Category Archives: HOA Cases

Mary J Bartle vs. Saguaro West Owner’s Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919059-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Mary J Bartle Counsel —
Respondent Saguaro West Owner's Association Counsel Nicole Payne, Esq.

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge affirmed the original conclusion and dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) regarding the contested $49,000.50 fund transaction.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set out in Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d).

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of Treasurer duties regarding fund transactions

The petitioner alleged the Association violated Bylaws Article VIII, section 8(d) by withdrawing and redepositing $49,000.50 from the operating account. The ALJ concluded that Petitioner failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that these transactions violated the specific duties of the treasurer set forth in that section.

Orders: Petitioner Mary J. Bartle’s petition is dismissed and Respondent is deemed the prevailing party in this matter.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Bylaws, Treasurer Duties, Dismissal, Burden of Proof, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (10th ed. 2014)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section and title 12, chapter 7, article 6
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Decision Documents

19F-H1919059-REL Decision – 767041.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:17:44 (94.6 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Mary J Bartle (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf and testified at the rehearing

Respondent Side

  • Nicole Payne (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Counsel for Respondent Saguaro West Owner's Association
  • Edith Rudder (attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, PLC
    Recipient of Transmittal

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Transmittal

Thomas J Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-30
Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel —
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's case, finding that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 or improperly adopted its Flag Display Rule.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808 and failed to prove that the HOA's Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with or improperly adopted under the CC&Rs.

Key Issues & Findings

Flags and Sings

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a petition arguing that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1808 after being notified he violated Association Rules by displaying a “Trump 2020” flag. He argued the HOA's Flag Display Rule was invalid because the CC&Rs only defined SIGNS (DCC&R 3.14) and had no reference to Flags whatsoever, thus the rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

Orders: Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed to be the prevailing party.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 12-904(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Flag Display, Political Sign, CC&Rs, Rules & Regulations
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • 4 United States Code sections 4 through 10

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919071-REL-RHG Decision – 767071.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:48 (69.0 KB)

19F-H1919071-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1919071-REL/741807.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:51 (78.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG


Administrative Hearing Brief: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from two administrative law judge decisions concerning a dispute between homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA). The core conflict arose from Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s display of a “Trump 2020” flag, which the HOA deemed a violation of its “Flag Display Rule.” Mr. Van Dan Elzen petitioned the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging the HOA’s rule was invalid and violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1808.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately dismissed the petition, both in the initial hearing and upon a subsequent rehearing. The central findings were that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that the HOA’s rule was inconsistent with its governing documents (CC&Rs) or that the HOA had violated the state statute. The HOA’s authority to create rules restricting the use of lots, granted by its CC&Rs, was upheld. The final decision affirmed the HOA as the prevailing party, concluding a legal challenge that centered on the distinction between statutorily protected flags and political displays.

——————————————————————————–

I. Case Background and Chronology

The dispute was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings, with Velva Moses-Thompson serving as the Administrative Law Judge. The case involved a petition filed by a homeowner against his HOA regarding flag display regulations.

Parties Involved:

• Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (appeared on his own behalf)

• Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (represented by Augustus H. Shaw IV, Esq.)

Key Events:

Date (2019-2020)

May 21, 2019

Carter Ranch HOA notifies Mr. Van Dan Elzen that his “Trump 2020” flag violates association rules.

June 14, 2019

Mr. Van Dan Elzen files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1808.

July 16, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Hearing.

Sept. 9, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

Sept. 30, 2019

The ALJ issues a decision dismissing the petitioner’s case.

Nov. 18, 2019

The Department of Real Estate issues an order for a rehearing.

Jan. 10, 2020

A rehearing is held.

Jan. 30, 2020

The ALJ issues a final decision on the rehearing, again dismissing the petition.

II. The Core Dispute and Competing Arguments

The central issue was the legality of the Carter Ranch HOA’s rule prohibiting Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s “Trump 2020” flag and the scope of the HOA’s authority to regulate such displays.

A. The Petitioner’s Position (Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen)

Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s challenge was based on the premise that the HOA’s “Flag Display Rule” was invalid because it was not explicitly supported by the language of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

• Primary Argument: He asserted that because the CC&Rs do not specifically contain the word “flag,” any rule created by the HOA Board regulating flags is inconsistent with the CC&Rs and therefore unenforceable.

• Petition Allegation: In his formal petition, Mr. Van Dan Elzen stated the violation was “based on 33-1808 Flags and Sings [sic].” He further argued that the HOA’s rule referenced section 3.14 of the CC&Rs, which he claimed “ONLY defines SIGNS and has no reference to Flags whatsoever.”

B. The Respondent’s Position (Carter Ranch HOA)

The Carter Ranch HOA maintained that its “Flag Display Rule” was a valid exercise of the authority granted to its Board by the community’s governing documents.

• Basis of Authority: The HOA contended that it was authorized to adopt the rule under Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs.

• Defense of the Rule: The HOA argued that the Flag Display Rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs and was properly adopted.

• Argument for Dismissal: Carter Ranch asserted that the petition should be dismissed because the petitioner had not successfully alleged a violation of any statute or provision within the governing documents.

III. Governing Documents and Legal Framework

The case was decided based on an interpretation of both state law and the HOA’s internal governing documents.

A. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Rules

• The “Flag Display Rule”: The association’s rules and regulations explicitly prohibit the flying of any flag other than the following:

◦ The American Flag

◦ Official or replica flags of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard

◦ A POW/MIA flag

◦ The Arizona State flag

◦ An Arizona Indian Nations flag

◦ The Gadsden Flag

• CC&Rs, Article V, Section 5.3: This section grants the HOA Board broad rule-making authority. The text states, in relevant part:

B. Arizona Revised Statutes § 33-1808

This state statute places specific limitations on an HOA’s ability to prohibit certain flags and political signs.

• Section A – Protected Flags: The statute mandates that an HOA “shall not prohibit the outdoor display” of the exact list of flags enumerated in the Carter Ranch “Flag Display Rule” (American, military, POW/MIA, state, etc.). A “Trump 2020” flag is not included in this list of protected flags.

• Section C – Political Signs: The statute addresses political signs separately from flags.

◦ Definition: A “political sign” is defined as “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election.”

◦ Regulation: An HOA may prohibit political signs “earlier than seventy-one days before the day of an election and later than three days after an election day.”

◦ Size/Number: An HOA may regulate the size and number of signs, provided the rules are no more restrictive than local ordinances. If no local ordinance exists, an HOA cannot limit the number of signs but can cap the maximum aggregate dimensions at nine square feet.

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions and Final Order

Across both the initial hearing and the rehearing, the ALJ’s conclusions of law consistently favored the respondent HOA. The petitioner failed to meet the required legal standard to prove his case.

A. Burden of Proof

The ALJ established that the petitioner, Mr. Van Dan Elzen, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the HOA had violated A.R.S. § 33-1808. A preponderance of the evidence means showing the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

B. Key Conclusions of Law

• Validity of the “Flag Display Rule”: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner “had not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs.” In the rehearing, this was stated as the petitioner having “not established that the Flag Display Rule was inconsistent with the CC&Rs.”

• No Statutory Violation: A critical conclusion in both decisions was that the petitioner “has not alleged that Carter Ranch violated A.R.S. § 33-1808.”

• Final Judgment: Based on these conclusions, the ALJ determined that Mr. Van Dan Elzen’s petition should be dismissed and that the Carter Ranch HOA should be deemed the prevailing party.

C. Final Order

• Initial Decision (September 30, 2019): “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition is dismissed.”

• Rehearing Decision (January 30, 2020): The order to dismiss was reaffirmed. The final notice specified that this order was binding on the parties and that any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case involving Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, based on the legal decisions from September 2019 and January 2020. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was the official case number?

2. What specific action by the Petitioner prompted the initial notice of violation from the homeowners association?

3. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument against the validity of the Association’s “Flag Display Rule”?

4. According to the Carter Ranch CC&Rs, what authority does the Board have to create rules and regulations?

5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence,” and which party had the burden of meeting this standard?

6. List at least five of the flags that are explicitly permitted for display under the Carter Ranch “Flag Display Rule.”

7. Summarize the key provisions of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808(C) regarding “political signs.”

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule?

9. What was the final outcome of the petition after both the initial hearing on September 9, 2019, and the rehearing on January 10, 2020?

