Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Foreclosure & Lien Priority | A.R.S. §§ 33-1807, 33-727 | CV2012-012813

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a homeowners association that had won a judgment of foreclosure and forced a sheriff’s sale squared off against Bank of America over who was entitled to the $4,716.06 left over after the sale. The association argued the foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, entitling it to the surplus; the Bank argued that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages. The court was persuaded by the Bank: distribution is governed by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and the Bank — as the next lienholder in priority — takes the excess proceeds.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-012813.

Download excess-proceeds ruling

Scope note: This page covers Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2012-012813) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 9, 2014 under-advisement ruling on the competing excess-proceeds applications; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entries, from May 2014, are orders directing the Clerk’s Office to release the excess proceeds to Bank of America; the collected minutes show no appeal or further activity, so the dispute over the sale proceeds appears concluded as of those entries. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court held that Bank of America, not the foreclosing homeowners association, was entitled to the $4,716.06 in excess proceeds left over from the sheriff’s sale that followed the Association’s judgment of foreclosure. The Association argued the lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, which would have sent the surplus to it as judgment creditor. The court was instead persuaded by the Bank’s position — grounded in A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), under which association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages — that distribution of the excess is governed by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A). Because the Bank was the next lienholder in priority, the court denied the Association’s application, granted the Bank’s, and directed the Clerk to distribute the excess proceeds to the Bank.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association (Plaintiff)
Scottsdale homeowners association that obtained a judgment of foreclosure on its lien and, as judgment creditor, applied for the excess proceeds from the September 2013 sheriff’s sale. Its application was denied.
Janet E. Jackim (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association, appearing at the February 28, 2014 oral argument on the competing excess-proceeds applications.
Roger Owers (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Plaintiff Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association at the February 28, 2014 oral argument.

Respondent Side

Windy Walk Properties, LLC (Defendant)
First-named defendant in the Association’s foreclosure suit. The Association applied for a default judgment against it in early 2013, and it appeared at the February 2014 oral argument through a company representative rather than counsel.
Bank of America, N.A. (Defendant)
Defendant lienholder that opposed the Association’s application and filed its own competing application for release of the excess proceeds. The court found the Bank was the next lienholder in priority and awarded it the $4,716.06.
David E. Funkhouser III (Counsel)
Counsel for Defendant Bank of America, N.A., appearing at the February 28, 2014 oral argument.
Lyzzette M. Bullock (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Defendant Bank of America, N.A. at the February 28, 2014 oral argument.
Doug Metz (Representative)
Representative of Defendant Windy Walk Properties, LLC, present at the February 28, 2014 oral argument. The minute entries identify him as a company representative, not counsel.

Neutral Parties

Maria del Mar Verdin (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the excess-proceeds dispute, heard the February 2014 oral argument, and issued the April 9, 2014 under-advisement ruling.
Colleen L. French (Judge)
Judge pro tem who signed the May 2014 orders directing release of the excess proceeds to Bank of America and correcting a clerical error in the release order.
Benjamin E. Vatz (Commissioner)
Court commissioner designated in the February 2013 minute entry to hear the Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings against Windy Walk Properties, LLC.

What happened

Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association sued Windy Walk Properties, LLC and Bank of America, N.A. in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2012-012813) and obtained a judgment of foreclosure on its lien. The collected minute entries pick up the case in early 2013, when the Association filed an application and affidavit for default judgment against Windy Walk Properties; the court directed that those Rule 55(b) default proceedings be heard by Commissioner Benjamin E. Vatz and that the default packet be hand-delivered to that division.

In February 2013 the Association also moved for summary judgment on lien priority. That motion never had to be decided: after the parties filed a stipulation in April 2013, the court deemed the summary-judgment motion moot in a May 3, 2013 minute entry.

On September 12, 2013, a sheriff’s sale was conducted on the property as a result of the judgment of foreclosure in the Association’s favor. The sale generated $4,716.06 in excess proceeds, which were deposited with the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court. In October 2013 the Association applied for distribution of the excess proceeds to itself as judgment creditor. Bank of America opposed that application in November 2013 and filed its own competing application for release of the same funds, and the two applications were fully briefed through December 2013.

Judge Maria del Mar Verdin set the competing applications for oral argument and heard them on February 28, 2014. Janet E. Jackim and Roger Owers argued for the Association; David E. Funkhouser and Lyzzette M. Bullock argued for Bank of America; Windy Walk Properties appeared through its representative, Doug Metz. The court took the matter under advisement.

In an under-advisement ruling issued April 9, 2014, the court resolved the statutory tug-of-war in the Bank’s favor. The Association had argued that its lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, entitling it to the excess proceeds; the Bank argued that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages, so any excess should be disbursed to the Bank. The court was persuaded by the Bank’s position that priority, under the circumstances presented, is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and held that the Bank was entitled to the excess proceeds as the next lienholder in priority. It denied the Association’s application, granted the Bank’s, and directed the Clerk to distribute the $4,716.06 to Bank of America.

The endgame was administrative. The Bank filed a proposed form of order in late April 2014, and Judge Pro Tem Colleen L. French signed an order in May 2014 granting the Bank’s application and directing release of the $4,716.06 — less a $30.00 processing fee and upon presentation of a fully executed U.S. Treasury Form W-9, citing A.R.S. § 33-812(g). A May 20, 2014 minute entry corrected a clerical error so that the Clerk’s Office, rather than the Maricopa County Treasurer, would release the funds. The collected minutes end there, with the excess proceeds ordered released to the Bank.

Procedural timeline

Step 2013-02-04 The court takes no action on the Association’s e-filed application for default judgment against Windy Walk Properties, LLC and directs that Rule 55(b) default proceedings be heard by Commissioner Benjamin E. Vatz.

Step 2013-02-27 The Association files a motion for summary judgment on lien priority with a separate statement of facts.

Step 2013-05-03 Pursuant to an April 26, 2013 stipulation, the court deems the summary-judgment motion on lien priority moot.

Step 2013-09-12 A sheriff’s sale is conducted on the property under the judgment of foreclosure in the Association’s favor; $4,716.06 in excess proceeds is deposited with the Clerk of the Superior Court.

Step 2013-10-17 The Association files its Application for Distribution of Excess Proceeds from Sale of Real Estate Under Execution and Order of Sale on Special Execution.

Step 2013-11-05 Bank of America files its response opposing the Association’s application and its own competing Application for Release of Excess Proceeds; briefing continues through December 2013.

Step 2014-01-09 The court sets the competing excess-proceeds applications for oral argument.

Step 2014-02-28 Oral argument before Judge Maria del Mar Verdin; counsel for the Association and the Bank argue, a Windy Walk Properties representative is present, and the matter is taken under advisement.

Step 2014-04-09 Under-advisement ruling: priority is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A); the Association’s application is denied, the Bank’s application is granted, and the Clerk is directed to distribute the $4,716.06 to Bank of America.

Step 2014-05-15 Order granting Bank of America’s application and directing release of the $4,716.06, less a $30.00 processing fee and upon presentation of a Form W-9, citing A.R.S. § 33-812(g).

Step 2014-05-20 Clerical correction: the Clerk’s Office, rather than the Maricopa County Treasurer, is to release the excess proceeds to Bank of America.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/ballantrae-ridge-homeowners-association-v-windy-walk-properties/raw/: 7 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2013-02-04

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Default-judgment entry ordering that no action would be taken by the assigned division because Rule 55(b) default-judgment papers had to proceed through commissioner procedure.

Download source file

2013-02-04_001_default-judgment.pdf

Source 2 2013-05-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-05-03_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2014-01-09

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2014-01-09_003_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 4 2014-02-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-02-28_004_minute-entry.pdf

Source 5 2014-04-09

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the association’s application for excess foreclosure-sale proceeds and directing distribution by lien priority.

Download source file

2014-04-09_005_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 6 2014-05-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-05-15_006_minute-entry.pdf

Source 7 2014-05-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-05-20_007_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What are “excess proceeds” in a foreclosure case like this one?

They are the money left over from a foreclosure sale after the amounts the sale was conducted to satisfy are paid. Here, the sheriff’s sale held on September 12, 2013 under the judgment of foreclosure in the Association’s favor produced $4,716.06 more than was needed, and that surplus was deposited with the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court until the judge decided who was entitled to it.

Why did Bank of America get the money instead of the association that foreclosed?

Because of lien priority. The court was persuaded by the Bank’s position that priority in these circumstances is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and it held the Bank was entitled to the excess proceeds “as the next lien holder in priority.” The Association’s foreclosure judgment gave it the right to force the sale, but it did not give the Association a superior claim to the surplus over the next lienholder in line.

What was the Association’s legal theory, and why did it fail?

The Association argued that its lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, which would have routed the excess sale proceeds to it as the judgment creditor. The court rejected that framing in favor of the Bank’s argument that, under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages — so the surplus is distributed by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A) rather than handed to the foreclosing judgment creditor.

What happened to the earlier summary-judgment motion on lien priority?

The Association moved for summary judgment on lien priority in February 2013, but the parties filed a stipulation in April 2013, and the court then deemed the motion moot in a May 3, 2013 minute entry. The priority question ultimately reached the court a different way — through the competing applications for the excess sale proceeds filed in the fall of 2013.

What is an under-advisement ruling?

When an Arizona superior-court judge takes a motion “under advisement” after briefing or argument, the later written decision is filed as an under-advisement ruling in the court’s minute entries. In this case, Judge Maria del Mar Verdin took the competing excess-proceeds applications under advisement at the February 28, 2014 oral argument and issued the written ruling on April 9, 2014. These rulings are public records available through the Clerk of the Superior Court.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA foreclosure disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading for anyone tracking association lien foreclosures: it shows a court treating an HOA lien foreclosure like a mortgage foreclosure under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) and distributing surplus sale proceeds strictly by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A), rather than awarding them to the foreclosing association.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2012-012813 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	April 9, 2014
Judge / panel	Hon. Maria del Mar Verdin, Judge Pro Tem Colleen L. French
Parties	Ballantrae Ridge Homeowners Association (Plaintiff, judgment creditor) v. Windy Walk Properties, LLC and Bank of America, N.A. (Defendants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1807 A.R.S. § 33-727 A.R.S. § 12-1562
Topics	ForeclosureAssessmentsProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court held that the excess proceeds from the sheriff’s sale following the association’s lien foreclosure must be distributed by lien priority — being persuaded by the Bank’s position, grounded in A.R.S. § 33-1807(A)’s treatment of association lien foreclosures as mortgages, that priority is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A) — and that Bank of America was entitled to the $4,716.06 as the next lienholder in priority, rejecting the association’s argument that the foreclosure was a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562 entitling it to the surplus as judgment creditor.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	7 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	11 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A Scottsdale homeowners association sued Windy Walk Properties, LLC and Bank of America, N.A. and obtained a judgment of foreclosure on its lien. A September 12, 2013 sheriff’s sale conducted under that judgment produced $4,716.06 in excess proceeds, which were deposited with the Clerk of the Superior Court. The association applied for the surplus as judgment creditor, arguing the lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562; Bank of America filed a competing application, arguing that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages so the excess should be disbursed to the Bank. After a February 28, 2014 oral argument, the court issued an April 9, 2014 under-advisement ruling adopting the Bank’s position: priority is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and the Bank was entitled to the excess proceeds as the next lienholder in priority. The court denied the association’s application, granted the Bank’s, and directed the Clerk to distribute the $4,716.06 to Bank of America; May 2014 orders implemented the release and corrected a clerical error.

Key Issues & Findings

The dispute reached the court through competing applications for the same pot of money. After the association won a judgment of foreclosure and a sheriff’s sale was conducted on the property on September 12, 2013, $4,716.06 in excess proceeds was deposited with the Clerk of the Maricopa County Superior Court. In October 2013 the association applied for distribution of the surplus to itself, characterizing the sale as one conducted under execution and an order of sale on special execution; in November 2013 Bank of America both opposed that application and filed its own application for release of the same funds. The applications were fully briefed through December 2013 and argued on February 28, 2014.

The April 9, 2014 under-advisement ruling framed the parties’ positions as a statutory choice. The association argued that the lien foreclosure should be treated as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562, which would entitle it, as judgment creditor, to the excess proceeds. The Bank argued that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) association lien foreclosures are treated as mortgages, so any excess monies should be disbursed to the Bank. The court stated it was persuaded by the Bank’s position that priority in the case, under the circumstances presented, is governed by A.R.S. § 33-727(A), and concluded the Bank was entitled to the excess proceeds “as the next lien holder in priority.”

On that basis the court denied the association’s application for distribution, granted the Bank’s application for release, and directed the Clerk to distribute the $4,716.06 to Bank of America, with counsel to lodge a form of order. Implementation followed in May 2014: a judge pro tem signed an order releasing the funds to the Bank less a $30.00 processing fee and upon presentation of a Form W-9, citing A.R.S. § 33-812(g), and a follow-up minute entry corrected a clerical error so the Clerk’s Office, rather than the county treasurer, would release the money. The collected minute entries show no appeal or further activity after the May 2014 release orders.

Why It Matters

This case answers a question that recurs whenever an Arizona homeowners association forecloses its lien and the property sells for more than the sale needed to raise: who keeps the surplus? The association here assumed that, as the foreclosing judgment creditor, it would — and framed the sheriff’s sale as a special execution under A.R.S. § 12-1562 to get there. The court instead treated the association’s lien foreclosure like a mortgage foreclosure, following the Bank’s argument under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), and distributed the excess strictly by lien priority under A.R.S. § 33-727(A). The next lienholder in line — a bank — took the money.

For associations, the lesson is that winning a foreclosure judgment and forcing a sale does not create a right to surplus sale proceeds; other lienholders’ priority positions survive the sale and control the distribution of any excess. For homeowners and lenders, the case shows the mechanics of how these fights actually unfold — competing applications to the court for funds deposited with the Clerk, briefing, oral argument, and an under-advisement ruling. The dollar amount here was modest ($4,716.06), but the priority principle applies regardless of size. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties and is not precedent; the collected minute entries show the matter concluded with the May 2014 release orders and no appeal.

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Richard Rudner v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&R Amendments & Parking Rules | Kalway v. Calabria Ranch | CV2023-002424

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, homeowners challenged a board-adopted amendment restricting overnight driveway parking to a single vehicle. The court held the amendment failed the foreseeability test of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022): the community’s existing parking restrictions addressed parking locations, not the number of vehicles or parking hours, and a board’s general power to amend does not by itself make new restrictions foreseeable. The court also held the homeowners could challenge the ultra vires act directly, without a derivative action under A.R.S. § 10-3304.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Richard Rudner v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-002424.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Richard Rudner v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-002424) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the September 6, 2023 under-advisement ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected minutes end with a stipulated Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction entered September 26, 2023, which concluded the case in the trial court; no appeal appears in the collected record. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the homeowners summary judgment and denied the Association’s cross-motion as moot. Applying Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), the court held that the board’s September 22, 2022 amendment limiting overnight driveway parking to one vehicle was not foreseeable: the CC&Rs and use restrictions did not give the homeowners sufficient notice, because the subject and character of the previous parking restrictions pertained to parking locations, not the number of vehicles or parking hours, and a board’s general power to amend does not create foreseeability. The court found the new restriction unreasonable and an unauthorized restriction on the use of private property. It also held A.R.S. § 10-3304 inapplicable — the homeowners had standing to challenge an ultra vires corporate act directly, making a derivative action unnecessary.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Richard Rudner (Plaintiff)
Homeowner in the Bellasera community, where the Rudners have resided since 2005; challenged the one-vehicle overnight driveway-parking amendment.
Darlene Rudner (Plaintiff)
Homeowner in the Bellasera community and co-plaintiff with Richard Rudner.
Charles W. Wirken (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiffs Richard and Darlene Rudner throughout the case. The court’s ruling noted he was also the prevailing party’s counsel in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, the Arizona Supreme Court decision the ruling applied.

Respondent Side

Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Homeowners’ association responsible for monitoring and supervising the Bellasera community under its governing CC&Rs; its board adopted the challenged parking amendment on September 22, 2022.
Joseph A. Cada (Counsel)
Counsel of record for the Association at the March 2023 motion-to-dismiss stage, per the minute-entry caption.
Marcus R. Martinez (Counsel)
Counsel of record for the Association from the summary-judgment briefing through entry of judgment.
Scott Carpenter (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the Association at the July 12, 2023 oral argument on behalf of Marcus R. Martinez.

Neutral Parties

Timothy J. Ryan (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the case, heard the July 2023 oral argument, and issued the September 6, 2023 under-advisement ruling.

What happened

Bellasera is an Arizona community governed by CC&Rs, with Bellasera Community Association, Inc. responsible for monitoring and supervising the community consistent with those documents. Richard and Darlene Rudner are homeowners in Bellasera, where they have resided since 2005. The Original and Amended CC&Rs authorize the Association’s board to “adopt rules which modify, cancel, limit, create exceptions to, or expand the Use Restrictions” attached to and incorporated in the CC&Rs.

On September 22, 2022, the Bellasera board amended the “Vehicles and Parking” use restriction set forth in subparagraph (g) of Exhibit C to the Amended CC&Rs. As relevant here, the amendment provided: “Except as specifically provided in subsections 3 and 8 below, no more than one (1) passenger vehicle, SUV or pickup truck may be parked on a driveway of a home in Bellasera overnight,” with “overnight” defined as midnight to 6:00 a.m. The Rudners demanded that the Association rescind the change; the Association refused, and this lawsuit followed. The Rudners did not challenge the amendment’s language on overnight street parking — only the prohibition on parking more than one vehicle on a private driveway.

The case’s early procedural steps were brief. The Association filed a motion to dismiss on March 9, 2023, then withdrew it by notice filed March 27, 2023, and the court formally withdrew the motion on March 30, 2023. The parties then moved directly to cross-motions for summary judgment: the Rudners filed their motion on April 17, 2023, the Association filed its response and cross-motion on May 22, 2023, and briefing closed with the Association’s reply on June 26, 2023. Judge Timothy J. Ryan heard oral argument on July 12, 2023 via the Court Connect remote platform and took the matter under advisement.

In an under-advisement ruling dated September 6, 2023, the court granted the Rudners summary judgment. It noted the parties did not dispute the relevant facts and found the case controlled by the principles of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), which the court described as substantially briefed and explained in the Rudners’ motion papers, incorporated by reference. Applying Kalway, the court held the September 22, 2022 change regarding the number of vehicles on a private driveway “was not foreseeable”: the CC&Rs and use restrictions did not give the Rudners sufficient notice, because “[t]he subject and character of the previous parking restrictions pertains to parking locations, not number of vehicles or parking hours.” The mere fact that the board holds a general power to amend, the court explained, does not create foreseeability. The court concluded the new restriction was unreasonable and “an unauthorized restriction on the use of private property.”

The court also rejected a threshold procedural defense, holding A.R.S. § 10-3304 inapplicable: the Rudners had standing to challenge an ultra vires corporate act, making a derivative action unnecessary. The court granted the Rudners’ motion for summary judgment and denied the Association’s cross-motion as moot. In a footnote, the court observed that the Rudners’ counsel had been the prevailing party’s counsel in Kalway itself.

The case then concluded by agreement on the form of relief. The parties submitted a Stipulation for Entry of Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction, and the court signed the formal Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction, which the Clerk entered on September 26, 2023; a September 27, 2023 minute entry approved and settled the judgment. No appeal appears in the collected minute entries.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Richard Rudner v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (CV2023-002424 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Kalway invalidated an unforeseeable CC&R amendment expanding architectural enforcement authority. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Richard Rudner v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2022-09-22 The Bellasera board amends the “Vehicles and Parking” use restriction to prohibit more than one passenger vehicle, SUV, or pickup truck from parking on a home’s driveway overnight (midnight to 6:00 a.m.).

Step 2023-02-14 After the Association refuses the Rudners’ demand to rescind the amendment, the Rudners sue in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2023-002424).

Step 2023-03-09 The Association files a motion to dismiss.

Step 2023-03-30 Following the Association’s March 27 notice of withdrawal, the court orders the motion to dismiss withdrawn.

Step 2023-04-17 The Rudners file their motion for summary judgment.

Step 2023-05-22 The Association files its response and cross-motion for summary judgment; briefing closes with the Association’s June 26 reply.

Step 2023-07-12 Oral argument on the cross-motions before Judge Timothy J. Ryan via Court Connect; the matter is taken under advisement.

Step 2023-09-06 Under-advisement ruling grants the Rudners summary judgment under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch and denies the Association’s cross-motion as moot; the court holds A.R.S. § 10-3304 inapplicable.

Step 2023-09-26 The stipulated Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction is signed by the court and entered by the Clerk; a September 27 minute entry approves and settles the judgment.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/richard-rudner-v-bellasera-community-association/raw/: 5 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2023-03-30

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2023-03-30_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2023-06-27

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2023-06-27_002_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 3 2023-07-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2023-07-14_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2023-09-06

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the homeowners summary judgment under Kalway and denying the association’s summary-judgment motion.

Download source file

2023-09-06_004_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 5 2023-09-27

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry approving and settling the formal order, judgment, and permanent injunction for the homeowners.

Download source file

2023-09-27_005_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

What did the challenged parking amendment say?

Adopted by the Bellasera board on September 22, 2022, the amendment to the “Vehicles and Parking” use restriction provided that, except as specifically allowed in two subsections, “no more than one (1) passenger vehicle, SUV or pickup truck may be parked on a driveway of a home in Bellasera overnight,” with “overnight” defined as midnight to 6:00 a.m. The Rudners challenged only this one-vehicle driveway limit, not the amendment’s language on overnight street parking.

Why did the court strike down the new driveway-parking rule?

The court applied the foreseeability framework of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022). It held the change was not foreseeable because the CC&Rs and use restrictions did not give the homeowners sufficient notice: the subject and character of the previous parking restrictions pertained to parking locations, not the number of vehicles or parking hours. The court concluded the new restriction was unreasonable and an unauthorized restriction on the use of private property.

Doesn’t a board’s general power to amend the rules cover a change like this?

Not by itself. The Bellasera CC&Rs authorize the board to “adopt rules which modify, cancel, limit, create exceptions to, or expand the Use Restrictions,” but the court held that the mere fact that a board has a general power to amend does not create foreseeability. Under the Kalway framework the court applied, existing documents must give owners sufficient notice of the subject and character of a future restriction.

