Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc. v. Randall & Gisela White

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2023-05-09
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $100.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc. Counsel Michael Shupe, Esq.
Respondent Randall & Gisela White Counsel

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 3(j)

Outcome Summary

The HOA's petition was granted. Respondents were found to have violated CC&Rs Section 3(j) by installing tile without approval and were ordered to comply with the CC&Rs, reimburse the $500 filing fee, and pay a $100 civil penalty.

Why this result: Respondents admitted to the alleged conduct and failed to establish a sufficient affirmative defense (incomplete CC&Rs) against the violation, as the recorded CC&Rs provided constructive notice of all provisions. Respondents' conduct during testimony was also considered a factor in aggravation.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized exterior modification (tile installation)

Respondents permanently installed tile on their front porch entryway without obtaining prior written approval. The ALJ rejected the Respondents' defense regarding missing CC&R pages, noting the HOA sustained its burden of proving a community document violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

Orders: Respondents must henceforth abide by CC&Rs Section 3(j), reimburse the Petitioner $500.00 for the filing fee, and pay a $100.00 civil penalty to the Department.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $100.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • Federoff v. Pioneer Title & Trust Co., 166 Ariz. 393 (1990)
  • Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser, 115 Ariz. 330 (App. 1977)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Flying Diamond Air Park LLC v. Minenberg, 215 Ariz. 44 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CC&R violation, Architectural Review Committee (ALC), exterior modification, tile installation, constructive notice, affirmative defense, HOA maintenance
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • Federoff v. Pioneer Title & Trust Co., 166 Ariz. 393 (1990)
  • Heritage Heights Home Owners Ass’n v. Esser, 115 Ariz. 330 (App. 1977)
  • Flying Diamond Air Park LLC v. Minenberg, 215 Ariz. 44 (App. 2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

https://open.spotify.com/episode/3itaPyCAGEsVerqaxDXPRZ

Decision Documents

23F-H042-REL Decision – 1048063.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:08 (55.7 KB)

23F-H042-REL Decision – 1055060.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:56:11 (219.4 KB)

Questions

Question

Am I excused from HOA rules if pages were missing from the copy of the CC&Rs I received at closing?

Short Answer

No. Recorded CC&Rs provide constructive notice of all provisions to homeowners, regardless of errors in the specific copy provided at closing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that missing pages in the document package provided by a disclosure company or previous owner do not excuse a homeowner from compliance. Because CC&Rs are recorded public documents, homeowners are deemed to have 'constructive notice' of all rules contained within the recorded version.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal is not swayed by Mr. White’s incorrect legal interpretations regarding the annotated CC&Rs received by HomeWise, as the Pima County recorded CC&Rs provide constructive notice of all provisions contained within the community documents

Legal Basis

Constructive Notice

Topic Tags

  • CC&Rs
  • disclosure
  • compliance

Question

Can the HOA regulate changes to my property even if they aren't visible from the street or neighboring properties?

Short Answer

Yes, especially if the HOA is responsible for maintaining the exterior surfaces.

Detailed Answer

The decision upheld the HOA's authority to regulate exterior modifications regardless of visibility, particularly noting that when an owner acquires a lot where the HOA performs maintenance, they may give up rights to control the appearance of those areas.

Alj Quote

Each Owner of a Villas Lot understands, acknowledges and agrees that by acquiring an interest in a Lot in which landscaping and exterior maintenance is performed or arranged by the Villas Association, such Owner is giving up rights to control the appearance and use of the outside areas of such Owner’s Villas Lot.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Contractual Obligations

Topic Tags

  • architectural control
  • maintenance
  • visibility

Question

Can I fix a violation for unapproved flooring by simply covering it with a rug?

Short Answer

No. Covering an unapproved permanent installation with a removable item like a rug does not cure the underlying violation.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ rejected the homeowner's argument that placing a custom rug over unapproved tiles resolved the issue. The violation (the unapproved installation) persisted despite being hidden from view.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal is not swayed… by Mr. White’s placement of a custom cut rug in lieu of paying the fine to the Association.

Legal Basis

Remedy of Violation

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • remedies
  • architectural control

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The Petitioner (the party bringing the case) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The Petitioner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence' (meaning it is more likely true than not). Conversely, if the Respondent claims an affirmative defense (a legal excuse), they bear the burden of proving that defense.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805. Respondents bear the burden of establishing any affirmative defenses by the same evidentiary burden.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • procedural
  • burden of proof
  • evidence

Question

If I lose the hearing, do I have to reimburse the HOA for their filing fee?

Short Answer

Yes. The prevailing party is typically entitled to reimbursement of the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA for the $500 filing fee they paid to bring the case. This is a statutory requirement under Arizona law.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall reimburse Petitioner its filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this ORDER, as required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

Can the ALJ order me to pay a penalty to the state in addition to reimbursing the HOA?

Short Answer

Yes. The ALJ has the authority to impose a civil penalty payable to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, in addition to ordering compliance and fee reimbursement to the HOA, the ALJ ordered the homeowner to pay a $100 civil penalty directly to the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall pay a $100.00 civil penalty in certified funds to the Department within thirty (30) days of this ORDER, as authorized by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalty
  • fines
  • ADRE

Question

Does my behavior during the dispute process affect the judge's decision?

Short Answer

Yes. Obfuscating or evasive conduct can be considered an aggravating factor against you.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ specifically noted that the homeowner's conduct during testimony was 'obfuscating' (confusing or unclear) and weighed this as a factor in aggravation when making the final ruling.

Alj Quote

Moreover, Mr. White’s conduct during the testimony was obfuscating, and is considered a factor in aggravation.

