Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Superior Court HOA Case

A Maricopa County judge held that Desert Mountain lacked standing or contract rights to compel an owner to maintain two recorded lots as one assembled parcel.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2006-052755.

Scope note: This page covers Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2006-052755) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s filed minute entries, especially the December 10, 2007 and May 7, 2008 under-advisement rulings and the March 18, 2010 judgment-entry minute entry; the complete collected minute-entry set is listed in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is dated March 18, 2010 and states that judgment was signed and entered after the court considered Carpediem’s fee-and-cost request. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

Desert Mountain could enforce restrictive covenants and reasonably review future construction plans, but it could not force Carpediem to keep two recorded lots assembled as one parcel. The court held the association was not a party or third-party beneficiary to the city hold-as-one-parcel agreement, so the owner’s development options turned on city consent, the final plat, zoning, and recorded restrictions rather than on an independent association right to compel one-lot treatment.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carpediem Investments LLC (Plaintiff)
    Owner that sought declarations and related relief concerning whether two Desert Mountain lots could be developed separately.
  • Frederick E. Davidson (Counsel)
    Counsel for Carpediem in the minute entries.
  • Chad R. Kaffer (Counsel)
    Counsel for Carpediem in later hearings and scheduling entries.

Respondent Side

  • Desert Mountain Master Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners association that opposed Carpediem’s position on the lot assemblage and retained architectural-review and covenant-enforcement authority.
  • Desert Mountain Owners Association for Gambel Quail, Sunrise and Eagle Feather (Defendant)
    Association defendant appearing in the case-parties data.
  • Mario F. Escudero and Grace T. Escudero (Defendants)
    Neighboring owner defendants involved in the lot-assemblage dispute and later sanctions-related proceedings.
  • Ted Kenny, John Folz, and Realty Executives Inc. (Defendants)
    Real-estate defendants who received summary judgment in the December 10, 2007 under-advisement ruling and a February 7, 2008 judgment.
  • Angela L. Potts (Counsel)
    Counsel for Desert Mountain in the minute entries.
  • Curtis S. Ekmark (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Desert Mountain in the case-parties data and some minute entries.

Neutral Parties

  • Paul A. Katz (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the December 2007 and May 2008 under-advisement rulings.
  • Brian R. Hauser (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled later scheduling, sanctions, settlement, and judgment-entry proceedings.

What happened

Carpediem Investments bought Desert Mountain property that had been treated as one assembled parcel even though the final plat showed two lots. The dispute turned on whether Carpediem could undo that arrangement and develop the property as two separate lots, or whether Desert Mountain and neighboring owners could force the property to remain a single unit.

The December 10, 2007 under-advisement ruling narrowed the case. Judge Paul A. Katz granted summary judgment to the real-estate defendants, denied Carpediem’s own summary-judgment request to declare the lot tie invalid, denied Desert Mountain’s summary-judgment request on negligent misrepresentation and part of the declaratory claim because genuine issues remained, and granted Desert Mountain summary judgment on promissory estoppel.

The key HOA ruling came on May 7, 2008. The court granted Carpediem’s summary-judgment motion against Desert Mountain on the enforceability of the lot assemblage. It held that Desert Mountain did not have standing or contractual rights to compel Carpediem to maintain and develop the property as a single unit. The court reasoned that the association was not in privity with the City of Scottsdale or Carpediem’s predecessor on the hold-as-one-parcel agreement and was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement.

The ruling did not strip Desert Mountain of ordinary HOA powers. The court said the association could enforce restrictive covenants for the association’s benefit, and that Carpediem’s future construction plans remained subject to association approval. But that approval could not be unreasonably withheld, and the association’s review power did not create a separate right to require one-home development if city approval, the final plat, zoning, and restrictive covenants allowed two separate lots.

Later entries focused on trial settings, sanctions procedure, a special-action stay, and settlement. In January 2009 the parties reported a settlement between Carpediem and the association defendants, and the court vacated the sanctions hearing, final pretrial conference, and trial. On March 18, 2010, the court entered a judgment signed three days earlier after finding Carpediem entitled to its requested attorneys’ fees and costs.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association (CV2006-052755 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Association could review plans but could not force two recorded lots to stay assembled as one parcel. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Carpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2006-11-22 The court denies the real-estate defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Step 2007-07-24 The court grants Carpediem leave to file a first amended complaint.
Step 2007-12-10 Under-advisement ruling grants summary judgment to the real-estate defendants, denies Carpediem’s motion to invalidate the lot tie, and partially resolves Desert Mountain’s summary-judgment motion.
Step 2008-02-07 Judgment is entered for the real-estate defendants while claims against Desert Mountain and other defendants continue.
Step 2008-05-07 Under-advisement ruling grants Carpediem summary judgment against Desert Mountain on the association’s inability to force the two lots to remain one assembled parcel.
Step 2008-08-15 The court hears sanctions argument and sets an evidentiary hearing; a later nunc pro tunc entry removes the recorded grant of sanctions.
Step 2008-09-25 The case is stayed pending a Court of Appeals special-action decision.
Step 2008-09-30 The court denies Desert Mountain’s motion for determination on attorneys’ fees.
Step 2009-01-15 The parties report settlement with the association defendants, remaining claims are withdrawn, and trial-related settings are vacated.
Step 2010-03-18 Judgment is entered after the court finds Carpediem entitled to requested attorneys’ fees and costs.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/carpediem-investments-v-desert-mountain-master-association/raw/: 37 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2006-11-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the real-estate defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and allowing Carpediem’s claims against those defendants to proceed.

Download source file
Source 2 2007-03-02

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2007-04-06

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 4 2007-05-03

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 5 2007-07-24

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Carpediem leave to file a first amended complaint against Desert Mountain and related defendants.

Download source file
Source 6 2007-08-13

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 7 2007-08-14

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 8 2007-10-11

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 9 2007-10-15

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 10 2007-10-22

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 11 2007-10-24

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

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Source 12 2007-12-10

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting summary judgment to the real-estate defendants, denying Carpediem’s bid to invalidate the lot tie, granting Desert Mountain summary judgment on promissory estoppel, and leaving negligent-misrepresentation and declaratory issues for further proceedings.

Source 13 2008-02-07

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Minute entry entering judgment for the real-estate defendants while allowing Carpediem’s claims against Desert Mountain and other remaining defendants to continue.

Source 14 2008-02-12

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 15 2008-04-21

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 16 2008-05-07

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling holding Desert Mountain could not force Carpediem to maintain or develop two recorded lots as one parcel, while preserving reasonable architectural review and covenant enforcement.

Source 17 2008-05-30

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 18 2008-05-30

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file
Source 19 2008-06-09

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 20 2008-06-25

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 21 2008-07-15

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 22 2008-08-05

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 23 2008-08-15

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Hearing minute entry that initially recorded sanctions as granted and set an evidentiary hearing, later corrected nunc pro tunc to remove the grant of sanctions.

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Source 24 2008-08-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 25 2008-09-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Carpediem leave to file a second amended complaint after denying oral argument on the amendment request.

Download source file
Source 26 2008-09-25

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Carpediem’s application for an interlocutory stay pending the Court of Appeals special-action decision and vacating the sanctions evidentiary hearing.

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Source 27 2008-09-26

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Nunc pro tunc ruling correcting the August 15 sanctions minute entry by removing the order that had granted sanctions and leaving only the evidentiary-hearing setting.

Download source file
Source 28 2008-09-30

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Desert Mountain’s motion for a determination on attorneys’ fees.

Download source file
Source 29 2008-10-15

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 30 2008-10-17

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 31 2008-10-28

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Carpediem’s motion for reconsideration.

Download source file
Source 32 2008-10-31

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 33 2008-11-19

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 34 2008-11-20

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 35 2009-01-12

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 36 2009-01-15

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 37 2010-03-18

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment-entry minute entry finding Carpediem entitled to requested attorneys’ fees and costs after the court balanced the parties’ relative hardships.

FAQ

What did the court decide about the two lots?

The court held that Desert Mountain could not compel Carpediem to maintain and develop the two recorded lots as one unit. Carpediem could pursue development consistent with city approval, the final plat, zoning, and restrictive covenants.

Did the ruling eliminate HOA architectural review?

No. The court expressly said prospective construction plans remained subject to association approval, but that approval could not be unreasonably withheld.

Why did Desert Mountain lose the lot-assemblage issue?

The court found Desert Mountain was not in privity with the City of Scottsdale or Carpediem’s predecessor on the hold-as-one-parcel agreement and was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement. Without standing or contractual rights under that agreement, the association could not force one-parcel treatment.

What role did the restrictive covenants still play?

The ruling preserved Desert Mountain’s ability to enforce restrictive covenants for the association’s benefit. The key point was that covenant enforcement did not equal an automatic right to require the two platted lots to stay assembled.

How did the case end in the collected minute entries?

The January 2009 entries show settlement with the association defendants and withdrawal of remaining claims between Carpediem and another defendant. The March 18, 2010 entry states that judgment was signed and entered after the court found Carpediem entitled to requested fees and costs.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2006-052755 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateMay 7, 2008
Judge / panelHon. Paul A. Katz, Hon. Brian R. Hauser
PartiesCarpediem Investments LLC (Plaintiff, owner) v. Desert Mountain Master Association and related defendants
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 12-349
Topics
CC&RsArchitectural ReviewCovenantsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court held that Desert Mountain Master Association could not compel Carpediem to maintain or develop two recorded lots as one assembled parcel. Carpediem could pursue one combined home or two separate homes if consistent with City of Scottsdale approvals, the final plat, and restrictive covenants, subject to the association’s reasonable architectural-review authority.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package37 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewCarpediem Investments LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions5 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Carpediem Investments LLC bought property in Desert Mountain made up of two platted lots that prior owners had treated as one parcel. Desert Mountain and neighboring owners disputed whether Carpediem could undo the lot assemblage and develop the property as two separate lots. The superior court granted Carpediem partial summary judgment against Desert Mountain, holding that the association lacked standing or contractual rights to force the property to remain a single unit. The court preserved the association’s right to enforce restrictive covenants and review construction plans, but said that approval could not be unreasonably withheld and did not itself make the two lots legally inseparable. The association defendants later settled, and a final judgment awarded Carpediem attorneys’ fees and costs.

Key Issues & Findings

The key May 7, 2008 under-advisement ruling separated the association’s covenant-enforcement role from the city’s parcel-assembly paperwork. The court found that Desert Mountain was not in privity with the City of Scottsdale or Carpediem’s predecessor on the covenant and agreement to hold the property as one parcel, and also was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement. On that record, the association lacked standing or contractual rights to compel Carpediem to keep the property assembled as a single unit.

The court still recognized that Desert Mountain could enforce recorded restrictive covenants for the association’s benefit. The ruling did not let Carpediem ignore the governing documents. Instead, it held that Carpediem’s development options depended on city consent to dissolve the one-parcel agreement and on development being consistent with the city zoning, final plat, and restrictive covenants. The court also noted that prospective construction plans remained subject to association approval, but that approval could not be unreasonably withheld.

The earlier December 10, 2007 ruling had already narrowed the case. It rejected Carpediem’s attempt to invalidate the lot tie by summary judgment, granted summary judgment to the real-estate defendants, and granted Desert Mountain summary judgment on promissory estoppel, while leaving genuine issues on negligent misrepresentation and declaratory relief. After the May 2008 ruling, later entries dealt mostly with trial scheduling, sanctions procedure, a stay during a special action, settlement with the association defendants, and the March 2010 final judgment awarding Carpediem fees and costs.

Why It Matters

This case is useful for Arizona HOA readers because it draws a practical boundary around architectural review and covenant enforcement. An association may review plans and enforce recorded restrictions, but this ruling did not let the association convert those powers into a free-standing right to force two city-platted lots to remain assembled as one parcel.

The ruling is especially relevant where a property’s history includes lot combinations, hold-as-one-parcel agreements, or neighbor expectations about future development. The court focused on privity, third-party-beneficiary status, the final plat, city approval, and the recorded restrictions. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but it is a detailed example of how a trial court treated HOA authority over lot assemblage and architectural approval.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Club West Conservancy v. Foothills Club West Community Association

Superior Court HOA Case

A Maricopa County judge held that Foothills Club West could not take over golf-course declarant rights without a 75% Master CC&R amendment vote and could not take final action in executive session.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Club West Conservancy v. Foothills Club West Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-003577.

Scope note: This page covers Club West Conservancy v. Foothills Club West Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-003577) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the July 1, 2020 dismissal ruling, the October 30, 2020 preliminary-injunction ruling, the March 23, 2021 summary-judgment ruling, and the November 10, 2021 Rule 54(c) judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entries, dated November 10, 2021, show a final Rule 54(c) judgment and denial of intervention; they do not show any appellate outcome. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court ruled that Foothills Club West Community Association could not become declarant under the Golf Course Declaration without following the Master CC&Rs’ 75% member-vote amendment process for annexing property. It also held that the association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by accepting the assignment and executing amendments in executive session, because the statute permits closed sessions for limited advice or discussion topics but not final votes or action.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Club West Conservancy (Plaintiff)
    Arizona nonprofit corporation whose pleaded purpose was to protect members affected by the association’s golf-course actions.
  • Francis J. Slavin (Counsel)
    Counsel for Club West Conservancy in the minute entries.
  • Daniel J. Slavin (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Club West Conservancy in later minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Foothills Club West Community Association (Defendant)
    Planned-community association that accepted the Golf Course Declaration declarant-rights assignment and executed later amendments.
  • Michael P. Hinz (Defendant)
    Board-member defendant and association president identified in the rulings as signing the 2018 First Amendment.
  • Paul Moroz (Defendant)
    Board-member defendant identified in the rulings as signing the 2010 Assignment of Declarant Rights as then-president.
  • Martha Neese (Defendant)
    Board-member defendant who appeared in the minute entries.
  • Christopher Geist (Defendant)
    Board-member defendant listed in the case-party records.
  • Fred Kaiser (Defendant)
    Board-member defendant listed in the case-party records.
  • Thomas Townsend (Defendant)
    Board-member defendant listed in the case-party records.
  • Carlotta L. Turman (Counsel)
    Counsel for the association defendants in the minute entries.
  • Jeffrey G. Solloway (Counsel)
    Counsel for the association defendants in the early motion-to-dismiss and later proceedings.
  • Scott Carpenter (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the association defendants in the early proceedings.
  • Timothy H. Barnes (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the association defendants in later proceedings.

Neutral Parties

  • The Edge at Club West, LLC (Proposed intervenor)
    Filed a motion to intervene after summary judgment; the court denied intervention on November 10, 2021.
  • Daniel G. Dowd (Counsel)
    Counsel associated with The Edge at Club West, LLC in the intervention-related minute entries.
  • Daniel J. Kiley (Judge)
    Superior Court judge who denied dismissal and entered the preliminary-injunction ruling.
  • Andrew J. Russell (Judge)
    Superior Court judicial officer who issued the March 23, 2021 summary-judgment ruling.
  • Joan M. Sinclair (Judge)
    Superior Court judge who entered costs, final judgment, and the intervention ruling.

What happened

Foothills Club West is a master planned community with a separate Golf Course Declaration. The Master CC&Rs required 75% owner approval for most amendments, including amendments involving addition or annexation of property. The Golf Course Declaration restricted the golf-course property to golf-course and related uses and allowed the original declarant to transfer declarant rights by recorded instrument.

The association accepted an Assignment of Declarant Rights in 2010. In 2018, the association signed a First Amendment to the Golf Course Declaration adding a process for member approval of a future change from golf use to non-golf use. The Conservancy alleged the association and board members lacked authority to accept those declarant rights, lacked authority to amend the Golf Course Declaration, and used executive sessions in a way that violated Arizona’s planned-community open-meeting statute.

Judge Daniel Kiley first denied the association defendants’ motion to dismiss. The July 1, 2020 ruling held the Conservancy had sufficiently pleaded representational standing, that the golf-course owner was not a basis for dismissal under Rule 19, that A.R.S. § 10-3304 did not bar declaratory relief, and that Paragraph 11.8 of the CC&Rs was broad enough to let owners enforce the governing documents through the Conservancy.

After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Kiley entered a preliminary injunction. The October 30, 2020 ruling found serious questions about whether the board could accept declarant rights and amend the Golf Course Declaration in executive session, and about whether a tract declaration could use a lower amendment threshold than the 75% threshold in the Master Declaration. The injunction barred votes to amend the governing documents to authorize non-golf use or development while the merits were pending.

Judge Andrew Russell later resolved the merits on summary judgment. The March 23, 2021 ruling held that accepting declarant rights effectively brought the golf-course property under association control and therefore required compliance with the Master CC&Rs’ annexation/amendment process. The court also held the association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 because accepting the assignment and executing amendments occurred in executive session, and executive sessions may not be used for final votes or action.

Final Rule 54(c) judgment was entered November 10, 2021. The judgment declared the Assignment of Declarant Rights, the First Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment null and void ab initio; held Shea Homes did not validly transfer declarant rights to the association; held the association did not become declarant under the Golf Course Declaration; awarded the Conservancy $5,108.83 plus interest; released the injunction bond; and stated no matters remained pending.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Club West Conservancy v. Foothills Club West Community Association (CV2020-003577 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA lacked authority to accept golf-course declarant rights without a 75% CC&R amendment vote. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Club West Conservancy v. Foothills Club West Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2020-03-16 Club West Conservancy files suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief over the association’s recorded assignment and amendments.
Step 2020-07-01 Under-advisement ruling denies the association defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Step 2020-10-21 The court holds the preliminary-injunction evidentiary hearing and takes the application under advisement.
Step 2020-10-30 Under-advisement ruling grants a preliminary injunction barring votes to authorize non-golf use or development of the golf-course property.
Step 2020-12-01 Formal preliminary-injunction order is entered.
Step 2021-01-22 The court hears argument on defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion and the Conservancy’s cross-motion.
Step 2021-03-23 Under-advisement ruling grants the Conservancy summary judgment and denies defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion.
Step 2021-05-05 The court awards the Conservancy $5,108.83 in taxable costs.
Step 2021-08-17 The parties agree to judgment-language changes and a 4.25% interest rate while an intervention motion remains pending.
Step 2021-11-10 Final Rule 54(c) judgment declares the assignment and amendments null and void, releases the injunction bond, and states no matters remain pending.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/club-west-conservancy-v-foothills-club-west-community-association/raw/: 20 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2020-05-29

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry setting oral argument on the association defendants’ motion to dismiss after they withdrew their motion for summary disposition.

Source 2 2020-06-15

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Order-to-show-cause minute entry setting a preliminary-injunction hearing and directing the parties to address a temporary restraining order barring Golf Course Declaration votes.

Download source file
Source 3 2020-06-22

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry setting an evidentiary hearing on temporary injunctive relief and taking the association defendants’ motion to dismiss under advisement.