Did the homeowners have to bring a derivative action under A.R.S. § 10-3304?

No. The court held A.R.S. § 10-3304 inapplicable and found the Rudners had standing to challenge an ultra vires corporate act directly, making a derivative action unnecessary.

How did the case end?

After the September 6, 2023 under-advisement ruling granted the Rudners summary judgment and denied the Association’s cross-motion as moot, the parties stipulated to the form of judgment. The court signed a formal Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction, entered by the Clerk on September 26, 2023, and approved it by minute entry the next day. No appeal appears in the collected minute entries.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading because it shows a trial court applying the Arizona Supreme Court’s Kalway foreseeability test to a board-adopted rule change — asking whether the existing CC&Rs gave owners sufficient notice of the subject and character of the new restriction — and confirming that owners may challenge an ultra vires association act directly rather than through a derivative action.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2023-002424 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	September 6, 2023
Judge / panel	Hon. Timothy J. Ryan
Parties	Richard Rudner and Darlene Rudner (Plaintiffs, homeowners) v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 10-3304
Topics	CC&RsBoard GovernanceProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the homeowners summary judgment, holding under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC that the board’s amendment limiting overnight driveway parking to one vehicle was not foreseeable from the existing CC&Rs and use restrictions — whose parking provisions addressed locations, not vehicle counts or hours — was unreasonable, and was an unauthorized restriction on the use of private property; the court also held A.R.S. § 10-3304 inapplicable because the homeowners had standing to challenge an ultra vires corporate act directly, without a derivative action.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	9 roadmap entries
Video overview	Richard Rudner v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Richard and Darlene Rudner, homeowners in the Bellasera community, where they have resided since 2005, sued their association after its board amended the community’s “Vehicles and Parking” use restriction on September 22, 2022 to provide that, with limited exceptions, “no more than one (1) passenger vehicle, SUV or pickup truck may be parked on a driveway of a home in Bellasera overnight,” with overnight defined as midnight to 6:00 a.m. The Rudners demanded rescission, the association refused, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on undisputed facts. In a September 6, 2023 under-advisement ruling, the court applied Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), and held the new driveway limit was not foreseeable from the existing CC&Rs — the previous parking restrictions addressed parking locations, not the number of vehicles or parking hours — and that the board’s general power to amend did not create foreseeability. The court found the restriction unreasonable and an unauthorized restriction on the use of private property, granted the homeowners summary judgment, and denied the association’s cross-motion as moot. A stipulated Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction was entered September 26, 2023.

Key Issues & Findings

The material facts were undisputed. The Bellasera CC&Rs authorize the board to “adopt rules which modify, cancel, limit, create exceptions to, or expand the Use Restrictions” incorporated in the CC&Rs, and on September 22, 2022 the board amended the “Vehicles and Parking” use restriction in subparagraph (g) of Exhibit C to the Amended CC&Rs to prohibit more than one passenger vehicle, SUV, or pickup truck from parking on a home’s driveway between midnight and 6:00 a.m. The Rudners challenged only that driveway limit, not the amendment’s street-parking language.

The court found the case governed by the principles of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), which it described as substantially briefed in the Rudners’ motion papers and incorporated by reference. Applying Kalway, the court held the change regarding the number of vehicles on a private driveway was not foreseeable: the CC&Rs and use restrictions did not give the Rudners sufficient notice, because the subject and character of the previous parking restrictions pertained to parking locations, not the number of vehicles or parking hours. The mere fact that the board holds a general power to amend does not create foreseeability. On that basis the court concluded the new restriction was unreasonable and an unauthorized restriction on the use of private property. In a footnote, the court noted that the Rudners’ counsel had been the prevailing party’s counsel in Kalway itself.

The court also disposed of a threshold procedural argument, finding A.R.S. § 10-3304 inapplicable: the homeowners had standing to challenge an ultra vires corporate act, making a derivative action unnecessary. The court granted the Rudners’ motion for summary judgment and denied the association’s cross-motion as moot. The parties then stipulated to the form of relief, and the court signed a formal Order and Judgment and Permanent Injunction entered by the Clerk on September 26, 2023.

Why It Matters

This case is a Maricopa County application of the Arizona Supreme Court’s Kalway foreseeability framework to a board amendment of a community’s use restrictions. It shows a trial court asking the Kalway questions concretely: did the existing documents give owners notice of the subject and character of the new restriction? Here, prior parking rules governed where vehicles could park, so a new rule limiting how many vehicles could park on an owner’s own driveway — and during what hours — was not foreseeable, and the board’s broad reserved power to modify use restrictions could not fill that gap.

The ruling also addresses a procedural point that recurs in owner-versus-association litigation: the court held A.R.S. § 10-3304 inapplicable and allowed the owners to challenge the board’s ultra vires act directly, without bringing a derivative action. And the endgame is instructive — after losing on summary judgment, the association stipulated to entry of a permanent injunction, and no appeal appears in the collected minute entries. As a superior-court decision, the ruling binds only these parties and is not precedent.

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Dominick Abatemarco v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc.: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Balcony Repairs & CC&R Enforcement | A.R.S. §§ 33-1255, 12-341.01 | CV2007-053132

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a condominium owner sued his association over a defective and dangerous balcony it refused to repair while its lawsuit against the community’s builder was pending. The court held the recorded Declaration made repair of the balconies — limited common elements — the association’s responsibility funded by equal assessments on all owners, mandatorily enjoined the association to promulgate a remediation plan and funding mechanism for all balconies, and, after a jury found the association breached the CC&Rs and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, entered a $90,000 damages judgment plus $250,000 in attorneys’ fees and $60,818.24 in costs for the owner.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Dominick Abatemarco v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2007-053132.

Download final judgment and fee ruling

Scope note: This page covers Dominick Abatemarco v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2007-053132) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 9, 2008 under-advisement ruling, the July 9, 2008 preliminary-injunction ruling, the March 2010 trial minute entries, and the June 4, 2010 judgment and attorneys’-fee ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected minute entries end in November 2010, in the middle of post-judgment garnishment proceedings against the Association’s bank accounts. A fall 2008 minute entry shows the Association sought (and was denied) a stay pending appeal, and the minutes do not identify the order appealed or show the outcome of any appeal, so later developments are not reflected here. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The homeowner substantially prevailed. The court found the balconies were limited common elements that the Declaration — Sections 3.5, 4.2, and 6.7 — made the Association’s responsibility to repair, funded by equal assessments on all unit owners, and it mandatorily enjoined the Association to promulgate and approve a remediation plan and funding mechanism to repair all balconies in the community. A jury then found the Association breached the CC&Rs ($40,000) and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing ($50,000), though it found for the Association on the claim for breach of a statutory duty to repair. Weighing the totality of the litigation under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) and the CC&Rs’ fee provision, the court held the owner was the successful party — but slashed his $591,475.50 fee request, which it called patently unreasonable, to $250,000 plus $60,818.24 in costs.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Dominick Abatemarco (Plaintiff)
Owner of condominium unit 226 at the Canterra at Squaw Peak complex in Phoenix since March 1998; a full-time resident who was current on his association dues. His balcony needed substantial repair, as did the balconies of many other owners.
Brian M. Bergin (Counsel)
Lead counsel for Plaintiff from the 2007 injunction proceedings through the 2010 jury trial and fee argument.
Brian J. Foster (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff appearing from May 2009 onward, and counsel of record during the 2010 post-judgment garnishment proceedings.
Kenneth M. Frakes (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff at the February 2010 final pretrial conference, the March 2010 jury trial, and the June 2010 fee argument.
Catherine Adams (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Plaintiff on the first day of the March 2010 jury trial.

Respondent Side

Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Phoenix condominium association that had sued the community’s builder over construction defects and, per the court’s 2009 summary-judgment ruling, declared on October 17, 2005 that there would be no balcony repairs until that litigation concluded. Early minute entries caption additional individual defendants (“et al.”); the court denied a 2008 motion to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants.
Mark A. Holmgren (Counsel)
Lead counsel for the Association throughout the case, from the 2007 injunction proceedings through trial, the fee ruling, and the 2010 garnishment proceedings.
Joshua M. Bolen (Counsel)
Counsel for the Association in the 2010 pretrial, trial, and fee-application proceedings.
Kellie J. Callahan (Counsel)
Counsel for the Association at the May 2009 and February 2010 pretrial conferences and the March 2010 jury trial.
J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the Association at the May 2009 final pretrial conference.
Javier Delgado (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the Association on the first day of the March 2010 jury trial.

Neutral Parties

Paul A. Katz (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the preliminary-injunction phase, issued the April 2008 under-advisement ruling, and entered the July 2008 mandatory preliminary injunction.
Brian R. Hauser (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who assumed the calendar in June 2008 and presided over the dispositive motions, the March 2010 jury trial, and the June 2010 judgment and fee ruling.
Gerald Porter (Commissioner)
Maricopa County Superior Court commissioner who presided over the fall 2010 post-judgment garnishment proceedings, including the September 28, 2010 judgment against garnishee Community Association Banc.

What happened

Dominick Abatemarco bought condominium unit 226 at the Canterra at Squaw Peak complex, 1747 E. Northern Avenue in Phoenix, in about March 1998, lived there full time, and was current on his association dues. According to the court’s findings, many units and common areas in the complex had construction defects, including defective and dangerous balconies, and the Association had filed a construction-defect lawsuit against the builder that was expected to settle for less than the cost of the needed repairs. Abatemarco’s balcony was in need of substantial repair, as were the balconies of many other homeowners.

Abatemarco sued the Association in 2007 and applied for a preliminary injunction compelling the repairs. After a February 25, 2008 evidentiary hearing at which Abatemarco and the Association’s representative Eric Hayes testified, Judge Paul A. Katz issued an under-advisement ruling on April 9, 2008. The court found the balconies were limited common elements; that A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)(1) assigns their repair costs to the benefited units only “unless the declaration … provides otherwise”; and that this Declaration did provide otherwise — Section 4.2 makes maintenance, repair, and replacement of limited common elements the Association’s responsibility, and Section 6.7 requires the Association to assess all unit owners equally for the cost. The Association was therefore “clearly responsible” for repairing Abatemarco’s balcony, but the court initially denied the injunction, reasoning that he had an adequate remedy at law and that ordering his balcony repaired first would improperly give him priority over similarly situated owners.

On Abatemarco’s motion for reconsideration, the court reversed course in part. In a July 9, 2008 “Ruling and Preliminary Injunction,” Judge Katz found that Abatemarco did not have an adequate remedy at law and — because the court still could not prioritize one owner’s balcony without violating the CC&Rs — mandatorily enjoined the Association to promulgate and approve a remediation plan and funding mechanism to repair all balconies in the community pursuant to Sections 3.5 and 4.2 of the CC&Rs, with the plan due to the court by September 12, 2008 and all repairs completed by December 31, 2009. The Association’s motion for a stay pending appeal was denied on November 3, 2008.

The damages case narrowed sharply before trial. On February 5, 2009, Judge Brian R. Hauser — who had assumed the calendar in mid-2008 — denied Abatemarco’s motion for partial summary judgment on liability, finding fact questions about whether the Association timely performed its duties under the CC&Rs, but granted the Association summary judgment on all of Abatemarco’s non-contract claims as time-barred: no reasonable jury could find other than that his loss occurred on October 17, 2005, when the Association declared there would be no balcony repairs until its litigation with the developer concluded. On December 1, 2009, the court dismissed counts three through six, nine, and ten of the second amended complaint under the economic loss rule, since Abatemarco had full relief available on his contract theories and no separate personal injury or property damage, and it dismissed his punitive-damages claim as falling clearly below the required threshold of proof.

The surviving contract claims were tried to a jury before Judge Hauser over four days, March 1–4, 2010. On March 4, 2010 the jury returned verdicts for Abatemarco on his claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing ($50,000) and on his claim for breach of the CC&Rs ($40,000), and for the Association on his claim for breach of the statutory duty to repair. Jury fees of $615.60 were assessed against the Association.

The June 4, 2010 judgment resolved the dueling attorneys’-fee applications. Applying A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) and the totality-of-the-litigation test, the court held Abatemarco was the successful party: he won $90,000 in contract damages, and his injunction had produced real-world results — “defendant has repaired the defective balconies as a result of plaintiff’s efforts, at least in large part.” The CC&Rs’ own fee provision for prevailing enforcement parties, made conclusive by the jury’s breach verdict, reinforced the award. But the court found the requested $591,475.50 in fees ($523,825.50 from Rose Law Group, P.C. and $67,650.00 from Snell & Wilmer, LLP) “patently unreasonable” in an over-litigated case, remarking that “[t]his case exemplifies the profligacy that results when one is spending someone else’s money,” and awarded $250,000 in fees plus $60,818.24 in costs in the formal judgment entered June 4, 2010. Collection followed: Abatemarco garnished the Association’s accounts, judgment was entered against garnishee Community Association Banc on September 28, 2010 after the parties reached an agreement, and the collected minute entries end in November 2010 with a further unopposed garnishee judgment request pending.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Dominick Abatemarco v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc. (CV2007-053132 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The association, not the individual unit owner, was responsible under the Declaration for repairing the defective… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Dominick Abatemarco v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2005-10-17 Per the court’s later summary-judgment ruling, the Association declares there will be no repairs to the defective balconies until its litigation against the developer is concluded.

Step 2007 (late) Abatemarco sues the Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2007-053132); an order-to-show-cause hearing on his application for a preliminary injunction is held November 30, 2007.

Step 2008-02-25 Evidentiary hearing on the preliminary-injunction application; Abatemarco and Association representative Eric Hayes testify; the matter is taken under advisement.

Step 2008-04-09 Under-advisement ruling: the Association is “clearly responsible” for repairing the balconies under Declaration Sections 4.2 and 6.7, but the injunction is denied for an adequate remedy at law.

Step 2008-07-09 On reconsideration, the court finds no adequate remedy at law and mandatorily enjoins the Association to adopt a remediation plan and funding mechanism to repair all balconies, with repairs completed by December 31, 2009.

Step 2008-11-03 The court denies the Association’s motion for a stay pending appeal.

Step 2009-02-05 Cross summary-judgment rulings: Abatemarco’s partial motion on liability is denied; the Association wins summary judgment on all non-contract claims as barred by the statutes of limitations.

Step 2009-12-01 The court dismisses counts three through six, nine, and ten of the second amended complaint under the economic loss rule and dismisses the punitive-damages claim.

Step 2010-03-01 Jury trial begins before Judge Brian R. Hauser; it runs four days, March 1–4, 2010.

Step 2010-03-04 Jury verdicts: $50,000 for Abatemarco on breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, $40,000 on breach of the CC&Rs, and for the Association on breach of the statutory duty to repair.

Step 2010-06-04 Judgment signed and entered: Abatemarco is the successful party and is awarded $250,000 in attorneys’ fees and $60,818.24 in costs; his $591,475.50 fee request is found patently unreasonable.

Step 2010-09-28 In post-judgment collection proceedings, judgment is entered against garnishee Community Association Banc after the parties reach an agreement.

Step 2010-11-01 The court sets a status conference on Abatemarco’s request for entry of an unopposed judgment against a garnishee; the collected minute entries end here.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/dominick-abatemarco-v-canterra-at-squaw-peak-condominium-association/raw/: 63 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2007-11-30

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2007-11-30_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2008-02-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-02-25_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2008-04-09

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-04-09_003_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 4 2008-04-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-04-17_004_minute-entry.pdf

Source 5 2008-05-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-05-07_005_minute-entry.pdf

Source 6 2008-06-02

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-06-02_006_minute-entry.pdf

Source 7 2008-06-27

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2008-06-27_007_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 8 2008-07-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-07-09_008_ruling.pdf

Source 9 2008-08-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-08-06_009_minute-entry.pdf

Source 10 2008-08-15

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the Motion to Dismiss Claims against Individual Defendants.

Download source file

2008-08-15_010_ruling.pdf

Source 11 2008-08-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-08-28_011_minute-entry.pdf

Source 12 2008-10-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoenas.

Download source file

2008-10-02_012_ruling.pdf

Source 13 2008-10-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-10-07_013_minute-entry.pdf

Source 14 2008-10-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-10-27_014_minute-entry.pdf

Source 15 2008-11-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying defendants’ motion to stay pending appeal.

Download source file

2008-11-03_015_ruling.pdf

Source 16 2008-11-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-11-21_016_minute-entry.pdf

Source 17 2008-12-02

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-12-02_017_minute-entry.pdf

Source 18 2008-12-04

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2008-12-04_018_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 19 2008-12-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2008-12-05_019_minute-entry.pdf

Source 20 2009-01-06

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2009-01-06_020_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 21 2009-01-14

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting the motion to strike defendants’ notice of non-party at fault.

Download source file

2009-01-14_021_ruling.pdf

Source 22 2009-01-26

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Defendants’ motion to reconsider order granting plaintiff’s motion to strike defendants’ notice of non-party at fault. The motion to strike will be deemed submitted after the filing of a response and reply.

Download source file

2009-01-26_022_ruling.pdf

Source 23 2009-01-30

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendants’ notice of a non-party at fault.

Download source file

2009-01-30_023_ruling.pdf

Source 24 2009-02-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2009-02-05_024_minute-entry.pdf

Source 25 2009-03-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Download source file

2009-03-10_025_ruling.pdf

Source 26 2009-03-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2009-03-20_026_minute-entry.pdf

Source 27 2009-04-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification.

Download source file

2009-04-21_027_ruling.pdf

Source 28 2009-05-08

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2009-05-08_028_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 29 2009-05-08

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2009-05-08_029_ruling.pdf

Source 30 2009-05-19

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the association’s motion for clarification.

Download source file

2009-05-19_030_ruling.pdf

Source 31 2009-05-22

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2009-05-22_031_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 32 2009-05-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2009-05-28_032_minute-entry.pdf

Source 33 2009-06-17

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2009-06-17_033_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 34 2009-06-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying oral argument and granting the motion to file an amended complaint.

Download source file

2009-06-22_034_ruling.pdf

Source 35 2009-06-29

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting the association leave to file a motion for summary judgment.

Download source file

2009-06-29_035_ruling.pdf

Source 36 2009-06-30

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2009-06-30_036_minute-entry.pdf

Source 37 2009-08-18

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting the association’s motion to quash a subpoena.

Download source file

2009-08-18_037_ruling.pdf

Source 38 2009-10-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2009-10-21_038_minute-entry.pdf

Source 39 2009-10-21

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply to Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint.

Download source file

2009-10-21_039_ruling.pdf

Source 40 2009-11-18

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2009-11-18_040_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 41 2009-12-01

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2009-12-01_041_ruling.pdf

Source 42 2009-12-10

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling permitting a response and reply on the association’s motion to reconsider denial of its motion to exclude undisclosed evidence.

Download source file

2009-12-10_042_ruling.pdf

Source 43 2009-12-22

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Abatemarco’s motion for reconsideration of the December 1, 2009 ruling.

Download source file

2009-12-22_043_ruling.pdf

Source 44 2010-01-04

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2010-01-04_044_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 45 2010-01-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Defendant’s motion to reconsider denial of Defendant’s motion to exclude undisclosed evidence.

Download source file

2010-01-20_045_ruling.pdf

Source 46 2010-01-29

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2010-01-29_046_minute-entry.pdf

Source 47 2010-02-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2010-02-16_047_minute-entry.pdf

Source 48 2010-02-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2010-02-17_048_minute-entry.pdf

Source 49 2010-02-19

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2010-02-19_049_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 50 2010-02-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2010-02-22_050_minute-entry.pdf

Source 51 2010-02-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2010-02-25_051_minute-entry.pdf

Source 52 2010-02-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2010-02-26_052_minute-entry.pdf

Source 53 2010-02-26

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling granting this motion regarding Mr. Josephson’s testimony about this late disclosed opinion.

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2010-02-26_053_ruling.pdf

Source 54 2010-03-01

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2010-03-01_054_minute-entry.pdf

Source 55 2010-03-02

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2010-03-02_055_minute-entry.pdf

Source 56 2010-03-03

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2010-03-03_056_minute-entry.pdf

Source 57 2010-03-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

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2010-03-04_057_minute-entry.pdf

Source 58 2010-04-22

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

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2010-04-22_058_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 59 2010-06-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

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2010-06-04_059_minute-entry.pdf

Source 60 2010-09-21

Minute Entry

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2010-09-21_060_minute-entry.pdf

Source 61 2010-09-24

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

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2010-09-24_061_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 62 2010-09-28

Oral Argument Set

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2010-09-28_062_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 63 2010-11-01

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2010-11-01_063_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

Who won this case?

Substantially the homeowner, though not on everything. The court mandatorily enjoined the Association to adopt a plan to repair all balconies in the community, the jury awarded Abatemarco $90,000 on his two contract-based claims, and the court awarded him $250,000 in attorneys’ fees and $60,818.24 in costs as the successful party. The Association won the jury verdict on the claim for breach of a statutory duty to repair, won summary judgment on all of the non-contract claims as time-barred, and had the tort and punitive-damages claims dismissed before trial.

Who has to pay to repair a condominium balcony in Arizona?

It depends on the recorded Declaration. The default rule, A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)(1), assigns the cost of maintaining, repairing, or replacing a limited common element such as a balcony to the unit or units it serves — but only if the declaration does not provide otherwise. In this case the court found the Declaration did provide otherwise: Section 4.2 made repair of limited common elements the Association’s responsibility, and Section 6.7 required the Association to assess all unit owners equally for the cost. The Association was therefore “clearly responsible” for repairing the balconies.

Why did the court first deny and then grant the injunction?

In its April 9, 2008 ruling the court held that even though the Association was responsible for the repairs, it could not compel them by injunction because Abatemarco had an adequate remedy at law — he could repair the balcony himself and sue for reimbursement. On reconsideration, the court found on July 9, 2008 that he did not have an adequate remedy at law. Because ordering only his balcony repaired would give him priority over similarly situated owners in violation of the CC&Rs, the court instead ordered the Association to adopt a remediation plan and funding mechanism covering all balconies in the community.

Why were so many of the homeowner’s claims dismissed before trial?