10. Who was the Administrative Law Judge that presided over both hearings?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, and the Respondent was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. The case number was 19F-H1919071-REL, with the rehearing designated as 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG.

2. The case was prompted by Mr. Van Dan Elzen displaying a “Trump 2020” flag on a flagpole in his front yard. On or about May 21, 2019, Carter Ranch notified him that this action violated the Association’s rules.

3. The Petitioner argued that the Flag Display Rule was invalid because the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) do not specifically mention the word “flag.” He asserted that the Association’s rules and regulations can only be based on topics explicitly mentioned in the CC&Rs.

4. Article V, Section 5.3 of the CC&Rs grants the Board the authority to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to the management of common areas, minimum maintenance standards for lots, the health, safety, or welfare of residents, and restrictions on the use of lots.

5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. The Petitioner, Mr. Van Dan Elzen, bore the burden of proving his case by this standard.

6. The Carter Ranch Flag Display Rule permits the display of the American Flag, an official replica of a U.S. military flag (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), a POW/MIA flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, the Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) states that an association cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but it can prohibit them earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election. An association may also regulate the size and number of signs to be no more restrictive than local ordinances, or to a maximum aggregate of nine square feet if no such ordinances exist.

8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner had not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs. The judge found that the rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

9. In both instances, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

10. The Administrative Law Judge for both the initial hearing and the rehearing was Velva Moses-Thompson.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy. Why did his argument that the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag” ultimately fail to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard?

2. Explain the relationship between the Carter Ranch CC&Rs, the Association’s Rules and Regulations, and Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808. How do these documents interact to govern what a resident can display on their property?

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard apply to Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition, and why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude he did not meet it?

4. Could the “Trump 2020” flag have been considered a “political sign” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1808(C)? Based on the text, evaluate the potential arguments for and against this classification and how the statute’s time restrictions on display might have been relevant.

5. Examine the authority granted to the Carter Ranch HOA Board by Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. How did the HOA use this section to justify its Flag Display Rule, and how did the Administrative Law Judge evaluate this justification?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 33-1808

The Arizona Revised Statute that, notwithstanding community documents, protects the right of homeowners to display certain flags (American, military, POW/MIA, state, etc.) and regulates how an association may restrict political signs.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to provide evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or homeowners association. In this case, Article V, Section 5.3 of the CC&Rs gave the Board authority to create rules.

Flag Display Rule

The specific Carter Ranch Association rule prohibiting any flag other than the American Flag, specific military flags, POW/MIA flag, Arizona Indian National flag, Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the petitioner was Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Political Sign

As defined in A.R.S. § 33-1808(C), “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing the recall of a public officer or supporting or opposing the circulation of a petition for a ballot measure, question or proposition or the recall of a public officer.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. Defined in the decision as “[e]vidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case. In this matter, a rehearing was held on January 10, 2020, after the initial decision was made on September 30, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case involving Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, based on the legal decisions from September 2019 and January 2020. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided case documents.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was the official case number?

2. What specific action by the Petitioner prompted the initial notice of violation from the homeowners association?

3. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument against the validity of the Association’s “Flag Display Rule”?

4. According to the Carter Ranch CC&Rs, what authority does the Board have to create rules and regulations?

5. What is the “preponderance of the evidence,” and which party had the burden of meeting this standard?

6. List at least five of the flags that are explicitly permitted for display under the Carter Ranch “Flag Display Rule.”

7. Summarize the key provisions of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808(C) regarding “political signs.”

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule?

9. What was the final outcome of the petition after both the initial hearing on September 9, 2019, and the rehearing on January 10, 2020?

10. Who was the Administrative Law Judge that presided over both hearings?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, and the Respondent was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. The case number was 19F-H1919071-REL, with the rehearing designated as 19F-H1919071-REL-RHG.

2. The case was prompted by Mr. Van Dan Elzen displaying a “Trump 2020” flag on a flagpole in his front yard. On or about May 21, 2019, Carter Ranch notified him that this action violated the Association’s rules.

3. The Petitioner argued that the Flag Display Rule was invalid because the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) do not specifically mention the word “flag.” He asserted that the Association’s rules and regulations can only be based on topics explicitly mentioned in the CC&Rs.

4. Article V, Section 5.3 of the CC&Rs grants the Board the authority to adopt, amend, and repeal rules pertaining to the management of common areas, minimum maintenance standards for lots, the health, safety, or welfare of residents, and restrictions on the use of lots.

5. “Preponderance of the evidence” is evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. The Petitioner, Mr. Van Dan Elzen, bore the burden of proving his case by this standard.

6. The Carter Ranch Flag Display Rule permits the display of the American Flag, an official replica of a U.S. military flag (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard), a POW/MIA flag, an Arizona Indian nations flag, the Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

7. A.R.S. § 33-1808(C) states that an association cannot prohibit the display of political signs on a member’s property, but it can prohibit them earlier than 71 days before an election and later than 3 days after an election. An association may also regulate the size and number of signs to be no more restrictive than local ordinances, or to a maximum aggregate of nine square feet if no such ordinances exist.

8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner had not established that the Association improperly adopted the Flag Display Rule under its CC&Rs. The judge found that the rule was not inconsistent with the CC&Rs.

9. In both instances, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The Respondent, Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, was deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

10. The Administrative Law Judge for both the initial hearing and the rehearing was Velva Moses-Thompson.

——————————————————————————–

Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy. Why did his argument that the CC&Rs do not explicitly mention the word “flag” ultimately fail to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard?

2. Explain the relationship between the Carter Ranch CC&Rs, the Association’s Rules and Regulations, and Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1808. How do these documents interact to govern what a resident can display on their property?

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” in this case. How did the “preponderance of the evidence” standard apply to Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen’s petition, and why did the Administrative Law Judge conclude he did not meet it?

4. Could the “Trump 2020” flag have been considered a “political sign” under the definition provided in A.R.S. § 33-1808(C)? Based on the text, evaluate the potential arguments for and against this classification and how the statute’s time restrictions on display might have been relevant.

5. Examine the authority granted to the Carter Ranch HOA Board by Article V, Section 5.3 of its CC&Rs. How did the HOA use this section to justify its Flag Display Rule, and how did the Administrative Law Judge evaluate this justification?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judge who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Velva Moses-Thompson.

A.R.S. § 33-1808

The Arizona Revised Statute that, notwithstanding community documents, protects the right of homeowners to display certain flags (American, military, POW/MIA, state, etc.) and regulates how an association may restrict political signs.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to provide evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden of proof.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set up the guidelines for a planned community or homeowners association. In this case, Article V, Section 5.3 of the CC&Rs gave the Board authority to create rules.

Flag Display Rule

The specific Carter Ranch Association rule prohibiting any flag other than the American Flag, specific military flags, POW/MIA flag, Arizona Indian National flag, Arizona State flag, and the Gadsden Flag.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the petitioner was Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Political Sign

As defined in A.R.S. § 33-1808(C), “a sign that attempts to influence the outcome of an election, including supporting or opposing the recall of a public officer or supporting or opposing the circulation of a petition for a ballot measure, question or proposition or the recall of a public officer.”

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. Defined in the decision as “[e]vidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case. In this matter, a rehearing was held on January 10, 2020, after the initial decision was made on September 30, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Augustus H. Shaw IV (HOA attorney)
    Shaw & Lines LLC
  • Dustin Snow (property manager)
    SNOW PROPERTY SERVICES

Neutral Parties

  • Velva Moses-Thompson (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Robert L Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019018-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-29
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome none
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Robert L Greco Counsel —
Respondent Bellasera Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Bellasera Community Association, Inc. did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the homeowner received constructive notice of the violation and fine structure, satisfying statutory requirements. The petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proving Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), as the evidence showed Petitioner received sufficient constructive notice of the alleged violation and had an opportunity to be heard or appeal.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated statutory requirements regarding notice and imposition of monetary penalties/late fees, resulting in suspension of privileges.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by imposing fines and suspending gate/clubhouse access without providing adequate (actual) notice of the violation and hearing opportunity, and by improperly imposing late fees. The ALJ found the HOA provided constructive notice, satisfying the statute, and was entitled to impose cumulative fines for the ongoing violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1220
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1090

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fines, Constructive notice, Statutory violation, Access suspension, Maintenance violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019018-REL Decision – 766844.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:34 (133.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019018-REL


Briefing Document: Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Robert L. Greco (Petitioner) versus the Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Respondent), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Homeowners Association (HOA).

