Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc. v. Randall & Gisela White

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-05-09
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $100.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc. Counsel Michael Shupe, Esq.
Respondent Randall & Gisela White Counsel

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 3(j)

Outcome Summary

The HOA's petition was granted. Respondents were found to have violated CC&Rs Section 3(j) by installing tile without approval and were ordered to comply with the CC&Rs, reimburse the $500 filing fee, and pay a $100 civil penalty.

Why this result: Respondents admitted to the alleged conduct and failed to establish a sufficient affirmative defense (incomplete CC&Rs) against the violation, as the recorded CC&Rs provided constructive notice of all provisions. Respondents' conduct during testimony was also considered a factor in aggravation.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized exterior modification (tile installation)

Respondents permanently installed tile on their front porch entryway without obtaining prior written approval. The ALJ rejected the Respondents' defense regarding missing CC&R pages, noting the HOA sustained its burden of proving a community document violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Orders: Respondents must henceforth abide by CC&Rs Section 3(j), reimburse the Petitioner $500.00 for the filing fee, and pay a $100.00 civil penalty to the Department.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $100.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • Federoff v. Pioneer Title & Trust Co., 166 Ariz. 393 (1990)
  • Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser, 115 Ariz. 330 (App. 1977)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Flying Diamond Air Park LLC v. Minenberg, 215 Ariz. 44 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&R violation, Architectural Review Committee (ALC), exterior modification, tile installation, constructive notice, affirmative defense, HOA maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • Federoff v. Pioneer Title & Trust Co., 166 Ariz. 393 (1990)
  • Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser, 115 Ariz. 330 (App. 1977)
  • Flying Diamond Air Park LLC v. Minenberg, 215 Ariz. 44 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

https://open.spotify.com/episode/3itaPyCAGEsVerqaxDXPRZ

Decision Documents

23F-H042-REL Decision – 1048063.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:08 (55.7 KB)

23F-H042-REL Decision – 1055060.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:11 (219.4 KB)

Questions

Question

Am I excused from HOA rules if pages were missing from the copy of the CC&Rs I received at closing?

Short Answer

No. Recorded CC&Rs provide constructive notice of all provisions to homeowners, regardless of errors in the specific copy provided at closing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that missing pages in the document package provided by a disclosure company or previous owner do not excuse a homeowner from compliance. Because CC&Rs are recorded public documents, homeowners are deemed to have 'constructive notice' of all rules contained within the recorded version.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal is not swayed by Mr. White’s incorrect legal interpretations regarding the annotated CC&Rs received by HomeWise, as the Pima County recorded CC&Rs provide constructive notice of all provisions contained within the community documents

Legal Basis

Constructive Notice

Topic Tags

  • CC&Rs
  • disclosure
  • compliance

Question

Can the HOA regulate changes to my property even if they aren't visible from the street or neighboring properties?

Short Answer

Yes, especially if the HOA is responsible for maintaining the exterior surfaces.

Detailed Answer

The decision upheld the HOA's authority to regulate exterior modifications regardless of visibility, particularly noting that when an owner acquires a lot where the HOA performs maintenance, they may give up rights to control the appearance of those areas.

Alj Quote

Each Owner of a Villas Lot understands, acknowledges and agrees that by acquiring an interest in a Lot in which landscaping and exterior maintenance is performed or arranged by the Villas Association, such Owner is giving up rights to control the appearance and use of the outside areas of such Owner’s Villas Lot.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Contractual Obligations

Topic Tags

  • architectural control
  • maintenance
  • visibility

Question

Can I fix a violation for unapproved flooring by simply covering it with a rug?

Short Answer

No. Covering an unapproved permanent installation with a removable item like a rug does not cure the underlying violation.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ rejected the homeowner's argument that placing a custom rug over unapproved tiles resolved the issue. The violation (the unapproved installation) persisted despite being hidden from view.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal is not swayed… by Mr. White’s placement of a custom cut rug in lieu of paying the fine to the Association.

Legal Basis

Remedy of Violation

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • remedies
  • architectural control

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The Petitioner (the party bringing the case) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The Petitioner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence' (meaning it is more likely true than not). Conversely, if the Respondent claims an affirmative defense (a legal excuse), they bear the burden of proving that defense.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805. Respondents bear the burden of establishing any affirmative defenses by the same evidentiary burden.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • procedural
  • burden of proof
  • evidence

Question

If I lose the hearing, do I have to reimburse the HOA for their filing fee?

Short Answer

Yes. The prevailing party is typically entitled to reimbursement of the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA for the $500 filing fee they paid to bring the case. This is a statutory requirement under Arizona law.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall reimburse Petitioner its filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this ORDER, as required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

Can the ALJ order me to pay a penalty to the state in addition to reimbursing the HOA?

Short Answer

Yes. The ALJ has the authority to impose a civil penalty payable to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, in addition to ordering compliance and fee reimbursement to the HOA, the ALJ ordered the homeowner to pay a $100 civil penalty directly to the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall pay a $100.00 civil penalty in certified funds to the Department within thirty (30) days of this ORDER, as authorized by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalty
  • fines
  • ADRE

Question

Does my behavior during the dispute process affect the judge's decision?

Short Answer

Yes. Obfuscating or evasive conduct can be considered an aggravating factor against you.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ specifically noted that the homeowner's conduct during testimony was 'obfuscating' (confusing or unclear) and weighed this as a factor in aggravation when making the final ruling.

Alj Quote

Moreover, Mr. White’s conduct during the testimony was obfuscating, and is considered a factor in aggravation.

Legal Basis

Judicial Discretion

Topic Tags

  • conduct
  • hearing process
  • aggravating factors

Case

Docket No
23F-H042-REL
Case Title
Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc. vs. Randall & Gisela White
Decision Date
2023-05-09
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Am I excused from HOA rules if pages were missing from the copy of the CC&Rs I received at closing?

Short Answer

No. Recorded CC&Rs provide constructive notice of all provisions to homeowners, regardless of errors in the specific copy provided at closing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that missing pages in the document package provided by a disclosure company or previous owner do not excuse a homeowner from compliance. Because CC&Rs are recorded public documents, homeowners are deemed to have 'constructive notice' of all rules contained within the recorded version.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal is not swayed by Mr. White’s incorrect legal interpretations regarding the annotated CC&Rs received by HomeWise, as the Pima County recorded CC&Rs provide constructive notice of all provisions contained within the community documents

Legal Basis

Constructive Notice

Topic Tags

  • CC&Rs
  • disclosure
  • compliance

Question

Can the HOA regulate changes to my property even if they aren't visible from the street or neighboring properties?

Short Answer

Yes, especially if the HOA is responsible for maintaining the exterior surfaces.

Detailed Answer

The decision upheld the HOA's authority to regulate exterior modifications regardless of visibility, particularly noting that when an owner acquires a lot where the HOA performs maintenance, they may give up rights to control the appearance of those areas.

Alj Quote

Each Owner of a Villas Lot understands, acknowledges and agrees that by acquiring an interest in a Lot in which landscaping and exterior maintenance is performed or arranged by the Villas Association, such Owner is giving up rights to control the appearance and use of the outside areas of such Owner’s Villas Lot.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Contractual Obligations

Topic Tags

  • architectural control
  • maintenance
  • visibility

Question

Can I fix a violation for unapproved flooring by simply covering it with a rug?