Two doctrines did most of the work. First, in February 2009 the court held all of the non-contract claims were barred by the statutes of limitations, because the loss occurred on October 17, 2005, when the Association declared there would be no balcony repairs until its lawsuit against the developer concluded. Second, in December 2009 the court applied the economic loss rule to dismiss six more counts of the second amended complaint, reasoning that Abatemarco had full relief available on his contract theories and had suffered no personal injury or property damage separate from the alleged breach. His punitive-damages claim was also dismissed as falling clearly below the required threshold of proof.

Why did the court award only $250,000 of the $591,475.50 in fees requested?

Because only reasonable fees may be awarded. The court found the case had been over-litigated even accounting for the intractable positions the parties took — “repetitive motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, motions to strike, motions to exclude, motions to file sur-replies and emergency motions that were anything but emergencies” — and that the plaintiff’s time entries were well beyond the norm for a case with, in the court’s words, “this lack of complexity,” with the second firm’s application duplicating the first’s inflated charges. It fixed reasonable fees at $250,000 plus $60,818.24 in costs, observing that “[t]his case exemplifies the profligacy that results when one is spending someone else’s money.”

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how a declaration can shift limited-common-element repair costs from the benefited units to the whole community, how a court can use a mandatory injunction to compel an association to plan and fund repairs for everyone rather than one complaining owner, and how the successful-party analysis under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) weighs injunctive relief alongside money damages. Note that the collected minute entries end in late 2010 during collection proceedings, and the minutes do not show the outcome of any appeal.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2007-053132 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	June 4, 2010
Judge / panel	Hon. Paul A. Katz, Hon. Brian R. Hauser, Commissioner Gerald Porter
Parties	Dominick Abatemarco (Plaintiff, condominium owner) v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1255 A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	CC&RsAssessmentsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The association, not the individual unit owner, was responsible under the Declaration for repairing the defective balconies (limited common elements) through equal assessments on all owners; the court mandatorily enjoined the association to adopt a community-wide remediation plan and funding mechanism; a jury found the association breached the CC&Rs and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, awarding $90,000; and the court held the owner was the successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) and the CC&Rs’ fee provision, awarding $250,000 in reasonable attorneys’ fees and $60,818.24 in costs while rejecting the full $591,475.50 request as patently unreasonable.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	63 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	13 roadmap entries
Video overview	Dominick Abatemarco v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A Phoenix condominium owner at the Canterra at Squaw Peak complex sued his association in 2007 over a defective and dangerous balcony that the association refused to repair while its construction-defect suit against the community’s builder was pending. In an April 2008 under-advisement ruling the court held the balconies were limited common elements whose repair the recorded Declaration (Sections 4.2 and 6.7) assigned to the association, funded by equal assessments on all owners — displacing the default allocation in A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)(1) — but initially denied injunctive relief. On reconsideration in July 2008 the court found no adequate remedy at law and mandatorily enjoined the association to promulgate a remediation plan and funding mechanism to repair all balconies in the community by December 31, 2009. After the non-contract claims were cut down on limitations and economic-loss-rule grounds, a jury in March 2010 awarded the owner $50,000 for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and $40,000 for breach of the CC&Rs, while finding for the association on a statutory-duty-to-repair claim. On June 4, 2010 the court entered judgment declaring the owner the successful party and awarding him $250,000 in attorneys’ fees and $60,818.24 in costs, after finding his $591,475.50 fee request patently unreasonable. Post-judgment garnishment of the association’s bank accounts followed through late 2010.

Key Issues & Findings

In the April 9, 2008 under-advisement ruling, the court found that the complex suffered widespread construction defects, including defective and dangerous balconies, and that the association’s suit against the builder was likely to settle for less than the needed repairs would cost. The balconies were limited common elements, and while A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)(1) by default assesses limited-common-element repair costs only against the units they serve, that rule yields to a contrary declaration. Section 4.2 of this Declaration made maintenance, repair, and replacement of limited common elements the association’s responsibility, and Section 6.7 required the association to assess all unit owners equally for the cost — so the association was “clearly responsible” for the repairs. The court nonetheless first denied a preliminary injunction, reasoning that the owner had an adequate remedy at law and that repairing his balcony first would give him priority over similarly situated owners in violation of the CC&Rs. On reconsideration, the July 9, 2008 ruling found the owner did not have an adequate remedy at law and resolved the priority problem by mandatorily enjoining the association to promulgate and approve a remediation plan and funding mechanism to repair all balconies pursuant to Sections 3.5 and 4.2, with completion ordered by December 31, 2009.

The damages claims narrowed before trial. In February 2009 the court granted the association summary judgment on all non-contract claims as time-barred, holding that no reasonable jury could find other than that the loss occurred on October 17, 2005, when the association declared there would be no balcony repairs until its developer litigation concluded. In December 2009 the court dismissed six more counts of the second amended complaint under the economic loss rule — the owner had full relief available on his contract theories and no personal injury or property damage separate from the alleged breach — and dismissed the punitive-damages claim as clearly below the required evidentiary threshold. The surviving contract claims went to a four-day jury trial in March 2010, producing verdicts of $50,000 for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and $40,000 for breach of the CC&Rs, with a defense verdict on the claim for breach of the statutory duty to repair.

The June 4, 2010 fee ruling applied A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) and the totality-of-the-litigation test from Schwartz v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona. Although the association won more claims on a purely mathematical basis, the court held the owner was the successful party: he recovered $90,000 in contract damages, and his injunction had worked — the association “has repaired the defective balconies as a result of plaintiff’s efforts, at least in large part.” The CC&Rs’ provision awarding reasonable fees to a party who prevails in an enforcement action, made conclusive by the jury’s breach-of-CC&Rs verdict, independently supported the award. But the court found the requested $591,475.50 ($523,825.50 from Rose Law Group, P.C. and $67,650.00 from Snell & Wilmer, LLP) patently unreasonable in an over-litigated case whose record was “replete with repetitive motions,” and fixed reasonable fees at $250,000 plus $60,818.24 in costs, remarking that “[t]his case exemplifies the profligacy that results when one is spending someone else’s money.”

Why It Matters

This case is one of the clearer Arizona illustrations that a condominium declaration can flip the Condominium Act’s default cost allocation in the owners’ favor: A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)(1) would have charged balcony repairs to the benefited units, but because the Declaration made limited-common-element repair the association’s obligation funded by equal assessments, the association could not defer the work — even while its construction-defect suit against the builder was pending. It also shows a court solving the fairness problem of single-owner injunctive relief by ordering a community-wide remedy: rather than move one complaining owner to the front of the line, the court compelled the association to plan, fund, and complete repairs for every balcony.

The endgame carries two more lessons. On fees, the successful-party analysis under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) looks at the totality of the litigation, so an owner who loses most of his claim count but wins the core contract claims and meaningful injunctive relief can still recover fees — yet the court will cut inflated bills sharply, here awarding $250,000 of a $591,475.50 request it labeled patently unreasonable. And on enforcement, the 2010 garnishment proceedings against the association’s bank accounts show what collecting a judgment from an unwilling association can look like. As a superior-court decision the case binds only the parties, and the collected minute entries end in late 2010 without showing the outcome of any appeal.

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Cottonfields Community Association v. RCP Southern Ridge, LLP: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Covenant Enforcement & Contempt Sanctions | A.R.S. § 12-1511 | CV2021-051550

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, the Cottonfields Community Association enforced a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement against RCP Southern Ridge, LLP, the owner and operator of the golf course adjacent to the community’s 450 homes. After confirming an arbitration award as a judgment with a permanent and continuing injunction, the court found the golf course owner in violation of that judgment, rejected its impossibility and vagueness defenses, ordered compliance on a deadline backed by contingent $60,000 monetary sanctions, and held that the enforcement orders run with the land — binding whoever owns the golf course property.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Cottonfields Community Association v. RCP Southern Ridge, LLP, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-051550.

Download under-advisement ruling

Scope note: This page covers Cottonfields Community Association v. RCP Southern Ridge, LLP (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-051550) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 1, 2022 under-advisement ruling on the association’s Application for Order to Show Cause and Motion for Sanctions; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the most recent collected minute entry is from August 17, 2023, when the court denied — without prejudice, for a service defect — the association’s motion to substitute the golf course’s new owner, Laveen 140, LLC, as defendant. The permanent injunction remained in effect and enforcement proceedings were still unresolved at that point, so later developments may not be reflected here. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

In its April 1, 2022 under-advisement ruling, the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that RCP Southern Ridge, LLP was violating the August 2021 judgment enforcing the community’s Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement. The court rejected the owner’s impossibility defense — a party claiming inability to pay bears the burden of producing financial evidence, and none was produced — and found no genuine confusion about the judgment’s specific and definite terms. It ordered full compliance by June 1, 2022 with a midpoint progress report, backed by contingent $60,000 monetary sanctions to be held as a maintenance bond, granted the association an easement to enter the golf course property for emergency repairs affecting adjacent homeowners, and ordered that these obligations run with the land, binding any future owner of the property. The court declined to impose anticipatory per-occurrence sanctions, declined to hold the LLP’s individual partners personally liable, and denied the association’s attorneys’ fees because no fee claim had been made in the pleadings.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Cottonfields Community Association (Plaintiff)
Homeowners association for the 450 homes adjacent to the Golf Course Property; obtained the arbitration award, the confirming judgment, and the enforcement orders.
Troy B. Stratman (Counsel)
Counsel for the Cottonfields Community Association throughout the collected minute entries, including the evidentiary hearing and enforcement proceedings.
Kesha Hodge (Association president)
Identified in the minute entries as a Cottonfields board member and as president of the homeowners association; testified at the December 2021 evidentiary hearing.

Respondent Side

RCP Southern Ridge, LLP (Defendant)
Owner and operator of the Golf Course Property at the time of the judgment and the 2022 sanctions ruling; the minute entries reflect that it later sold the property.
Asha Sebastian (Counsel)
Counsel for RCP Southern Ridge, LLP, appearing from the November 12, 2021 return hearing onward, including the December 2021 evidentiary hearing.
Mark Horne (Counsel)
Co-counsel for RCP Southern Ridge, LLP at the December 9, 2021 evidentiary hearing.
Shifton White (Principal of Defendant)
Described in the minute entries as the sole proprietor of RCP Southern Ridge, LLP; testified at the December 2021 evidentiary hearing, including that proper maintenance of the golf course used to cost him $115,000 to $120,000 per year.

Neutral Parties

Sara J. Agne (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who confirmed the arbitration award, presided over the 2021 enforcement hearings, and issued the April 1, 2022 under-advisement ruling.
Melissa Iyer Julian (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the May 2023 ruling vacating the erroneous dismissal and the August 2023 ruling on the motion to substitute the successor owner.

What happened

Cottonfields is a 450-home Arizona community whose homes sit adjacent to a golf course. The golf course property was owned and operated by RCP Southern Ridge, LLP and is subject to a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA), which the court described as setting restrictions and obligations on the proper use, operation, and enjoyment of the Golf Course Property for the purpose of enhancing and protecting the value, desirability, and attractiveness of the 450 homes within the Cottonfields Community Association and of the golf course itself.

The association took a REMA dispute to arbitration and won. In May 2021 it applied to the superior court to confirm the Final Arbitration Award; when the time for opposition under A.R.S. § 12-1511 passed with no response, Judge Sara Agne directed the association to lodge a proposed judgment. The judgment, filed August 3, 2021, imposed a permanent and continuing injunction requiring RCP to bring the golf course into compliance with the REMA, stop operating other businesses on the property in violation of REMA Section 5.1, regularly irrigate the property, maintain it in good condition to the Maintenance Standard of Section 5.2, and keep the related lakes in good condition as Section 3.1 requires.

Two weeks after judgment, the association filed an Application for Order to Show Cause and Motion for Sanctions, alleging noncompliance. Enforcement started slowly: at an October 2021 hearing, RCP’s principal Shifton White appeared without counsel, disputed that the company had been served, and declined a request to accept service, and the court ordered RCP to appear through counsel. With counsel on board, the court held an evidentiary hearing on December 9, 2021, at which White and association president Kesha Hodge testified, followed by written closing arguments.

In the April 1, 2022 under-advisement ruling, Judge Agne found the testimony and evidence “largely unequivocal” that RCP was violating the judgment and injunction, and that the association had proved this by clear and convincing evidence — RCP’s own principal admitted the golf course’s condition was not what he would like. The court rejected RCP’s two defenses. On impossibility, a party asserting inability to pay bears the burden of production under United States v. Rylander, and RCP produced no financial evidence; its principal testified only that the company had a “nominal income” he could not quantify. On vagueness, the court found the judgment’s terms specific and definite, noting White had owned golf courses before and understood how to comply, and finding his testimony that he was unaware of the judgment’s specific terms not credible.

The court ordered RCP to bring the property into full compliance with the REMA by June 1, 2022, and to file a written midpoint progress report by May 1, 2022 — with a $60,000 monetary sanction, payable to the Clerk of Court and held as a bond for future maintenance, if either deadline was missed, and a second $60,000 sanction if noncompliance continued into late 2022. It also granted the association an easement to access the golf course property for emergency repairs that would otherwise impact adjacent homeowners, and ordered that these obligations run with the land, binding whoever owns the property. The court declined to go further: it refused a prospective $10,000-per-occurrence sanction as an improper anticipatory contempt order, declined to pierce the LLP’s veil to reach its individual partners for lack of evidence, and denied the association’s attorneys’ fees because no fee claim had been made in the pleadings as Rule 54(g)(1) requires.

The 2023 minute entries cover the aftermath of a sale of the golf course. In March 2023 the association’s prior counsel stipulated to dismiss the case without prejudice on the ground that RCP no longer owned the property, and the court granted the stipulation. The association — asserting the stipulation was signed without its consent and that the new owner, Laveen 140, LLC, was violating the judgment and sanctions order — moved to vacate. In a May 11, 2023 ruling, Judge Melissa Iyer Julian granted Rule 60(b)(6) relief, concluding the court had erred: the claims had already been resolved in a final, unappealed Rule 54(c) judgment, so “there was nothing to dismiss,” and the dismissal conflicted with the continuing injunction that remains in effect. The proper path, the court explained, was substitution of Laveen 140, LLC as successor defendant under Rule 25(c). The association’s first substitution motion was denied without prejudice in August 2023 because the proposed new party had not been served under Rule 4.1; that is where the collected record ends.

Procedural timeline

Step 2021-05-06 The association files an Application/Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award (served May 25, 2021).

Step 2021-07-06 With the A.R.S. § 12-1511 opposition period expired, the court orders the association to lodge a proposed form of judgment.

Step 2021-08-03 Judgment based on the Final Arbitration Award is filed, imposing a permanent and continuing injunction requiring RCP to comply with the REMA, stop operating other businesses on the property, irrigate, and maintain the golf course and lakes.

Step 2021-08-17 The association files an Application for Order to Show Cause and Motion for Sanctions alleging noncompliance.

Step 2021-10-15 Return hearing: RCP’s principal appears without counsel and declines to accept service; the court orders RCP to appear through counsel by November 5, 2021 and resets the hearing.

Step 2021-11-12 Return hearing with both sides represented; the court sets a three-hour evidentiary hearing and orders exhibits and prehearing briefs.

Step 2021-12-09 Evidentiary hearing: Shifton White and Kesha Hodge testify; written closing arguments are ordered; the matter is taken under advisement as of January 31, 2022.

Step 2022-04-01 Under-advisement ruling: RCP found in violation of the judgment by clear and convincing evidence; compliance ordered by June 1, 2022 with contingent $60,000 sanctions; emergency-repair easement granted; orders run with the land; veil-piercing, anticipatory sanctions, and attorneys’ fees denied.

Step 2023-03-29 The court grants a stipulation — signed by the association’s prior counsel — dismissing the case without prejudice after RCP sells the golf course property.

Step 2023-05-11 Ruling grants the association Rule 60(b)(6) relief and vacates the dismissal: the claims were already resolved in a final Rule 54(c) judgment, the injunction continues in effect, and the new owner should be substituted under Rule 25(c).

Step 2023-08-17 The association’s motion to substitute Laveen 140, LLC as defendant is denied without prejudice because the proposed new party was not served under Rule 4.1; the motion may be refiled.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/cottonfields-community-association-v-rcp-southern-ridge/raw/: 8 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2021-07-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2021-07-06_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2021-10-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2021-10-15_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2021-10-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2021-10-20_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2021-11-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2021-11-12_004_minute-entry.pdf

Source 5 2021-12-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2021-12-09_005_minute-entry.pdf

Source 6 2022-04-01

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting in part the relief sought by the Application; Defendant must comply with the Judgment and bring the Golf Course Property into full compliance with the REMA prior to June 1, 2022, and mus.

Download source file

2022-04-01_006_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 7 2023-05-11

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2023-05-11_007_ruling.pdf

Source 8 2023-08-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2023-08-17_008_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What is the Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA), and why could the HOA enforce it against a golf course?

The REMA is an agreement that, in the court’s words, sets restrictions and obligations on the proper use, operation, and enjoyment of the Golf Course Property for the purpose of enhancing and protecting the value, desirability, and attractiveness of the 450 homes within the Cottonfields Community Association and of the golf course itself. Because the golf course owner’s maintenance obligations run to the benefit of the community, the association could arbitrate the owner’s breach, confirm the award as a court judgment, and then ask the court to enforce that judgment.

What did the August 2021 judgment require the golf course owner to do?

The judgment imposed a permanent and continuing injunction with five specific requirements: bring the Golf Course Property into compliance with the REMA; stop violating REMA Section 5.1 by desisting from operating other businesses on the property; regularly irrigate the property; maintain it in good condition to the Maintenance Standard required by Section 5.2; and maintain the related lakes in good condition as required by Section 3.1.

What sanctions did the court actually impose in April 2022?

The court ordered RCP to bring the property into full compliance by June 1, 2022 and to file a midpoint progress report by May 1, 2022. Missing either deadline would trigger a $60,000 monetary sanction paid to the Clerk of Court and held as a bond for future maintenance of the golf course, with a second $60,000 sanction if noncompliance continued into late 2022. The court emphasized that civil contempt uses coercion rather than punishment to secure compliance, and it refused to impose a prospective $10,000-per-occurrence sanction because anticipatory contempt orders are disapproved — future violations would need their own evidentiary hearing.

Why weren’t the LLP’s individual partners held personally liable?

The association asked the court to pierce the veil of the defendant entity and hold its individual partners personally liable on the judgment and sanctions orders, but the court found that no evidence had been presented about the individual partners sufficient to allow it to do so. The court similarly noted that no evidence was presented that would let it ascertain the company’s finances or alleged lack of them.

Why was the association denied its attorneys’ fees even though it won?

Under Rule 54(g)(1) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim for attorneys’ fees must be made in the pleadings. The court found no fee claim had been pleaded, so it denied the association’s request for the fees and costs of the enforcement proceeding. It is a purely procedural point — the association prevailed on the merits but still absorbed its own enforcement costs.

What happened when the golf course was sold to a new owner?

The association’s prior counsel stipulated to dismiss the case without prejudice because RCP no longer owned the property, and the court initially granted the dismissal. On the association’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion — asserting the stipulation was signed without its consent and that the new owner, Laveen 140, LLC, was violating the judgment — the court vacated the dismissal, explaining that the claims had already been resolved in a final Rule 54(c) judgment, so there was nothing left to dismiss, and the permanent injunction remains in effect. Because the April 2022 orders run with the land, they apply to any owner of the golf course property; the court directed that further enforcement proceed by substituting the new owner as defendant under Rule 25(c), a motion that had been denied without prejudice on service grounds as of the last collected minute entry.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2021-051550 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	April 1, 2022
Judge / panel	Hon. Sara J. Agne, Hon. Melissa Iyer Julian
Parties	Cottonfields Community Association (Plaintiff, homeowners association for 450 homes) v. RCP Southern Ridge, LLP (Defendant, owner/operator of the adjacent Golf Course Property)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-1511
Topics	CC&RsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that RCP Southern Ridge, LLP was violating the judgment and permanent injunction enforcing the REMA, held that its impossibility defense failed for lack of any financial evidence and that the judgment’s terms were specific and definite, ordered full compliance by June 1, 2022 with contingent $60,000 monetary sanctions held as a maintenance bond, granted the association an easement for emergency repairs, and ordered that the enforcement orders run with the land and bind successor owners — while denying anticipatory per-occurrence sanctions, veil-piercing against the LLP’s individual partners, and attorneys’ fees not claimed in the pleadings.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	8 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	11 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

The Cottonfields Community Association, a 450-home Arizona community adjacent to a golf course, enforced a Reciprocal Easement and Maintenance Agreement (REMA) against the golf course’s owner-operator, RCP Southern Ridge, LLP. After winning a Final Arbitration Award establishing RCP’s breach, the association confirmed the award in superior court — the A.R.S. § 12-1511 opposition period passed without response — and obtained an August 3, 2021 judgment imposing a permanent and continuing injunction requiring RCP to bring the golf course into REMA compliance, stop operating other businesses on the property, irrigate it, and maintain the course and its lakes. When RCP did not comply, the association sought an order to show cause and sanctions. Following a December 2021 evidentiary hearing, the court’s April 1, 2022 under-advisement ruling found RCP in violation of the judgment by clear and convincing evidence, rejected its impossibility and vagueness defenses, ordered full compliance by June 1, 2022 backed by contingent $60,000 monetary sanctions, granted the association an emergency-repair access easement, and ordered that the obligations run with the land. In 2023, after RCP sold the property, the court vacated an erroneous stipulated dismissal under Rule 60(b)(6) — the claims were already merged into a final judgment and the injunction continues in effect — and directed that the successor owner, Laveen 140, LLC, be substituted as defendant under Rule 25(c). The first substitution motion was denied without prejudice on service grounds in August 2023, where the collected minute-entry record ends.

Key Issues & Findings

The court’s April 1, 2022 under-advisement ruling rested on its inherent power to enforce its own judgments and on Rule 70(e), with civil contempt used as coercion rather than punishment. The evidence was “largely unequivocal” that RCP was violating the August 2021 judgment: RCP’s principal, Shifton White, admitted the golf course’s condition was not what he would like, and credibly testified that proper maintenance used to cost $115,000 to $120,000 per year when he was engaged in it. RCP’s defenses failed on the record. Under United States v. Rylander, a party asserting impossibility based on inability to pay bears the burden of production, and RCP produced no financial evidence — only its principal’s testimony that the company had a “nominal income” of unknown amount. And because White had owned golf courses before, the court found no genuine confusion about the judgment’s specific and definite terms, expressly finding not credible his testimony that he was unaware of them.

