
5. What were the two key sections of the CC&Rs at the center of the dispute, and what did each section generally govern?
6. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclude that the HOA’s decision to proceed under Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs was inappropriate for the violations committed by the owner?
7. According to the ALJ’s decision, what specific procedural steps should the HOA have followed under Section 18 of the CC&Rs to properly enforce the covenants against an owner?
8. On what grounds did the Cedar Ridge HOA request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued in favor of the petitioner?
9. During the rehearing, the HOA introduced an “unclean hands” argument. What did this argument claim, and how did the ALJ respond to it?
10. What was the final, binding outcome of this case after the rehearing, including the ruling on attorney’s fees and the petitioner’s filing fee?
——————————————————————————–
Quiz Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra, and the Respondent, Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association (HOA). While the dispute began over rental violations, the central issue at the hearing was the liability for legal fees the HOA incurred and asserted were owed by the Petitioner.
2. The Petitioner’s son violated Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs by listing the property on VRBO for short-term rentals (less than 30 consecutive days) and producing revenue from January to April 2018. He also later posted on Facebook Marketplace offering to rent separate units within the home, which violated the rule requiring the lease of an “owner’s entire lot.”
3. HOA President Bill Ferguson made a phone call to Mr. Stienstra in April 2018 to bring the short-term rental violations to his attention. The ALJ characterized this as a “courtesy or informational call” and not a formal enforcement action because it did not comply with the written notice procedures required by either Section 1.1 or Section 18 of the CC&Rs.
4. The first letter (May 11, 2018) demanded that Stienstra cease all rentals of less than 30 days. The second letter (June 1, 2018) added a demand for $1,500 in attorney’s fees, and the third letter (June 17, 2018) increased this demand to $2,600.
5. The key sections were Section 1.1 and Section 18. Section 1.1 governed leasing requirements (e.g., minimum 30-day term) and detailed a process for an owner to take action against a non-compliant tenant (occupant). Section 18, titled “Enforcement of Covenants,” provided the formal process for the HOA Board to take action against a non-compliant owner.
6. The ALJ concluded that Section 1.1 was inappropriate because its enforcement mechanism empowers the HOA to act “on behalf of such owner against owner’s occupant” if the owner fails to do so. In this case, the HOA was taking direct action against the owner (Stienstra) for his own violations, a scenario that the ALJ determined was governed by Section 18.
7. Under Section 18, the HOA was required to notify the owner “in writing of the breach,” provide the owner 30 days to appear before the Board to respond, and then grant a reasonable time period (not to exceed 60 days) to remedy the breach before it could levy a fine.
8. The HOA requested a rehearing on the grounds that the ALJ’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and was not support by the evidence.” The HOA specifically alleged the ALJ had not considered evidence that it had reason to believe violations were continuing and had erred in interpreting the CC&Rs.
9. The HOA argued that because the Petitioner had admittedly violated the CC&Rs, he had “unclean hands” and therefore was not entitled to seek relief from the Department regarding the HOA’s actions. The ALJ noted that the remedy sought by the Petitioner was monetary (release from fees), not equitable, and the core issue remained whether the HOA’s enforcement actions were valid under its own governing documents.
10. The final outcome, upheld on rehearing, was that the Petitioner’s petition was granted. The HOA was ordered to reimburse Mr. Stienstra for his $500 filing fee, and the ALJ concluded that the asserted legal fees were not assignable to him due to the HOA’s failure to follow its own CC&R enforcement procedures.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each question using only the facts and arguments presented in the provided legal decisions.
1. Analyze the procedural missteps made by the Cedar Ridge HOA Board in its enforcement actions against Steven Stienstra. How did its choice to proceed under Section 1.1 instead of Section 18 fundamentally undermine its position, according to the Administrative Law Judge?
2. Discuss the role of communication and miscommunication in escalating the conflict between Stienstra and the HOA. Use specific examples from the text, such as the Ferguson phone call, the continued VRBO listing, the HOA’s internal distrust, and the unofficial board meeting, to illustrate your points.
3. Evaluate the HOA’s argument on rehearing that its actions were protected because they acted in good faith based on the advice of their attorney, as allowed under A.R.S. § 10-3830. Why was this argument ultimately unpersuasive to the Administrative Law Judge?
4. The central issue in this case evolved from CC&R violations to a dispute over attorney’s fees. Trace this evolution, explaining how each Cease & Desist letter escalated the financial stakes and why the ALJ ultimately determined the fees were not assignable to Stienstra.
5. Compare and contrast the enforcement mechanisms detailed in Section 1.1 and Section 18 of the Cedar Ridge CC&Rs. Explain the specific purpose of each section and why applying the correct one was critical to the outcome of this case.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary
Definition
A.R.S. § 33-1806.01
An Arizona Revised Statute providing that a planned community property owner may use their property as a rental unless prohibited in the declaration and must abide by the declaration’s rental time period restrictions.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and rulings. In this case, the ALJ was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the HOA’s violations by a preponderance of the evidence.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.
Cease & Desist Letter
A formal written demand from an attorney or party to stop (cease) and not restart (desist) an allegedly illegal or infringing activity.
Declaration
The legal document that creates a homeowners association and its CC&Rs.
Forcible Entry and Detainer
A legal action, often used for eviction, to recover possession of real property from someone who is in wrongful possession. Section 1.1 mentions this as an action an owner could take against a non-compliant tenant.
A legal claim or right against a property to secure the payment of a debt. Section 18 of the CC&Rs allows the HOA to place a lien on a property for an unpaid special assessment or fine.
Occupant
As used in Section 1.1, refers to a tenant or lessee under a lease agreement, distinct from the property owner.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, meaning that the evidence as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association.
Special Assessment
A charge levied by an HOA against an owner for a specific purpose, such as repaying attorney’s fees incurred by the HOA or as a fine, as described in Sections 1.1 and 18.
Unclean Hands
A legal doctrine arguing that a party who has acted unethically or in bad faith in relation to the subject of a complaint should not be entitled to seek relief. The HOA raised this argument against the Petitioner on rehearing.
An Expedia Group website containing listings for vacation property rentals, which the Petitioner’s son used to list the property.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Steven D. Stienstra(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf,.
Petitioner's son(witness) Related to Petitioner Managed rental property listings (referred to as 'Son'),,; testified at hearing,.
Keith D. Collett(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC. Represented Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association/HOA,,.
Diana J. Elston(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C. Represented Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association/HOA,.
Vic Burolla(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association HOA Board Secretary,,; witness at initial hearing,,; no longer Secretary by time of hearing,.
Bill Ferguson(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association HOA Board President,; no longer President by time of hearing,; witness at initial hearing.
Tucker(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association HOA Board Vice-president,; participated in September 4, 2018 meeting,.
Griffin(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association HOA Board Treasurer,; participated in September 4, 2018 meeting,.
Dick Ellis(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association May have attended portion of September 4, 2018 meeting,.
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Administrative Law Judge,,.
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner,,.
The Petitioner was the prevailing party. The ALJ affirmed that the HOA violated its CC&Rs regarding enforcement procedures, particularly by failing to adhere to Section 18 requirements and incorrectly applying Section 1.1 against the owner, rendering the legal fee demands improper. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee,.