Short Answer

No. Covering an unapproved permanent installation with a removable item like a rug does not cure the underlying violation.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ rejected the homeowner's argument that placing a custom rug over unapproved tiles resolved the issue. The violation (the unapproved installation) persisted despite being hidden from view.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal is not swayed… by Mr. White’s placement of a custom cut rug in lieu of paying the fine to the Association.

Legal Basis

Remedy of Violation

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • remedies
  • architectural control

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The Petitioner (the party bringing the case) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The Petitioner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence' (meaning it is more likely true than not). Conversely, if the Respondent claims an affirmative defense (a legal excuse), they bear the burden of proving that defense.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805. Respondents bear the burden of establishing any affirmative defenses by the same evidentiary burden.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • procedural
  • burden of proof
  • evidence

Question

If I lose the hearing, do I have to reimburse the HOA for their filing fee?

Short Answer

Yes. The prevailing party is typically entitled to reimbursement of the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA for the $500 filing fee they paid to bring the case. This is a statutory requirement under Arizona law.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall reimburse Petitioner its filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this ORDER, as required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

Can the ALJ order me to pay a penalty to the state in addition to reimbursing the HOA?

Short Answer

Yes. The ALJ has the authority to impose a civil penalty payable to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, in addition to ordering compliance and fee reimbursement to the HOA, the ALJ ordered the homeowner to pay a $100 civil penalty directly to the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall pay a $100.00 civil penalty in certified funds to the Department within thirty (30) days of this ORDER, as authorized by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalty
  • fines
  • ADRE

Question

Does my behavior during the dispute process affect the judge's decision?

Short Answer

Yes. Obfuscating or evasive conduct can be considered an aggravating factor against you.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ specifically noted that the homeowner's conduct during testimony was 'obfuscating' (confusing or unclear) and weighed this as a factor in aggravation when making the final ruling.

Alj Quote

Moreover, Mr. White’s conduct during the testimony was obfuscating, and is considered a factor in aggravation.

Legal Basis

Judicial Discretion

Topic Tags

  • conduct
  • hearing process
  • aggravating factors

Case

Docket No
23F-H042-REL
Case Title
Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc. vs. Randall & Gisela White
Decision Date
2023-05-09
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael Shupe (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt Shupe, PLLC
    Appeared as counsel for Petitioner
  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt Shupe, PLLC
    Legal counsel for the Association; communication contact listed
  • Lori Don Woullet (Property Manager/Witness)
    Cadden Community Management
    Senior Community Association Manager
  • Diane Patricia Weber (Former Board Member/Witness)
    Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc.
    Former Board Treasurer
  • Lynn Birleffi (Witness)
    Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc.
    Called as a witness for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Randall White (Respondent)
    Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc.
    Appeared pro se and testified
  • Gisela White (Respondent)
    Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc.
    Appearance waived

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presiding Administrative Law Judge
  • Susan Nicolson (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

James Iannuzo v. Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221014-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-12-30
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James Iannuzo Counsel
Respondent Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association Counsel Jason E. Smith

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243(H)(4)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner prevailed by showing the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1243. The Association was ordered to refund the $500.00 filing fee. Petitioner's requests for voiding election results, assessing a civil penalty, and appointing an administrator were denied.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of statutory procedure for board member removal concerning ballot tabulation after deadline.

The Association violated the statute by tabulating ballots for a recall election at the August 19, 2021 meeting, as those ballots were only valid for the canceled June 30, 2021 special meeting.

Orders: Respondent must pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days of the Order. Other requested remedies (voiding results, assessing civil penalty, appointing administrator) were denied.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250(C)(3)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA board recall, Ballot tabulation, Quorum dispute, Statutory violation, Filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Whitmer v. Hilton Casitas Homeowners Ass'n
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221014-REL Decision – 935534.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:41:19 (128.9 KB)

22F-H2221014-REL Decision – 945764.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:41:24 (48.2 KB)

22F-H2221014-REL Decision – 949683.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:41:26 (49.4 KB)

Questions

Question

What is the deadline for an HOA to hold a special meeting after receiving a petition to recall board members?

Short Answer

The meeting must be held within 30 days of receiving the petition.

Detailed Answer

According to Arizona statute, once an HOA receives a petition for the removal of a board member, it is legally required to call, notice, and actually hold the special meeting within a 30-day timeframe.

Alj Quote

The special meeting shall be called, noticed and held within thirty days after receipt of the petition.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)

Topic Tags

  • recall election
  • deadlines
  • board removal

Question

Can an HOA count ballots collected for a specific meeting date at a later, rescheduled meeting?

Short Answer

No, ballots are only valid for the specific meeting they were issued for.

Detailed Answer

An HOA cannot use ballots collected for a canceled meeting at a subsequent meeting held on a different date. The decision clarified that counting such ballots violates the statute because the ballots are strictly limited to the meeting for which they were originally valid.

Alj Quote

The Association’s decision to count the ballots at the August 19th meeting does not comply with section 33-1243 because those ballots were valid only for the June 30th meeting as evidenced by the ballots, the Notice, and the voting instructions.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250(C)(3)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • ballots
  • meetings

Question

Can an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) void an HOA election or remove board members?

Short Answer

No, the ALJ does not have the authority to void election results or appoint administrators.

Detailed Answer

While an ALJ can determine if a violation occurred and levy penalties, they cannot order an election to be voided or appoint an independent administrator to oversee the HOA. These remedies are outside the tribunal's statutory scope.

Alj Quote

Mr. Iannuzo’s requests that the tribunal void the election results and that an oversight administrator be appointed have not been shown to be within the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal remedies
  • ALJ authority
  • elections

Question

Is an HOA allowed to determine a quorum based solely on mail-in ballots before the meeting starts?

Short Answer

Likely no; the quorum should be determined based on eligible voters present at the time of the meeting.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the statute calls for a quorum to be determined based on the number of eligible voters at the time of the meeting, implying that canceling a meeting beforehand based solely on returned ballots is not supported by persuasive legal argument.

Alj Quote

The Association presented no persuasive legal argument or authority showing that in determining whether a quorum existed it was appropriate for the Association to use only the ballots returned by June 29th, rather than using the ballots and the members present at the meeting on June 30th.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(d)

Topic Tags

  • quorum
  • meetings
  • voting

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my filing fee refunded?

Short Answer

Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA must be ordered to pay the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge determines that the homeowner has prevailed in proving a violation, the law mandates that the Judge order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.

Alj Quote

If the petitioner prevails, the administrative law judge shall order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • reimbursement

Question

Can an HOA fix a violation for missing the 30-day recall meeting deadline by holding the meeting later?

Short Answer

No, this specific violation cannot be cured after the fact.

Detailed Answer

Once the 30-day window for holding a recall meeting has passed, the violation is established and cannot be retroactively fixed by holding the meeting late.