The remedy was calibrated to coerce compliance rather than punish: a June 1, 2022 full-compliance deadline with a May 1 midpoint progress report, each backed by a $60,000 sanction payable to the Clerk of Court and held as a bond for future golf course maintenance, with a second $60,000 sanction if noncompliance continued into late 2022. The court granted the association an easement to enter the property for emergency repairs that would otherwise affect adjacent homeowners, and ordered — citing the REMA’s own terms — that the orders run with the land, applying to whoever holds title to the Golf Course Property. It declined a prospective $10,000-per-occurrence sanction as an improper anticipatory contempt order under BMO Harris Bank v. Bluff, declined to pierce the entity veil because no evidence about the individual partners was presented, and denied attorneys’ fees because no fee claim appeared in the pleadings as Rule 54(g)(1) requires.

The 2023 rulings dealt with the golf course’s sale. The association’s prior counsel had stipulated to dismiss the case without prejudice because RCP no longer owned the property, and the court granted it — an error, Judge Julian later concluded. Granting Rule 60(b)(6) relief under Gonzalez v. Nguyen’s merits-favoring standard, the court explained that the claims had already been resolved in a final, unappealed Rule 54(c) judgment entered August 3, 2021; the 2022 proceedings were post-judgment enforcement, so “there was nothing to dismiss,” and the dismissal order was ineffective and conflicted with the continuing injunction that remains in effect. The correct mechanism for pursuing the successor owner, Laveen 140, LLC, was substitution under Rule 25(c) — but the association’s first attempt was denied without prejudice in August 2023 because a non-party proposed for substitution must be served under Rule 4.1, not merely mailed the motion under Rule 5(c).

Why It Matters

Most Arizona HOA litigation is association-versus-member, but this case shows an association enforcing its covenants outward — against the commercial owner of an adjacent golf course whose upkeep directly affects the value of 450 homes. It maps the full enforcement toolchain: arbitrate the breach, confirm the award under A.R.S. § 12-1511, reduce it to a judgment with a permanent injunction, and then use the court’s contempt power when the injunction is ignored. The ruling also illustrates the limits of an impossibility defense — a party claiming it cannot afford compliance must actually produce financial evidence, not just assert poverty — and the limits of enforcement, since courts will not issue anticipatory per-occurrence sanctions or reach an entity’s individual partners without evidence.

Two procedural lessons stand out for associations. First, fee recovery is not automatic even for a prevailing party: because no attorneys’ fees claim was made in the pleadings, Rule 54(g)(1) barred recovery for the entire enforcement proceeding. Second, the 2023 rulings show how covenant enforcement survives a property sale — because the orders run with the land, a final judgment and continuing injunction cannot simply be dismissed away when the violator sells; the remedy is substituting the successor owner under Rule 25(c), with full Rule 4.1 service on the new party. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties, and the collected record ends in August 2023 with enforcement against the successor owner still unresolved.

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Chauncey Ranch Office Condominium Association v. North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

Covenant Enforcement & Attorneys’ Fees | CC&R §§ 4.3, 12.1 | CV2013-003636

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, an office condominium association sued a unit owner that admittedly-then-disputedly installed a door along a common wall without board approval. The court held the association could sue under the CC&Rs’ enforcement clause, but granted the unit owner summary judgment because the association never timely disclosed damages and the requested injunction — moving a door at roughly $245,000 and closing a medical facility for months — failed the hardship-balancing element of specific performance. The declaration’s prevailing-party fee clause then required the association to pay the owner’s attorneys’ fees.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Chauncey Ranch Office Condominium Association v. North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-003636.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Chauncey Ranch Office Condominium Association v. North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-003636) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the September 26, 2014 under-advisement ruling denying the association’s summary-judgment motion, the April 14, 2015 under-advisement ruling granting the unit owner summary judgment, and the July 28, 2015 attorneys’-fees ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected minute entries end with the July 28, 2015 ruling awarding the unit owner attorneys’ fees and entering judgment — no appeal or later activity appears in the collected entries, so any subsequent developments are not reflected here. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

An association can win the framing of a covenant-enforcement case and still lose it. The court held early on that the CC&Rs’ § 12.1 enforcement clause authorized the association to sue over a door installed along a common wall without the board approval required by § 4.3, and that the declaration’s Article 11 dispute-resolution process did not apply. But at summary judgment the association’s breach-of-contract claim failed because it never timely disclosed any computation of damages, and its injunction claim failed because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the benefit of relocating the door outweighed the hardship — an undisputed expense of approximately $245,000 and months of closure of a medical facility. The same § 12.1 that authorized the suit also entitled the prevailing party to all attorneys’ fees, so the court was required to award the unit owner its fees: $276,666.14, plus costs and expert-witness costs.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Chauncey Ranch Office Condominium Association (Plaintiff)
Office condominium association that filed suit in April 2013 to compel a unit owner to comply with CC&R § 4.3 after the owner installed a door along a common-element wall; its claims for breach of contract and injunctive relief were resolved against it at summary judgment.
Quinten T. Cupps (Counsel)
Counsel of record for the association in the case’s early phase (minute-entry captions from April 2013 through March 2014).
Augustus H. Shaw IV (Counsel)
Counsel for the association from the June 2013 order-to-show-cause hearing through the summary-judgment phase, including the February 2014 and August 2014 oral arguments.
Lydia Peirce Linsmeier (Counsel)
Counsel for the association at the August 2014 summary-judgment argument, the January 2015 emergency protective-order hearing, and the April 2015 summary-judgment argument.
Curtis Ekmark (Counsel)
Listed as the association’s attorney in the court’s case-party records; he does not appear in the collected minute entries.

Respondent Side

North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC (Defendant)
Unit owner and medical facility that installed the door at issue; contested whether it had obtained permission, won summary judgment on both of the association’s claims, and was awarded $276,666.14 in attorneys’ fees plus costs as the prevailing party.
Joe Rosas (Third-Party Defendant)
Named as a third-party defendant on North Scottsdale Pain Center’s third-party complaint; the association applied for entry of default against the third-party defendants in September 2013, and the third-party complaint was dismissed without prejudice by stipulation in June 2014. The court’s case-party records list him as self-represented.
Dina Rosas (Third-Party Defendant)
Named as a third-party defendant on North Scottsdale Pain Center’s third-party complaint, dismissed without prejudice by stipulation in June 2014.
D. Rosas Interior Architecture Design Group (Third-Party Defendant)
Design firm named as a third-party defendant on North Scottsdale Pain Center’s third-party complaint, dismissed without prejudice by stipulation in June 2014.
Mark D. Goldman (Counsel)
Listed on the defense side of the caption in the May 28, 2013 minute entry.
Scott H. Zwillinger (Counsel)
Counsel for North Scottsdale Pain Center from mid-2013, including the June 2013 order-to-show-cause hearing and the February 2014 oral argument; his application to withdraw was denied as moot in April 2014.
Clifford Frisbie (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for North Scottsdale Pain Center at the June 20, 2013 order-to-show-cause return hearing.
John A. Buric (Counsel)
Counsel for North Scottsdale Pain Center from spring 2014 through judgment, including the August 2014 and April 2015 summary-judgment arguments.
Peter J. Foster (Counsel)
Counsel for North Scottsdale Pain Center at the January 2015 emergency hearing and the April 2015 summary-judgment argument; listed on the defense side of minute-entry captions beginning April 2014.

Neutral Parties

Lisa Daniel Flores (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the case from 2013 into mid-2014 and denied the unit owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in February 2014.
Patricia Ann Starr (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided from mid-2014, issued the September 2014 and April 2015 under-advisement rulings, and entered the July 2015 fee award and judgment.

What happened

Chauncey Ranch Office Condominium is an office condominium community governed by recorded CC&Rs. In a complaint filed April 18, 2013, the association sued unit owner North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC (NSPC), a medical facility, alleging breach of contract and seeking an injunction requiring NSPC to bring its property into compliance with the CC&Rs. The dispute centered on a door NSPC installed along a common-element wall. CC&R § 4.3 requires the prior written consent of the association’s board before a unit owner alters a perimeter or party wall or makes any structural alteration within a unit. The court signed an order to show cause in April 2013 directing NSPC to explain why a permanent injunction should not issue, and after a June 2013 return hearing the case was set for an evidentiary hearing.

NSPC brought a third-party complaint against Joe Rosas, Dina Rosas, and D. Rosas Interior Architecture Design Group; the association applied for entry of default against those third-party defendants in September 2013, and the third-party complaint was later dismissed without prejudice by stipulation in June 2014. NSPC also moved for judgment on the pleadings in November 2013, arguing the case belonged in the CC&Rs’ Article 11 “Dispute Resolution” process. Judge Lisa Daniel Flores denied that motion in February 2014, finding that Article 11 does not apply where a defendant “admittedly installed a door along a common wall without Association approval,” that § 12.1 of the CC&Rs “clearly authorizes the Association to file a suit at law or in equity to enjoin a violation of, or compel compliance with, the CC&R’s,” and rejecting NSPC’s effort to recast the dispute as a design-defect claim.

The association moved for summary judgment in March 2014, arguing NSPC was bound by “judicial admissions” — statements in its initial disclosure statement and in the judgment-on-the-pleadings briefing that it had not sought approval before installing the door. In a September 26, 2014 under-advisement ruling, Judge Patricia Ann Starr denied the motion. The court held that a Rule 12(c) motion is not a “pleading” and a disclosure statement is not a judicial admission, that NSPC had moved to amend its answer and had retracted the earlier statements, and that whether NSPC obtained approval to relocate the door was a genuine issue of material fact. The court also granted NSPC leave to amend its answer.

NSPC then filed its own motion for summary judgment in October 2014. While it was pending, a side dispute erupted: NSPC had posted deposition transcripts of Renee Hanson and Gladys Effio, described in the minutes as part of the association, on a website it set up. After an emergency hearing in January 2015, the court ordered the depositions not be re-posted pending a final ruling, and it ultimately granted the association a protective order to the extent that any depositions posted to the website had to be redacted of personally identifying information, citing the deponents’ privacy, safety, and financial welfare. The court denied the association’s separate motion to suppress the Hanson deposition transcript.

In the dispositive under-advisement ruling filed April 14, 2015, the court granted NSPC summary judgment on both claims. On breach of contract, the association had to prove damages, but the deadline to disclose a computation of damages had “come and gone” — and the “nominal damages” theory it raised for the first time at oral argument, based on the tax value of the “stolen” portion of the common elements, was “neither timely nor sufficient.” On injunctive relief, it was undisputed that moving the door would cost approximately $245,000 and would require closing NSPC, a medical facility, for months; applying the specific-performance factors from The Power P.E.O., Inc. v. Employees Ins. of Wausau, the court concluded no reasonable factfinder could find the anticipated benefit to the association outweighed that hardship. A pending motion to consolidate was denied as moot.

The endgame was about money. In a July 28, 2015 ruling, the court held NSPC was the prevailing party and that § 12.1 of the declaration — the same enforcement clause the association had sued under — entitles the prevailing party to recover “all attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party in the action,” leaving the court no discretion to refuse a contractual fee award. The court awarded NSPC $276,666.14 in attorneys’ fees, $8,555.30 in costs — after holding that under Rule 68(g) NSPC was entitled to double the taxable costs incurred after its April 18, 2014 offer of judgment — and $8,621.24 in expert-witness costs, while excluding fees tied to a separate injunction-against-harassment matter and one expert’s fees it found unreasonable. Notably, the court denied NSPC’s request for sanctions under A.R.S. § 12-349 and Rule 11, finding the association did not bring or maintain its claims without substantial justification. Judgment was entered the same day, and the collected minute entries end there.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Chauncey Ranch Office Condominium Association v. North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC (CV2013-003636 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Unit owner won summary judgment against association breach-of-contract and architectural claims. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Chauncey Ranch Office Condominium Association v. North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2013-04-18 The association files its complaint against North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC (per the court’s later minute entries), alleging a door was installed along a common wall without the board approval required by CC&R § 4.3.

Step 2013-04-30 The court signs an order to show cause directing NSPC to appear and show why a permanent injunction should not issue requiring compliance with the CC&Rs.

Step 2013-06-20 Order-to-show-cause return hearing; the parties request and the court sets an evidentiary hearing.

Step 2013-09-10 The association applies for entry of default against third-party defendants Joe Rosas, Dina Rosas, and D. Rosas Interior Architecture Group; the court refers default proceedings to the assigned commissioner.

Step 2013-11-22 NSPC files a motion for judgment on the pleadings; the court also signs an order on NSPC’s expedited motion to stay the preliminary-injunction hearing, with no objection from the association.

Step 2014-02-10 After oral argument, the court denies NSPC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings: the CC&Rs’ Article 11 dispute-resolution process does not apply, and § 12.1 authorizes the association’s enforcement suit.

Step 2014-03-03 The association files its motion for summary judgment.

Step 2014-06-24 NSPC’s third-party complaint is voluntarily dismissed without prejudice by stipulation, each party bearing its own fees and costs.

Step 2014-09-26 Under-advisement ruling denies the association’s summary-judgment motion — NSPC’s earlier statements were not binding judicial admissions, and whether it obtained approval is a disputed fact — and grants NSPC leave to amend its answer.

Step 2014-10-15 NSPC files its motion for summary judgment.

Step 2015-01-20 Emergency hearing on the association’s motion for a protective order after NSPC posted deposition transcripts of Renee Hanson and Gladys Effio to a website; the court orders the depositions not be re-posted pending a final ruling.

Step 2015-04-03 Oral argument on NSPC’s motion for summary judgment; the matter is taken under advisement.

Step 2015-04-14 Under-advisement ruling grants NSPC summary judgment on both claims, denies the motion to suppress the Hanson deposition, grants the protective order in part (redaction of personal identifying information), and denies the motion to consolidate as moot.

Step 2015-07-28 Fee ruling and judgment: NSPC, as prevailing party under CC&R § 12.1, is awarded $276,666.14 in attorneys’ fees, $8,555.30 in costs, and $8,621.24 in expert-witness costs; sanctions under A.R.S. § 12-349 and Rule 11 are denied; judgment is entered.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/chauncey-ranch-office-condominium-association-v-north-scottsdale-pain/raw/: 30 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2013-04-30

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-04-30_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2013-05-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-05-28_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2013-06-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-06-20_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2013-09-10

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Default-judgment entry ordering that no action would be taken by the assigned division because default-judgment papers had to proceed through commissioner procedure.

Download source file

2013-09-10_004_default-judgment.pdf

Source 5 2013-09-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-09-26_005_minute-entry.pdf

Source 6 2013-12-02

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-12-02_006_minute-entry.pdf

Source 7 2014-01-29

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2014-01-29_007_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 8 2014-02-10

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-02-10_008_minute-entry.pdf

Source 9 2014-03-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-03-14_009_minute-entry.pdf

Source 10 2014-04-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-04-11_010_minute-entry.pdf

Source 11 2014-04-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-04-15_011_minute-entry.pdf

Source 12 2014-05-01

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-05-01_012_minute-entry.pdf

Source 13 2014-05-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-05-07_013_minute-entry.pdf

Source 14 2014-06-23

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2014-06-23_014_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 15 2014-06-24

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-06-24_015_minute-entry.pdf

Source 16 2014-07-31

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2014-07-31_016_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 17 2014-08-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-08-21_017_minute-entry.pdf

Source 18 2014-09-26

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the Motion for Summary Judgment; granting the Motion for Leave to Amend Answer. The Amended Answer shall be filed and served by October 10, 2014.

Download source file

2014-09-26_018_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 19 2014-10-31

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-10-31_019_minute-entry.pdf

Source 20 2014-12-15

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2014-12-15_020_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 21 2015-01-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-01-16_021_minute-entry.pdf

Source 22 2015-01-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-01-20_022_minute-entry.pdf

Source 23 2015-01-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-01-26_023_minute-entry.pdf

Source 24 2015-03-02

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2015-03-02_024_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 25 2015-03-03

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2015-03-03_025_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 26 2015-03-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-03-09_026_minute-entry.pdf

Source 27 2015-04-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-04-03_027_minute-entry.pdf

Source 28 2015-04-14

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the Motion to Suppress; denying the request for attorneys’ fees regarding the Motion to Suppress.

Download source file

2015-04-14_028_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 29 2015-04-28

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-04-28_029_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 30 2015-07-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-07-28_030_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What did the association accuse the unit owner of doing?

Installing a door along a common-element wall without first getting the association board’s written consent. CC&R § 4.3 requires prior written consent of the board before a unit owner alters a perimeter or party wall or makes any structural alteration within a unit. The association sued for breach of contract and asked the court to order the property brought back into compliance with the CC&Rs.

Why didn’t the CC&Rs’ internal dispute-resolution process apply?

NSPC argued the case belonged in the CC&Rs’ Article 11 “Dispute Resolution” process. The court disagreed: Article 11 did not apply to a situation where the owner installed a door along a common wall without association approval, and § 12.1 of the CC&Rs specifically governs enforcement and “clearly authorizes the Association to file a suit at law or in equity to enjoin a violation of, or compel compliance with, the CC&R’s.” The court also rejected the owner’s attempt to recast the case as a design-defect dispute to fit it into Article 11.

Why did the association’s own summary-judgment motion fail?

The association argued NSPC had made binding “judicial admissions” — in its initial disclosure statement and in earlier motion practice — that it never sought approval before installing the door. The court held those statements did not qualify: a Rule 12(c) motion is not a “pleading,” and a disclosure statement is not a judicial admission. NSPC had also moved to amend its answer and retracted the statements. That left whether NSPC obtained approval as a genuine issue of material fact that could not be resolved on summary judgment.

Why did the association ultimately lose at summary judgment?

Two independent failures. On breach of contract, the association had to prove damages, but the deadline to disclose a computation of damages had passed, and the “nominal damages” theory it raised for the first time at oral argument — based on the tax value of the “stolen” portion of the common elements — was neither timely nor sufficient. On injunctive relief, it was undisputed that relocating the door would cost approximately $245,000 and require closing the owner’s medical facility for months; the court held that no reasonable factfinder could find the benefit to the association outweighed that hardship, defeating a required element of specific performance.

Why did the association have to pay the unit owner’s attorneys’ fees?

The same CC&R clause the association sued under, § 12.1, provides that the prevailing party in such an action recovers “all attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party in the action.” Because the fee provision is contractual, the court had no discretion to refuse the award once it found NSPC was the prevailing party. The court awarded $276,666.14 in fees, plus $8,555.30 in costs — after holding that Rule 68(g) entitled NSPC to double the taxable costs incurred after its April 18, 2014 offer of judgment — and $8,621.24 in expert-witness costs. Prevailing-party fee clauses in CC&Rs cut both ways.

Was the association’s lawsuit found frivolous, and is this ruling binding elsewhere?

No on both counts. The court expressly denied NSPC’s request for sanctions under A.R.S. § 12-349 and Rule 11, finding the association did not bring or maintain its claims without substantial justification — losing at summary judgment does not make a claim groundless. And as a superior-court decision, the ruling binds only these parties and is not precedent. It is still instructive on how Arizona courts weigh hardship before ordering covenant-compliance injunctions, and on the financial exposure created by prevailing-party fee clauses.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2013-003636 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	April 14, 2015
Judge / panel	Hon. Lisa Daniel Flores, Hon. Patricia Ann Starr
Parties	Chauncey Ranch Office Condominium Association (Plaintiff) v. North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC (Defendant, unit owner)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-349
Topics	CC&RsArchitectural ReviewAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the unit owner summary judgment on the association’s breach-of-contract and injunctive-relief claims — the association failed to timely disclose any computation of damages, and no reasonable factfinder could find that the benefit of relocating the door outweighed the undisputed hardship of approximately $245,000 in cost and months of closure of a medical facility — and, because CC&R § 12.1 entitles the prevailing party to all attorneys’ fees, awarded the owner $276,666.14 in fees plus costs and expert-witness costs, while denying A.R.S. § 12-349 and Rule 11 sanctions because the association’s claims were not brought without substantial justification.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	30 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	14 roadmap entries
Video overview	Chauncey Ranch Office Condominium Association v. North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

An office condominium association sued a unit owner, medical practice North Scottsdale Pain Center, LLC, in April 2013 for installing a door along a common-element wall without the prior written board consent required by CC&R § 4.3, seeking breach-of-contract damages and an injunction compelling compliance. The court denied the owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in February 2014, holding the CC&Rs’ Article 11 dispute-resolution process did not apply and that § 12.1 authorized the association’s enforcement suit. It then denied the association’s summary-judgment motion in September 2014, holding the owner’s earlier statements that it had not sought approval were not binding judicial admissions and that whether the owner obtained approval was a disputed fact. In an April 14, 2015 under-advisement ruling the court granted the owner summary judgment on both claims: the association never timely disclosed a computation of damages, and the requested injunction — relocating the door at an undisputed cost of about $245,000 while closing a medical facility for months — would inflict hardship outweighing any benefit. In July 2015 the court, applying the declaration’s prevailing-party fee clause, awarded the owner $276,666.14 in attorneys’ fees plus $8,555.30 in costs and $8,621.24 in expert-witness costs, while denying sanctions against the association, and entered judgment.

Key Issues & Findings

At the pleadings stage, the court sided with the association’s framing of the case. Denying the owner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in February 2014, Judge Flores held that the CC&Rs’ Article 11 “Dispute Resolution” process did not apply to a situation in which the defendant “admittedly installed a door along a common wall without Association approval”; the suit was brought to compel compliance with CC&R § 4.3, which requires prior written board consent before altering a perimeter or party wall or making any structural alteration within a unit, and § 12.1 “clearly authorizes the Association to file a suit at law or in equity to enjoin a violation of, or compel compliance with, the CC&R’s.” The court rejected the owner’s effort to recast the dispute as a design-defect claim subject to Article 11.

