Michael Lyon v. Regency House Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&R Amendments & Common Elements | Kalway Reasonable-Expectations Test | CV2020-008665

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, an apartment owner at Regency House argued that his association could not alter the parking spaces identified on the community’s recorded plat — including spaces P-237 through P-246, among them his assigned space P-238 — without the 75% owner vote that Section 24 of the CC&Rs requires for amendments. The court initially held the board’s general use and maintenance powers made the question one for a jury, but on reconsideration it applied Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC and held the 2019 alterations were substantial and unforeseen changes a homeowner could not reasonably expect, granting the owner summary judgment.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Michael Lyon v. Regency House Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-008665.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Michael Lyon v. Regency House Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-008665) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 15, 2022 under-advisement ruling and the September 6, 2022 ruling on reconsideration that granted the plaintiff summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entries show a Notice of Settlement filed October 21, 2022 and the case placed on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after January 25, 2023, with all pending motions deemed moot — the collected entries do not include the final dismissal order or any settlement terms. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

On reconsideration, the superior court granted the homeowner summary judgment. Applying the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022) — which the court acknowledged it had been unaware of when it originally denied the motion — the court held that the association’s 2019 alteration of the parking garage was a substantial and unforeseen change to parking spaces specifically identified on the recorded plat, which the CC&Rs incorporated by reference. The board’s general authority to “maintain, repair, replace, administer and operate the Property” under Section 4.2 did not extend to that completed alteration, especially where no homeowner vote was taken; changing the recorded plat required the Section 24 amendment process — an instrument signed by owners of at least 75% of the total ownership of the common elements and all institutional first mortgagees. The court also noted the plaintiff’s undisputed measurements showing three new spaces were illegal under the City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance, observing that illegal parking spaces are not something a homeowner could reasonably expect.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Michael Lyon (Plaintiff)
Owner at Regency House who was assigned parking space P-238 when he purchased his apartment in 2009; he challenged the September 2019 alteration of the community’s parking garage and won summary judgment on reconsideration.
Rachel Ellen Phillips (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff Michael Lyon in the early phase of the case; she argued the December 4, 2020 hearing on the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. (Her surname appears as both “Phillips” and “Philips” in the minute entries.)
Damien R. Meyer (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Plaintiff Michael Lyon in the later phase of the case; he argued the March 25, 2022 hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment. (His surname appears as both “Meyer” and “Myer” in the minute entries.)

Respondent Side

Regency House Association (Defendant)
The community association governed by the Regency House CC&Rs and Bylaws; in September 2019 the community’s parking garage was altered with new parking spaces and loading zones. The minute entries caption the defendants collectively as “Regency House Association, et al.”
A A M, L.L.C. (Defendant)
Co-defendant named in the case-party records, where it is listed as self-represented (“Pro Per”). The minute entries do not describe its role; they refer to the defendants collectively as “Regency House Association, et al.”
Augustus H. Shaw IV (Counsel)
Counsel for the defendants throughout the collected minute entries; he argued both the December 2020 motion-to-dismiss hearing and the March 2022 summary-judgment hearing.

Neutral Parties

Joan M. Sinclair (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the April 15, 2022 under-advisement ruling denying partial summary judgment and the September 6, 2022 ruling granting reconsideration and summary judgment for the plaintiff.
Andrew J. Russell (Judge)
Judicial officer (signing as Commissioner) who presided over the December 4, 2020 argument on the partial motion to dismiss, dismissed the gross-negligence count, referred the parties to a settlement conference, and denied the defendants’ 2021 motion for reconsideration.
Daniel J. Kiley (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge assigned early in the case; he set the December 2020 telephonic oral argument on the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss.

What happened

Regency House is a community governed by recorded covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) under which the owners share ownership of common elements that include the parking garage and parking areas (Section 1.7). The plat recorded with the CC&Rs was incorporated into them by reference (Section 1.20) and specifically identified the individual parking spaces in the first and second basement plans as they existed in April 1979. Michael Lyon was assigned parking space P-238 when he purchased his apartment in 2009. In September 2019, the parking garage was altered with new parking spaces and loading zones. Lyon sued Regency House Association and a co-defendant in 2020, asserting claims that included breach of contract (Count 1), gross negligence (Count IV), and injunctive relief and/or specific performance (Count 6).

The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss. After a virtual oral argument on December 4, 2020, Commissioner Andrew J. Russell granted the motion as to the gross-negligence count against all defendants and denied it as to every remaining count. The court then referred the parties to a mandatory settlement conference through its Alternative Dispute Resolution office. In June 2021 the defendants sought expedited reconsideration of the motion-to-dismiss ruling; Judge Joan M. Sinclair ordered briefing, noting “the confusion relative to the order in the minute entry filed on December 7, 2020 and the change in judicial officers,” and Commissioner Russell denied the motion on July 23, 2021.

In October 2021 Lyon moved for partial summary judgment on his breach-of-contract and injunctive-relief/specific-performance counts. His theory was that the parking spaces identified on the recorded plat could not be altered without following Section 24 of the CC&Rs, which requires any change, modification, or rescission of the Declaration to be made by a recorded instrument signed by owners of at least 75% of the total ownership of the common elements and by all institutional first mortgagees. After oral argument on March 25, 2022, Judge Sinclair denied the motion in an April 15, 2022 under-advisement ruling. Although the court observed that “[a]t first blush, it appears that the parking spaces cannot be altered without following the Section 24 requirements,” it pointed to the board’s authority over the “use” of parking under Sections 6, 7, and 21.9 of the CC&Rs and its power under the Bylaws to adopt rules and to provide for maintenance, repair, and replacement of the common elements, and concluded a reasonable juror could find no breach — so summary judgment was inappropriate.

Lyon moved for reconsideration on June 7, 2022, supported by exhibits and a declaration of Paul Bakalis. In its September 6, 2022 ruling, the court explained that it had been “unfortunately unaware” of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022), when it decided the original motion. In Kalway, the Arizona Supreme Court held that even a procedurally proper majority-vote amendment fails if the original declaration did not give homeowners sufficient notice of the change, because “allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed.” The inquiry turns on the objective, reasonable expectations of homeowners based on the declaration in effect when they purchased.

Applying Kalway, the court found that no vote of 75% of the owners had been taken under Section 24; that the recorded plat — incorporated into the Declaration — specifically identified the parking spaces as they originally existed; and that “[a]dding parking spots within the already cramped parking structure was not contemplated within the CC&Rs.” Lyon’s spot and the other owners’ spots from P-237 to P-246 were disproportionally affected. The board’s general authority under Section 4.2 to “maintain, repair, replace, administer and operate the Property” did not extend to the completed alteration of the parking areas, because those changes were substantial and unforeseen — especially with no homeowners’ vote. The court added that the defendants did not dispute Lyon’s measurements showing the three parking spaces behind P-237 to P-246 were illegal under City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance 702(B)(2)(a), and that “[i]llegal parking spaces are not something that a homeowner could reasonably expect.” It granted reconsideration, vacated the April ruling, granted Lyon’s motion for summary judgment, and directed him to file a proposed order by September 30, 2022.

The case then resolved by agreement. The court received a Notice of Settlement filed October 21, 2022, and on October 25, 2022 it placed the matter on the dismissal calendar for dismissal of all remaining claims and parties on or after January 25, 2023 — unless a judgment, stipulation of dismissal, or extension intervened — and deemed all pending motions moot. The collected minute entries end there; they do not show the final dismissal order or the settlement’s terms.

Procedural timeline

Step 2019-09 The Regency House parking garage is altered with new parking spaces and loading zones.

Step 2020 Michael Lyon sues Regency House Association, et al. in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2020-008665); his claims include breach of contract, gross negligence, and injunctive relief and/or specific performance.

Step 2020-10-19 Judge Daniel J. Kiley sets a telephonic oral argument on the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss.

Step 2020-12-04 After oral argument, Commissioner Andrew J. Russell dismisses Count IV (gross negligence) as to all defendants and denies the motion to dismiss as to all remaining counts.

Step 2020-12-18 The court refers the parties to a mandatory settlement conference through the ADR office, to be held by April 16, 2021.

Step 2021-07-23 Commissioner Russell denies the defendants’ expedited motion for reconsideration of the motion-to-dismiss ruling (filed June 9, 2021; briefing ordered June 16, 2021).

Step 2021-10 Lyon files a motion for partial summary judgment on Count 1 (breach of contract) and Count 6 (injunctive relief and/or specific performance). The minute entries date the filing as both October 5 and October 15, 2021.

Step 2022-03-25 Virtual oral argument on the motion for partial summary judgment; Judge Joan M. Sinclair takes the matter under advisement.

Step 2022-04-15 Under-advisement ruling (filed April 19, 2022) denies partial summary judgment: a reasonable juror could find no breach given the board’s use and maintenance authority under the CC&Rs and Bylaws.

Step 2022-06-07 Lyon files a motion for reconsideration with supporting exhibits and the declaration of Paul Bakalis; the court sets a briefing schedule the next day.

Step 2022-09-06 Applying Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, the court grants reconsideration, vacates the April ruling, and grants Lyon’s motion for summary judgment; a proposed order is due September 30, 2022.

Step 2022-10-25 After a Notice of Settlement (filed October 21, 2022), the court places the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after January 25, 2023 and deems all pending motions moot.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/michael-lyon-v-regency-house-association/raw/: 12 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2020-10-19

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

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2020-10-19_001_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 2 2020-12-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2020-12-04_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2020-12-18

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2020-12-18_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2021-06-16

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2021-06-16_004_minute-entry.pdf

Source 5 2021-07-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2021-07-23_005_minute-entry.pdf

Source 6 2022-02-15

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

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2022-02-15_006_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 7 2022-03-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2022-03-03_007_minute-entry.pdf

Source 8 2022-03-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2022-03-25_008_minute-entry.pdf

Source 9 2022-04-15

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the motion for partial summary judgment.

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2022-04-15_009_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 10 2022-06-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2022-06-08_010_minute-entry.pdf

Source 11 2022-09-06

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the Motion for Reconsideration and vacating the under advisement ruling filed on April 19, 2022.

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2022-09-06_011_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 12 2022-10-25

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

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2022-10-25_012_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

What was this lawsuit about?

Whether the Regency House Association could alter the community’s parking garage — adding new parking spaces and loading zones in September 2019 — without following the CC&Rs’ amendment process. The parking garage and parking areas are common elements under Section 1.7 of the CC&Rs, and the recorded plat, incorporated into the CC&Rs by Section 1.20, specifically identified the individual parking spaces as they existed in April 1979. Section 24 requires any change to the Declaration to be approved by owners of at least 75% of the total ownership of the common elements and all institutional first mortgagees. No such vote was taken before the 2019 alterations.

Why did the court deny summary judgment and then grant it five months later?

Because of a controlling Arizona Supreme Court decision that the court had not considered when it first ruled. In April 2022 the court held that the board’s authority over the “use” of parking (CC&Rs Sections 6, 7, and 21.9) and its Bylaws powers over rules and maintenance meant a reasonable juror could find no breach, so the dispute had to go to trial. Lyon then moved for reconsideration under Rule 7.1(e) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court acknowledged it had been “unfortunately unaware” of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022), when it made the original ruling. Measured against Kalway, the court concluded its prior ruling was inconsistent with that decision, vacated it, and granted summary judgment for Lyon.

What is the Kalway decision and why did it control?

Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC is a 2022 Arizona Supreme Court decision that the superior court quoted as raising “issues of statewide importance regarding the scope of an HOA’s authority to amend CC&Rs.” It holds that changes imposed on homeowners are tested against the reasonable expectations of owners based on the declaration in effect when they purchased — an objective inquiry — because “allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed.” Here, the court found that adding parking spots to the already cramped structure was not contemplated by the CC&Rs, that spaces P-237 through P-246 were disproportionally affected, and that the board’s general maintain-and-operate authority could not carry a substantial, unforeseen alteration made without any homeowner vote.

Did it matter that the new parking spaces were allegedly illegal?

Yes, as a supporting point. Lyon submitted measurements — through the declaration of Paul Bakalis — showing that the three parking spaces added behind spaces P-237 to P-246 were illegal under City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance 702(B)(2)(a), and the defendants did not dispute those measurements. The court observed that “[i]llegal parking spaces are not something that a homeowner could reasonably expect,” reinforcing its conclusion under Kalway’s reasonable-expectations framework.

How did the case end?

The homeowner won the dispositive ruling, and the parties then settled. The September 6, 2022 ruling granted Lyon summary judgment on the counts he moved on and directed him to file a proposed order by September 30, 2022. A Notice of Settlement was filed October 21, 2022, and the court placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal of all remaining claims and parties on or after January 25, 2023, deeming all pending motions moot. The collected minute entries do not include the final dismissal or any settlement terms. Earlier in the case, the court had also dismissed Lyon’s gross-negligence count.

Is this ruling binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The binding precedent here is Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC itself, which the Arizona Supreme Court decided in 2022. This case is still useful reading because it shows a trial court applying Kalway’s reasonable-expectations test to a board’s physical alteration of common elements — and shows that a board’s general use, maintenance, and operation powers are not a substitute for the declaration’s formal amendment process when the change is substantial and unforeseen.

Case Dossier

This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2020-008665 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	September 6, 2022
Judge / panel	Hon. Joan M. Sinclair, Hon. Andrew J. Russell, Hon. Daniel J. Kiley
Parties	Michael Lyon (Plaintiff, apartment owner assigned parking space P-238) v. Regency House Association and A A M, L.L.C. (Defendants)
Topics	CC&RsAmendmentsBoard GovernanceProcedure
Outcome / holding	On reconsideration under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, the superior court granted the homeowner summary judgment, holding that the association’s 2019 alteration of the parking garage — adding spaces and loading zones that disproportionally affected spots P-237 to P-246 — was a substantial and unforeseen change to parking spaces specifically identified on the recorded plat, which the board’s general authority to maintain, repair, replace, administer, and operate the property could not authorize without the 75% owner vote required by Section 24 of the CC&Rs.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	12 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	12 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A Regency House apartment owner, assigned parking space P-238 when he purchased in 2009, sued his association after the community’s parking garage was altered in September 2019 with new parking spaces and loading zones. He argued that the parking spaces identified on the recorded plat — incorporated into the CC&Rs — could not be changed without the Section 24 amendment process, which requires a recorded instrument signed by owners of at least 75% of the total ownership of the common elements and all institutional first mortgagees. In December 2020 the court dismissed his gross-negligence count but let the rest of the case proceed. In April 2022 the court denied his motion for partial summary judgment on the breach-of-contract and injunctive-relief counts, reasoning that the board’s use and maintenance authority meant a reasonable juror could find no breach. On the owner’s motion for reconsideration, the court applied the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022) — which it said it had been unaware of when deciding the original motion — vacated its April ruling, and on September 6, 2022 granted the owner summary judgment. The parties then settled, and in October 2022 the case was placed on the dismissal calendar with all pending motions deemed moot.

Key Issues & Findings

The court’s April 2022 under-advisement ruling initially treated the question as one for a jury. It acknowledged that “[a]t first blush, it appears that the parking spaces cannot be altered without following the Section 24 requirements,” since the recorded plat identifying each space was incorporated into the Declaration by Section 1.20. But it weighed the board’s countervailing powers — each owner’s right to use the common elements is “subject to and governed by” the governing documents (Section 6), parking spaces “may be assigned, rented or otherwise used in such a manner as the Board may prescribe” (Section 7), parking is subject to board rules (Section 21.9), and the Bylaws let the board adopt rules and provide for maintenance, repair, and replacement of the common elements (Bylaws Section 11) — and concluded a reasonable juror could find no breach of contract, so it denied the owner’s motion for partial summary judgment.

On the owner’s Rule 7.1(e) motion for reconsideration, the court confronted Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022), which it said it had been “unfortunately unaware” of when deciding the original motion. Kalway tests changes against homeowners’ objective, reasonable expectations based on the declaration in effect at purchase, because “allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed.” Measured against that framework, the court found its earlier ruling could not stand: no 75% owner vote was taken under Section 24; the plat specifically identified the parking spaces as they originally existed; adding spots “within the already cramped parking structure was not contemplated within the CC&Rs”; and the owners of spots P-237 to P-246 were disproportionally affected. The board’s general Section 4.2 authority to “maintain, repair, replace, administer and operate the Property” did not reach a completed alteration that was substantial and unforeseen, especially with no homeowners’ vote.

The court bolstered the conclusion with the owner’s undisputed measurements — supported by the declaration of Paul Bakalis — showing the three parking spaces added behind P-237 to P-246 were illegal under City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance 702(B)(2)(a): “Illegal parking spaces are not something that a homeowner could reasonably expect.” It granted reconsideration, vacated the April ruling, and granted the owner’s motion for summary judgment. A Notice of Settlement followed within weeks, and the court placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after January 25, 2023, deeming all pending motions moot.

Why It Matters

This case shows the Arizona Supreme Court’s Kalway decision working in real time at the trial-court level. The superior court had already denied the homeowner summary judgment on conventional contract-interpretation grounds; once Kalway’s reasonable-expectations framework was brought to its attention, the same record produced the opposite result — the court expressly determined that its prior ruling was inconsistent with Kalway and reversed itself on a Rule 7.1(e) motion for reconsideration.

For associations, the ruling illustrates a hard boundary on board power over common elements: general authority to maintain, repair, replace, administer, and operate the property does not authorize substantial, unforeseen physical alterations to features specifically identified in the recorded plat and declaration. If a change of that kind is not put to the owners under the declaration’s amendment provision — here, a 75% vote plus all institutional first mortgagees — a court may find the board acted beyond its authority. For homeowners, the case shows the value of concrete, undisputed evidence (the plaintiff’s zoning-ordinance measurements went unchallenged) and of persistence: the winning argument arrived on reconsideration. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties, and the case ultimately ended in a settlement rather than a final litigated judgment.

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Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Foreclosure & Assessment Liens | A.R.S. §§ 33-1807, 33-420 | CV2014-094169

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a delinquent Troon North owner argued that paying the assessments off in full after years of delinquency defeated the association’s foreclosure count under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A). The court read the statute’s “has been delinquent” language as a trigger: once an owner has been delinquent for a year or for $1,200 or more, a later payoff of the regular assessments does not end the association’s lien or its right to foreclose — a right the court found the association also holds independently under Article 7 of its CC&Rs. The A.R.S. § 33-420 counterclaim against the association and its attorney over an unreleased lis pendens was dismissed with prejudice because the underlying debt was admittedly owed when the lis pendens took effect.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094169.

Download partial-summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2014-094169) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling on the cross-motions for partial summary judgment and the June 26, 2015 final judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entry is the June 26, 2015 judgment, which states that no further matters remained and that it was a final judgment entered under Rule 54(c) — any later appellate history is outside these records. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court held that Troon North Association could foreclose its assessment lien even though the owner paid off the delinquent assessments after years of nonpayment. It read A.R.S. § 33-1807(A)’s “has been delinquent” language as a triggering mechanism: once an owner has been delinquent for a period of one year or for $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first, the statute applies, and a later payoff of the regular assessments does not let the owner avoid the statute’s foreclosure provisions or extinguish the association’s lien. The court also found the association holds a separate contractual right to lien and foreclose under Article 7 of its CC&Rs — specifically Sections 7.02, 7.04, and 7.07 — which the Planned Community Act does not preempt. The owner’s A.R.S. § 33-420 special action and counterclaim against the association and its attorney over an unreleased lis pendens was dismissed with prejudice because the owner admitted owing $1,682.00 when the lis pendens took effect. Final judgment for the association, including attorneys’ fees and costs, was entered June 26, 2015.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Troon North Association (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
Homeowners association that sued to foreclose its lien for delinquent assessments on a property at 28695 North 94th Place in Scottsdale and prevailed on every claim, ending the case with a judgment that included its attorneys’ fees and costs.
Mark W. Waldron (Counsel / Counterdefendant)
Attorney listed for the association in the early minute entries and present on its behalf at the April 3, 2015 oral argument; also named as a counterdefendant because the A.R.S. § 33-420 counterclaim sought to hold him and the association responsible for failing to release the lis pendens.
Charles E. Maxwell (Counsel)
Counsel present on behalf of the association at the April 3, 2015 oral argument and listed as its counsel of record in the spring 2015 minute entries.
Paul R. Neil (Counsel)
Counsel present on behalf of the association at the April 3, 2015 oral argument; replaced as counsel of record by substitution within the firm in June 2015.
Samuel C. Richardson (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
Substituted in on June 22, 2015 as attorney of record for the association and counterdefendant Mark W. Waldron, in place of Paul R. Neil.

Respondent Side

Ripson Holdings, LLC (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
Defendant that moved for partial summary judgment against the foreclosure count and brought the A.R.S. § 33-420 special action and counterclaim against the association and attorney Mark W. Waldron; the counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice.
4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
Co-defendant; the association applied for default judgment against it in December 2014, and its June 2015 request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-723 and 33-1807(A) was denied in the final judgment.
City of Scottsdale (Defendant (dismissed))
Municipal defendant dismissed on the association’s notice of dismissal by order entered August 12, 2014.
Elijah W. Rosov (Counsel)
Counsel of record for defendants Ripson Holdings, LLC and 4AAR Holdings, LLC; present on behalf of the defendants at the April 3, 2015 oral argument.
Eric C. Anderson (Counsel)
Attorney listed in the 2014 minute entries for Defendant City of Scottsdale, which was dismissed in August 2014.