Download source file
Source 4 2020-06-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Correcting minute entry replacing the remote-hearing information for the July 6 evidentiary hearing.

Download source file
Source 5 2020-07-01

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the association defendants’ motion to dismiss and holding Club West Conservancy had pleaded enough to pursue declaratory and injunctive claims over the Golf Course Declaration.

Source 6 2020-07-06

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry vacating the evidentiary hearing by agreement and setting a telephonic status conference.

Source 7 2020-07-10

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry recording the parties’ agreement to resolve the temporary-restraining-order issue and resetting the preliminary-injunction hearing.

Source 8 2020-09-17

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Club West Conservancy additional time to respond to the association defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion.

Download source file
Source 9 2020-09-28

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry resetting the preliminary-injunction hearing at counsel’s request.

Source 10 2020-10-21

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Preliminary-injunction hearing minute entry receiving testimony and exhibits, denying the defendants’ oral request to deny injunctive relief, and taking the application under advisement.

Download source file
Source 11 2020-10-30

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting a preliminary injunction that barred votes to amend the Golf Course Declaration or Master Declaration to allow non-golf use or development of the golf-course property.

Source 12 2020-12-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling entering the formal preliminary-injunction order with modifications consistent with the court’s written injunction ruling.

Download source file
Source 13 2020-12-09

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry setting argument on the association defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion and Club West Conservancy’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Source 14 2021-01-22

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry taking the competing summary-judgment motions under advisement.

Download source file
Source 15 2021-03-23

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the association defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion, granting Club West Conservancy summary judgment, and holding the association lacked authority to accept declarant rights without a 75% Master CC&R amendment vote and violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by acting in executive session.

Source 16 2021-05-05

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry awarding Club West Conservancy $5,108.83 in taxable costs after the summary-judgment ruling resolved the case.

Source 17 2021-07-22

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry setting a status conference on the proposed Rule 54(c) judgment.

Source 18 2021-08-17

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry recording agreed changes to the proposed judgment and delaying entry until the pending intervention motion was resolved.

Source 19 2021-11-10

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Rule 54(c) judgment declaring the Assignment of Declarant Rights, First Amendment, and Fifth Amendment null and void ab initio, holding the association did not become declarant, awarding Club West Conservancy $5,108.83 plus interest, releasing the injunction bond, and stating no matters remained pending.

Source 20 2021-11-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying The Edge at Club West, LLC’s motion to intervene and related requests while stating the judgment would track the under-advisement ruling.

Download source file

FAQ

What did Club West Conservancy challenge?

The Conservancy challenged the association’s recorded acceptance of Golf Course Declaration declarant rights and later amendments to that declaration, arguing the association had no authority to act as declarant or change the declaration through executive-session board action.

Why did the court say a 75% vote mattered?

The court treated accepting the golf-course declarant role as effectively bringing the golf-course property under association control. Because the original 20-year annexation pathway had expired, the court held the only available route was a Master CC&R amendment under Section 11.2, which required approval by members owning at least 75% of all lots.

What did the court decide under A.R.S. § 33-1804?

The court held that the association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by accepting declarant rights and executing amendments in executive session. The statute allows closed sessions for limited topics such as legal advice, but the court held those topics do not include voting or otherwise taking final action.

Did the preliminary injunction decide the whole case?

No. The October 2020 preliminary injunction preserved the status quo by barring votes to authorize non-golf use or development while the case continued. The merits were resolved later in the March 23, 2021 summary-judgment ruling.

What did the final judgment void?

The November 10, 2021 judgment declared the 2010 Assignment of Declarant Rights, the 2018 First Amendment, and the 2019 Fifth Amendment null and void ab initio, and held the association did not become declarant under the Golf Course Declaration.

Is this ruling binding precedent for other HOA disputes?

No. It is a superior-court ruling, so it binds only the parties. It is still educational because it lays out a detailed trial-court analysis of CC&R hierarchy, annexation authority, and A.R.S. § 33-1804 open-meeting limits.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2020-003577 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateMarch 23, 2021
Judge / panelHon. Daniel J. Kiley, Hon. Andrew J. Russell, Hon. Joan M. Sinclair
PartiesClub West Conservancy (Plaintiff) v. Foothills Club West Community Association and board-member defendants (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
CC&RsAmendmentsOpen MeetingsBoard GovernanceProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Club West Conservancy summary judgment, denied the association defendants’ partial summary-judgment motion, held that Foothills Club West Community Association could not accept golf-course declarant rights without following the Master CC&Rs’ 75% amendment-vote requirement, and held the association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by taking the assignment and amendment actions in executive session.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package20 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewClub West Conservancy v. Foothills Club West Community Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Club West Conservancy sued Foothills Club West Community Association and board-member defendants over the association’s acceptance of declarant rights under the Foothills Club West Golf Course Declaration and later amendments to that declaration. The court first denied the association defendants’ motion to dismiss, allowing the Conservancy to proceed on representational standing and CC&R-enforcement theories. After an evidentiary hearing, the court entered a preliminary injunction barring votes to amend the Golf Course Declaration or Master Declaration to allow non-golf use or development of the golf-course property. On summary judgment, the court ruled for the Conservancy: accepting declarant rights effectively annexed the golf-course property and required a 75% member vote to amend the Master CC&Rs, and the association violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by voting and taking action in executive session. Final Rule 54(c) judgment declared the assignment and two amendments null and void ab initio and awarded costs to the Conservancy.

Key Issues & Findings

The court treated the association’s acceptance of the Golf Course Declaration declarant rights as more than a simple transfer of contract rights. Although the Golf Course Declaration allowed the original declarant to transfer rights, the court held the receiving association also had to be authorized by its own Master CC&Rs to take control over the golf-course property. Because accepting the declarant role brought additional property under the association’s control, the court characterized it as annexation. The Master CC&Rs’ original 20-year annexation pathway had expired, the golf course did not fit the separate non-annexable-property provision, and Section 11.2 required a 75% member vote to amend the Master CC&Rs for annexation.

The court also enforced Arizona’s open-meeting statute for planned communities. It found no factual dispute that the association accepted the declarant-rights assignment and executed later Golf Course Declaration amendments in executive session. The court rejected the argument that a board may take final action behind closed doors because counsel is present or legal advice is involved. A.R.S. § 33-1804 allows executive sessions for limited topics such as legal advice and litigation discussion, but the court held none of those authorized topics includes voting or otherwise taking action.

Earlier rulings shaped the case but did not end it. The July 2020 dismissal ruling held the Conservancy could proceed based on representational standing, the CC&Rs’ owner-enforcement clause, and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The October 2020 preliminary-injunction ruling found serious questions about both executive-session action and whether a tract declaration could use a lower amendment threshold than the Master Declaration. The March 2021 summary-judgment ruling then resolved the merits, and the November 2021 judgment declared the Assignment of Declarant Rights, First Amendment, and Fifth Amendment null and void ab initio.

Why It Matters

This case is a detailed Arizona superior-court example of an HOA board’s limits when trying to control property and amendment rights outside the ordinary common-area structure. The ruling did not say a golf-course declaration could never be assigned; it said this association could not accept that role unless its own Master CC&Rs authorized the resulting annexation, which required a 75% member-approved amendment.

The open-meeting holding is equally important for board governance. The court read A.R.S. § 33-1804 to permit closed executive sessions for advice and discussion on listed topics, but not for final votes or action. As a superior-court ruling it is not precedent, but it is a strong must-read trial-court treatment of CC&R hierarchy, tract declarations, annexation, open meetings, and member control over major community changes.

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Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Superior Court HOA Case

A Maricopa County judge upheld Desert Mountain’s short-term-rental amendment, rejected open-meeting and voting-threshold challenges, and awarded the association fees and costs.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-015165.

Scope note: This page covers Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-015165) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, especially the July 29, 2019 under-advisement ruling and the October 24, 2019 under-advisement rulings on clarification, amendment, fees, and costs; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated May 19, 2020, shows the court denied Desert Mountain’s supplemental fee application as untimely and granted Nicdon’s motion to quash after a supersedeas bond was posted; the minute entries reviewed here do not show the appellate outcome. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court upheld Desert Mountain’s short-term-rental amendment. It held that the Master Declaration expressly allowed the board to add use restrictions through the Section 5.20 major-decision procedure, that the association used the correct voting threshold when more than two-thirds of the votes cast at the called meeting approved the amendment, and that Arizona law did not make the restriction invalid. Later, the court denied Nicdon leave to add an open-meeting theory because the request came after summary judgment and would be futile, then awarded Desert Mountain its fees and costs as the prevailing party.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Nicdon 10663 LLC (Plaintiff)
    Owner of a residence within Desert Mountain Master Association that challenged the association’s 2018 short-term-rental amendment.
  • Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
    Counsel for Nicdon in the minute entries, including the February 2019 hearing and later proceedings.
  • Jacob A. Kubert (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Nicdon at the May 2019 status conference and June 2019 oral argument.

Respondent Side

  • Desert Mountain Master Association (Defendant)
    Homeowners association that adopted and defended the 2018 amendment to its Master Declaration restricting short-term rentals.
  • Curtis S. Ekmark (Counsel)
    Counsel for Desert Mountain throughout the minute entries.
  • Gregory A. Stein (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing with Curtis S. Ekmark for Desert Mountain at the February, June, and October 2019 hearings.

Neutral Parties

  • Colleen L. French (Judge)
    Judicial officer who handled the February 2019 order-to-show-cause return hearing.
  • Danielle J. Viola (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the July 2019 and October 2019 under-advisement rulings.
  • M. Scott McCoy (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who handled post-judgment bond, stay, subpoena, and supplemental-fee matters.

What happened

Nicdon 10663 LLC owned a residence in Desert Mountain. In 2018, Desert Mountain Master Association recorded an amendment to its Master Declaration that restricted short-term rentals to eligible renters and generally barred rentals to ineligible renters for periods of less than thirty days. The court described the core dispute as whether the association followed the correct procedure to adopt that rental restriction and whether the restriction was valid.

The association first tried a 60-day rental proposal, received substantial owner objections, then rescinded that proposal and moved forward with a 30-day minimum. The February 2018 board resolution triggered the Section 5.20 objection process. More than ten percent of members objected, so the matter went to a member vote. The ruling states that 1,323 owners voted for the amendment, 430 voted against it, and 8 abstained out of 1,761 votes cast.

Nicdon argued the amendment was invalid because the declaration did not warn buyers that the association could add a new 30-day rental minimum, because the amendment allegedly favored the Desert Mountain Golf Club, because Arizona law required a different level of consent, and because the amendment process allegedly violated open-meeting requirements and the governing documents. Desert Mountain argued Section 4.2 expressly allowed use restrictions to be amended or added, and Section 5.20 supplied the voting process for that major decision.

Judge Danielle J. Viola granted Desert Mountain summary judgment on July 29, 2019. The court held that Section 4.2 expressly contemplated adding use restrictions, Section 5.20 required two-thirds of eligible votes present in person or by absentee ballot at the called meeting rather than a majority of all members, the amendment applied uniformly, and A.R.S. § 33-1806 supported enforcement of declaration-based rental time-period restrictions. The court also found Nicdon had not shown that alleged open-meeting problems voided the later owner vote.

On October 24, 2019, the court clarified that the July ruling did not give Nicdon any new right to rent to prospective club members who were not eligible renters under the amendment. The same ruling denied Nicdon leave to file an amended complaint, awarded Desert Mountain $109,145.00 in attorneys’ fees and $4,673.79 in costs, and denied Nicdon’s fee request. Later entries denied Nicdon’s new-trial motion, set a supersedeas bond, temporarily stayed enforcement after a subpoena dispute, and denied Desert Mountain’s supplemental fee application as untimely.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association (CV2018-015165 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). CC&R amendment adding a 30-day rental minimum upheld under the declaration’s voting procedure. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Nicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2018-07 Desert Mountain records an amendment to its Master Declaration restricting short-term rentals.
Step 2019-02-14 The court denies Nicdon Rule 56(d) relief and sets a response deadline on Desert Mountain’s summary-judgment motion.
Step 2019-06-07 The court hears argument on the competing summary-judgment, strike, Rule 56(d), and Rule 11 filings and takes several motions under advisement.
Step 2019-07-29 Under-advisement ruling grants Desert Mountain summary judgment, denies Nicdon summary judgment, denies the motion to strike and Rule 11 motion, and holds the rental amendment valid.
Step 2019-10-21 The court hears argument on proposed judgments, fee applications, clarification, and Nicdon’s motion for leave to amend.
Step 2019-10-24 Under-advisement ruling grants Desert Mountain clarification, denies Nicdon leave to amend, awards Desert Mountain fees and costs, and denies Nicdon’s fee request.
Step 2020-01-15 The court denies Nicdon’s Rule 59 motion for new trial.
Step 2020-04-03 The court sets the supersedeas bond at $113,818.79.
Step 2020-04-07 The court stays Bank of America document production and stays judgment enforcement for thirty days.
Step 2020-05-19 The court denies Desert Mountain’s supplemental fee application as untimely and grants Nicdon’s motion to quash because a supersedeas bond had been posted.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/nicdon-10663-llc-v-desert-mountain-master-association/raw/: 17 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2019-02-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry denying Nicdon’s Rule 56(d) relief and setting a deadline for its response to Desert Mountain’s summary-judgment motion.

Download source file
Source 2 2019-05-07

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry setting oral argument on Desert Mountain’s summary-judgment motion.

Source 3 2019-05-17

Status Conference

Type: Court/source PDF

Status-conference minute entry adding all pending summary-judgment, strike, Rule 56(d), and Rule 11 motions to the June 7 argument.

Source 4 2019-05-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry ordering Desert Mountain to clarify its Rule 56(d) request or have the request deemed abandoned.

Download source file
Source 5 2019-06-07

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry taking Nicdon’s summary-judgment motion, Desert Mountain’s motion to strike, and Desert Mountain’s Rule 11 motion under advisement.

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Source 6 2019-07-29

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Desert Mountain summary judgment, denying Nicdon summary judgment, denying the motion to strike and Rule 11 motion, and holding the rental amendment valid under the declaration and Arizona law.

Source 7 2019-10-03

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Minute entry setting argument on proposed judgments, fee applications, Desert Mountain’s clarification motion, and Nicdon’s motion for leave to amend.

Source 8 2019-10-21

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Oral-argument minute entry taking the competing fee applications, proposed judgments, clarification motion, and motion for leave to amend under advisement.

Download source file
Source 9 2019-10-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Correcting minute entry revising the July 29 summary-judgment ruling’s cross-motion standard while leaving the balance of the ruling unchanged.

Download source file
Source 10 2019-10-24

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Desert Mountain clarification, denying Nicdon leave to amend, awarding Desert Mountain $109,145.00 in attorneys’ fees and $4,673.79 in costs, and denying Nicdon’s fee request.

Source 11 2020-01-15

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Nicdon’s Rule 59 motion for new trial without oral argument.

Download source file
Source 12 2020-02-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry correcting Judge McCoy’s division contact information.

Download source file
Source 13 2020-03-10

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Hearing-set minute entry denying expedited treatment and setting an evidentiary hearing on Nicdon’s supersedeas-bond and stay motion.

Source 14 2020-03-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Minute entry converting the supersedeas-bond evidentiary hearing to a telephonic hearing because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Download source file
Source 15 2020-04-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling setting the supersedeas bond at $113,818.79 and vacating the scheduled evidentiary hearing.

Download source file
Source 16 2020-04-07

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Emergency-hearing minute entry staying Bank of America document production and staying enforcement of the judgment for thirty days.

Download source file
Source 17 2020-05-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Desert Mountain’s supplemental fee-and-cost application as untimely and granting Nicdon’s motion to quash because a supersedeas bond had been posted.

Download source file

FAQ

What rental restriction did the court uphold?

The court upheld Desert Mountain’s amendment to its Master Declaration restricting rentals to ineligible renters for periods of less than thirty days, while allowing rentals to eligible renters as defined in the amendment.

Why did the court say the association used the right voting threshold?

Section 5.20 allowed a major decision to proceed, after more than ten percent of members objected, if approved by two-thirds of eligible votes present in person or by absentee ballot at a meeting called for that purpose. The court held that language required two-thirds of the votes cast at the called meeting, not a majority of all members.

Did the court require unanimous owner consent?

No. The court rejected Nicdon’s unanimous-consent argument, including its reliance on the Arizona Condominium Act’s A.R.S. § 33-1227(D), because the case involved a homeowners association and the declaration itself contained a specific amendment process for use restrictions.

How did A.R.S. § 33-1806 matter?

The court read A.R.S. § 33-1806 as supporting enforcement of rental time-period restrictions when those restrictions are in the declaration, and it noted that A.R.S. § 33-1802 includes amendments within the declaration.

What happened to Nicdon’s open-meeting theory?

The court found the theory was not clearly pleaded before summary judgment and, even if considered, Nicdon had not cited authority showing that an alleged A.R.S. § 33-1804 problem would void a later properly noticed owner vote approving the amendment.

Why were fees awarded to Desert Mountain?

The court treated Desert Mountain as the prevailing party under the declaration’s fee provision and as the successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. It awarded $109,145.00 in attorneys’ fees and $4,673.79 in costs after reducing the requested fees for excessive amounts tied to unsuccessful procedural motions.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2018-015165 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateOctober 24, 2019
Judge / panelHon. Colleen L. French, Hon. Danielle J. Viola, Hon. M. Scott McCoy
PartiesNicdon 10663 LLC (Plaintiff, owner) v. Desert Mountain Master Association (Defendant, homeowners association)
Governing law
Topics
AmendmentsRental RestrictionsOpen MeetingsCC&RsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court upheld Desert Mountain’s short-term-rental amendment, granted the association summary judgment, denied Nicdon’s competing summary-judgment motion, denied leave to amend, and awarded Desert Mountain $109,145.00 in attorneys’ fees plus $4,673.79 in costs.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package17 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewNicdon 10663 LLC v. Desert Mountain Master Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Nicdon 10663 LLC challenged Desert Mountain Master Association’s 2018 amendment to its Master Declaration restricting short-term rentals. The superior court granted Desert Mountain summary judgment, holding that Section 4.2 expressly allowed the board to add use restrictions through the Section 5.20 major-decision process, that Section 5.20 required approval by two-thirds of eligible votes present in person or by absentee ballot at the called meeting rather than a majority of all members, and that the amendment was not inconsistent with Arizona law. The court rejected Nicdon’s open-meeting and procedural-defect theories as either not properly pleaded or not a basis to void the member-approved amendment, denied leave to amend as delayed, prejudicial, and futile, and awarded Desert Mountain attorneys’ fees and costs.