Why this result: The HOA failed to follow the explicit due process requirements (written notice and 30 days to appear) mandated by CC&Rs Section 18 for enforcement against the owner, and incorrectly relied on Section 1.1 to justify its demand for unauthorized flat fees,,,,.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA enforcement action regarding CC&R violations and asserted legal fees
Petitioner challenged the HOA's enforcement actions regarding short-term rentals and leasing less than the entire lot. The ALJ found the HOA proceeded inappropriately under Section 1.1 (intended for action against occupants on the owner's behalf) and failed to follow the mandatory enforcement requirements of Section 18, thus violating its own CC&Rs. Consequently, the asserted legal fees were not assigned to Petitioner,,,.
Orders: The Petition was granted. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner the $500.00 filing fee,. The asserted legal fees of $1,500 and $2,600 sought by the HOA were determined not to be assignable to the Petitioner,.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1806.01
CC&Rs Section 1.1
CC&Rs Section 18
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Legal Fees, Due Process, Rental Restriction
Briefing Document: Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Steven D. Stienstra (Petitioner) and the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association (HOA/Respondent). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s enforcement actions and subsequent demand for attorney’s fees related to alleged violations of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) prohibiting short-term rentals.
The ALJ ultimately ruled in favor of the Petitioner in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The decisions established that the HOA violated its own CC&Rs by employing an incorrect and unreasonable enforcement procedure. Specifically, the HOA misapplied Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs, which governs an owner’s failure to take action against a non-compliant tenant, instead of following the prescribed due process for owner violations outlined in Section 18. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that the attorney’s fees demanded by the HOA were not assignable to the Petitioner. The final order required the HOA to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee, affirming that the HOA’s actions, including a series of escalating cease and desist letters, were procedurally flawed and unreasonable given the circumstances.
Case Overview and Core Dispute
The case, No. 19F-H1918033-REL, involved a petition filed by Steven D. Stienstra in November 2018 with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. Mr. Stienstra alleged that the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association, a voluntary board in Sedona, Arizona, violated A.R.S. § 33-1806.01 and Sections 1.1 and 18 of its own CC&Rs.
The dispute originated from short-term rental activity at Mr. Stienstra’s property, which he purchased in August 2017. While the Petitioner admitted to the initial violations, he contended that he ceased the activity immediately after a phone call from the HOA President in April 2018. Despite his assurances, the HOA, acting on legal advice, pursued enforcement through a series of cease and desist letters, culminating in a demand for $2,600 in attorney’s fees.
The central issue before the Office of Administrative Hearings was whether the HOA’s enforcement process was proper under its governing documents and, consequently, whether Mr. Stienstra was liable for the legal fees incurred by the HOA.
Chronology of the Dispute
Details
Aug 2017
Property Purchase
Steven D. Stienstra purchases the residence. He acknowledges the CC&R restrictions on short-term rentals.
Jan-Apr 2018
Rental Activity
Stienstra’s son uses VRBO to manage stays for friends and family, which expands to produce some revenue from rentals of less than 30 days.
Apr 3, 2018
Motor Home Incident
HOA Secretary Vic Burolla calls Stienstra about a motor home parked in the driveway, a separate CC&R violation.
April 2018
Ferguson’s Phone Call
HOA President Bill Ferguson calls Stienstra about the short-term rentals. Recollections vary, but Stienstra claims he agreed to cease the activity. Ferguson’s impression was that Stienstra was not going to stop.
Apr 26, 2018
HOA Retains Counsel
The first noted contact between the HOA and its law firm occurs after the phone call with Stienstra.
May 11, 2018
First Cease & Desist Letter
The HOA’s attorney sends a letter demanding Stienstra cease all rentals of less than 30 days and rentals of less than the entire property within ten days, threatening a lawsuit under Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs.
June 1, 2018
Second Cease & Desist Letter
The HOA rejects Stienstra’s explanation of compliance. The letter demands payment of $1,500.00 by July 2, 2018, described as a “flat amount to resolve the matter.”
June 17, 2018
Third Cease & Desist Letter
Citing a new Facebook Marketplace post by Stienstra’s son (offering to lease bedrooms separately), the HOA sends another letter. The demand for attorney’s fees increases to $2,600.00.
Sep 4, 2018
Informal Meeting
At Stienstra’s request, three HOA board members meet with him in an unofficial capacity to discuss the dispute. The meeting transcript reflects a tense relationship.
Nov 2018
Petition Filed
Stienstra files his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Oct 7, 2019
Initial Hearing
The Office of Administrative Hearings conducts a hearing on the matter.
Nov 15, 2019
Initial Decision
ALJ Kay Abramsohn issues a decision finding the HOA violated its CC&Rs and grants Stienstra’s petition.
Dec 19, 2019
Rehearing Request
The HOA requests a rehearing, arguing the ALJ’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.”
Mar 12, 2020
Rehearing
A rehearing is conducted where the HOA introduces new arguments, including that its board acted in good faith on legal advice.
Apr 1, 2020
Rehearing Decision
The ALJ issues a final decision affirming the original order, finding Stienstra to be the prevailing party and ordering the HOA to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Analysis of Arguments and Evidence
Petitioner’s Position (Steven D. Stienstra)
• Compliance: Stienstra argued that he and his son ceased all short-term rental activity immediately following the April 2018 phone call from HOA President Bill Ferguson.
• Improper Procedure: The core of his argument was that the HOA failed to follow the enforcement procedures mandated by Section 18 of the CC&Rs. This section requires the Board to provide written notice of a breach, a 30-day period for the owner to appear before the Board, and a reasonable time (up to 60 days) to remedy the breach before levying fines.
• Misapplication of CC&Rs: Stienstra contended the HOA incorrectly proceeded under Section 1.1, which he argued applies to an owner’s failure to take legal action against a non-compliant tenant, not direct violations by the owner themselves.
• Unjustified Fees: Because the HOA did not provide due process and followed an improper enforcement path, Stienstra argued he should be released from any liability for the attorney’s fees the HOA incurred.
Respondent’s Position (Cedar Ridge HOA)
• Reasonable Belief of Violation: The HOA argued it had reason to believe violations were ongoing. It cited the continued presence of a VRBO listing (which Stienstra’s son claimed was inactive for booking) and observations of “multiple cars parked there daily” as evidence.
• Reliance on Legal Counsel: The HOA maintained that its actions were reasonable because it sought and followed the advice of its attorney. At the rehearing, it cited A.R.S. § 10-3830, arguing it discharged its duties in good faith.
• Discretion in Enforcement: The Board believed it had the discretion to enforce the CC&Rs under either Section 1.1 or Section 18. Board Secretary Vic Burolla testified at the rehearing that Section 1.1 was chosen because it “seemed more expeditious, to be able to collect” legal fees.
• “Unclean Hands” Doctrine: At the rehearing, the HOA argued for the first time that because Stienstra had admittedly violated the CC&Rs initially, he had “unclean hands” and was not entitled to seek relief regarding the HOA’s subsequent actions.
Key Evidence Presented
• CC&Rs: The text of Section 1.1 (“Leasing”) and Section 18 (“Enforcement of Covenants”) were central to the case.
• Cease & Desist Letters: The series of three letters from the HOA’s attorney documented the escalating demands and the HOA’s legal strategy.
• Testimony of Board Members: Testimony from Bill Ferguson and Vic Burolla provided insight into the Board’s decision-making process, including their impression of the April 2018 phone call and their justification for hiring an attorney. Vic Burolla provided conflicting testimony, stating in the initial hearing he was “not aware of any specific instructions in the CC&Rs” for notifications, but stating in the rehearing that the Board had discussed the benefits of proceeding under either Section 1.1 or Section 18.