Alj Quote

And although the Association did not conduct the required meeting within 30 days of receiving the recall petitions, this violation cannot be cured.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • compliance
  • deadlines

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221014-REL
Case Title
James Iannuzo vs. Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association
Decision Date
2021-12-30
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

What is the deadline for an HOA to hold a special meeting after receiving a petition to recall board members?

Short Answer

The meeting must be held within 30 days of receiving the petition.

Detailed Answer

According to Arizona statute, once an HOA receives a petition for the removal of a board member, it is legally required to call, notice, and actually hold the special meeting within a 30-day timeframe.

Alj Quote

The special meeting shall be called, noticed and held within thirty days after receipt of the petition.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)

Topic Tags

  • recall election
  • deadlines
  • board removal

Question

Can an HOA count ballots collected for a specific meeting date at a later, rescheduled meeting?

Short Answer

No, ballots are only valid for the specific meeting they were issued for.

Detailed Answer

An HOA cannot use ballots collected for a canceled meeting at a subsequent meeting held on a different date. The decision clarified that counting such ballots violates the statute because the ballots are strictly limited to the meeting for which they were originally valid.

Alj Quote

The Association’s decision to count the ballots at the August 19th meeting does not comply with section 33-1243 because those ballots were valid only for the June 30th meeting as evidenced by the ballots, the Notice, and the voting instructions.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1250(C)(3)

Topic Tags

  • voting
  • ballots
  • meetings

Question

Can an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) void an HOA election or remove board members?

Short Answer

No, the ALJ does not have the authority to void election results or appoint administrators.

Detailed Answer

While an ALJ can determine if a violation occurred and levy penalties, they cannot order an election to be voided or appoint an independent administrator to oversee the HOA. These remedies are outside the tribunal's statutory scope.

Alj Quote

Mr. Iannuzo’s requests that the tribunal void the election results and that an oversight administrator be appointed have not been shown to be within the scope of the tribunal’s authority.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • legal remedies
  • ALJ authority
  • elections

Question

Is an HOA allowed to determine a quorum based solely on mail-in ballots before the meeting starts?

Short Answer

Likely no; the quorum should be determined based on eligible voters present at the time of the meeting.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the statute calls for a quorum to be determined based on the number of eligible voters at the time of the meeting, implying that canceling a meeting beforehand based solely on returned ballots is not supported by persuasive legal argument.

Alj Quote

The Association presented no persuasive legal argument or authority showing that in determining whether a quorum existed it was appropriate for the Association to use only the ballots returned by June 29th, rather than using the ballots and the members present at the meeting on June 30th.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(d)

Topic Tags

  • quorum
  • meetings
  • voting

Question

If I win my case against the HOA, can I get my filing fee refunded?

Short Answer

Yes, if the homeowner prevails, the HOA must be ordered to pay the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

If the Administrative Law Judge determines that the homeowner has prevailed in proving a violation, the law mandates that the Judge order the HOA to reimburse the petitioner for the filing fee.

Alj Quote

If the petitioner prevails, the administrative law judge shall order the respondent to pay to the petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • penalties
  • reimbursement

Question

Can an HOA fix a violation for missing the 30-day recall meeting deadline by holding the meeting later?

Short Answer

No, this specific violation cannot be cured after the fact.

Detailed Answer

Once the 30-day window for holding a recall meeting has passed, the violation is established and cannot be retroactively fixed by holding the meeting late.

Alj Quote

And although the Association did not conduct the required meeting within 30 days of receiving the recall petitions, this violation cannot be cured.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • compliance
  • deadlines

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221014-REL
Case Title
James Iannuzo vs. Moonrise at Starr Pass Community Association
Decision Date
2021-12-30
Alj Name
Thomas Shedden
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • James Iannuzo (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (respondent attorney)
    Smith & Wamsley, PLLC
    Counsel for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Miranda Alvarez (clerk)
    Transmitted Decision
  • c. serrano (clerk)
    Transmitted Advisements
  • AHansen (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)
  • djones (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)
  • DGardner (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)
  • vnunez (staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission (Attn)

Clifford Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221010-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-12-09
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John T. Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the Petitioner's petition, finding the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by requiring the Petitioner to inspect records before providing copies and failing to comply with the 10-day statutory deadline. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to fulfill records request

Petitioner alleged the Association failed to fulfill his request for copies of records within the statutory 10-day period because the Association improperly required him to inspect the documents first. The ALJ found the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805, as the statute does not permit an HOA to mandate prior inspection before providing requested copies.

Orders: Petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds and ordered to henceforth comply with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2), 32-2199.01(A), 32-2199.01(D), 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Records Request, ARS 33-1805, Records Inspection, Timeliness, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2), 32-2199.01(A), 32-2199.01(D), 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221010-REL Decision – 930949.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:40:34 (139.0 KB)

Questions

Question

Can my HOA force me to inspect records in person before they will provide me with copies?

Short Answer

No. The HOA cannot require an in-person inspection as a prerequisite to providing copies.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Arizona statute allows homeowners to request copies directly. While the HOA can make records available for inspection, they cannot force a member to inspect them first if the member has requested copies. Doing so violates the statutory requirement to provide copies within ten business days.

Alj Quote

Nothing in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 can be read to permit an HOA to require members to first inspect records before it provides copies of records requested by members.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • inspection
  • homeowner rights

Question

How many days does the HOA have to provide copies of records I requested?

Short Answer

The HOA must provide copies within 10 business days.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, once a member requests to purchase copies of records, the association has a strict deadline of ten business days to fulfill that request.

Alj Quote

On request for purchase of copies of records by any member or any person designated by the member in writing as the member's representative, the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • deadlines
  • records request
  • HOA obligations

Question

What is the maximum amount the HOA can charge me for copies of records?

Short Answer

The HOA cannot charge more than 15 cents per page.

Detailed Answer

The statute limits the fee an association may charge for copying records to a maximum of fifteen cents per page.

Alj Quote

An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • records request
  • costs

Question

Can the HOA charge me a fee just to look at or review records?

Short Answer

No. The HOA cannot charge for making materials available for review.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA can charge for copies, they are explicitly prohibited from charging a member for the act of making the material available for examination/review.

Alj Quote

The association shall not charge a member or any person designated by the member in writing for making material available for review.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • records review
  • homeowner rights

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my $500 filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge can order the HOA to reimburse your filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this case, because the homeowner prevailed in proving the violation, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds.

Legal Basis

Order

Topic Tags

  • reimbursement
  • penalties
  • legal costs

Question

Can I authorize someone else to look at the HOA records for me?

Short Answer

Yes, if you designate them in writing.

Detailed Answer

The statute allows records to be examined by the member or any person the member designates in writing as their representative.

Alj Quote

…all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member or any person designated by the member in writing as the member's representative.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • representation
  • records request
  • homeowner rights

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

The petitioner (homeowner) must prove that their contention is more probably true than not. It requires superior evidentiary weight, though not necessarily freedom from all doubt.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

Legal Basis

Legal Standard

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • hearing procedure

Question

Is it a valid excuse if the HOA says mailing the records to the wrong name/address was just a mistake?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA has the correct legal name and address on file, mailing to a nickname or wrong address does not satisfy the requirement to provide records on time.