Neutral Parties

David K. Udall (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the cross-motions, issued the April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling, and signed the June 2015 final judgment.
Mark F. Aceto (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge initially assigned to the case; ordered the dismissal of the City of Scottsdale in August 2014 before the case was reassigned on the association’s notice of change of judge.
John Rea (Judge)
Civil Presiding Judge who reassigned the case to Judge Udall in September 2014 after a notice of change of judge was filed.

What happened

Troon North Association is a homeowners association in Scottsdale. In 2014 it sued Ripson Holdings, LLC, 4AAR Holdings, LLC, and the City of Scottsdale in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2014-094169), including a count to foreclose its assessment lien on a property at 28695 North 94th Place. The court later found that the owner — referred to in the ruling as “Defendant Ripson,” with Michael Ripson personally present at the 2015 oral argument — became delinquent on assessment fees in 2009 and remained delinquent every year through 2014, when the delinquent assessments were finally paid off on August 4, 2014. The City of Scottsdale was dismissed early, on the association’s own notice, by an August 12, 2014 order, and after the association filed a notice of change of judge the case moved from Judge Mark F. Aceto to Judge David K. Udall in September 2014.

The defense answered with a counterattack. Ripson Holdings brought a special action and counterclaim under A.R.S. § 33-420 — Arizona’s wrongful-recording statute — seeking to hold the association and its attorney, Mark W. Waldron, responsible for failing to release a lis pendens that had been recorded against the property. Meanwhile, in December 2014 the association applied for default judgment against 4AAR Holdings; the assigned judge took no action on the e-filed application and directed that Rule 55(b) default proceedings be handled by Commissioner Margaret Benny, with the default packet hand-delivered as required by administrative order.

The case came to a head on cross-motions. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment against the association’s foreclosure count and on their counterclaim; the association and Waldron cross-moved for partial summary judgment. Judge Udall heard oral argument on April 3, 2015 — Charles Maxwell, Mark Waldron, and Paul Neil appearing for the association, Elijah Rosov for the defendants — ordered the defendants to respond to the association’s motion to strike, and took the matter under advisement.

The April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling resolved everything in the association’s favor. The court first granted the motion to strike, finding the defendants had improperly cited a ruling by Judge Aceto, and refused to consider those references. It then dismissed the § 33-420 special action and counterclaim with prejudice: at the time the lis pendens took effect the defendant owed the association $1,682.00 and admitted owing it, so as a matter of law § 33-420 did not apply. On the foreclosure count, the defendants argued the association had no right to foreclose under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because the assessments had since been paid. The court disagreed, interpreting the statute’s “has been delinquent” phrase as a triggering mechanism — once an owner has been delinquent for over a year or for $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first, the statute applies, and the owner cannot later pay the full assessment fees to avoid its foreclosure provisions. The association’s lien, the court found, did not end with the payment of the regular-assessment portion of the debt.

The ruling also gave the association a second, independent path. Under Article 7 of the CC&Rs — Sections 7.02 and 7.04 — the association has the right to place liens on parcels and enforce them, along with the right to levy special assessments, and Section 7.07 confirms its contractual liens against delinquent homeowners and its ability to collect late charges, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The court found the Planned Community Act does not preempt those contractual lien and foreclosure rights: while A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) contains language showing the legislature’s intent to preempt contractual or other statutory rights, no such language limits an association’s right to foreclose under § 33-1807(A). The court therefore denied the defendants’ motion, granted the association’s cross-motion — finding no genuine issues of material fact and a right to foreclose under both theories — and allowed the association to seek its attorneys’ fees and costs.

The endgame ran through June 2015. The court denied the association’s request for a hearing on the remaining issues in May and warned that the case would be dismissed if the parties did not submit the required joint report or a form of final judgment; in early June it granted short extensions for the defendants to respond to the fee application and proposed judgment, and on June 22 Samuel C. Richardson of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. substituted in as the association’s counsel of record. On June 26, 2015 the court entered judgment: it denied 4AAR Holdings’ request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-723 and 33-1807(A), granted the association’s application for attorneys’ fees, entered judgment for the association and against the defendants, and dismissed Ripson Holdings’ special action and counterclaim against the association and Waldron with prejudice. The court noted that no further matters remained and that the judgment was final under Rule 54(c).

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC (CV2014-094169 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). HOA foreclosure judgment quieted lien priority and rejected homeowner recording-penalty theories. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014-08-12 On the association’s notice of dismissal, the court dismisses all claims against Defendant City of Scottsdale.

Step 2014-09-05 After a notice of change of judge, the Civil Presiding Judge reassigns the case from Judge Aceto to Judge David K. Udall; a September 11 correction clarifies the notice was filed by the association.

Step 2014-12-10 The court takes no action on the association’s e-filed application for default judgment against 4AAR Holdings, LLC, directing that Rule 55(b) default proceedings be heard by Commissioner Margaret Benny.

Step 2015-03-03 Oral argument is set on the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the foreclosure count and counterclaim, and on the association’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

Step 2015-04-03 Oral argument is held; the defendants are ordered to respond to the association’s motion to strike by April 8, and the matter is taken under advisement.

Step 2015-04-08 Rule 16(b) order: the parties must file a joint report and proposed scheduling order by May 8, 2015 or the case will be placed on the dismissal calendar.

Step 2015-04-15 Under-advisement ruling: motion to strike granted; the A.R.S. § 33-420 counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice; the association may foreclose under both A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) and its CC&Rs; attorneys’ fees and costs are allowed.

Step 2015-05-27 The court denies the association’s request for a hearing on remaining issues and places the case on the dismissal calendar for June 15, 2015 absent the required filings.

Step 2015-06-05 The court signs orders extending to June 15 the deadline to respond to the association’s attorneys’-fee application and Ripson Holdings’ deadline to respond to the proposed form of judgment.

Step 2015-06-22 Samuel C. Richardson of Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. substitutes for Paul R. Neil as counsel of record for the association and counterdefendant Mark W. Waldron.

Step 2015-06-26 Judgment signed: the fee application is granted, 4AAR Holdings’ request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure is denied, judgment is entered for the association against the defendants, Ripson Holdings’ counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice, and the judgment is final under Rule 54(c).

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/troon-north-association-v-ripson-holdings/raw/: 13 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2014-08-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-08-12_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2014-09-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-09-05_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2014-09-11

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2014-09-11_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2014-12-10

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file

2014-12-10_004_default-judgment.pdf

Source 5 2015-03-03

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2015-03-03_005_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 6 2015-04-03

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-04-03_006_minute-entry.pdf

Source 7 2015-04-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-04-08_007_minute-entry.pdf

Source 8 2015-04-15

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the association partial summary judgment on its foreclosure count, dismissing the counterclaim with prejudice, and allowing fees and costs.

Download source file

2015-04-15_008_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 9 2015-05-27

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-05-27_009_minute-entry.pdf

Source 10 2015-06-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-06-05_010_minute-entry.pdf

Source 11 2015-06-05

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-06-05_011_minute-entry.pdf

Source 12 2015-06-22

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-06-22_012_minute-entry.pdf

Source 13 2015-06-26

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying 4AAR’s foreclosure-amount request, awarding the association fees and costs, entering judgment for the association, and dismissing Ripson’s special-action complaint.

Download source file

2015-06-26_013_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

FAQ

Can a homeowner stop an HOA foreclosure by paying off the delinquent assessments?

Not according to this ruling. The court interpreted A.R.S. § 33-1807(A)’s “has been delinquent” language as a triggering mechanism: once an owner has been delinquent for a period of one year or for $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first, the statute applies to that owner. The court expressly declined to read the statute as allowing a delinquent homeowner to pay the full assessment fees at any point and thereby avoid its foreclosure provisions, and it found the association’s lien did not end when the owner paid the regular-assessment portion of the debt.

What does A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) require before an HOA can foreclose?

As quoted in the ruling, the association’s lien for assessments, late charges, reasonable collection fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs may be foreclosed in the same manner as a mortgage on real estate — but only if the owner has been delinquent in the payment of money secured by the lien, excluding those fees and charges, for a period of one year or for an amount of $1,200.00 or more, whichever occurs first. Here the court found the owner became delinquent in 2009 and remained delinquent each year through 2014, satisfying the trigger.

What happened to the counterclaim against the association and its attorney?

It was dismissed with prejudice. Ripson Holdings brought a special action and counterclaim under A.R.S. § 33-420, Arizona’s wrongful-recording statute, seeking to hold the association and attorney Mark W. Waldron responsible for failing to release a recorded lis pendens. The court found that at the time the lis pendens took effect the defendant owed the association $1,682.00, admitted owing that money, and that as a matter of law § 33-420 does not apply in those circumstances. The final judgment repeated the dismissal with prejudice.

Can an HOA foreclose under its CC&Rs even apart from the statute?

In this case, yes. The court found that Article 7 of the CC&Rs — Sections 7.02 and 7.04 — gives the association the right to place liens on parcels and enforce them, and that Section 7.07 confirms its contractual liens against delinquent homeowners and its ability to collect late charges, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. It held the Planned Community Act does not preempt those contractual rights: A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) shows the legislature included preemption language where it intended preemption, and no such language restricts an association’s right to foreclose under § 33-1807(A). The association therefore had a separate right to foreclose under its CC&Rs as well as under the statute.

Who ultimately won, and what did the judgment include?

The association won on every dispositive issue. The April 15, 2015 ruling denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, granted the association’s cross-motion, dismissed the § 33-420 counterclaim with prejudice, and allowed the association to seek fees. The June 26, 2015 final judgment granted the association’s application for attorneys’ fees, denied 4AAR Holdings’ request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure, entered judgment for the association against the defendants, and again dismissed Ripson Holdings’ counterclaim against the association and Waldron with prejudice.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how one Arizona trial court read the “has been delinquent” trigger in A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), how CC&R lien provisions can supply an independent contractual foreclosure right, and why a § 33-420 wrongful-recording claim fails when the underlying debt was admittedly owed when the document was recorded. The collected minute entries end with the June 26, 2015 final judgment, so any appellate history is outside these records.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2014-094169 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	April 15, 2015
Judge / panel	Hon. David K. Udall, Hon. Mark F. Aceto
Parties	Troon North Association (Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, homeowners association) v. Ripson Holdings, LLC and 4AAR Holdings, LLC (Defendants/Counterclaimants); Mark W. Waldron (Counterdefendant); City of Scottsdale (Defendant, dismissed August 2014)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1807 A.R.S. § 33-420
Topics	ForeclosureAssessmentsCC&RsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the association partial summary judgment on its foreclosure count and dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice, holding that under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) an owner who has been delinquent for over a year or $1,200 or more cannot avoid foreclosure by later paying the full assessment fees, that the association’s lien did not end with payment of the regular-assessment portion, that the association has a separate, non-preempted right to foreclose under Sections 7.02, 7.04, and 7.07 of its CC&Rs, and that A.R.S. § 33-420 did not apply to the unreleased lis pendens because the underlying debt was admittedly owed when it took effect.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	13 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	11 roadmap entries
Video overview	Troon North Association v. Ripson Holdings, LLC
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Troon North Association, a Scottsdale homeowners association, sued in 2014 to foreclose its assessment lien on a property at 28695 North 94th Place whose owner had been delinquent on assessments from 2009 through 2014, paying them off only on August 4, 2014. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing the payoff defeated the association’s right to foreclose under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), and Ripson Holdings counterclaimed under A.R.S. § 33-420 to hold the association and its attorney, Mark W. Waldron, responsible for failing to release a recorded lis pendens. In an April 15, 2015 under-advisement ruling, Judge David K. Udall held the statute’s “has been delinquent” language is a trigger — once the one-year or $1,200 threshold is met, a later payoff of the regular assessments does not avoid foreclosure or end the lien — and that the association also holds an independent contractual right to lien and foreclose under Article 7 of its CC&Rs, which the Planned Community Act does not preempt. The § 33-420 counterclaim was dismissed with prejudice because the defendant admitted owing $1,682.00 when the lis pendens took effect. Final judgment for the association, including attorneys’ fees and costs, was entered June 26, 2015.

Key Issues & Findings

On the counterclaim, the court found that Ripson Holdings’ special action under A.R.S. § 33-420 — which attempted to hold attorney Waldron and the association responsible for failing to release a recorded lis pendens — failed as a matter of law. At the time the lis pendens took effect the defendant owed the association $1,682.00 and admitted owing that money, so the wrongful-recording statute simply did not apply in those circumstances. The court dismissed the special action and counterclaim with prejudice, a dismissal the final judgment later repeated as to both the association and Waldron.

On the foreclosure count, the defendants argued the association had no right to foreclose under A.R.S. § 33-1807(A) because the assessments had since been paid in full on August 4, 2014. The court quoted the statute — the lien may be foreclosed only if the owner “has been” delinquent for a period of one year or in an amount of $1,200 or more, whichever occurs first — and interpreted “has been” as a triggering mechanism, analogous to a jurisdictional question: once the delinquent party has been in arrears past either threshold, the statute applies to that owner from that point. The court refused to read the language as allowing a delinquent homeowner to pay the full assessment fees at any time and thereby avoid the statute’s foreclosure provisions, and it found the association’s lien did not end with the defendant’s payment of the regular-assessment portion, since the lien also secures late charges, collection costs, and attorneys’ fees.

The court then held the association has a second, independent foreclosure path under its own CC&Rs. Article 7 — Sections 7.02 and 7.04 — gives the association the right to place liens on parcels and enforce them and to levy special assessments, and Section 7.07 confirms its contractual liens against delinquent homeowners and its right to collect late charges, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The Planned Community Act does not preempt those contractual rights: A.R.S. § 33-1807(K) contains language showing the legislature’s intent to preempt contractual or other statutory rights where it so chose, and no such language appears with respect to an association’s right to foreclose under § 33-1807(A). Finding no genuine issues of material fact and a right to foreclose under both theories, the court denied the defendants’ motion, granted the association’s cross-motion, and allowed the association its attorneys’ fees and costs. The June 26, 2015 final judgment granted the fee application, denied 4AAR Holdings’ request to establish the amount subject to foreclosure under A.R.S. §§ 33-723 and 33-1807(A), and entered judgment for the association against the defendants under Rule 54(c).

Why It Matters

This case answers a question delinquent owners often raise: can you cut off an HOA foreclosure by writing a check for the past-due assessments once the lawsuit is underway? Under this court’s reading of A.R.S. § 33-1807(A), no — the “has been delinquent” language is a one-way trigger. Once an owner has been delinquent for a year or for $1,200 or more, the association’s statutory foreclosure right attaches, and paying off the regular assessments later does not erase the lien, which continues to secure late charges, collection costs, and attorneys’ fees.

The ruling also illustrates two other recurring points. First, a planned community’s CC&Rs can supply an independent contractual lien-and-foreclosure right that survives alongside the statute — the court found no preemption language in § 33-1807(A), contrasting it with subsection (K), where the legislature spoke expressly. Second, A.R.S. § 33-420 wrongful-recording claims over a lis pendens fail when the underlying debt was admittedly owed at the time of recording. The financial coda is familiar: the owner entities ended the case with a judgment against them that included the association’s attorneys’ fees and costs. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties; the collected minute entries end with the June 2015 final judgment.

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Richard J. Murtland v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

CC&R Amendments & Rental Restrictions | A.R.S. §§ 33-1227, 33-1260.01 | CV2015-091102

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, condominium owners in the Scottsdale Astragal community argued that an amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period changed the use to which their units were restricted and therefore required the unanimous consent of all unit owners under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D). The court held the rental restriction was instead subject to the 67% amendment rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration, noted that A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A) lets owners rent their units only “unless prohibited in the Declaration” and in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions, found the six-month rule not unreasonable, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-091102.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2015-091102) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the January 12, 2016 under-advisement ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment (downloadable above) and the February 24, 2016 judgment entry; the procedural timeline below tracks each collected minute entry. Currency caveat: the court entered a final judgment under Rule 54(c) on February 24, 2016, stating that no further matters remained in the case, and the collected minute entries show no later activity — this page does not track whether any appeal was taken. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court upheld the Association’s amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period on all residences. It held the rental restriction was not subject to the unanimous-consent requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) — which applies to amendments that, among other things, change “the use to which any unit is restricted” — but instead to the 67% amendment rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Astragal Declaration. The court also pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A), which lets a unit owner rent a unit only “unless prohibited in the Declaration” and in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions. Finding the six-month restriction not unreasonable, with potential benefits for the community at large, and finding no due-process violation because the owners had ample notice the Declaration could be amended, the court denied the owners’ motion for summary judgment, granted the Association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Final judgment including the Association’s attorneys’ fees followed in February 2016.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Richard J. Murtland (Plaintiff)
Condominium owner in the Scottsdale Astragal community who challenged the six-month minimum rental amendment, contending he was damaged because he could not generate income through short-term rentals.
Barbara Bergfield (Plaintiff)
Co-plaintiff condominium owner. The court found both plaintiffs owned condominiums in the Scottsdale Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association.
Erin Selene Iungerich (Counsel)
Substituted in as the plaintiffs’ attorney of record in July 2015 (a substitution within the same firm as J. Roger Wood) and appeared for the plaintiffs at the January 8, 2016 oral argument.
J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
The plaintiffs’ original attorney of record, replaced by Erin S. Iungerich in a within-firm substitution in July 2015; he also appeared for the plaintiffs at the January 8, 2016 oral argument.

Respondent Side

Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (Defendant)
Scottsdale condominium association whose owners voted, under the Declaration’s 67% amendment provision, to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences; it prevailed on cross-summary judgment and recovered its attorneys’ fees.
J. Gary Linder (Counsel)
Counsel for the Association, appearing on its behalf at the January 8, 2016 oral argument.

Neutral Parties

David K. Udall (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the cross-motions for summary judgment, issued the January 12, 2016 under-advisement ruling, and signed the February 2016 final judgment.

What happened

Astragal is a Scottsdale condominium community governed by a Declaration. The Declaration includes a provision allowing 67% of the Association’s owners to vote to change the governing Declaration. Using that mechanism, the Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association amended its Declaration to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all of its residences whenever owners lease or rent their units to third parties.

Richard J. Murtland and Barbara Bergfield, both owners of condominiums in the community, sued the Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2015-091102). Their position was that they had been damaged because the amendment prevented them from generating income through short-term rentals. In July 2015 the court granted a notice of substitution of counsel within the plaintiffs’ firm, allowing attorney Erin S. Iungerich to substitute for J. Roger Wood as attorney of record.

The dispute was resolved on paper rather than at trial. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and the Association filed a cross-motion for summary judgment; the court found that neither party disputed the significant facts. After full briefing, the court set oral argument, which Judge David K. Udall heard on January 8, 2016, with Iungerich and Wood appearing for the plaintiffs and J. Gary Linder for the Association. The court took the matter under advisement.

In an under-advisement ruling issued January 12, 2016, the court rejected the owners’ central statutory argument. A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) provides that, except as expressly permitted or required elsewhere in the Condominium Act, an amendment may not “change the boundaries of any unit, the allocated interest of the unit or the use to which any unit is restricted, in the absence of unanimous consent of the unit owners.” The court found the rental restriction was not subject to that unanimous-consent requirement; it was instead subject to the 67% rule in A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Astragal Declaration. The court also noted A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A), under which “[a] unit owner may use the unit owner’s unit as a rental property unless prohibited in the Declaration and shall use it in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions.”

The court then distinguished the plaintiffs’ lead case, Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010). In Dreamland, a community used a majority vote to force non-members of a homeowners association to become members subject to its CC&Rs, fees, and assessments. Here, by contrast, the plaintiffs were already members of the Astragal Association and, in the court’s words, “knew full well their Declaration potentially could be amended by a 67% majority vote at some point in the future.” The court further found the six-month leasing restriction “is not unreasonable, and it has potential benefits for the community at large,” and that the plaintiffs’ due-process rights were not violated because they had ample notice of a potential change in short-term lease restrictions when they purchased their properties. It denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted the Association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

The endgame was brief. On February 24, 2016, after reviewing the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees and the plaintiffs’ response, the court granted the application and awarded judgment in favor of the Association, in accordance with a formal written judgment signed February 22 and entered February 24, 2016. The court noted that no further matters remained in the case, making it a final judgment under Rule 54(c) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (CV2015-091102 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). A declaration amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period was not subject to the unanimous-consent… This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step Before suit The Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association amends its Declaration — under the Declaration’s provision allowing amendment by a 67% vote of owners — to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences leased or rented to third parties.

Step 2015 Condominium owners Richard J. Murtland and Barbara Bergfield sue the Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2015-091102), claiming damages because they cannot generate income through short-term rentals.

Step 2015-07-06 The court grants the plaintiffs’ notice of substitution of counsel (within firm), allowing Erin S. Iungerich to substitute for J. Roger Wood as attorney of record.

Step 2015-10-23 With the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and the Association’s cross-motion fully briefed, the court sets oral argument for January 8, 2016 before Judge David K. Udall.

Step 2016-01-08 Oral argument is held on the cross-motions for summary judgment; the court takes the matter under advisement.

Step 2016-01-12 Under-advisement ruling: the rental restriction is not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1227(D)’s unanimous-consent requirement but to the 67% rule of § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration; Dreamland Villa is distinguished; the plaintiffs’ motion is denied, the Association’s cross-motion is granted, and the case is dismissed with prejudice.