The core dispute originated from a 2013 violation notice regarding a faded garage door. The Petitioner claimed he did not receive the initial notices and only became aware of the issue upon receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney. Despite subsequently painting the door, an outstanding balance of $750 in fines remained on his account. For six years, the Petitioner paid his quarterly dues but ignored the outstanding fine balance. In June 2019, after failed settlement negotiations, the HOA deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and clubhouse access, prompting him to file the formal dispute.

The judge’s decision rested on two key legal conclusions. First, the court rejected the Petitioner’s argument that “actual notice” was required for the fines to be valid. It ruled that the multiple notices mailed to the Petitioner’s residence constituted sufficient “constructive notice” under Arizona law, providing both notification of the violation and an opportunity to be heard. Second, the court determined that the $750 charge was not an improper late fee but rather three separate, legitimate fines of $250 each, levied for an ongoing, uncorrected violation as per the HOA’s enforcement policy.

Case Overview

Case Name

Robert L Greco, Petitioner, vs. Bellasera Community Association, Inc., Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2019018-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

January 9, 2020

Decision Date

January 29, 2020

Petitioner’s Core Allegation

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by imposing penalties and revoking privileges without providing proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Core Factual Issue

The denial of automatic gate and clubhouse access to the Petitioner on July 1, 2019, due to unpaid fines from 2013.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict between Mr. Greco and the Bellasera Community Association unfolded over six years, escalating from a minor maintenance issue to a formal legal dispute and revocation of privileges.

Initial Violation and Fines (2013)

Details

Feb. 5, 2013

Courtesy Notice

Respondent sent a notice to Petitioner’s address stating his garage door was faded and needed to be repainted, in violation of the Design Guidelines.

Mar. 14, 2013

Final Notice & First Fine

A follow-up notice was sent, stating a $250 fine was posted to Petitioner’s account. It warned that an additional $250 fine would be assessed automatically every 14 days if the violation remained uncorrected.

Apr. 2, 2013

Notice of Remedy & Second Fine

A third notice was sent, posting another $250 fine. This letter explicitly warned that the HOA had the “ability to suspend privileges for use of the Recreational Facilities” and informed the Petitioner of his right to appeal within 14 days.

May 7, 2013

Fourth Notice & Third Fine

A fourth notice was sent, posting another $250 fine to the account. It again noted the right to appeal the fine.

Jun. 5, 2013

Letter from HOA Counsel

Attorney Kelly Oetinger sent a letter demanding the garage door be repainted within 15 days. The letter explicitly stated, “If you do not repaint… the Association may disable the transponder you use to enter the community and may disable the fobs you use for the clubhouse.”

Petitioner’s Response and Aftermath (2013)

• July 4, 2013: Petitioner repainted the garage door.

• July 5, 2013: Petitioner sent a letter to the HOA stating the attorney’s letter was his “initial alert of the garage door condition.” He explained his delay by stating, “To effectively manage my workload, I dispose of unsolicited mail… In the future, I will exercise greater caution in disposing of unsolicited mail.”

• July 5, 2013: The HOA sent a letter acknowledging the repainting and offered to settle the $900 in fines for a payment of $500. The letter reiterated the threat to deactivate gate openers and fobs.

• July 17, 2013: The HOA sent a follow-up letter correcting an internal accounting error. The total fines were $750, not $900. A new settlement offer was made: pay $375, and the remaining $375 would be waived.

Period of Inaction (2013 – 2019)

From 2013 to 2019, the Petitioner received quarterly statements from the HOA indicating a $750 balance in addition to current assessments. Each quarter, the Petitioner would physically cross out the $750 balance and pay only the current assessment amount.

Escalation and Revocation of Privileges (2019)

• June 2019: Dennis Carson, a friend of the Petitioner serving on the HOA Board of Directors, informed him that his name was on a penalty list and the Board planned to deactivate his security gate and clubhouse access.

• June 2019: Settlement negotiations failed. The Petitioner offered $100; the Board countered with $250. The Petitioner then offered $251 ($250 for the fine and $1 to rent the clubhouse), which the Board declined.

• July 1, 2019: The Respondent deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and access to the clubhouse.

• October 11, 2019: The Petitioner filed the Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition, initiating the legal proceedings.

Key Arguments and Legal Findings

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of “notice” as required by state law and the legitimacy of the fines imposed by the HOA.

Petitioner’s Position

1. Lack of Proper Notice: The Petitioner argued that he had not received “actual notice” of the violation or the impending fines until the letter from the HOA’s counsel on June 5, 2013. He asserted that because he acted promptly after receiving that letter, the fines were unjust. His argument implied that warnings in mail he did not personally read could not be held against him.

2. Improper Fines: The Petitioner alleged that the additional $500 in charges on the original $250 fine constituted improper late fees.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The Judge systematically refuted the Petitioner’s arguments, concluding that the HOA acted within its rights and in accordance with the law.

1. On the Matter of Notice:

• The governing statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), requires “notice and an opportunity to be heard” before imposing penalties.

• The Judge found no legal authority requiring this to be “actual notice.” To accept this argument would create an unworkable standard where a homeowner could “avoid receiving ‘actual notice’ by simply refusing to sign for a certified mailing.”

• The decision established that the Petitioner received constructive notice through the “multiple mailings that were presumably delivered to his residential address.”

• The notices also informed the Petitioner how to appeal the matter, thereby satisfying the requirement for an “opportunity to be heard.”

• Conclusion: “Accordingly, Petitioner was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).”

2. On the Matter of Fines:

• The Judge differentiated between late fees and fines for an ongoing violation.

• The notices sent by the Respondent “clearly stated that an ongoing failure to remedy the violation would result in additional fines every 14 days.”

• The violation persisted from before March 14, 2013 (first fine) until July 5, 2013 (when the door was confirmed painted).

• Conclusion: The Respondent was entitled to impose three separate fines for the “ongoing condition of the garage door,” making the total of $750 legitimate.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis of the evidence and law, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

• Final Ruling: “This Tribunal concludes that Respondent did not violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).”

• Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

• Binding Nature: The order, dated January 29, 2020, is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2019018-REL


Study Guide: Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Robert L. Greco (Petitioner) versus Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 20F-H2019018-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz to test your knowledge, an answer key for review, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was the Petitioner’s central complaint that initiated the legal action?

2. What specific violation of the community’s rules was the Petitioner initially accused of, and which governing documents were cited as being violated?

3. Describe the timeline of notices and fines issued by the Respondent between February and May 2013.

4. What was the Petitioner’s explanation for not responding to the initial violation notices from the Respondent before receiving a letter from the association’s attorney?

5. What actions did the Respondent take in or around June 2019 that led the Petitioner to file his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

6. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument regarding the “notice” required by the Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge differentiate between “actual notice” and “constructive notice” in her decision?

8. Why did the judge ultimately conclude that the Respondent had provided the Petitioner with adequate “notice and an opportunity to be heard”?

9. Explain the Petitioner’s allegation about improper late fees and the reason the judge rejected this argument.

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was homeowner Robert L. Greco, and the Respondent was the Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (the HOA). Greco’s central complaint, filed on October 11, 2019, was that the HOA had denied him automatic gate access and use of clubhouse facilities on July 1, 2019, despite his being a long-term resident with timely payment of all quarterly dues.

2. The Petitioner was accused of having a faded garage door that needed to be repainted. The violation was cited as being contrary to the CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions), specifically Article V, Section 5.2, and the community’s Design Guidelines, specifically Article III, Section J.

3. The Respondent sent an initial “Courtesy Notice” on February 5, 2013. This was followed by a “Final Notice” with a $250 fine on March 14, a “Notice of Remedy” with another $250 fine on April 2, and a “Fourth Notice of Non-Compliance” with another $250 fine on May 7, 2013.

4. The Petitioner claimed that the attorney’s letter, received around June 5, 2013, was his “initial alert” regarding the garage door condition. He stated that he routinely disposes of unsolicited mail without reading it and had inadvertently discarded the previous notices sent by the Respondent.

5. In June 2019, after failed settlement negotiations over the outstanding $750 in fines from 2013, the Respondent deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and his access to the clubhouse. This action prompted the Petitioner to file his dispute petition.