The cross-motions for summary judgment then turned the case. In September 2014, Judge Starr denied the association’s motion, which rested on the theory that the owner was bound by “judicial admissions” — statements in its initial disclosure statement and in the judgment-on-the-pleadings briefing that it had not sought approval. The court held that a Rule 12(c) motion is not a “pleading” under Rule 7(a) and a disclosure statement is not a judicial admission under Clark Equipment, that even an admission can be relieved when made through mistake, and that the owner had moved to amend its answer and retracted the statements; whether the owner obtained approval to relocate the door was therefore a genuine issue of material fact. In the dispositive April 14, 2015 ruling, the court granted the owner’s motion: the association’s contract claim required proof of damages, but the disclosure deadline had “come and gone,” and the nominal-damages theory based on the tax value of the “stolen” portion of the common elements, first raised at oral argument, was “neither timely nor sufficient.” The injunction claim failed the fourth specific-performance element from The Power P.E.O., Inc. v. Employees Ins. of Wausau — it was undisputed that moving the door would cost approximately $245,000 and require closing the owner’s medical facility for months, a hardship no reasonable factfinder could find outweighed by the benefit to the association.

The July 28, 2015 fee ruling completed the picture. Because § 12.1 of the declaration entitles the prevailing party to “all attorney fees incurred by the prevailing party in the action,” and a court lacks discretion to refuse a contractual fee award, the court awarded the owner $276,666.14 in fees after finding the China Doll requirements met and the fees not clearly excessive. It awarded $8,555.30 in costs — after holding that Rule 68(g) entitled the owner to double the taxable costs incurred after its April 18, 2014 offer of judgment — and $8,621.24 in expert-witness costs, while excluding fees from a separate injunction-against-harassment matter and one expert’s unreasonable fees. The court declined to sanction the association under A.R.S. § 12-349 or Rule 11, holding that its claims were not groundless merely because they failed at summary judgment, and entered judgment the same day.

Why It Matters

This case shows that establishing a covenant violation theory is only half of an enforcement suit — the association won every framing battle, including a ruling that the CC&Rs authorized it to sue and that the owner’s ADR argument failed, yet lost the case because it could not prove timely-disclosed damages and asked for a remedy the court found wildly disproportionate. Arizona courts weigh hardship before ordering specific performance of covenants: an injunction requiring a $245,000 door relocation and months-long closure of a medical facility was never going to balance against an unquantified injury to the association.

It is also a stark illustration that prevailing-party fee clauses in CC&Rs cut both ways. The same § 12.1 the association invoked to bring the suit obligated it, after losing, to pay the unit owner more than $293,000 in fees, costs, and expert-witness costs — an award the court had no discretion to refuse under the contract. At the same time, the court’s denial of A.R.S. § 12-349 sanctions confirms that losing at summary judgment does not make a claim frivolous. As a superior-court decision, the ruling binds only these parties and is not precedent, and the collected minute entries end at the July 2015 judgment.

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Caroline Brown v. Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc.: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 2, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&Rs & Insurance Covenants | Breach of Contract | CV2011-008669

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a homeowner argued her association breached the community’s Declaration by procuring a blanket insurance policy whose repair proceeds were not made payable to the unit owner and the association jointly, as the CC&Rs required. The court held the association’s breach was clear — it was no defense that the insurance company, not the association, decided how the checks would be issued — while the owner’s separate unjust-enrichment claim against the repair contractor failed because any enrichment did not come at her expense. Liability was decided on summary judgment; the case settled before a damages trial.

Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Caroline Brown v. Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C., et al. (Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc.), Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-008669.

Download partial-summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Caroline Brown v. Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C., et al. — including defendant Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. (“CVIA”) — Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2011-008669, as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the November 30, 2011 under-advisement ruling on the defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings and the June 25, 2012 under-advisement ruling granting the homeowner partial summary judgment on contract liability; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated October 30, 2013, records that the court was advised the case had settled and placed the matter on the inactive calendar for dismissal on December 23, 2013; the settlement terms and any final dismissal order are not part of the collected minutes, so damages were never adjudicated. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the homeowner partial summary judgment on contract liability against the association. There was no dispute that the community’s Declaration required CVIA to “procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the Owners” such that “proceeds payable from [it] shall be payable to the Unit Owner and the Association jointly,” and CVIA did not argue that it had done so. The court held it was no defense that CAU — the insurance company — rather than CVIA decided how the checks would be issued: it was CVIA’s obligation to make sure, if necessary by express contract language, that checks would issue as the Declaration required, and if CAU would not agree there were many other insurance companies. In the court’s words, “CVIA’s breach is clear.” The owner’s separate unjust-enrichment claim against the repair contractor, Pinnacle Restoration, was rejected on the pleadings because any enrichment was not at her expense, and the contractor was awarded $12,500 in attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The case settled in October 2013 before damages against the association were tried.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Caroline Brown (Plaintiff)
Unit owner in the Camelback Village community who paid insurance premiums to the association and had to contract for work as a result of the contractor’s alleged nonperformance; won partial summary judgment on contract liability against the association in June 2012.
Mark DePasquale (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff Caroline Brown throughout the case, appearing at the November 2011 and June 2012 oral arguments and the case-management conferences.

Respondent Side

Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. (CVIA) (Defendant)
Community association whose Declaration (CC&Rs) required it to procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the owners, with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly; held in breach of that covenant on summary judgment.
Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. (Defendant)
Contractor engaged to perform covered repairs; won judgment on the pleadings on the owner’s unjust-enrichment claim in November 2011 and was awarded $12,500 in attorneys’ fees plus $241 in costs. Its dismissal was later taken up on appeal, and the trial court vacated the July 2013 trial so all claims could potentially be tried together.
Erin E. McManis (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. at the November 23, 2011 oral argument and the April 16, 2012 status conference.
Thomas P. Burke II (Counsel)
Counsel for Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. from the June 2012 summary-judgment argument through the 2013 trial-setting conferences.
Elizabeth L. Fleming (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. on behalf of Thomas Burke II at the June 18, 2013 status conference.
Patrick J. Van Zanen (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Defendant Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. at the November 23, 2011 oral argument on the motions for judgment on the pleadings.
Brian D. Myers (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Defendant Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. at the June and July 2013 status conferences.

Neutral Parties

Dean M. Fink (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the November 2011 judgment-on-the-pleadings ruling, the June 2012 partial-summary-judgment ruling, the fee award, and the motion-in-limine rulings.
Michael Barth (Commissioner)
Superior-court commissioner to whom the May 2011 Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings were assigned; the collected minutes show both defendants going on to litigate the case.

What happened

Caroline Brown owned a unit in the Camelback Village community, governed by Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. (“CVIA”) under the community’s CC&Rs. According to the complaint as recited in the court’s rulings, CVIA had the right, which it exercised, to “procure a blanket insurance policy [which] shall insure each of the Units within the Properties,” and the Declaration required that proceeds payable from that policy be payable to the unit owner and the association jointly. Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. was contracted to perform covered repairs. Brown sued both CVIA and Pinnacle in 2011, and in May 2011 applied for default judgments against each; the court routed those applications to Commissioner Michael Barth’s default-judgment process, and both defendants went on to litigate the case.

Both defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Judge Dean M. Fink heard argument on November 23, 2011. In a November 30, 2011 under-advisement ruling the court split the case. Pinnacle won: Brown’s unjust-enrichment claim failed because a defendant must be enriched at the claimant’s expense, and any enrichment here “was by the CVIA and/or its insurer, not by Ms. Brown” — her impoverishment from having to contract for work after Pinnacle’s alleged nonperformance did not enrich Pinnacle, and her insurance premiums went to CVIA, not the contractor. An alternative third-party-beneficiary theory could not be considered because it was never pled. CVIA lost its motion: while a “blanket” policy is a single policy on the entirety — so individual owners could not each be named insureds — the CC&Rs still obligated CVIA to insure the individual owners and to make proceeds payable to them and the association “jointly,” and to that extent the complaint stated a breach-of-contract claim. The duplicative good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim was left in, and the court declined to resolve on the pleadings whether CVIA owed Brown a fiduciary duty.

The Pinnacle side of the case then wound down at the trial level. The court denied Brown’s motion for new trial on March 6, 2012, explaining that her theory depended “not on what the insurance policy under which Pinnacle was contracted said, but on what it should have said,” and that it was unrealistic to impute to “a simple contractor” knowledge of CVIA’s specific contractual obligations to her. On April 11, 2012 the court awarded Pinnacle $12,500 in attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 — some, but not all, of what it requested under the Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Warner factors — plus $241 in taxable costs, and a judgment in Pinnacle’s favor was signed on June 4, 2012.

Meanwhile Brown moved for partial summary judgment on contract liability against CVIA. The court gave CVIA a Rule 56(f) continuance to take discovery before responding, then heard argument on June 18, 2012 — declining to consider CVIA’s untimely supplemental response. In the June 25, 2012 under-advisement ruling, the court granted the motion. There was no dispute the Declaration required CVIA to procure a blanket policy insuring the owners with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly, and CVIA did not argue that it did so. Nor was it a defense that CAU — the insurance company — and not CVIA decided how the checks were issued: it was CVIA’s obligation to make sure, “if necessary by including express language in the contract,” that checks would issue as the Declaration required, and “if CAU would not agree, there are many other insurance companies.” The court concluded: “CVIA’s breach is clear.”

With liability established, the case moved toward a damages trial. A four-day jury trial was set for July 30 through August 2, 2013, but on June 18, 2013 the court vacated it after discussing the Court of Appeals’ decision on Pinnacle’s unjust-enrichment claim and the possibility of resetting the trial so all claims could be tried at one time; at a July 1, 2013 conference the court was advised Pinnacle would be filing a Petition for Review, and the jury trial was reset for December 10 through 13, 2013. An August 15, 2013 ruling on motions in limine framed the damages issues: CVIA was liable for the consequential damages of its breach, so Brown could not recover for work she chose to undertake “outside what should have been in CVIA’s policy” — but whether the money she used came from another insurance company, such as the Farmers payments at issue in the motion, or out of her own pocket was immaterial. The court granted the motion as to Mutual Management and CAU and denied it as to Pinnacle.

The trial never happened. On October 30, 2013 the court was advised the case had settled. It placed the matter on the inactive calendar for dismissal on December 23, 2013 unless a judgment or stipulation for dismissal was filed first, deemed all pending motions moot, and vacated the December trial and the final trial-management conference. The settlement terms do not appear in the collected minute entries.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Caroline Brown v. Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. (CV2011-008669 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The Declaration undisputedly required CVIA to procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the owners with proceeds… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Caroline Brown v. Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2011-05-20 / 2011-05-23 Brown applies for default judgments against Pinnacle Restoration and CVIA; the court routes the applications to Commissioner Michael Barth’s Rule 55(b) default process. Both defendants go on to litigate.

Step 2011-10-04 The court orders a mandatory settlement conference and refers the case to the ADR office for appointment of a judge pro tempore.

Step 2011-11-23 Oral argument on Pinnacle’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and CVIA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; matter taken under advisement.

Step 2011-11-30 Under-advisement ruling: Pinnacle’s motion granted — unjust enrichment fails because any enrichment was by CVIA and/or its insurer, not at Brown’s expense; CVIA’s motion denied — the complaint states a claim that CVIA breached the CC&Rs’ blanket-insurance and joint-payment obligations.

Step 2012-03-06 Brown’s motion for new trial on the Pinnacle ruling is denied; her theory rested on what the policy “should have said,” which did not implicate the contractor.

Step 2012-03-26 CVIA is granted a Rule 56(f) continuance to take discovery before responding to Brown’s motion for partial summary judgment; oral argument set for June 18, 2012.

Step 2012-04-11 The court awards Pinnacle $12,500 in attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and $241 in taxable costs against Brown.

Step 2012-06-04 Judgment in favor of Pinnacle Restoration is signed (noted in the June 14, 2012 minute entry).

Step 2012-06-18 Oral argument on Brown’s motion for partial summary judgment on contract liability against CVIA; the court declines to consider CVIA’s untimely supplemental response and takes the matter under advisement.

Step 2012-06-25 Under-advisement ruling grants Brown partial summary judgment on contract liability: CVIA did not argue it procured the required blanket policy with proceeds payable jointly, and “CVIA’s breach is clear.”

Step 2012-12-03 A four-day jury trial is set for July 30 – August 2, 2013.

Step 2013-06-18 The court vacates the July 2013 trial after discussing the Court of Appeals’ decision on Pinnacle’s unjust-enrichment claim and the possibility of trying all claims together.

Step 2013-07-01 The court is advised Pinnacle will be filing a Petition for Review; the jury trial is reset for December 10–13, 2013.

Step 2013-08-15 Motion-in-limine ruling frames damages: CVIA is liable for consequential damages of its breach; work outside what the policy should have covered is not recoverable, but the source of Brown’s funds (another insurer or her own pocket) is immaterial.

Step 2013-10-30 The court is advised the case has settled; the matter is placed on the inactive calendar for dismissal on December 23, 2013, pending motions are deemed moot, and the December trial is vacated.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/caroline-brown-v-camelback-village-improvement-association/raw/: 26 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2011-05-20

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file

2011-05-20_001_default-judgment.pdf

Source 2 2011-05-23

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file

2011-05-23_002_default-judgment.pdf

Source 3 2011-08-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2011-08-23_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2011-10-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2011-10-04_004_minute-entry.pdf

Source 5 2011-10-07

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2011-10-07_005_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 6 2011-10-17

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2011-10-17_006_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 7 2011-11-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2011-11-23_007_minute-entry.pdf

Source 8 2011-11-30

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Pinnacle Restoration judgment on the pleadings on the unjust-enrichment claim and awarding it attorneys’ fees.

Download source file

2011-11-30_008_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 9 2012-02-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-02-09_009_minute-entry.pdf

Source 10 2012-02-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-02-15_010_minute-entry.pdf

Source 11 2012-03-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-03-06_011_minute-entry.pdf

Source 12 2012-03-07

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-03-07_012_minute-entry.pdf

Source 13 2012-03-26

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2012-03-26_013_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 14 2012-03-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-03-26_014_minute-entry.pdf

Source 15 2012-04-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-04-11_015_minute-entry.pdf

Source 16 2012-04-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-04-16_016_minute-entry.pdf

Source 17 2012-06-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-06-14_017_minute-entry.pdf

Source 18 2012-06-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-06-18_018_minute-entry.pdf

Source 19 2012-06-25

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the unit owner partial summary judgment on contract liability against Camelback Village Improvement Association.

Download source file

2012-06-25_019_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 20 2012-10-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-10-11_020_minute-entry.pdf

Source 21 2012-12-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2012-12-03_021_minute-entry.pdf

Source 22 2013-06-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-06-18_022_minute-entry.pdf

Source 23 2013-07-01

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2013-07-01_023_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 24 2013-08-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-08-15_024_minute-entry.pdf

Source 25 2013-08-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-08-20_025_minute-entry.pdf

Source 26 2013-10-30

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2013-10-30_026_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What exactly did the association do wrong?

The community’s Declaration required CVIA to procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the owners, with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly. In the June 25, 2012 ruling the court noted CVIA did not argue that it had done so, and rejected its defense that the insurance company (CAU) — not the association — decided how the checks were issued. It was the association’s obligation to make sure, if necessary by express contract language, that checks would issue as the Declaration required; if the insurer would not agree, the court observed, “there are many other insurance companies.” On that record, “CVIA’s breach is clear.”

Did the homeowner win the case?

She won on liability against the association: the June 2012 ruling established as a matter of law that CVIA breached the CC&Rs. But damages were never decided by a court — the case settled in October 2013 before the December 2013 jury trial, and the settlement terms are not in the minute entries. Against the contractor, Pinnacle Restoration, she lost at the trial level and was ordered to pay $12,500 of Pinnacle’s attorneys’ fees plus $241 in costs, although that dismissal was later the subject of a Court of Appeals decision and a planned Petition for Review whose outcomes are not stated in the collected minutes.

What is a “blanket” insurance policy, according to the court?

In its November 30, 2011 ruling the court explained that a blanket policy “is a single policy covering the entirety, not a conglomeration of policies each covering one unit.” Because owners have no insurable interest in each other’s units, they cannot each be named insureds on the single policy — but that did not excuse the association from its separate CC&R obligations to insure the individual owners and to make proceeds payable to the owner and the association jointly.

Why did the claim against the repair contractor fail?

Brown sued Pinnacle Restoration for unjust enrichment, but the court held that a defendant must be unjustly enriched at the claimant’s expense. Any enrichment from Pinnacle’s alleged failure to perform flowed to CVIA and/or its insurer, not from Brown, and her insurance premiums were paid to CVIA, not to the contractor. The court also declined to consider a third-party-beneficiary theory because it was never pled, and on the motion for new trial it added that Brown’s argument depended on what the insurance contract “should have said” — something that could not be imputed to “a simple contractor.”

What damages could the homeowner have recovered from the association?

The August 15, 2013 motion-in-limine ruling drew the line: CVIA was liable for the consequential damages of its breach, so damages deriving from Brown’s decision to undertake work outside what should have been in CVIA’s policy were not recoverable. At the same time, where the money came from was immaterial — whether Brown funded her share through another insurance company (the ruling addressed Farmers Insurance payments) or out of her own pocket did not reduce CVIA’s liability. The case settled before a jury put a number on those damages.

Is this ruling binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent, and this case ended in a settlement rather than a final trial judgment. It is still instructive reading: it shows a court taking a CC&R insurance covenant literally — the association had to deliver exactly the joint-payment arrangement the Declaration promised — and refusing to let the association shift responsibility to its insurance company.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2011-008669 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	June 25, 2012
Judge / panel	Hon. Dean M. Fink
Parties	Caroline Brown (Plaintiff, unit owner) v. Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc. (Defendant) and Pinnacle Restoration, L.L.C. (Defendant, repair contractor)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-341.01
Topics	CC&RsAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the unit owner partial summary judgment on contract liability against the association, holding that the Declaration undisputedly required CVIA to procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the owners with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly, that CVIA did not argue it had done so, and that it was no defense that the insurance company rather than the association decided how the checks were issued — “CVIA’s breach is clear.” The court separately granted the repair contractor judgment on the pleadings on the owner’s unjust-enrichment claim and awarded it attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	26 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	15 roadmap entries
Video overview	Caroline Brown v. Camelback Village Improvement Association, Inc.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A unit owner in the Camelback Village community sued her association (CVIA) and the contractor hired to perform covered repairs, Pinnacle Restoration, over how insurance proceeds for repair work were handled. The community’s Declaration required CVIA to procure a blanket insurance policy insuring the owners, with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly. In a November 30, 2011 under-advisement ruling on the defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings, the court dismissed the owner’s unjust-enrichment claim against the contractor — any enrichment was by the association and/or its insurer, not at her expense — while holding the complaint stated a breach-of-contract claim against the association. In a June 25, 2012 under-advisement ruling the court granted the owner partial summary judgment on contract liability: CVIA did not argue it had procured the required policy, and it was no defense that the insurance company (CAU) decided how checks were issued, because it was CVIA’s obligation to make sure checks issued as the Declaration required. “CVIA’s breach is clear.” The contractor recovered $12,500 in fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01; an appeal over its dismissal led the court to vacate the July 2013 trial, and the case settled in October 2013 before damages were tried.

Key Issues & Findings

The November 30, 2011 judgment-on-the-pleadings ruling split the case between the two defendants. Against Pinnacle Restoration, the unjust-enrichment claim failed because it is not enough that a defendant is enriched — it must be enriched at the claimant’s expense (citing Western Corrections Group, Inc. v. Tierney). Any enrichment from Pinnacle’s alleged nonperformance ran to CVIA and/or its insurer, and Brown’s insurance premiums were paid to CVIA, not the contractor, so as far as Pinnacle was concerned she was receiving its services gratuitously; an unpled third-party-beneficiary theory could not be considered. Against CVIA, however, the complaint stated a claim: a “blanket” policy is a single policy covering the entirety, so owners could not each be named insureds, but the CC&Rs still obligated CVIA to insure the individual owners and to make proceeds payable to the owner and the association jointly. The duplicative good-faith-and-fair-dealing claim was left in place, and the fiduciary-duty question was held unsuitable for resolution on the pleadings.

The dispositive June 25, 2012 ruling on Brown’s motion for partial summary judgment rested on the undisputed text of the Declaration: CVIA was required to procure a blanket policy insuring the owners such that proceeds “shall be payable to the Unit Owner and the Association jointly,” and CVIA did not argue that it did so. The court rejected the association’s attempt to shift responsibility to its insurance company: it was no defense that CAU, not CVIA, made the decision on how to issue the checks, because it was CVIA’s obligation to make sure — if necessary by including express language in the contract — that checks would be issued as the Declaration required, and “if CAU would not agree, there are many other insurance companies.” On that record the court found CVIA’s breach “clear” and granted summary judgment on contract liability.

Later rulings defined what the breach was worth. In its August 15, 2013 motion-in-limine ruling the court held CVIA liable for the consequential damages of its breach: to the extent Brown’s alleged damages derived from her decision to undertake work outside what should have been in CVIA’s policy she could not recover, but whether she funded the work through another insurance company (such as the Farmers payments) or out of her own pocket was immaterial. The court also awarded Pinnacle $12,500 in fees and $241 in costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 after weighing the Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Warner factors, awarding some but not all of the fees requested. The damages questions never reached the jury: after a Court of Appeals decision on the Pinnacle unjust-enrichment claim prompted the court to vacate the July 2013 trial so all claims could potentially be tried together, the parties settled, and on October 30, 2013 the case was placed on the inactive calendar for dismissal.

Why It Matters

The case is a pointed example of a court holding an association to the letter of its own CC&Rs. The Declaration promised owners a specific insurance arrangement — a blanket policy with proceeds payable to the unit owner and the association jointly — and the court treated the association’s failure to deliver that arrangement as a clear breach, expressly refusing to let it hide behind its insurance company’s check-issuing practices. For associations, the lesson is that delegating performance to a vendor does not delegate the covenant; for owners, it shows that insurance and repair-proceeds provisions in a declaration are enforceable contract terms.

The case also illustrates the risk of suing the wrong party: the owner’s unjust-enrichment claim against the repair contractor was dismissed on the pleadings because any enrichment did not come at her expense, and she was ordered to pay $12,500 of the contractor’s attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Finally, it is a reminder that many HOA wins end quietly — liability was decided on summary judgment, but the case settled before any jury valued the damages, and as a superior-court decision it binds only the parties.