Detailed Answer

The HOA attempted to shift blame to the homeowner for using a nickname in emails, but the judge noted the HOA had the official member list with the legal name. Failing to use the correct information resulted in a violation of the 10-day deadline.

Alj Quote

Respondent cannot be said to have provided Petitioner with copies of the records he requested within 10 days of his request.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • excuses
  • mailing
  • HOA obligations

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221010-REL
Case Title
Clifford Burnes vs. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-12-09
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can my HOA force me to inspect records in person before they will provide me with copies?

Short Answer

No. The HOA cannot require an in-person inspection as a prerequisite to providing copies.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Arizona statute allows homeowners to request copies directly. While the HOA can make records available for inspection, they cannot force a member to inspect them first if the member has requested copies. Doing so violates the statutory requirement to provide copies within ten business days.

Alj Quote

Nothing in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 can be read to permit an HOA to require members to first inspect records before it provides copies of records requested by members.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • inspection
  • homeowner rights

Question

How many days does the HOA have to provide copies of records I requested?

Short Answer

The HOA must provide copies within 10 business days.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, once a member requests to purchase copies of records, the association has a strict deadline of ten business days to fulfill that request.

Alj Quote

On request for purchase of copies of records by any member or any person designated by the member in writing as the member's representative, the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • deadlines
  • records request
  • HOA obligations

Question

What is the maximum amount the HOA can charge me for copies of records?

Short Answer

The HOA cannot charge more than 15 cents per page.

Detailed Answer

The statute limits the fee an association may charge for copying records to a maximum of fifteen cents per page.

Alj Quote

An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • records request
  • costs

Question

Can the HOA charge me a fee just to look at or review records?

Short Answer

No. The HOA cannot charge for making materials available for review.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA can charge for copies, they are explicitly prohibited from charging a member for the act of making the material available for examination/review.

Alj Quote

The association shall not charge a member or any person designated by the member in writing for making material available for review.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • records review
  • homeowner rights

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my $500 filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge can order the HOA to reimburse your filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this case, because the homeowner prevailed in proving the violation, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds.

Legal Basis

Order

Topic Tags

  • reimbursement
  • penalties
  • legal costs

Question

Can I authorize someone else to look at the HOA records for me?

Short Answer

Yes, if you designate them in writing.

Detailed Answer

The statute allows records to be examined by the member or any person the member designates in writing as their representative.

Alj Quote

…all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member or any person designated by the member in writing as the member's representative.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • representation
  • records request
  • homeowner rights

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

The petitioner (homeowner) must prove that their contention is more probably true than not. It requires superior evidentiary weight, though not necessarily freedom from all doubt.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

Legal Basis

Legal Standard

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • hearing procedure

Question

Is it a valid excuse if the HOA says mailing the records to the wrong name/address was just a mistake?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA has the correct legal name and address on file, mailing to a nickname or wrong address does not satisfy the requirement to provide records on time.

Detailed Answer

The HOA attempted to shift blame to the homeowner for using a nickname in emails, but the judge noted the HOA had the official member list with the legal name. Failing to use the correct information resulted in a violation of the 10-day deadline.

Alj Quote

Respondent cannot be said to have provided Petitioner with copies of the records he requested within 10 days of his request.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • excuses
  • mailing
  • HOA obligations

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221010-REL
Case Title
Clifford Burnes vs. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-12-09
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford Burnes (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; also identified as Clifford (Norm) Burnes or Norm Burnes,,,.

Respondent Side

  • John T. Crotty (respondent attorney)
    Farley, Choate & Wood
    Represented Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association,,.

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Listed as Administrative Law Judge.
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Signed the Administrative Law Judge Decision.
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission of the Decision.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed for transmission ([email protected]).
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed for transmission ([email protected]).
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed for transmission ([email protected]).
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed for transmission ([email protected]).

Other Participants

  • Joseph Martinez (unknown)
    Petitioner verbally notified him regarding the undelivered certified mail package.

Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919047-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Victor L Pattarozzi Counsel
Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Counsel Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:01 (89.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL


Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?

3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?

4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.

5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?

6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?

7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?

8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?

9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.

2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.

3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.

4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.

5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.

6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.

7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.

8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.

9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.

2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.

4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?

5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.

Dismissed

The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.

Statutory Interpretation

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Victor L Pattarozzi (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Andrew Apodaca (attorney)
    Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C.
    Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
  • Stuart Glenn (board member)
    Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
    Board president who presented testimony for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Listed in the final section of the document

Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919047-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Victor L Pattarozzi Counsel
Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Counsel Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:08 (89.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL


Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?

3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?

4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.

5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?

6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?

7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?

8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?

9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.

2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.

3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.

4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.

5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.

6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.

7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.

8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.

9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.

2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.

4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?

5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.

Dismissed

The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.

Statutory Interpretation

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Victor L Pattarozzi (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Andrew Apodaca (attorney)
    Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C.
    Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
  • Stuart Glenn (board member)
    Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
    Board president who presented testimony for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Listed in the final section of the document

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brad W. Stevens Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:21 (102.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties:

Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Timeline:

June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Aripark, Inc.,

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) by charging a $25 late fee, as the statutory limit applies to all assessments,. However, the ALJ found no violation regarding the $325 assessment increase because the $209 portion was a special assessment and the remaining regular increase did not exceed the 20% limit,,.

Why this result: The Petitioners' primary loss on the assessment cap issue was due to a failed legal interpretation that 'regular assessment' encompasses all assessments, a view the ALJ found would render statutory language redundant,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to $325 Assessment Increase (Docket 029-RHG)

Petitioner Brown argued that 'regular assessment' refers to the procedure (motion, second, vote) and thus the entire $325 increase should be subject to the 20% cap,. The ALJ rejected this, finding that $116 was a regular increase (14.1%) and $209 was a special assessment, to which the cap did not apply,.

Orders: Petition in Docket No. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • Deer Valley v. Houser

Excessive Late Fee and Interest (Docket 045)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late charge and interest rate exceeded the limits of A.R.S. § 33-1803(A). The ALJ ruled that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all 'assessments', not just 'regular assessments', and found the HOA in violation,.

Orders: Respondent must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Petitioner his $500 filing fee within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix

Challenge to $325 Assessment Increase (Docket 054 & Rehearing)

Petitioner Stevens argued the entire $325 must be a regular assessment because the HOA lacked authority to impose special assessments or used deceptive accounting to justify the increase,,. The ALJ found that 'regular assessment' is a specific type of assessment and the $116 increase (14.1%) did not exceed the cap,,.

Orders: Petition in Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL and the subsequent rehearing are dismissed,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Assessment Increase Cap, Regular Assessment vs Special Assessment, Late Fee Limit, Statutory Construction, Accounting Impropriety Allegations, Rehearing, Consolidated Matter
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • A.A.C. § R2-19-119
  • Deer Valley v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:24 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:25 (144.6 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf and testified

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Counsel for Respondent, referred to as Greg Stein in rehearing
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Counsel for Respondent (also spelled Sahl/Saul)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff/clerk)
    Transmitting staff

James and Shawna Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corp

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome no_win
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James and Shawna Larson Counsel Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioners' complaint, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and within its authority under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) by requiring homeowners to remove their limited common element patio covers for necessary maintenance and requiring the homeowners to bear the associated cost.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Respondent HOA committed a violation of the condominium documents or statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to require removal of a limited common element (patio cover) for maintenance and allocation of associated costs.