Step 2016-02-24 The court grants the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees and awards judgment in its favor; the formal written judgment, signed February 22 and entered February 24, 2016, is a final judgment under Rule 54(c), with no further matters remaining.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/richard-j-murtland-v-astragal-condominium-unit-owners-association/raw/: 5 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2015-07-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2015-07-06_001_minute-entry.pdf

Source 2 2015-10-23

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2015-10-23_002_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 3 2016-01-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2016-01-08_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2016-01-12

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the owners’ summary-judgment motion, granting the association summary judgment, and dismissing the rental-restriction challenge with prejudice.

Download source file

2016-01-12_004_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 5 2016-02-24

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2016-02-24_005_minute-entry.pdf

FAQ

Can a condominium association restrict short-term rentals by amending its CC&Rs?

In this case, yes. The Astragal Declaration allowed 67% of the Association’s owners to vote to change the governing Declaration, and the owners used that provision to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences. The court upheld the amendment, holding it was subject to the 67% rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration, and found the six-month restriction was not unreasonable and had potential benefits for the community at large.

Didn’t changing how units can be used require unanimous consent under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D)?

That was the owners’ central argument. Section 33-1227(D) requires the unanimous consent of unit owners for amendments that create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units, or change unit boundaries, allocated interests, or “the use to which any unit is restricted.” The court found the six-month rental restriction was not subject to that unanimous-consent requirement — it fell under the 67% amendment rule in A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as the Astragal Declaration adopted it.

What role did A.R.S. § 33-1260.01 play in the ruling?

The court quoted A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A): “A unit owner may use the unit owner’s unit as a rental property unless prohibited in the Declaration and shall use it in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions.” In other words, the statute itself contemplates that a declaration can prohibit rentals or set rental time period restrictions — which is what the Astragal amendment did.

Why didn’t Dreamland Villa v. Raimey help the owners?

The plaintiffs relied on Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010), but the court found it distinguishable. In Dreamland, a community used a majority vote to require non-members of a homeowners association to become members subject to its CC&Rs, fees, and assessments. The Astragal plaintiffs, by contrast, were already members of the Association and knew when they bought their units that the Declaration could be amended by a 67% majority vote in the future. The court held the Dreamland holding did not apply.

Did the owners recover anything?

No. The court denied their motion for summary judgment, granted the Association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice on January 12, 2016. It then granted the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees and, on February 24, 2016, entered a final judgment in the Association’s favor under Rule 54(c).

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how a Maricopa County judge applied the Condominium Act’s amendment rules — the 67% supermajority in A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) versus the unanimous-consent triggers in § 33-1227(D) — to a rental-restriction amendment, and it illustrates the fee-shifting risk owners face when a challenge to a CC&R amendment fails.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2015-091102 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	January 12, 2016
Judge / panel	Hon. David K. Udall
Parties	Richard J. Murtland and Barbara Bergfield (Plaintiffs, condominium owners) v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association (Defendant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1227 A.R.S. § 33-1260.01
Topics	AmendmentsCC&RsCovenantsRental RestrictionsAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the association summary judgment on its cross-motion and dismissed the owners’ case with prejudice, holding that a declaration amendment imposing a six-month minimum rental period was not subject to the unanimous-consent requirement of A.R.S. § 33-1227(D) but to the 67% amendment rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the declaration, that the restriction was not unreasonable, and that the owners’ due-process rights were not violated because they had ample notice the declaration could be amended.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	5 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	7 roadmap entries
Video overview	Richard J. Murtland, et al. v. Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Two owners of condominiums in the Scottsdale Astragal community sued their association after the owners amended the Declaration, under its 67%-vote amendment provision, to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences leased or rented to third parties. The owners claimed they were damaged because they could not generate income through short-term rentals, and argued the amendment changed the use to which their units were restricted and therefore required unanimous consent under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D). On cross-motions for summary judgment, with the significant facts undisputed, the court held in a January 12, 2016 under-advisement ruling that the rental restriction was not subject to the unanimous-consent requirement but to the 67% rule of A.R.S. § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Declaration. It distinguished Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, found the six-month restriction not unreasonable, denied the owners’ motion, granted the association’s cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. A final Rule 54(c) judgment awarding the association its attorneys’ fees was entered February 24, 2016.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began from undisputed facts: both plaintiffs owned condominiums in the Scottsdale Astragal community, the Declaration allowed 67% of the Association’s owners to vote to change the governing Declaration, and the Association used that provision to amend the Declaration to impose a six-month minimum rental period on all residences leased or rented to third parties. The plaintiffs claimed damage because they could not generate income through short-term rentals. The court set the statutory frame with A.R.S. § 33-1227(D), which — except as expressly permitted or required elsewhere in the Condominium Act — bars amendments that create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units, or change unit boundaries, allocated interests, or “the use to which any unit is restricted” absent the unanimous consent of the unit owners. It also quoted A.R.S. § 33-1260.01(A): a unit owner may use the unit as a rental property “unless prohibited in the Declaration and shall use it in accordance with the Declaration’s rental time period restrictions.” On that framework the court found the rental restriction was not subject to § 33-1227(D)’s unanimous-consent requirement; it was instead subject to the 67% rule in § 33-1227(A) as adopted by the Astragal Declaration.

The court then rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Dreamland Villa Community Club Inc. v. Raimey, 224 Ariz. 42, 226 P.3d 411 (App. 2010). In Dreamland, a community used a majority vote to require non-members of a homeowners association to become members subject to its CC&Rs, fees, and assessments. The Astragal plaintiffs, by contrast, were already members of the Association and “knew full well their Declaration potentially could be amended by a 67% majority vote at some point in the future,” so the Dreamland holding did not apply. The court further found the six-month leasing restriction not unreasonable, with potential benefits for the community at large, and found no due-process violation because the plaintiffs had ample notice of a potential change in short-term lease restrictions when they purchased their properties.

On those findings the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, granted judgment for the Association on its cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice. After reviewing the Association’s application for attorneys’ fees and the plaintiffs’ response, the court granted the application and awarded judgment in the Association’s favor in a formal written judgment signed February 22 and entered February 24, 2016 — a final judgment under Rule 54(c), with no further matters remaining in the case.

Why It Matters

Short-term-rental restrictions are one of the most common flashpoints in Arizona condominium communities, and this case shows how a Maricopa County judge sorted the key statutory question: which amendments require every owner’s consent under A.R.S. § 33-1227(D), and which need only the supermajority the declaration itself sets under § 33-1227(A). Owners challenging a rental-restriction amendment often assume that limiting rentals “changes the use to which the unit is restricted” and so demands unanimity; here the court held a six-month minimum rental period adopted by the Declaration’s 67% vote was valid without unanimous consent.

The ruling also illustrates two recurring themes. First, courts weigh what buyers signed up for: because the plaintiffs bought into a community whose Declaration could be amended by a 67% vote, the court found they had ample notice that rental rules could change, and it distinguished Dreamland Villa, where a majority vote forced obligations onto people who had never joined the association. Second, losing a challenge like this can be expensive — the case ended with a final judgment awarding the association its attorneys’ fees. As a superior-court decision, the ruling binds only the parties and is not precedent, but it is a clean, compact example of how these disputes get resolved on cross-motions for summary judgment.

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Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Assessments & CC&R Amendments | A.R.S. § 33-1803 | CV2016-051857

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a homeowner whose annual assessment payment rose from $328 to $425 after her community voted to charge every residential unit the same amount argued that the reallocation was invalid because the board did not fix the specific dollar amount before the vote, put it on the ballot, and implement it immediately. The court held that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) requires only the approval of a majority of the association’s members — which the January 2015 vote supplied — and that no reasonable jury could find a material breach of the CC&Rs where the members received a fair vote on accurate, carefully explained ballot information.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2016-051857.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2016-051857) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the August 15, 2016 ruling dismissing the individually named defendants and the June 12, 2017 under-advisement summary-judgment ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: after the June 2017 ruling the parties filed a joint notice of settlement, and a formal stipulated judgment against the plaintiff was signed and entered on August 28, 2017 — the final entry in the collected record. No appeal appears in these minute entries. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on every claim. Assuming without deciding that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and Article XI, Section 3 of the CC&Rs even applied to a reallocation of the existing assessment, the court held the 2015 resolution satisfied both: the statute’s plain language requires only “the approval of the majority of the members of the association,” which the HOA obtained when its members voted in January 2015 to charge every residential unit the same amount, and the statute says nothing about ballot wording, the timing of the vote relative to the effective date, or separate board approval of the ballot document. The breach-of-contract and good-faith claims failed because no jury could find a material breach — the members received a fair vote on ballot information that was neither incorrect nor materially misleading — and a refund remedy would have forced the Association to disgorge revenues it had already spent, an outcome tantamount to a forfeiture. The class-certification motion was denied as moot.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Rene Bishop (Plaintiff)
Sunland Village member who had benefitted from the old occupancy-based assessment formula; her annual payment rose about thirty percent, from $328 to $425, when the equalized allocation took effect in January 2016.
Jeffrey Miller (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff Rene Bishop; appeared with her at the May 26, 2016 and April 14, 2017 oral arguments.

Respondent Side

Sunland Village Community Association (Defendant)
Homeowners’ association that placed the 2014 board resolution amending the CC&Rs on the annual ballot, obtained majority member approval in January 2015, and prevailed on summary judgment on every claim.
Graydon Mathison (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; the court’s August 15, 2016 ruling dismissed all claims against the defendants other than the Association.
Marianne Mathison (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Jon Holter (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Yvonne Holter (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Kevin Tracy (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Bonnie Tracy (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Kathryn Trebus (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Ron Trebus (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Paul Meiners (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Susan Meiners (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Jim Matre (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Bonnie Sims (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Carl Sims (Defendant)
Individually named defendant; dismissed from the case by the August 15, 2016 ruling.
Augustus H. Shaw IV (Counsel)
Appeared on behalf of Defendants Sunland Village Community Association, et al., at the May 26, 2016 and April 14, 2017 oral arguments; listed in the case-party records as counsel for the individually named defendants.
Nicole Payne (Counsel)
Listed in the case-party records as counsel for Defendant Sunland Village Community Association; appears on the defense side of most minute-entry captions in the case.

Neutral Parties

John R. Hannah Jr. (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided throughout the case; issued the August 2016 dismissal ruling and the June 2017 summary-judgment ruling, and signed the August 2017 stipulated judgment.

What happened

Sunland Village Community Association formerly allocated its annual assessment among members using a formula based in part on the number of residents in each unit. Rene Bishop was one of the members who benefitted from that formula — her share of the common expenses was less than what some of her neighbors paid. In late 2014 the Association’s board adopted a resolution placing on the annual ballot an amendment to the community’s CC&Rs under which every residential unit would pay the same amount regardless of the number of occupants. A “ballot document” explained the effect: using the 2015 budget, a single residential unit’s assessment would be about $414, meaning a single occupant would pay roughly $86 more per year (about $7 per month) and a two-occupant unit about $59 less. Copies went to every member who requested an early ballot and were placed in each voting booth. The members approved the resolution by majority vote in January 2015.

The reallocated assessment was collected for the first time in January 2016, and Bishop’s payment rose about thirty percent, from $328 to $425. She sued the Association and thirteen individually named defendants in Maricopa County Superior Court, alleging breach of the CC&Rs — Article XI, Section 3, which refers any per-unit regular assessment increase of more than ten percent to a vote of the members — along with breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803, which bars a regular assessment more than twenty percent greater than the prior year’s without majority member approval. In her view, those rules required the board to determine her specific payment amount before the vote, to put that specific amount on the ballot, and to put the increase into effect immediately upon approval.

The early motion practice split. On May 26, 2016, after oral argument, Judge John R. Hannah Jr. denied the Association’s motion to dismiss, finding that homeowners who are not similarly situated to Bishop were proper parties who could appear and argue their position if they chose, but were not necessary parties. On August 15, 2016, however, the court dismissed all claims against the defendants other than the Association. The contract claim failed against the directors individually because they are not parties to the contract between the plaintiff and the Association, and the statutory claim failed because A.R.S. § 33-1803 limits the power of the association but creates no cause of action against individual directors. The court acknowledged that an HOA director can be personally liable for dishonest or bad-faith actions on behalf of the association, citing Albers v. Edelson Technology Partners L.P., but found the amended complaint alleged no specific facts supporting an inference of dishonesty or bad faith — a letter from the plaintiff’s lawyer opining that the directors’ actions were illegal was “not enough.”

In January 2017 the court referred the parties to a mandatory settlement conference and set oral argument on the Association’s motion for summary judgment and Bishop’s cross-motion for summary judgment; in March it added Bishop’s motion to certify the case as a class action to the same hearing. On April 14, 2017 the court heard argument on all three motions and took them under advisement.

The June 12, 2017 under-advisement ruling resolved the case. Assuming for the sake of discussion that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and Article XI, Section 3 applied at all — the Association had argued that merely reallocating the existing assessment is not an “increase,” a question the court found unnecessary to decide — the 2015 resolution satisfied both provisions. The statute’s plain language requires only “the approval of the majority of the members of the association,” which the HOA obtained, and it says nothing about the timing of the vote, the ballot language, or board approval of the ballot document; Bishop cited nothing in election law or Title 33 mandating the steps she said were required. The contract and good-faith claims failed for lack of any evidence of a material breach: the reasonable expectation under the CC&Rs was that a substantial assessment increase would be submitted to a fair vote of adequately informed members, which is what happened, and nothing in the ballot document was incorrect or materially misleading. The one-year delay before the new allocation took effect, if anything, benefitted Bishop, and the refund she sought would have forced the Association to disgorge revenues already received and spent — an outcome the court called tantamount to a forfeiture. The court granted the Association summary judgment, denied Bishop’s cross-motion, and denied the class-certification motion as moot.

The endgame was brief. On July 6, 2017 the court noted a joint notice of settlement and a stipulation extending the attorneys’-fees application deadline, placed the case on the dismissal calendar, and vacated all pending hearings. On August 28, 2017 the court approved and entered a formal stipulated judgment against Plaintiff Rene Bishop — the final entry in the collected minute-entry record.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association (CV2016-051857 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Member vote validly approved equalizing annual assessments under A.R.S. § 33-1803 and the CC&Rs. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2014 (late) The Association’s board adopts a resolution placing a CC&R amendment on the annual ballot to charge every residential unit the same assessment regardless of the number of occupants.

Step 2015-01 The members approve the resolution by majority vote; a ballot document had explained the estimated per-unit effect.

Step 2016-01 The reallocated assessment is collected for the first time; Bishop’s payment rises about thirty percent, from $328 to $425.

Step 2016-03-24 Bishop sues the Association and thirteen individually named defendants in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2016-051857; docket filing date).

Step 2016-04-04 The Association files a motion to dismiss.

Step 2016-05-26 After oral argument, the court denies the Association’s motion to dismiss, finding homeowners not similarly situated to Bishop are proper but not necessary parties.

Step 2016-08-15 Ruling dismisses all claims against the defendants other than the Association: the directors are not parties to the CC&R contract, A.R.S. § 33-1803 creates no cause of action against individual directors, and no specific facts of dishonesty or bad faith are alleged.

Step 2017-01-17 The court orders a mandatory settlement conference through the ADR office and sets oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment.

Step 2017-03-31 On its own motion, the court adds Bishop’s motion to certify a class action to the April 14 argument.

Step 2017-04-14 Oral argument on the class-certification motion and the cross-motions for summary judgment; all three are taken under advisement.

Step 2017-06-12 Under-advisement ruling grants the Association summary judgment on the statutory, contract, and good-faith claims, denies Bishop’s cross-motion, and denies class certification as moot.

Step 2017-07-06 A joint notice of settlement and stipulation to extend the fee-application deadline is received; the case goes on the dismissal calendar and all pending hearings are vacated.

Step 2017-08-28 The court approves and enters a formal stipulated judgment against Plaintiff Rene Bishop.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/rene-bishop-v-sunland-village-community-association/raw/: 10 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2016-04-28

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2016-04-28_001_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 2 2016-05-26

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2016-05-26_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2016-08-15

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling dismissing all claims against the defendants other than the Sunland Village Community Association.

Download source file

2016-08-15_003_ruling.pdf

Source 4 2017-01-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-01-17_004_minute-entry.pdf

Source 5 2017-01-17

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2017-01-17_005_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 6 2017-03-31

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2017-03-31_006_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 7 2017-04-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-04-14_007_minute-entry.pdf

Source 8 2017-06-12

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment and denying the homeowner’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

Download source file

2017-06-12_008_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 9 2017-07-06

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2017-07-06_009_minute-entry.pdf

Source 10 2017-08-28

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry approving and settling the formal stipulated judgment against Rene Bishop.

Download source file

2017-08-28_010_judgment-entered.pdf

FAQ

Why did one homeowner’s assessment go up about thirty percent if the total assessment never increased?

Because the community changed how the same total was divided. Sunland Village formerly allocated its annual assessment using a formula based in part on how many residents lived in each unit, and Bishop was among those who paid less under it. The 2015 amendment made every residential unit pay the same amount, so members of smaller households — like Bishop, whose payment went from $328 to $425 — paid more while multi-occupant units paid less. The court emphasized that the 2015 resolution “merely reallocated the total annual assessment, without increasing it.”

Didn’t A.R.S. § 33-1803 limit how much the assessment could rise?

The statute bars a regular assessment more than twenty percent greater than the prior year’s “without the approval of the majority of the members of the association.” The court held the HOA obtained exactly that approval when the members adopted the 2015 resolution, and that nothing more was required. The statute says nothing about the timing of the vote relative to the effective date, the ballot wording, or whether the board separately approved the ballot document — details Bishop tried to read into the statute without any textual basis. The court noted, without deciding, the Association’s argument that the statute might not apply at all to a mere reallocation.

Why did the breach-of-contract claim under the CC&Rs fail?

Because a contract claim requires a material breach, and the court found no evidence from which a jury could find one. The reasonable expectation under Article XI, Section 3 of the CC&Rs was that a substantial assessment increase would be submitted to a fair vote of adequately informed members — which happened. The ballot document carefully explained how the resolution would affect assessments and contained nothing incorrect or materially misleading. The court also weighed forfeiture: refunding the excess to everyone in Bishop’s position would force the HOA to disgorge revenues it had already received and spent, leaving it poorer than if the resolution had never passed.

Why were the individually named defendants dismissed?

In its August 15, 2016 ruling the court dismissed all claims against the defendants other than the Association. The directors individually are not parties to the contract between the homeowner and the Association, so the CC&R claim failed against them, and A.R.S. § 33-1803 limits the power of the association but does not create a cause of action against individual directors. While a director can be personally liable for dishonest or bad-faith actions on behalf of the association — the court cited Albers v. Edelson Technology Partners L.P. — the complaint alleged no specific facts supporting that inference; receiving a demand letter from the plaintiff’s lawyer calling the board’s actions illegal was “not enough.”

What happened to the class-action motion?

Bishop moved to certify the case as a class action, and the court heard argument on that motion together with the cross-motions for summary judgment on April 14, 2017. Because the June 12, 2017 ruling granted the Association summary judgment on every claim, the court denied the class-certification motion as moot — there were no surviving claims left to certify.

How did the case end, and is the ruling binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

After the summary-judgment ruling, the parties filed a joint notice of settlement, and on August 28, 2017 the court approved and entered a stipulated judgment against Bishop — the last entry in the collected minute-entry record; no appeal appears in these minutes. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent, but the case remains useful reading on when a member vote satisfies A.R.S. § 33-1803, how courts assess materiality for CC&R breach claims, and the limits of personal liability for HOA directors.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2016-051857 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	June 12, 2017
Judge / panel	Hon. John R. Hannah Jr.
Parties	Rene Bishop (Plaintiff, homeowner) v. Sunland Village Community Association and thirteen individually named defendants (Defendants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1803
Topics	AssessmentsCC&RsBoard GovernanceElections
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on all claims, holding that — assuming A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and Article XI, Section 3 of the CC&Rs applied to a reallocation of the existing assessment — the January 2015 majority member vote satisfied both provisions, that the statute’s plain language requires nothing beyond majority member approval, and that no reasonable jury could find a material breach of the CC&Rs where the members received a fair vote on ballot information that was neither incorrect nor materially misleading; the class-certification motion was denied as moot.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	10 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	13 roadmap entries
Video overview	Rene Bishop v. Sunland Village Community Association
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Sunland Village Community Association formerly allocated its annual assessment using a formula based in part on the number of residents in each unit. In late 2014 the board placed a CC&R amendment on the annual ballot equalizing the assessment across all residential units; a ballot document explained the estimated per-unit effect, and the members approved the amendment by majority vote in January 2015. When the reallocation took effect in January 2016, Rene Bishop’s payment rose about thirty percent, from $328 to $425. She sued the Association and thirteen individually named defendants for breach of the CC&Rs (Article XI, Section 3), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803, arguing the board had to fix the specific amount before the vote, put it on the ballot, and implement it immediately upon approval. The court dismissed all claims against the individual defendants in August 2016, and in a June 12, 2017 under-advisement ruling granted the Association summary judgment on every claim, denied Bishop’s cross-motion, and denied her class-certification motion as moot. After a joint notice of settlement, a stipulated judgment against Bishop was entered on August 28, 2017.

Key Issues & Findings

The court resolved the case in two written rulings. First, in its August 15, 2016 ruling, it dismissed all claims against the defendants other than the Association. The breach-of-contract claim failed against the directors individually because they are not parties to the contract between the plaintiff and the Association, and the statutory claim failed because A.R.S. § 33-1803 limits the power of the association but does not create a cause of action against individual directors. The court acknowledged, citing Albers v. Edelson Technology Partners L.P. and the Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 6.14, that an HOA director can be personally liable for dishonest or bad-faith actions on behalf of the association, but found the amended complaint alleged no specific facts supporting an inference of dishonesty or bad faith — a letter from the plaintiff’s lawyer opining that the directors’ actions were illegal was “not enough.”