• VRBO and Facebook Listings: Printouts of the online rental listings were used as evidence by the HOA to demonstrate ongoing or attempted violations.
• Meeting Transcript: A transcript of the informal September 4, 2018 meeting revealed the “tense relationship” and communication breakdown between the parties. When asked who was in the house if not tenants, Stienstra replied, “It’s not anybody’s business who’s in our house, really.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Rulings
The ALJ’s conclusions were consistent across both the initial decision and the rehearing decision, ultimately finding that the Petitioner had proven his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Interpretation of Governing CC&Rs
• Section 1.1 vs. Section 18: The ALJ decisively concluded that the two sections govern different circumstances.
◦ Section 1.1 applies when an occupant or lessee violates the CC&Rs. It requires the owner to take legal action against that occupant within 10 days of a written demand from the Board. If the owner fails, the Board may act “on behalf of such owner against owner’s occupant.” The ALJ found these were “not the circumstances in this case.”
◦ Section 1.8 is the proper procedure for violations committed directly by the owner. It provides a clear due process framework: written notice, an opportunity to be heard by the Board, and a period to cure the breach.
• Conclusion: The ALJ ruled that the “appropriate action that was required to be taken by Respondent was set forth in Section 18 of the CC&Rs.” By using Section 1.1, the HOA committed a procedural violation.
Assessment of HOA Enforcement Actions
• Verbal Warning: The ALJ characterized the April 2018 phone call from Mr. Ferguson as “appropriate in the nature of education” but clarified it “is not an ‘enforcement’ action under the CC&Rs.”
• Unreasonable Continuation: The Judge found the HOA’s continued actions after the May 11 letter to be unreasonable. The decision notes that the HOA’s characterization of Stienstra “intentionally” continuing to violate the CC&Rs “simply demonstrates that the Board members did not and were not going to believe Petitioner or his son no matter what information they provided.”
• Distrust: The decision highlights the Board’s fundamental distrust, quoting Mr. Burolla’s testimony that even if the HOA had called to clarify the situation, “there’s no reason to suspect we would have been told the truth.”
Ruling on Attorney’s Fees
• Not Assignable to Petitioner: Because the HOA violated its own CC&Rs by following an improper enforcement procedure, the ALJ ruled that the “asserted legal fees are not assigned to Petitioner.”
• Improper Demand: The ALJ specifically analyzed the demand in the June 1, 2018 letter for “$1,500.00… authorized by the Board as a flat amount to resolve the matter.” The ruling states this amount “could only be looked at as either a settlement offer or as some sort of fine, which is not authorized under Section 1.1 but only under Section 18.” It was not a legitimate accounting of actual fees incurred as permitted by the CC&Rs.
• No Expenses Incurred Under Section 1.1: The Judge found that since Stienstra took action to stop the leasing, no legal action by the HOA “on behalf of the owner against the occupant” was required. Therefore, no expenses were actually incurred pursuant to the parameters of Section 1.1.
Final Decisions and Order
• Initial Decision (Nov 15, 2019): The petition was granted, and the HOA was ordered to reimburse Mr. Stienstra the $500.00 filing fee.
• Rehearing Decision (Apr 1, 2020): The ALJ affirmed the original order. The HOA’s new arguments regarding “good faith” and “unclean hands” did not alter the core finding of procedural failure. The final order declared the Petitioner the prevailing party and re-stated the requirement for the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918033-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing and rehearing decisions in the case between petitioner Steven D. Stienstra and respondent Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a series of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the legal decisions.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central issue that prompted the administrative hearing?
2. What specific violations of the CC&Rs did the homeowner, Steven Stienstra, or his son commit that initiated the dispute?
3. Describe the initial action taken by HOA President Bill Ferguson in April 2018 and explain why the Administrative Law Judge did not consider it a formal enforcement action.
4. The HOA’s attorneys sent three Cease & Desist letters. What was the primary demand of the first letter, and what financial demands were added in the second and third letters?
5. What were the two key sections of the CC&Rs at the center of the dispute, and what did each section generally govern?
6. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclude that the HOA’s decision to proceed under Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs was inappropriate for the violations committed by the owner?
7. According to the ALJ’s decision, what specific procedural steps should the HOA have followed under Section 18 of the CC&Rs to properly enforce the covenants against an owner?
8. On what grounds did the Cedar Ridge HOA request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued in favor of the petitioner?
9. During the rehearing, the HOA introduced an “unclean hands” argument. What did this argument claim, and how did the ALJ respond to it?
10. What was the final, binding outcome of this case after the rehearing, including the ruling on attorney’s fees and the petitioner’s filing fee?
——————————————————————————–
Quiz Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra, and the Respondent, Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association (HOA). While the dispute began over rental violations, the central issue at the hearing was the liability for legal fees the HOA incurred and asserted were owed by the Petitioner.
2. The Petitioner’s son violated Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs by listing the property on VRBO for short-term rentals (less than 30 consecutive days) and producing revenue from January to April 2018. He also later posted on Facebook Marketplace offering to rent separate units within the home, which violated the rule requiring the lease of an “owner’s entire lot.”
3. HOA President Bill Ferguson made a phone call to Mr. Stienstra in April 2018 to bring the short-term rental violations to his attention. The ALJ characterized this as a “courtesy or informational call” and not a formal enforcement action because it did not comply with the written notice procedures required by either Section 1.1 or Section 18 of the CC&Rs.
4. The first letter (May 11, 2018) demanded that Stienstra cease all rentals of less than 30 days. The second letter (June 1, 2018) added a demand for $1,500 in attorney’s fees, and the third letter (June 17, 2018) increased this demand to $2,600.
5. The key sections were Section 1.1 and Section 18. Section 1.1 governed leasing requirements (e.g., minimum 30-day term) and detailed a process for an owner to take action against a non-compliant tenant (occupant). Section 18, titled “Enforcement of Covenants,” provided the formal process for the HOA Board to take action against a non-compliant owner.
6. The ALJ concluded that Section 1.1 was inappropriate because its enforcement mechanism empowers the HOA to act “on behalf of such owner against owner’s occupant” if the owner fails to do so. In this case, the HOA was taking direct action against the owner (Stienstra) for his own violations, a scenario that the ALJ determined was governed by Section 18.
7. Under Section 18, the HOA was required to notify the owner “in writing of the breach,” provide the owner 30 days to appear before the Board to respond, and then grant a reasonable time period (not to exceed 60 days) to remedy the breach before it could levy a fine.
8. The HOA requested a rehearing on the grounds that the ALJ’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and was not support by the evidence.” The HOA specifically alleged the ALJ had not considered evidence that it had reason to believe violations were continuing and had erred in interpreting the CC&Rs.
9. The HOA argued that because the Petitioner had admittedly violated the CC&Rs, he had “unclean hands” and therefore was not entitled to seek relief from the Department regarding the HOA’s actions. The ALJ noted that the remedy sought by the Petitioner was monetary (release from fees), not equitable, and the core issue remained whether the HOA’s enforcement actions were valid under its own governing documents.
10. The final outcome, upheld on rehearing, was that the Petitioner’s petition was granted. The HOA was ordered to reimburse Mr. Stienstra for his $500 filing fee, and the ALJ concluded that the asserted legal fees were not assignable to him due to the HOA’s failure to follow its own CC&R enforcement procedures.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each question using only the facts and arguments presented in the provided legal decisions.