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by mandating the removal of their patio cover at their expense to facilitate building painting. The ALJ found the HOA's proposed plan was reasonable and authorized by CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b), and that Petitioners, under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), must bear the cost of removing and reinstalling the limited common element.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is dismissed. Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation is deemed to be the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove and reinstall their patio cover.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R Section 9
  • CC&R Section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Authority, Limited Common Element, Maintenance Costs, CC&R Interpretation, Patio Cover Removal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806(E)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL-RHG Decision – 605540.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T06:58:20 (105.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG


Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.

The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.

In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.

Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings

Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation

On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.

Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.

This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:

Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”

Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.

Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.

Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing

On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”

• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.

• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”

• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”

• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute

The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.

Respondent’s (HOA) Case

The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:

Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.

Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).

Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.

Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.

Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case

The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.

Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.

Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:

◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.

◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.

Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.

Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Key Findings and Conclusions of Law

Finding/Conclusion

Details

Standard of Review

The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.

Reasonableness of HOA Action

Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.

HOA Authority

CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

Patio Cover Classification

The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

Cost Responsibility

The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”

The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.


James and Shawna Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corp

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome no_win
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James and Shawna Larson Counsel Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the Petitioners' complaint, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and within its authority under the CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) by requiring homeowners to remove their limited common element patio covers for necessary maintenance and requiring the homeowners to bear the associated cost.

Why this result: Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the Respondent HOA committed a violation of the condominium documents or statutes.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to require removal of a limited common element (patio cover) for maintenance and allocation of associated costs.

Petitioners alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by mandating the removal of their patio cover at their expense to facilitate building painting. The ALJ found the HOA's proposed plan was reasonable and authorized by CC&R Sections 9 and 9(b), and that Petitioners, under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), must bear the cost of removing and reinstalling the limited common element.

Orders: Petitioners' petition is dismissed. Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation is deemed to be the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove and reinstall their patio cover.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R Section 9
  • CC&R Section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Authority, Limited Common Element, Maintenance Costs, CC&R Interpretation, Patio Cover Removal
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806(E)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL-RHG Decision – 605540.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:35 (105.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG


Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (the “Respondent” or “HOA”). The core conflict centered on the HOA’s directive that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project.

The case progressed through two distinct phases. Initially, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommended dismissing the Larsons’ petition for a lack of a “justiciable controversy,” reasoning that the HOA had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the dispute speculative. However, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected this recommendation, finding the matter was “ripe for adjudication,” and ordered a full hearing on the merits.

In the final decision, a second ALJ dismissed the Larsons’ petition and ruled in favor of the HOA. The judge found the HOA’s plan to be reasonable and necessary for the proper and safe completion of the project, based on credible testimony from the project manager. The decision affirmed the HOA’s authority under its CC&Rs to require the removal of the structure. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona law. Consequently, pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the homeowners (the Larsons) are exclusively responsible for all costs associated with it, including its removal and potential reinstallation.

Procedural History and Jurisdictional Rulings

Initial Petition and Dismissal Recommendation

On June 16, 2017, James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate against their HOA, alleging a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). However, the initial filing did not specify which provisions had been violated.

Upon inquiry, the Petitioners’ counsel admitted via email that no specific provision of the CC&Rs had yet been violated. Instead, their concern was that section 10(a) would be violated if the HOA acted on its threat to forcibly remove their patio cover and charge them for the cost.

This led to the “ORDER RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY,” issued on August 25, 2017, by Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil. The key findings of this order were:

Speculative Harm: The Judge found that the HOA’s actions “have not yet been undertaken and our [are] speculative at this juncture.”

Lack of Jurisdiction: The order stated that the Office of Administrative Hearings’ jurisdiction, per A.R.S. § 32-2199, is limited to adjudicating existing violations of community documents, not potential future ones.

Misunderstanding by Both Parties: The order noted, “Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.” The Petitioners were seeking a ruling on a future action, while the Respondent was urging the Tribunal to find the Petitioners had violated the CC&Rs, which was not the subject of the petition.

Recommended Forum: The Judge suggested that the appropriate forum for the Petitioners would be a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

Rejection of Dismissal and Re-Hearing

On August 31, 2017, Judy Lowe, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, issued an “ORDER REJECTING RECOMMENDATION OF DISMISSAL.”

• The Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s finding that the matter lacked a justiciable controversy.

• The order cited a letter from the Respondent dated June 1, 2017, which posed the question: “Is the presence of the awning a violation of the Association’s governing documents?”

• This question was deemed sufficient to make the matter “ripe for adjudication.”

• The Commissioner requested that the hearing be rescheduled for a ruling on the matter. A re-hearing was subsequently conducted on November 20, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Analysis of the Merits of the Dispute

The re-hearing focused on the substantive conflict: whether the HOA had the authority to compel the Larsons to remove their patio cover at their own expense for the maintenance project.

Respondent’s (HOA) Case

The HOA, consisting of 169 units, initiated a project to make necessary repairs to its twenty-five buildings and then have them painted. The HOA’s position was based on the following points:

Legal Authority: The HOA asserted its authority under sections 9 and 9(b) of its CC&Rs, which state that the HOA is responsible for maintaining building exteriors and that “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the… [building] exteriors… shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

Project Necessity: The project manager, Wayne King, provided testimony that the HOA’s board deemed credible and reasonable.

Safety: King stated that all five bidding contractors required the patio covers to be removed to ensure a safe work environment as mandated by the Arizona Department of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA).

Logistics: Standard scaffolding would not fit without removing the covers, commercial scaffolding would not provide full access, a forklift was not viable due to overhead power lines, and allowing painters to walk on homeowner patio covers was unsafe.

Quality of Work: The project involved sanding, power washing, and patching before painting to “do the job right.” Many covers had been improperly flashed, causing damage to the buildings that needed repair.

Warranty: The paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, such as the Larsons, were permitted to paint their own units.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Case

The Larsons, who purchased their unit in 1999 with the wooden patio cover already in place, contested the HOA’s demands.

Challenge to Authority: The Petitioners argued that the HOA had no legal authority to demand the removal of their patio cover.

Unreasonable Cost: They asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation was unreasonable, submitting two bids:

◦ One bid quoted $1,250 to remove and dispose of the cover and $3,980 to remove and rebuild it with new wood.

◦ A second bid quoted $5,975 to remove and then replace the structure.

Proposed Alternative: In a letter dated May 19, 2017, the Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense.

Compromise Offer: During the November 20, 2017 hearing, after hearing the project manager’s testimony, Ms. Larson offered that they would agree not to reinstall the patio cover if the HOA would pay for its removal.

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

On December 11, 2017, ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision dismissing the Larsons’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation.

Key Findings and Conclusions of Law

Finding/Conclusion

Details

Standard of Review

The HOA’s decisions regarding maintenance and repair are given deference, provided they act reasonably.

Reasonableness of HOA Action

Based on the “credible testimony” of Wayne King, the Judge found that the HOA’s proposed plan for repairing and painting the buildings, which required the removal of patio covers, was reasonable.