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Village At Grayhawk Owners Association v. Kathryn Marie Jones: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Procedure & Attorneys’ Fees | Rule 56(e), A.R.S. § 12-341.01 | CV2016-050453

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, an association’s suit against a condominium owner ran more than six years — through a stricken answer, a default judgment reversed on appeal, extensive disability-accommodation rulings, and finally an April 2022 under-advisement ruling entering summary judgment for the association under Rule 56(e) because the owner’s opposition did not comply with Rule 56(c). The court then awarded the association $150,000 in attorneys’ fees and $8,324.44 in costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Village At Grayhawk Owners Association v. Kathryn Marie Jones, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2016-050453.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Village At Grayhawk Owners Association v. Kathryn Marie Jones (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2016-050453) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 13, 2022 under-advisement ruling granting summary judgment and the July 25, 2022 attorneys’-fees ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: final judgment with Rule 54(c) language was entered July 27, 2022, and the last collected minute entry (September 14, 2022) records that a notice of appeal had been filed and jurisdiction had passed to the Court of Appeals — the outcome could change on appeal, and later developments are not reflected here. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on its claims and on the homeowner’s counterclaims under Rule 56(e) — not because it weighed the competing stories, but because the homeowner’s opposition failed to comply with Rule 56(c): she filed no separate statement of facts and no memorandum of law, and her 22-page handwritten narrative did not set forth specific facts supported by admissible evidence. The court held that a self-represented litigant, even one receiving disability accommodations, is held to the same standard as an attorney, and its own precautionary search of the record found no competent evidence creating a genuine issue for trial. The deadline rules cut both ways: in the same ruling the court granted the homeowner’s motions to strike the Association’s late-filed reply and a late response, and refused to consider them. Because the action arose out of a contract, the court then awarded the Association $150,000 in attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and $8,324.44 in costs — after disallowing the fees the Association ran up on the default judgment that had been reversed on appeal, its stricken late reply, and the motions to strike it lost.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Village At Grayhawk Owners Association (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
Owners association that filed the verified complaint in February 2016 and defended against Jones’s counterclaims; won summary judgment in April 2022 and a $158,324.44 judgment for fees and costs in July 2022.
Stewart Foster Salwin (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the Association during the 2016-2017 order-to-show-cause phase.
Joshua M. Bolen (Counsel)
Counsel of record for the Association from 2019 forward; the July 2022 fee ruling reviewed his affidavit covering the six-year litigation and named him, with Scott Humble, in the judgment.
Timothy D. Butterfield (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the Association at status conferences from 2019 and at the January 2022 oral arguments.
Scott Humble (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the Association in its role as Counterdefendant on Jones’s counterclaims, including at the October 2020 trial-setting conference, the October 2021 trial-planning conference, and the January 2022 oral arguments.

Respondent Side

Kathryn Marie Jones (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
Condominium owner (Unit #1053) sued by the Association. Represented by different attorneys at various phases and self-represented from roughly 2020 forward; the court found she has disabilities entitling her to ADA accommodations. She sold the unit in 2022; after final judgment, a notice of appeal was filed and jurisdiction passed to the Court of Appeals.
Alan Jones (Defendant’s husband; proffered defense expert)
Non-party husband of Kathryn Jones, described in the disclosures as a retired registered professional engineer. The court found his expert disclosures deficient under Rule 26.1 but denied the motion to preclude his testimony as moot. A May 2017 minute entry restricted case contacts to Jones or a licensed attorney after he confronted judicial staff at the courthouse. His post-judgment motion to intervene went unaddressed once the appeal was filed.
J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the defendant at the December 2016 hearing on the Association’s order to show cause.
David L. Abney (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Jones after the 2019 appellate mandate, including the February 2019 post-mandate status conference.
Mark Buchanan (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Jones at the August 2019 telephonic status conference.
Sharon S. Moyer (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Jones at the August 2019 telephonic status conference.

Neutral Parties

Aimee L. Anderson (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the 2016-2017 phase, including the order-to-show-cause proceedings and the June 2017 sanction striking Jones’s answer and counterclaim.
Steven K. Holding (Commissioner)
Court commissioner whose division handled the default-judgment file; in January 2019 his minute entry vacated the December 5, 2017 Default Judgment and Injunction Order pursuant to the Court of Appeals decision.
Theodore Campagnolo (Judge)
Judge assigned after the 2019 remand; issued the April 2020 ADA-accommodation ruling, denied the requests for indefinite and permanent stays, denied the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, and set the case for trial.
Alison S. Bachus (Judge)
Judge who issued the April 13, 2022 under-advisement ruling granting summary judgment, the July 25, 2022 fee ruling, and the final judgment.

What happened

The Village At Grayhawk Owners Association filed a verified complaint against condominium owner Kathryn Marie Jones on February 25, 2016 (the caption reads “Alan Jones, et al.,” but the court later made clear that judgment would enter against Kathryn Jones personally, not against the KMJ Trust). The minute entries do not restate the complaint, but the early proceedings centered on the Association’s application for an order to show cause and on orders requiring Jones to make her garage accessible for a termite inspection and to sit for a deposition — steps the parties had agreed to while she was still represented by counsel. The court later characterized the suit as an action arising out of a contract between the parties. Jones counterclaimed; her amended counterclaims included federal and Arizona fair-housing claims (42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) and A.R.S. § 41-1491.19(E)(2)) alleging the Association denied her a reasonable accommodation — having it pay for professional moving and temporary storage of her personal property — and her filings described sewage backing up into her unit’s bathrooms.

The first phase ended in default. After continuances, several stricken filings, and a May 2017 incident in which Jones’s husband confronted judicial staff at the courthouse (prompting an order that only Jones or a licensed attorney could contact the assigned division), Jones failed to appear at the June 28, 2017 evidentiary hearing on the Association’s order to show cause. Judge Aimee Anderson granted the Association’s request for sanctions, struck Jones’s answer and counterclaim, and allowed the Association to proceed by default. A Default Judgment and Injunction Order was signed on December 5, 2017. The July 2022 fee ruling recounts the backdrop: a stay request had been denied after Jones’s then-counsel (not named in the minutes) was disbarred, and the default judgment followed.

Jones appealed and won. Following the Arizona Court of Appeals’ memorandum decision of December 20, 2018, the superior court vacated the default judgment and injunction on January 30, 2019, and the mandate issued that month. After reassignments — Judge Cynthia Bailey disqualified herself and the presiding civil judge sent the case to Judge Theodore Campagnolo — the litigation restarted. In April 2020 the court found that Jones has disabilities entitling her to accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act and granted most of what she asked for: timely consideration of extension requests, breaks during proceedings, depositions capped at two hours and one per day, and illness-based rescheduling with medical documentation. What the court repeatedly refused — in June 2020 and again in October 2020 — were her requests for indefinite or permanent stays, which it held are not reasonable accommodations. Later rulings added double response time for her filings, 14-point-font filings with expanded page limits, and 14-point minute entries. In June 2021 the court denied her Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, finding it had subject-matter jurisdiction.

On September 14, 2021 — the dispositive-motion deadline — the Association moved for summary judgment on its claims and on all of Jones’s counterclaims, and separately moved to preclude the expert testimony of Alan Jones, the defendant’s husband, a retired registered professional engineer proffered as a defense expert. Judge Alison Bachus, by then assigned to the case, vacated the November 2021 trial (resetting it to May 2023) because the motion could not be resolved in time, and heard oral argument in January 2022. At the summary-judgment argument the court gave Jones leave to file a written motion to strike the Association’s late reply.

The April 13, 2022 under-advisement ruling resolved the case. Applying the deadline rules strictly, the court granted both of Jones’s motions to strike: the Association’s reply in support of summary judgment and its late response to the first motion to strike were stricken and not considered. The court found Alan Jones’s expert disclosures deficient under Rule 26.1 — “devoid of the substance of Mr. Jones’ full opinions and the bases for those opinions” — but denied the motion to preclude as moot. On the main motion, the court held that Jones’s opposition failed to comply with Rule 56(c): there was no separate statement of facts, no memorandum of law, and only a 22-page handwritten narrative the court described as “meandering” and “challenging to distill to salient legal arguments,” with most factual assertions uncited and key attachments (such as settlement emails barred by Rule 408) inadmissible. Quoting Bloch v. Bentfield, the court held a self-represented party to the same standard as counsel, noted that Jones had shown in her own motions to strike that she could apply the rules precisely, and — in an abundance of caution — searched the record itself for evidence creating a genuine dispute, without success. Summary judgment was entered against Jones under Rule 56(e) on the Association’s claims and her counterclaims, and the court found the Association entitled to apply for fees because the action arose out of contract.

The endgame ran through the summer of 2022. Jones’s motion for reconsideration was denied in May. On July 25, 2022 the court ruled on the Association’s fee application under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, weighing the Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Warner factors: it found the litigation “could have been settled years ago,” that no extreme hardship was shown, and that the questions were neither novel nor complex — but it also policed the application hard, disallowing the fees incurred on the default-judgment phase that was reversed on appeal, the stricken reply, the lost motions to strike, and other entries. Of roughly $242,000 requested in fees and costs, the court awarded $150,000 in fees and $8,324.44 in costs, for a judgment of $158,324.44 plus interest at 6.75%. Final judgment with Rule 54(c) language was entered July 27, 2022. Jones sold the condominium in 2022 — the court held the sale did not moot the case — and post-judgment motions by Jones and her husband were left unaddressed once a notice of appeal was filed. The last collected minute entry, September 14, 2022, records that jurisdiction had passed to the Court of Appeals.

Procedural timeline

Step 2016-02-25 The Association files its verified complaint against Jones in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2016-050453), as recited in later minute entries.

Step 2016-12-16 Hearing on the Association’s order to show cause; an evidentiary hearing is set.

Step 2017-03-24 The court orders Jones to make her garage accessible for a termite inspection and to sit for a deposition, warning that noncompliance can lead to her answer being struck.

Step 2017-06-28 Jones fails to appear at the evidentiary hearing; the court strikes her answer and counterclaim and allows the Association to proceed by default.

Step 2017-12-05 Default Judgment and Injunction Order signed (as recited in the January 30, 2019 minute entry).

Step 2018-12-20 The Arizona Court of Appeals issues a memorandum decision in Jones’s favor on her second appeal.

Step 2019-01-30 The superior court vacates the default judgment and injunction; after reassignments, the case lands with Judge Campagnolo.

Step 2020-04-17 ADA ruling: the court finds Jones has disabilities entitling her to accommodations and grants five accommodations, but declines automatic extensions.

Step 2020-10-28 Trial-setting conference: permanent-stay request denied; Jones granted double response time; an 11-day jury trial is set for November-December 2021 with dispositive motions due September 14, 2021.

Step 2021-06-21 The court denies Jones’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, finding it has subject-matter jurisdiction.

Step 2021-09-14 The Association files its motion for summary judgment and its motion to preclude the expert testimony of Alan Jones.

Step 2021-10-04 Because the summary-judgment motion cannot be resolved before trial, the jury trial is vacated and reset to May 2023; minute entries ordered issued in 14-point font.

Step 2022-01-19 / 2022-01-28 Oral arguments on the motion to preclude and the motion for summary judgment; Jones is given leave to file a written motion to strike the Association’s late reply.

Step 2022-04-13 Under-advisement ruling: Jones’s motions to strike are granted, the motion to preclude is denied as moot, and summary judgment is granted for the Association under Rule 56(e).

Step 2022-05-27 Jones’s motion for reconsideration of the under-advisement ruling is denied.

Step 2022-07-25 Fee ruling: $150,000 in attorneys’ fees and $8,324.44 in costs awarded under A.R.S. § 12-341.01; final judgment with Rule 54(c) language is entered July 27, 2022.

Step 2022-09-14 Post-judgment motions by Jones and her husband are left unaddressed; a notice of appeal has been filed and jurisdiction rests with the Court of Appeals (last collected minute entry).

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/village-at-grayhawk-owners-association-v-kathryn-marie-jones/raw/: 36 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2016-12-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2016-12-16_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2017-03-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-03-21_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2017-03-24

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-03-24_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2017-04-03

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying Defendant’s request for a stay in the proceedings.

Download source file

2017-04-03_004_ruling.pdf

Source 5 2017-04-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-04-11_005_minute-entry.pdf

Source 6 2017-05-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-05-12_006_minute-entry.pdf

Source 7 2017-06-01

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-06-01_007_minute-entry.pdf

Source 8 2017-06-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-06-28_008_minute-entry.pdf

Source 9 2017-07-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-07-27_009_minute-entry.pdf

Source 10 2017-08-24

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file

2017-08-24_010_default-judgment.pdf

Source 11 2019-01-30

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Default-judgment entry vacating the Default Judgment and Injunction Order signed by this Court on December 5, 2017.

Download source file

2019-01-30_011_default-judgment.pdf

Source 12 2019-02-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2019-02-04_012_minute-entry.pdf

Source 13 2019-02-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2019-02-11_013_minute-entry.pdf

Source 14 2019-02-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2019-02-21_014_minute-entry.pdf

Source 15 2019-08-09

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2019-08-09_015_minute-entry.pdf

Source 16 2019-08-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2019-08-14_016_minute-entry.pdf

Source 17 2020-04-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-04-08_017_minute-entry.pdf

Source 18 2020-04-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-04-17_018_minute-entry.pdf

Source 19 2020-06-24

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-06-24_019_minute-entry.pdf

Source 20 2020-06-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-06-25_020_minute-entry.pdf

Source 21 2020-08-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-08-20_021_minute-entry.pdf

Source 22 2020-10-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-10-16_022_minute-entry.pdf

Source 23 2020-10-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2020-10-28_023_minute-entry.pdf

Source 24 2021-02-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2021-02-19_024_minute-entry.pdf

Source 25 2021-05-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2021-05-05_025_minute-entry.pdf

Source 26 2021-06-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2021-06-21_026_minute-entry.pdf

Source 27 2021-08-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2021-08-03_027_minute-entry.pdf

Source 28 2021-10-04

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2021-10-04_028_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 29 2021-12-17

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2021-12-17_029_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 30 2022-01-19

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2022-01-19_030_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 31 2022-01-28

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-01-28_031_minute-entry.pdf

Source 32 2022-04-13

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Reply to its Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 3, 2022. Plaintiff’s reply to the motion for summary judgment, which was filed December 17, 2021, is stricken.

Download source file

2022-04-13_032_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 33 2022-05-27

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying Defendant’s Motion.

Download source file

2022-05-27_033_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 34 2022-07-25

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file

2022-07-25_034_default-judgment.pdf

Source 35 2022-08-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-08-12_035_minute-entry.pdf

Source 36 2022-09-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-09-14_036_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What was this lawsuit about?

The collected minute entries do not restate the 2016 complaint in full, but they show its shape. The Association filed a verified complaint in February 2016 that the court later described as an action arising out of a contract; the early hearings enforced orders requiring Jones to make her garage available for a termite inspection and to sit for a deposition, and the eventual (later vacated) default judgment included an injunction. Jones counterclaimed, including federal and Arizona fair-housing claims alleging the Association denied her a reasonable accommodation by refusing to pay for professional moving and temporary storage of her personal property; her filings also described sewage backups into her unit’s bathrooms.

Why did the association win without a trial?

Because of Rule 56 mechanics, not a merits contest. Rule 56(c) requires a party opposing summary judgment to file a separate statement of facts identifying the disputed paragraphs and the specific facts — supported by admissible evidence, with record citations — that create a genuine dispute. Jones instead filed a 22-page handwritten narrative with no separate statement of facts and no memorandum of law, most assertions uncited, and key attachments inadmissible (for example, settlement emails barred by Arizona Rule of Evidence 408). Under Rule 56(e), when the opposing party does not properly respond, summary judgment “shall” be entered. The court emphasized it had searched the record itself and that its ruling was not merely “style over substance.”

Jones was self-represented and had court-recognized disabilities — did that change the standard?

No. The court granted her substantial accommodations over the years: liberal consideration of extensions, breaks during proceedings, two-hour depositions limited to one per day, double the normal response time, 14-point-font filings with expanded page limits, and 14-point minute entries. But it repeatedly held that indefinite or permanent stays are not reasonable accommodations, and — quoting Bloch v. Bentfield — that a self-represented litigant is held to the same standard as a licensed attorney. The court also noted that Jones’s own motions to strike showed she could apply the procedural rules precisely when she chose to.

What happened to the first judgment in this case?

It was reversed. After Jones failed to appear at the June 2017 evidentiary hearing, the court struck her answer and counterclaim as a sanction and let the Association proceed by default; a Default Judgment and Injunction Order was signed December 5, 2017. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed in a December 20, 2018 memorandum decision, and the superior court vacated the default judgment in January 2019. Notably, when the Association later applied for fees, the court refused to award any fees or costs for that reversed phase of the litigation.

How much did the homeowner end up owing?

The final judgment was $158,324.44 — $150,000 in attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 plus $8,324.44 in costs — with interest at 6.75%. The Association had asked for about $242,000 in fees and costs. Applying the Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Warner factors, the court found the case could have been settled years earlier and that no extreme hardship was shown, but it disallowed tens of thousands of dollars in entries, including everything spent on the reversed default judgment, the stricken summary-judgment reply, and the motions to strike the Association lost.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still instructive: it shows how strictly Arizona courts apply Rule 56(c)’s opposition requirements — to represented and self-represented parties alike — and how large the attorneys’-fee exposure can be in HOA cases, which courts treat as actions arising out of contract under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Note that a notice of appeal had been filed and jurisdiction had passed to the Court of Appeals as of the last collected minute entry (September 14, 2022), so the outcome could have changed on appeal.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2016-050453 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	April 13, 2022
Judge / panel	Hon. Alison S. Bachus, Hon. Theodore Campagnolo, Hon. Aimee L. Anderson
Parties	Village At Grayhawk Owners Association (Plaintiff/Counterdefendant) v. Kathryn Marie Jones (Defendant/Counterclaimant, condominium owner)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-341.01 Americans with Disabilities Act (Title II)
Topics	ProcedureAttorney FeesCC&Rs
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on its claims and all of Jones’s counterclaims under Rule 56(e), holding that her opposition — a handwritten narrative without a Rule 56(c) separate statement of facts, memorandum of law, or specific facts supported by admissible evidence — failed to properly respond to the motion, and that a self-represented litigant receiving disability accommodations is held to the same standard as counsel; the court simultaneously granted Jones’s motions to strike the Association’s late-filed reply and response, denied the motion to preclude her husband’s expert testimony as moot, and later awarded the Association $150,000 in fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and $8,324.44 in costs.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	36 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	17 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A homeowners association filed a verified complaint against condominium owner Kathryn Marie Jones in February 2016; the minute entries show the early proceedings enforced orders requiring Jones to make her garage accessible for a termite inspection and to sit for a deposition, and the court later described the suit as an action arising out of a contract. After Jones failed to appear at a June 2017 evidentiary hearing, the court struck her answer and counterclaim and entered a default judgment and injunction in December 2017, which the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed in December 2018. On remand the case restarted: the court found Jones has disabilities entitling her to ADA accommodations (double response time, deposition limits, 14-point-font filings and minute entries) but repeatedly denied her requests for indefinite or permanent stays, and denied her Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. In an April 13, 2022 under-advisement ruling, the court struck the Association’s late summary-judgment reply, denied its motion to preclude Alan Jones’s expert testimony as moot, and granted the Association summary judgment on its claims and on Jones’s counterclaims (including fair-housing reasonable-accommodation counterclaims) under Rule 56(e), because Jones’s opposition failed to comply with Rule 56(c). In July 2022 the court awarded the Association $150,000 in attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and $8,324.44 in costs, entering a $158,324.44 final judgment; a notice of appeal had been filed and jurisdiction had passed to the Court of Appeals when the collected minute entries end in September 2022.

Key Issues & Findings

The April 13, 2022 under-advisement ruling opened by enforcing the deadline rules against the Association: computing time under Rules 5, 6, 7.1, and 56, the court found the Association’s reply in support of summary judgment and its response to the first motion to strike were both late, granted Jones’s two motions to strike, and refused to consider the stricken filings. It reviewed Alan Jones’s expert disclosures under Rule 26.1(d)(3) and found them deficient — ‘devoid of the substance of Mr. Jones’ full opinions and the bases for those opinions,’ consisting mostly of conclusory statements with no basis given for opinions on legal issues such as the ADA — but because the trial would be vacated it denied the motion to preclude without prejudice as moot.

On summary judgment, the court held Jones’s opposition failed Rule 56(c)(3): there was no separate statement of facts, no memorandum of law, and only a 22-page handwritten narrative the court found meandering, interspersed with immaterial facts, and mostly uncited, with attachments that included inadmissible settlement emails barred by Evidence Rule 408. Quoting Bloch v. Bentfield and Maher v. Uhlman, the court held a self-represented party to the same standard as a licensed attorney — noting Jones had precisely applied the rules in her own motions to strike — and, citing Tilley v. Delci, undertook its own precautionary search of the record, which was ‘unsuccessful’ in locating admissible evidence creating a genuine dispute (for example, no evidence supporting the fair-housing counterclaim’s reasonable-accommodation damages beyond unproven pleading allegations). Under Rule 56(e), summary judgment ‘shall’ be entered against a party who does not properly respond, and the court stressed the ruling was not merely ‘style over substance.’

The July 25, 2022 fee ruling applied A.R.S. § 12-341.01 and the Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Warner factors: the court made no finding on whether Jones’s claims were meritorious (since the case was resolved under Rule 56(e)), found the litigation could have been settled years earlier and that some of Jones’s actions unnecessarily prolonged it, found no extreme hardship, and found the issues neither novel nor complex. It then cut the request substantially — disallowing all fees for the default-judgment phase reversed on Jones’s second appeal, the stricken reply, the Association’s unsuccessful opposition to the motions to strike, and other entries — awarding $150,000 of the roughly $232,000 in fees requested plus $8,324.44 of $9,786.25 in claimed costs, and entering judgment against Jones personally (declining to recaption her as trustee of the KMJ Trust) for $158,324.44 plus 6.75% interest.

Why It Matters

This case is a stark procedural lesson for Arizona homeowners litigating against their associations. Summary-judgment opposition mechanics are dispositive: a party who does not file a Rule 56(c) separate statement of facts and point to specific, admissible evidence loses under Rule 56(e), even where the court voluntarily searches the record itself — and self-represented owners are held to the same standard as attorneys. The rulings also map the real boundaries of litigation disability accommodations: the court granted extensive ADA accommodations (double response time, deposition limits, large-print filings and minute entries) while consistently holding that indefinite or permanent stays are not reasonable accommodations.