On the merits, the June 12, 2017 under-advisement ruling began from the statute’s plain language, citing North Valley Emergency Specialists, L.L.C. v. Santana for the rule that clear statutory text must be applied without resort to other interpretive methods. A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) requires “the approval of the majority of the members of the association” before a regular assessment more than twenty percent greater than the prior year’s may be imposed. The HOA obtained that approval when the members adopted the 2015 resolution equalizing the allocation; nothing more was required. The statute says nothing about the timing of the members’ approval relative to the effective date, the ballot language, or board approval of the ballot document, and Bishop cited nothing in election law or Title 33 mandating the steps she claimed were required. The court noted, without deciding, the Association’s argument that the statute and the CC&R provision might not apply at all because the total assessment was merely reallocated, not increased.

The contract and good-faith claims failed on materiality. Citing Ry-Tan Construction and Foundation Development Corp. v. Loehmann’s, the court explained that a material breach must defeat the very purpose of the contract, weighing the injured party’s expected benefit against the breaching party’s forfeiture. Bishop’s reasonable expectation under Article XI, Section 3 was that a substantial assessment increase would be submitted to a fair vote of adequately informed members — which occurred. The ballot document carefully explained the resolution’s effect on members’ assessments and contained nothing incorrect or materially misleading, and no alleged irregularity fundamentally compromised the fairness of the election. The one-year delay before the new allocation took effect, if anything, benefitted Bishop. Finally, the refund she sought would force the HOA to disgorge revenues already received and spent, leaving it poorer than if the resolution had never passed — an outcome tantamount to a forfeiture. The court granted the Association summary judgment, denied the cross-motion, and denied class certification as moot; after a joint notice of settlement, a stipulated judgment against Bishop was entered on August 28, 2017.

Why It Matters

This case answers a recurring question in Arizona planned communities: what does it take to validly change who pays how much? The ruling shows that when an assessment change is put to the members and approved by a majority vote, A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) is satisfied — courts will not read extra procedural requirements (specific dollar amounts on the ballot, immediate implementation, separate board approval of ballot materials) into the statute’s plain text. It also illustrates that a reallocation of the same total assessment is analytically different from an increase, a distinction the Association pressed and the court flagged without needing to decide.

For homeowners weighing a lawsuit over CC&R procedure, the decision is a caution on two fronts. Breach-of-contract claims against an association require a material breach — one that defeats the purpose of the provision — and courts will weigh the forfeiture a refund remedy would impose on the association and its other members. And claims against board members personally face a high bar: directors are not parties to the CC&R contract, A.R.S. § 33-1803 creates no cause of action against them individually, and personal liability requires specific facts showing dishonesty or bad faith, not just a demand letter calling the board’s conduct illegal. As a superior-court decision, the ruling binds only the parties and is not precedent.

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Oleg Bortman v. First Service Residential Arizona, LLC: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Board Governance & Defamation | A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01, 12-349 | CV2024-031553

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, the owner of a commercial condominium in the Safari Drive Condominium complex claimed the association defamed his real estate brokerage in a newsletter and that board members breached their own Code of Conduct. The court held the plaintiffs lacked standing because the alleged harm ran to the non-party brokerage, that the newsletter’s sales list was true and therefore not defamatory, that calling a lawsuit “frivolous and meritless” is non-actionable opinion, and that a board members’ code of conduct is not a contract an individual association member can sue on. It later refused to award the winning defendants attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 and 12-349.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Oleg Bortman v. First Service Residential Arizona, LLC, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-031553.

Download dismissal ruling

Scope note: This page covers Oleg Bortman v. First Service Residential Arizona, LLC, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2024-031553) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the March 25, 2025 under-advisement ruling dismissing the case and the June 16, 2025 under-advisement ruling denying attorneys’ fees; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: as of the last collected minute entry (June 16, 2025), the complaint had been dismissed without prejudice, the court had ordered the defendants to submit a proposed form of judgment, and the fee application had been denied — the docket may have developed further, and dismissed claims could in theory be refiled. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court dismissed the First Amended Complaint without prejudice on every count. The defamation and interference claims failed because the alleged harm ran to The Brokery — a real estate brokerage that was not a party — so plaintiffs Bortman and JIMBO, LLC lacked standing; because the association newsletter’s list of recent sales was true, even if not complete, and true facts cannot be defamatory; and because a board statement that the lawsuit was “frivolous and meritless” is a statement of opinion, not fact. The breach-of-contract and implied-covenant claims failed because the Board Members Code of Conduct is not a contract an individual association member can enforce. Injunctive relief against future disparagement was unavailable, and the individual directors, the management company, and its general manager were not appropriate parties absent specific individual acts. The court later denied the defendants’ application for attorneys’ fees in full: the case sounded primarily in tort, so A.R.S. § 12-341.01 did not support a fee award, and § 12-349 sanctions were inappropriate because the claims were arguable until fully developed on the motion to dismiss.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Oleg Bortman (Plaintiff)
Managing member of JIMBO, LLC and designated representative for JIMBO; operates a real estate brokerage business called The Brokery out of the commercial condominium JIMBO owns in the Safari Drive Condominium complex.
JIMBO, LLC (Plaintiff)
Owner of a first-floor business condominium in the Safari Drive Condominium complex; named as a plaintiff alongside Bortman in the First Amended Complaint.
Kim Robert Maerowitz (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff Oleg Bortman, appearing at the March 21, 2025 and June 13, 2025 oral arguments.

Respondent Side

Safari Drive Condominium Association (Defendant)
Non-profit corporation run by a board that governs the mixed residential and commercial Safari Drive Condominium complex; published the September 27 Newsletter at the center of the defamation claims.
First Service Residential Arizona, LLC (Defendant)
Property manager for the Safari Drive Condominium complex; the court found it was an agent of the Board and the Association and not an appropriate party absent specific acts outside board authority.
Suzanne Hawk (Defendant)
General manager for the property-management company; dismissed as an inappropriate party for the same agency reasons as the management company.
Brenda Vogel (Defendant)
Member of the Safari Drive Condominium Association Board of Directors; the ruling found no individual allegations against any director.
Dirk Claussen (Defendant)
Member of the Safari Drive Condominium Association Board of Directors.
Fritz Beesmeyer (Defendant)
Member of the Safari Drive Condominium Association Board of Directors.
Michael Brady (Defendant)
Member of the Safari Drive Condominium Association Board of Directors.
Charlie Ray (Defendant)
Member of the Safari Drive Condominium Association Board of Directors.
Erin E. McManis (Counsel)
Counsel of record for all defendants — the association, the management company, the general manager, and the five board members.
Josh M. Bolen (Counsel)
Co-counsel for the defendants, appearing at the March 21, 2025 and June 13, 2025 oral arguments.

Neutral Parties

Michael J. Herrod (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who heard the motion to dismiss and fee application and issued the March 25, 2025 and June 16, 2025 under-advisement rulings.

What happened

Safari Drive is a condominium complex containing both residential and commercial units, governed by the Safari Drive Condominium Association, a non-profit corporation run by a board of directors. First Service Residential Arizona, LLC is the complex’s property manager, and Suzanne Hawk is the management company’s general manager. JIMBO, LLC owns a first-floor business condominium in the complex; Oleg Bortman is JIMBO’s managing member and operates a real estate brokerage called The Brokery out of that unit — set up, in part, with the expectation that The Brokery would be in a uniquely favorable position to market units in the complex.

Bortman and JIMBO sued the Association, the management company, Hawk, and five board members (Brenda Vogel, Dirk Claussen, Fritz Beesmeyer, Michael Brady, and Charlie Ray) in Maricopa County Superior Court. Their First Amended Complaint pleaded five counts: defamation (libel and slander), interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and injunctive relief. The defamation and interference counts centered on the Association’s “September 27 Newsletter,” which contained a simple list of recent sales in the complex; plaintiffs alleged the sales were cherry-picked so that the only sale listed for The Brokery was an under-market sale. The interference count also pointed to allegations that units were listed with another broker, that The Brokery was refused electronic promotional monitors near windows and an open-air event in the common area, and that at a November 12, 2024 open session the Board announced Bortman had filed a “frivolous and meritless” lawsuit. The contract counts rested on the Board Members Code of Conduct, which plaintiffs alleged each director signs on joining the board.

The defendants moved to dismiss on January 13, 2025. After full briefing, the court heard oral argument on March 21, 2025 — simultaneously with two Rule 26(D) discovery disputes — and took the motion under advisement, ordering that the clock for responding to the plaintiffs’ discovery would start on the ruling date if the motion were granted, and that the plaintiffs could not serve the defendants by email absent an agreement.

On March 25, 2025, Judge Michael Herrod issued an under-advisement ruling dismissing the complaint without prejudice. On the defamation and interference counts, the court found that even if the allegations were true they applied to The Brokery — a business whose relationship to the plaintiffs the complaint never explained — so Bortman and JIMBO lacked standing to sue on its behalf; that the newsletter’s facts “were true, even if not complete,” and therefore could not be defamatory; and that the statement that the lawsuit was frivolous and meritless was a non-actionable statement of opinion under Takieh v. O’Meara, because it does not imply a false assertion of fact. The Code of Conduct claims failed because association members are not overtly named as third-party beneficiaries, so the Code is not a contract an individual member can sue on. Injunctive relief was denied because “[t]he Court cannot order the Board or the Association ‘not to say that'” — defamation law deters conduct through damages. Finally, the court held the individual directors could not be individually liable where no specific acts by specific directors were identified, and that the management company and Hawk, as agents of the Board and Association, were not appropriate parties. The court ordered the defendants to submit a proposed form of judgment and a fee application.

The fee fight then played out over the spring. The defendants applied for attorneys’ fees and costs on April 8, 2025, invoking A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (actions arising out of contract) and § 12-349 (claims without substantial justification, harassment, delay, or discovery abuse). In an April 30 minute entry the court signaled it would deny § 12-341.01 fees because, although the case was pleaded partly in contract, the matter did not arise out of contract, and it set oral argument on the § 12-349 request. After the June 13, 2025 argument, the court’s June 16, 2025 under-advisement ruling denied the application entirely. Analyzing Mullins, Colberg, and Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., the court explained that a defendant who defeats a contract claim can still recover § 12-341.01 fees, but here the tort of defamation “has nothing to do with the Board Members Code of Conduct” — the tort and contract theories were not intertwined, and the case “sounded primarily in tort.” As for § 12-349 sanctions, even accepting the defendants’ account, sanctions were not appropriate because “the claims were arguable until the parties fully developed the claims in the proceedings on the motion to dismiss.”

Procedural timeline

Step 2024 Bortman and JIMBO, LLC sue the Safari Drive Condominium Association, its property manager, the general manager, and five board members (CV2024-031553). The First Amended Complaint pleads defamation, interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, and injunctive relief, centered on the Association’s “September 27 Newsletter” and a November 12, 2024 board statement that the lawsuit was frivolous and meritless.

Step 2025-01-13 Defendants file their motion to dismiss; the response is filed January 17 and the reply January 27.

Step 2025-02-05 The court sets virtual oral argument on the motion to dismiss for March 21, 2025.

Step 2025-03-19 Two Rule 26(D) joint statements of discovery dispute are set to be heard simultaneously with the motion to dismiss.

Step 2025-03-21 Oral argument is held; the motion to dismiss is taken under advisement. The court orders that discovery-response deadlines will run from the ruling date if the motion is granted, and bars service on defendants by email absent agreement.

Step 2025-03-25 Under-advisement ruling dismisses the complaint without prejudice on all five counts and orders defendants to submit a proposed form of judgment and an application for attorneys’ fees.

Step 2025-04-08 Defendants file their Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, a notice of lodging judgment, and a statement of costs; plaintiffs object the next day.

Step 2025-04-30 The court states it will deny fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 because the matter did not arise out of contract, and sets oral argument on the A.R.S. § 12-349 fee request.

Step 2025-06-13 Oral argument on the fee application; the matter is taken under advisement.

Step 2025-06-16 Under-advisement ruling denies the defendants’ fee application in full: the case sounded primarily in tort, and § 12-349 sanctions are inappropriate because the claims were arguable.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/oleg-bortman-v-first-service-residential-arizona/raw/: 7 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2025-02-05

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2025-02-05_001_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 2 2025-03-19

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2025-03-19_002_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 3 2025-03-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-03-21_003_minute-entry.pdf

Source 4 2025-03-25

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-03-25_004_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 5 2025-04-30

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2025-04-30_005_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 6 2025-06-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-06-13_006_minute-entry.pdf

Source 7 2025-06-16

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the Application for Attorneys’ Fees.

Download source file

2025-06-16_007_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

FAQ

Why did the defamation claims fail?

For three independent reasons. First, standing: the party allegedly damaged by the newsletter was The Brokery, a real estate brokerage that was not a plaintiff, and the complaint never explained its relationship to Bortman or JIMBO, LLC — so the plaintiffs could not sue on its behalf. Second, truth: the court found the facts in the September 27 Newsletter — a simple list of recent sales with no commentary — “were true, even if not complete,” and true facts cannot be defamatory. Third, opinion: the board’s statement that the lawsuit was frivolous and meritless is a subjective belief, not an objectively verifiable fact, and under Takieh v. O’Meara an opinion is only actionable if it implies a false assertion of fact.

Can an association member sue the board for breaching a board members’ code of conduct?

Not on the facts of this case. The Board Members Code of Conduct set out principles and guidelines for directors and was allegedly signed by each director on joining the board. But although some parts address behavior toward association members, members are not overtly named as third-party beneficiaries. The court held the Code of Conduct “is not a contract based upon which an individual member of the association can bring a breach of contract action or allege a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”

Why were the individual board members, the management company, and its general manager dismissed?

The First Amended Complaint made no individual allegations against any of them. The court explained that directors of a non-profit corporation acting as a group are taking the actions of the association — there is no individual liability unless specific actions of specific directors are identified. Likewise, the management company and its general manager are agents of the Board and the Association and cannot be liable for board or association actions unless they committed specific acts outside board authority that damaged the plaintiffs. No such acts were alleged.

The defendants won — why didn’t they get their attorneys’ fees?

The court denied fees under both statutes invoked. Under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which covers actions arising out of contract, the court acknowledged that a defendant who defeats a contract claim can still recover fees, but found this case “sounded primarily in tort”: the defamation claims had nothing to do with the Board Members Code of Conduct, so the tort and contract theories were not intertwined. Under A.R.S. § 12-349, which mandates fees for claims brought without substantial justification or for harassment, delay, or discovery abuse, the court found sanctions inappropriate because the claims were arguable until the parties fully developed them in the motion-to-dismiss proceedings.

What does “dismissed without prejudice” mean here?

A dismissal without prejudice ends the case as pleaded but does not bar the claims from being refiled in a corrected form. In this case the court dismissed the complaint without prejudice on March 25, 2025 and ordered the defendants to submit a proposed form of judgment. As of the last collected minute entry (June 16, 2025), the fee application had been denied; whether the plaintiffs refiled or the docket developed further is beyond the collected record.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows the standing problem that arises when the injured business is not the named plaintiff, why true statements and opinions in an association newsletter are not defamatory, why a board code of conduct is a weak vehicle for member claims, and that even a winning HOA defense team is not guaranteed attorneys’ fees when the case sounds primarily in tort.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2024-031553 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	March 25, 2025
Judge / panel	Hon. Michael J. Herrod
Parties	Oleg Bortman and JIMBO, LLC (Plaintiffs — JIMBO owns a commercial condominium in the Safari Drive complex; Bortman is JIMBO’s managing member) v. First Service Residential Arizona, LLC (property manager); Safari Drive Condominium Association; Suzanne Hawk (general manager); and board members Brenda Vogel, Dirk Claussen, Fritz Beesmeyer, Michael Brady, and Charlie Ray (Defendants)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 12-341.01 A.R.S. § 12-349
Topics	Board GovernanceAttorney FeesProcedure
Outcome / holding	The superior court dismissed the First Amended Complaint without prejudice: Bortman and JIMBO, LLC lacked standing to sue for harm to the non-party brokerage The Brokery; the association newsletter’s sales list was true, even if incomplete, and therefore not defamatory; a board statement that the lawsuit was frivolous and meritless was non-actionable opinion; the Board Members Code of Conduct is not a contract an individual association member can enforce; injunctive relief against disparagement was unavailable; and the individual directors, the management company, and its general manager were not appropriate parties. The court subsequently denied the prevailing defendants’ attorneys’-fees application under both A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (the case sounded primarily in tort) and A.R.S. § 12-349 (the claims were arguable).
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	7 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

The managing member of an LLC that owns a commercial condominium in the Safari Drive Condominium complex — out of which he operates a real estate brokerage called The Brokery — sued the condominium association, its property manager First Service Residential Arizona, LLC, the general manager, and five board members. The First Amended Complaint pleaded defamation, interference with prospective economic advantage, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and injunctive relief, centered on an association newsletter’s allegedly cherry-picked list of recent sales and a board statement at a November 12, 2024 open session that the lawsuit was frivolous and meritless. In a March 25, 2025 under-advisement ruling the court dismissed the complaint without prejudice on all counts: the plaintiffs lacked standing because the alleged harm ran to the non-party Brokery, the newsletter was true and the frivolous-lawsuit remark was non-actionable opinion, the Board Members Code of Conduct is not a member-enforceable contract, injunctive relief was unavailable, and the individual directors, management company, and general manager were not appropriate parties. In a June 16, 2025 ruling the court denied the defendants’ application for attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 and 12-349 in full.

Key Issues & Findings

On the tort counts, the March 25, 2025 under-advisement ruling started with standing: the plaintiffs were Bortman and JIMBO, LLC, but the party allegedly damaged by the September 27 Newsletter was The Brokery, a business whose structure and ownership the complaint never explained. Even taking the allegations as true, they applied to The Brokery, not to the plaintiffs, so both defamation and interference counts failed at the threshold. The court then found the newsletter’s facts — a simple list of recent sales with no comments — “were true, even if not complete,” and true facts cannot be defamatory. Quoting Takieh v. O’Meara, the court held that the board’s announcement that Bortman had filed a frivolous and meritless lawsuit was a subjective statement of opinion that does not imply a false assertion of fact and is therefore not actionable.

On the contract counts, the court examined the Board Members Code of Conduct attached to the First Amended Complaint — principles and guidelines allegedly signed by each director on joining the board. Although some provisions address behavior toward association members, members are not overtly named as third-party beneficiaries, so the Code is not a contract on which an individual member can sue for breach or for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Injunctive relief failed because the court cannot order a board or association “not to say that”; defamation law deters conduct through damages. As to the defendants beyond the association, the court held that directors of a non-profit corporation acting as a group are taking the association’s actions — no individual liability attaches unless specific acts of specific directors are identified — and that the management company and its general manager, as agents of the Board and Association, are not appropriate parties absent specific acts outside board authority. None were alleged.

The June 16, 2025 fee ruling is a careful application of Arizona’s fee-shifting law. Surveying Mullins v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., Colberg v. Rellinger, and Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., the court acknowledged that a defendant who defeats a contract claim may still recover fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, and that intertwined tort and contract theories can support an award when the tort could not exist but for the breach of contract. Here, though, the defamation tort “has nothing to do with the Board Members Code of Conduct” — either theory could have stood independently — so the case sounded primarily in tort and § 12-341.01 fees were denied. The § 12-349 request, premised on discovery propounded while the motion to dismiss was pending and on pre-suit warnings that the claims were not cognizable, also failed: sanctions were inappropriate because the claims were arguable until the parties fully developed them in the motion-to-dismiss proceedings.

Why It Matters

This case maps the practical limits of suing an HOA or condominium association over reputational grievances. A member who feels an association newsletter slighted their business must clear three hurdles the plaintiffs here could not: the injured party must actually be the plaintiff (harm to a separate business entity is not the owner’s harm), true information is not defamatory even when selectively presented, and board rhetoric like calling a lawsuit “frivolous” is protected opinion. The ruling also confirms two structural protections common in Arizona association litigation: board members acting collectively are not individually liable without specific individual allegations, and management companies and their staff are agents who cannot be sued for the board’s decisions.

The case is equally instructive on governance documents: a Board Members Code of Conduct — even one every director signs — is not a contract that members can enforce in court unless it names them as beneficiaries. And the fee rulings cut the other way, in the members’ favor: an association-side defense team that wins a dismissal is not automatically entitled to attorneys’ fees. Where the claims sound primarily in tort rather than contract, A.R.S. § 12-341.01 does not apply, and A.R.S. § 12-349 sanctions require more than losing — the claims must have been unarguable. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties, and the dismissal without prejudice left room for the claims to be refiled.

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Merrick Avenue Management, LLC v. Troon Village Association: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Common Areas & Negligence | CC&R-Based Duty | CV2023-008406

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, homeowners in a gated Scottsdale community — and a visitor who was shot in their driveway — alleged that homeowners associations, board members, and property companies were negligent because the community’s entrance gate was inoperative and left open. The court held that a recorded declaration’s allocation of common-area maintenance to an association creates a negligence duty running to owners and even their invitees, but granted the moving association and individual defendants summary judgment because the undisputed security-camera evidence would not let a jury reasonably infer that the shooter entered through the gate.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Merrick Avenue Management, LLC v. Troon Village Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-008406 (consolidated with CV2023-012338).