1. Analyze the procedural missteps made by the Cedar Ridge HOA Board in its enforcement actions against Steven Stienstra. How did its choice to proceed under Section 1.1 instead of Section 18 fundamentally undermine its position, according to the Administrative Law Judge?
2. Discuss the role of communication and miscommunication in escalating the conflict between Stienstra and the HOA. Use specific examples from the text, such as the Ferguson phone call, the continued VRBO listing, the HOA’s internal distrust, and the unofficial board meeting, to illustrate your points.
3. Evaluate the HOA’s argument on rehearing that its actions were protected because they acted in good faith based on the advice of their attorney, as allowed under A.R.S. § 10-3830. Why was this argument ultimately unpersuasive to the Administrative Law Judge?
4. The central issue in this case evolved from CC&R violations to a dispute over attorney’s fees. Trace this evolution, explaining how each Cease & Desist letter escalated the financial stakes and why the ALJ ultimately determined the fees were not assignable to Stienstra.
5. Compare and contrast the enforcement mechanisms detailed in Section 1.1 and Section 18 of the Cedar Ridge CC&Rs. Explain the specific purpose of each section and why applying the correct one was critical to the outcome of this case.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary
Definition
A.R.S. § 33-1806.01
An Arizona Revised Statute providing that a planned community property owner may use their property as a rental unless prohibited in the declaration and must abide by the declaration’s rental time period restrictions.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and rulings. In this case, the ALJ was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the HOA’s violations by a preponderance of the evidence.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.
Cease & Desist Letter
A formal written demand from an attorney or party to stop (cease) and not restart (desist) an allegedly illegal or infringing activity.
Declaration
The legal document that creates a homeowners association and its CC&Rs.
Forcible Entry and Detainer
A legal action, often used for eviction, to recover possession of real property from someone who is in wrongful possession. Section 1.1 mentions this as an action an owner could take against a non-compliant tenant.
A legal claim or right against a property to secure the payment of a debt. Section 18 of the CC&Rs allows the HOA to place a lien on a property for an unpaid special assessment or fine.
Occupant
As used in Section 1.1, refers to a tenant or lessee under a lease agreement, distinct from the property owner.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, meaning that the evidence as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association.
Special Assessment
A charge levied by an HOA against an owner for a specific purpose, such as repaying attorney’s fees incurred by the HOA or as a fine, as described in Sections 1.1 and 18.
Unclean Hands
A legal doctrine arguing that a party who has acted unethically or in bad faith in relation to the subject of a complaint should not be entitled to seek relief. The HOA raised this argument against the Petitioner on rehearing.
An Expedia Group website containing listings for vacation property rentals, which the Petitioner’s son used to list the property.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918033-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Stienstra v. Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing and rehearing decisions in the case between petitioner Steven D. Stienstra and respondent Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz with an answer key, a series of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the legal decisions.
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was the central issue that prompted the administrative hearing?
2. What specific violations of the CC&Rs did the homeowner, Steven Stienstra, or his son commit that initiated the dispute?
3. Describe the initial action taken by HOA President Bill Ferguson in April 2018 and explain why the Administrative Law Judge did not consider it a formal enforcement action.
4. The HOA’s attorneys sent three Cease & Desist letters. What was the primary demand of the first letter, and what financial demands were added in the second and third letters?
5. What were the two key sections of the CC&Rs at the center of the dispute, and what did each section generally govern?
6. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclude that the HOA’s decision to proceed under Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs was inappropriate for the violations committed by the owner?
7. According to the ALJ’s decision, what specific procedural steps should the HOA have followed under Section 18 of the CC&Rs to properly enforce the covenants against an owner?
8. On what grounds did the Cedar Ridge HOA request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued in favor of the petitioner?
9. During the rehearing, the HOA introduced an “unclean hands” argument. What did this argument claim, and how did the ALJ respond to it?
10. What was the final, binding outcome of this case after the rehearing, including the ruling on attorney’s fees and the petitioner’s filing fee?
——————————————————————————–
Quiz Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra, and the Respondent, Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association (HOA). While the dispute began over rental violations, the central issue at the hearing was the liability for legal fees the HOA incurred and asserted were owed by the Petitioner.
2. The Petitioner’s son violated Section 1.1 of the CC&Rs by listing the property on VRBO for short-term rentals (less than 30 consecutive days) and producing revenue from January to April 2018. He also later posted on Facebook Marketplace offering to rent separate units within the home, which violated the rule requiring the lease of an “owner’s entire lot.”
3. HOA President Bill Ferguson made a phone call to Mr. Stienstra in April 2018 to bring the short-term rental violations to his attention. The ALJ characterized this as a “courtesy or informational call” and not a formal enforcement action because it did not comply with the written notice procedures required by either Section 1.1 or Section 18 of the CC&Rs.
4. The first letter (May 11, 2018) demanded that Stienstra cease all rentals of less than 30 days. The second letter (June 1, 2018) added a demand for $1,500 in attorney’s fees, and the third letter (June 17, 2018) increased this demand to $2,600.
5. The key sections were Section 1.1 and Section 18. Section 1.1 governed leasing requirements (e.g., minimum 30-day term) and detailed a process for an owner to take action against a non-compliant tenant (occupant). Section 18, titled “Enforcement of Covenants,” provided the formal process for the HOA Board to take action against a non-compliant owner.
6. The ALJ concluded that Section 1.1 was inappropriate because its enforcement mechanism empowers the HOA to act “on behalf of such owner against owner’s occupant” if the owner fails to do so. In this case, the HOA was taking direct action against the owner (Stienstra) for his own violations, a scenario that the ALJ determined was governed by Section 18.
7. Under Section 18, the HOA was required to notify the owner “in writing of the breach,” provide the owner 30 days to appear before the Board to respond, and then grant a reasonable time period (not to exceed 60 days) to remedy the breach before it could levy a fine.
8. The HOA requested a rehearing on the grounds that the ALJ’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and was not support by the evidence.” The HOA specifically alleged the ALJ had not considered evidence that it had reason to believe violations were continuing and had erred in interpreting the CC&Rs.
9. The HOA argued that because the Petitioner had admittedly violated the CC&Rs, he had “unclean hands” and therefore was not entitled to seek relief from the Department regarding the HOA’s actions. The ALJ noted that the remedy sought by the Petitioner was monetary (release from fees), not equitable, and the core issue remained whether the HOA’s enforcement actions were valid under its own governing documents.
10. The final outcome, upheld on rehearing, was that the Petitioner’s petition was granted. The HOA was ordered to reimburse Mr. Stienstra for his $500 filing fee, and the ALJ concluded that the asserted legal fees were not assignable to him due to the HOA’s failure to follow its own CC&R enforcement procedures.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response to each question using only the facts and arguments presented in the provided legal decisions.
1. Analyze the procedural missteps made by the Cedar Ridge HOA Board in its enforcement actions against Steven Stienstra. How did its choice to proceed under Section 1.1 instead of Section 18 fundamentally undermine its position, according to the Administrative Law Judge?
2. Discuss the role of communication and miscommunication in escalating the conflict between Stienstra and the HOA. Use specific examples from the text, such as the Ferguson phone call, the continued VRBO listing, the HOA’s internal distrust, and the unofficial board meeting, to illustrate your points.