HOA Authority

CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were found to be “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

Patio Cover Classification

The Petitioners’ patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element” within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

Cost Responsibility

The central issue of payment was decided by statute. The Judge concluded that under a “reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C),” any common expense associated with a limited common element “shall be assessed exclusively against the units benefitted.”

Final Order

Based on these findings, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

“The evidence of record supports a conclusion that Respondent has authority to require Petitioners to remove their patio cover to allow the building to be properly and safely painted, and that Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.”

The final order was that the Petitioners’ petition be dismissed, and the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.


James and Shawna Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corp

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-12-11
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner James and Shawna Larson Counsel Lisa M. Hanger
Respondent Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1255(C); CC&R sections 9 and 9(b)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that the HOA acted reasonably and had the authority under the CC&Rs to require the removal of the homeowner's patio cover for necessary painting and repairs. The ALJ determined that because the patio cover is a limited common element, the Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation according to A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).

Why this result: Petitioners failed to prove the HOA violated CC&Rs or acted unreasonably, and statutory law assigned the expense burden for the limited common element to the homeowner.

Key Issues & Findings

Authority of HOA to mandate removal of homeowner's patio cover for maintenance and assignment of removal/reinstallation costs.

Petitioners challenged the Respondent HOA's authority and reasonableness in requiring them to remove their patio cover, a limited common element, for building painting and repair, and disputed the requirement that Petitioners bear the costs. The ALJ concluded that the HOA's plan was reasonable, the HOA had the authority under CC&R sections 9 and 9(b), and Petitioners must bear the cost of removal and reinstallation under A.R.S. § 33-1255(C).

Orders: Petitioners’ petition is dismissed. Respondent is deemed the prevailing party. Petitioners are responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it should they choose to do so.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R section 9
  • CC&R section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA authority, limited common element, maintenance costs, patio cover, CC&Rs, statutory interpretation, dismissal, prevailing party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1255(C)
  • CC&R section 9
  • CC&R section 9(b)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1212(4)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

17F-H1717038-REL-RHG Decision – 605540.pdf

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17F-H1717038-REL-RHG Decision – ../17F-H1717038-REL/583987.pdf

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17F-H1717038-REL-RHG Decision – ../17F-H1717038-REL/585505.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG


Briefing on Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowners James and Shawna Larson (Petitioners) and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation (Respondent). The core conflict centered on the Respondent’s requirement that Petitioners remove their patio cover at their own expense to facilitate a community-wide building repair and painting project. The case initially faced a jurisdictional challenge, with an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) recommending dismissal due to the speculative nature of the Respondent’s threat to remove the cover. This recommendation was rejected by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, who found the matter ripe for adjudication and ordered a new hearing.

The final Administrative Law Judge Decision ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent. The decision found the HOA’s plan to remove the patio covers was reasonable, necessary for the safe and proper completion of the project, and authorized under the community’s CC&Rs. Crucially, the ruling established that the patio cover is a “limited common element” under Arizona statute. Consequently, the financial responsibility for its removal and potential reinstallation rests solely with the Petitioners as the homeowners to whom the element is assigned. The Petitioners’ petition was dismissed, and the Respondent was deemed the prevailing party.

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Procedural History

The case progressed through several distinct legal phases, beginning with a petition and culminating in a final administrative decision after a rehearing.

Outcome/Significance

June 15-16, 2017

Petition Filed

James and Shawna Larson filed a petition with the Department of Real Estate alleging a violation of the Respondent’s CC&Rs.

August 25, 2017

Order Recommending Dismissal

Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil recommended dismissing the petition, finding no “justiciable controversy” because the Respondent had not yet acted on its threat to remove the patio cover, rendering the issue speculative.

August 31, 2017

Order Rejecting Recommendation

Judy Lowe, Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, rejected the ALJ’s recommendation. Citing a June 1, 2017 letter from the Respondent, the Commissioner determined the matter was “ripe for adjudication” and ordered the hearing to be rescheduled.

September 1, 2017

Notice of Re-Hearing Issued

The Arizona Department of Real Estate formally scheduled a new hearing in the matter.

November 20, 2017

Rehearing Conducted

A full hearing on the merits was conducted before Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

December 11, 2017

Final Administrative Law Judge Decision

ALJ Thomas Shedden issued a final decision, dismissing the Petitioners’ petition and finding in favor of the Respondent.

Core Dispute Analysis

The conflict arose from a maintenance project initiated by the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which consists of 169 units. The project involved repairing and painting the exteriors of the community’s twenty-five two-story buildings.

Respondent’s (HOA’s) Mandate and Rationale

Project Requirement: The HOA informed homeowners with patio covers that they were required to remove the covers at their own expense before repairs and painting could begin.

Enforcement Threat: In a letter dated June 1, 2017, the HOA stated that if the Larsons’ patio cover was not removed within ten days, the HOA would remove it under the authority of CC&R section 10(a) and charge the homeowners for the cost.

Legal Justification: The HOA asserted its authority based on:

CC&R Section 9(b): Grants the Respondent responsibility for maintaining the building exteriors.

CC&R Section 9: States, “Any cooperative action necessary or appropriate to the proper maintenance and upkeep of the … [building] exteriors … shall be taken by the [Respondent].”

Practical Necessity: The HOA argued that removal was essential for the project’s proper and safe completion, a position supported by its project manager.

Petitioners’ (Larsons’) Objections and Counter-Arguments

Initial Legal Position: In their brief, the Petitioners stated that “the true issues underlying this issue are not about whether Respondent’s current threatened actions are a violation of the CC&Rs. The true issues relate to Respondent Association’s actions and inactions that have lead up to the point where the Parties now find themselves addressing this administrative law panel.”

Lack of Authority: In a May 19, 2017 letter, the Larsons’ counsel argued the HOA had no legal authority to support its request.

Unreasonable Cost: The Petitioners asserted that the cost of removal and reinstallation would be “thousands of dollars” and provided bids ranging from $3,980 to $5,975.

Historical Precedent: The patio cover was in place when the Larsons purchased their unit in 1999, and they argued the HOA did not disclose any violation at that time.

Proposed Alternatives:

1. The Larsons offered to have the back of their unit painted at their own expense, which the HOA rejected over concerns about project warranty and management.

2. During the November 20 hearing, after hearing testimony, the Larsons offered not to reinstall their patio cover if the Respondent would pay for its removal.

Key Evidence and Testimony

The final decision heavily relied on the testimony of Wayne King, the project manager hired by the HOA, and an analysis of competing cost estimates.

Testimony of Wayne King (Project Manager)

Project Scope: King testified that the project involved not only painting but also repairing damaged siding, much of which was caused by improperly flashed patio covers. To “do the job right,” the process required sanding, power washing, and patching before painting.

Contractor Requirements: All five contractors who bid on the project required the patio covers to be removed.

Safety and Logistics: King explained why working around the covers was not viable:

Scaffolding: “Regular” scaffolding would not fit, and commercial scaffolding would not provide access to the entire building.

Lifts: Using a “reach” or forklift was not an option due to overhead powerlines creating a safety hazard.