6. The Petitioner’s primary argument was that he did not receive “actual notice” of the violation until the attorney’s letter. He contended that because he acted promptly to correct the violation after receiving actual notice, he should not have been fined.

7. The judge used definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary. “Actual notice” was defined as notice given directly to, or personally received by, a party. “Constructive notice” was defined as notice arising by presumption of law from facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.

8. The judge concluded that the multiple notices mailed to the Petitioner’s residential address constituted “constructive notice” of the violation. Because the relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), does not explicitly require “actual notice,” and the mailings also advised him of his right to appeal, the judge found the Respondent had fulfilled its obligation to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.

9. The Petitioner alleged that the additional $500 in fines were improper late fees on the original $250 fine. The judge rejected this, clarifying that the Respondent’s notices stated that additional fines would be assessed every 14 days for an ongoing failure to remedy the violation. Therefore, the additional charges were three separate fines for the “ongoing condition of the garage door,” not late fees.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The parties were notified that this order was binding unless a request for rehearing was filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for favoring “constructive notice” over “actual notice” in the context of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B). Discuss the potential consequences for homeowners and HOAs if the ruling had required “actual notice.”

2. Trace the negotiation attempts between the Petitioner and the Respondent in 2013 and 2019. Evaluate the effectiveness of these attempts and discuss whether the dispute could have been resolved without formal legal proceedings.

3. The Petitioner argued that the fines imposed after the initial $250 were improper late fees. The judge, however, characterized them as new fines for an “ongoing condition.” Based on the evidence presented in the notices, construct an argument supporting both the Petitioner’s and the judge’s interpretation.

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and identify the key pieces of evidence that allowed the judge to conclude the Respondent did not violate the statute.

5. Examine the roles of the various community governing documents cited in this case (CC&Rs, Design Guidelines, Violation Enforcement policy). Explain how these documents worked together to grant the Respondent the authority to take action against the Petitioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

The Arizona Revised Statute central to this case, which permits an HOA board to impose reasonable monetary penalties for violations after providing “notice and an opportunity to be heard.”

Actual Notice

As defined in the decision, it is “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.”

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision. In this case, it was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners association (HOA) for the Bellasera Community in Arizona.

An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents for the community, which the Petitioner was found to have violated (specifically Article V, Section 5.2).

Constructive Notice

As defined in the decision, it is “[n]otice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.” The judge ruled that mail sent to a residence constitutes this form of notice.

Design Guidelines

A set of rules established by the HOA governing the aesthetic appearance of properties. The Petitioner was found in violation of Article III, Section J of these guidelines.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition seeking a ruling. In this case, it was the homeowner, Robert L. Greco.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, it was the HOA.






Blog Post – 20F-H2019018-REL


He Threw Away His Mail for Years. His HOA’s Response Is a Warning to Every Homeowner.

That official-looking envelope from your Homeowners Association sits on the counter, a silent challenge. It’s easy to dismiss it as a newsletter or a bland reminder, just another piece of paper to be sorted later. But what if it isn’t? What if that envelope is a legal summons in disguise, the first shot in a battle you don’t even know you’re fighting?

For Robert L. Greco, a resident in his community for 17 years, this hypothetical became a harsh reality. He learned that ignoring HOA correspondence can ignite a conflict that smolders for years before erupting into severe consequences. Originating from a maintenance issue as simple as a faded garage door, his case offers a masterclass in the powerful lessons every homeowner should heed.

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1. The “I Didn’t Read It” Defense Doesn’t Work

The central pillar of the homeowner’s defense was disarmingly simple: he claimed he never received the first four violation notices because he habitually throws away what he considers “unsolicited mail.” He argued that without having read the warnings, he couldn’t be held responsible for the fines.

The judge’s ruling, however, invoked a foundational legal concept that extends far beyond HOA disputes into areas like property deeds and public records: the difference between “actual notice” and “constructive notice.” While actual notice means you personally saw the information, constructive notice presumes you have knowledge of something because it was delivered properly—in this case, mailed to the correct address. Whether you open the envelope is irrelevant.

In a July 5, 2013 letter, the homeowner unwittingly sealed his own fate by describing his mail-handling routine:

Routinely, Saturdays are my mail-pick-up days, and invariably, I walk straight to the re-cyclable container, and deposit the mail in the receptacle… I was astonished to learn that my garage door failed inspection. This is my initial alert of the garage door condition.

For homeowners, the takeaway is a stark one: in the eyes of the law, your recycling bin is not a valid legal defense. The burden doesn’t fall on an HOA to ensure you read your mail, only to send it. The responsibility to open and review all official correspondence rests squarely on the homeowner.

2. A Tiny Issue Can Snowball into a Years-Long Standoff

The timeline of this dispute reveals a classic case of conflict avoidance, where a minor, fixable problem was allowed to spiral into a major legal battle. The cost of a can of paint and a Saturday afternoon of work was ultimately dwarfed by a six-year, $750 dispute that cost the homeowner his access to his own community.

• February 5, 2013: The HOA sends its first “Courtesy Notice” regarding a faded garage door in need of repainting.

• March – May 2013: After no response, the HOA issues three more notices, levying escalating fines that total $750.

• 2013 to 2019: For six years, the homeowner receives quarterly statements showing the $750 balance. Each time, he would “cross out the $750.00 balance and pay the current assessment.”

• June/July 2019: The HOA finally forces the issue by deactivating his security gate fob and his access to the clubhouse.

This progression shows how a simple lack of communication transformed a weekend chore into a years-long standoff. By ignoring the notices and the subsequent fines, the homeowner allowed a molehill to grow into a mountain of conflict.

3. “Continuing Violation” Fines Are Not Late Fees

The homeowner contended that the HOA was improperly stacking late fees on top of an initial $250 penalty. However, the administrative law judge highlighted a critical distinction embedded in the association’s rules.

The HOA wasn’t charging late fees on a single, past-due penalty. It was levying new fines for a “continuing violation.” The notice sent on March 14, 2013, explicitly warned that “an additional fine of $250 will be assessed automatically every 14 days… if the violation remains uncorrected.”

This is a crucial detail found in many HOA bylaws. An unpainted garage door is not a one-time offense; it is an ongoing breach of community standards. A homeowner who thinks they are simply letting a single fine sit unpaid may actually be incurring entirely new violations over time, dramatically increasing their financial liability.

4. Failed Negotiations Can Cost More Than Money

Twice, this dispute could have been resolved. The breakdown in negotiations, however, reveals how ego and principle can prove more costly than the fines themselves.

The first attempt came in 2013, after the homeowner had finally painted the garage. The HOA initially offered to settle a supposed $900 balance for $500. This, however, was based on an “internal accounting error.” In a subsequent letter, the HOA apologized, corrected the record to show the true balance was $750, and made a formal offer: pay half—just $375—and the matter would be closed. The offer was not accepted. Including this error shows the HOA was not infallible, making the subsequent stalemate more complex.

The second negotiation occurred in 2019, prompted by a friend on the Board who urged a settlement. The homeowner offered $100. The Board countered with $250. The homeowner’s final offer was exquisitely specific: “$251.00, $250.00 to settle the outstanding fines and $1.00 to rent the clubhouse on a specific date.”

This offer was a tactical and psychological blunder. That extra dollar wasn’t about money; it was a message. Whether intended as a sarcastic jab or a principled stand to assert his rights as a member, it transformed a financial negotiation into a battle of wills. For a Board of Directors, accepting such an offer could be seen as capitulating to a petty gesture, setting a precedent that defiance works. They declined. Shortly after, the homeowner’s access to community facilities was cut off, leading to the legal petition he ultimately lost.

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Conclusion: A Lesson in Communication

This case serves as a powerful warning. The legal force of “constructive notice” makes you responsible for the mail you receive, not just the mail you read. The six-year standoff over a can of paint shows how inaction can have disproportionate consequences. And the failed $251 offer demonstrates that good-faith negotiation is paramount.

Ultimately, the homeowner was left still owing the money and locked out of his own amenities—a casualty of a battle he prolonged at every turn. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question to consider: in a dispute with your HOA, where is the line between standing on principle and causing yourself unnecessary harm?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert L Greco (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (attorney)
    Brown|Olcott, PLLC
  • David Reid (board member)
    Testified for Respondent
  • Annette McCarthy (manager)
    Acting Manager; Testified for Respondent
  • Kelly Oetinger (attorney)
    Counsel for Respondent in 2013
  • Dennis Carson (board member)

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE

Paul L Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association

Posted on by

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-27
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul L Moffett Counsel Richard M. Rollman
Respondent Vistoso Community Association Counsel Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.

Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.

Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
  • CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:28 (48.3 KB)

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:31 (109.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019014-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

Executive Summary

On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.

The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.

The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.

Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.

Detail

Information

Case Name

Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association

Case Number

20F-H2019014-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petition Filed

On or about September 25, 2019

Hearing Date

December 16, 2019

Decision & Order Date

January 27, 2020

Petitioner

Paul L. Moffett

Petitioner’s Counsel

Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.

Respondent

Vistoso Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC

The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments

Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.

The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:

• Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.

• Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.

Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.

Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions

The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.

Key Governing Document Provisions

• Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.

Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)

The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:

• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.

• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.

• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.

Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)

The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:

• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.

• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.

• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.

Established Findings of Fact

The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.

• March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.

• March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

• August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.

• October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

• January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.

• March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.

• Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Legal Interpretation

The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.

The decision states:

“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”

The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.

Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy

The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”

Final Order

Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

• Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2019014-REL


Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?

3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?

5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?

6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?

8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.

2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.

3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.

4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.

6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.

8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.

9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.

2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?

4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.

5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1

The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3

The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Declarant

The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.

Developer Owner

An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2019014-REL


The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head

For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.

This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.

The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote

The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.

The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:

• Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.

• Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.

On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.

The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years

The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.

• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.

• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.

The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole

This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.

In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.

The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:

Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.

The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote

Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.

The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).

While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.

This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.

Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details

This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.

The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul L Moffett (petitioner)
    Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
  • Richard M. Rollman (petitioner attorney)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
  • Alyssa Leverette (legal staff)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
    Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
  • Kimberly Rubly (witness)
    Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
  • Sean K. Moynihan (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
    Recipient of Order

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order

Other Participants

  • Sarah Nelson (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Patrick Straney (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Dennis Ottley (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election

Paul L Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-27
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Paul L Moffett Counsel Richard M. Rollman
Respondent Vistoso Community Association Counsel Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.

Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.

Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
  • CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:33 (48.3 KB)

20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:33 (109.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019014-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

Executive Summary

On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.

The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.

The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.

Case Overview

This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.

Detail

Information

Case Name

Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association

Case Number

20F-H2019014-REL

Adjudicating Body

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Petition Filed

On or about September 25, 2019

Hearing Date

December 16, 2019

Decision & Order Date

January 27, 2020

Petitioner

Paul L. Moffett

Petitioner’s Counsel

Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.

Respondent

Vistoso Community Association

Respondent’s Counsel

Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC

The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments

Petitioner’s Allegation

On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.

The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:

• Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.

• Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.

Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.

Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions

The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.

Key Governing Document Provisions

• Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.

Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)

The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:

• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.

• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.

• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.

Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)

The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:

• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.

• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.

• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.

Established Findings of Fact

The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.

• March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.

• March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

• August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.

• October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.

• January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.

• March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.

• Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”

The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

Legal Interpretation

The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.

The decision states:

“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”

The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.

Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy

The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”

Final Order

Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.

• Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

• Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 20F-H2019014-REL


Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?

3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?

5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?

6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?

7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?

8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?

10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.

2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.

3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.

4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.

6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.

8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.

9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.

2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.

3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?

4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.

5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms and Entities

Term / Entity

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.

Article VII, Section 7.3.1

The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

Article VIII, Section 8.3

The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Declarant

The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.

Developer Owner

An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.

Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition

The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.






Blog Post – 20F-H2019014-REL


The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head

For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.

This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.

The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote

The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.

The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:

• Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.

• Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.

On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.

The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years

The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.

• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.

• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.

However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.

The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole

This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”

The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.

In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.

The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:

Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.

The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote

Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.

The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).

While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.

This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.

Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details

This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.

The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Paul L Moffett (petitioner)
    Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
  • Richard M. Rollman (petitioner attorney)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
  • Alyssa Leverette (legal staff)
    Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
    Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
  • Kimberly Rubly (witness)
    Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
  • Sean K. Moynihan (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
    Recipient of Order

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of Order

Other Participants

  • Sarah Nelson (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Patrick Straney (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election
  • Dennis Ottley (board member (elected))
    Vistoso Community Association
    Recipient of votes in disputed election

Joan A. Tober, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joan A. Tober Counsel —
Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – 764197.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:27 (187.4 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/714863.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:32 (51.7 KB)

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/725808.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:28:37 (89.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”

The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.

The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.

Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.

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Case Overview

This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Name

Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1918042-REL

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Kay A. Abramsohn

Core Issue

Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.

Initial Hearing Date

June 5, 2019

Initial Decision Date

July 29, 2019

Rehearing Date

December 11, 2019

Final Decision Date

January 15, 2020

——————————————————————————–

Key Parties and Individuals

• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober

◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.

◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.

◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.

◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.

◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.

• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)

◦ The governing body for the planned community.

◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn

◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

——————————————————————————–

Chronology of the Dispute

Nov 20, 2018

At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.

Nov 26, 2018

Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.

Nov 27, 2018

Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.

Nov 29, 2018

At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

Nov 29, 2018

At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.

Dec 13, 2018

Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”

Dec 26, 2018

Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jan 15-16, 2019

The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.

June 5, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

July 29, 2019

Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.

Aug 5, 2019

Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”

Aug 23, 2019

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

Dec 11, 2019

The rehearing is conducted.

Jan 15, 2020

Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Core Dispute and Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)

1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”

2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.

3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)

1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.

4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.

——————————————————————————–

Key Findings of Fact and Evidence

The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.

• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”

• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.

• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:

◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.

◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”

◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”

◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.

• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.

——————————————————————————–

Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law

Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)

• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.

• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”

• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.

Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)

• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.

• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”

• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”

• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”

• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”

• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

——————————————————————————–

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?

2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?

3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?

6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?

7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?

8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?

9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.

10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.

4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.

6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.

8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.

9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.

10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?

5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.

Attorney-Client Privilege

A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.

Executive Session

A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.

Petition

The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

The Letter

The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG


She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.

Introduction: The Fight for Information

Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.

This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.

1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.

The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.

The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.

2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.

Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.

After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”

In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:

An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.

The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.

3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.

What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.

But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:

Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.

Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.

Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort

The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.

This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joan A. Tober (petitioner)
    Former Board member; current Finance Committee member

Respondent Side

  • Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
  • Mr. Mastrosimone (Board President)
    Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
    Testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (Clerk)
  • Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal

Joan A. Tober, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

Posted on by
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joan A. Tober Counsel —
Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA) was the prevailing party. The ALJ found that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B) because the specific attorney letter requested was privileged and could be withheld,, and Petitioner's request for additional 'background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified,.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) as the HOA lawfully withheld privileged documents under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B) and was not required to guess what records were requested due to the vague nature of the demand for 'any and all documentation'.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of requirement to provide association records.

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide all requested documentation, specifically an attorney letter concerning the North Ridge wall, and failed to comply with the 10-business day response period required for record requests.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party on rehearing and Petitioner's appeal was dismissed. The HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B). The requested attorney letter was privileged communication and could be withheld.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – 764197.pdf

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19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/714863.pdf

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19F-H1918042-REL-RHG Decision – ../19F-H1918042-REL/725808.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Tober v. Civano 1 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the legal proceedings and outcomes of the case Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (No. 19F-H1918042-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was Petitioner Joan A. Tober’s demand for records from her Homeowners Association (HOA), specifically a legal opinion letter concerning the “North Ridge wall.”

The Petitioner argued that the HOA violated Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide this letter and other “background information.” She contended the HOA waived attorney-client privilege by discussing the letter in an open board meeting and, in a subsequent rehearing, failed to provide records within the statutorily required 10-day timeframe.

The HOA maintained that the letter was a privileged communication with its attorney and therefore exempt from disclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B). The HOA also argued that the Petitioner’s broader request for “any and all documentation” was overly vague and that she failed to clarify the request when asked.

Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn ultimately ruled in favor of the HOA in both the initial hearing and a subsequent rehearing. The final decision affirmed that the legal letter was privileged and could be withheld. Crucially, the judge concluded the HOA did not violate the 10-day provision because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification, thereby preventing the HOA from being able to “reasonably make records available.” The HOA was declared the prevailing party in both instances.