3. Evaluate the HOA’s argument on rehearing that its actions were protected because they acted in good faith based on the advice of their attorney, as allowed under A.R.S. § 10-3830. Why was this argument ultimately unpersuasive to the Administrative Law Judge?
4. The central issue in this case evolved from CC&R violations to a dispute over attorney’s fees. Trace this evolution, explaining how each Cease & Desist letter escalated the financial stakes and why the ALJ ultimately determined the fees were not assignable to Stienstra.
5. Compare and contrast the enforcement mechanisms detailed in Section 1.1 and Section 18 of the Cedar Ridge CC&Rs. Explain the specific purpose of each section and why applying the correct one was critical to the outcome of this case.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary
Definition
A.R.S. § 33-1806.01
An Arizona Revised Statute providing that a planned community property owner may use their property as a rental unless prohibited in the declaration and must abide by the declaration’s rental time period restrictions.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal findings and rulings. In this case, the ALJ was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this proceeding, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the HOA’s violations by a preponderance of the evidence.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The governing legal documents that set forth the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.
Cease & Desist Letter
A formal written demand from an attorney or party to stop (cease) and not restart (desist) an allegedly illegal or infringing activity.
Declaration
The legal document that creates a homeowners association and its CC&Rs.
Forcible Entry and Detainer
A legal action, often used for eviction, to recover possession of real property from someone who is in wrongful possession. Section 1.1 mentions this as an action an owner could take against a non-compliant tenant.
A legal claim or right against a property to secure the payment of a debt. Section 18 of the CC&Rs allows the HOA to place a lien on a property for an unpaid special assessment or fine.
Occupant
As used in Section 1.1, refers to a tenant or lessee under a lease agreement, distinct from the property owner.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal or administrative action. In this case, homeowner Steven D. Stienstra.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in this case, meaning that the evidence as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association.
Special Assessment
A charge levied by an HOA against an owner for a specific purpose, such as repaying attorney’s fees incurred by the HOA or as a fine, as described in Sections 1.1 and 18.
Unclean Hands
A legal doctrine arguing that a party who has acted unethically or in bad faith in relation to the subject of a complaint should not be entitled to seek relief. The HOA raised this argument against the Petitioner on rehearing.
An Expedia Group website containing listings for vacation property rentals, which the Petitioner’s son used to list the property.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Steven D. Stienstra(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf,.
Petitioner's son(witness) Related to Petitioner Managed rental property listings (referred to as 'Son'),,; testified at hearing,.
Keith D. Collett(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, PLC. Represented Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association/HOA,,.
Diana J. Elston(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C. Represented Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association/HOA,.
Vic Burolla(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association HOA Board Secretary,,; witness at initial hearing,,; no longer Secretary by time of hearing,.
Bill Ferguson(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association HOA Board President,; no longer President by time of hearing,; witness at initial hearing.
Tucker(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association HOA Board Vice-president,; participated in September 4, 2018 meeting,.
Griffin(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association HOA Board Treasurer,; participated in September 4, 2018 meeting,.
Dick Ellis(board member) Cedar Ridge Homeowners Association May have attended portion of September 4, 2018 meeting,.
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Administrative Law Judge,,.
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Commissioner,,.
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1918042-REL
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Joan A. Tober
Counsel
—
Respondent
Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
Counsel
Diana J. Elston
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA) was the prevailing party. The ALJ found that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B) because the specific attorney letter requested was privileged and could be withheld,, and Petitioner's request for additional 'background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified,.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) as the HOA lawfully withheld privileged documents under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B) and was not required to guess what records were requested due to the vague nature of the demand for 'any and all documentation'.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA violation of requirement to provide association records.
Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide all requested documentation, specifically an attorney letter concerning the North Ridge wall, and failed to comply with the 10-business day response period required for record requests.
Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party on rehearing and Petitioner's appeal was dismissed. The HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B). The requested attorney letter was privileged communication and could be withheld.
Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”
The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.
The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Case Name
Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.
Case Number
19F-H1918042-REL
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Core Issue
Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.
Initial Hearing Date
June 5, 2019
Initial Decision Date
July 29, 2019
Rehearing Date
December 11, 2019
Final Decision Date
January 15, 2020
——————————————————————————–
Key Parties and Individuals
• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober
◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.
◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.
◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.
◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.
◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.
• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)
◦ The governing body for the planned community.
◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn
◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
——————————————————————————–
Chronology of the Dispute
Nov 20, 2018
At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.
Nov 26, 2018
Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.
Nov 27, 2018
Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.
Nov 29, 2018
At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
Nov 29, 2018
At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.
Dec 13, 2018
Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”
Dec 26, 2018
Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Jan 15-16, 2019
The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.
June 5, 2019
The initial administrative hearing is held.
July 29, 2019
Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.
Aug 5, 2019
Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”
Aug 23, 2019
The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.
Dec 11, 2019
The rehearing is conducted.
Jan 15, 2020
Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.
——————————————————————————–
Core Dispute and Arguments
Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)
1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”
2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.
3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).
Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)
1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.
4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.
——————————————————————————–
Key Findings of Fact and Evidence
The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.
• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”
• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.
• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:
◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.
◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”
◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”
◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.
• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.
——————————————————————————–
Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law
Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)
• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.
• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”
• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.
Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)
• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.
• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”
• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”
• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”
• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”
• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
——————————————————————————–
Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.
1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?
2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?
3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?
4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?
5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?
6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?
7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?
8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?
9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.
10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.
4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.
5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.
6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.
8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.
9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.
10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.
2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.
3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?
5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.
A.R.S. § 33-1805
The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.
Attorney-Client Privilege
A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.
Executive Session
A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.
An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.
Petition
The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”
Rehearing
A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
The Letter
The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.
Introduction: The Fight for Information
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.
This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.
1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.
The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.
The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.
2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.
Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.
After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”
In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:
An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.
The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.
3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.
What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.
But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:
Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.
Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.
Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort
The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.
This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Joan A. Tober(petitioner) Former Board member; current Finance Committee member
Respondent Side
Diana J. Elston(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Mr. Mastrosimone(Board President) Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Testified at rehearing
Neutral Parties
Kay A. Abramsohn(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
c. serrano(Clerk)
Felicia Del Sol(Clerk)
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
19F-H1918042-REL
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Joan A. Tober
Counsel
—
Respondent
Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
Counsel
Diana J. Elston
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.
Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.
Key Issues & Findings
HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.
Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2102
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”
The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.
The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.
——————————————————————————–
Case Overview
This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Case Name
Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.
Case Number
19F-H1918042-REL
Adjudicating Body
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Administrative Law Judge
Kay A. Abramsohn
Core Issue
Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.
Initial Hearing Date
June 5, 2019
Initial Decision Date
July 29, 2019
Rehearing Date
December 11, 2019
Final Decision Date
January 15, 2020
——————————————————————————–
Key Parties and Individuals
• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober
◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.
◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.
◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.
◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.
◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.
• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)
◦ The governing body for the planned community.
◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn
◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
——————————————————————————–
Chronology of the Dispute
Nov 20, 2018
At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.
Nov 26, 2018
Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.
Nov 27, 2018
Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.
Nov 29, 2018
At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
Nov 29, 2018
At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.
Dec 13, 2018
Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”
Dec 26, 2018
Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
Jan 15-16, 2019
The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.
June 5, 2019
The initial administrative hearing is held.