It also illustrates the financial stakes and the two-way discipline of HOA fee-shifting. Because HOA disputes are treated as actions arising out of contract, A.R.S. § 12-341.01 exposed the losing homeowner to a $158,324.44 judgment. At the same time, the fee ruling shows courts scrutinizing association fee applications line by line: the court refused to award the Association anything for the default judgment it lost on appeal, its stricken late reply, or the motions to strike it lost, trimming a roughly $242,000 request to $158,324.44. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties, and an appeal was pending when the collected minute entries end in September 2022.

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Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&R Amendments & Short-Term Rentals | Kalway v. Calabria Ranch | CV2022-004188

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, homeowner Diana Costain challenged the Villa Sendero Homeowners Association’s authority to adopt a Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs banning rentals of less than 30 days. Invoking Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, she argued the original declaration — which allows “rent signs” and lets owners delegate common-area rights to tenants — gave no reasonable notice that short-term rentals could later be prohibited. The court denied her motion to dismiss because terms like “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” are undefined in the CC&Rs and required factual development. The parties settled before the question was ever answered on the merits.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2022-004188.

Download motion-to-dismiss ruling

Scope note: This page covers Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2022-004188) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the August 9, 2022 under-advisement ruling on the motion to dismiss; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry, dated December 14, 2022, shows the court accepted a notice of settlement and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023. The collected entries do not include a final dismissal order, and the terms of the settlement are not part of the court’s minute-entry record. The court never ruled on the merits of the amendment’s validity. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court denied homeowner Diana Costain’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Whether the Association’s 2020 Fifth Amendment to the CC&Rs — which prohibits rentals of less than 30 days — was properly adopted could not be decided on the pleadings, because key terms in the CC&Rs are undefined: “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent.” The court held that further development of those terms was appropriate during the case, and it noted that Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA — the Arizona Supreme Court amendment-notice decision both sides fought over — was initially addressed by the trial court on summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. The court also held that a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs. The parties settled about four months later, so the validity of the short-term-rental ban was never decided on the merits.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Villa Sendero Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff)
Homeowners association that adopted the Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs in 2020 prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days; the named plaintiff in this action, which filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction on April 4, 2022.
Chandler W. Travis (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Plaintiff Villa Sendero Homeowners Association, Inc. throughout the collected minute entries.

Respondent Side

Diana Costain (Defendant)
Homeowner who purchased her Villa Sendero property in 2013 — a 35,000-square-foot lot containing a home, multiple buildings, and parking. She moved to dismiss, challenging the Association’s authority to adopt the short-term-rental restriction.
Mark Bainbridge (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Defendant Diana Costain throughout the collected minute entries.

Neutral Parties

Joseph P. Mikitish (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided over the case and issued the August 9, 2022 under-advisement ruling denying the motion to dismiss.
John D. Lierman (Judge Pro Tempore)
Judge pro tempore appointed through the court’s Alternative Dispute Resolution department; conducted the parties’ settlement conference and signed the Civil Settlement Conference Report reflected in the December 14, 2022 minute entry.

What happened

Villa Sendero is a homeowners-association community governed by a recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). Diana Costain purchased her property there in 2013 — a 35,000-square-foot lot containing a home, multiple buildings, and parking — and the property has been subject to the CC&Rs since her purchase. In 2020 the Association adopted an amendment to the CC&Rs, the “Fifth Amendment,” prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days.

The dispute reached Maricopa County Superior Court in 2022 with the Association as the named plaintiff and Costain as the defendant; the Association filed an Application for Preliminary Injunction on April 4, 2022. At an April 22, 2022 return hearing before Judge Joseph P. Mikitish, the parties stipulated to a briefing schedule for a motion to dismiss from Costain, and the court held the Association’s preliminary-injunction application in abeyance until that motion could be argued. Costain filed her motion on May 19, 2022, and the court heard oral argument on June 17, 2022 — a virtual hearing that six residents of the Villa Sendero community also attended.

Costain’s motion framed the core question: could the Association validly adopt a new short-term-rental restriction by amendment? She argued that CC&Rs are contracts interpreted as a matter of law, and that under the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), an original declaration must give owners sufficient notice of the possibility of a future amendment. Here, she argued, the original CC&Rs did not restrict rentals at all and in fact contemplated them — Article VIII allows “rent signs,” and Article III, Section 2 lets a homeowner delegate common-area enjoyment rights to tenants — so the general amendment provision gave her no reasonable notice that rentals under 30 days could later be banned. She also argued the restriction decreased her property’s value.

The Association responded on two fronts. Procedurally, it argued Costain’s Kalway theory failed because she had not filed a declaratory relief action, as the Kalway plaintiff had. Substantively, it argued the original CC&Rs already required each lot to be used only for a single-family residence and prohibited use of the premises for “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes” — so residents had notice of use restrictions from the start, and the amendment merely clarified that prohibited commercial operations include short-term, bed-and-breakfast-style leases. Costain replied that no declaratory counterclaim is required to raise the defense, that the Association was not clarifying an existing restriction but adding a new one untethered to the original CC&Rs, and that a short-term rental is no more a business operation than a long-term rental is.

In an under-advisement ruling issued August 9, 2022, Judge Mikitish denied the motion to dismiss. The court agreed with Costain that a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs. But it found that key terms and provisions in the CC&Rs — “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” — are not defined, and that further development of those terms was appropriate during the action to determine whether the Fifth Amendment was properly adopted. The court could not conclude at the pleading stage that the complaint failed to support the Association’s allegations, and it noted that Kalway itself was initially addressed by the trial court on motions for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss.

The case then moved toward resolution rather than trial. On September 27, 2022 the court adopted the parties’ stipulated scheduling order, referred the case to the court’s Alternative Dispute Resolution department for a mandatory settlement conference to be held by January 5, 2023, and set a trial setting conference for February 24, 2023. The settlement conference worked: after receiving the Civil Settlement Conference Report signed by Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman, the court on December 14, 2022 accepted the notice of settlement, deemed all pending matters moot, vacated the trial setting conference, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023. The settlement’s terms do not appear in the minute-entry record, and the validity of the short-term-rental amendment was never decided.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain (CV2022-004188 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The superior court denied the homeowner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding that a party need not file a… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2020 The Association adopts the Fifth Amendment to the CC&Rs, prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days.

Step 2022-04-04 The Association files an Application for Preliminary Injunction in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2022-004188).

Step 2022-04-22 Virtual return hearing before Judge Mikitish. By stipulation, the court sets a briefing schedule for Costain’s motion to dismiss, sets oral argument, and holds the preliminary-injunction application in abeyance.

Step 2022-05-19 Costain files her Motion to Dismiss; the Association responds June 3 and Costain replies June 9.

Step 2022-06-17 Virtual oral argument on the motion to dismiss, attended by six Villa Sendero residents; the court takes the motion under advisement.

Step 2022-08-09 Under-advisement ruling denies the motion to dismiss: key CC&R terms are undefined and require factual development before the Fifth Amendment’s validity can be determined.

Step 2022-09-27 The court adopts the parties’ stipulated scheduling order, orders a mandatory settlement conference (to be held by January 5, 2023), and sets a trial setting conference for February 24, 2023.

Step 2022-12-14 After a settlement conference before Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman, the court accepts the notice of settlement, deems pending matters moot, vacates the trial setting conference, and places the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/villa-sendero-homeowners-association-v-diana-costain/raw/: 5 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2022-04-22

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2022-04-22_001_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 2 2022-06-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-06-17_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2022-08-09

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the Motion.

Download source file

2022-08-09_003_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 4 2022-09-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-09-27_004_minute-entry.pdf

Source 5 2022-12-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-12-14_005_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What was this case about?

The validity of an HOA CC&R amendment restricting short-term rentals. In 2020 the Villa Sendero Homeowners Association adopted a Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days. Homeowner Diana Costain challenged the Association’s authority to adopt that restriction, arguing the original CC&Rs gave owners no notice that such a ban could later be imposed by amendment.

What is Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA and why did it matter here?

As described in the court’s ruling, Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), is an Arizona Supreme Court decision holding that for CC&Rs to be amended, the original declaration must give sufficient notice of the possibility of a future amendment. Costain relied on it to argue the general amendment clause in Villa Sendero’s CC&Rs gave no reasonable notice that a sub-30-day rental ban could be adopted. The court noted that Kalway was initially addressed by the trial court on summary judgment — a stage with a developed factual record — rather than on a motion to dismiss.

Did the court decide whether the short-term-rental ban was valid?

No. The August 9, 2022 ruling decided only that the question could not be answered on the pleadings. Because the CC&Rs do not define key terms — “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” — the court held further development of those terms was appropriate to determine whether the Fifth Amendment was properly adopted. The case settled in December 2022 before any merits ruling.

Does a homeowner have to file a declaratory judgment action to challenge a CC&R amendment?

Not to raise the issue defensively. The Association argued Costain’s challenge failed because, unlike the Kalway plaintiff, she had not filed a declaratory relief action. The court disagreed, holding that under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs.

How did the case end?

By settlement. The court ordered a mandatory settlement conference in September 2022, and after Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman conducted the conference and submitted a Civil Settlement Conference Report, the court on December 14, 2022 accepted the notice of settlement, deemed all pending matters moot, vacated the trial setting conference, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023. The settlement’s terms are not part of the minute-entry record.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent — and here the court never even reached the merits of the amendment’s validity. The case is still useful reading: it shows how a Kalway notice challenge to a short-term-rental amendment is litigated, that undefined CC&R terms can keep such a dispute alive past the pleading stage, and that these fights often resolve through court-ordered settlement conferences rather than trial.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2022-004188 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	August 9, 2022
Judge / panel	Hon. Joseph P. Mikitish
Parties	Villa Sendero Homeowners Association, Inc. (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Diana Costain (Defendant, homeowner)
Topics	CC&RsProcedureAmendmentsCovenantsRental Restrictions
Outcome / holding	The superior court denied the homeowner’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding that a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs, but that whether the Fifth Amendment prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days was properly adopted could not be resolved on the pleadings because key CC&R terms — “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” — are undefined and require further development; the case settled before any merits ruling.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	8 roadmap entries
Video overview	Villa Sendero Homeowners Association Inc v. Diana Costain
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

In 2020 the Villa Sendero Homeowners Association adopted a Fifth Amendment to its CC&Rs prohibiting rentals of less than 30 days. The resulting Maricopa County Superior Court case — filed with the Association as plaintiff, which also applied for a preliminary injunction in April 2022 — turned on homeowner Diana Costain’s motion to dismiss, in which she challenged the Association’s authority to adopt the restriction. Relying on Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532 (2022), Costain argued the original CC&Rs gave no reasonable notice that short-term rentals could later be banned: the declaration allows “rent signs” and lets owners delegate common-area rights to tenants. The Association countered that the original CC&Rs’ single-family-residence requirement and ban on “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes” gave owners notice, and that the amendment merely clarified that prohibited commercial operations include short-term bed-and-breakfast-style leases. In an August 9, 2022 under-advisement ruling, the court denied the motion to dismiss because key CC&R terms are undefined and required factual development. The parties then settled at a court-ordered settlement conference, and on December 14, 2022 the court accepted the notice of settlement and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after February 14, 2023.

Key Issues & Findings

The court applied the familiar Rule 12(b)(6) standard: a claim is dismissed only when the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts, the court looks only to the pleading and its well-pled factual allegations, conclusory statements are insufficient, and factual allegations are assumed true in the light most favorable to the pleading party. Against that standard, Costain argued that CC&Rs are contracts interpreted as a matter of law and that under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA an original declaration must give sufficient notice of the possibility of a future amendment. She pointed to features of the original CC&Rs that contemplate renting — Article VIII allows “rent signs” and Article III, Section 2 permits a homeowner to delegate common-area enjoyment rights to tenants — and argued the general amendment provision gave her no reasonable notice that rentals under 30 days could be prohibited, a restriction she said also decreased her property’s value.

The Association raised a threshold procedural objection — that Costain’s position failed because she had not filed a declaratory relief action, as the Kalway plaintiff had — and a substantive defense: the original CC&Rs required each lot to be used only for a single-family residence and prohibited use of the premises for “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” so owners had notice of use restrictions and the amendment provisions could be used to clarify that prohibited commercial operations include short-term, bed-and-breakfast-style leases. Costain replied that the Association was not clarifying an existing restriction but adding a new one untethered to the original CC&Rs, that short-term rentals are consistent with single-family-residence use, and that a short-term rental is no more a business operation than a long-term rental.

The court resolved the motion on two grounds. It first rejected the Association’s procedural argument, holding that under the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure a party need not file a declaratory judgment action to raise a defense regarding the terms of CC&Rs. It then found that key terms and provisions in the CC&Rs — “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” and “rent” — are not defined, and that further development of those terms was appropriate during the course of the action to determine whether the Fifth Amendment was properly adopted. Because the court could not conclude at the pleading stage that the complaint failed to support the Association’s allegations, and because Kalway itself was initially addressed by the trial court on motions for summary judgment rather than a motion to dismiss, the motion was denied. The case never reached that developed record: after a September 27, 2022 scheduling order requiring a mandatory settlement conference, the parties settled before Judge Pro Tempore John D. Lierman, and on December 14, 2022 the court accepted the notice of settlement, deemed pending matters moot, and placed the case on the dismissal calendar.

Why It Matters

Short-term-rental amendments are one of the most contested moves an Arizona HOA can make, and this case shows how a Kalway notice challenge to such an amendment actually plays out in superior court. Two practical points emerge from the ruling. First, the procedural holding: a homeowner does not need to file her own declaratory judgment action to attack an amendment’s validity — she can raise it as a defense when the association litigates against her. Second, drafting matters: because Villa Sendero’s CC&Rs never defined “single-family residence,” “business, professional, commercial or institutional purposes,” or “rent,” the court could not resolve the amendment’s validity on the pleadings and sent the dispute into discovery.

The case also illustrates a common endgame. Rather than litigate through summary judgment the way Kalway itself was decided, the parties settled at a court-ordered settlement conference roughly four months after the motion to dismiss was denied, and the case went onto the dismissal calendar. That means the ruling offers no merits answer on whether the 30-day rental ban survives Kalway — and as a superior-court decision it binds only these parties in any event.

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Susan M. Marcella v. The Legend Trail Community Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Architectural Approval & Records | A.R.S. § 33-1805 | CV2023-052094

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a Legend Trail homeowner claims her association breached its CC&R duties by approving her neighbors’ renovations — which she says are a nuisance that interferes with the quiet enjoyment of her home — and by failing to produce association records under A.R.S. § 33-1805. The court refused to force the neighbors into the case as indispensable parties, and in an October 18, 2024 under-advisement ruling denied the homeowner’s motion for partial summary judgment: the fence agreement she relied on exists only as a very basic description in committee meeting minutes, so contract formation and intent are jury questions, and she identified no authority that the records statute creates a private right of action for damages.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Susan M. Marcella v. The Legend Trail Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-052094.

Download under-advisement ruling

Scope note: This page covers Susan M. Marcella v. The Legend Trail Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-052094) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the February 15, 2024 ruling on the motion to join indispensable parties and the October 18, 2024 under-advisement ruling on the homeowner’s motion for partial summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the case was still active when this page was last updated — the most recent collected minute entry is a February 28, 2025 status conference setting deadlines for a proposed amended complaint, a new scheduling order, and a discovery-dispute statement, and no final judgment appears in the collected entries. The rulings described here are interim decisions that could be affected by later proceedings. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court denied the homeowner’s motion for partial summary judgment on every ground. On the breach-of-contract and implied-covenant claims, the court found disputed issues of material fact: the agreement allowing the homeowner to erect a temporary fence “during” construction on her neighbor’s property is reflected only in a very basic description in the ACC’s meeting minutes, so whether the parties had a meeting of the minds — and what they intended — must be evaluated by a jury. On the records claim, the homeowner identified no authority that an association’s failure to promptly produce records under A.R.S. § 33-1805 creates a private right of action for damages, and no evidence of damages from the alleged violations. And promissory estoppel is an alternative remedy available only in the absence of a binding contract, so a plaintiff who alleges a binding contract cannot win summary judgment on that theory unless the contract claim fails. Earlier, the court also held the neighbors were not indispensable parties under Rule 19 because the complaint sought no declaratory or injunctive relief directed at their home — its only declaratory request was an order requiring the Association to produce records.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Susan M. Marcella (Plaintiff)
Homeowner in the Legend Trail master planned community. Sued the Association for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, “breach of duty,” and violations of A.R.S. § 33-1805, based in part on the Association’s approval of renovations to her neighbors’ home.
Mark Bainbridge (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff Susan Marcella, appearing at the July 2024 scheduling-order argument, the October 2024 partial-summary-judgment argument, and the February 2025 status conference.

Respondent Side

The Legend Trail Community Association (Defendant)
Community association that manages the Legend Trail master planned community and is responsible for enforcing the CC&Rs and approving renovations to community homes.
Martin Lorenzo (Defendant)
Owns a neighboring home in the community. Listed on the court’s party record as a defendant appearing pro per; the February 2024 ruling held that he and Peter Kraus were not indispensable to Marcella’s existing claims, without prejudice to amended pleadings. The July 2024 minutes list him with no address on record.
Peter Kraus (Defendant)
Co-owner of the neighboring home. Listed on the court’s party record as a defendant appearing pro per; the February 2024 ruling held that he and Martin Lorenzo were not indispensable to Marcella’s existing claims. The July 2024 minutes list him with no address on record.
Tessa Knueppel (Counsel)
Counsel for the Association, appearing at the July 2024 scheduling-order argument, the October 2024 partial-summary-judgment argument, and the February 2025 status conference.
Edith I. Rudder (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the Association alongside Tessa Knueppel at the July 2024, October 2024, and February 2025 hearings; the minutes record her name as “Eadie Rudder” and “Edith Rudder.”
Tessa Hustead (Counsel)
Listed in the captions of the October and December 2023 minute entries in the counsel position on the Association’s side; the 2024–2025 captions list Tessa Knueppel in that position.

Neutral Parties

Melissa Iyer Julian (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the February 2024 indispensable-parties ruling and the October 2024 under-advisement ruling and presided over the case’s hearings.

What happened

Legend Trail is a master planned community managed by The Legend Trail Community Association, which is responsible for enforcing the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (the CC&Rs) and for approving renovations to community homes. Susan Marcella owns a home there; Martin Lorenzo and Peter Kraus own a neighboring home. In 2023 Marcella sued the Association (CV2023-052094), asserting damages claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, “breach of duty,” and violations of A.R.S. § 33-1805 relating to the production of association records. Her suit is premised in part on the Association’s approval of renovations to her neighbors’ home, which she contends violated the CC&Rs and constitutes a “nuisance” that interferes with the “quiet enjoyment” of her home.

The case’s first year was procedural. In October 2023 the court referred the parties to a mandatory settlement conference; in December it rejected their joint readiness certification for failing to certify good-faith settlement discussions. On December 13, 2023 the Association moved to join Lorenzo and Kraus as indispensable parties. The court granted that motion as unopposed on January 22, 2024 — then discovered Marcella had filed a belated response that had not yet appeared on the docket. In a February 15, 2024 ruling, Judge Melissa Iyer Julian vacated the mistaken order and denied the motion on the merits: despite the parties’ assumptions, the complaint contained no request for declaratory or injunctive relief compelling the Association to take any action against the Lorenzo/Kraus home — its only declaratory request was an order “requiring the Association to produce records” — so the neighbors were not indispensable to Marcella’s damages claims. The court denied the motion without prejudice to amended pleadings, stayed all deadlines to March 20, 2024, and warned that the case would go on the Rule 38.1 dismissal calendar if the parties failed to propose an amended schedule. The court’s later party record nonetheless lists Lorenzo and Kraus as defendants appearing pro per.

Scheduling and discovery fights followed. The Association asked in May 2024 to amend the March 28, 2024 scheduling order; the court denied Marcella leave to file a sur-reply and heard argument on July 25, 2024, granting the request in part and entering an amended Tier 2 scheduling order. At the same hearing the court deemed Marcella’s motion to quash a subpoena (or for a protective order) moot in light of the extended deadlines, encouraged the parties to meet and confer before bringing written-discovery disputes under Rule 26(d), and ordered that the defendants were entitled to conduct a Rule 34 inspection of Marcella’s home on or before August 16, 2024.

The substantive turning point in the collected minutes came on Marcella’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 15, 2024 and argued October 18, 2024. In an under-advisement ruling issued the same day, the court denied the motion in full. It observed that Marcella sought “partial summary judgment” on various issues without tying the motion to her specific claims or their elements. On breach of contract and the implied covenant, the record showed disputed issues of material fact — conflicting evidence about whether the parties had a meeting of the minds sufficient to form a binding contract, and about their intent in reaching the agreement allowing Marcella to erect a temporary fence “during” construction on her neighbor’s property. Because that agreement is reflected only in a very basic description in the ACC’s meeting minutes, the court held, the parties’ intent and any alleged breach must be evaluated by a jury.

The ruling rejected Marcella’s other theories as well. She had not identified any authority supporting the proposition that an association’s failure to promptly produce records as required by A.R.S. § 33-1805 creates a private right of action for damages, nor had she provided any evidence of damages suffered as a result of the alleged statutory violations. And promissory estoppel, the court explained, is an alternative remedy available only in the absence of a binding contract — because Marcella alleges a binding contract exists, she could not win summary judgment on the estoppel theory unless her contract claim is unsuccessful. The court reset a trial-setting conference for November 22, 2024.

The last collected minute entry is a February 28, 2025 status conference. The court and the parties discussed mediation, an amended scheduling order, a document-discovery dispute, and the status of the case. The court ordered Marcella’s counsel to provide a redlined proposed amended complaint to the Association’s counsel by March 24, 2025, with any motion to amend due March 28, 2025 if the parties could not stipulate; ordered the parties to submit a stipulation and proposed scheduling order by March 28, 2025; and directed them to keep meeting and conferring on the document dispute, with a Rule 26(d) statement due by the same date if it could not be resolved. As of that entry, the case remained active with no dispositive judgment.

Procedural timeline

Step 2023 Susan Marcella sues The Legend Trail Community Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2023-052094), asserting breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, “breach of duty,” and A.R.S. § 33-1805 records claims.