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Case Overview

This matter involves a formal dispute between a homeowner and her homeowners’ association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).

Case Name

Joan A. Tober, Petitioner, vs. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number

19F-H1918042-REL

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

Administrative Law Judge

Kay A. Abramsohn

Core Issue

Alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805, which governs member access to association records.

Initial Hearing Date

June 5, 2019

Initial Decision Date

July 29, 2019

Rehearing Date

December 11, 2019

Final Decision Date

January 15, 2020

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Key Parties and Individuals

• Petitioner: Joan A. Tober

◦ A homeowner in the Civano 1 Neighborhood since 2001.

◦ Previously worked for the company that developed the land/homes in the association area.

◦ Has served as a past Board member for the HOA.

◦ Served as an alternate member on the Finance Committee in 2018.

◦ Exhibits a high level of engagement with HOA affairs, having taped and often transcribed every meeting since 2008.

• Respondent: Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association (HOA)

◦ The governing body for the planned community.

◦ Represented by Diana J. Elston, Esq., of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

• Adjudicator: Kay Abramsohn

◦ The Administrative Law Judge for the Office of Administrative Hearings who presided over both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

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Chronology of the Dispute

Nov 20, 2018

At an HOA Board meeting, the Board President mentions receiving a letter (“the Letter”) from its attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, states it concerns the HOA’s legal responsibility, and suggests it can be sent out to residents.

Nov 26, 2018

Petitioner sends her first email request for a copy of the Letter.

Nov 27, 2018

Petitioner sends a second request. The HOA replies that it is waiting for clarification from its attorney.

Nov 29, 2018

At 4:58 a.m., Petitioner sends a third, formal request citing A.R.S. § 33-1805, demanding “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

Nov 29, 2018

At 9:44 a.m., the HOA responds, stating the President misspoke and the Letter is a privileged legal opinion. The HOA asks if Petitioner needs a copy of “the original engineer report.” The judge later finds no evidence that Petitioner responded to this clarification query.

Dec 13, 2018

Petitioner writes to the Board, stating she will use “all means… to obtain the requested materials, to include a formal complaint.”

Dec 26, 2018

Petitioner files her single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Jan 15-16, 2019

The HOA forwards to Petitioner the “Civano historical erosion reports” (2013 and 2014) and an invoice related to the 2014 study.

June 5, 2019

The initial administrative hearing is held.

July 29, 2019

Initial Decision Issued: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finds the Letter is privileged and the HOA is the prevailing party.

Aug 5, 2019

Petitioner files a request for rehearing, arguing the initial decision “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.”

Aug 23, 2019

The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

Dec 11, 2019

The rehearing is conducted.

Jan 15, 2020

Final Decision Issued: The ALJ again finds for the HOA, concluding it did not violate the statute because Petitioner’s request was overly broad and she failed to clarify it. The appeal is dismissed.

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Core Dispute and Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Joan A. Tober)

1. Waiver of Privilege: The Petitioner’s central argument was that the HOA intentionally waived attorney-client privilege regarding the Letter when the Board President mentioned it in an open meeting and offered to distribute it, with the other Board members not objecting, thereby showing “unanimous consent to waive confidentiality.”

2. Right to “Background Information”: Petitioner argued that because the North Ridge wall issue had been ongoing since 2013, her request for “any and all documents” and “background information” was justified, and that more than just two prior engineering reports must exist.

3. Untimely Response (Rehearing Argument): In her request for rehearing, Petitioner’s primary argument shifted to timeliness, asserting that even if the HOA “eventually” provided some records, it failed to do so within the 10-business-day period mandated by A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

Respondent’s Position (Civano 1 HOA)

1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The HOA’s primary defense was that the Letter constituted “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association,” which may be withheld from members under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

2. No Waiver: The HOA contended that the “mere mention” of the Letter by the Board President at a meeting did not constitute a legal waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

3. Vague and Overly Broad Request: The HOA argued that the Petitioner’s request for “any and all” documents was too broad to know what she wanted.

4. Prior Possession of Documents: The HOA indicated that it could be determined from the Petitioner’s own exhibits that she had already received or possessed copies of key requested documents, such as the 2013 and 2014 erosion reports.

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Key Findings of Fact and Evidence

The Administrative Law Judge made several critical findings of fact based on the evidence presented across both hearings.

• The Nature of the “Letter”: The document at the center of the dispute was confirmed to be a legal opinion from the HOA’s attorney. It had been discussed by the Board in an executive session prior to the November 20, 2018 meeting. The letter advised that the HOA was responsible for the land below the wall and recommended hiring a “licensed bonded engineer.”

• Petitioner’s Pre-existing Knowledge: The Petitioner was well-informed on the North Ridge wall issue. She acknowledged at the rehearing that at the time of her November 29, 2018 request, she already possessed copies of the 2013 and 2014 engineering reports, which she had obtained from the city in 2014.

• Petitioner’s Request and Failure to Clarify:

◦ The Petitioner’s initial requests on November 26 and 27 were solely for the attorney’s Letter.

◦ Her formal request on November 29 expanded to “any and all documentation… and all background information.”

◦ On the same day, the HOA asked for clarification, specifically inquiring if she “still need[ed] a copy of the original engineer report.”

◦ The ALJ found “no document supporting” the Petitioner’s claim that she responded to this email. During the rehearing, the Petitioner was unable to produce such a response. This failure to clarify was a key factor in the final ruling.

• Lack of Other Documents: The hearing record contained no evidence of any other erosion reports besides the 2013 and 2014 reports. The HOA President, Mr. Mastrosimone, testified that “there were no documents other than the Letter that would have been responsive” to the request.

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Legal Rulings and Conclusions of Law

Initial Decision (July 29, 2019)

• Jurisdiction: The OAH confirmed its authority to hear the dispute under Arizona statutes.

• Privilege: The ALJ concluded that under A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” may be withheld. Therefore, the HOA was “not statutorily required to provide access or a copy of the Letter to Petitioner.”

• Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA provided records in compliance with the statute and was deemed the prevailing party.

Final Decision on Rehearing (January 15, 2020)

• Issue for Rehearing: The sole issue on rehearing was whether the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide access to records within 10 business days.

• Privileged Communication: The ALJ reaffirmed that the Letter was privileged communication and the HOA was not required to provide it “within any time period.”

• Unreasonably Broad Request: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s formal request was “unreasonably broad and remained unclarified.”

• Failure to Clarify: The ruling explicitly states: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available. An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.”

• No Violation of Timeliness: Because the request was unclarified, the ALJ found the HOA did not violate the 10-day rule in A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The decision notes that the initial ruling “inartfully stated” that the HOA had provided records in compliance, and that it “should have simply stated that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805.”

• Final Outcome: The ALJ concluded that the HOA acted in compliance with both subsections (A) and (B) of the statute. The HOA was again declared the prevailing party, and the Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The decision was declared binding on the parties, subject to judicial review in superior court.






Study Guide – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case No. 19F-H1918042-REL, involving Petitioner Joan A. Tober and Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

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Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.

1. What specific event prompted Joan Tober to first request documents from the HOA in November 2018?

2. What was the HOA’s primary legal justification for refusing to provide a copy of “the Letter” to the Petitioner?

3. According to Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), what is the required timeframe for an HOA to make records available to a member after a written request?

4. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why the HOA had forfeited its right to keep “the Letter” confidential?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner file her request for a rehearing after the initial decision on July 29, 2019?

6. How did the Petitioner’s document request evolve between her first communication on November 26, 2018, and her third request on November 29, 2018?

7. What crucial step did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner failed to take after the HOA’s email on November 29, 2018?

8. Besides “the Letter,” what other key documents related to the North Ridge wall did the Petitioner already possess when she filed her formal request?

9. Describe the Petitioner’s long-standing involvement and activities within the Civano 1 HOA community.

10. What was the final ruling in the Administrative Law Judge Decision on Rehearing, issued January 15, 2020?

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Answer Key

1. The request was prompted by the HOA Board meeting on November 20, 2018. At this meeting, the Board President mentioned receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney regarding the North Ridge wall, stated its legal conclusion, and indicated, “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

2. The HOA’s primary justification was that the document was a privileged attorney-client communication. The HOA argued that the letter contained legal analysis and advice to the Board and was therefore exempt from disclosure under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805(B).

3. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) states that a homeowners association has “ten business days” to fulfill a written request for examination of its financial and other records.