July 29, 2019
Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.
Aug 5, 2019
Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”
Aug 23, 2019
The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.
Dec 11, 2019
The rehearing is conducted.
Jan 15, 2020
Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.
——————————————————————————–
Core Dispute and Arguments
Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)
1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”
2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.
3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).
Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)
1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.
4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.
——————————————————————————–
Key Findings of Fact and Evidence
The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.
• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”
• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.
• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:
◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.
◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”
◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”
◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.
• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.
——————————————————————————–
Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law
Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)
• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.
• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”
• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.
Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)
• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.
• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”
• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”
• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”
• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”
• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.
——————————————————————————–
Short Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.
1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?
2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?
3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?
4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?
5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?
6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?
7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?
8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?
9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.
10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).
3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.
4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.
5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.
6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”
7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.
8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.
9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.
10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.
2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.
3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.
4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?
5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.
A.R.S. § 33-1805
The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.
Attorney-Client Privilege
A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.
Executive Session
A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.
An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.
Petition
The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”
Rehearing
A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.
The Letter
The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG
She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.
Introduction: The Fight for Information
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.
This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.
1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.
The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”
Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.
The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.
2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.
Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.
After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”
In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:
An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.
The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.
3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.
What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.
But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:
Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.
Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.
Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort
The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.
This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Joan A. Tober(petitioner) Former Board member; current Finance Committee member
Respondent Side
Diana J. Elston(HOA attorney) Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
Mr. Mastrosimone(Board President) Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Testified at rehearing
Neutral Parties
Kay A. Abramsohn(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
c. serrano(Clerk)
Felicia Del Sol(Clerk)
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Addressed in transmittal
The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.
Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.
The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
• Parties Involved:
◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.
◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.
• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.
• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.
Background and Timeline of the Dispute
The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).
• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):
◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.
◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.
◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.
◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.
• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:
◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.
◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.
◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.
• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.
• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.
• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.
• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.
• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.
Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)
The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”
• Specific Violations Alleged:
◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.
◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.
◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.
• Evidence Presented at Hearing:
◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.
◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).
◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.
◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.
Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)
The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.
• Core Arguments:
◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.
◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.
◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.
• Actions Taken by MCIII:
◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.
◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.
◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.
◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.
◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.
Governing Rules and CC&Rs
The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.
Document
Article/Rule
Provision
Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)
Rule 3
Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.12
Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.13
States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.14
Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.
• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.
• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.
◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.
◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”
◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.
◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.
• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL
Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?
3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?
4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.
5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?
6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?
7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?
9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.
2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.
3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.
4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.
5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.
6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.
7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.
9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.
2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.
4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.
Common Elements
Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.
Community Manager
An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.
Inoperable Vehicle
A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.
A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.
A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.
Prevailing Party
The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL
He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.
Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking
For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.
This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.
The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.
1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work
The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.
The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.
The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:
MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.
2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon
John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:
• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.
• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.
• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.
The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.
3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures
In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.
The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.
This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.
4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis
Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.
Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.
The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:
Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.
The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.
5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient
Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:
• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.
• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.
The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.
For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.
Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One
The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John W. Gray(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Austin Baillio(attorney) Maxwell & Morgan PC Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
Andrea Lacombe(community manager) Curtiss Management Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party regarding the Respondent's violations of the CC&Rs and rules concerning parking enforcement. The Respondent was ordered to refund the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.
Petitioner alleged that the HOA refused to enforce parking rules regarding vehicle limits, requiring use of garages for first cars, and banning inoperable or commercial vehicles, despite written complaints. The ALJ found the HOA failed to enforce these rules or issue proper notices/fines.
Orders: MCIII ordered to pay Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order.
Briefing Document: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (Case No. 19F-H1918004-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides a comprehensive analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of John W. Gray (Petitioner) versus the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII, Respondent). The central issue was MCIII’s failure to enforce its own Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and community rules regarding vehicle parking.
The Petitioner, Mr. Gray, presented credible and convincing evidence of widespread, ongoing parking violations by multiple residents, including exceeding vehicle limits, failing to use garages for primary parking, and the long-term storage of an inoperable vehicle in a common area parking space. The Respondent, MCIII, argued that the rules were difficult to enforce and that it had taken some action, including revising the rules shortly before the hearing.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately rejected MCIII’s defense, concluding that the association had demonstrably failed to enforce its governing documents. The ALJ found that MCIII had viable enforcement options, such as issuing notices and fines, which it did not utilize. The final order deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party and required MCIII to reimburse his $500 filing fee.
Case Overview
• Parties Involved:
◦ Petitioner: John W. Gray, owner of Unit 122 in the Mesa Coronado III Condominium development.
◦ Respondent: Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the unit owners’ association for the 33-unit development.
• Adjudicating Body: The Office of Administrative Hearings, following a referral from the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• Hearing Date: October 29, 2018.
• Decision Date: November 30, 2018.
• Core Allegation: The Petitioner alleged that MCIII violated its own Rules, Regulations, and CC&Rs (specifically Articles 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14) by refusing to enforce parking rules despite receiving written complaints.
Background and Timeline of the Dispute
The conflict centered on parking within the MCIII development, which has 36 parking spaces for 33 units, with spaces being “open” and not assigned to specific units (with one exception).
• Pre-existing Rules (Adopted Jan. 2002):
◦ Owners were limited to two cars per unit.
◦ The garage was considered the “assigned” parking for the first car.
◦ Inoperable vehicles were banned from the property.
◦ A system of warnings and fines was in place for rule violations.
• May 17, 2018: Petitioner Gray submitted a formal written complaint to MCIII, identifying at least eight units in violation of parking rules. His complaint specified:
◦ Units with three cars were not using their garages for parking, instead using them for storage.
◦ An inoperable red truck had been stationary in the same parking spot for over a year.
◦ A commercial truck was present containing what he believed to be hazardous pool chemicals.
• MCIII’s Initial Response: The association acknowledged a “history” with the parking situation and stated the Board would review the rules for revision. MCIII noted it would investigate the red truck and also accused the Petitioner of regularly parking his own truck in a fire lane.
• July 16, 2018: The Petitioner sent a follow-up notification regarding the continuing violations.
• MCIII’s Second Response: The association informed the Petitioner that the issue would be on the agenda for the July 24, 2018 Board meeting and again reminded him of his own alleged fire lane parking violations.
• July 23, 2018: MCIII sent a notice to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck, informing them of the rules violation.
• July 30, 2018: The Petitioner filed his formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• October 23, 2018: Days before the hearing, the MCIII Board adopted new parking rules.
Petitioner’s Case and Evidence (John W. Gray)
The Petitioner built a detailed case demonstrating a pattern of non-enforcement by MCIII. The ALJ found his evidence to be “credible and convincing.”
• Specific Violations Alleged:
◦ Excess Vehicles: Multiple units possessed more than the two-vehicle limit.
◦ Garage Misuse: Residents with multiple cars were using common area parking spaces while their garages were used for storage.
◦ Inoperable Vehicle: A red truck remained parked and inoperable in one space for over a year, in direct violation of CC&R 4.14.
• Evidence Presented at Hearing:
◦ Photographs: A series of exhibits (6 through 16) contained photographs documenting the various offending vehicles.
◦ Private Investigation: The Petitioner hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to link specific vehicles to their owners and units (Exhibit 17).
◦ Quantitative Analysis: The Petitioner calculated that just 12 units were occupying 27 common area parking spaces, leaving very few spaces for the remaining 21 units.