Worker Safety: Allowing painters to walk on homeowners’ patio covers was not a safe option. He noted that changes in safety laws since the buildings were last painted necessitated different methods.

Warranty: King testified that the paint company would not provide a warranty for the project if individual homeowners, like the Larsons, painted their own units.

Cost Estimates and Discrepancies

Petitioners’ Estimates: The Larsons submitted two bids for their wooden patio cover:

Bid 1: $1,250 to remove and dispose; $3,980 to remove and rebuild with new wood.

Bid 2: $5,975 to remove and replace the structure.

Respondent’s Estimates:

◦ The HOA’s initial letter offered a contractor who would remove aluminum covers for $150. The cost for the Larsons’ wood cover was stated as $225, though this was not a firm price.

◦ Wayne King testified that the Petitioners’ estimates were “very high” and opined that $1,000 should cover the cost of removing and rebuilding, assuming existing materials were reused. He acknowledged decking material would likely need replacement but estimated 80% of rafters could be reused.

Legal Findings and Final Decision

The Administrative Law Judge Decision of December 11, 2017, provided a comprehensive legal analysis that concluded in the Respondent’s favor.

Governing Authority and Reasonableness

Deference to the HOA: Citing Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, the decision established that the tribunal must accord the HOA deference in its decisions regarding maintenance and repair, provided it acts reasonably.

Finding of Reasonableness: Based on the credible testimony of Wayne King, the judge found that the Respondent’s proposed plan for repairing and painting was reasonable, as the buildings could not be “properly and safely painted without the patio covers being removed.”

Authorization under CC&Rs: The judge concluded that CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) were “sufficient to show that Respondent has the authority to remove Petitioners’ patio to complete the painting work.”

“Limited Common Element” Doctrine and Cost Allocation

The central legal issue of financial responsibility was resolved by applying Arizona state statutes.

1. Classification: The Petitioners’ patio cover was classified as a limited common element within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1212(4).

2. Statutory Rule: The judge then applied ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), which states:

3. Conclusion on Cost: Based on a “reasonable reading” of this statute, the decision concluded that the Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, should they choose to do so, the cost of reinstalling it.

Final Ruling

• The evidence supported the conclusion that the Respondent had the authority to require the removal of the patio cover at the Petitioners’ expense.

IT IS ORDERED that the petition filed by James and Shawna Larson is dismissed.

• The Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was deemed the prevailing party.

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Key Parties and Representatives

Name(s)

Representation

Petitioners

James and Shawna Larson

Lisa M. Hanger, Esq.

Respondent

Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

Nathan Tennyson, Esq. (Brown Alcott PLLC)

ALJ (Initial)

Suzanne Marwil

Office of Administrative Hearings

ALJ (Final)

Thomas Shedden

Office of Administrative Hearings

Commissioner

Judy Lowe

Arizona Department of Real Estate






Study Guide – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG


Study Guide for Larson v. Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between James and Shawna Larson and the Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, culminating in the Administrative Law Judge Decision of December 11, 2017. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, and procedural history.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided source documents. Each answer should be two to three sentences long.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what was their relationship?

2. What was the initial reason given by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Suzanne Marwil for recommending the dismissal of the Larsons’ petition?

3. Why did Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate Judy Lowe reject the initial recommendation for dismissal?

4. What was the central issue adjudicated at the November 20, 2017 hearing before ALJ Thomas Shedden?

5. According to the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, which specific sections of the CC&Rs granted it the authority to require the removal of patio covers?

6. Who was Wayne King, and what was the substance of his testimony during the hearing?

7. How did the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) classify the Petitioners’ patio cover, and why was this classification legally significant for the case’s outcome?

8. What safety and logistical reasons were provided to justify the necessity of removing the patio covers for the painting project?

9. What was the final decision issued by ALJ Thomas Shedden on December 11, 2017?

10. According to the final ruling, who is financially responsible for the removal and potential reinstallation of the Petitioners’ patio cover, and what was the legal basis for this conclusion?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioners, homeowners James and Shawna Larson, and the Respondent, their homeowner’s association, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation. The dispute arose from the Respondent’s requirement that the Petitioners remove a patio cover at their unit.

2. ALJ Suzanne Marwil recommended dismissal on August 25, 2017, for a lack of a “justiciable controversy.” She reasoned that the Respondent’s threat to take down the patio cover had not yet been undertaken, making the issue speculative and more appropriate for a declaratory judgment action in superior court.

3. Commissioner Judy Lowe rejected the recommendation on August 31, 2017, stating the matter was “ripe for adjudication.” Her decision was based on a letter from June 1, 2017, in which the Respondent alleged a violation of the governing documents, thus creating a tangible controversy for the administrative tribunal to rule upon.

4. The central issue was whether the Respondent had the authority to mandate the removal of the Petitioners’ patio cover to facilitate a large-scale building repair and painting project. A secondary issue was determining who was financially responsible for the cost of removal and reinstallation.

5. The Respondent cited CC&R sections 9 and 9(b) as the source of its authority. Section 9(b) makes the Respondent responsible for maintaining building exteriors, and section 9 grants it the power to take “any cooperative action necessary or appropriate” for that maintenance.

6. Wayne King was the project manager hired by the Respondent for the painting project. He provided expert testimony that removing the patio covers was necessary to properly and safely repair and paint the buildings, noting that all five bidding contractors required their removal and that alternative methods were not viable or safe.

7. The patio cover was classified as a “limited common element” under A.R.S. § 33-1212(4). This was significant because A.R.S. § 33-1255(C) states that common expenses associated with the maintenance or repair of a limited common element shall be assessed against the units to which it is assigned, placing the financial burden on the Petitioners.

8. Project manager Wayne King testified that removal was necessary to accommodate the 14-foot by 8-foot area required for scaffolding. He explained that using a forklift was unsafe due to overhead powerlines, and allowing painters to walk on the covers was also a safety hazard, especially given changes in safety laws since the last painting project.

9. ALJ Thomas Shedden dismissed the Petitioners’ petition and deemed the Respondent, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, to be the prevailing party. The order found that the Respondent’s plan was reasonable and that it had the authority to require the patio cover’s removal.

10. The final ruling concluded that the Petitioners, James and Shawna Larson, were responsible for the cost to remove the patio cover and the cost to reinstall it if they chose to do so. The legal basis was A.R.S. § 33-1255(C), which assigns expenses related to a “limited common element” (the patio cover) exclusively to the unit owner it benefits.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a comprehensive response for each, drawing evidence from the provided source documents.

1. Trace the procedural history of case No. 17F-H1717038-REL from the initial petition to the final decision. Explain the reasoning behind each major procedural step, including the initial recommendation for dismissal, its rejection by the Commissioner, and the final order.

2. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioners (James and Shawna Larson) and the Respondent (Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation) at the November 20, 2017 hearing. Discuss the key pieces of evidence, including witness testimony, cost estimates, and CC&R provisions, that each side used to support its position.

3. Explain the concept of “justiciable controversy” as it was applied by ALJ Suzanne Marwil in her recommendation for dismissal. Contrast her interpretation with Commissioner Judy Lowe’s reasoning for why the matter was “ripe for adjudication.”