4. The Petitioner argued that the HOA had intentionally waived confidentiality. She contended that because the Board President mentioned the letter in an open meeting and the other Board members did not object, they showed unanimous consent to waive the attorney-client privilege.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing on the grounds that the initial Administrative Law Judge ruling “did not address the timeliness aspect of the law.” She argued that while the HOA eventually provided access to some records, it had not done so within the required 10-business day period.

6. The Petitioner’s request evolved from a specific ask for a copy of “the Letter” on November 26 and 27 to a much broader request on November 29. Her third request asked for “any and all documentation to include the letter… regarding the structural integrity and the Association members’ responsibility for same and all background information.”

7. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA’s request for clarification in its November 29 email. The HOA had asked if she needed a copy of the “original engineer report,” and the Judge found no evidence in the hearing records that the Petitioner ever answered this question, thus preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.

8. The Petitioner already possessed the 2013 Engineering report and the 2014 report concerning erosion issues with the North Ridge wall. She acknowledged at the rehearing that she had obtained these from the city in 2014.

9. The Petitioner worked for the company that developed the land, purchased her home in 2001, and has been a past Board member. At the time of the dispute, she was an alternate member of the Finance Committee and had been taping and often transcribing every HOA meeting since 2008.

10. The final ruling was that the HOA was the prevailing party and had not violated A.R.S. § 33-1805. The Judge concluded the HOA was not required to provide the privileged letter and that its failure to provide other documents within 10 days was excused because the Petitioner’s request was “unreasonably broad” and she failed to clarify it. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a longer, essay-format response. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the concept of “waiver” of attorney-client privilege as it was argued in this case. Discuss the Petitioner’s claim that the President’s public comments constituted a waiver and contrast this with the Administrative Law Judge’s implicit and explicit findings on the matter.

2. Trace the procedural history of this case, beginning with the initial petition filing on December 26, 2018, and concluding with the final notice of appeal rights in the January 15, 2020 order. Identify the key legal proceedings, decisions, and dates that marked the progression of the dispute.

3. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the court documents. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge applied this standard to the evidence presented by the Petitioner and why the Petitioner ultimately failed to meet her burden of proof in both the initial hearing and the rehearing.

4. Examine the role and interpretation of Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1805 in this dispute. How did the two key subsections, (A) and (B), create the central legal conflict between the Petitioner’s right to access records and the HOA’s right to withhold privileged information?

5. Evaluate the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning that the Petitioner’s November 29, 2018 request was “unreasonably broad.” How did this determination, combined with the Petitioner’s alleged failure to clarify her request, become the deciding factor in the rehearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues legal decisions and orders.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (“the Department”)

The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearings from members of homeowners’ associations in Arizona.

A.R.S. § 33-1805

The Arizona Revised Statute governing access to homeowners’ association records. Subsection (A) requires records be made “reasonably available” within ten business days, while subsection (B) allows for withholding of privileged attorney-client communications.

Attorney-Client Privilege

A legal concept that allows for certain communications between an attorney and their client (in this case, the HOA) to be kept confidential. The HOA cited this privilege as the reason for withholding “the Letter.”

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal proceeding to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated statutes or community documents.

Executive Session

A private meeting of a board of directors. “The Letter” had been discussed by the HOA Board in an executive session prior to the public meeting where it was mentioned.

An acronym for Homeowners Association. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The office with the legal authority to hear and decide contested cases involving disputes between homeowners and planned community associations in Arizona.

Petition

The formal, single-issue complaint filed by the Petitioner with the Department of Real Estate on December 26, 2018, which initiated the legal proceedings.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, the Petitioner is Joan A. Tober.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” and “the greater weight of the evidence.”

Rehearing

A second hearing granted to re-examine a legal case after an initial decision has been made. A rehearing was granted in this case to address the Petitioner’s claim that the initial ruling did not consider the “timeliness aspect of the law.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent is the Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association.

The Letter

The specific document at the heart of the dispute: a privileged legal opinion letter from the HOA’s attorneys to the Board regarding the North Ridge wall, which was “disclosed and discussed” at the November 20, 2018, Board meeting.






Blog Post – 19F-H1918042-REL-RHG


She Recorded Every HOA Meeting for a Decade and Still Lost. Here’s What Every Homeowner Can Learn.

Introduction: The Fight for Information

Many homeowners have felt the frustration of seeking information from their Homeowners Association (HOA), only to feel that the board is being less than transparent. It’s a common story that often ends in resignation. But for one Arizona homeowner, it ended in a formal administrative hearing.

This is the story of Joan A. Tober, a remarkably dedicated resident who filed a petition against her HOA with the Arizona Department of Real Estate over access to documents related to a retaining wall. She was a former board member, sat on the finance committee, and, most astoundingly, had personally recorded and often transcribed every single HOA meeting for over a decade. Yet, despite her exhaustive personal record-keeping, her petition was denied. The surprising and counter-intuitive lessons from her story offer a masterclass for any homeowner navigating a dispute with their association.

1. Takeaway #1: The “Attorney-Client Privilege” Shield is Stronger Than You Think.

The central conflict revolved around a single document: a letter from the HOA’s attorney. During an open board meeting, the Board President mentioned the letter, which concerned the association’s responsibility for a retaining wall, and created an expectation of transparency, stating: “I believe we can … send it out … so people can have it.”

Ms. Tober argued that by openly discussing the letter and offering to distribute it, the board had waived its confidentiality, and she was therefore entitled to a copy. It seems like a logical assumption. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) disagreed, pointing directly to the law. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)), “privileged communication between an attorney for the association and the association” can be legally withheld from members.

The tribunal found that the mere mention of the letter in a public meeting—even with the president’s comment—did not break that legal privilege. This is a critical point for homeowners to understand. The law protects the board’s ability to seek and receive candid legal advice to govern the association effectively. While it may feel like a lack of transparency, this shield is a fundamental and legally protected aspect of HOA operations.

2. Takeaway #2: Asking for “Everything” Can Get You Nothing.

Beyond the privileged letter, the evolution and wording of Ms. Tober’s request became a major factor in the denial of her petition. The timeline shows how a homeowner’s frustration can lead to a fatal strategic error. On November 26 and 27, 2018, she made two specific requests for the attorney’s letter. The HOA responded that it was seeking clarification from its attorney.

After this delay, Ms. Tober’s third request, dated November 29, escalated significantly. She now asked for: “any and all documentation to include the letter that was disclosed and discussed… and all background information.”

In response, the HOA asked for clarification, but according to the hearing record, Ms. Tober could not provide evidence that she ever replied to narrow her request. This failure proved fatal. The Administrative Law Judge found the request to be “unreasonably broad.” The judge’s decision on the matter was blunt and serves as a powerful warning:

An association is not required to guess what records are being requested.

The ultimate reason for the denial synthesized both issues: “Petitioner failed to respond to the HOA request for clarification of her unreasonably broad request, preventing the HOA from being able to reasonably make records available.” This demonstrates that the legal burden falls squarely on the homeowner to articulate a request the association can reasonably fulfill. As the ALJ noted, an association is not required to be a mind reader.

3. Takeaway #3: Diligence Alone Doesn’t Guarantee a Win.

What makes this story so compelling is the extraordinary diligence of the petitioner. Joan Tober was not a casual observer. The hearing records establish her deep involvement in the community: she was a former Board member, a member of the Finance Committee, and had even worked for the company that originally developed the community.

But one fact, noted in the ALJ’s decision, highlights her stunning level of dedication:

Since 2008, Petitioner has taped every meeting and she often creates a transcript of the meetings.

Despite this decade of meticulous personal record-keeping and her clear passion for the issue, her petition was denied—not just once, but twice, on the initial hearing and again on the rehearing. This presents a sobering reality for all homeowners. While passion, engagement, and even a mountain of personal documentation are valuable, they cannot overcome fundamental legal principles. The outcome of a formal hearing is determined by the strength of the legal argument, not the volume of personal effort expended.

Conclusion: Strategy Over Sheer Effort

The petition of Joan A. Tober is a powerful reminder that when dealing with an HOA, effectiveness is not always measured by effort. Her story provides three critical takeaways for every homeowner: attorney-client privilege provides HOAs with a strong legal shield, record requests must be specific and targeted to be enforceable, and meticulous personal diligence must be paired with a sound legal strategy to succeed in a formal dispute.