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Merrick Avenue Management, LLC v. Troon Village Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2023-008406, consolidated with CV2023-012338) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the September 18 and October 12, 2023 rulings on motions to dismiss and the April 30, 2025 under-advisement ruling granting summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the collected minute entries run through June 19, 2025, when the case was still active — the April 2025 summary-judgment ruling resolved the claims against Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association and the individual defendants only, Amcor’s own summary-judgment motion had been noted but not decided, claims involving Troon Village Association and Cornerstone Properties, Inc. remained, and default judgments against two consolidated defendants had just been entered. Later docket activity may not be reflected here. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

In an April 30, 2025 under-advisement ruling, the court granted summary judgment to Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association and all of the moving individual defendants on every count. Every claim rested on the allegation that the community’s inoperative gate at the Happy Valley Road entrance — left open at the direction of the board president — allowed the shooter in. Because undisputed security-camera evidence showed the shooter approaching from the north, fleeing to the north, and riding away on a bicycle from the north, and the plaintiffs admitted they had no evidence he came through the gate, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could infer gate entry, so causation failed. At the same time, the court held — following Gfeller v. Scottsdale Vista North Townhomes Association — that a declaration’s allocation of common-area maintenance to an association creates a negligence duty running to owners and their invitees. The defense won on causation, not on the absence of a duty.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Merrick Avenue Management, LLC (Plaintiff)
Lead plaintiff in CV2023-008406, suing alongside homeowners Edward Trenton Albarracin and Gretchen Marie Zamjahn on negligence claims arising from the open community gate.
Edward Trenton Albarracin (Plaintiff)
Co-owner of the Scottsdale residence where the February 18, 2023 shooting occurred; a plaintiff in this case and, per the January 2024 consolidation hearing, a defendant in Douglas Cordano’s pre-consolidation case. Docketed in the party records as Trenton Edward Albarricin.
Gretchen Marie Zamjahn (Plaintiff)
Co-owner of the residence where the shooting occurred; a plaintiff in this case and, per the January 2024 consolidation hearing, a defendant in Douglas Cordano’s pre-consolidation case.
Douglas J. Cordano (Consolidated Plaintiff)
Shooting victim. He went to the residence on February 18, 2023 to administer IV injections to the owners and was shot at close range in the driveway. His separate case, CV2023-012338, was consolidated into this case in January 2024; he later obtained default judgments against Patrick Gruchala and Carrie A. Luikens.
Cody J. Jess (Counsel)
Counsel listed in the minute-entry captions and party records for plaintiffs Merrick Avenue Management, LLC, Edward Trenton Albarracin, and Gretchen Marie Zamjahn.
Joshua Taylor Greer (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the Merrick Avenue plaintiffs, including at the January 2024 consolidation hearing, the December 2024 order-to-show-cause hearing, and the April 30, 2025 summary-judgment argument.
Steven A. Cohen (Counsel)
Counsel of record for consolidated plaintiff Douglas J. Cordano throughout the collected minute entries.

Respondent Side

Troon Village Association (Defendant)
Association whose CC&Rs the complaint alleged apply to the plaintiffs’ property and make it responsible in part for Common Areas, including the gates at issue. Its motion to dismiss (joint with Cornerstone) was denied in September 2023; it was not among the defendants granted summary judgment in April 2025.
Cornerstone Properties, Inc. (Defendant)
Co-defendant that moved to dismiss jointly with Troon Village Association; the motion was denied in September 2023. Not among the defendants granted summary judgment in April 2025.
Troon Fairways Homeowners Association (Defendant)
The association (called “the HOA” in the summary-judgment ruling) whose common areas include the Happy Valley Road entrance gate. It moved for summary judgment with the individual defendants on January 29, 2025 and prevailed on all counts on April 30, 2025; it withdrew its motions for entry of judgment and attorneys’ fees in June 2025.
Jeffrey D. Kinney (Defendant)
Troon Fairways board president who, per the undisputed facts in the summary-judgment ruling, directed that the non-functioning gate be left open. One of only two individual defendants on the board on February 18, 2023, and the only one the evidence linked to the gate decision; summary judgment was nonetheless granted in his favor.
Pamela D. North (Defendant)
Individual defendant identified in the summary-judgment ruling as Mr. Kinney’s spouse; granted summary judgment.
Shari L. Weintraub (Defendant)
The other individual defendant who served on the board on February 18, 2023; the court found no evidence linking her to any action. Listed pro per in the party records; granted summary judgment.
Sanford L. and Amy J. Friedman; Richard S. and Linda K. Jaffee; Eric and Melissa Mack Gold; Todd D. Weintraub (Defendants)
Individual defendants the court found had no facts tying them to the allegations; the ruling states summary judgment was appropriate for them regardless of the gate-entry analysis.
Amcor Property Professionals, Inc. (Defendant)
Defendant whose Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was denied in October 2023 without prejudice to a later summary-judgment motion; at the April 30, 2025 argument the court noted Amcor’s own motion for summary judgment had been filed but it was not decided in that ruling.
MC General Contracting, LLC (Defendant)
Defendant in the consolidated litigation that appeared through counsel at the January 2024 consolidation hearing and the December 2024 order-to-show-cause hearing.
Patrick Gruchala (Defendant (consolidated))
Identified in the April 2025 summary-judgment ruling as the shooter. A pro per defendant in the consolidated case; Commissioner Albrecht entered a default judgment against him on June 19, 2025.
Carrie A. Luikens (Defendant (consolidated))
Pro per defendant in the consolidated case; ordered in December 2024 to appear for a deposition, and a default judgment was entered against her on June 19, 2025.
Quinten T. Cupps (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Troon Village Association and Cornerstone Properties, Inc. through the January 2024 consolidation hearing.
Christina N. Morgan (Counsel)
Attorney listed for Troon Village Association and Cornerstone Properties, Inc. in the party records and minute-entry captions from September 2024 onward.
DeeAnn Marie Barnes (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Troon Village Association and Cornerstone Properties, Inc. at the December 2024 hearing and the April 30, 2025 summary-judgment argument.
Geoffrey G. Collins (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association and individual defendants Kinney, North, the Friedmans, the Jaffees, and the Golds.
Tessa Knueppel (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Amcor Property Professionals, Inc.

Neutral Parties

Jay Ryan Adleman (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge originally assigned to the case; disqualified himself in September 2023.
Katherine Cooper (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who received the case on reassignment, denied the Troon Village/Cornerstone and Amcor motions to dismiss in 2023, and granted consolidation in January 2024.
Scott Minder (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who assumed the calendar effective June 21, 2024 and issued the April 30, 2025 under-advisement ruling granting summary judgment.
Richard Albrecht (Commissioner)
Maricopa County Superior Court commissioner who handled the default proceedings and entered the June 19, 2025 default judgments against Patrick Gruchala and Carrie A. Luikens.

What happened

Edward Trenton Albarracin and Gretchen Marie Zamjahn own a home in Scottsdale inside the Troon Fairways Homeowners Association; the complaint alleged the property is also part of Troon Village Association and subject to its CC&Rs. Under the governing CC&Rs, the association is contractually obligated to maintain the common areas, including the gate at the community’s entrance off Happy Valley Road. On February 18, 2023, Douglas J. Cordano went to the residence to administer IV injections to the owners. Security cameras recorded Patrick Gruchala — who in the preceding days had entered a business deal regarding his own home with Mr. Albarracin or Mr. Albarracin’s company — walking southbound past the driveway, then running into the driveway and shooting into Mr. Cordano’s driver’s-side window eight times at point-blank range before fleeing north on foot and, moments later, riding a bicycle south on Alma School Road. It is undisputed that the entrance gate was not functioning that day, had been inoperative for days or weeks, and had been left open at the direction of board president Jeffrey Kinney.

Merrick Avenue Management, LLC, Mr. Albarracin, and Ms. Zamjahn sued Troon Village Association, Cornerstone Properties, Inc., Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association, individual owners and board members, and Amcor Property Professionals, Inc. in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2023-008406), asserting negligence claims that all related to the open gate. Mr. Cordano brought his own case (CV2023-012338), in which Mr. Albarracin and Ms. Zamjahn appeared as defendants. The originally assigned judge, Jay Ryan Adleman, disqualified himself in September 2023, and the case was reassigned to Judge Katherine Cooper. On September 18, 2023, Judge Cooper denied Troon Village Association and Cornerstone’s motion to dismiss, finding the complaint adequately alleged that the TVA CC&Rs are the source of a contractual duty to maintain Common Areas, including the gates. On October 12, 2023, she denied Amcor’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion as well, while noting the ruling did not decide that Amcor actually owed a duty and did not preclude a later summary-judgment motion. In January 2024, all counsel stipulated to consolidating the two cases under CV2023-008406.

Through 2024 the case moved through amended scheduling orders: the trial-setting conference originally set for November 2024 was reset several times, ultimately to August 12, 2025, and Judge Scott Minder assumed the calendar effective June 21, 2024. Meanwhile, default applications against consolidated defendants Patrick Gruchala and Carrie A. Luikens were referred to Commissioner Richard Albrecht, and at a December 2024 order-to-show-cause hearing Ms. Luikens was ordered to appear for a deposition the following January.

On January 29, 2025, Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association and individual defendants Kinney, North, Friedman, Weintraub, Jaffe, and Gold moved for summary judgment on all counts. After oral argument on April 30, 2025, Judge Minder granted the motion the same day in an under-advisement ruling. The court explained that the inoperative gate underlay every claim, so the plaintiffs had to be able to show a jury that Mr. Gruchala entered the community through the Happy Valley Road gate. The undisputed video evidence pointed the other way: he approached the residence from the north, fled north after the shooting, and was recorded moments later on a bicycle on Alma School Road. The plaintiffs admitted they had no evidence he came through the gate and relied on a jury inference, but the court walked through the implausible alternative scenarios such an inference would require and concluded it was not reasonable on the record. A fallback theory — that the long-open gate let the shooter scout the area on an earlier date — was rejected as pure speculation.

The ruling is notable for what the defense did not win. On duty, the court followed Gfeller v. Scottsdale Vista North Townhomes Association and held that the CC&Rs’ allocation of common-area maintenance to the association creates a negligence duty — the association owed the owner plaintiffs, and their invitees, a duty to maintain the gate as part of the common areas. Citing Perez v. Circle K, the court refused the defendants’ invitation to define the duty narrowly as one to prevent an unforeseeable shooting, because that would intertwine duty with breach and causation. It rejected Mr. Cordano’s separate business-invitee theory against the association, since the association had not invited him for business purposes, but still extended the maintenance duty to residents’ invitees. On causation, the court said that if there had been a reasonable basis to conclude the shooter came through the gate, causation would have been for the jury — evidence suggested the association knew of prior security incidents potentially related to the open gate. And among the individual defendants, only Mr. Kinney and Shari Weintraub served on the board on the day of the shooting; the evidence linked only Mr. Kinney to the decision to leave the gate open, so all individual defendants except Mr. Kinney (and Ms. North as his spouse) would have been dismissed in any event. The court also observed that no complaint pleaded a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.

The collected minute entries end in mid-2025 with the case still active. The Troon Fairways defendants filed motions for entry of judgment and attorneys’ fees in May 2025 but withdrew them in June. On June 19, 2025, after an evidentiary default hearing at which Mr. Cordano testified, Commissioner Albrecht entered default judgments against Mr. Gruchala and Ms. Luikens. The claims involving Troon Village Association, Cornerstone Properties, and Amcor — whose own summary-judgment motion had been noted at the April 30 argument — were not resolved in the collected minute entries.

Procedural timeline

Step 2023-02-18 Douglas Cordano is shot in the driveway of the Albarracin/Zamjahn residence inside the Troon Fairways community; the Happy Valley Road entrance gate is inoperative and has been left open at the board president’s direction.

Step 2023 Merrick Avenue Management, LLC, Edward Trenton Albarracin, and Gretchen Marie Zamjahn sue Troon Village Association, Cornerstone Properties, Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association, individual defendants, and Amcor (CV2023-008406); Douglas Cordano files a separate case (CV2023-012338).

Step 2023-09-14 Judge Jay Ryan Adleman disqualifies himself; the case is reassigned to Judge Katherine Cooper.

Step 2023-09-18 Judge Cooper denies Troon Village Association and Cornerstone’s motion to dismiss: the complaint adequately alleges the TVA CC&Rs as the source of a duty to maintain Common Areas, including the gates.

Step 2023-10-12 Judge Cooper denies Amcor’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, without deciding that Amcor actually owed a duty and without precluding a later summary-judgment motion.

Step 2024-01-19 By stipulation of all counsel, CV2023-008406 and CV2023-012338 are consolidated under CV2023-008406.

Step 2024-03-04 to 2024-11-15 Scheduling orders are amended several times; the trial-setting conference is reset from November 2024 ultimately to August 12, 2025, and Judge Scott Minder assumes the calendar effective June 21, 2024.

Step 2024-10-04 Plaintiff’s default applications against consolidated defendants Patrick Gruchala and Carrie A. Luikens are referred to Commissioner Richard Albrecht.

Step 2024-12-02 At an order-to-show-cause hearing on Cordano’s failure-to-appear motion, Ms. Luikens is ordered to appear for a January deposition.

Step 2025-01-29 Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association and individual defendants Kinney, North, Friedman, Weintraub, Jaffe, and Gold move for summary judgment on all counts.

Step 2025-04-30 After oral argument, Judge Minder issues an under-advisement ruling granting the Troon Fairways defendants summary judgment on all counts: a jury could not reasonably infer the shooter entered through the gate, so causation fails, although the CC&Rs did create a duty to maintain the gate for owners and their invitees.

Step 2025-06-13 The Troon Fairways defendants withdraw their May 2025 motions for entry of judgment and attorneys’ fees; the court will not address them.

Step 2025-06-19 After an evidentiary default hearing at which Cordano testifies, Commissioner Albrecht enters default judgments against Patrick Gruchala and Carrie A. Luikens. The collected minute entries end here, with claims against other defendants still pending.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/merrick-avenue-management-v-troon-village-association/raw/: 20 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2023-08-24

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file

2023-08-24_001_default-judgment.pdf

Source 2 2023-09-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2023-09-14_002_minute-entry.pdf

Source 3 2023-09-18

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2023-09-18_003_ruling.pdf

Source 4 2023-10-12

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling denying the Motion to Dismiss.

Download source file

2023-10-12_004_ruling.pdf

Source 5 2024-01-09

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2024-01-09_005_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 6 2024-01-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-01-19_006_minute-entry.pdf

Source 7 2024-03-04

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-03-04_007_minute-entry.pdf

Source 8 2024-05-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-05-13_008_minute-entry.pdf

Source 9 2024-09-19

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-09-19_009_minute-entry.pdf

Source 10 2024-10-04

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Default-judgment entry ordering that no action would be taken by the assigned division because default-judgment papers had to proceed through commissioner procedure.

Download source file

2024-10-04_010_default-judgment.pdf

Source 11 2024-11-15

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-11-15_011_minute-entry.pdf

Source 12 2024-12-02

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-12-02_012_minute-entry.pdf

Source 13 2025-04-01

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-04-01_013_minute-entry.pdf

Source 14 2025-04-08

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-04-08_014_minute-entry.pdf

Source 15 2025-04-08

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2025-04-08_015_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 16 2025-04-30

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting summary judgment for Troon Fairways HOA and the moving individual defendants on the remaining claims.

Download source file

2025-04-30_016_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 17 2025-05-14

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-05-14_017_minute-entry.pdf

Source 18 2025-05-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-05-20_018_minute-entry.pdf

Source 19 2025-06-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-06-13_019_minute-entry.pdf

Source 20 2025-06-19

Default Judgment

Type: Decision or judgment

Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.

Download source file

2025-06-19_020_default-judgment.pdf

FAQ

Why did the case turn on how the shooter entered the community?

Because every negligence claim against the association defendants rested on the allegation that the inoperative, open gate at the Happy Valley Road entrance let the shooter in. The court held the plaintiffs therefore had to give a jury some basis to find that Mr. Gruchala actually entered through that gate. The undisputed security video showed him approaching the residence from the north, fleeing north, and riding a bicycle away on Alma School Road moments later; the plaintiffs admitted they had no evidence of gate entry. The court concluded a jury could not reasonably infer gate entry without setting aside that video evidence, so summary judgment was granted.

Did the court decide the HOA owed no duty to anyone?

No — the opposite. Following Gfeller v. Scottsdale Vista North Townhomes Association, the court held that the CC&Rs’ allocation of common-area maintenance to the association creates a duty for negligence purposes, and it extended that duty not only to owners but also to their invitees, like Mr. Cordano. Citing Perez v. Circle K, it refused to define the duty narrowly as one to prevent an unforeseeable shooting, because that would improperly mix duty with breach and causation. The association won on causation, not duty.

What happened to the individual board members and homeowners who were sued?

All of the moving individual defendants were granted summary judgment. The court also explained that most of them would have exited the case anyway: only Jeffrey Kinney and Shari Weintraub served on the board on the day of the shooting, the evidence linked only Mr. Kinney to the decision to leave the gate open, and no facts tied the Friedmans, the Jaffees, the Golds, or Todd Weintraub to the allegations at all. Neither plaintiff disputed that result.

Did the April 2025 ruling end the whole case?

No. It resolved all counts against Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association and the moving individual defendants only. Troon Village Association and Cornerstone Properties — whose 2023 motion to dismiss had been denied — were not part of the motion, and Amcor’s own summary-judgment motion was noted at the April 30 argument but not decided in the ruling. In June 2025, default judgments were entered against consolidated defendants Patrick Gruchala and Carrie A. Luikens. The collected minute entries end on June 19, 2025 with the case still active.

What is an under-advisement ruling?

When an Arizona superior-court judge takes a motion “under advisement” after briefing or argument, the later written decision is filed as an under-advisement ruling in the court’s minute entries. The April 30, 2025 ruling in this case is that kind of decision: after the morning’s oral argument, the court issued a written order the same day setting out the undisputed facts, the summary-judgment standard, and its analysis of duty, causation, and the individual defendants. These rulings are public records available through the Clerk of the Superior Court.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading for two reasons: it applies Gfeller to hold that CC&R maintenance obligations create a negligence duty running to owners and their invitees, and it shows that duty alone does not carry a case — a plaintiff must still produce evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that the association’s alleged failure actually caused the harm. Note also that the case remained active against other defendants when the collected minute entries end in June 2025, so later rulings may exist.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2023-008406 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	April 30, 2025
Judge / panel	Hon. Scott Minder, Hon. Katherine Cooper
Parties	Merrick Avenue Management, LLC; Edward Trenton Albarracin; Gretchen Marie Zamjahn (Plaintiffs) and Douglas J. Cordano (Consolidated Plaintiff) v. Troon Village Association; Cornerstone Properties, Inc.; Troon Fairways Homeowners Association; Amcor Property Professionals, Inc.; individual board members and homeowners; and consolidated defendants (Defendants)
Topics	CC&RsBoard GovernanceProcedureNegligence
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association and the moving individual defendants summary judgment on all counts because no reasonable jury could infer that the shooter entered the community through the Happy Valley Road gate — the central allegation underlying every claim — while holding that the CC&Rs’ allocation of common-area maintenance to the association creates a negligence duty running to owners and their invitees under Gfeller, and that causation would otherwise have been a jury question.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	20 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	13 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

After Douglas Cordano was shot eight times at point-blank range on February 18, 2023 while parked in the driveway of a Scottsdale home inside the Troon Fairways community, the homeowners (with Merrick Avenue Management, LLC) and Cordano brought negligence suits against Troon Village Association, Cornerstone Properties, Troon Fairways Homeowners’ Association, individual board members and homeowners, and Amcor Property Professionals. Every claim rested on the allegation that the community’s entrance gate off Happy Valley Road — inoperative for days or weeks and left open at the direction of board president Jeffrey Kinney — allowed the shooter, Patrick Gruchala, into the community. In 2023 the court denied motions to dismiss by Troon Village/Cornerstone and Amcor, holding the complaint adequately alleged CC&R-based duties to maintain common areas including the gates, and the two cases were consolidated in January 2024. On April 30, 2025, the court granted the Troon Fairways defendants summary judgment on all counts: undisputed security video showed Gruchala approaching from and fleeing to the north, the plaintiffs admitted they had no evidence of gate entry, and a jury could not reasonably infer he came through the gate — so causation failed even though the court, following Gfeller, found the CC&Rs created a duty to maintain the gate for owners and their invitees. Default judgments against consolidated defendants Gruchala and Carrie Luikens were entered June 19, 2025; the case remained active against other defendants when the collected minute entries end.

Key Issues & Findings

Applying the Orme School standard, the court found the burden shifted to the plaintiffs once the defendants pointed to the undisputed security-camera evidence: Gruchala walked southbound on 104th Way from north of the residence, ran back north immediately after shooting Cordano, and was recorded moments later riding a bicycle southbound on Alma School Road. The plaintiffs admitted they had no evidence he came through the gate and relied entirely on a jury inference. The court walked through the alternative scenarios that inference would require — stashing or retrieving a bicycle over a wall, walking exposed along busy streets, passing the same cameras without triggering them — and concluded no jury could reasonably draw it, particularly given short walls and an ungated golf-cart opening beside the gate. A fallback theory that the long-open gate let Gruchala scout the area on an earlier day was rejected as pure speculation, noting he had searched the address online and no evidence showed any prior entry.