Key Issues & Findings

On the CC&R amendment issue, the court read Section 4.2 and Section 5.20 together. Section 4.2 said the board had the right to amend, repeal, or add use restrictions in Exhibit E, subject to member approval under Section 5.20. Section 5.20 then created a major-decision process: after board approval and notice to owners, if more than ten percent objected, the decision could be authorized by two-thirds of eligible votes present in person or by absentee ballot at a meeting called for that purpose. Because the board adopted a written resolution, more than ten percent objected, and 1,323 of 1,761 votes cast favored the amendment, the court held the declaration’s voting requirement was satisfied.

The court rejected Nicdon’s arguments that unanimous consent, a majority of all members, or the Arizona Condominium Act’s A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) standard controlled. It distinguished cases such as Dreamland and Wilson because Desert Mountain’s declaration already gave notice that use restrictions existed and could be amended, and because the rental amendment did not force owners into a new association or assessment structure. The court also concluded A.R.S. § 33-1806 supported enforcement of declaration-based rental time-period restrictions, and A.R.S. § 33-1802 included amendments within the declaration.

On procedure and open meetings, the court found Nicdon had not clearly pleaded the theory that earlier board conduct invalidated the amendment, and in any event had not cited authority showing that an alleged A.R.S. § 33-1804 violation would void a later properly noticed member vote. After summary judgment, the court denied Nicdon leave to amend because the request came after briefing, argument, and ruling; the proposed amendment would be futile in light of the court’s earlier analysis; and delay and prejudice weighed against reopening the case. The court then treated Desert Mountain as the prevailing party under the declaration’s fee provision and, independently, as the successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, while reducing the requested fee award for excessive amounts tied to unsuccessful procedural motions.

Why It Matters

This ruling is useful for Arizona HOA rental-restriction disputes because it shows how much turns on the recorded declaration’s amendment language. The court did not treat a short-term-rental restriction as automatically invalid merely because it added a new practical limit on rentals; it enforced the amendment because the declaration expressly allowed new use restrictions and specified a member-vote process that the association followed.

The case also shows the limits of open-meeting and procedural objections when the requested remedy is to void an owner-approved amendment. The court recognized A.R.S. § 33-1804 but found no authority in the record requiring invalidation of a later properly noticed member vote. As a superior-court ruling, it binds only the parties, but it is a detailed example of how a trial court analyzed CC&R amendment authority, rental-period restrictions, and fee-shifting after an association prevailed.

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Joyce Jasper-Burnett v. Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Fiduciary Duty & Negligence | Rule 12(b)(6) | CV2017-015815

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, Joyce Jasper-Burnett brought claims of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel against the Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association, and aiding-and-abetting and negligence claims against co-defendant AAM, LLC. Applying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, the court dismissed the fiduciary-duty count against the Association and the negligence count against AAM, allowed the remaining counts to proceed, and — after the case was confirmed on the arbitration track and referred to a settlement conference — the parties settled in March 2019.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Joyce Jasper-Burnett v. Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2017-015815.

Scope note: This page covers Joyce Jasper-Burnett v. Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2017-015815) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the July 18, 2018 under-advisement ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. The minute entries recite the counts pleaded and the court’s orders but do not recite the underlying factual allegations. Currency caveat: the collected entries end with the court’s March 6, 2019 order — entered after the parties filed a Notice of Settlement — setting the case for dismissal on May 6, 2019 unless dismissal papers were submitted; the final dismissal order itself is not among the collected entries. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

In its July 18, 2018 under-advisement ruling, the court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part and denied it in part. It dismissed Count Two — breach of fiduciary duty against the Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association and negligence against AAM, LLC — but denied dismissal of Count Three (negligence) and Count Four (equitable estoppel) against the Association and Count One (aiding and abetting) against AAM. Applying the standard from Coleman v. City of Mesa, the court accepted the plaintiff’s alleged facts as true and asked only whether dismissal was permitted because the plaintiff “would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” The surviving claims never reached trial: the case was confirmed on the arbitration track, referred to a settlement conference, and resolved by settlement in March 2019.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Joyce Jasper-Burnett (Plaintiff)
    Plaintiff who sued the Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association and AAM, LLC on counts including negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel.
  • Joseph C. Dolan (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for Plaintiff Joyce Jasper-Burnett, appearing at the June 2018 oral argument and the later status conferences.
  • Sally Odegard (Counsel)
    Listed as counsel for the plaintiff in the court’s case-party records; she does not appear in the collected minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association (Defendant)
    Townhouse association defendant. The court dismissed the breach-of-fiduciary-duty count against it but allowed the negligence and equitable-estoppel counts to proceed.
  • AAM, LLC (Defendant)
    Co-defendant. The court dismissed the negligence count against it but allowed the aiding-and-abetting count to proceed.
  • Nicholas C.S. Nogami (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for Defendants Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association and AAM, LLC throughout the collected minute entries.
  • Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the Defendants, including at the June 27, 2018 oral argument (in place of Mr. Nogami) and the February 27, 2019 status conference.

Neutral Parties

  • Pamela Gates (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the motion-to-dismiss argument, issued the July 18, 2018 under-advisement ruling, and presided over the settlement-conference and arbitration proceedings.
  • Randall H. Warner (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge assigned earlier in the case; set the June 2018 oral argument before the calendar rotated to Judge Gates.
  • Nicholas C. Abdo (Arbitrator)
    Court-appointed arbitrator who filed a Notice of Potential Conflict in February 2019; the court excused him after the plaintiff objected to his continuing on the case.

What happened

Joyce Jasper-Burnett sued the Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association (the “Association”) and AAM, LLC in Maricopa County Superior Court under 2017 case number CV2017-015815. As reflected in the court’s July 2018 ruling, her complaint included counts for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel against the Association, and counts for aiding and abetting and negligence against AAM. The collected minute entries do not recite the underlying factual allegations behind those counts.

On April 23, 2018 the defendants jointly moved to dismiss certain counts of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Judge Randall H. Warner set oral argument for June 27, 2018, noting that the June judicial rotation would move the civil calendar to Judge Pamela Gates. At the June 27 argument, Joseph C. Dolan appeared for the plaintiff and Lydia A. Peirce Linsmeier appeared for the defendants in place of Nicholas C.S. Nogami; Judge Gates took the motion under advisement.

Judge Gates issued the under-advisement ruling on July 18, 2018. Quoting Coleman v. City of Mesa, the court framed the question as whether the facts alleged were sufficient “to warrant allowing the [Plaintiff] to attempt to prove [her] case,” accepting all material facts alleged by the plaintiff as true and permitting dismissal only when a plaintiff “would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Applying that standard, the court denied dismissal of Count Three (negligence) and Count Four (equitable estoppel) against the Association and Count One (aiding and abetting) against AAM, but granted dismissal of Count Two — breach of fiduciary duty against the Association and negligence against AAM.

The case then moved toward resolution. In October 2018 the parties jointly asked for a referral to a settlement conference, and at a November 7, 2018 status conference the court granted the request, referring the case to the Superior Court’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Department for appointment of a judge pro tempore to conduct a mandatory settlement conference no later than February 11, 2019. Plaintiff’s counsel confirmed the case was on the arbitration track, and the matter was continued on the dismissal calendar to February 28, 2019.

In February 2019 the parties jointly requested an emergency status conference. At that conference on February 27, 2019, the court found the parties had not knowingly or intentionally waived their right to arbitration and ordered arbitration to proceed. The court-appointed arbitrator, Nicholas C. Abdo, had filed a Notice of Potential Conflict; after the plaintiff’s counsel objected to his continuing, the court excused Mr. Abdo and sent the case to the arbitration desk for appointment of a new arbitrator. The dismissal deadline was extended to August 27, 2019.

Arbitration never ran its course. The parties filed a Notice of Settlement on March 5, 2019, and the next day the court vacated the August dismissal deadline, set the case for dismissal on May 6, 2019 unless a stipulated judgment or stipulation for dismissal was submitted, and deemed all pending motions moot. The collected minute entries end there.

Procedural timeline

Step 2018-04-23 Defendants Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association and AAM, LLC move to dismiss certain counts of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).
Step 2018-05-31 Judge Warner sets oral argument on the motion to dismiss for June 27, 2018, noting the civil calendar will rotate to Judge Gates in June.
Step 2018-06-27 Oral argument before Judge Gates; the motion is taken under advisement.
Step 2018-07-18 Under-advisement ruling: the breach-of-fiduciary-duty count against the Association and the negligence count against AAM are dismissed; the negligence and equitable-estoppel counts against the Association and the aiding-and-abetting count against AAM proceed.
Step 2018-10-16 The parties file a Joint Request for Referral to Settlement Conference.
Step 2018-11-07 Status conference: the case is confirmed on the arbitration track, referred to the ADR Department for a mandatory settlement conference no later than February 11, 2019, and continued on the dismissal calendar to February 28, 2019.
Step 2019-02-27 Status conference: the court finds no knowing or intentional waiver of arbitration and orders arbitration to proceed; arbitrator Nicholas C. Abdo is excused after the plaintiff’s objection, and the dismissal deadline is extended to August 27, 2019.
Step 2019-03-05 The parties file a Notice of Settlement.
Step 2019-03-06 The court vacates the August deadline, sets the case for dismissal on May 6, 2019 unless dismissal papers are submitted, and deems all pending motions moot.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/joyce-jasper-burnett-v-chateau-de-vie-four-townhouse-association/raw/: 10 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2018-05-31

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 2 2018-06-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 3 2018-07-18

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count Three, Negligence against the Association.

Source 4 2018-10-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 5 2018-11-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 6 2018-11-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 7 2019-02-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 8 2019-02-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 9 2019-02-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 10 2019-03-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

FAQ

What claims were at issue in this case?

According to the court’s July 18, 2018 ruling, the complaint included counts for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel against the Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association, and counts for aiding and abetting and negligence against AAM, LLC. The minute entries recite the counts and the court’s orders but do not describe the underlying factual allegations behind them.

What did the court decide in the July 18, 2018 ruling?

The court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part and denied it in part. It dismissed Count Two — breach of fiduciary duty against the Association and negligence against AAM, LLC — but denied dismissal of Count Three (negligence) and Count Four (equitable estoppel) against the Association and Count One (aiding and abetting) against AAM, allowing those claims to move forward.

What standard did the court apply to the motion to dismiss?

The Rule 12(b)(6) standard from Arizona case law, including Coleman v. City of Mesa. The court asked only whether the facts alleged in the complaint were sufficient “to warrant allowing the [Plaintiff] to attempt to prove [her] case,” accepted all material facts alleged by the plaintiff as true, and could dismiss only if the plaintiff “would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Surviving that standard means only that a claim may proceed — not that it will ultimately succeed.

Did the case go to trial or arbitration?

Neither. The case was on the superior court’s arbitration track — in February 2019 the court found the parties had not waived arbitration and ordered it to proceed — but before a new arbitrator could take up the case, the parties filed a Notice of Settlement on March 5, 2019. The court then set the case for dismissal and deemed all pending motions moot.

Why was the court-appointed arbitrator removed?

The court-appointed arbitrator, Nicholas C. Abdo, filed a Notice of Potential Conflict in February 2019. Plaintiff’s counsel objected to his continuing on the case, so the court excused him, sent the case to the Civil Court Administration/Arbitration Desk for appointment of a new arbitrator, and directed that Mr. Abdo be appointed as arbitrator in the next available case instead.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The July 2018 ruling is still useful reading as an example of how Arizona courts screen homeowner claims against associations at the pleading stage: some counts were dismissed outright while others survived to be litigated. Because the case settled, no court ever decided the merits of the surviving claims.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2017-015815 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateJuly 18, 2018
Judge / panelHon. Pamela Gates, Hon. Randall H. Warner
PartiesJoyce Jasper-Burnett (Plaintiff) v. Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association and AAM, LLC (Defendants)
Topics
ProcedureBoard GovernanceMembershipNegligence
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss: it dismissed the breach-of-fiduciary-duty count against the Association and the negligence count against AAM, LLC for failure to state a claim, but allowed the negligence and equitable-estoppel counts against the Association and the aiding-and-abetting count against AAM to proceed. The surviving claims were never adjudicated on the merits because the parties settled in March 2019.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package10 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap9 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Joyce Jasper-Burnett sued the Chateau De Vie Four Townhouse Association and AAM, LLC in Maricopa County Superior Court on counts including negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable estoppel against the Association, and aiding and abetting and negligence against AAM; the collected minute entries do not recite the underlying factual allegations. The defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss certain counts, and in a July 18, 2018 under-advisement ruling Judge Pamela Gates granted the motion in part: the breach-of-fiduciary-duty count against the Association and the negligence count against AAM were dismissed, while the negligence and equitable-estoppel counts against the Association and the aiding-and-abetting count against AAM survived. The case was confirmed on the arbitration track and referred to a court-supervised settlement conference; after the court excused the original arbitrator over a potential conflict and ordered arbitration to proceed, the parties filed a Notice of Settlement on March 5, 2019 and the court set the case for dismissal.

Key Issues & Findings

The July 18, 2018 under-advisement ruling turned entirely on the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard. Quoting Coleman v. City of Mesa, the court framed the narrow question as whether the facts alleged in the complaint were sufficient “to warrant allowing the [Plaintiff] to attempt to prove [her] case,” and, citing Fidelity Security Life Insurance Co. v. State Department of Insurance, noted that dismissal is permitted only when a plaintiff “would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” The court accepted all material facts alleged by the plaintiff as true in assessing the motion.

Applying that standard, the court reached a mixed result stated in its orders: it denied dismissal of Count Three (negligence) and Count Four (equitable estoppel) against the Association and Count One (aiding and abetting) against AAM, LLC, but granted dismissal of Count Two — breach of fiduciary duty against the Association and negligence against AAM. The minute entry states the standard and the count-by-count orders without setting out claim-specific analysis, so the ruling’s reasoning on each individual count is not reflected in the collected record.

The rest of the docket shows how the case resolved. The parties jointly sought a settlement-conference referral in October 2018, which the court granted in November while confirming the case remained on the arbitration track. In February 2019 the court found the parties had not knowingly or intentionally waived arbitration and ordered it to proceed, excusing the court-appointed arbitrator after he disclosed a potential conflict and the plaintiff objected. Before a new arbitrator took up the case, the parties filed a Notice of Settlement on March 5, 2019; the court then set the case for dismissal on May 6, 2019 and deemed all pending motions moot.

Why It Matters

This case is a compact example of how homeowner tort suits against Arizona community associations are screened at the pleading stage. The plaintiff’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty count against the townhouse association did not survive the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, while her negligence and equitable-estoppel counts against the association — and an aiding-and-abetting count against co-defendant AAM, LLC — were allowed to proceed because, under Coleman v. City of Mesa, dismissal requires that the plaintiff could not recover under any provable interpretation of the alleged facts.

It also illustrates the procedural machinery that resolves most association disputes short of trial: the compulsory-arbitration track, court-ordered referral to a settlement conference before an ADR judge pro tempore, arbitrator conflict-of-interest handling, and the dismissal-calendar deadlines that keep a settling case moving. The dispute ended in a private settlement, so no court ever ruled on the merits of the surviving claims. As a superior-court minute-entry ruling, the decision binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Legal Malpractice & Attorneys’ Fees | A.R.S. § 12-341.01 | CV2019-094307

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Association sued its former law firm, Jones Skelton & Hochuli, and one of the firm’s attorneys over the settlement of an earlier homeowner lawsuit challenging association spending on a property improvement project. The court held that an attorney’s alleged failure to follow a board settlement committee’s oral directions is negligent performance — a tort — not the breach of separate oral “mini-contracts,” granted the firm summary judgment on the contract count, found the association had waived privilege over its dealings with the successor firm it hired to finish the settlement, and ruled the firm was entitled to attorneys’ fees. The remaining tort claims settled and the case was dismissed with prejudice.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2019-094307.

Scope note: This page covers Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2019-094307) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the December 11, 2019 under-advisement ruling on the breach-of-contract count and the April 9, 2020 under-advisement ruling on privilege and attorneys’ fees; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the parties settled, and the last collected minute entry shows the case was dismissed with prejudice as to all parties and claims on June 30, 2020 — the settlement terms and any final fee amount do not appear in the minute entries. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted Jones Skelton & Hochuli summary judgment on the association’s breach-of-contract count, holding under Keonjian v. Olcott that a professional-malpractice claim generally sounds in tort: an attorney’s alleged failure to follow a client’s oral directions — here, directions from the settlement committee of the HOA’s board — is negligent performance of the retainer, not the nonperformance of a specific promise, and does not create separate oral contracts. Because the association had sued on a contract the court found did not exist, the court ruled the firm was entitled to apply for attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The court also held that by filing the malpractice suit the association waived attorney-client privilege over its communications with the successor law firm it hired to finish the settlement. The remaining tort claims were never adjudicated: the parties settled and the case was dismissed with prejudice on June 30, 2020.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association that retained Jones Skelton & Hochuli to represent it in a prior Pima County lawsuit brought by a homeowner over allegedly wrongful or unauthorized spending of association funds, then sued the firm over its handling of that dispute’s settlement.
  • Mark E. Chadwick (Counsel)
    Counsel for the association, appearing at the December 2019 and March 2020 oral arguments.

Respondent Side

  • Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C. (Defendant)
    Phoenix law firm that represented the association in the underlying homeowner dispute; won summary judgment on the breach-of-contract count and a ruling that a fee award in its favor was appropriate.
  • Diana J. Elston (Defendant)
    Jones Skelton & Hochuli attorney through whom, per the court’s April 2020 ruling, the firm represented the association in negotiating the settlement of the underlying homeowner dispute.
  • Donald Wilson Jr. (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for defendants Jones Skelton & Hochuli and Diana Elston throughout the collected minute entries.
  • Jessica Kokal (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the defendants at the December 10, 2019 and March 3, 2020 oral arguments.
  • Danielle Chronister (Counsel)
    Co-counsel appearing for the defendants at the March 3, 2020 oral argument.

Neutral Parties

  • David J. Palmer (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the December 2019 and April 2020 under-advisement rulings and signed the June 30, 2020 dismissal.

What happened

The dispute grew out of an earlier lawsuit against the association itself. A homeowner in the Sycamore Hills community sued the association in Pima County Superior Court (Zablotny v. Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowner’s Association, No. C20154533), alleging the wrongful and/or unauthorized expenditure of association funds on a property improvement project. The association retained the Phoenix law firm Jones Skelton & Hochuli — through one of its attorneys, Diana Elston — to represent it, including in negotiating a settlement of that dispute. Before the settlement was final, the association brought in a Tucson firm, Goldschmidt Shupe, which took over the final stages of negotiations and completed the settlement on or about March 13, 2017.

Dissatisfied with the settlement, the association sued Jones Skelton & Hochuli in Pima County Superior Court on November 27, 2018 (No. C20185762); venue was changed to Maricopa County Superior Court on or about July 12, 2019, where the case became CV2019-094307. The complaint pleaded three counts: negligence/legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and — against the firm only — breach of contract. The association alleged the firm entered into a settlement agreement without appropriate approval from the association’s board of directors and failed to abide by “oral directions” given by board members, arguing that those oral directions formed a series of “mini-contracts” separate from the written retainer agreement.