◦ Written Correspondence: Copies of his complaints to MCIII were submitted, demonstrating that the association was put on notice of the violations.
Respondent’s Defense and Actions (MCIII)
The association’s defense centered on the difficulty of enforcement and subsequent actions taken after the Petitioner’s complaint.
• Core Arguments:
◦ Unenforceability: MCIII asserted that it was “almost impossible” to enforce the existing restrictive rules, as it would require constant 24/7 monitoring.
◦ Lack of Prior Complaints: The Respondent claimed it had received no complaints about parking prior to Mr. Gray’s.
◦ Issue is Moot: MCIII argued that its recent revision of the parking rules rendered the Petitioner’s complaint moot.
• Actions Taken by MCIII:
◦ Rule Revision: At the October 23, 2018 Board meeting, MCIII adopted new rules that eliminated the two-car limit but maintained the requirement for residents to use their garage first before occupying common area spaces. The ban on inoperable and commercial vehicles was also kept.
◦ Enforcement Against Petitioner: The Respondent noted that it had previously taken enforcement action by having the Petitioner’s own truck towed for parking in a fire lane.
◦ Notice Regarding Red Truck: MCIII provided evidence that it sent one letter on July 23, 2018, regarding the inoperable red truck.
◦ Towing Contract: The association stated it had recently contracted with Shaffer Towing for towing services.
◦ Community Manager Patrols: The “Community Manager,” Andrea Lacombe, testified that she drove through the property approximately twice a month looking for violations.
Governing Rules and CC&Rs
The decision rested on the specific language of the association’s governing documents in effect at the time of the complaint.
Document
Article/Rule
Provision
Rules & Regulations (Jan 2002)
Rule 3
Limits owners to two cars per unit and “assigns” the garage as parking for the first car.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.12
Prohibits the parking of commercial vehicles, RVs, boats, trailers, etc., on any part of the condominium outside of an enclosed garage.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.13
States that no parking space may be used for storage or any purpose other than parking of Family Vehicles. Grants the Board the right to assign spaces.
CC&Rs (Jan 1999)
Art. 4.14
Prohibits the storage of inoperable vehicles on any portion of the condominium other than within enclosed garages. Grants the Board the right to have violating vehicles towed.
Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ sided with the Petitioner, finding that MCIII had failed in its duty to enforce its own rules.
• Rejection of MCIII’s Defense: The ALJ determined that MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable was “not a viable defense.” The decision explicitly stated that the association could have used provisions for notification and fines to enforce the rules but failed to do so.
• Evidence of Non-Enforcement: The hearing record demonstrated a clear failure by MCIII to act.
◦ The evidence was “undisputed” that the inoperable red truck had been in violation for over a year, yet MCIII only sent a single notice long after the complaint was filed.
◦ The ALJ noted that clearing even that one space would have improved the “tenuous parking situation.”
◦ The record contained no indication that MCIII had ever enforced the rules regarding the number of vehicles or the mandatory use of garages for primary parking.
◦ The only enforcement action cited, other than the single letter, was the towing of the Petitioner’s own vehicle.
• Conclusion of Law: Based on the evidence, the ALJ concluded that “MCIII failed to enforce CC&Rs and rules and regulations regarding parking.” The revision of the rules just before the hearing did not negate the past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the Petitioner’s complaint.
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued a binding order with two key provisions:
1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, John W. Gray, is officially deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
2. Reimbursement: MCIII is ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.
Study Guide – 19F-H1918004-REL
Study Guide: Gray v. Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 19F-H1918004-REL, concerning a dispute over the enforcement of parking regulations. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based entirely on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What were the two main issues John W. Gray alleged in his petition filed with the Department on July 30, 2018?
3. According to the MCIII rules in effect at the time of the complaint, what were the primary restrictions placed on vehicle ownership and parking for residents?
4. Describe the key evidence the Petitioner presented at the hearing to substantiate his claims of widespread parking rule violations.
5. What was the Respondent’s primary defense for not enforcing the more restrictive parking rules that were in place at the time of the complaint?
6. How did the new rules, adopted on October 23, 2018, change the association’s approach to vehicle limits and garage use?
7. Explain the significance of the inoperable red truck to the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision.
8. What was the required standard of proof for the Petitioner in this case, and did the judge determine that he met it?
9. Prior to the hearing, what specific enforcement actions did MCIII take in response to the Petitioner’s documented complaints?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge, and what was MCIII required to do?
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John W. Gray, the Petitioner, who was a condominium owner in the MCIII development, and the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association (MCIII), the Respondent and the governing unit owners’ association for the development. Mr. Gray initiated the legal action against the association for allegedly failing to enforce its rules.
2. The Petitioner’s two main allegations were that the association had failed to provide him with a copy of its management company agreement and that it refused to enforce its parking rules. He specifically alleged multiple units were violating rules regarding the number of vehicles and the presence of inoperable vehicles.
3. The rules in effect at the time of the complaint limited owners to a maximum of two cars per unit. The rules also “assigned” the garage as the designated parking spot for the first car and explicitly banned “inoperable” vehicles from the property.
4. The Petitioner presented credible evidence including photographs from multiple exhibits (6-16) showing numerous violations. He also testified based on his personal observations, identified specific units with three cars using garages for storage, and provided vehicle registration information obtained through a private investigator.
5. The Respondent defended its lack of enforcement by arguing that the existing restrictive rules were “almost impossible” to enforce without constant surveillance. The Community Manager also testified that she had received no prior complaints about parking from other residents.
6. The new rules, adopted October 23, 2018, removed the limit on the number of cars permitted per unit. However, they instituted a new requirement that owners must park their vehicles in their respective garages before using any common area parking spaces.
7. The inoperable red truck was significant because it had been parked in the same spot for over a year, serving as undisputed evidence of a long-standing violation. The judge noted that MCIII’s single letter to the owner, sent long after the violation began, demonstrated a clear failure to enforce its rules regarding inoperable vehicles.
8. The required standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the Petitioner had to convince the judge that his contentions were more probably true than not. The judge concluded that the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof.
9. MCIII’s primary enforcement actions were to place the issue on its July 24, 2018, Board meeting agenda and to send one letter on July 23, 2018, to the owner of the unit associated with the inoperable red truck. The record also shows MCIII had previously enforced parking rules against the Petitioner himself by having his truck towed from a fire lane.
10. The judge ordered that the Petitioner be deemed the prevailing party in the case. The judge further ordered that MCIII must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the order.
Essay Questions
The following questions are designed to promote deeper analysis of the case. Formulate comprehensive responses based on the facts and arguments presented in the source document.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s argument that revising the parking rules made the Petitioner’s complaints “moot.” Based on the judge’s decision, evaluate the strength of this defense and explain why it was ultimately unsuccessful.
2. Discuss the concept of a condominium association’s duty to enforce its own rules and CC&Rs, using the specific examples of MCIII’s actions (and inactions) from the case. How did the association’s selective enforcement—such as towing the Petitioner’s vehicle but not others—factor into the case’s context?
3. Evaluate the evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent. Which party presented a more compelling case, and why? Support your analysis by citing specific exhibits, testimony, and documented observations mentioned in the decision.
4. Explore the timeline of events from the Petitioner’s first complaint in May 2018 to the judge’s decision in November 2018. How does this timeline illustrate the dispute’s escalation and the association’s response strategy?