On duty, the court followed Gfeller v. Scottsdale Vista North Townhomes Association and held that the CC&Rs — which obligate the association to manage, maintain, repair, replace, and improve the Common Areas, with assessments used to promote the recreation, health, safety and welfare of the Owners — create a negligence duty to owner-members to maintain the common areas, including the entrance gate. Citing Perez v. Circle K, it refused to define the duty narrowly as one to prevent an unforeseeable targeted shooting, because framing duty that way would improperly intertwine it with breach and causation. The court rejected Cordano’s business-invitee theory against the association, since the association had not invited him for any business purpose, but nonetheless found the maintenance duty ran to residents’ invitees as well. Summary judgment therefore could not rest on absence of duty as to any plaintiff.

On causation, the court held the plaintiffs’ inability to show gate entry was dispositive: without it, the open gate could not have caused any damages. It emphasized that if a reasonable basis for gate entry existed, causation would have gone to the jury, because evidence suggested the association knew of prior security incidents potentially related to the open gate and of the security value of a working gate. Separately, only Kinney and Shari Weintraub served on the board on the day of the shooting; evidence linked only Kinney to the decision to leave the gate open, so all individual defendants except Kinney (and North as his spouse) were entitled to judgment regardless — a result neither plaintiff disputed. The court also noted that no complaint pleaded negligent infliction of emotional distress and declined to limit the recoverable damages on the summary-judgment record. In June 2025 the Fairways defendants withdrew their motions for entry of judgment and attorneys’ fees, and default judgments were entered against consolidated defendants Gruchala and Luikens.

Why It Matters

This case is a clear illustration of how Arizona courts treat an association’s CC&R maintenance obligations in tort. Following Gfeller, the court held that when a declaration assigns common-area maintenance — here, a community entrance gate — to an association, that assignment creates a negligence duty for purposes of a lawsuit, and the duty runs not only to owner-members but to their invitees. Boards cannot assume that a criminal act by a third party, or the fact that an injury happened on a private driveway, erases the basic duty to maintain what the CC&Rs put in their charge; under Perez v. Circle K, those arguments go to breach and causation, not duty.

At the same time, the ruling shows that duty alone does not decide a case. The plaintiffs lost because they could not produce evidence from which a jury could reasonably find the open gate actually mattered — the shooter’s recorded movements pointed to a different entry route, and speculation could not fill the gap. For individual board members, the decision is also instructive: directors who were not on the board at the relevant time, or whom no evidence ties to the challenged decision, were entitled to exit the case, while the board president who directed that the broken gate be left open was the one individual with potential exposure. As a superior-court decision it binds only these parties, and the case remained active against other defendants — including Troon Village Association, Cornerstone Properties, and Amcor Property Professionals — when the collected minute entries end in June 2025.

← Back to Superior Court cases

Pat Mah v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc.: Arizona HOA Superior Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Assessments & Records | A.R.S. §§ 33-1255, 33-1258 | CV2021-018876

In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, a condominium owner whose unit has no balcony argued she could not be assessed for balcony repairs and that the association mishandled her records requests. The court held the recorded Declaration—not the Condominium Act’s default rule—controls how limited-common-element costs are allocated, found the 2020 balcony work was repair rather than structural alteration, and rejected the records claim because A.R.S. § 33-1258 creates no private right of action and no specific withheld document was identified.

Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Pat Mah v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-018876.

Download summary-judgment ruling

Scope note: This page covers Pat Mah v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2021-018876) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the September 26, 2022 under-advisement ruling and the December 29, 2025 summary-judgment ruling; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: final judgment was entered April 30, 2026 and the homeowner’s appeal was pending when this page was last updated — the outcome could change on appeal. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.

The takeaway

The superior court granted the Association summary judgment on every remaining claim. It held that the recorded Declaration makes maintenance, repair, and replacement of limited common elements such as balconies a Common Expense shared equally by all unit owners — a permissible deviation from the default allocation in A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) — and that the 2020 balcony work was repair rather than a structural alteration requiring a special assessment. The homeowner’s records claim failed because A.R.S. § 33-1258 does not create a private right of action and, in any event, most requested documents had already been disclosed and no specific improperly withheld document was identified.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Pat Mah (Plaintiff)
Condominium owner in the Canterra at Squaw Peak community whose unit has patios rather than a balcony; represented by counsel for most of the case and self-represented by the time of the 2025 summary-judgment ruling.
John Sud (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff Pat Mah in the early phase of the case, including the 2022 motion-to-dismiss briefing and argument.
Andrew B. Turk (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for Plaintiff Pat Mah at the September 26, 2022 oral argument.
Jonathan A. Dessaules (Counsel)
Dessaules Law Group
Counsel of record for Plaintiff Pat Mah during the 2024 amended-complaint phase.

Respondent Side

Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Phoenix condominium association that assessed the 2020 balcony repair work to all unit owners as a Common Expense and prevailed on every claim.
Henry Nickolas Eicher (Counsel)
Counsel of record for the Association through the motion-to-dismiss and amended-complaint phases.
Jonathan D. Ebertshauser (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the Association, including at the September 26, 2022 oral argument.
Kyle Banfield (Counsel)
Counsel for the Association in the summary-judgment and post-judgment phase, including the fee application.

Neutral Parties

Scott A. Blaney (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the September 2022 under-advisement ruling, the December 2025 summary-judgment ruling, and the post-judgment rulings.
Margaret R. Mahoney (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge assigned earlier in the case; set the 2022 oral argument on the partial motion to dismiss.

What happened

Canterra at Squaw Peak is a Phoenix condominium community governed by a recorded Declaration (CC&Rs). Some units have balconies and walk decks, which the Declaration classifies as limited common elements serving a single unit; other units, including Pat Mah’s, have patios instead. Under Section 4.2 of the Declaration, the Association is responsible for maintaining, repairing, and replacing the limited common elements as part of the community’s Common Expenses, and under Section 6.7 all regular assessments are fixed at an equal amount for every unit.

In 2020 the Association performed repair work on certain balconies and walk decks and assessed the cost against all unit owners. Mah sued the Association in late 2021. She sought a declaratory judgment that she could not be assessed for balcony repairs — arguing that a 1996 amendment to the CC&Rs limited those costs to the owners who actually benefit from the balconies — and that the work should have been funded through a special assessment on the benefited owners.

The Association moved to dismiss. After full briefing and an oral argument at which the court struck improper attachments from both sides, Judge Scott Blaney issued an under-advisement ruling on September 26, 2022. The court found that the Declaration allocates limited-common-element repair costs to all owners as a Common Expense, and that this deviation from the default allocation in A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) — which would assign such costs to the benefited units — is expressly permitted by the statute’s opening qualifier, “[u]nless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” The court dismissed the 1996-amendment claim and ordered the parties to meet and confer or mediate.

In February 2024 the court granted Mah leave to file a first amended complaint, but only in part: the dismissed 1996-amendment claim could not be revived. The amended complaint asserted declaratory relief, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a claim that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1258 by failing to allow reasonable access to association records. The claims rested on allegations that the Association paid for balcony repairs without authority, owed her reimbursement for window and door maintenance, and used improper budgeting to create a “slush fund.”

The Association moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims. After an October 29, 2025 oral argument, the court granted the motion in a December 29, 2025 under-advisement ruling. It found the 2020 balcony work was “repair, maintenance, and/or replacement” rather than a structural alteration or addition, so the Association was authorized to pay for it with regular assessments; the contract and good-faith claims failed for the same reasons, and the slush-fund arguments were “confusing and unsupported by the record.” On the records claim, the court held that A.R.S. § 33-1258 does not create a private right of action, that most of the requested documents had already been disclosed before and during the litigation, and that Mah identified no specific document the Association improperly withheld.

The endgame ran through spring 2026. The court denied Mah’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief in January, rejected her attempt to supplement it in February, and on April 30, 2026 entered a formal judgment against her that included the Association’s attorneys’ fees and costs. In May 2026 the court denied her motion for a stay pending appeal and to set a bond, and her appeal remained pending when this page was last updated.

Video overview of the ruling

An AI-generated video overview of Pat Mah v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc. (CV2021-018876 (Maricopa County Superior Court)). Declaration made limited-common-element balcony repairs a common expense shared by all condo owners. This plain-language summary was generated from the court’s filings; the court’s own ruling controls.

Listen: audio deep dive on the ruling

An AI-generated audio deep dive walking through the court’s reasoning and disposition in Pat Mah v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc.. Generated from the case filings; verify against the linked ruling below.

Audio overview generated with Google NotebookLM from the case’s court filings.

Procedural timeline

Step 2020 The Association performs repair work on certain balconies and walk decks and assesses the cost to all unit owners as a Common Expense.

Step 2021 (late) Pat Mah sues the Association in Maricopa County Superior Court (CV2021-018876), seeking a declaratory judgment on the balcony-repair assessments.

Step 2022-01-26 The Association files a partial motion to dismiss.

Step 2022-09-26 After oral argument, the court issues an under-advisement ruling: the Declaration controls the allocation of limited-common-element costs, the 1996-amendment claim is dismissed, and the parties are ordered to meet and confer or mediate.

Step 2024-02-13 The court grants Mah leave to file a first amended complaint in part; the dismissed 1996-amendment claim may not be revived.

Step 2025-10-29 Oral argument on the Association’s motion for summary judgment.

Step 2025-12-29 Under-advisement ruling grants the Association summary judgment on all remaining claims, including the A.R.S. § 33-1258 records claim, and orders Rule 54(c) judgment procedures.

Step 2026-01-20 The court denies Mah’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief; her later motion to supplement it is rejected in February.

Step 2026-04-30 Formal judgment against Mah — including the Association’s attorneys’ fees and costs — is signed April 29 and entered April 30, 2026.

Step 2026-05-18 The court denies Mah’s motion for a stay pending appeal and request to set a bond; the appeal remains pending.

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/pat-mah-v-canterra-at-squaw-peak-condominium-association/raw/: 24 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2022-06-06

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2022-06-06_001_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 2 2022-09-26

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling dismissing the 1996-amendment assessment theory but allowing other contract and records claims to proceed.

Download source file

2022-09-26_002_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 3 2022-09-26

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2022-09-26_003_oral-argument.pdf

Source 4 2022-10-13

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-10-13_004_minute-entry.pdf

Source 5 2022-11-28

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2022-11-28_005_ruling.pdf

Source 6 2023-05-12

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2023-05-12_006_minute-entry.pdf

Source 7 2023-06-23

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2023-06-23_007_minute-entry.pdf

Source 8 2024-02-13

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling allowing a first amended complaint in part while barring revival of the dismissed 1996-amendment assessment claim.

Download source file

2024-02-13_008_ruling.pdf

Source 9 2024-04-17

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-04-17_009_minute-entry.pdf

Source 10 2024-05-07

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-05-07_010_ruling.pdf

Source 11 2024-07-01

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-07-01_011_minute-entry.pdf

Source 12 2024-07-08

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-07-08_012_ruling.pdf

Source 13 2024-08-02

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-08-02_013_ruling.pdf

Source 14 2024-08-20

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2024-08-20_014_minute-entry.pdf

Source 15 2024-11-22

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling denying the homeowner’s clarification request and holding the prior assessment ruling was clear.

Download source file

2024-11-22_015_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 16 2025-01-21

Minute Entry

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2025-01-21_016_minute-entry.pdf

Source 17 2025-08-26

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2025-08-26_017_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 18 2025-10-15

Oral Argument Set

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2025-10-15_018_oral-argument-set.pdf

Source 19 2025-10-29

Oral Argument

Type: Court/source PDF

Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.

Download source file

2025-10-29_019_oral-argument.pdf

Source 20 2025-12-29

Under Advisement Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment on all remaining claims, including the A.R.S. § 33-1258 records claim.

Download source file

2025-12-29_020_under-advisement-ruling.pdf

Source 21 2026-01-20

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2026-01-20_021_ruling.pdf

Source 22 2026-02-09

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Ruling rejecting Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement Plaintiff’s Request for Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6).

Download source file

2026-02-09_022_ruling.pdf

Source 23 2026-04-30

Judgment Entered

Type: Decision or judgment

Judgment entry approving and settling final judgment against Pat Mah after the association’s fee-and-cost application.

Download source file

2026-04-30_023_judgment-entered.pdf

Source 24 2026-05-18

Ruling

Type: Court order/minute entry

Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.

Download source file

2026-05-18_024_ruling.pdf

FAQ

Why did a unit owner without a balcony have to help pay for balcony repairs?

Because the community’s recorded Declaration says so. The Declaration classifies balconies and walk decks as limited common elements, makes their maintenance, repair, and replacement a Common Expense of the Association, and fixes regular assessments at an equal amount for every unit. The court held that this allocation is a permissible deviation from A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), whose default rule assigning limited-common-element costs to the benefited units applies only “[u]nless otherwise provided for in the declaration.”

What is the difference between a regular assessment and a special assessment in this case?

Under the Declaration, ordinary maintenance, repair, and replacement of common and limited common elements is funded through equal regular assessments on all units. Structural alterations or additions to a building require prior approval by a majority of owners and first mortgagees and are funded through a special assessment allocated by ownership interest. The case turned in part on this line: the court found the 2020 balcony work was repair, maintenance, and/or replacement — not a structural alteration — so regular assessments were the proper funding mechanism.

Why did the records claim under A.R.S. § 33-1258 fail?

Two independent reasons. First, the court held the statute does not create a private right of action for an allegedly aggrieved party. Second, the Association showed through the record that most of the documents Mah sought had already been disclosed to her before and during the litigation, and her remaining requests were vague, broad categories; she identified no specific document that was improperly withheld.

What is an under-advisement ruling?

When an Arizona superior-court judge takes a motion “under advisement” after briefing or argument, the later written decision is filed as an under-advisement ruling in the court’s minute entries. These rulings are the trial court’s substantive written decisions — the September 2022 and December 2025 rulings in this case each set out findings, legal analysis, and orders — and they are public records available through the Clerk of the Superior Court.

Did the homeowner recover anything?

No. The court dismissed her core declaratory theory in 2022, granted the Association summary judgment on every remaining claim in December 2025, denied her Rule 60(b)(6) motion, and in April 2026 entered judgment against her that included the Association’s attorneys’ fees and costs. In May 2026 the court also denied her request for a stay pending appeal.

Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?

No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The case is still useful reading: it shows how courts apply a condominium declaration’s cost-allocation provisions over the Condominium Act’s defaults, and what a records-access claim under A.R.S. § 33-1258 needs to survive. Note that an appeal was pending when this page was last updated, so the outcome could still change.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	CV2021-018876 (Maricopa County Superior Court)
Court / tribunal	Superior Court
Decision / key date	December 29, 2025
Judge / panel	Hon. Scott A. Blaney, Hon. Margaret R. Mahoney
Parties	Pat Mah (Plaintiff, condominium owner) v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc. (Defendant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1255 A.R.S. § 33-1258
Topics	AssessmentsCC&RsRecords RequestsProcedureAttorney Fees
Outcome / holding	The superior court granted the association summary judgment on all remaining claims, holding that the Declaration permissibly allocates limited-common-element repair costs to all unit owners as an equal Common Expense notwithstanding A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)’s default rule, that the 2020 balcony work was repair rather than a structural alteration requiring a special assessment, and that the A.R.S. § 33-1258 records claim failed both because the statute creates no private right of action and because no specific improperly withheld document was identified.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	24 PDFs
Step-by-step docket roadmap	10 roadmap entries
Video overview	Pat Mah v. Canterra at Squaw Peak Condominium Association, Inc.
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

A Phoenix condominium owner whose unit has patios rather than a balcony sued her association after it assessed 2020 balcony and walk-deck repair costs against all unit owners. She sought a declaratory judgment that a 1996 CC&R amendment limited those costs to the owners who benefit from the balconies, and later added claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant, and denial of records access under A.R.S. § 33-1258. In a September 2022 under-advisement ruling the court dismissed the core declaratory theory, holding that the recorded Declaration makes limited-common-element repairs a Common Expense shared equally by all units and that this deviation from A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)’s default allocation is expressly permitted by the statute. In a December 2025 under-advisement ruling the court granted the association summary judgment on all remaining claims, finding the 2020 balcony work was repair rather than structural alteration and that the records claim failed because the statute creates no private right of action and no specific withheld document was identified. Judgment with attorneys’ fees and costs was entered against the owner in April 2026; her appeal is pending.

Key Issues & Findings

On the assessment question, the court’s September 2022 under-advisement ruling walked through the Declaration: Section 3.5 classifies balconies and walk decks as limited common elements; Section 4.2 makes their maintenance, repair, and replacement part of the Common Expenses the association bears; and Section 6.7 fixes all regular assessments at an equal amount for every unit. The court acknowledged that the Arizona Condominium Act’s default rule, A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), would allocate limited-common-element expenses to the units that benefit from their exclusive use, but held the Declaration’s different allocation controls because the statute applies only “[u]nless otherwise provided for in the declaration.” On that basis the court dismissed the claim that a 1996 amendment restricted balcony-repair costs to benefited owners, adopting the association’s interpretation of the Declaration and declining to reach its res judicata and collateral estoppel defenses.

At summary judgment in December 2025, the court found the association had established through competent record evidence — and the court’s own earlier rulings — that the 2020 balcony work was repair, maintenance, and/or replacement rather than a structural alteration or addition, so the association was authorized to fund it through regular assessments rather than the special-assessment mechanism reserved for structural changes. The declaratory, breach-of-contract, and implied-covenant claims all failed on that same footing, and the court found the plaintiff’s “slush fund” budgeting arguments confusing and unsupported by the record.

On the records claim, the court gave two independent grounds: A.R.S. § 33-1258 does not create a private right of action for an allegedly aggrieved party, and the record showed most of the requested documents had already been disclosed before and during the litigation while the remaining requests were vague, broad categories. Because the plaintiff identified no specific document improperly withheld, summary judgment was warranted. The court then denied her Rule 60(b)(6) motion for lack of good cause, entered judgment including the association’s attorneys’ fees and costs in April 2026, and denied a stay pending appeal in May 2026.

Why It Matters

This case is a clear, recent illustration of two recurring Arizona condominium fights. First, cost allocation: owners often assume the Condominium Act guarantees that only the units that benefit from a limited common element — a balcony, a walk deck — pay for its upkeep. The ruling shows that A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) is only a default; a recorded declaration that spreads those costs equally across all units controls, even for owners whose units lack the element entirely.

Second, records access: the court held A.R.S. § 33-1258 creates no private right of action and that a records plaintiff must point to specific documents actually withheld — broad categorical demands, or requests for material already produced, will not survive summary judgment. The decision also shows the financial risk of pressing weak claims: the owner ended the case with a judgment against her for the association’s attorneys’ fees and costs. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties, and an appeal was pending as of mid-2026.

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In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Bankruptcy & Assessments | 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) | 451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)

In this 2011 published decision, Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines held that an individual Chapter 11 debtor stays personally liable for post-petition homeowner- and condominium-association assessments—and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them—for as long as the debtor retains title, because neither stay relief nor plan confirmation transfers legal title.

Federal court | 451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011) | Decided 2011-05-26

Read the source opinion FAQ

Scope note: This educational page summarizes In re Shawn Burgueno, Debtor, a Federal court HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.

Source note: The page keeps the public source URL but does not provide a local ruling PDF because no source PDF passed the file gate.

This federal bankruptcy authority was issued by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona.

The takeaway

Post-petition homeowners’ and condominium-association assessments, and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them, remain nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the property. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan transfers legal title or terminates that liability, which continues until title actually transfers—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer. Attorneys’ fees provided for in the CC&Rs qualify as a nondischargeable “fee” within § 523(a)(16).

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Shawn Burgueno (Debtor)
Individual Chapter 11 debtor and record owner of the Scottsdale condominium; moved to have the associations’ post-petition claims limited to their allowed pre-petition amounts under the confirmed plan; motion denied.
D. Lamar Hawkins (Counsel)
Aiken Schenk Hawkins & Ricciardi PC
Counsel for the debtor, Shawn Burgueno; the only attorney named in the published opinion.

Respondent Side

Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association (Creditor)
Condominium association that continued to bill the debtor for post-petition assessments; argued the plan could not discharge those assessments while the debtor held title. Its counsel is not identified in the published opinion, so no Carpenter Hazlewood/CHDB Law connection could be verified.
Grayhawk Community Association (Creditor)
Master community association that likewise sought post-petition assessments and collection attorneys’ fees. Its counsel is not identified in the published opinion, so no Carpenter Hazlewood/CHDB Law connection could be verified.

Neutral Parties

Randolph J. Haines (Judge)
United States Bankruptcy Judge for the District of Arizona; authored the Opinion and Order denying discharge of the post-petition HOA fees and attorneys’ fees.

What happened

Shawn Burgueno, a Phoenix-area loan officer, filed an individual Chapter 11 case (No. 2:09-bk-10375-RJH) in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona in 2009. His scheduled assets included his home, a vacant lot, and five single-family residential investment properties; according to his schedules, all of the investment properties were worth less than the debts secured by them. One investment property was a condominium in Scottsdale, subject to assessments by two associations—the Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and the Grayhawk Community Association.

In February 2010, Burgueno stipulated with Wells Fargo Bank for relief from the automatic stay so the bank could immediately foreclose on the condominium. The stipulation terminated the § 362 automatic stay as to the bank’s interest in the property and waived the 14-day stay under Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3). The bankruptcy court approved the stipulation on March 8, 2010.

Burgueno’s Chapter 11 plan was confirmed in August 2010. The order confirming the plan expressly incorporated the Wells Fargo stipulation for treatment of the bank’s claim regarding the Scottsdale condominium.

Despite obtaining stay relief, Wells Fargo did not conduct a foreclosure or trustee’s sale of the condominium for more than a year. In the meantime, the two associations continued to bill Burgueno for post-petition assessments, which totaled roughly $8,000 by April 2011.