The firm moved for summary judgment on the contract count on July 24, 2019. After briefing and a December 10, 2019 oral argument, Judge David J. Palmer issued an under-advisement ruling on December 11, 2019 granting the motion. Relying on Keonjian v. Olcott and Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., the court explained that claims for professional malpractice are generally tort claims, and that the distinction is between nonfeasance and malfeasance: carrying out a task negligently does not change the gravamen of the action from tort to contract. The court was unpersuaded that oral directions from the settlement committee of the association’s board created a new contract separate from the signed retainer agreement, found no genuine issues of material fact, and ordered the firm to submit a proposed form of judgment with Rule 54(b) language.

Two follow-on fights were argued together on March 3, 2020 and decided in an April 9, 2020 under-advisement ruling. The first was discovery: the firm — which had filed a notice naming Goldschmidt Shupe as a non-party at fault — subpoenaed the association’s communications with that successor firm, and the association objected on attorney-client privilege grounds, arguing the parties had agreed to limit discovery to November 29, 2016 through March 15, 2017. Applying the three-part waiver test from Elia v. Pifer, the court found that by filing the lawsuit the association put its Goldschmidt Shupe communications at issue, that those discussions were “clearly relevant and vital” to the malpractice claims, and that privilege was therefore waived as to any communications with Goldschmidt Shupe related to the underlying litigation, the settlement negotiations, or the settlement agreement. It ordered the association and Goldschmidt Shupe to comply with the firm’s second subpoena.

The second issue was attorneys’ fees. Both parties agreed the court had discretion under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 to award fees based on its resolution of the contract question. Citing Lacer v. Navajo County — “[a] party is entitled to an award of its attorney’s fees under A.R.S. §12-341.01 if judgment in its favor is based upon the absence of the contract sued upon by the adverse party” — the court found that an award of attorneys’ fees to be paid by Sycamore Hills to Jones Skelton was appropriate, and set a schedule for the firm’s fee application and the association’s response.

The case never reached trial on the remaining tort counts. The court had ordered a mandatory settlement conference in January 2020 (with the completion deadline later extended to October 30, 2020), and on June 10, 2020 the defendants filed a Notice of Settlement. The court vacated the pretrial conference, placed the matter on the dismissal calendar, and — after the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss on June 28, 2020 — dismissed the case with prejudice as to all parties and claims on June 30, 2020. The settlement terms and any final fee amount do not appear in the minute entries.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., et al. (CV2019-094307 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). An attorney’s alleged failure to follow a client’s oral directions — including directions from the settlement… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., et al.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2017-03-13 (approx.) Goldschmidt Shupe, the Tucson firm the association retained to take over from Jones Skelton & Hochuli, completes the settlement of the underlying homeowner lawsuit (Zablotny v. Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowner’s Association, Pima County No. C20154533).
Step 2018-11-27 The association sues Jones Skelton & Hochuli in Pima County Superior Court (No. C20185762), alleging negligence/legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.
Step 2019-07-12 (approx.) Venue is changed to Maricopa County Superior Court, where the case becomes CV2019-094307.
Step 2019-07-24 Jones Skelton & Hochuli files its Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Breach of Contract (Count 3, against the firm only).
Step 2019-12-10 Oral argument on the summary-judgment motion; the court takes the matter under advisement.
Step 2019-12-11 Under-advisement ruling grants the firm summary judgment on the breach-of-contract count: under Keonjian v. Olcott the claim sounds in tort, and oral directions from the board’s settlement committee did not create separate contracts. Rule 54(b) judgment procedures ordered.
Step 2020-01-30 Pursuant to the parties’ joint scheduling order, the court orders a mandatory settlement conference (deadline later extended to October 30, 2020).
Step 2020-03-03 Oral argument on the discovery dispute over the association’s communications with Goldschmidt Shupe and on the firm’s application for attorneys’ fees; taken under advisement.
Step 2020-04-09 Under-advisement ruling: by suing, the association waived attorney-client privilege over its Goldschmidt Shupe settlement communications (Elia v. Pifer), and a fee award to the firm under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 is appropriate (Lacer v. Navajo County).
Step 2020-06-11 Following the defendants’ June 10 Notice of Settlement, the court vacates the pretrial conference and places the case on the dismissal calendar.
Step 2020-06-30 Per the parties’ June 28 stipulation, the court dismisses the case with prejudice as to all parties and claims.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/sycamore-hills-estates-homeowners-association-v-jones-skelton-hochuli/raw/: 12 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2019-11-21

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 2 2019-12-09

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 3 2019-12-10

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2019-12-11

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Jones Skelton summary judgment on the aiding-and-abetting count.

Source 5 2020-01-24

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 6 2020-01-30

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2020-02-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 8 2020-03-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 9 2020-04-09

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 10 2020-04-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 11 2020-06-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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Source 12 2020-06-30

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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FAQ

Why did a homeowners association sue its own law firm?

The association had been sued by one of its homeowners in Pima County over the allegedly wrongful or unauthorized expenditure of association funds on a property improvement project. Jones Skelton & Hochuli, through attorney Diana Elston, represented the association and negotiated a settlement of that dispute. The association claimed the firm was negligent, breached its fiduciary duty, and breached a contract — alleging the firm entered into the settlement agreement without appropriate board approval and failed to follow oral directions given by board members.

Why did the breach-of-contract claim fail?

Because Arizona case law treats claims for professional malpractice as tort claims unless there is a true failure to perform. Relying on Keonjian v. Olcott and Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., the court explained that the distinction is between nonfeasance and malfeasance: performing a task negligently, even in violation of a client’s instructions, does not change the gravamen of the action from tort to contract. The court rejected the theory that oral directions from the settlement committee of the association’s board created a series of “mini-contracts” separate from the signed retainer agreement.

Why did the association face an attorneys’ fee award after losing the contract count?

A.R.S. § 12-341.01 gives courts discretion to award fees in actions arising out of contract, and both parties agreed the statute applied to the court’s resolution of the contract question. Citing Lacer v. Navajo County, the court noted that a party is entitled to fees under the statute when judgment in its favor is based on the absence of the very contract the other side sued upon. On that basis it found an award of attorneys’ fees to be paid by Sycamore Hills to Jones Skelton appropriate. The minute entries do not show a final fee amount — the case settled before one was entered.

Why did the association have to turn over communications with its new lawyers?

Under Elia v. Pifer, a party waives attorney-client privilege when it (1) affirmatively asserts the privilege after an affirmative act such as filing a lawsuit, (2) thereby puts the protected information at issue, and (3) applying the privilege would deny the opposing party information vital to its defense. The court found the association’s discussions with Goldschmidt Shupe — the successor firm hired to finish the very settlement the association claimed was botched — were clearly relevant and vital to the malpractice claims, so privilege was waived and the association and Goldschmidt Shupe were ordered to comply with the defendants’ subpoena.

How did the case end?

By settlement. The defendants filed a Notice of Settlement on June 10, 2020, the parties filed a stipulation to dismiss on June 28, 2020, and on June 30, 2020 the court dismissed the case with prejudice as to all parties and claims. The negligence and breach-of-fiduciary-duty counts were never adjudicated, and the settlement terms do not appear in the minute entries.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading for association boards: it shows how courts classify claims against former counsel as torts rather than contract claims, how suing on a contract the court finds absent can expose the plaintiff to a fee award under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, and how filing a malpractice suit can waive privilege over communications with successor counsel about the same matter.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2019-094307 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateDecember 11, 2019
Judge / panelHon. David J. Palmer
PartiesSycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C. (Defendant, Phoenix law firm) and Diana J. Elston (Defendant, attorney)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics
Attorney FeesBoard GovernanceProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted Jones Skelton & Hochuli summary judgment on the association’s breach-of-contract count, holding that an attorney’s alleged failure to follow a client’s oral directions — including directions from the settlement committee of the HOA’s board — is negligent performance sounding in tort, not the nonperformance of a specific promise required for a contract claim, and that the oral directions did not create contracts separate from the written retainer agreement. The court later held the association waived attorney-client privilege over its communications with successor counsel by filing the malpractice suit, and that the firm was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 because judgment in its favor rested on the absence of the contract sued upon.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package12 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap11 roadmap entries
Video overviewSycamore Hills Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Jones Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., et al.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A homeowner in the Sycamore Hills community sued the association in Pima County (Zablotny v. Sycamore Hills Estates Homeowner’s Association, No. C20154533) over allegedly wrongful or unauthorized spending of association funds on a property improvement project. The association retained the Phoenix firm Jones Skelton & Hochuli, through attorney Diana Elston, to represent it, then brought in the Tucson firm Goldschmidt Shupe to finish the settlement, completed on or about March 13, 2017. Unhappy with the result, the association sued Jones Skelton and Elston in November 2018 for negligence/legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract, alleging the firm settled without appropriate board approval and ignored oral directions from board members; venue was transferred to Maricopa County in July 2019. In a December 11, 2019 under-advisement ruling the court granted the firm summary judgment on the contract count, holding under Keonjian v. Olcott that the claim sounded in tort. In an April 9, 2020 under-advisement ruling the court held the association had waived attorney-client privilege over its Goldschmidt Shupe communications by filing suit (Elia v. Pifer) and that a fee award to the firm under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 was appropriate. The parties then settled, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on June 30, 2020.

Key Issues & Findings

On the contract count, the court’s December 11, 2019 under-advisement ruling applied Keonjian v. Olcott, 216 Ariz. 563, 169 P.3d 927 (App. 2007), and Collins v. Miller & Miller, Ltd., 189 Ariz. 387, 943 P.2d 747 (App. 1996): claims for professional malpractice are generally tort claims, and the distinction to be drawn is between nonfeasance and malfeasance — an attorney who carries out a task negligently, even in violation of the standard of care, has not converted the action from tort to contract. The court noted that Collins declined to hold that a failure to follow client instructions issued after and separate from the retainer constitutes a breach of contract, and it was unpersuaded that oral directions from the settlement committee of the Sycamore Hills board created a new contract — a series of “mini-contracts” — apart from the signed retainer agreement. Finding no genuine issue of material fact, it granted the firm summary judgment on Count 3 under Rule 56 and ordered a proposed form of judgment with Rule 54(b) language.

The April 9, 2020 under-advisement ruling resolved two follow-on disputes. On discovery, the firm — which had named successor counsel Goldschmidt Shupe as a non-party at fault — subpoenaed the association’s communications with that firm about the settlement; the association objected on privilege grounds and argued a stipulated discovery window (November 29, 2016 to March 15, 2017) was binding, while the defendants pointed to HOA board-meeting minutes dated March 18, 2017 indicating later communications. Applying the three-part waiver test of Elia v. Pifer, 194 Ariz. 74, 977 P.2d 796 (App. 1998), the court found that by filing the lawsuit the association put its discussions with Goldschmidt Shupe at issue and that those discussions were clearly relevant and vital to the malpractice defense, so any privilege was waived as to communications with Goldschmidt Shupe related to the underlying litigation, the settlement negotiations, or the settlement agreement, and the association and Goldschmidt Shupe were ordered to comply with the second subpoena.

On fees, both parties agreed the court had discretion under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 given its resolution of the contract question. Quoting Lacer v. Navajo County, 141 Ariz. 392, 687 P.2d 400 (App. 1984) — a party is entitled to fees under the statute “if judgment in its favor is based upon the absence of the contract sued upon by the adverse party” — the court found an award of attorneys’ fees to be paid by Sycamore Hills to Jones Skelton appropriate and set an application-and-response schedule. The remaining negligence and fiduciary-duty counts were never adjudicated: the defendants filed a Notice of Settlement on June 10, 2020, and on June 30, 2020 the court dismissed the case with prejudice as to all parties and claims per the parties’ stipulation. No final fee amount appears in the minute entries.

Why It Matters

This case shows what happens when an HOA board, unhappy with how its lawyers settled a homeowner dispute, tries to turn that dissatisfaction into a breach-of-contract claim. Arizona courts classify professional-malpractice claims as torts unless the lawyer failed to perform at all, and oral directions from a board or its settlement committee do not create stand-alone contracts on top of the retainer. Framing matters: the tort/contract line controls which claims survive and which fee-shifting rules apply.

The fee ruling is the sharper lesson for associations. Because the association sued on a contract the court found did not exist, A.R.S. § 12-341.01 exposed it to paying the law firm’s attorneys’ fees — losing the framing fight created out-of-pocket exposure for the association and, ultimately, its members. The privilege ruling is a second trap: by suing former counsel over a settlement, the association waived attorney-client privilege over its communications with the successor firm it hired to finish that same settlement. Boards weighing malpractice claims should expect their entire settlement file, including successor-counsel communications, to become discoverable. As a superior-court decision resolved by settlement and stipulated dismissal, the rulings bind only these parties and are not precedent.

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Steven Piper v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Community Documents & Amenity Rules | Community Barn Program | CV2013-014446

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, plaintiffs Steven and Janet Piper litigated against their equestrian-ranch community association over the community barn. The court held — even though the governing document was “inartfully drafted” — that its plain meaning was clear: a person who decides to keep a horse in the community barn agrees to participate in the barn’s program. Summary judgment was granted to the association on all four of the plaintiffs’ counts, the association’s uncontested counterclaim motion was granted, and the case ended in a settlement.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Steven Piper, et al. v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-014446.

Scope note: This page covers Steven Piper, et al. v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-014446) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling that granted the association summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. The minute entries do not restate the parties’ pleadings in detail, so the description of the underlying claims here is limited to what the court’s own rulings say. Currency caveat: the last collected entries show a Notice of Settlement received May 12, 2015 and the case placed on the dismissal calendar for June 16, 2015, with a plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration still in briefing — the collected record ends there, and the final stipulated dismissal or judgment does not appear in it. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association summary judgment on all four counts of the Pipers’ complaint. Based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel, the court found that if a person decides to keep a horse in the community barn, they agree to participate in the barn’s program — and that while the governing document “may be inartfully drafted, the plain meaning is clear. If you choose to board a horse you agree to the barn’s programs.” The Pipers’ own cross-motion for summary judgment had already been denied from the bench. Weeks later, the association’s separate summary-judgment motion on its counterclaim was granted as uncontested after the Pipers filed no response, and the parties then settled.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Steven Piper (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
    First-named plaintiff (the caption reads “Steven Piper, et al.”) and counterdefendant on the association’s counterclaim.
  • Janet Piper (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
    Plaintiff and counterdefendant who filed an affidavit in September 2014 supporting the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment.
  • J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for the Pipers throughout the collected minute entries; appeared for the plaintiffs at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.

Respondent Side

  • Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
    Community association for the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch community. It won summary judgment on all four of the plaintiffs’ counts and, separately, an uncontested summary judgment on its counterclaim before the case settled.
  • Augustus H. Shaw IV (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for the association throughout the collected minute entries; appeared at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.
  • Lydia Linsmeier (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the association at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.

Neutral Parties

  • James T. Blomo (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided from mid-2014 onward, heard the February 2015 oral argument, and issued the March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling and the April 29, 2015 counterclaim ruling.
  • Michael J. Herrod (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the February 4, 2014 ruling denying the Pipers’ motion to dismiss the counterclaim and ordering the association to state its claim more definitely.
  • James Morrow (Commissioner)
    Court commissioner designated to hear Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings after an application for entry of default on the counterclaim was filed in August 2014; the collected minute entries contain no default ruling.

What happened

Steven and Janet Piper sued the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2013, and the association filed a counterclaim. The collected minute entries do not restate the pleadings in detail, but the court’s dispositive ruling shows what the fight was about: the community barn, and whether a person who keeps a horse there is bound to participate in the barn’s program under the community’s governing document.

The first ruling came on the counterclaim. The Pipers moved in January 2014 to dismiss it for failure to state a claim. On February 4, 2014, Judge Michael J. Herrod denied the motion without oral argument but ordered the association to file an amended pleading stating its claim more definitely. In August 2014 an application for entry of default on the counterclaim was filed against the Pipers; the assigned division took no action on it and routed any Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings to Commissioner James Morrow. No default ruling appears in the collected minute entries.

The case then moved to dueling summary-judgment motions before Judge James T. Blomo. The association filed a verified motion for summary judgment on August 6, 2014, followed by a request for summary disposition under Rule 7.1. The Pipers responded on September 14, 2014 and cross-moved for summary judgment, supported by Janet Piper’s affidavit. The association moved to strike the Pipers’ response; the court denied that motion on September 22, 2014. Briefing closed in late October 2014, and oral argument — originally set for January 30, 2015 — was reset to February 20, 2015.

At the February 20, 2015 argument, J. Roger Wood appeared for the Pipers and Augustus H. Shaw IV and Lydia Linsmeier appeared for the association. After hearing argument, the court denied the Pipers’ cross-motion from the bench and took the association’s motion under advisement. On March 2, 2015, Judge Blomo issued the under-advisement ruling granting the association’s verified motion. Applying the Rule 56 standard, the court found — based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel — that “if a person decides to keep a horse in the community barn they agree to participate in the barn’s program,” that “[w]hile the document may be inartfully drafted, the plain meaning is clear,” and that there were no material facts in dispute as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4.

The counterclaim was resolved next. The association, as counterclaimant, filed its own motion for summary judgment on March 17, 2015. The Pipers filed no response, and on April 29, 2015 the court granted the motion under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1, finding it “uncontested, supported by the facts and appropriate.”

The endgame was brief. The Pipers filed a motion for reconsideration and a request to extend the summary-judgment briefing schedule, and on May 11, 2015 the court ordered the association to respond within ten days. The next day, May 12, 2015, the court received a Notice of Settlement and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for June 16, 2015 — unless a stipulated judgment or stipulation for dismissal was submitted by that date, all remaining claims and parties would be dismissed. The collected minute entries end there.

Procedural timeline

Step 2013 Steven and Janet Piper sue the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2013-014446); the association counterclaims.
Step 2014-02-04 Judge Herrod denies the Pipers’ motion to dismiss the counterclaim and orders the association to file an amended pleading stating its claim more definitely.
Step 2014-08-06 The association files its verified motion for summary judgment.
Step 2014-08-11 An application for entry of default on the counterclaim is filed against the Pipers; the division takes no action and refers Rule 55(b) default proceedings to Commissioner Morrow.
Step 2014-09-14 The Pipers respond to the association’s motion and cross-move for summary judgment, supported by Janet Piper’s affidavit.
Step 2014-09-22 The court denies the association’s motion to strike the Pipers’ summary-judgment response.
Step 2015-02-20 Oral argument on the cross-motions; the court denies the Pipers’ cross-motion for summary judgment from the bench and takes the association’s motion under advisement.
Step 2015-03-02 Under-advisement ruling grants the association’s verified motion for summary judgment: keeping a horse in the community barn means agreeing to the barn’s program, and no material facts are in dispute on Counts 1-4.
Step 2015-04-29 The court grants the association’s uncontested motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 after the Pipers file no response.
Step 2015-05-11 On the Pipers’ motion for reconsideration and request to extend the summary-judgment briefing schedule, the court orders the association to respond within ten days.
Step 2015-05-12 The court receives a Notice of Settlement and sets the case on the June 16, 2015 dismissal calendar; the collected minute entries end here.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/steven-piper-v-will-rogers-equestrian-ranch-community-association/raw/: 10 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2014-02-04

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim for Failure to State a Claim.