4. Discuss the legal significance of classifying the patio cover as a “limited common element.” How did this classification, in conjunction with Arizona Revised Statutes and the community’s CC&Rs, ultimately determine the outcome of the case regarding financial responsibility?

5. Evaluate the role of expert testimony in the final administrative hearing. How did the testimony of Wayne King influence ALJ Thomas Shedden’s findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the reasonableness and necessity of the Respondent’s actions?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The judge who presides over administrative hearings at a government agency, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings. In this case, Suzanne Marwil and Thomas Shedden served as ALJs.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The official compilation of the laws of the state of Arizona. Key statutes cited include A.R.S. § 32-2199, § 33-1212(4), and § 33-1255(C).

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions)

The governing documents for a planned community or condominium association that outline the rights and obligations of the homeowners and the association. In this case, sections 9, 9(b), and 10(a) were specifically mentioned.

Declaratory Judgment Action

A legal action filed in superior court where a party asks the court to provide a binding ruling on the rights and obligations of the parties before an actual injury has occurred.

Justiciable Controversy

A real, substantial legal dispute that is appropriate for a court or tribunal to resolve. It cannot be a hypothetical, speculative, or advisory matter.

Limited Common Element

As defined in A.R.S. § 33-1212(4), a common element of a condominium assigned for the exclusive use of one or more units, but fewer than all of them. The Larsons’ patio cover was classified as such.

Petition

The formal written request filed by a party to initiate a case with an administrative body. The Larsons filed their petition with the Department of Real Estate on June 15/16, 2017.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, James and Shawna Larson were the Petitioners.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It means the greater weight of the evidence is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation was the Respondent.

Tribunal

A body, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings, with the authority to judge, adjudicate on, or determine claims or disputes.






Blog Post – 17F-H1717038-REL-RHG


They Fought the HOA Over a Patio and Lost: 3 Shocking Legal Lessons for Every HOA Member

It’s the letter every homeowner dreads. An official-looking envelope from the Homeowner’s Association (HOA) lands in your mailbox, and the message inside is not a friendly neighborhood greeting. It’s a demand.

This is exactly what happened to Arizona couple James and Shawna Larson. Their HOA, Tempe Gardens Townhouse Corporation, was planning a large-scale project to repair and paint the building exteriors. To do the job properly, the HOA demanded that the Larsons remove their wooden patio cover—at their own expense. The Larsons, believing this was an unreasonable overreach, refused. That refusal kicked off a legal battle that serves as a masterclass in the often-shocking realities of HOA power.

This post distills the most important lessons from their fight. These are the legal realities that every homeowner should understand before they find themselves on the receiving end of a similar notice.

You Can Win the First Round and Still Lose the Case

In the first stage of the dispute, the Administrative Law Judge actually recommended that the Larsons’ petition be dismissed. The judge’s reasoning was based on a crucial legal doctrine: ripeness. Because the HOA had only threatened to remove the patio cover and hadn’t physically done it yet, the judge found the issue “speculative.” In the court’s view, there was no “justiciable controversy” to rule on yet.

The initial ruling contained a powerful statement highlighting the confusion:

Both parties fundamentally misunderstand the limits of this Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

But this initial victory was short-lived. In a surprising twist, the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate rejected the judge’s recommendation. The Commissioner found that the core question—whether the patio cover violated the association’s rules—was “ripe for adjudication” and ordered the case back to court for a full hearing. This highlights a key principle: administrative bodies often prefer to rule on the substance of a dispute rather than dismiss it on procedural grounds, ensuring that core community conflicts are actually resolved.

A case isn’t over until it’s over. An initial procedural win (or loss) can be overturned, shifting the entire battlefield. With the case now officially back on, the court turned to the central question of the dispute: who was financially responsible for the patio cover?

It’s Your Patio, So It’s Your Bill—Even When the HOA Forces the Work

The central conflict boiled down to one question: who should pay? The Larsons believed that since the HOA required the patio cover to be removed for its maintenance project, the HOA should bear the associated costs. This seems like common sense, but HOA law operates on a different logic.

The case was decided by a key legal concept: the patio cover was legally classified as a “limited common element.” For most homeowners, this is where their jaw hits the floor. A limited common element is part of the common area (like exterior walls or roofs) but is assigned for the exclusive use of a single unit owner. The logic behind this law is that while the HOA maintains general common areas, elements that provide an exclusive benefit to one owner—like their personal patio, balcony, or assigned parking spot—carry an exclusive financial responsibility, even for HOA-mandated work.

This classification has a devastating financial consequence spelled out in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1255(C). The law states that common expenses associated with a limited common element are assessed against the unit it’s assigned to. The judge’s final conclusion was direct and absolute:

Because the patio cover is a limited common element, under a reasonable reading of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1255(C), Petitioners must bear the cost of removing the patio cover and, if they choose to do so, the cost of reinstalling it.

Under the law, because the patio exclusively benefitted the Larsons, they were solely responsible for all costs associated with it, even when the work was demanded by the HOA for its own project.

Deference is Given to a Well-Prepared HOA

The HOA didn’t win just because of a legal statute; it won because it built a sound, well-documented case for its demand. They didn’t just issue an order; they presented extensive evidence that their plan was “reasonable.”

The testimony of their project manager, Wayne King, was particularly compelling. He laid out a series of facts that were difficult to dispute:

• The project involved necessary repairs to siding and flashing, not just cosmetic painting.

• All five painting contractors who bid on the project required the patio covers to be removed.

• Removal was essential to comply with modern safety laws for scaffolding and to allow for proper work, including sanding and power washing.

• Safety laws had changed since the buildings were last painted, making old methods unsafe and illegal.

• Allowing individual homeowners to paint their own sections would void the painter’s warranty for the entire project.

Faced with this mountain of meticulously documented evidence, the judge ruled that the HOA’s plan was “reasonable.” Because of this, the court was legally bound to “accord Respondent deference in decisions regarding maintenance and repair of the common areas.” In other words, when an HOA acts logically, documents its process, and prioritizes safety and proper procedure, courts will give it significant authority to enforce its decisions.

Conclusion: Knowledge is Power in an HOA

The Larsons’ case is a stark reminder that in an HOA, what feels fair is irrelevant. The only things that matter are procedural correctness (even a ‘win’ can be temporary), the fine print of legal definitions (you can be forced to pay to remove your own property), and an HOA’s documented reasonableness (a well-prepared board is nearly unbeatable). These principles are found not in a sense of fairness, but in the specific, often surprising language of state law and a community’s own CC&Rs.

This case was about a patio cover, but the principles apply to fences, doors, and windows—do you truly know what you own and what you’re responsible for?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • James Larson (petitioner)
  • Shawna Larson (petitioner)
  • Lisa M. Hanger (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (respondent attorney)
    Brown Alcott PLLC
  • Wayne King (witness)
    Project Manager for painting project hired by Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
    Issued initial Recommended Order of Dismissal (August 25, 2017)
  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Issued Administrative Law Judge Decision (December 11, 2017)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Rejected initial recommendation of dismissal
  • Dan Gardner (HOA Coordinator)
    Transmitted Commissioner's order