In April 2011, Burgueno filed motions seeking orders determining that the associations were bound by his confirmed plan and therefore limited to their allowed pre-petition claims. The associations responded that the plan neither did nor could discharge their post-petition assessments so long as Burgueno held legal title, and that neither the stipulated stay relief nor the plan confirmation terminated that title.

On May 26, 2011, Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denied the motion. He held the post-petition assessments—and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them—nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(16) and 1141(d) for as long as Burgueno retained a legal, equitable, or possessory interest in the unit. Because the associations had not requested a money judgment and the dispute was a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the court entered no judgment but denied the debtor’s motion to compel plan compliance.

This published bankruptcy decision is frequently cited for the proposition that an individual debtor’s personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association assessments does not stop at the bankruptcy filing or at stay relief—it continues, post-petition, for as long as the debtor holds legal title to the unit. For Arizona associations, it confirms that assessments (and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them) keep accruing as nondischargeable obligations until title actually transfers by foreclosure or conveyance, even where the lender has obtained relief from the automatic stay but delays foreclosing. For owners and their counsel, the case is a cautionary lesson about “surrendering” investment property in bankruptcy: giving up possession and consenting to foreclosure does not, by itself, cut off assessment liability. To stop the clock, the debtor generally must affirmatively transfer title—through a court-approved quit-claim deed under § 363(b)(1) or a plan transfer under § 1123(a)(5)(B)—rather than wait for a lender that may take a year or more to foreclose. The decision also underscores that a Chapter 11 plan will not discharge post-petition HOA fees unless it says so expressly and the association fails to object.

Litigation record

Step 1 2009

Shawn Burgueno files an individual Chapter 11 bankruptcy case (No. 2:09-bk-10375-RJH) in the District of Arizona; his assets include a Scottsdale condominium subject to two associations’ assessments.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 2 2010-02-16

Burgueno stipulates with Wells Fargo Bank for relief from the automatic stay so the bank can foreclose on the condominium, waiving the 14-day stay under Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(3).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 3 2010-03-08

The bankruptcy court approves the Wells Fargo stay-relief stipulation.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 4 2010-08-31

Burgueno’s Chapter 11 plan is confirmed; the confirmation order incorporates the Wells Fargo stipulation for treatment of the condominium claim.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 5 2011-04

Wells Fargo still has not foreclosed; post-petition assessments total roughly $8,000. Burgueno moves to have the associations’ claims deemed controlled by the confirmed plan and limited to their pre-petition amounts.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 6 2011-05-26

Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denies the motion, holding the post-petition assessments and collection attorneys’ fees nondischargeable under §§ 523(a)(16) and 1141(d).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

FAQ

What did In re Burgueno decide?

The bankruptcy court held that an individual Chapter 11 debtor’s personal liability for post-petition homeowner- and condominium-association assessments—and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them—remains nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of the debtor’s plan ended that liability, so the court denied the debtor’s motion to limit the associations to their pre-petition claims.

What is 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16)?

Section 523(a)(16) is a bankruptcy discharge exception for homeowner- and condominium-association fees and assessments. Before the 2005 BAPCPA amendments it applied only while the debtor occupied the property, but the amendment expanded it so that it applies regardless of possession as long as the debtor or the trustee retains a legal or equitable ownership interest in the unit. The exception covers not only “assessments” but also “a fee,” which the court read to include collection attorneys’ fees.

Why didn’t stay relief or plan confirmation end the debtor’s liability for HOA fees?

The court explained that nothing in § 523(a)(16) or § 1141 terminates post-petition liability when a debtor obtains stay relief or confirms a plan, because neither event transfers legal title. Stay relief may signal that the debtor has surrendered possession, but the debtor remained the record owner of the condominium. As long as the debtor holds title, post-petition assessments continue to accrue as nondischargeable obligations.

Are an association’s attorneys’ fees for collecting assessments also nondischargeable?

Yes. The court held that attorneys’ fees the associations incurred collecting the assessments are themselves a nondischargeable “fee” under § 523(a)(16). The CC&Rs—which Arizona treats as a contract—expressly provided for collection fees, and even a narrow reading of the discharge exception could not exclude attorneys’ fees. The court relied on Ninth Circuit BAP and Seventh Circuit authority reaching the same conclusion.

How could the debtor have stopped the post-petition assessments from accruing?

The court explained that to end the liability the debtor would have had to transfer legal title rather than wait for the lender to foreclose. Options included conveying the unit by quit-claim deed—an out-of-the-ordinary-course transaction requiring a motion, notice, hearing, and court order under § 363(b)(1)—or transferring title through the plan under § 1123(a)(5)(B). Until title actually passed, the nondischargeable liability continued.

Is this decision binding precedent?

It is a published, precedential decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona (451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)), authored by Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines. As a trial-level bankruptcy opinion it binds the parties and is persuasive, frequently cited authority on the post-petition, nondischargeable nature of HOA and condominium assessments; it is not an appellate decision, so other courts are not strictly bound by it.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	451 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011)
Court / tribunal	Federal Court
Decision / key date	May 26, 2011
Judge / panel	Haines
Parties	Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and Grayhawk Community Association (Creditors/Respondents) v. Shawn Burgueno (Debtor/Movant)
Governing law	11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (incl. (a), (d)(2), (d)(5)) 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) 11 U.S.C. § 362 (automatic stay) 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(B) A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (attorneys’ fees) A.R.S. § 33-401(B) A.R.S. § 33-402 (quit-claim deed) Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6)
Topics	BankruptcyLiensAssessmentsAttorney FeesCC&RsForeclosure
Outcome / holding	Post-petition homeowners’ and condominium-association assessments, and the attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting them, remain nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the property. Neither relief from the automatic stay nor confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan transfers legal title or terminates that liability, which continues until title actually transfers—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer. Attorneys’ fees provided for in the CC&Rs qualify as a nondischargeable “fee” within § 523(a)(16).
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	No raw source-folder files found for this slug
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	0 download links

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

In re Burgueno arose from the individual Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Shawn Burgueno, a Phoenix-area loan officer whose properties included a Scottsdale condominium subject to assessments by two associations, the Edge at Grayhawk Condominium Association and the Grayhawk Community Association. In February 2010 Burgueno stipulated to relief from the automatic stay so that Wells Fargo Bank could foreclose on the condominium, and his Chapter 11 plan was confirmed in August 2010. Wells Fargo, however, did not foreclose for more than a year, and during that time the two associations kept billing Burgueno for post-petition assessments, which reached roughly $8,000 by April 2011. Burgueno moved for orders declaring that the associations were bound by his confirmed plan and limited to their allowed pre-petition claims. Bankruptcy Judge Randolph J. Haines denied the motion. Applying 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) as expanded by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments, the court held that an individual debtor’s personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association fees continues after the bankruptcy filing for as long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Because neither stay relief nor plan confirmation transfers legal title, Burgueno remained personally liable until title actually passed—by foreclosure, a quit-claim deed, or a plan transfer of title. The court further held that the attorneys’ fees the associations incurred in collecting the assessments are themselves a nondischargeable “fee” under § 523(a)(16), supported both by the CC&Rs (a contract under Arizona law) and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Because the associations sought no money judgment and this was not an adversary proceeding, the court entered no judgment but denied the debtor’s motion to compel plan compliance.

Key Issues & Findings

The court began with the plain language of § 523(a)(16). Before the 2005 BAPCPA amendments the exception applied only when the debtor occupied the property; as the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel explained in In re Foster, the amendment expanded the exception so it applies regardless of possession, so long as the debtor or trustee retains a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in the unit. Nothing in § 523(a)(16) or § 1141 terminates that post-petition liability upon stay relief or plan confirmation.

The court acknowledged that post-petition, pre-confirmation fees are administrative expenses that § 1129(a)(9)(A) requires be paid in full on the effective date, but that plan treatment did not apply here because the associations filed neither a proof of claim nor an application for allowance of an administrative expense; and § 1141(d)(2) makes clear that individual Chapter 11 debtors are not discharged from debts excepted under § 523. Had the plan expressly discharged the post-petition fees and the associations failed to object despite adequate notice, that provision would be res judicata under the Supreme Court’s decision in Espinosa—but this plan did not so provide, and the court cautioned that the “specter” of Rule 11 penalties should deter bad-faith attempts to discharge otherwise nondischargeable debts by such an ambush.

The core problem was that the bank failed to foreclose for more than a year after obtaining stay relief—an increasingly frequent occurrence. While stay relief may signal the debtor’s surrender of possession, surrender does not terminate legal title; following the Massachusetts bankruptcy court in In re Ames, the court held that post-petition assessments remain nondischargeable while the debtor remains the record owner. To end the liability, the debtor would have to convey title—by quit-claim deed (an out-of-the-ordinary-course transaction requiring a motion, notice, hearing, and order under § 363(b)(1)) or by a plan transfer of title under § 1123(a)(5)(B).

On attorneys’ fees, the court noted that Arizona treats the CC&Rs as a contract (Pinetop Lakes Ass’n v. Hatch), and that while A.R.S. § 12-341.01 might not apply because the contract was not the central issue in the litigation, the CC&Rs themselves expressly provided for collection fees. Moreover, § 523(a)(16) excepts not only “assessments” but also “a fee,” and even a narrow construction of the exception cannot exclude attorneys’ fees; the Ninth Circuit BAP (Foster) and the Seventh Circuit (In re Busson-Sokolik) reached the same conclusion. The court therefore held the fees nondischargeable but declined to enter a money judgment, because the associations had not requested one and the matter was a contested motion rather than an adversary proceeding under Bankruptcy Rule 7001(6).

Why It Matters

This published bankruptcy decision is frequently cited for the proposition that an individual debtor’s personal liability for homeowner- and condominium-association assessments does not stop at the bankruptcy filing or at stay relief—it continues, post-petition, for as long as the debtor holds legal title to the unit. For Arizona associations, it confirms that assessments (and the CC&R-based attorneys’ fees for collecting them) keep accruing as nondischargeable obligations until title actually transfers by foreclosure or conveyance, even where the lender has obtained relief from the automatic stay but delays foreclosing.

For owners and their counsel, the case is a cautionary lesson about “surrendering” investment property in bankruptcy: giving up possession and consenting to foreclosure does not, by itself, cut off assessment liability. To stop the clock, the debtor generally must affirmatively transfer title—through a court-approved quit-claim deed under § 363(b)(1) or a plan transfer under § 1123(a)(5)(B)—rather than wait for a lender that may take a year or more to foreclose. The decision also underscores that a Chapter 11 plan will not discharge post-petition HOA fees unless it says so expressly and the association fails to object.

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AZNH Revocable Trust v. Sunland Springs Village Homeowners Association: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Open Meetings | A.R.S. § 33-1804 | 1 CA-CV 25-0424

An Arizona homeowner challenged a Sunland Springs HOA board that voted on budgets, spending, age-waivers, and foreclosures behind closed doors. Division One held that boards may deliberate but not vote in closed session, and that closed-meeting agendas must meaningfully describe what will be addressed.

Arizona Court of Appeals | 1 CA-CV 25-0424 | Decided 2026-04-28

Download the ruling PDF FAQ

Scope note: This educational page summarizes AZNH Revocable Trust v. Sunland Springs Village Homeowners Association, a Arizona Court of Appeals HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.

This is a published Arizona open-meetings landmark for planned-community board action under A.R.S. section 33-1804.

The takeaway

Under A.R.S. § 33-1804, a planned-community association must take all votes and formal actions at open meetings; a board may discuss or deliberate on the subsection (A) topics during a closed (executive) portion but may not vote or decide there, because ‘consideration’ means thought and discussion, not voting. The statute’s open-meeting policy in subsection (F) applies to all meetings, so a meeting agenda—including for a closed portion—must contain information reasonably necessary to apprise members of the matters to be addressed; merely citing the subsection (A) paragraph that justifies closure is insufficient, though associations need not disclose personally identifying or attorney-client privileged information. A board may delegate its subsection (C) duty to identify the reason for closing a meeting. The court affirmed that the association’s notices complied with the statute, reversed as to the agendas, and remanded for factual development on whether the board properly delegated the closure-reason duty. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; costs awarded to neither party.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

AZNH Revocable Trust (Plaintiff)
Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee; referred to in the opinion as ‘Homeowner.’ Holds residential property in the Sunland Springs Village planned community and brought the declaratory-judgment action alleging open-meeting violations.
John F. Sullivan (Counsel)
Law Offices of John F. Sullivan (Chandler)
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee AZNH Revocable Trust (the Homeowner); listed in the opinion as John Sullivan, Chandler.

Respondent Side

Sunland Springs Village Homeowners Association (Defendant)
Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant; the homeowners association governing the Sunland Springs Village planned community, subject to A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16.
Lisa M. Lampkin (Counsel)
Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP (Scottsdale)
Co-counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Sunland Springs Village HOA.
Megan E. Ritenour (Counsel)
Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP (Scottsdale)
Co-counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Sunland Springs Village HOA.
Chad M. Gallacher (Counsel)
Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. (Mesa)
Co-counsel for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Sunland Springs Village HOA; Maxwell & Morgan is an Arizona community-association law firm.

Neutral Parties

James B. Morse Jr. (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Authored the opinion of the court.
Andrew M. Jacobs (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Presiding Judge; joined the opinion.
Brian Y. Furuya (Judge)
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One
Judge; joined the opinion.
Hon. Rodrick J. Coffey (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Trial judge who granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part in No. CV2023-096192.

What happened

Sunland Springs Village is a planned community in Maricopa County, Arizona, subject to Arizona’s Planned Community Act (A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, §§ 33-1801 to 33-1820). The community is governed by a homeowners association that conducts its business through board of directors’ meetings, some of which are closed to residents. The homeowner in this case owns residential property in the community and holds it through the AZNH Revocable Trust.

According to the opinion, Sunland Springs did not permit residents to attend its closed meetings except by invitation, and its board president determined what business would be addressed in closed sessions. Before a closed meeting, the association gave members notice of the date, time, and place and quoted the language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that allows meetings to be closed. Its closed-meeting agendas identified matters only by the paragraph of Section 33-1804(A) corresponding to the topic.

The opinion states that Sunland Springs conducted formal business and voting during its closed meetings. Among other things, the board approved a $917,000 budget item, granted the community manager up to $7,000 in discretionary spending authority, addressed 13 waivers of the community’s minimum-age requirement for residents, and authorized foreclosures against two homeowners—all in closed session.

In December 2023, the homeowner filed a declaratory-judgment action in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2023-096192), alleging that Sunland Springs failed to conduct its meetings in compliance with Section 33-1804. After initial discovery, the homeowner moved for summary judgment on three points: that the board improperly voted and took formal action in closed meetings; that it had to designate closed-meeting agenda items by formal action at open meetings; and that its notices and agendas for closed meetings were deficient.

The superior court, the Honorable Rodrick J. Coffey presiding, granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part. It agreed that Section 33-1804 required votes to occur in open session, but held that the statute did not require the board to select closed-meeting agenda items by formal action at an open meeting, and did not require notices or agendas to describe closed-meeting topics beyond citing the applicable paragraph of Section 33-1804(A). The parties agreed the ruling resolved all claims, the court entered a final judgment under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), and both sides appealed.

On April 28, 2026, Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a published opinion authored by Judge James B. Morse Jr. and joined by Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Brian Y. Furuya. The court affirmed that all votes and formal actions must occur at open meetings and that the content of the association’s notices complied with the statute. It reversed on the agenda issue, holding that closed-meeting agendas must reasonably describe the matters to be addressed, and it remanded for factual development on whether the board properly delegated to its president the duty to identify the reason for closing a meeting.

Because both parties prevailed in part, the court declined to award costs on appeal to either side and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. As of the opinion’s issuance, a petition for review was pending before the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-26-0167-PR), so the decision’s ultimate status could change.

This is a landmark 2026 interpretation of Arizona’s HOA open-meeting statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, and it draws a bright line for planned-community and condominium boards: they may deliberate on sensitive matters such as legal advice, litigation, personnel, and member appeals behind closed doors, but they may not vote or take formal action there. Approving budgets, granting spending authority, ruling on waivers, or authorizing foreclosures must happen at an open meeting where members can be present and can speak before the vote. Boards that have historically finalized business in executive session will need to move those votes into open session. The decision also reshapes how boards must describe closed-session business. An agenda—even for a closed portion of a meeting—must give members information reasonably necessary to understand what will be addressed, not merely a citation to the statutory paragraph that authorizes closing the meeting, while still protecting personally identifying and privileged information. For homeowners, the ruling strengthens the right to meaningful notice and participation; for associations and managers, it signals a need to revise meeting notices, agendas, and closure procedures, including how the authority to state the reason for a closed meeting is delegated. Because the opinion is published it is binding Arizona precedent, but a petition for review is pending in the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-26-0167-PR), so its status could change.

Open-meetings note: the published decision is treated here as a landmark Arizona planned-community open-meetings authority because it distinguishes deliberation from formal board action under A.R.S. section 33-1804.

Litigation record

Step 1 Before December 2023

Sunland Springs Village HOA routinely conducts formal business and voting in closed board meetings—including approving a $917,000 budget item, granting the community manager up to $7,000 in discretionary spending authority, addressing 13 age-requirement waivers, and authorizing foreclosures against two homeowners—with notices that only quote A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and agendas that identify matters only by the corresponding subsection (A) paragraph.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 2 2023-12

The homeowner, through the AZNH Revocable Trust, files a declaratory-judgment action in Maricopa County Superior Court (No. CV2023-096192) alleging the association violated the open-meeting requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 3 2024

After initial discovery, the homeowner moves for partial summary judgment on three issues: improper voting in closed meetings, the need to designate closed-meeting agenda items by formal action at open meetings, and deficient notices and agendas.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 4 2025

The superior court (Hon. Rodrick J. Coffey) grants summary judgment in part and denies it in part; the parties agree the ruling resolves all claims, a Rule 54(c) judgment is entered, and the homeowner appeals while the association cross-appeals (docket 1 CA-CV 25-0424).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 5 2026-04-28

Division One of the Arizona Court of Appeals issues a published opinion affirming in part (open-meeting voting; notice content), reversing in part (closed-meeting agenda content), and remanding (delegation of the closure-reason duty); no costs awarded to either party.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 6 2026

A petition for review is pending before the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-26-0167-PR); the decision’s ultimate status could change.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Download source

2026-07-01_001_opinion.pdf

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/aznh-revocable-trust-v-sunland-springs-village-hoa/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2026-07-01

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that HOA votes and formal actions must occur in open meetings with agenda notice of the action to be taken.

Download source file

2026-07-01_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

Is AZNH Revocable Trust v. Sunland Springs Village HOA binding precedent in Arizona?

Yes. It is a published opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, filed April 28, 2026, so it is binding precedent in Arizona. However, a petition for review is pending in the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-26-0167-PR), which means the decision could be affected if the higher court agrees to review it.

Can an Arizona HOA board vote or take formal action during a closed (executive) session?

No. The court held that A.R.S. § 33-1804 allows a board to close a portion of a meeting only to ‘consider’—that is, to think about and discuss—certain sensitive topics such as legal advice, litigation, personnel, and member appeals. Voting and other formal actions are decisions, not consideration, and must take place at an open meeting.

What must a closed-meeting agenda include under this decision?

The court held that an agenda, even for a closed portion of a meeting, must contain information reasonably necessary to apprise members of the matters to be addressed. Simply citing the paragraph of Section 33-1804(A) that justifies closing the meeting is not enough. Associations still do not have to reveal personally identifying information or attorney-client privileged information.

Does Arizona’s HOA open-meeting policy apply to closed meetings too?

Yes. The court held that the legislative policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) refers back to ‘all meetings’ of an association, so it applies to closed meetings as well as open ones. Courts must construe the open-meeting provisions in favor of open meetings.

Who decides the reason for closing an HOA meeting—the full board or the president?

The court held that A.R.S. § 33-1804(C) does not require the full board to identify the reason for a closed meeting by formal action at an open meeting; under A.R.S. § 10-3801(B), a nonprofit board may delegate that duty, for example to its president. Because the record was unclear on whether Sunland Springs had formally delegated the duty, the court remanded that question to the trial court.

What was the outcome of the appeal?