Download source file
Source 2 2014-08-11

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Source 3 2014-09-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2014-11-18

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 5 2014-12-02

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 6 2015-02-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 7 2015-03-02

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Defendant’s Verified Motion for Summary Judgment.

Source 8 2015-04-29

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 9 2015-05-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 10 2015-05-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

FAQ

What was this case about?

The minute entries do not restate the complaint or counterclaim in detail, but the court’s March 2, 2015 ruling shows the dispute centered on the community barn at Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch. The decisive question was whether a person who keeps a horse in the community barn is bound to participate in the barn’s program under the community’s governing document. The court found the answer was yes: “If you choose to board a horse you agree to the barn’s programs.”

Who won?

The association won every dispositive ruling in the collected record. The court denied the Pipers’ cross-motion for summary judgment from the bench on February 20, 2015, granted the association’s verified motion for summary judgment on all four of the Pipers’ counts on March 2, 2015, and granted the association’s uncontested summary-judgment motion on its counterclaim on April 29, 2015. The parties then settled before a final dismissal appears in the collected entries.

Why did the court rule for the association even though it called the document “inartfully drafted”?

Because imperfect drafting is not the same as ambiguity. The court found that, based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel, the document’s plain meaning was clear — choosing to board a horse in the community barn means agreeing to participate in the barn’s program — and that there were no material facts in dispute on Counts 1 through 4. Under Rule 56, that combination entitles the moving party to judgment without a trial.

What happened with the association’s counterclaim?

Early on, the Pipers moved to dismiss it for failure to state a claim; the court denied that motion in February 2014 but ordered the association to replead its claim more definitely. In March 2015, after winning summary judgment on the Pipers’ claims, the association moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim. The Pipers filed no response, and under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 the court granted the motion as uncontested, finding it supported by the facts and appropriate. The minute entries do not describe the counterclaim’s substance.

What is an under-advisement ruling?

When an Arizona superior-court judge takes a motion “under advisement” after briefing or argument, the later written decision is filed as an under-advisement ruling in the court’s minute entries. The March 2, 2015 ruling in this case is one: after the February 20, 2015 oral argument, the court issued a written decision setting out the Rule 56 summary-judgment standard, its findings about the community barn document, and its order granting the association’s motion. These rulings are public records available through the Clerk of the Superior Court.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent, and this case ended in a settlement rather than an appellate decision. It is still useful reading: it shows a court enforcing the plain meaning of a community document despite drafting flaws, and it illustrates the procedural cost of leaving a summary-judgment motion unanswered — an unopposed motion can be granted as uncontested under Rule 7.1 and Rule 56(e)(4).

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2013-014446 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateMarch 2, 2015
Judge / panelHon. James T. Blomo, Hon. Michael J. Herrod
PartiesSteven Piper and Janet Piper (Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants) v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (Defendant/Counterclaimant)
Topics
CC&RsCovenantsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court granted the association’s verified motion for summary judgment on all four of the plaintiffs’ counts, finding that a person who decides to keep a horse in the community barn agrees to participate in the barn’s program — the governing document, though “inartfully drafted,” had a clear plain meaning — and that no material facts were in dispute; the court separately granted the association’s unopposed motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim as uncontested under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package10 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap11 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Steven and Janet Piper sued the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2013, and the association counterclaimed. The minute entries do not restate the pleadings, but the court’s rulings show the dispute centered on the community barn and whether a person who keeps a horse there is bound to participate in the barn’s program. After the Pipers’ motion to dismiss the counterclaim was denied in February 2014 (with the association ordered to replead more definitely), the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Following a February 20, 2015 oral argument at which the Pipers’ cross-motion was denied from the bench, the court issued a March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment on all four counts, finding that anyone who chooses to board a horse in the community barn agrees to the barn’s programs and that the governing document’s plain meaning was clear despite inartful drafting. In April 2015 the court granted the association’s uncontested summary-judgment motion on its counterclaim, and in May 2015 — with a plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration in briefing — the parties filed a Notice of Settlement and the case was set on the dismissal calendar.

Key Issues & Findings

In the March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling, the court began with the Rule 56(c) standard: summary judgment is available only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the interests of justice are ordinarily best served by a trial on the merits. The court cited United Bank of Arizona v. Allyn, Gold Insurance Company v. Grishom, City of Tucson v. Sanderson, and Comacho v. Gardner for these propositions before turning to the merits.

Applying that standard, the court found — based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel — that if a person decides to keep a horse in the community barn, they agree to participate in the barn’s program. The court acknowledged the governing document “may be inartfully drafted” but held “the plain meaning is clear. If you choose to board a horse you agree to the barn’s programs.” Because there were no material facts in dispute as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4, the association’s verified motion for summary judgment was granted; the Pipers’ competing cross-motion had already been denied from the bench at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.

The counterclaim was resolved on procedural grounds. The association filed a summary-judgment motion on the counterclaim on March 17, 2015 and the Pipers filed no response. On April 29, 2015 the court found the motion “uncontested, supported by the facts and appropriate” under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 and granted it. The Pipers then moved for reconsideration and to extend the summary-judgment briefing schedule, and the court ordered a response — but the next day, May 12, 2015, a Notice of Settlement arrived and the court set the case for dismissal on June 16, 2015 unless a stipulated judgment or stipulation for dismissal was filed. The collected minute entries end at that point.

Why It Matters

This case is a compact illustration of how Arizona courts treat imperfectly drafted community documents: inartful drafting does not create ambiguity if the plain meaning is clear. The court enforced the community barn document as written — choosing to board a horse in the community barn meant agreeing to the barn’s program — and that single interpretive finding disposed of all four of the homeowners’ counts at summary judgment.

It also carries two procedural lessons for HOA litigants. First, an unanswered summary-judgment motion is dangerous: the association’s counterclaim motion was granted as uncontested under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 when no response was filed. Second, superior-court cases often end without an appellate answer — here the parties settled while a reconsideration motion was in briefing, so the rulings bind only these parties and set no precedent for other Arizona communities.

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Woodmar IV Association, Inc. v. Paul S. Rubin, Inc.: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

HOA vs. Management Company | Discovery & Sanctions | CV2017-094721

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, the Woodmar IV homeowners association alleged that Paul S. Rubin, Inc., doing business as PRM Association Management, stole roughly $244,000 from the association while serving as its property manager, pleading breach of contract, negligence, and conversion. The case never reached trial — it was a two-year discovery war. The court compelled forensic inspection of the management company’s servers, computers, and QuickBooks files, held the manager could not shield its records behind a claimed fiduciary-duty privilege, awarded the association fees as sanctions, denied the manager’s bid to end the case over contractual notice-cure-and-mediate conditions, and allowed a punitive-damages amendment before the parties settled in August 2019.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Woodmar IV Association, Inc. v. Paul S. Rubin, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2017-094721.

Scope note: This page covers Woodmar IV Association, Inc. v. Paul S. Rubin, Inc. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2017-094721) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 30 and 31, 2019 under-advisement rulings on discovery and sanctions and the April 3, 2019 under-advisement ruling on the pleadings; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated August 21, 2019, records that a Notice of Settlement was received and the case was placed on the court’s dismissal calendar for October 21, 2019 — the collected minutes do not include a final dismissal order or any terms of the settlement. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

This case never produced a merits verdict — it settled — but the association won every substantive contested motion in the collected record; the only defense motion granted was a scheduling-order amendment. The court compelled the former management company to permit forensic computer inspections, held that the company could not withhold association-related records under a claimed fiduciary-duty privilege because an association owes no fiduciary duty to its individual members and neither, therefore, does its agent, and ordered that the association could remove imaged copies of the manager’s servers, computers, and QuickBooks files from the manager’s premises. The court awarded the association attorneys’ fees and costs as discovery sanctions, denied the manager’s motion for judgment on the pleadings based on contractual notice, cure, and mediation conditions — noting the parties had actually mediated unsuccessfully — and granted the association leave to add a punitive-damages claim based on what discovery had turned up. With a renewed sanctions motion awaiting argument, the parties settled in August 2019.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Woodmar IV Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
    Homeowners association formerly managed by the defendant; alleged the management company stole approximately $244,000 of association funds and mismanaged and withheld its financial records.
  • Clint G. Goodman (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for the Association throughout the case; appeared at the January 2018 status conference and the March 2018 oral argument on the motion to amend.
  • Mark A. Holmgren (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the Association at the December 2018 scheduling conference and the 2019 oral arguments and discovery conferences.

Respondent Side

  • Paul S. Rubin, Inc. (d/b/a PRM Association Management) (Defendant)
    Property-management company that previously managed the Woodmar IV community; resisted forensic discovery of its computer systems and sought dismissal based on contractual conditions precedent.
  • Brian E. Ditsch (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Paul S. Rubin, Inc. in the early 2018 phase, including the January 2018 status conference and the March 2018 oral argument.
  • James A. Robles Jr. (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for Paul S. Rubin, Inc. from mid-2018, appearing at the December 2018 scheduling conference and the January 2019 oral argument.
  • Michael John Hrnicek (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for Paul S. Rubin, Inc. at the December 2018 conference and the 2019 oral arguments, including the February and April 2019 hearings.

Neutral Parties

  • Joshua D. Rogers (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the early phase, including the arbitration-track conference, the first motion to amend, and the referral to a settlement conference.
  • David J. Palmer (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided from September 2018, granted the Association’s motion to compel by signed order, and issued the under-advisement rulings on reconsideration, sanctions, judgment on the pleadings, the second amended complaint, and the computer-imaging disputes.

What happened

Woodmar IV Association, Inc. is a homeowners association; Paul S. Rubin, Inc., doing business as PRM Association Management, is the property-management company that previously managed the community. The Association filed its complaint on July 31, 2017, alleging that while PRM managed the property it stole approximately $244,000 from the association. As the case developed, the Association’s claims included breach of contract, negligence, and conversion, built on allegations that PRM economically damaged the Association by mismanaging its funds, failing to keep accurate financial records, and failing to properly disclose those records to the Association.

The case began on the compulsory-arbitration track. At a January 2018 telephonic status conference, Judge Joshua D. Rogers vacated a scheduled arbitration hearing and extended the arbitration deadline while the Association’s motions to amend the complaint and to vacate arbitration were briefed. In March 2018 the court granted the Association’s motion to amend the complaint after oral argument, and in June 2018 — under the parties’ joint scheduling order — it referred the case to a mandatory settlement conference to be held by the end of November 2018.

Discovery became the center of the case. After PRM failed for roughly a year to allow entry onto its premises and forensic inspection of its computers, the Association moved to compel in June 2018; Judge David J. Palmer granted that motion by an order entered September 25, 2018. PRM moved for reconsideration, arguing among other things that the material was privileged because of a fiduciary duty owed to individual homeowners. In a January 30, 2019 under-advisement ruling the court rejected that argument — finding correct the Association’s position that an association owes no fiduciary duty to individual members, so its agent-manager owes none either — and denied reconsideration. The next day the court ruled on the Association’s motion for discovery sanctions: striking PRM’s answer and entering a default judgment of $244,567.00 was “too extreme” at that point, but the court warned it would seriously reconsider such sanctions if PRM kept delaying, and it awarded the Association additional attorneys’ fees and costs. In June 2019, with no response from PRM, the court set those at $8,000.00 in fees and $54.20 in costs.

The forensic-inspection fight continued into 2019. After an April status conference, the court ruled on April 29, 2019 that the Association could remove imaged copies of data from PRM’s computer servers, laptop and desktop computers, and QuickBooks files from PRM’s premises for off-site examination, rejecting PRM’s insistence that review happen only at its offices with its own expert “looking over their shoulder.” When PRM sought “clarification” in May 2019 to protect attorney-client material — an issue the court noted had never before been raised — the court on August 12, 2019 simply added a clawback protocol: if the Association received a document reasonably deemed privileged, it must stop reading it, make no use of it, and notify opposing counsel. The same day, the court denied PRM’s request to transfer the case to Commercial Court as impermissibly late under either version of Rule 8.1.

PRM’s main merits attack also failed. Its motion for judgment on the pleadings argued the Association had not complied with contractual conditions precedent — notice of the alleged breach, a 30-day opportunity to cure, and an offer to mediate. In an April 3, 2019 under-advisement ruling the court denied the motion, noting the Association’s arguments that the cure provision presupposed an ongoing business relationship that no longer existed, that the parties had actually mediated unsuccessfully, and that the Association had offered to dismiss the litigation to mediate — an offer PRM refused. The same ruling granted the Association leave to file a second amended complaint adding a punitive-damages claim based on information turned up in discovery, applying Rule 15(a)(2) and Owen v. Superior Court and finding no unfair prejudice since no trial date had been set. The court denied PRM’s motions to reconsider that ruling on April 30 and again on August 9, 2019.

The endgame came quickly. On August 14, 2019 the court set oral argument on the Association’s renewed motion to reconsider sanctions, to which PRM had filed no response in sixty days. One week later, on August 21, 2019, a Notice of Settlement was received; the court vacated the argument and placed the case on its dismissal calendar for October 21, 2019, to be dismissed unless a stipulated judgment or stipulation for dismissal was submitted first. The collected minute entries do not disclose the settlement terms.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Woodmar IV Association, Inc. v. Paul S. Rubin, Inc. (CV2017-094721 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Management company could not win judgment on the pleadings against HOA computer-data claims. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Woodmar IV Association, Inc. v. Paul S. Rubin, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2017-07-31 Woodmar IV Association, Inc. files its complaint against Paul S. Rubin, Inc. (d/b/a PRM Association Management) in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2017-094721).
Step 2018-01-23 Telephonic status conference: the court vacates the January 29 arbitration hearing and extends the arbitration deadline to April 30, 2018, while motions to amend the complaint and to vacate arbitration are briefed.
Step 2018-03-26 After oral argument, the court grants the Association’s motion to amend the complaint.
Step 2018-06-20 Pursuant to the parties’ joint scheduling order, the court orders a mandatory settlement conference to be held by November 30, 2018.
Step 2018-09-25 Order granting the Association’s June 28, 2018 motion to compel — covering entry onto land and forensic computer inspections — is signed September 19 and entered September 25, 2018.
Step 2019-01-30 Under-advisement ruling denies PRM’s motion for reconsideration of the motion-to-compel order, rejecting its fiduciary-duty privilege argument.
Step 2019-01-31 Under-advisement ruling on sanctions: striking PRM’s answer and entering a $244,567 default judgment is too extreme for now, but the Association is awarded additional attorneys’ fees and costs.
Step 2019-04-03 Under-advisement ruling denies PRM’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (conditions precedent) and grants the Association leave to file a second amended complaint adding a punitive-damages claim.
Step 2019-04-29 Discovery ruling: the Association may remove imaged copies of PRM’s computer servers, laptop and desktop computers, and QuickBooks files from PRM’s premises for off-site examination.
Step 2019-06-04 With no response from PRM, the court awards the Association $8,000.00 in attorneys’ fees and $54.20 in costs on the sanctions-related fee application.
Step 2019-08-12 The court adds an attorney-client clawback protocol to the imaging order and denies PRM’s request to transfer the case to Commercial Court as impermissibly late.
Step 2019-08-14 Oral argument set for August 28 on the Association’s renewed motion to reconsider sanctions, to which PRM filed no response.
Step 2019-08-21 A Notice of Settlement is received; the court vacates the sanctions argument and places the case on the dismissal calendar for October 21, 2019.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/woodmar-iv-association-v-paul-s-rubin-inc/raw/: 21 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2018-01-23

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling vacating the Arbitration Hearing on January 29, 2018; extending the deadline to complete arbitration to April 30, 2018. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite Ruling is moot. T.

Download source file
Source 2 2018-02-21

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 3 2018-03-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2018-06-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 5 2018-09-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 6 2018-12-17

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 7 2019-01-28

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 8 2019-01-30

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 9 2019-01-31

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling allowing the HOA to seek attorneys’ fees and costs on the discovery issues it won.

Source 10 2019-02-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 11 2019-04-03

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 12 2019-04-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 13 2019-04-29

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Source 14 2019-04-29

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 15 2019-04-30

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Download source file
Source 16 2019-06-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 17 2019-08-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying PRM’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Download source file
Source 18 2019-08-12

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling ordering procedures for handling potentially privileged documents in the computer-data dispute.

Source 19 2019-08-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 20 2019-08-14

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 21 2019-08-21

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

FAQ

What was this lawsuit about?

Woodmar IV Association, Inc., a homeowners association, sued Paul S. Rubin, Inc. — the property-management company doing business as PRM Association Management that previously managed the community — alleging that while PRM managed the property it stole approximately $244,000 from the association. The Association’s claims included breach of contract, negligence, and conversion, resting on allegations that PRM mismanaged the Association’s funds, failed to keep accurate financial records, and failed to properly disclose those records to the Association.

Who won the case?

No one won at trial, because there was no trial: on August 21, 2019 the court received a Notice of Settlement and placed the case on its dismissal calendar. But in the collected minute entries the Association prevailed on every substantive contested motion — the motion to compel, PRM’s reconsideration motions on discovery and on the pleadings (the latter denied twice), the computer-imaging dispute, the fee awards, the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Commercial Court transfer request, and leave to add a punitive-damages claim; the only defense motion granted was a scheduling-order amendment. The settlement terms are not in the court’s minute entries.

Why did the court order the management company to open its computers to the HOA?

The Association served discovery seeking entry onto PRM’s premises and forensic computer inspections tied to the claims in the complaint, and after about a year without compliance it moved to compel under Rule 37(a)(3)(B). The court granted the motion, and on reconsideration rejected PRM’s argument that the records were privileged because of a fiduciary duty owed to individual homeowners — finding correct the Association’s position that an association owes no fiduciary duty to its individual members, so PRM, as the Association’s agent, owed none either. The court later ruled the Association could remove imaged copies of PRM’s servers, computers, and QuickBooks files for off-site examination, subject to a clawback protocol for any attorney-client material.

Was the management company sanctioned?