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that MCIII’s argument of the rules being “unenforceable” was not a viable defense. What practical enforcement actions, short of 24/7 surveillance, could the association have taken according to the information provided in the hearing record?
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over the evidentiary hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision. In this case, it was Kay Abramsohn.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a trial to produce evidence that proves the claims they have made against the other party.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community like a condominium. MCIII’s CC&Rs were effective January 12, 1999.
Common Elements
Also referred to as the “Common Area,” these are parts of the condominium property, such as the parking lot, available for use by all unit owners.
Community Manager
An employee of the management company (Curtiss Management) hired by the association to handle its affairs. In this case, the manager was Andrea Lacombe.
Evidentiary Hearing
A formal legal proceeding where parties present evidence (exhibits) and testimony to prove their case before a judge or hearing officer.
Inoperable Vehicle
A vehicle that cannot be operated. Both the old and new MCIII rules, as well as CC&R 4.14, prohibited storing such vehicles on the property outside of an enclosed garage.
A term used to describe an issue that is no longer in dispute or of practical significance. MCIII argued that its new rules made the Petitioner’s issues moot.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action or files a petition. In this case, John W. Gray.
A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. The plat for MCIII showed there were 36 parking spaces in the lot.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case. It is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true; it is a superior evidentiary weight that inclines an impartial mind to one side.
Prevailing Party
The party who is found to have won the legal case. The judge deemed the Petitioner to be the prevailing party.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1918004-REL
He Fought the HOA Over Parking—and Won. Here Are the 5 Surprising Lessons from His Battle.
Introduction: The Familiar Frustration of HOA Parking
For anyone living in a condo, townhome, or planned community, the daily dance of parking is a familiar routine. It’s a world of limited spaces, confusing rules about guest parking, and the constant fear of a warning sticker or, worse, a tow truck. This shared frustration often simmers just below the surface of community life, where the rules established by a Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel arbitrary and inconsistently applied.
This post breaks down a real-life administrative court case where one resident, John W. Gray, took on his Condominium Association for its complete failure to enforce its own parking rules. Without getting lost in legal jargon, we will explore how a single, determined individual was able to hold his HOA accountable. This wasn’t just a simple disagreement; it was a formal challenge that went before a judge.
The official court decision in Gray’s favor offers powerful and surprising lessons for any homeowner, renter, or board member. This David vs. Goliath story is more than just a victory for one resident; it’s a practical guide filled with takeaways on how to effectively address community disputes and understand the true responsibilities of an HOA.
1. The ‘It’s Too Hard to Enforce’ Excuse Doesn’t Work
The association (MCIII) built its primary defense on the argument that its own parking rules were “almost impossible” to enforce. They claimed that the two-car limit per unit was too restrictive and would require constant, 24/7 monitoring and picture-taking, which was simply not feasible.
The administrative law judge completely rejected this excuse. The core lesson from the ruling is that an HOA cannot simply choose to ignore its governing documents because enforcement is inconvenient. The judge pointed out that the association had simpler tools at its disposal, such as issuing violation notices and levying fines as outlined in their rules, but failed to take even these basic steps.
The judge’s finding offers a powerful reality check for any board that feels overwhelmed by its own regulations:
MCIII’s argument that the rules were unenforceable is not a viable defense in this instance, as the rules contained many provisions that could have been noticed to the units regarding parking rules and their enforcement.
2. Meticulous Data is Your Strongest Weapon
John W. Gray didn’t just complain; he built an airtight case. His methodical approach to proving the association’s failure was a key factor in his success. The court record details the specific actions he took:
• He conducted personal observations and took photographs of the offending vehicles.
• He identified the specific units that had too many cars and were using their garages for storage instead of parking.
• He hired a private investigator to obtain vehicle registration information to definitively link cars to specific units.
The judge found this evidence to be “credible and convincing.” Gray’s detailed documentation painted a clear picture of the problem’s scale. According to his calculations, just 12 of the community’s 33 units were monopolizing 27 parking spaces, leaving very few for the remaining 21 units. This takeaway is clear: a well-documented, fact-based complaint is infinitely more powerful than anecdotal grievances.
3. Changing the Rules Doesn’t Erase Past Failures
In response to Gray’s formal complaint, the HOA Board took a strategic but ultimately unsuccessful step. Just days before the scheduled hearing, the Board reviewed and adopted a new set of parking rules. These new rules conveniently removed the two-car limit that the association had claimed was unenforceable.
The association then argued that this rule change made the petitioner’s original complaint “moot,” or irrelevant. They essentially claimed that since the rule he was complaining about no longer existed, there was no longer a case to be heard.
This strategy failed because the judge ruled on the HOA’s past failure to enforce the rules that were in effect at the time of the complaint. This is a crucial lesson in accountability. An organization cannot escape responsibility for its prior negligence simply by changing the rules at the last minute. The failure to act had already occurred, and the consequences of that failure were the basis of the lawsuit.
4. Ignoring Small Violations Can Create a Major Crisis
Nowhere was the HOA’s failure more obvious than in the case of a single inoperable red truck. The vehicle had been parked in the same spot for over a year, in clear violation of the rules prohibiting the storage of inoperable vehicles on the property.
Despite this long-term, visible violation, the hearing record shows the HOA’s response was both delayed and minimal. They sent only one letter to the unit owner about the truck, and this action was taken “long after” the violation began and only after Gray had formally complained.
The judge’s observation on this single vehicle underscores the wider impact of the board’s inaction:
Even the clearing of just one more space would have made the tenuous parking situation better.
The red truck was a symptom of a much larger disease. The failure to address one obvious, easily-proven violation demonstrated a systemic failure to manage the community’s shared resources, which directly contributed to the parking crisis and the disproportionate use of spaces by a few residents.
5. Enforcement Must Be Fair, Not Just Convenient
Perhaps the most telling detail from the hearing record was the apparent double standard in the HOA’s enforcement actions. The record explicitly mentions only two enforcement actions the association had taken regarding parking:
• Towing the petitioner’s own truck on one occasion for parking in a fire lane.
• Sending a single, very late letter about the red truck that had been parked for over a year.
The hearing record is devastatingly clear on this point. The only enforcement actions the board could point to were punitive or reactive: towing the truck of the very resident demanding action, and sending a single, belated letter about a year-old violation after he had filed a formal complaint. This wasn’t just inconsistent enforcement; it was a textbook case of selective enforcement that targeted the complainant while ignoring the systemic problem.
For an HOA’s authority to be respected and legally defensible, its rules must be applied fairly and consistently to all residents, not just when it is convenient or aimed at a perceived nuisance.
Conclusion: A Win for the Power of One
The judge’s order was a decisive victory for resident rights, affirming that an HOA’s duty to enforce its own rules is not optional. While the association was ordered to repay his $500 filing fee, the real prize was the validation that one resident, armed with credible evidence, can successfully hold a board accountable to the entire community. This case proves that meticulous documentation, persistence, and a refusal to be ignored are the great equalizers in community governance. It makes you wonder: what ‘unenforceable’ rules in your community are just waiting for a champion to demand they be followed?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John W. Gray(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Austin Baillio(attorney) Maxwell & Morgan PC Represented Mesa Coronado III Condominium Association
Andrea Lacombe(community manager) Curtiss Management Testified for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Felicia Del Sol(administrative staff) Transmitted decision electronically