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part (votes and formal actions must occur at open meetings, and the association’s notice content complied with the statute), reversed in part (closed-meeting agendas must reasonably describe the matters to be addressed), and remanded for factual development on the delegation issue. Because both sides prevailed in part, the court awarded appellate costs to neither party.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 25-0424
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	April 28, 2026
Judge / panel	Hon. James B. Morse Jr. (author), Hon. Andrew M. Jacobs (Presiding Judge), Hon. Brian Y. Furuya
Parties	AZNH Revocable Trust (Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee; the ‘Homeowner’) v. Sunland Springs Village Homeowners Association (Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Planned Community Act — open meetings; subsections (A), (C), (D), (F)) A.R.S. § 33-1805(B) (association books and records) A.R.S. § 10-3801(B) (Nonprofit Corporation Act — board authority and delegation) A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1) (appellate jurisdiction)
Topics	Open MeetingsProcedureMembershipRecords Requests
Outcome / holding	Under A.R.S. § 33-1804, a planned-community association must take all votes and formal actions at open meetings; a board may discuss or deliberate on the subsection (A) topics during a closed (executive) portion but may not vote or decide there, because ‘consideration’ means thought and discussion, not voting. The statute’s open-meeting policy in subsection (F) applies to all meetings, so a meeting agenda—including for a closed portion—must contain information reasonably necessary to apprise members of the matters to be addressed; merely citing the subsection (A) paragraph that justifies closure is insufficient, though associations need not disclose personally identifying or attorney-client privileged information. A board may delegate its subsection (C) duty to identify the reason for closing a meeting. The court affirmed that the association’s notices complied with the statute, reversed as to the agendas, and remanded for factual development on whether the board properly delegated the closure-reason duty. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; costs awarded to neither party.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

Parties, Court, and Research Coverage

Uploaded source package	1 PDF
Step-by-step docket roadmap	6 roadmap entries
Video overview	No video embed currently configured
Study / briefing material	1 section
FAQ / homeowner questions	6 questions
Curated download aliases	1 download link

Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

AZNH Revocable Trust v. Sunland Springs Village Homeowners Association is a published 2026 opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, interpreting the open-meeting requirements of the Planned Community Act, A.R.S. § 33-1804. A homeowner in the Sunland Springs Village planned community, acting through the AZNH Revocable Trust, filed a declaratory-judgment action contending that the association’s board did not provide statutorily compliant meeting notices and agendas and improperly conducted formal business—including votes—during closed (executive) sessions. The superior court granted summary judgment in part to each side, and both parties appealed. Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge James B. Morse Jr. reached three conclusions. First, Section 33-1804 lets a board ‘consider’ certain sensitive topics during a closed portion of a meeting, but ‘consideration’ means thought and discussion, not voting, so all votes and formal actions must occur at open meetings. Second, the statute’s policy of open governance in subsection (F) applies to all meetings, and a meeting agenda—even for a closed portion—must contain information reasonably necessary to apprise members of the matters to be addressed, though it need not disclose personally identifying or attorney-client privileged information; merely citing the subsection (A) paragraph that justifies closure is not enough. Third, a board may delegate its subsection (C) duty to identify the reason for closing a meeting, so the court remanded for factual development on whether the board properly delegated that duty to its president. The court affirmed that the association’s notices complied with the statute, reversed on the agenda issue, and remanded. Because both sides prevailed in part, it awarded costs to neither. A petition for review is pending in the Arizona Supreme Court.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing the questions of statutory interpretation de novo, the court read Section 33-1804 according to the plain meaning of its words in their broader statutory context and gave weight to the legislative policy statement in subsection (F), which directs that the section’s provisions be construed in favor of open meetings. On voting, subsection (A) allows a portion of a meeting to be closed only for ‘consideration’ of enumerated sensitive topics. The court held that ‘consideration’—though undefined and, as the association conceded at oral argument, ambiguous—denotes thought, reflection, and discussion that precede a decision, not the formal act of voting. Reading it otherwise would nullify the statutory guarantee that a member may speak after the board discusses an agenda item but before it takes formal action, and would conflict with subsection (F)’s open-meeting mandate.

The court rejected the association’s argument that requiring open votes would clash with A.R.S. § 33-1805(B), which permits withholding minutes of a closed session. Minutes are not kept solely to record votes; a board may take minutes of a meeting even when it takes no formal action, much as public bodies may keep minutes of an executive session despite being barred from voting there. Section 33-1805 therefore does not authorize closed-session voting and does not conflict with Section 33-1804.

On notices and agendas, the court held that subsection (F)’s reference to ‘those meetings’ relates back to ‘all meetings,’ so the open-meeting policy reaches closed meetings too. The association’s notices—containing the date, time, and place plus the subsection (A) paragraph justifying closure—satisfied the specific notice requirements of subsections (C) and (D). But because the statute does not detail what an agenda must contain, the court looked to subsection (F) and held that an agenda must reasonably advise members of the items to be addressed, even for a closed meeting, so that members can speak meaningfully before formal action; a bare citation to the subsection (A) paragraph is not enough, though personally identifying and attorney-client privileged information need not be disclosed. Finally, because Section 33-1804(C) does not dictate how a board must identify the reason for closing a meeting, and A.R.S. § 10-3801(B) allows a nonprofit board to act through delegation, the board could delegate that duty; the record was unclear whether Sunland Springs had formally delegated it to the president, requiring remand.

Why It Matters

This is a landmark 2026 interpretation of Arizona’s HOA open-meeting statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, and it draws a bright line for planned-community and condominium boards: they may deliberate on sensitive matters such as legal advice, litigation, personnel, and member appeals behind closed doors, but they may not vote or take formal action there. Approving budgets, granting spending authority, ruling on waivers, or authorizing foreclosures must happen at an open meeting where members can be present and can speak before the vote. Boards that have historically finalized business in executive session will need to move those votes into open session.

The decision also reshapes how boards must describe closed-session business. An agenda—even for a closed portion of a meeting—must give members information reasonably necessary to understand what will be addressed, not merely a citation to the statutory paragraph that authorizes closing the meeting, while still protecting personally identifying and privileged information. For homeowners, the ruling strengthens the right to meaningful notice and participation; for associations and managers, it signals a need to revise meeting notices, agendas, and closure procedures, including how the authority to state the reason for a closed meeting is delegated. Because the opinion is published it is binding Arizona precedent, but a petition for review is pending in the Arizona Supreme Court (No. CV-26-0167-PR), so its status could change.

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Eli v. Procaccianti AZ II LP: HOA Court Case Guide

Posted on July 1, 2026 by [email protected]

Arizona Court of Appeals – Division One (Unpublished)

Homeowners at the Scottsdale Hilton Casitas claimed a global settlement had been reached at a meeting. Because nothing was signed or stated in open court, the court held there was no enforceable agreement and upheld a six-figure fee award against them.

Arizona Court of Appeals | 1 CA-CV 20-0476 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2021) (mem. decision) | Decided 2021-08-24 | Nonprecedential / citation-limited

Download the ruling PDF FAQ

Scope note: This educational page summarizes Eli v. Procaccianti AZ II LP, a Arizona Court of Appeals HOA-related authority. It is not legal advice.

The takeaway

A disputed settlement of pending litigation is unenforceable under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 80(a) and the Statute of Frauds (A.R.S. § 44-101) unless it is reduced to a signed writing or made orally in open court and entered in the minutes; opposing counsel’s discarded notes merely listing one side’s demands do not satisfy the writing requirement where the other party never assented. Parties who jointly defend and rely on an alleged settlement (rather than moving to be dismissed) are proper parties to the resulting declaratory judgment and may be held jointly and severally liable for attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

Zadok Eli (Plaintiff/Appellant)
Casita owner and ground lessee; stated the monetary and lease demands at the January 2018 settlement meeting.
Hana Eli (Plaintiff/Appellant)
Casita owner and ground lessee at the Scottsdale Hilton Casitas.
Lamar Whitmer (Plaintiff/Appellant)
Asked to leave the settlement meeting because the Whitmers’ claims concerned only the HOA; still held jointly liable for fees for defending the alleged settlement.
Colleen London (Plaintiff/Appellant)
Casita owner grouped with Lamar Whitmer as the “Whitmers.”
Robert S. Porter (Counsel)
Porter Law Firm
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants (the Homeowners); repeatedly asserted after the meeting that a settlement had been reached.

Respondent Side

Procaccianti AZ II LP (Defendant/Appellee)
The Hotel and ground lessor; filed the declaratory-judgment action and prevailed on the settlement-enforceability issue.
Andrew M. Federhar (Counsel)
Spencer Fane LLP
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Procaccianti (the Hotel).
Jessica Anne Gale (Counsel)
Spencer Fane LLP
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Procaccianti (the Hotel).

Neutral Parties

Jennifer B. Campbell (Judge)
Authored the memorandum decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One.
D. Steven Williams (Judge)
Presiding Judge; joined the decision.
James B. Morse Jr. (Judge)
Judge of the Court of Appeals; joined the decision.
Theodore Campagnolo (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court
Superior court judge who found no settlement existed and awarded fees; his judgment was affirmed.

What happened

The Elis, the Whitmers, and Diana Shaffer (collectively the “Homeowners”) own or previously owned casitas at the Scottsdale Hilton Casitas. Although they own their houses, they lease the ground on which the houses sit from Procaccianti AZ II LP (the “Hotel”). Since at least 2012 the Homeowners, the Hilton Casitas Homeowners Association (the “HOA”), and the Hotel had been locked in litigation over the price of the ground lease and related disputes, generating several prior appeals.

In January 2018 the Hotel asked to meet with the Homeowners to negotiate a global settlement resolving all pending litigation, including appeals. The Homeowners agreed but demanded that no litigation counsel attend. The HOA said its representative, Mike Bengson, would attend and would convey the HOA’s non-negotiable terms beforehand. The Elis then demanded that Bengson not attend, asserting he lacked real authority, and warned they would walk out if he did. Per the Elis’ demand, Bengson did not attend; the HOA did not convey its demands to the Homeowners but did disclose them to the Hotel, and those demands sought a global settlement of all pending litigation involving the Whitmers, the Elis, and Mrs. Shaffer.

At the meeting, the Hotel’s general counsel, Ron Hadar, and its CFO attended. After Zadoc Eli, Tim Shaffer (for Mrs. Shaffer), and Lamar Whitmer arrived, the Hotel asked Mr. Whitmer to leave because the Whitmers’ claims concerned only the HOA, which was not present; Whitmer left, and the Hotel did not pass along the HOA’s demands. Mr. Eli and Mr. Shaffer each stated their demands. Mr. Eli demanded that the Hotel pay him $228,829, set his ground lease at $690 per month until 2036, and waive more than $500,000 in fees awarded against the Homeowners in prior cases. Hadar wrote down each demand and recited them back at the end of the meeting. The parties exchanged no draft agreements and signed nothing, and Hadar discarded his notes soon after.

The Homeowners promptly asserted that an enforceable settlement had been reached. The Hotel disagreed and filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that no settlement existed (the “Declaratory Action”). The Homeowners answered, asserted counterclaims, and filed a separate complaint (the “Tort Action”) raising substantially the same claims as their counterclaims. On the Homeowners’ motion, the court consolidated the two cases.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the declaratory-relief claim. The Hotel argued that no valid settlement existed under Rule 80(a) and the Statute of Frauds, A.R.S. § 44-101. The Elis argued that Hadar’s notes evidenced a binding agreement. The Hotel acknowledged Hadar had written down the Elis’ demands but argued it never acquiesced, contending Hadar had told the Homeowners that no agreement could be made without meeting conditions, including the approval of the Hotel’s owner, Procaccianti. For the first time in the cross-motion, the Whitmers argued they should be dismissed because they had been excluded from the meeting. Meanwhile, Mrs. Shaffer settled, leaving the Elis and the Whitmers.

The superior court ruled there was no settlement agreement. It reserved the Declaratory Action counterclaims for resolution in the Tort Action, entered declaratory judgment for the Hotel with Rule 54(b) finality language, and awarded attorneys’ fees jointly and severally against the Homeowners in the amount of $114,255.70. The court denied the Elis’ and Whitmers’ motion for a new trial, and they timely appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed. It held Rule 80(a) applied because there was a genuine dispute over whether the Hotel had imposed conditions precedent, and remanding for a trial on added oral conditions would eviscerate the rule’s anti-fraud purpose. Hadar’s notes recorded only the Elis’ demands and did not show the Hotel’s assent, so no enforceable writing existed. The Whitmers were proper parties because they defended the alleged settlement and asserted counterclaims dependent on the contract’s existence rather than moving to be dismissed; because a dispute over the existence of a contract is a contract matter, they were jointly and severally liable for fees, and the court granted the Hotel its appellate fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

For HOA communities and their members, this decision is a reminder that settlements of pending litigation carry a heightened formality requirement. Even when the parties meet, discuss numbers, and one side writes them down, there is no enforceable deal unless it is reduced to a signed writing or stated orally in open court and entered in the minutes. Rule 80(a) exists precisely to prevent later disputes about what was agreed, so homeowners, boards, and their counsel should insist on a signed term sheet before treating a negotiation as resolved and should be wary of relying on an opponent’s informal notes. The decision also shows the fee exposure that flows from how a party litigates. The Whitmers, who were not even in the room, still faced joint and several liability for the Hotel’s fees because they answered, defended the alleged settlement, and pressed counterclaims that depended on the contract existing, instead of promptly moving to be dismissed. Because a fight over whether a contract exists is treated as a contract action, A.R.S. § 12-341.01 allowed a fee award to the prevailing party. As an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), the ruling is not precedential and may be cited only as that rule allows, but it illustrates well-settled Arizona principles on settlement enforceability and fees.

Litigation record

Step 1 2012

The Homeowners, the Hilton Casitas Homeowners Association, and the Hotel begin litigating over ground-lease pricing and related disputes, spawning several appeals.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 2 2018-01

The Hotel requests a global settlement meeting; the Homeowners agree on the condition that litigation counsel be excluded, and the Elis demand that the HOA’s representative not attend.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 3 2018-01

The settlement meeting is held. Lamar Whitmer is asked to leave; Mr. Eli and Mr. Shaffer state their demands; general counsel Hadar records and recites the demands. No draft is exchanged or signed, and Hadar later discards his notes.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 4 2018

The Homeowners assert an enforceable settlement was reached; the Hotel files a declaratory-judgment action (Maricopa County No. CV2018-014021).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 5 2018

The Homeowners answer, assert counterclaims, and file a separate tort action (No. CV2018-055021); the cases are consolidated.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 6 2019

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court (Hon. Theodore Campagnolo) finds no settlement existed; Mrs. Shaffer settles her claims separately.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 7 2020

The court enters declaratory judgment for the Hotel with Rule 54(b) finality and awards $114,255.70 in attorneys’ fees jointly and severally; the Elis and Whitmers appeal (1 CA-CV 20-0476).

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Step 8 2021-08-24

The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, affirms the judgment and fee award and grants the Hotel its attorneys’ fees on appeal.

Filed by: Court record

Part of the record summarized for homeowners, boards, and counsel.

Download source

2026-07-01_001_opinion.pdf

Complete uploaded source-document index

This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/eli-v-procaccianti/raw/: 1 PDF. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.

Source 1 2026-07-01

Opinion

Type: Decision or judgment

Opinion holding that a disputed settlement of pending litigation is unenforceable under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 80(a) and the Statute of Frauds (A.R.S. § 44-101) unless it is reduced to a signed writing or made orally in open court and entered in the minutes; opposing counsel’s discarded notes merely listing one side’s demands do not satisfy the writing requirement where the other party never assented.

Download source file

2026-07-01_001_opinion.pdf

FAQ

What was Eli v. Procaccianti about?

Homeowners at the Scottsdale Hilton Casitas, who own their casitas but lease the ground from Procaccianti AZ II LP (the “Hotel”), claimed they had reached a global settlement of years of litigation at a January 2018 meeting. The Hotel disagreed and sought a declaratory judgment that no settlement existed. The superior court agreed with the Hotel and awarded attorneys’ fees, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Why did the court find there was no enforceable settlement?

Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 80(a), a disputed agreement to resolve pending litigation is binding only if it is in writing or made orally in open court and entered in the minutes. Nothing was said in open court, and the only “writing” was the Hotel general counsel’s notes listing the homeowners’ demands, which he later discarded. Those notes did not show the Hotel’s assent, and the Hotel maintained no deal could close without its owner’s approval, so Rule 80(a) and the Statute of Frauds barred enforcement.

Do informal notes from a settlement meeting count as a binding agreement?

Not here. The court explained that notes recording one side’s demands do not satisfy the writing requirement unless they reflect mutual assent to all terms. Because the Hotel disputed that any agreement existed and denied assenting, the notes were insufficient. The safest practice is to reduce any settlement to a signed term sheet or to place it on the record in open court.

Why were the Whitmers held liable for fees when they were not even at the meeting?

Although the Whitmers were asked to leave the meeting, they answered the declaratory action, defended the alleged settlement alongside the other homeowners, and asserted counterclaims that depended on a contract having been formed. The court held that a party who actively defends an alleged settlement, rather than promptly moving to be dismissed, is a proper party to the judgment and can be held jointly and severally liable for the prevailing party’s attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. section 12-341.01.

Is this decision precedential in Arizona?

No. This is an unpublished memorandum decision. Under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), it is not precedential and may be cited only as that rule allows. It nonetheless illustrates how Arizona courts apply Rule 80(a), the Statute of Frauds, and the fee statute to disputed settlements.

What is the practical takeaway for HOAs and homeowners?

Do not treat a negotiation as resolved until there is a signed writing or an on-the-record statement of the terms. Relying on an opponent’s informal notes or a verbal recap is risky. And be deliberate about how you litigate: defending an alleged settlement and pressing contract-dependent counterclaims can expose you to the other side’s attorneys’ fees if you lose, because a dispute over whether a contract exists is treated as a contract action.

Case Dossier

Case Summary

Case ID / citation	1 CA-CV 20-0476 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2021) (mem. decision)
Court / tribunal	Court of Appeals
Decision / key date	August 24, 2021
Judge / panel	Jennifer B. Campbell (author), D. Steven Williams (Presiding Judge), James B. Morse Jr.
Parties	Homeowners (Zadok & Hana Eli and Lamar Whitmer & Colleen London) v. Procaccianti AZ II LP (Hotel and ground lessor at the Scottsdale Hilton Casitas)
Governing law	A.R.S. § 44-101 (Statute of Frauds) A.R.S. § 12-1831 (Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act) A.R.S. § 12-341.01 (attorneys’ fees in contract actions) A.R.S. § 12-349 Ariz. R. Civ. P. 80(a) Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a) Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(b) Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ARCAP 21, 25
Topics	Attorney FeesProcedureGood Faith & Fair Dealing
Outcome / holding	A disputed settlement of pending litigation is unenforceable under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 80(a) and the Statute of Frauds (A.R.S. § 44-101) unless it is reduced to a signed writing or made orally in open court and entered in the minutes; opposing counsel’s discarded notes merely listing one side’s demands do not satisfy the writing requirement where the other party never assented. Parties who jointly defend and rely on an alleged settlement (rather than moving to be dismissed) are proper parties to the resulting declaratory judgment and may be held jointly and severally liable for attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.
Primary public source	View source opinion/order

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Key Issues & Findings

Case Summary

Zadok and Hana Eli and Lamar Whitmer and Colleen London (the “Homeowners”) own or once owned casitas at the Scottsdale Hilton Casitas, a community where residents lease the underlying ground from Procaccianti AZ II LP (the “Hotel”). Since 2012 the Homeowners, the Hilton Casitas Homeowners Association, and the Hotel had litigated over ground-lease pricing and related disputes. In January 2018 the parties met to negotiate a global settlement of all pending litigation. At the Elis’ insistence the HOA’s representative was excluded, and Lamar Whitmer was asked to leave because the Whitmers’ claims concerned only the HOA. During the meeting the Hotel’s general counsel wrote down the remaining Homeowners’ monetary and lease demands and read them back, but no drafts were exchanged, nothing was signed, and counsel discarded his notes afterward. When the Homeowners claimed an enforceable settlement had been reached, the Hotel filed a declaratory-judgment action. On cross-motions for summary judgment the superior court found no settlement existed, entered declaratory judgment for the Hotel, and awarded $114,255.70 in attorneys’ fees jointly and severally against the Homeowners. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Because the existence of the agreement was disputed and it was neither reduced to a signed writing nor stated in open court, Rule 80(a) and the Statute of Frauds barred enforcement, and counsel’s notes did not show mutual assent. The court also held the Whitmers were proper parties jointly liable for fees because they defended the alleged settlement and asserted dependent counterclaims instead of moving to be dismissed, and it granted the Hotel its appellate fees.

Key Issues & Findings

Reviewing summary judgment de novo, the court applied Rule 80(a), which makes a disputed agreement to resolve pending litigation unenforceable unless it is in writing or made orally in open court and entered in the minutes. Because the Hotel disputed that any agreement existed, asserting that its general counsel told the Homeowners no deal could close without owner Procaccianti’s approval, and because nothing was pronounced in open court, the Homeowners could prevail only by producing a writing showing mutual assent on all terms. General counsel Hadar’s discarded notes merely recorded the Elis’ demands and did not evidence the Hotel’s assent, so Rule 80(a) and the Statute of Frauds barred enforcement. The court refused to remand for a trial on whether oral conditions were added, reasoning that doing so would eviscerate Rule 80(a)’s purpose of preventing disputes over the existence and terms of settlements. The Whitmers were proper parties because, although absent from the meeting, they answered and defended the alleged settlement and asserted counterclaims dependent on the contract’s existence rather than moving under Rule 12(b)(6) to be dismissed; a dispute over whether a contract exists is a contract matter, so they were jointly and severally liable for fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Why It Matters

For HOA communities and their members, this decision is a reminder that settlements of pending litigation carry a heightened formality requirement. Even when the parties meet, discuss numbers, and one side writes them down, there is no enforceable deal unless it is reduced to a signed writing or stated orally in open court and entered in the minutes. Rule 80(a) exists precisely to prevent later disputes about what was agreed, so homeowners, boards, and their counsel should insist on a signed term sheet before treating a negotiation as resolved and should be wary of relying on an opponent’s informal notes.

The decision also shows the fee exposure that flows from how a party litigates. The Whitmers, who were not even in the room, still faced joint and several liability for the Hotel’s fees because they answered, defended the alleged settlement, and pressed counterclaims that depended on the contract existing, instead of promptly moving to be dismissed. Because a fight over whether a contract exists is treated as a contract action, A.R.S. § 12-341.01 allowed a fee award to the prevailing party. As an unpublished memorandum decision under Arizona Supreme Court Rule 111(c), the ruling is not precedential and may be cited only as that rule allows, but it illustrates well-settled Arizona principles on settlement enforceability and fees.

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