Yes, financially. The court awarded the Association its fees in connection with the motion to compel, and in the January 31, 2019 sanctions ruling awarded additional attorneys’ fees and costs — set in June 2019 at $8,000.00 in fees and $54.20 in costs after PRM filed no response. The court declined the Association’s harsher requests — striking PRM’s answer and entering a default judgment of $244,567.00 — as “too extreme” at that stage, but warned it would seriously reconsider such sanctions if PRM unreasonably delayed disclosure again. A renewed sanctions motion was awaiting argument when the case settled.

Why didn’t the contract’s notice, cure, and mediation clauses end the case?

PRM moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the Association failed to satisfy conditions precedent in the parties’ contract: notice of the alleged breach, a 30-day opportunity to cure, and an offer to mediate. The court denied the motion, noting the Association’s arguments that the cure provision was designed for parties in an ongoing business relationship — which no longer existed — that the parties had in fact mediated unsuccessfully, and that the Association had even offered to dismiss the litigation to mediate, an offer PRM refused. The court also denied PRM’s two motions to reconsider that ruling.

Is this case binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent, and this case ended in a settlement rather than a judgment on the merits. It is still instructive reading for associations and management companies: it shows a court ordering forensic discovery of a former manager’s computer systems and financial files, rejecting a privilege theory built on fiduciary duty to homeowners, enforcing discovery orders with fee sanctions, and allowing a punitive-damages amendment based on what discovery revealed.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2017-094721 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateApril 3, 2019
Judge / panelHon. David J. Palmer, Hon. Joshua D. Rogers
PartiesWoodmar IV Association, Inc. (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Paul S. Rubin, Inc., d/b/a PRM Association Management (Defendant, former property-management company)
Topics
ProcedureBoard GovernanceAttorney FeesMeetings & RecordsNegligence
Outcome / holding

In its April 3, 2019 under-advisement ruling the court denied the management company’s motion for judgment on the pleadings — rejecting its argument that the association’s suit was barred by contractual conditions precedent requiring notice of breach, a 30-day cure period, and an offer to mediate, where the business relationship had ended and the parties had actually mediated unsuccessfully — and granted the association leave to file a second amended complaint adding a punitive-damages claim; the case then settled in August 2019 without any adjudication of the merits.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package21 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap13 roadmap entries
Video overviewWoodmar IV Association, Inc. v. Paul S. Rubin, Inc.
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A Maricopa County homeowners association sued its former property-management company, Paul S. Rubin, Inc. (d/b/a PRM Association Management), alleging the manager stole approximately $244,000 of association funds while it managed the community, mismanaged the association’s money, and failed to keep and disclose accurate financial records; its claims included breach of contract, negligence, and conversion. The two-year case was dominated by discovery fights: the court compelled forensic computer inspections, rejected the manager’s argument that its records were privileged under a fiduciary duty to individual homeowners, ruled the association could remove imaged copies of the manager’s servers, computers, and QuickBooks files for off-site examination, and awarded the association attorneys’ fees and costs as discovery sanctions while declining, for the time being, to strike the manager’s answer and enter a $244,567 default judgment. In an April 3, 2019 under-advisement ruling the court denied the manager’s motion for judgment on the pleadings based on contractual notice, cure, and mediation conditions and granted the association leave to add a punitive-damages claim based on what discovery had revealed. With a renewed sanctions motion set for argument, the parties settled in August 2019 and the case was placed on the dismissal calendar.

Key Issues & Findings

On the pleadings, the court held the case could proceed despite the contract’s conditions precedent. PRM argued the complaint had to be dismissed because the association never gave notice of the alleged breach, allowed a 30-day cure period, or offered to mediate before suing. The court credited the association’s responses: the cure provision was aimed at parties working together in an ongoing business relationship, and there no longer was one; the parties had in fact engaged in mediation, albeit unsuccessfully; and the association had offered to dismiss the litigation to mediate, an offer PRM refused. On the same day the court granted leave to file a second amended complaint adding a punitive-damages claim, applying Rule 15(a)(2) and Owen v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 75 (1982): leave to amend must be freely given, mere delay is not enough to deny it, no trial date had been set, and the new claim arose from the same alleged conduct, so there was no unfair prejudice. PRM’s motions to reconsider were denied in April and August 2019.

The discovery rulings carried the case’s most consequential legal analysis. After granting the association’s motion to compel entry onto PRM’s premises and forensic computer inspections under Rule 37(a)(3)(B), the court denied reconsideration in a January 30, 2019 under-advisement ruling. It rejected PRM’s claim that the information was privileged under a fiduciary duty owed to individual homeowners, finding correct the association’s argument that an association has no fiduciary duty to its individual members and that PRM, as the association’s agent, has no such duty either. The court also found PRM’s reliance on an unpublished court of appeals decision about medical records, Manzutto v. Gass, improperly cited and easily distinguishable. In an April 29, 2019 ruling the court ordered that the association could remove imaged copies of data from PRM’s computer servers, laptop and desktop computers, and QuickBooks files from PRM’s premises, rejecting PRM’s demand that review occur only at its offices under its expert’s supervision; an August 12, 2019 ruling added only a clawback protocol for any attorney-client material and otherwise left the order unchanged.

On sanctions, the court’s January 31, 2019 ruling acknowledged that striking PRM’s answer and entering a default judgment of $244,567.00 under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) was ‘clearly allowed by law,’ but found those sanctions too extreme while the reconsideration motion had only just been decided — while warning it would seriously reconsider them if PRM unreasonably delayed disclosure again. It instead awarded the association attorneys’ fees and costs on top of the fees already awarded with the motion to compel, fixed in June 2019 at $8,000.00 and $54.20 after PRM filed no response. The court separately denied PRM’s request to transfer the case to Commercial Court as impermissibly late under either version of Rule 8.1. In August 2019, with the association’s renewed sanctions motion unanswered and set for argument, the parties filed a notice of settlement and the case went on the dismissal calendar.

Why It Matters

This case is one of the clearest local examples of an Arizona homeowners association turning the litigation tables on its own former management company. HOA disputes usually feature owners suing boards; here the association itself pursued its manager for roughly a quarter-million dollars in allegedly stolen or mismanaged funds, and the court’s rulings show what that recovery effort looks like in practice — forensic imaging of the manager’s servers, computers, and QuickBooks files, off-site examination by the association’s expert, and fee sanctions when the manager stalled.

Two rulings deserve particular attention. First, the court held a management company cannot resist producing association-related records by invoking a fiduciary duty to individual homeowners: the association owes no fiduciary duty to individual members, so its agent-manager owes none either. Second, contractual notice-cure-and-mediate conditions did not bar the suit where the business relationship had ended and mediation had actually been tried and failed. The case also shows the practical arc of many association-versus-manager fights: sustained discovery pressure, escalating sanctions exposure, and a settlement before trial. As a superior-court matter resolved by settlement, it binds no one beyond the parties — but it is a useful roadmap for associations auditing a former manager’s books.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Penelope Johnson v. The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Assessments & CC&Rs | A.R.S. § 12-341.01 | CV2012-017609

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, the court tried a single question to the bench: did the community’s Declaration allow The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association to spend courthome exterior-maintenance assessments on common-area landscaping, watering, and road maintenance? The court said no — reading paragraph 6.2 together with paragraph 1.15, courthome assessments may be used only to repair and maintain the courthome exteriors, including courthome balconies, trellises, patio covers, and the boundary walls enclosing courthome patios and backyards. The ruling applied prospectively, the association won the separate cable and trust issues, and the plaintiff recovered $56,000 in fees and $2,889.15 in costs as the prevailing party.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Penelope Johnson v. The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-017609.

Scope note: This page covers Penelope Johnson v. The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-017609) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the July 1, 2013 oral-argument minutes, the August 12–13, 2013 bench-trial minutes, the December 11, 2013 clarification ruling, and the March 17, 2014 under-advisement ruling that entered judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: judgment was entered under Rule 54(c) on March 17, 2014. The collected minute entries reflect no appeal, and a June 3, 2020 clerk’s notice regarding disposition of exhibits states the case “is not subject to further modification.” Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

After a two-day bench trial, the superior court found in the plaintiff’s favor on the central issue: the community’s Declaration did not allow the Association to spend courthome exterior-maintenance assessments on common-area landscaping, watering, and road maintenance. Reading paragraph 6.2 of the Declaration together with paragraph 1.15, the court held the courthome exterior-maintenance obligation includes repair and maintenance of all courthome balconies, trellises, patio covers, and boundary walls that enclose courthome patios and backyards — and that the Association may use courthome assessments only for repair and maintenance of the courthome exteriors as described by paragraph 6.2. The ruling operated prospectively. The Association prevailed on the separate cable and trust issues, but the court found the assessment question was the heart of the case, deemed the plaintiff the prevailing party, and awarded her $56,000 in attorneys’ fees and $2,889.15 in costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Penelope Johnson (Plaintiff)
    Brought the case challenging, among other things, how the Association used courthome exterior-maintenance assessments; testified at the August 2013 bench trial, prevailed on the central assessment issue, and was awarded $56,000 in attorneys’ fees plus $2,889.15 in costs.
  • Christopher A. LaVoy (Counsel)
    Counsel for Plaintiff Penelope Johnson throughout the case, from the 2013 motion practice through the bench trial and the 2014 fee award.

Respondent Side

  • The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association (Defendant)
    Residential association that prevailed on the cable and trust issues and on the early partial dismissals, but was found to have misused courthome assessments on common-area expenses and ordered to discontinue the practice. Its board president, B. David Cathell, attended the November 2013 hearing as an observer.
  • Brian W. Morgan (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for the Association in the minute-entry captions; appeared for the Association at the September 5, 2013 telephonic status conference.
  • Paul R. Neil (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the Association at the July 2013 oral argument, the final trial management conference, the August 2013 bench trial, and the March 2014 fee argument.
  • Chad M. Gallacher (Counsel)
    Counsel appearing for the Association at the August 12–13, 2013 bench trial.

Neutral Parties

  • Douglas L. Rayes (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge assigned in March 2013; decided the dispositive motions, conducted the bench trial, issued the post-trial clarifications, and entered the March 2014 judgment and fee award.
  • John Rea (Judge)
    Judge who signed the March 20, 2013 civil-presiding-judge reassignment order transferring the case to Judge Rayes after Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Judge.
  • Lisa Flores (Judge)
    Judge originally assigned to the case per the March 2013 reassignment minute entry (which spells the surname “Florex” in its text and “Flores” in its caption); Plaintiff exercised a change of judge before the substantive rulings.

What happened

Penelope Johnson sued The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2012 (case No. CV2012-017609). The minute entries show the litigation revolved around several distinct disputes: whether the Association could use “courthome” exterior-maintenance assessments to pay for common-area landscaping, watering, and road maintenance; a claim the minutes identify as the “cable issue,” which turned in part on what it means for units to be “separately metered and/or separately charged”; a “trust issue”; a fiduciary-duty allegation; and a claim for injunctive relief.

The early rounds went to the Association. In February 2013 it moved for partial dismissal of the fiduciary-duty allegations and of the claim for injunctive relief. After Johnson exercised a change of judge and the case was reassigned to Judge Douglas L. Rayes, the court granted both partial motions on April 11, 2013 — striking the words “and fiduciary capacity” from Paragraph 63(e) of the complaint — while denying the Association’s request for attorneys’ fees. In May 2013 the court also struck Johnson’s application for entry of default, again denying the Association’s fee request.

Both sides then moved for partial summary judgment, and Johnson sought a preliminary injunction. At a July 1, 2013 oral argument the court denied the preliminary injunction, granted the Association partial summary judgment on the trust issue, and denied the balance of both summary-judgment motions — except the courthome exterior-maintenance issue, which it reserved for trial. The Association’s cross-motion on the cable issue was taken under advisement and, at the August 1, 2013 final trial management conference, both sides’ cable-issue motions were denied, sending that question to trial as well.

The court held a two-day bench trial on August 12–13, 2013. Witnesses included Mike P. Harris, Kathleen Daurio, Steven J. Schloeder, and Johnson herself for the plaintiff’s case, and Kenneth Hensman, Barry Smith, and Guilford Nergard in the defense case; Harris was recalled to the stand on day two, and plaintiff’s counsel — limited at the pretrial conference to calling one Gosnell witness — was permitted to call Stuart “Steve” Berres out of order during the defense case. At the close of trial, for reasons stated on the record, the court found in favor of the Association on the cable issue and in favor of Johnson on the courthome exterior-maintenance issue, and directed each side to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue it had won.

The remedy was refined over the following months. At a September 5, 2013 telephonic conference the court clarified that its ruling was intended “to stop and move forward prospectively,” observed that starting the assessment changes on January 1, 2014 “makes sense,” and directed the parties to mediate the start date and amounts. At a November 22, 2013 hearing — attended by the Association’s board president as an observer — the court ruled on objections to Johnson’s proposed findings, defined “separately metered and/or separately charged” as when each unit is metered separately and charged an individual amount, and clarified that its earlier use of the phrase “good faith” was a term of art rather than a legal finding. On December 11, 2013 the court issued its written clarification: paragraph 6.2 of the Declaration, read with paragraph 1.15, makes the courthome exterior-maintenance obligation include repair and maintenance of all courthome balconies, trellises, patio covers, and boundary walls that enclose courthome patios and/or backyards — and the Association may use courthome assessments only for repair and maintenance of the courthome exteriors as described by paragraph 6.2.

Both sides then moved for attorneys’ fees. In its March 17, 2014 under-advisement ruling, the court acknowledged that each party had prevailed on some claims, but found the heart of the case was whether the Declaration allowed courthome assessment fees to pay common-area landscaping, watering, and road-maintenance expenses — an issue Johnson won, with the Association ordered to discontinue the misuse of the courthome assessments. Applying the factors in Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Warner, the court granted Johnson’s fee motion under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, awarded her $56,000 in fees and $2,889.15 in costs, denied the Association’s fee motion, overruled its objection to the form of judgment, and entered judgment under Rule 54(c). A June 2020 clerk’s notice on exhibit disposition states the case is not subject to further modification.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Penelope Johnson v. The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association (CV2012-017609 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). After a bench trial, the court held that the Declaration did not permit the Association to use courthome… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Penelope Johnson v. The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2012 Penelope Johnson sues The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2012-017609).
Step 2013-02-19 The Association files partial motions to dismiss the fiduciary-duty allegations and the claim for injunctive relief.
Step 2013-03-20 After Johnson files a Notice of Change of Judge, the case is reassigned from Judge Flores to Judge Douglas L. Rayes.
Step 2013-04-11 The court grants both partial dismissals — striking “and fiduciary capacity” from Paragraph 63(e) of the complaint — and denies the Association’s request for attorneys’ fees.
Step 2013-05-08 The court strikes Johnson’s application for entry of default; the Association’s request for fees and costs is denied.
Step 2013-07-01 Oral argument on four motions: the preliminary injunction is denied; the Association wins partial summary judgment on the trust issue; the courthome exterior-maintenance issue is reserved for a two-day bench trial; the cable-issue cross-motion is taken under advisement.
Step 2013-08-01 Final trial management conference: both sides’ summary-judgment motions on the cable issue are denied; exhibits are admitted and trial logistics set.
Step 2013-08-12 Bench trial day one before Judge Rayes; the plaintiff’s witnesses testify.
Step 2013-08-13 Bench trial day two; after closing arguments the court finds for the Association on the cable issue and for Johnson on the courthome exterior-maintenance issue.
Step 2013-09-05 Telephonic conference: the court clarifies the ruling operates prospectively, notes a January 1, 2014 start for assessment changes “makes sense,” and directs mediation on the start date and amounts.
Step 2013-11-22 Hearing on proposed findings of fact; the court orders supplemental briefing on balconies, patio covers, trellises, boundary walls, and rod-iron gate features, and defines “separately metered and/or separately charged.”
Step 2013-12-11 Written clarification: reading Declaration paragraph 6.2 with paragraph 1.15, courthome assessments may be used only for repair and maintenance of the courthome exteriors, including courthome balconies, trellises, patio covers, and boundary walls enclosing courthome patios and backyards.
Step 2013-12-31 Johnson moves for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs; the Association files its own fee motion on January 2, 2014.
Step 2014-03-14 Oral argument on the cross-motions for attorneys’ fees; the matters are taken under advisement.
Step 2014-03-17 Under-advisement ruling: Johnson is the prevailing party on the heart of the case; she is awarded $56,000 in fees and $2,889.15 in costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01; the Association’s fee motion is denied; judgment is entered under Rule 54(c).
Step 2020-06-03 Clerk’s notice regarding disposition of exhibits states the case has been reviewed and is not subject to further modification.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/penelope-johnson-v-pointe-south-mountain-residential-association/raw/: 21 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2013-03-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2013-04-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Defendant’s Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Claim for Injunctive Relief.

Download source file
Source 3 2013-05-08

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Application for Entry of Default.

Download source file
Source 4 2013-05-13

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 5 2013-05-14

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 6 2013-05-31

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 7 2013-06-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 8 2013-06-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 9 2013-07-01

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 10 2013-08-01

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling limiting the homeowner’s Gosnell witness presentation and allowing the association limited follow-up discovery.

Source 11 2013-08-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 12 2013-08-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 13 2013-09-05

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 14 2013-11-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 15 2013-12-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 16 2014-01-30

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 17 2014-01-30

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 18 2014-02-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 19 2014-03-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 20 2014-03-17

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Source 21 2020-06-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

FAQ

What was the “courthome exterior maintenance issue” at the center of this case?

It was the question the court itself called the heart of the case: whether the community’s Declaration allowed the Association to use courthome exterior-maintenance assessments to pay common-area landscaping, watering, and road-maintenance expenses. After the August 2013 bench trial, the court answered no and ordered the Association to discontinue the misuse. Its December 2013 written clarification held that paragraph 6.2 of the Declaration, read with paragraph 1.15, limits courthome assessments to repair and maintenance of the courthome exteriors — including courthome balconies, trellises, patio covers, and the boundary walls that enclose courthome patios and backyards.

Did the plaintiff win everything?

No — the case split. The court dismissed her fiduciary-duty allegation and her claim for injunctive relief early on, struck her application for entry of default, denied her preliminary-injunction motion, granted the Association partial summary judgment on the trust issue, and found for the Association on the cable issue at trial. But she won the courthome-assessment issue that the court found most significant, and on that basis recovered her fees and costs.

Did the ruling require the Association to refund past assessments?

The minute entries do not show a refund order. At a September 2013 conference the court clarified that the intention of its ruling was “to stop and move forward prospectively,” said that beginning the change in assessments on January 1, 2014 “makes sense,” and directed the parties to mediate the beginning date and amounts — recommending a mediator if they could not agree on one.

Why did the plaintiff get attorneys’ fees when both sides won issues?

Arizona’s contract fee statute, A.R.S. § 12-341.01, lets the court award fees to the successful party. The court acknowledged both parties prevailed on some claims, but looked at the totality of the litigation and found the most significant issue — whether courthome assessments could fund common-area landscaping, watering, and road maintenance — went to the plaintiff. Applying the factors from Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Warner, it awarded her $56,000 in fees and $2,889.15 in costs and denied the Association’s competing fee motion.