Step 2023-10-25 The court refers the parties to a mandatory settlement conference through the ADR department, with a joint readiness certification due December 4, 2023.

Step 2023-12-08 The court rejects the parties’ joint ADR certification, allowing re-filing within 10 days if the good-faith-settlement-discussions language is corrected.

Step 2023-12-13 The Association moves to join neighbors Martin Lorenzo and Peter Kraus as indispensable parties.

Step 2024-01-22 The joinder motion is granted as unopposed — by mistake, because Marcella’s belated response had not yet appeared on the docket.

Step 2024-02-15 The court vacates the mistaken joinder order, denies the motion on the merits (the complaint seeks no declaratory or injunctive relief directed at the neighbors’ home), and stays all deadlines to March 20, 2024.

Step 2024-05-24 The Association files a request to amend the March 28, 2024 scheduling order.

Step 2024-07-02 The court denies Marcella leave to file a sur-reply and sets oral argument on the scheduling-order request.

Step 2024-07-15 Marcella files her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Step 2024-07-25 After oral argument, the court grants the scheduling-order request in part, enters an amended Tier 2 scheduling order, deems Marcella’s motion to quash a subpoena moot, and orders a Rule 34 inspection of her home by August 16, 2024.

Step 2024-10-18 Oral argument on the partial-summary-judgment motion; the same day, the court issues an under-advisement ruling denying the motion in full and resets a trial-setting conference for November 22, 2024.

Step 2025-02-28 Status conference: deadlines set for a redlined proposed amended complaint (March 24, 2025), a motion to amend or stipulation with a proposed scheduling order (March 28, 2025), and a Rule 26(d) statement on the document-discovery dispute (March 28, 2025). The case remains active.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/susan-marcella-v-legend-trail-community-association/raw/: 9 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2023-10-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2023-10-25_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2023-12-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

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2023-12-08_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2024-02-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

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2024-02-15_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2024-07-02

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

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2024-07-02_004_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 5 2024-07-25

Oral Argument

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2024-07-25_005_oral-argument.pdf

Source 6 2024-09-13

Oral Argument Set

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2024-09-13_006_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 7 2024-10-18

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed July 15, 2024; resetting a trial setting conference in this case for November 22, 2024 at 9:30 a.m. (Time allotted: 15 minutes) Judge Melissa Iyer Julian’s.

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2024-10-18_007_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 8 2024-10-18

Minute Entry

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2024-10-18_008_minute-entry.pdf

Source 9 2025-02-28

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2025-02-28_009_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What is this lawsuit about?

A homeowner in the Legend Trail master planned community sued her community association over how it administers the CC&Rs. Her damages claims — breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, “breach of duty,” and violations of A.R.S. § 33-1805 — rest in part on the Association’s approval of renovations to her neighbors’ home, which she contends violated the CC&Rs’ architectural requirements and created a nuisance interfering with the quiet enjoyment of her home. She also relies on an agreement allowing her to erect a temporary fence during the neighbors’ construction, and claims the Association failed to produce association records.

Has the case been decided?

No. As of the most recent collected minute entry — a February 28, 2025 status conference — the case was still active, with deadlines set for a proposed amended complaint, a new scheduling order, and a discovery-dispute statement. The most significant ruling so far is the October 18, 2024 under-advisement ruling denying the homeowner’s motion for partial summary judgment, which sends her contract-based claims toward a jury rather than resolving them.

Why did the court deny the homeowner’s motion for partial summary judgment?

Three reasons. First, the breach-of-contract and implied-covenant claims turn on disputed facts: the agreement allowing her to erect a temporary fence “during” construction on her neighbor’s property is reflected only in a very basic description in the ACC’s meeting minutes, so whether there was a meeting of the minds — and what the parties intended — must be decided by a jury. Second, she identified no authority that A.R.S. § 33-1805 creates a private right of action for damages and no evidence of damages from the alleged records violations. Third, promissory estoppel is an alternative remedy that exists only where no binding contract does; because she alleges a binding contract, she cannot win summary judgment on estoppel unless her contract claim fails.

Can a homeowner sue an association for damages under A.R.S. § 33-1805?

This ruling did not decide that question for all cases, but it went against the homeowner here: the court held she had not identified any authority supporting the proposition that an association’s failure to promptly produce records as required by A.R.S. § 33-1805 creates a private right of action for damages, and she provided no evidence of damages suffered as a result of the alleged violations. Homeowners considering a records claim should note that this court expected both legal authority for a damages remedy and proof of actual harm.

Why weren’t the neighbors indispensable parties?

Under Rule 19, the neighbors would need to be joined if the lawsuit sought relief directly affecting their property — for example, a declaration that the approval of their renovations violated the CC&Rs, or an injunction compelling the Association to enforce the CC&Rs against their home. But the court could find no such request in the complaint: the only claim for declaratory or injunctive relief sought an order requiring the Association to produce records, which has no bearing on the neighbors’ home. The court therefore denied the joinder motion, without prejudice to amended pleadings that would make the neighbors necessary parties. The court’s party record later lists both neighbors as defendants appearing pro per.

What is an under-advisement ruling, and is it binding on other HOA disputes?

When an Arizona superior-court judge takes a motion “under advisement” after briefing or argument, the later written decision is filed as an under-advisement ruling in the court’s minute entries. These rulings are the trial court’s substantive written decisions — here, the October 18, 2024 ruling sets out the court’s findings and analysis on the partial-summary-judgment motion — and they are public records available through the Clerk of the Superior Court. They bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent for other disputes, and because this case was still active as of the last collected entries, even the parties’ final outcome remains undetermined.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2023-052094 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	October 18, 2024
Judge / panel	Hon. Melissa Iyer Julian
Parties	Susan M. Marcella (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. The Legend Trail Community Association (Defendant); Martin Lorenzo and Peter Kraus (Defendants, neighbors, pro per)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1805
Topics	Architectural ReviewMeetings & RecordsCC&RsProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court denied the homeowner’s motion for partial summary judgment on all grounds, holding that disputed issues of material fact — including whether the parties had a meeting of the minds on the temporary-fence agreement reflected only in a basic description in committee meeting minutes — must be evaluated by a jury; that the homeowner identified no authority that an association’s failure to promptly produce records under A.R.S. § 33-1805 creates a private right of action for damages, and no evidence of damages; and that promissory estoppel is an alternative remedy unavailable at summary judgment to a plaintiff who alleges a binding contract. The court had earlier held the neighboring homeowners were not indispensable parties because the complaint sought no declaratory or injunctive relief directed at their property.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	9 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	12 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A homeowner in the Legend Trail master planned community sued her association, asserting damages claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, “breach of duty,” and violations of A.R.S. § 33-1805 relating to the production of association records. Her suit is premised in part on the Association’s approval of renovations to her neighbors’ home, which she contends violated the CC&Rs and created a nuisance interfering with the quiet enjoyment of her home, and on an agreement allowing her to erect a temporary fence during that construction. In February 2024 the court vacated a mistakenly entered order joining the neighbors and held they were not indispensable parties because the complaint sought no declaratory or injunctive relief directed at their home. In an October 18, 2024 under-advisement ruling, the court denied the homeowner’s motion for partial summary judgment in full: the contract and implied-covenant claims present jury questions because the fence agreement is reflected only in a very basic description in the ACC’s meeting minutes; the records claim failed because she identified no authority that A.R.S. § 33-1805 creates a private right of action for damages and no evidence of damages; and promissory estoppel is unavailable while she alleges a binding contract. The case remained active as of the last collected minute entry, a February 28, 2025 status conference setting amended-complaint and scheduling deadlines.

Key Issues & Findings

The court’s February 15, 2024 ruling untangled a procedural knot before reaching the merits of joinder. It had granted the Association’s motion to join neighbors Martin Lorenzo and Peter Kraus as indispensable parties as unopposed on January 22, 2024, not realizing the homeowner had filed a belated response that had not yet appeared on the docket; it vacated that order and decided the motion on complete briefing. On the merits, the court found that despite both sides’ assumptions, the complaint contained no request for declaratory or injunctive relief seeking to compel the Association to take any action against the Lorenzo/Kraus home — the only declaratory request was an order requiring the Association to produce records, which has no bearing on the neighbors’ property. Absent such a claim, the neighbors were not indispensable to the homeowner’s damages claims, though the court denied the motion without prejudice to amended pleadings and stayed the case deadlines so the parties could confer about amendment.

In the October 18, 2024 under-advisement ruling, the court noted the homeowner sought “partial summary judgment” on various issues without tying the motion to her specific claims or their elements. On breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the record reflected disputed issues of material fact: conflicting evidence about whether the parties had a meeting of the minds sufficient to form a binding contract and about their intent in reaching the agreement allowing the homeowner to erect a temporary fence “during” construction on her neighbor’s property. Because the agreement is reflected only in a very basic description in the ACC’s meeting minutes, the parties’ intent and any alleged breach must be evaluated by a jury.

The court disposed of the remaining theories on legal grounds. The homeowner identified no authority supporting the proposition that the Association’s failure to promptly produce records as required under A.R.S. § 33-1805 creates a private right of action for damages, and she provided no evidence of damages suffered as a result of the alleged statutory violations. Promissory estoppel, the court explained citing Del Hayes & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell, is the name applied to a contract implied in law where no contract exists in fact — an alternative remedy available only in the absence of a binding contract — so a plaintiff who alleges a binding contract is not entitled to summary judgment on an estoppel theory unless her contract claim is unsuccessful. The court denied the motion in full and reset a trial-setting conference; a February 28, 2025 status conference set deadlines for a proposed amended complaint, a stipulated scheduling order, and a Rule 26(d) discovery-dispute statement, leaving the case active.

Why It Matters

This case illustrates two practical hurdles for homeowners litigating against Arizona planned-community associations. First, records claims: the court held the homeowner identified no authority that A.R.S. § 33-1805 — the planned-community records statute — creates a private right of action for damages, and she offered no proof of damages from the alleged violations. A homeowner who wants more than the statute’s production mechanism should expect to justify the damages remedy and prove actual harm. Second, informal agreements with an association are fragile litigation vehicles: when the only written record of a deal (here, permission to erect a temporary fence during a neighbor’s construction) is a very basic description in committee meeting minutes, questions of contract formation, intent, and breach go to a jury rather than being resolved on summary judgment.

The February 2024 indispensable-parties ruling is also a useful procedural lesson. A homeowner suing her association over its approval of a neighbor’s renovations can pursue damages against the association alone, but any claim for a declaration or injunction that would directly affect the neighbor’s property requires joining the neighbors under Rule 19 — and pleading imprecision about which remedy is actually sought can stall a case for months, as it did here. The rulings are interim: the case was still active as of the last collected minute entries, so the ultimate outcome between these parties remains undetermined, and superior-court rulings bind only the parties in any event.

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Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Assessment-Lien Foreclosure | CC&R Enforcement | CV2018-090922

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a homeowners association filed a foreclosure complaint against a homeowner who had become significantly delinquent on her monthly assessments, asserting contractual lien rights under the community’s recorded CC&Rs and statutory lien rights under Arizona law. The self-represented homeowner’s response rested on a large partial payment she made after the complaint was filed. The court held that the recorded CC&Rs created a binding obligation to pay assessments on time, that the association had convincingly shown she failed to stay current, and that her written response and oral argument stated no factual or legal defense — so the association was entitled to summary judgment, with the post-complaint payment credited against the amount awarded.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-090922.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2018-090922) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected minute entries end with the September 26, 2018 ruling, which directed the association to lodge a proposed form of judgment by October 12, 2018 and permitted an attorneys’-fee application upon entry of judgment. The entry of final judgment, any fee award, and anything that happened afterward are not reflected in the collected record or on this page. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on its assessment-lien foreclosure complaint. It found the Association had firmly established that, as a property owner in the Palm Valley Community subject to the recorded CC&Rs, the homeowner had an ongoing, binding, and absolute legal obligation to make timely assessment payments — with failure carrying strict penalties up to and including foreclosure — and had convincingly shown she failed to remain current. Her written response and oral argument stated no factual or legal defense. The court awarded the Association the $4,622.64 principal balance sought in the complaint, less her post-complaint payment of $4,095.50, plus assessments, late charges, or fees incurred after the complaint was filed, and held the Association entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in collection.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Palm Valley Community Association (Plaintiff)
Homeowners association for the Palm Valley Community that filed the May 2018 foreclosure complaint to collect delinquent assessments and prevailed on summary judgment.
Mark W. Waldron (Counsel)
Counsel of record listed for the Association in the minute-entry captions and the court’s party records.
Samuel C. Richardson (Counsel)
Counsel who appeared for the Association at the September 19, 2018 oral argument and is named in the under-advisement ruling.

Respondent Side

Stella Benton (Defendant)
Homeowner in the Palm Valley Community who became delinquent on monthly assessments; she represented herself throughout the collected minute entries, including at the September 19, 2018 oral argument.

Neutral Parties

David J. Palmer (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who set and heard the summary-judgment oral argument and issued the September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling.

What happened

Stella Benton owned a home in the Palm Valley Community, a development governed by duly recorded Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). Under the CC&Rs, she was obligated to pay monthly fees assessed by the Palm Valley Community Association. According to the court’s later ruling, she became delinquent in those obligations “to a significant degree.”

On May 3, 2018, the Association filed a complaint seeking foreclosure on its contractual lien rights under the CC&Rs and its statutory lien rights under applicable Arizona statutory provisions. The principal balance at the time of filing was $4,622.64, which included unpaid assessments plus interest, late charges, and other fees imposed because of the missed payments.

On June 14, 2018, the Association moved for summary judgment with an accompanying statement of facts. Benton, representing herself, filed a “Request to Deny Motion for Summary Judgment,” which the court treated as her response; the Association filed a reply on June 21, 2018. Benton’s response pointed to a significant payment of $4,095.50 she made on May 31, 2018 — a few weeks after the complaint was filed — which the Association characterized as four months late and less than the full amount owed.

Judge David J. Palmer set oral argument for September 19, 2018. At the hearing, attorney Samuel C. Richardson appeared for the Association and Benton appeared on her own behalf; after roughly sixteen minutes of argument, the court took the motion under advisement.

In a September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling, the court recited Arizona’s summary-judgment standard — judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party — and found that the Association had firmly established Benton’s ongoing, binding, and absolute obligation to make timely assessment payments, with failure carrying strict penalties up to and including foreclosure. It further found the Association had convincingly shown she failed to remain current, and that her written response and oral argument stated no factual or legal defense to the complaint or the motion.

The court therefore granted summary judgment in the amount of $4,622.64, less the $4,095.50 payment made since the case began, plus any assessments, late charges, or fees incurred between the filing of the complaint and the date of judgment. It directed the Association to lodge a proposed form of judgment by October 12, 2018 — with Benton free to object — and held the Association entitled to collect the attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred in its collection efforts, to be sought by application upon entry of judgment. The collected minute entries end with this ruling.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton (CV2018-090922 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on its assessment-lien foreclosure complaint, finding no… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2018-05-03 The Association files its complaint seeking foreclosure on its contractual (CC&R) and statutory lien rights; the principal balance is $4,622.64, including unpaid assessments, interest, late charges, and other fees.

Step 2018-05-31 Benton makes a $4,095.50 payment, which the Association characterizes as four months late and less than the full amount owed.

Step 2018-06-14 The Association files its motion for summary judgment with a statement of facts; Benton files a “Request to Deny Motion for Summary Judgment,” which the court treats as her response.

Step 2018-06-21 The Association files its reply in support of summary judgment.

Step 2018-09-05 The court sets oral argument on the summary-judgment motion for September 19, 2018 (30 minutes, split between the parties).

Step 2018-09-19 Oral argument is held; Samuel C. Richardson appears for the Association and Benton appears on her own behalf. The court takes the motion under advisement.

Step 2018-09-26 Under-advisement ruling grants the Association summary judgment for $4,622.64, less the $4,095.50 payment, plus post-complaint assessments, late charges, or fees; a proposed form of judgment is due October 12, 2018, and the Association may apply for its attorneys’ fees upon entry of judgment.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/palm-valley-community-association-v-stella-benton/raw/: 3 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2018-09-05

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

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2018-09-05_001_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 2 2018-09-19

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

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2018-09-19_002_oral-argument.pdf

Source 3 2018-09-26

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment on its assessment-lien foreclosure claim and entitlement to collection fees.

Download source file

2018-09-26_003_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

FAQ

What was this case about?

Delinquent HOA assessments. Stella Benton owned a home in the Palm Valley Community subject to recorded CC&Rs that required her to pay monthly assessments to the Association. After she became significantly delinquent, the Association filed a complaint in May 2018 seeking to foreclose on its contractual lien rights under the CC&Rs and its statutory lien rights under Arizona law, with a principal balance of $4,622.64 at filing.

Didn’t the homeowner pay most of what she owed?

She made a significant payment — $4,095.50 on May 31, 2018 — but only after the complaint had been filed on May 3, and the Association characterized the payment as four months late and less than the full amount owed. The court credited the payment against the judgment amount, but it did not defeat the case: summary judgment was still granted for the remaining balance plus assessments, late charges, or fees incurred after the complaint was filed.

Why did the homeowner lose at summary judgment?

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court found the Association had firmly established Benton’s binding obligation to pay assessments on time and had convincingly shown she failed to remain current — and, in the court’s words, her “own written Response, as well as her oral argument, fails to state any factual or legal defense” to the complaint or the motion. With no disputed material facts, the Association was entitled to judgment.

What exactly did the court order?

The September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment in the amount of $4,622.64, less the $4,095.50 payment made since the case began, plus any subsequently incurred assessments, late charges, or fees through the date of judgment. The Association was ordered to lodge a proposed form of judgment by October 12, 2018, with Benton able to file timely objections, and was held entitled to collect the attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred in its collection efforts, to be sought by application upon entry of judgment.

Was the home actually foreclosed?

The collected minute entries do not say. The complaint sought foreclosure on the Association’s lien rights, and the ruling granted summary judgment on the amounts owed and set up the judgment and fee-application process — but the collected record ends with the September 26, 2018 ruling, before entry of a final judgment. Whether a foreclosure sale, payoff, or other resolution followed is not reflected in the minute entries this page is built from.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how an Arizona assessment-lien foreclosure case proceeds from complaint to summary judgment, how a court treats a large partial payment made after suit is filed (credited against the judgment, but not a defense), and that a losing homeowner can also be ordered to pay the association’s collection attorneys’ fees.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2018-090922 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	September 26, 2018
Judge / panel	Hon. David J. Palmer
Parties	Palm Valley Community Association (Plaintiff, homeowners association) v. Stella Benton (Defendant, homeowner)
Topics	ForeclosureAssessmentsCC&RsAttorney FeesLiens
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on its assessment-lien foreclosure complaint, finding no genuine issue of material fact: the recorded CC&Rs imposed an ongoing, binding, and absolute obligation to pay assessments on time, the Association convincingly showed the homeowner failed to remain current, and her response and oral argument stated no factual or legal defense. Judgment was awarded for the $4,622.64 principal balance less her $4,095.50 post-complaint payment, plus subsequently incurred assessments, late charges, or fees, with the Association entitled to its reasonable collection attorneys’ fees.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	3 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	7 roadmap entries
Video overview	Palm Valley Community Association v. Stella Benton
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Palm Valley Community Association sued homeowner Stella Benton in May 2018 to foreclose on its contractual lien rights under the community’s recorded CC&Rs and its statutory lien rights under Arizona law, after she became significantly delinquent on her monthly assessments; the principal balance at filing was $4,622.64, including unpaid assessments, interest, late charges, and other fees. The Association moved for summary judgment in June 2018. Benton, representing herself, responded by pointing to a $4,095.50 payment she made on May 31, 2018 — after the complaint was filed — which the Association characterized as four months late and less than the full amount owed. After a September 19, 2018 oral argument, the court issued a September 26, 2018 under-advisement ruling granting the Association summary judgment for $4,622.64 less the $4,095.50 payment, plus post-complaint assessments, late charges, or fees, and held the Association entitled to apply for its reasonable collection attorneys’ fees upon entry of judgment. The collected minute entries end with that ruling.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began from Arizona’s summary-judgment standard, quoting Johnson v. Earnhardt’s Gilbert Dodge, Inc. and Orme School v. Reeves: judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and the motion denied if the opposing evidence would let reasonable people reach a different conclusion.

Applying that standard, the court found the Association had “firmly established” that Benton, as a property owner in the Palm Valley Community subject to the duly recorded CC&Rs, had an ongoing, binding, and absolute legal obligation to make timely assessment payments — an obligation whose breach carries strict penalties including late fees, fines, and other financial sanctions, up to and including foreclosure by the Association to collect the unpaid amounts. The Association had further established convincingly that Benton failed to remain current on her assessments.

Benton’s defense reduced to the $4,095.50 payment she made on May 31, 2018, roughly four weeks after the complaint was filed — a payment the Association characterized as four months late and less than the full amount owed. The court found that her written response and her oral argument failed to state any factual or legal defense to the complaint or the summary-judgment motion. With no genuine issue of material fact, the court granted judgment for the $4,622.64 principal balance less the $4,095.50 payment, plus any assessments, late charges, or fees incurred between the complaint and the date of judgment, directed the Association to lodge a proposed form of judgment by October 12, 2018 (with Benton able to object), and held the Association entitled to collect the attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred in its collection efforts by application upon entry of judgment.

Why It Matters

This case is a compact, real-world example of the most common kind of Arizona HOA litigation: an assessment-lien collection and foreclosure action against a delinquent homeowner. It shows how quickly such a case can move — complaint in May, summary-judgment motion six weeks later, judgment granted within five months — and how little a homeowner’s position matters at summary judgment unless it raises an actual factual or legal defense to the delinquency itself.

The treatment of the homeowner’s $4,095.50 payment is the practical lesson. Paying most of the arrears after the association has already sued reduces the judgment (the court credited every dollar) but does not undo the case: the association still recovered the remaining balance, everything that accrued after filing, and its reasonable collection attorneys’ fees. For homeowners, the economics favor resolving delinquencies before a complaint is filed; for associations, the ruling illustrates that recorded CC&Rs plus a documented payment history is ordinarily enough to carry a summary-judgment motion. As a superior-court decision it binds only these parties, and the collected minute entries end at the ruling stage, before entry of final judgment.

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