This case leaves every homeowner with a critical question: when you have a dispute, are you channeling your energy into the most effective strategy, or simply into the most effort?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joan A. Tober (petitioner)
    Former Board member; current Finance Committee member

Respondent Side

  • Diana J. Elston (HOA attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
  • Mr. Mastrosimone (Board President)
    Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association
    Testified at rehearing

Neutral Parties

  • Kay A. Abramsohn (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • c. serrano (Clerk)
  • Felicia Del Sol (Clerk)
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Addressed in transmittal

Joan A. Tober v. Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-15
Administrative Law Judge Kay A. Abramsohn
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Joan A. Tober Counsel —
Respondent Civano 1 Neighborhood 1 Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded, both in the original decision and the rehearing, that the HOA was the prevailing party. The final decision affirmed that the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B), specifically ruling that privileged documents are exempt from disclosure timelines and that the Petitioner's request for 'all background information' was unreasonably broad and unclarified.

Why this result: Petitioner lost because she failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The primary record sought was protected by attorney-client privilege, and her vague request for 'any and all documentation' made it impossible for the HOA to reasonably comply within the 10-day period.

Key Issues & Findings

HOA violation of requirement to provide association records within ten business days.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide access to requested documents, including a privileged attorney letter and 'all background information', within the required 10-business day period. The rehearing focused specifically on the timeliness aspect.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party in the rehearing, and Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded the HOA acted in compliance with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) and (B).

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Records Request, Attorney-Client Privilege, A.R.S. 33-1805, Planned Community, Rehearing, Unreasonably Broad Request, Timeliness of Disclosure
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2102
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199(2)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Olga Carnahan v. White Mountain Lake Vistas

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019021-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-13
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Olga Carnahan Counsel —
Respondent White Mountain Lake Vistas Counsel Edward O’Brien

Alleged Violations

Article 12.3

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Respondent did not violate the CC&Rs. The specific article cited by the Petitioner (Article 12.3) governed amendments to the Declaration and Plat, not the purchase of real property, and therefore did not require a membership vote.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the CC&Rs required a membership vote for the Board to purchase lots.

Key Issues & Findings

Purchase of lots without membership vote

Petitioner alleged the HOA Board violated CC&Rs by purchasing two lots without a membership vote. The Board argued Article 12.3 applies to amendments, not property purchases, and no vote was required.

Orders: The Petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Article 12.3

Decision Documents

20F-H2019021-REL Decision – 763430.pdf

Uploaded 2026-02-11T06:42:49 (100.4 KB)

**Case Summary: Carnahan v. White Mountain Lake Vistas**
**Case No:** 20F-H2019021-REL
**Date of Decision:** January 13, 2020
**Forum:** Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

**Overview**
This case involved a dispute between Petitioner Olga Carnahan and Respondent White Mountain Lake Vistas (a Homeowners Association). The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by purchasing two lots without obtaining a majority vote from the homeowners.

**Key Facts**
* The Petitioner, a lot owner since 2017, filed a petition claiming the HOA Board improperly purchased lots #54 and #65 without holding a membership vote.
* The Respondent purchased these lots to address drainage issues.
* While the purchase was discussed at a September 2019 meeting where members expressed general agreement, the Board did not conduct a formal membership vote, asserting it was not required.

**Key Arguments**
* **Petitioner’s Position:** The Petitioner argued that Article 12.3 of the CC&Rs required a two-thirds (2/3) membership vote for such actions. She further contended that the purchase resulted in an immediate financial loss for the Association because no HOA fees would be collected on the vacant lots.
* **Respondent’s Position:** The Respondent argued that Article 12.3 specifically governs amendments to the CC&Rs and the Plat, not the purchase of real property. Testimony established that while Article 12.3 requires a 2/3 vote to *amend* the Declaration, it contains no provision requiring a vote to *purchase* property.

**Legal Findings and Decision**
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera presided over the hearing and issued the following findings:

1. **Interpretation of Governing Documents:** The Judge examined Article 12.3, noting it explicitly addresses "Amendments." Article 12.3.1 requires a 2/3 vote to amend the Declaration, and Article 12.3.2 allows the Board to amend the Plat in specific regulatory scenarios without owner consent.
2. **Scope of Authority:** The Judge determined that Article 12.3 does not require a membership vote for the purchase of property. Consequently, the Petitioner failed to establish that the CC&Rs mandated a vote for the acquisition of lots #54 and #65.
3. **Burden of Proof:** The Petitioner bore the burden of proving the violation by a preponderance of the evidence but failed to do so.
4. **Ripeness:** The Judge ruled that arguments regarding future financial adversity were not ripe and did not constitute an immediate violation.

**Outcome**
The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be **dismissed**. The Respondent was found to have acted within its authority, as the CC&Rs did not require a membership vote for the purchase of the lots in question.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Olga Carnahan (Petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Edward O’Brien (Respondent Attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen LLP
    Appeared on behalf of White Mountain Lake Vistas
  • Rose Thomas (Board Secretary/Treasurer)
    White Mountain Lake Vistas Board
    Witness
  • Joyce Dick (Board President)
    White Mountain Lake Vistas Board
    Witness

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmitted order

Larry Kline vs. The Foothills Community Association

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Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019012-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-02
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Larry Kline Counsel —
Respondent The Foothills Community Association Counsel Austin Baillio

Alleged Violations

Article IV, Section 4.2(p)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof. The retaining wall was on private property (Lot 22) and the adjoining golf course, not Common Area. The Petitioner failed to establish that the Association was a successor or assign of the Declarant for the specific easement agreement claimed.

Why this result: Insufficient evidence presented to establish a recorded instrument imparting maintenance/repair requirements on the Association; wall not on Common Area.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to Maintain Retaining Wall

Petitioner alleged the Association failed to repair a retaining wall located on the rear perimeter of his property, citing a latent defect and easement agreement.

Orders: Petition denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Article IV, Section 4.2(p)
  • Bylaws Article I

Decision Documents

20F-H2019012-REL Decision – 761847.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-27T21:17:44 (150.9 KB)

**Case Summary: *Larry Kline v. The Foothills Community Association***
**Case No:** 20F-H2019012-REL
**Date of Decision:** January 2, 2020
**Forum:** Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona)

**Proceedings**
Petitioner Larry Kline filed a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate alleging that The Foothills Community Association (Respondent) failed to repair a retaining wall in violation of the community's governing documents. The Department referred the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings, where Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark presided over an evidentiary hearing on December 19, 2019,.

**Key Facts**
* The Petitioner owns Lot 22 in the Club House Estates subdivision,.
* A retaining wall located on the rear perimeter of the Petitioner’s property separates the lot from the Foothills Golf Course.
* The wall suffered significant damage due to failing anchors, with repair costs estimated between $30,000 and $40,000,.
* The Petitioner sought to have the Association cover the repair costs, citing an easement agreement,.

**Main Issues and Arguments**
The primary legal issue was whether the Association violated Association Bylaws Article IV, Section 4.2(p) by refusing to repair the wall.

* **Petitioner’s Arguments:** Kline argued that the Association was responsible for maintenance based on the CC&Rs, a recorded "Reservation of Easement," and a Special Warranty Deed,. He contended that these documents conveyed liability to the Association.

* **Respondent’s Arguments:** The Association argued it had no duty to maintain the wall because the structure is not located in a Common Area. The Association’s witness testified that while the Association owns a nearby Common Area ("Tract A"), there is no legal or physical relationship between Tract A and the retaining wall on Lot 22,. The Association asserted that under the Bylaws, maintenance responsibility for party fences/walls falls to the owners of the contiguous parcels (the Petitioner and the golf course owner), not the Association.

**Legal Findings**
The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation. The decision relied on the following points:
1. **Location:** The wall is located on the Petitioner's property and the adjacent golf course, neither of which is owned by the Association.
2. **Lack of Recorded Duty:** The Petitioner failed to provide

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Larry Kline (petitioner)
    Club House Estates subdivision property owner
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Austin Baillio (HOA attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Represented The Foothills Community Association; also listed as B. Austin Baillo
  • Patricia Ann Wontor (witness)
    The Foothills Community Association
    Onsite Community Manager

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the transmitted order

Other Participants

  • Joe Robinson (observer)
    Observed the hearing
  • Sandra Salvo (observer)
    Observed the hearing