What were the “cable issue” and the “trust issue”?

The minute entries identify these disputes only by those shorthand labels. Both sides moved for summary judgment on the cable issue, both motions were denied, and the court found for the Association on it at trial; when plaintiff’s counsel later asked, the court defined “separately metered and/or separately charged” as when each unit is metered separately and each unit is charged an individual amount. The trust issue was resolved in the Association’s favor on partial summary judgment in July 2013. The underlying details of both issues live in the trial record rather than the minute entries.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows a court tracing an association’s spending authority to the specific text of its recorded Declaration, limiting a dedicated assessment to its stated purpose, and using prevailing-party fee-shifting under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 to decide who bears the cost of a mixed-outcome case. Judgment was entered in March 2014, and the collected minute entries reflect no appeal.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2012-017609 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateMarch 17, 2014
Judge / panelHon. Douglas L. Rayes
PartiesPenelope Johnson (Plaintiff) v. The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association (Defendant)
Governing law
  • A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics
AssessmentsCC&RsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding

After a bench trial, the court held that the Declaration did not permit the Association to use courthome exterior-maintenance assessments for common-area landscaping, watering, and road maintenance: paragraph 6.2, read in conjunction with paragraph 1.15, makes the courthome exterior-maintenance obligation include repair and maintenance of all courthome balconies, trellises, patio covers, and boundary walls enclosing courthome patios and/or backyards, and the Association may use courthome assessments only for repair and maintenance of the courthome exteriors as described by paragraph 6.2. The court found for the Association on the cable issue, applied its assessment ruling prospectively, and — finding Johnson the prevailing party on the most significant issue — awarded her $56,000 in fees and $2,889.15 in costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package21 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap16 roadmap entries
Video overviewPenelope Johnson v. The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Penelope Johnson sued The Pointe South Mountain Residential Association in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2012 over, principally, the Association’s use of courthome exterior-maintenance assessments to pay common-area landscaping, watering, and road-maintenance expenses; the litigation also included a “cable issue,” a “trust issue,” a fiduciary-duty allegation, and a claim for injunctive relief. The Association won the early rounds — partial dismissal of the fiduciary-duty and injunctive-relief claims, denial of a preliminary injunction, and partial summary judgment on the trust issue — and the court reserved the courthome-assessment and cable issues for a two-day bench trial held August 12–13, 2013. At trial the court found for the Association on the cable issue and for Johnson on the courthome exterior-maintenance issue, later clarifying in writing that Declaration paragraph 6.2, read with paragraph 1.15, limits courthome assessments to repair and maintenance of the courthome exteriors, and that the ruling operated prospectively. In its March 17, 2014 under-advisement ruling the court found Johnson the prevailing party on the heart of the case, awarded her $56,000 in attorneys’ fees and $2,889.15 in costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, denied the Association’s fee motion, and entered judgment under Rule 54(c).

Key Issues & Findings

The case was litigated issue by issue. The Association prevailed throughout the pretrial phase: in April 2013 the court granted partial dismissal of Johnson’s fiduciary-duty allegation (striking “and fiduciary capacity” from Paragraph 63(e) of the complaint) and of her claim for injunctive relief; in May 2013 it struck her application for entry of default; and on July 1, 2013 it denied her preliminary-injunction motion and granted the Association partial summary judgment on the trust issue. But the court refused to resolve the central dispute on paper — it denied both sides’ partial summary-judgment motions as to the courthome exterior-maintenance issue and, after taking the Association’s cable-issue cross-motion under advisement, denied both cable motions as well, sending both questions to a two-day bench trial.

At the close of trial on August 13, 2013, the court found for the Association on the cable issue and for Johnson on the courthome exterior-maintenance issue, directing each side to submit proposed findings on the issue it won. The remedy took shape through post-trial clarifications: the ruling was intended “to stop and move forward prospectively,” with the court observing that a January 1, 2014 start for the assessment changes made sense and directing mediation over dates and amounts. The December 11, 2013 written clarification supplied the interpretive core — paragraph 6.2 of the Declaration, read in conjunction with paragraph 1.15, requires the courthome exterior-maintenance obligation to include repair and maintenance of all courthome balconies, trellises, patio covers, and boundary walls that enclose courthome patios and/or backyards, and the Association may only use courthome assessments for the repair and maintenance of the exterior of the courthomes as described by paragraph 6.2. The court also defined “separately metered and/or separately charged” as when each unit is metered separately and each unit is charged an individual amount, and clarified that its earlier use of “good faith” was a term of art, not a legal finding.

On the cross-motions for fees, the court acknowledged that both parties prevailed on some claims and lost others, but considered the totality of the litigation and found the most significant issue — the heart of the case — was whether the Declaration provided for courthome assessment fees to be used to pay common-area landscaping, watering, and road-maintenance expense. Because it had ruled in Johnson’s favor on that issue and ordered the Association to discontinue the misuse of the courthome assessments, and after weighing the factors in Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567 (1985), the court granted Johnson’s fee motion under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, awarded $56,000 in fees and $2,889.15 in costs, denied the Association’s fee motion, and entered judgment under Rule 54(c) on March 17, 2014.

Why It Matters

This case is a clean illustration of purpose-restricted assessments: when a recorded declaration dedicates an assessment to a particular function — here, courthome exterior maintenance — the association cannot redirect that money to general common-area expenses like landscaping, watering, and road maintenance. The court traced the association’s spending authority to the specific text of the Declaration (paragraph 6.2 read with paragraph 1.15) and confined the assessment to its stated purpose, ordering the misuse discontinued on a prospective basis.

It also shows how prevailing-party fee-shifting works in a mixed-outcome HOA case. The association won the fiduciary-duty and injunctive-relief dismissals, the trust issue, and the cable issue — yet still ended up paying the homeowner-side plaintiff $56,000 in fees plus costs, because the court weighed the totality of the litigation and found the assessment question was the heart of the case. Under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and the Associated Indemnity v. Warner factors, winning the issue that matters most can matter more than winning the most issues. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties; the collected minute entries reflect no appeal.

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Darryl J. Roberts v. Windy Walk Homeowners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

CC&Rs & Board Governance | A.R.S. §§ 10-3825, 10-3830 | CV2016-011505

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, Darryl and Ann Roberts and their qualified trust sued Windy Walk Homeowners Association, three related associations, four individual committee-member defendants, and the Cost-Sharing Committee of the Third Amended and Restated Master Easement and Cost-Sharing Agreement. The court refused to dismiss the First Amended Verified Complaint at the pleading stage — holding that Arizona’s notice-pleading standard was satisfied, that the parties’ rights and obligations are governed by the Windy Walk CC&Rs and the Cost-Sharing Agreement, and that committee-member conduct is measured under A.R.S. §§ 10-3825 and 10-3830 rather than the statute the defendants relied on — and later twice found the plaintiff entitled to attorneys’ fees over the defendants’ repeated failure to provide the same discovery.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Darryl J. Roberts, et al. v. Windy Walk Homeowners Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2016-011505.

Scope note: This page covers Darryl J. Roberts, et al. v. Windy Walk Homeowners Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2016-011505) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the November 16, 2017 under-advisement ruling on the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the November 19, 2018 Rule 37(b) sanctions ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected minute entries run only through November 19, 2018, when the case was still active and in discovery — no final judgment or trial outcome appears in the collected record, so this page cannot say how the case ultimately ended. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court denied the eight moving defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without prejudice. It held that Rule 12(b)(6) motions are disfavored under Arizona law, that key paragraphs of the First Amended Verified Complaint satisfied Arizona’s notice-pleading standard, and that even a deficient complaint must ordinarily be given a chance to be cured by amendment before dismissal. The court also held that the parties’ rights and obligations are governed by the Windy Walk CC&Rs and the Cost-Sharing Agreement attached to the complaint, and that the conduct of the committee-member defendants is measured under A.R.S. §§ 10-3825 and 10-3830 — the general standards and rebuttable presumption for committee members’ acts, omissions, and discharge of duties — rather than the Nonprofit Corporation Act provision the defendants relied on. A year later, the court granted the plaintiff a second entitlement to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as Rule 37(b) sanctions for the defendants’ repeated failure to provide the same discovery.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Darryl J. Roberts (Plaintiff)
    Lead plaintiff; sued the Windy Walk association defendants together with Ann K. Roberts and the couple’s qualified trust.
  • Ann K. Roberts (Plaintiff)
    Co-plaintiff alongside Darryl J. Roberts.
  • Darryl J. Roberts / Ann K. Roberts Qualified Trust (Plaintiff)
    Trust co-plaintiff represented by the same counsel as the individual plaintiffs.
  • Mark Bainbridge (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for plaintiffs Darryl J. Roberts, Ann K. Roberts, and the Roberts qualified trust throughout the collected minute entries.

Respondent Side

  • Windy Walk Homeowners Association (Defendant)
    Lead defendant association; its CC&Rs were Exhibit A to the First Amended Verified Complaint, and the court held they govern the parties’ rights and obligations.
  • Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association (Defendant)
    One of the four association defendants that jointly filed the June 2017 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
  • Troon Mountain Community Association (Defendant)
    One of the four association defendants that jointly filed the June 2017 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
  • Skye Top at Troon Homeowners Association (Defendant)
    One of the four association defendants that jointly filed the June 2017 Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
  • Michael Kieffer (Defendant)
    One of the four individuals the court’s November 2017 ruling refers to collectively as the Individual Committee Member defendants; the court’s party records list attorney Lynn Krupnik as his counsel.
  • George Howison (Defendant)
    One of the four Individual Committee Member defendants who joined the June 2017 motion to dismiss.
  • Richard Shenkus (Defendant)
    One of the four Individual Committee Member defendants who joined the June 2017 motion to dismiss.
  • Richard Fretland (Defendant)
    One of the four Individual Committee Member defendants who joined the June 2017 motion to dismiss.
  • Cost-Sharing Committee of the Third Amended and Restated Master Easement and Cost-Sharing Agreement (Defendant)
    Committee defendant listed in the court’s party records as appearing pro per; it was not among the eight defendants that filed the June 2017 motion to dismiss. The Cost-Sharing Agreement was Exhibit B to the First Amended Verified Complaint.
  • Michael H. Orcutt (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for the Windy Walk association defendants in the minute-entry captions throughout the collected record.
  • Daxton R. Watson (Counsel)
    Appeared for the defendants on behalf of Michael H. Orcutt at the September 18, 2017 oral argument.
  • Thomas Brent Demmitt (Counsel)
    Appeared for the defendants on behalf of Michael H. Orcutt at the September 18, 2017 oral argument.
  • Lynn M. Krupnik (Counsel)
    Listed in the court’s party records as counsel for defendant Michael Kieffer; appears on the distribution of the November 19, 2018 sanctions ruling.

Neutral Parties

  • Connie Contes (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over all collected minute entries, including the November 2017 under-advisement ruling and the November 2018 sanctions ruling.

What happened

Darryl J. Roberts, Ann K. Roberts, and the Darryl J. Roberts / Ann K. Roberts Qualified Trust sued in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2016-011505), naming as defendants four homeowners associations — Windy Walk Homeowners Association, Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association, Troon Mountain Community Association, and Skye Top at Troon Homeowners Association — four individuals the court’s ruling refers to collectively as the Individual Committee Member defendants (Michael Kieffer, George Howison, Richard Shenkus, and Richard Fretland), and the Cost-Sharing Committee of the Third Amended and Restated Master Easement and Cost-Sharing Agreement. The operative pleading was a First Amended Verified Complaint that attached the Windy Walk CC&Rs as Exhibit A and the Cost-Sharing Agreement as Exhibit B.

On June 27, 2017, the four associations and the four individual defendants jointly filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs responded on July 14, 2017, and the moving defendants replied on July 26, 2017. Judge Connie Contes set oral argument for September 14, 2017, then reset it to September 18, 2017 because of a calendar conflict. At the September 18 hearing, Mark Bainbridge appeared for the plaintiffs and Daxton R. Watson and Thomas Brent Demmitt appeared for the defendants on behalf of Michael H. Orcutt; after argument, the court took the motion under advisement.

In its November 16, 2017 under-advisement ruling, the court denied the motion. It began with the settled framework: Rule 12(b)(6) motions are not favored under Arizona law, dismissal is permitted only when a plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof, and the court must accept the nonmoving party’s material factual allegations as true. The defendants’ motion rested substantially on asserted pleading deficiencies — they highlighted conclusory statements and general accusations in paragraphs 23, 29, 35, 36, and 42 of the First Amended Complaint — but the court found that paragraphs 30-32, 39, and 44-50 complied with Arizona’s notice-pleading standards, which require only that a complaint give the opponent fair notice of the nature and basis of the claim. The court added that even a deficient complaint must ordinarily be given an opportunity to be cured by amendment before dismissal, and that if the defendants did not fully understand the claims, the mandatory disclosure process — followed if necessary by a summary-judgment motion under the Celotex principle adopted in Orme School — was the more effective and efficient tool.

The ruling also sorted out the governing law. The court held that the defendants’ reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3304(B)(2) of the Nonprofit Corporation Act and the Rohde case was misplaced and inapposite; the more applicable statutory sections were A.R.S. §§ 10-3825 and 10-3830, which set the general standards and rebuttable presumption for the acts, omissions, and discharge of duties of committee members, along with A.R.S. §§ 10-11602 and 10-11620. Beyond the statutes, the court stated that the rights and obligations of the plaintiff and the defendants are governed by the terms of the CC&Rs and the Cost-Sharing Agreement attached to the complaint. The denial was without prejudice but came with conditions: before filing any new or renewed motion to dismiss based on pleading deficiencies, the parties had to meet and confer — through personal, not written, communication — about whether an amendment or disclosure statement could cure the problem, and any renewed motion had to certify that the conference occurred. The plaintiff, for its part, was ordered to serve a detailed, fact-specific disclosure statement within 30 days.

The later collected entries show the case grinding through discovery. On August 9, 2018, pursuant to signed orders regarding a motion to compel and a motion to amend the complaint, the court excused the assigned arbitrator. On September 7, 2018 the plaintiff filed a Motion for Rule 37(b) Sanctions for failure to comply with a court order, which was fully briefed by October 8. In its November 19, 2018 ruling, the court noted this was the second time it had been asked to review the defendants’ failure to provide the same discovery, and rejected as meritless the defendants’ contention that responding fifty days after a court order — without communication, conferring, or ‘some form of professional courtesy’ — was not a failure to obey. For the second time, the court found the plaintiff entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for having to pursue the motion, though it deferred setting the amount until the submission of concluding documents; the other requested relief was denied at that time. The court also warned that if the case proceeded to trial, the trier of fact could be permitted to consider the untimely discovery as bearing on a party’s credibility. That sanctions ruling is the last collected minute entry, so the ultimate outcome of the case does not appear in this record.

Procedural timeline

Step 2017-06-27 The four association defendants (Windy Walk, Ballantrae Ridge, Troon Mountain, and Skye Top at Troon) and the four individual defendants jointly file a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the First Amended Verified Complaint.
Step 2017-07-14 Plaintiffs file their response to the motion to dismiss.
Step 2017-07-26 The moving defendants file their reply in support of the motion to dismiss.
Step 2017-08-30 Judge Connie Contes sets oral argument on the motion to dismiss for September 14, 2017.
Step 2017-09-14 On the court’s own motion, oral argument is reset to September 18, 2017 because of a calendar conflict.
Step 2017-09-18 Oral argument is held; the court takes the Rule 12(b)(6) motion under advisement.
Step 2017-11-16 Under-advisement ruling denies the motion to dismiss without prejudice, requires a personal (not written) meet-and-confer and certification before any renewed motion, and orders plaintiff to serve a detailed, fact-specific disclosure statement within 30 days.
Step 2018-08-09 Pursuant to signed orders regarding a motion to compel and a motion to amend the complaint, the court excuses the assigned arbitrator.
Step 2018-09-07 Plaintiff files a Motion for Rule 37(b) Sanctions for failure to comply with a court order; briefing concludes October 8, 2018.
Step 2018-11-19 The court grants the sanctions motion in part — finding for the second time that plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs — but defers the amount until concluding documents and denies the other requested relief at that time. This is the last collected minute entry; the case remained active.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/darryl-j-roberts-v-windy-walk-homeowners-association/raw/: 6 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2017-08-30

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 2 2017-09-14

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 3 2017-09-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 4 2017-11-16

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the eight moving defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without prejudice and requiring a personal meet-and-confer before any renewed motion.

Source 5 2018-08-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 6 2018-11-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

FAQ

Who won this case?

The collected minute entries do not show a final winner. Through November 19, 2018 — the last collected entry — the court had denied the eight moving defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice, excused the assigned arbitrator, and twice found the plaintiff entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs over the defendants’ failure to provide the same discovery. No final judgment, settlement, or trial outcome appears in the collected record, so this page cannot say how the case ultimately ended.

What is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and why did it fail here?

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion asks the court to throw out a complaint for failure to state a claim before any evidence is taken. The court explained that such motions are not favored under Arizona law: dismissal is permitted only when the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof, and the court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. Here, the defendants attacked conclusory statements in several paragraphs of the First Amended Complaint, but the court found other paragraphs (30-32, 39, and 44-50) satisfied Arizona’s notice-pleading standard, and noted that even a deficient complaint must ordinarily be given a chance to be cured by amendment before dismissal.

What law governs the conduct of HOA committee members, according to this ruling?

The court held that the defendants’ reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3304(B)(2) of the Nonprofit Corporation Act and the Rohde case was misplaced and inapposite. The more applicable provisions, it said, are A.R.S. §§ 10-3825 and 10-3830 — which set the general standards and a rebuttable presumption for the acts, omissions, and discharge of duties of committee members — along with A.R.S. §§ 10-11602 and 10-11620. Beyond the statutes, the court stated that the parties’ rights and obligations are governed by the Windy Walk CC&Rs and the Cost-Sharing Agreement attached to the complaint.

What conditions did the court attach when it denied the motion to dismiss?

The denial was without prejudice, but before filing any new or renewed motion to dismiss based on claimed pleading deficiencies, the affected parties had to meet and confer — through personal, not written, communication — about whether an amended complaint or a disclosure statement could cure the problem, and the renewed motion had to include a certification that the conference occurred and failed. The court warned that noncompliance could be grounds for rejecting the motion. The plaintiff was also ordered to serve a detailed, fact-specific disclosure statement within 30 days, with the court noting that notice pleading is insufficient in disclosure statements.

What were the Rule 37(b) sanctions about?

Rule 37(b) lets a court sanction a party that fails to obey a discovery order. In its November 19, 2018 ruling, the court noted it was the second time it had been asked to review the defendants’ failure to provide the same discovery, and rejected the defendants’ argument that responding fifty days after a court order — without communication or conferring — was not a violation. For the second time it found the plaintiff entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for having to pursue the motion, though it deferred the amount until concluding documents. The court also warned that untimely discovery could be considered by the trier of fact as bearing on a party’s credibility, and directed the parties to use the expedited discovery-dispute procedure in Rule 26(d) before filing future discovery motions.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how difficult it is to get an HOA lawsuit dismissed at the pleading stage in Arizona, which nonprofit-corporation statutes a court looks to for committee-member conduct, and the fee exposure an association side can build up by repeatedly failing to provide court-ordered discovery. Remember also that the collected minute entries end in November 2018 with the case still active, so the final outcome is not reflected here.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2016-011505 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateNovember 16, 2017
Judge / panelHon. Connie Contes
PartiesDarryl J. Roberts, Ann K. Roberts, and the Darryl J. Roberts / Ann K. Roberts Qualified Trust (Plaintiffs) v. Windy Walk Homeowners Association, Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association, Troon Mountain Community Association, Skye Top at Troon Homeowners Association, Michael Kieffer, George Howison, Richard Shenkus, Richard Fretland, and the Cost-Sharing Committee of the Third Amended and Restated Master Easement and Cost-Sharing Agreement (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
ProcedureCC&RsBoard GovernanceAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding

The superior court denied the eight moving defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss without prejudice, holding that the First Amended Verified Complaint satisfied Arizona’s notice-pleading standard, that the parties’ rights and obligations are governed by the Windy Walk CC&Rs and the Cost-Sharing Agreement attached to the complaint, and that committee-member conduct is governed by A.R.S. §§ 10-3825 and 10-3830 — not the § 10-3304(B)(2) provision the defendants invoked; any renewed motion required a personal (not written) meet-and-confer and certification, and the plaintiff was ordered to serve a detailed, fact-specific disclosure statement within 30 days. A year later the court granted in part the plaintiff’s Rule 37(b) sanctions motion, finding for the second time that the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for the defendants’ failure to provide the same discovery.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package6 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap10 roadmap entries
Video overviewNo video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Darryl and Ann Roberts and their qualified trust sued Windy Walk Homeowners Association, three other associations (Ballantrae Ridge, Troon Mountain, and Skye Top at Troon), four individuals the court called the Individual Committee Member defendants, and the Cost-Sharing Committee of the Third Amended and Restated Master Easement and Cost-Sharing Agreement. Their First Amended Verified Complaint attached the Windy Walk CC&Rs and the Cost-Sharing Agreement as exhibits. Eight defendants jointly moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim, attacking the complaint as conclusory. After oral argument, Judge Connie Contes denied the motion without prejudice in a November 16, 2017 under-advisement ruling: key paragraphs satisfied Arizona’s notice-pleading standard, deficient pleadings must ordinarily be given a chance to be cured by amendment, the parties’ rights and obligations are governed by the CC&Rs and the Cost-Sharing Agreement, and committee-member conduct is measured under A.R.S. §§ 10-3825 and 10-3830 rather than § 10-3304(B)(2). The court conditioned any renewed motion on a personal (not written) meet-and-confer with certification and ordered the plaintiff to serve a detailed disclosure statement. In November 2018 the court granted in part the plaintiff’s Rule 37(b) sanctions motion — the second fee entitlement against the defendants over the same withheld discovery. The collected minute entries end there with the case still active.

Key Issues & Findings

The court’s November 16, 2017 under-advisement ruling started from the settled Arizona framework: Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss are not favored, dismissal is permitted only when the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof, and the court must accept the nonmoving party’s material allegations as true and indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor. The defendants’ motion was predicated substantially on asserted pleading deficiencies — conclusory statements and general accusations in paragraphs 23, 29, 35, 36, and 42 of the First Amended Complaint — but the court held that unless a complaint is so lacking that a defendant cannot understand the basis for the claim and its general nature, dismissal is unwarranted, and found that paragraphs 30-32, 39, and 44-50 complied with Arizona’s notice-pleading standards. Even a deficient complaint, the court added, must ordinarily be given an opportunity to be cured by amendment before it can be dismissed, and any residual confusion about the claims was better addressed through the mandatory disclosure process, followed if necessary by a summary-judgment motion under the Celotex principle adopted in Orme School.

On the governing law, the court held the defendants’ reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3304(B)(2) of the Nonprofit Corporation Act and the Rohde case misplaced and inapposite. The more applicable provisions were A.R.S. §§ 10-3825 and 10-3830 — which supply the general standards and rebuttable presumption for the acts, omissions, and other discharge of duties of committee members — along with A.R.S. §§ 10-11602 and 10-11620. Beyond the statutes, the rights and obligations of the plaintiff and the defendants are governed by the terms of the Windy Walk CC&Rs and the Cost-Sharing Agreement attached as Exhibits A and B to the complaint. The denial was without prejudice but conditioned: any new or renewed motion to dismiss based on pleading deficiencies required a prior personal (not written) meet-and-confer about whether amendment or disclosure could cure the problem, plus a certification that the conference failed, and the plaintiff had 30 days to serve a detailed, fact-specific disclosure statement.

The discovery phase produced the record’s other substantive ruling. On November 19, 2018, addressing the plaintiff’s Rule 37(b) sanctions motion, the court noted it was the second time it had been required to review the defendants’ failure to provide the same discovery, and rejected as meritless their contention that producing discovery fifty days after a court order — without communication, conferring, or ‘some form of professional courtesy’ — was not a failure to obey. For the second time the court granted the plaintiff an entitlement to its reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for having to pursue the motion, deferring the amount until submission of concluding documents, while denying the other requested relief at that time. It warned that untimely discovery could be considered by the trier of fact as bearing on a party’s credibility and directed the parties to the expedited discovery-dispute procedure of Rule 26(d) going forward.

Why It Matters

For Arizona homeowners suing an association — or associations defending such suits — this case is a clean illustration of how high the bar is for a pleading-stage dismissal. The court refused to toss the complaint even while acknowledging conclusory paragraphs, because notice pleading requires only fair notice of the claim, amendment must ordinarily be offered before dismissal, and disclosure and summary judgment are the preferred tools for testing weak claims. The meet-and-confer-plus-certification conditions the court attached to any renewed motion show how Maricopa County judges push parties to fix pleading fights without motion practice.

The ruling also matters for HOA governance disputes because it identifies the statutory home for claims about committee-member conduct: A.R.S. §§ 10-3825 and 10-3830 of the nonprofit-corporation statutes, with their general standards and rebuttable presumption for the discharge of duties, rather than § 10-3304(B)(2) — and it reiterates that the recorded governing documents (here the Windy Walk CC&Rs and a multi-association Master Easement and Cost-Sharing Agreement) define the parties’ rights and obligations. Finally, the 2018 sanctions ruling is a warning about discovery conduct: the association-side defendants twice ended up owing the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees over the same withheld discovery, and the court flagged that discovery failures can be used against a party’s credibility at trial. As a superior-court decision it binds only these parties, and the collected minute entries end in November 2018 with the case still active, so the ultimate outcome is not reflected in this record.

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Christine Davis v. Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Member Standing & Association Records | A.R.S. § 33-1805 | CV2015-091129

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, two plaintiffs sued the Westglen Villas Homeowners Association and an individual co-defendant. On the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, Judge David K. Udall held that a jury should decide whether the defendants violated the duties owed to the plaintiffs and whether they violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 as to Christine Davis — but that co-plaintiff David Opstein, who is not a member of the homeowners association, had no standing on the statutory count, which was dismissed against him with prejudice.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Christine Davis, et al. v. Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-091129.

Scope note: This page covers Christine Davis, et al. v. Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-091129) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, centered on the March 31, 2016 under-advisement ruling on the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected minute entries end with a November 28, 2016 order denying the plaintiff’s motion to reinstate the case to the active calendar and compulsory arbitration. They do not show a trial, judgment, or other final disposition, so the ultimate outcome of the case is not reflected in these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court largely denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. On Count 1, the court found “there is enough evidence to go to the jury on the question of whether or not Defendants violated the duties owed to the Plaintiffs.” On Count 2, breach of A.R.S. § 33-1805, it found enough evidence for a jury as to plaintiff Christine Davis. But the court found that co-plaintiff David Opstein “is not a member of the Homeowners Association and has no standing with respect to this Count”, granted the motion against him on Count 2, and dismissed that count as to him with prejudice. Opstein’s Count 1 claim survived.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Christine Davis (Plaintiff)
    Lead plaintiff. The court found enough evidence for a jury on both of her claims — Count 1 (duties owed to the plaintiffs) and Count 2 (breach of A.R.S. § 33-1805) — and denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to her on both counts.
  • David Opstein (Plaintiff)
    Co-plaintiff. The court found he is not a member of the homeowners association and has no standing on the A.R.S. § 33-1805 count, which was dismissed against him with prejudice; his Count 1 claim survived summary judgment.
  • Erin Selene Iungerich (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for plaintiffs Christine Davis and David Opstein throughout the collected minute entries.
  • James Roger Wood (Counsel)
    Appeared at the March 31, 2016 oral argument on behalf of Erin Iungerich for the plaintiffs.

Respondent Side

  • Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc (Defendant)
    Homeowners association defendant. Its motion for partial summary judgment was denied as to Christine Davis on both counts and granted only as to David Opstein’s statutory count.
  • Phil Gardner (Defendant)
    Individual co-defendant named alongside the association. The collected minute entries do not describe his role further.
  • Terry Wayne Straughn (Counsel)
    Counsel of record for the defendants; argued the motion for partial summary judgment at the March 31, 2016 hearing.

Neutral Parties

  • David K. Udall (Judge)
    Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the collected minute entries, heard the March 31, 2016 oral argument, issued the under-advisement ruling the same day, and denied the November 2016 motion to reinstate.

What happened

Christine Davis and David Opstein sued the Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc and Phil Gardner in Maricopa County Superior Court under case number CV2015-091129. Erin Selene Iungerich represented the plaintiffs and Terry Wayne Straughn represented the defendants. The collected minute entries pick up in late 2015, with a defense motion for partial summary judgment already pending. The complaint itself is not among these records, but the court’s later ruling shows the case included at least two counts: Count 1, addressing whether the defendants violated the duties owed to the plaintiffs, and Count 2, alleging breach of A.R.S. § 33-1805 — the Arizona Planned Communities Act provision governing association records.

On November 20, 2015, the court granted the parties’ stipulation to continue the deadline for responsive pleadings, extending the plaintiffs’ time to respond to the pending motion for partial summary judgment through November 23, 2015. After receiving and reviewing the motion, the response, and the reply, Judge David K. Udall issued a January 11, 2016 order setting a one-hour oral argument for March 18, 2016 at the Southeast Courthouse in Mesa.

Oral argument was ultimately held on the morning of March 31, 2016. Counsel James Roger Wood appeared on behalf of Erin Iungerich for the plaintiffs, who were not present; Terry Straughn appeared for the defendants, who were also not present. After argument running from 9:02 to 9:26 a.m., the court took the motion under advisement.

The court issued its under-advisement ruling the same day. On Count 1, it found “there is enough evidence to go to the jury on the question of whether or not Defendants violated the duties owed to the Plaintiffs.” On Count 2, breach of A.R.S. § 33-1805, it found enough evidence for a jury as to Christine Davis. As to David Opstein, however, the court found he “is not a member of the Homeowners Association and has no standing with respect to this Count.” The court therefore denied the motion as to Davis on Counts 1 and 2 and as to Opstein on Count 1, granted the motion against Opstein on Count 2, and dismissed Count 2 with prejudice as to him.

The final collected minute entry is dated November 28, 2016: the court received, considered, and denied the plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate to Active Calendar and Compulsory Arbitration. The collected minutes do not show a trial, judgment, or other final disposition, so how the case ultimately ended is not reflected in these records.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Christine Davis v. Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc (CV2015-091129 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The superior court denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Christine Davis on both counts… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Christine Davis v. Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2015-11-20 The court grants the parties’ November 18, 2015 stipulation to continue the deadline for responsive pleadings, extending the plaintiffs’ response to the pending motion for partial summary judgment through November 23, 2015.
Step 2016-01-11 Having received and reviewed the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs’ response, and the defendants’ reply, the court sets a one-hour oral argument for March 18, 2016 before Judge David K. Udall at the Southeast Courthouse in Mesa.
Step 2016-03-31 Oral argument on the motion is held (9:02–9:26 a.m.); James Roger Wood appears on behalf of Erin Iungerich for the plaintiffs and Terry Straughn appears for the defendants. The court takes the matter under advisement.
Step 2016-03-31 Under-advisement ruling: the motion is denied as to Christine Davis on Counts 1 and 2 and as to David Opstein on Count 1; it is granted against Opstein on Count 2 (breach of A.R.S. § 33-1805) because he is not a member of the homeowners association and has no standing, and that count is dismissed as to him with prejudice.
Step 2016-11-28 The court denies the plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate to Active Calendar and Compulsory Arbitration — the last entry in the collected minutes.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/christine-davis-v-westglen-villas-homeowners-association/raw/: 5 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2015-11-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 2 2016-01-11

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Source 3 2016-03-31

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying summary judgment against Christine Davis on both counts, denying it against David Opstein on Count 1, and dismissing Opstein’s A.R.S. § 33-1805 count.

Source 4 2016-03-31

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file
Source 5 2016-11-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

FAQ

What did the court decide in the March 31, 2016 ruling?

It mostly denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. The court found enough evidence for a jury on Count 1 — whether the defendants violated the duties owed to the plaintiffs — and on Count 2, the A.R.S. § 33-1805 claim, as to Christine Davis. The only relief the defendants won was against co-plaintiff David Opstein: his Count 2 claim was dismissed with prejudice because he is not a member of the homeowners association and had no standing under that count.

Why was David Opstein’s statutory claim dismissed?

Standing. The court found that Opstein “is not a member of the Homeowners Association and has no standing with respect to this Count”, so it granted the defendants partial summary judgment on the A.R.S. § 33-1805 count as to him and dismissed it with prejudice — meaning he cannot refile it. His Count 1 claim, however, survived and was allowed to proceed.

What is A.R.S. § 33-1805?

It is the provision of Arizona’s Planned Communities Act that governs members’ access to a homeowners association’s records. The minute entries identify Count 2 only as “breach of ARS 33-1805” and do not describe the underlying factual allegations. What the ruling does show is who could pursue the claim: the court let it go to a jury for member-plaintiff Christine Davis, while dismissing it for David Opstein because he is not a member of the association.

Does denial of summary judgment mean the plaintiffs won?

No. Denying summary judgment means only that the court found “enough evidence to go to the jury” — a jury would still have to decide whether the defendants actually violated the duties owed to the plaintiffs or A.R.S. § 33-1805. The collected minute entries do not include a trial or verdict, so these records do not show who ultimately prevailed.

What is an under-advisement ruling?

When an Arizona superior-court judge takes a motion “under advisement” after briefing or argument, the later written decision is filed as an under-advisement ruling in the court’s minute entries. These rulings are the trial court’s substantive written decisions — here, the March 31, 2016 ruling set out the court’s findings on each count and its orders on the motion for partial summary judgment — and they are public records available through the Clerk of the Superior Court.

How did the case end?

The collected minute entries do not say. The last entry, dated November 28, 2016, denies the plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate to Active Calendar and Compulsory Arbitration; no trial, judgment, or dismissal order appears in the collected records after the March 2016 ruling. Superior-court decisions also bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent for other Arizona HOA disputes.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citationCV2015-091129 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunalSuperior Court
Decision / key dateMarch 31, 2016
Judge / panelHon. David K. Udall
PartiesChristine Davis and David Opstein (Plaintiffs) v. Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc and Phil Gardner (Defendants)
Governing law
Topics
Meetings & RecordsProcedure
Outcome / holding

The superior court denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Christine Davis on both counts, finding enough evidence to go to the jury on whether the defendants violated the duties owed to the plaintiffs and whether they violated A.R.S. § 33-1805, and as to David Opstein on Count 1; but it granted the motion against Opstein on the A.R.S. § 33-1805 count and dismissed it as to him with prejudice because he is not a member of the homeowners association and has no standing.

Primary public sourceView source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap5 roadmap entries
Video overviewChristine Davis v. Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc
Study / briefing material1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions6 questions
Curated download aliases1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Christine Davis and David Opstein sued the Westglen Villas Homeowners Association Inc and Phil Gardner in Maricopa County Superior Court. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on two counts: Count 1, addressing whether the defendants violated the duties owed to the plaintiffs, and Count 2, alleging breach of A.R.S. § 33-1805, the Planned Communities Act provision governing association records. After oral argument on March 31, 2016, Judge David K. Udall issued an under-advisement ruling the same day denying the motion as to Davis on both counts — finding enough evidence to go to the jury — and as to Opstein on Count 1, but granting it against Opstein on Count 2 because he is not a member of the homeowners association and has no standing; that count was dismissed as to him with prejudice. The collected minute entries end with a November 28, 2016 order denying the plaintiff’s motion to reinstate the case to the active calendar and compulsory arbitration, and do not show a trial or final judgment.

Key Issues & Findings

The March 31, 2016 under-advisement ruling followed full briefing and a morning oral argument the same day, after which the court took the motion under advisement. On Count 1, the court found “there is enough evidence to go to the jury on the question of whether or not Defendants violated the duties owed to the Plaintiffs”, so summary judgment was inappropriate as to both plaintiffs on that count.

On Count 2, breach of A.R.S. § 33-1805, the court drew a line between the two plaintiffs based on association membership. As to Christine Davis, it found enough evidence for a jury on whether the defendants violated the statute, and denied the motion. As to David Opstein, the court found he “is not a member of the Homeowners Association and has no standing with respect to this Count” — so it granted the defendants partial summary judgment against him on Count 2 and dismissed that count as to him with prejudice, while his Count 1 claim survived.

The ruling left the surviving claims for a jury, but the collected minute entries do not show a trial or verdict. The last collected entry, dated November 28, 2016, denies the plaintiff’s Motion to Reinstate to Active Calendar and Compulsory Arbitration, and the ultimate disposition of the case is not reflected in these records.

Why It Matters

The ruling is a compact illustration of who may enforce Arizona’s planned-community statutes. The court dismissed the A.R.S. § 33-1805 count brought by a plaintiff who is not a member of the homeowners association — with prejudice — for lack of standing, while letting the identical count proceed for the member plaintiff. For anyone considering a records-related claim against an HOA, membership in the association was the threshold the court applied before reaching the merits.

It also shows what surviving summary judgment does and does not mean: the court’s finding of “enough evidence to go to the jury” kept the claims alive but decided nothing about who was right. Because the collected minute entries end in November 2016 without a trial or judgment, these records show the procedural posture rather than a final winner. As a superior-court decision, the ruling binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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