Legal Basis

Judicial Discretion

Topic Tags

  • conduct
  • hearing process
  • aggravating factors

Case

Docket No
23F-H042-REL
Case Title
Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc. vs. Randall & Gisela White
Decision Date
2023-05-09
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Am I excused from HOA rules if pages were missing from the copy of the CC&Rs I received at closing?

Short Answer

No. Recorded CC&Rs provide constructive notice of all provisions to homeowners, regardless of errors in the specific copy provided at closing.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that missing pages in the document package provided by a disclosure company or previous owner do not excuse a homeowner from compliance. Because CC&Rs are recorded public documents, homeowners are deemed to have 'constructive notice' of all rules contained within the recorded version.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal is not swayed by Mr. White’s incorrect legal interpretations regarding the annotated CC&Rs received by HomeWise, as the Pima County recorded CC&Rs provide constructive notice of all provisions contained within the community documents

Legal Basis

Constructive Notice

Topic Tags

  • CC&Rs
  • disclosure
  • compliance

Question

Can the HOA regulate changes to my property even if they aren't visible from the street or neighboring properties?

Short Answer

Yes, especially if the HOA is responsible for maintaining the exterior surfaces.

Detailed Answer

The decision upheld the HOA's authority to regulate exterior modifications regardless of visibility, particularly noting that when an owner acquires a lot where the HOA performs maintenance, they may give up rights to control the appearance of those areas.

Alj Quote

Each Owner of a Villas Lot understands, acknowledges and agrees that by acquiring an interest in a Lot in which landscaping and exterior maintenance is performed or arranged by the Villas Association, such Owner is giving up rights to control the appearance and use of the outside areas of such Owner’s Villas Lot.

Legal Basis

CC&Rs Contractual Obligations

Topic Tags

  • architectural control
  • maintenance
  • visibility

Question

Can I fix a violation for unapproved flooring by simply covering it with a rug?

Short Answer

No. Covering an unapproved permanent installation with a removable item like a rug does not cure the underlying violation.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ rejected the homeowner's argument that placing a custom rug over unapproved tiles resolved the issue. The violation (the unapproved installation) persisted despite being hidden from view.

Alj Quote

The Tribunal is not swayed… by Mr. White’s placement of a custom cut rug in lieu of paying the fine to the Association.

Legal Basis

Remedy of Violation

Topic Tags

  • violations
  • remedies
  • architectural control

Question

Who has the burden of proof in an administrative hearing regarding an HOA dispute?

Short Answer

The Petitioner (the party bringing the case) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The Petitioner must prove their case by a 'preponderance of the evidence' (meaning it is more likely true than not). Conversely, if the Respondent claims an affirmative defense (a legal excuse), they bear the burden of proving that defense.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805. Respondents bear the burden of establishing any affirmative defenses by the same evidentiary burden.

Legal Basis

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • procedural
  • burden of proof
  • evidence

Question

If I lose the hearing, do I have to reimburse the HOA for their filing fee?

Short Answer

Yes. The prevailing party is typically entitled to reimbursement of the filing fee.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ordered the losing homeowner to reimburse the HOA for the $500 filing fee they paid to bring the case. This is a statutory requirement under Arizona law.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall reimburse Petitioner its filing fee of $500.00, to be paid directly to Petitioner within thirty (30) days of this ORDER, as required by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.01

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • costs
  • penalties

Question

Can the ALJ order me to pay a penalty to the state in addition to reimbursing the HOA?

Short Answer

Yes. The ALJ has the authority to impose a civil penalty payable to the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Detailed Answer

In this decision, in addition to ordering compliance and fee reimbursement to the HOA, the ALJ ordered the homeowner to pay a $100 civil penalty directly to the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall pay a $100.00 civil penalty in certified funds to the Department within thirty (30) days of this ORDER, as authorized by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 32-2199.02

Topic Tags

  • civil penalty
  • fines
  • ADRE

Question

Does my behavior during the dispute process affect the judge's decision?

Short Answer

Yes. Obfuscating or evasive conduct can be considered an aggravating factor against you.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ specifically noted that the homeowner's conduct during testimony was 'obfuscating' (confusing or unclear) and weighed this as a factor in aggravation when making the final ruling.

Alj Quote

Moreover, Mr. White’s conduct during the testimony was obfuscating, and is considered a factor in aggravation.

Legal Basis

Judicial Discretion

Topic Tags

  • conduct
  • hearing process
  • aggravating factors

Case

Docket No
23F-H042-REL
Case Title
Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc. vs. Randall & Gisela White
Decision Date
2023-05-09
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Michael Shupe (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt Shupe, PLLC
    Appeared as counsel for Petitioner
  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt Shupe, PLLC
    Legal counsel for the Association; communication contact listed
  • Lori Don Woullet (Property Manager/Witness)
    Cadden Community Management
    Senior Community Association Manager
  • Diane Patricia Weber (Former Board Member/Witness)
    Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc.
    Former Board Treasurer
  • Lynn Birleffi (Witness)
    Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc.
    Called as a witness for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Randall White (Respondent)
    Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc.
    Appeared pro se and testified
  • Gisela White (Respondent)
    Quail Creek Villas Association, Inc.
    Appearance waived

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Presiding Administrative Law Judge
  • Susan Nicolson (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Clifford Burnes v. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 22F-H2221010-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2021-12-09
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Clifford Burnes Counsel
Respondent Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel John T. Crotty

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the Petitioner's petition, finding the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by requiring the Petitioner to inspect records before providing copies and failing to comply with the 10-day statutory deadline. The HOA was ordered to reimburse the Petitioner's $500.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to fulfill records request

Petitioner alleged the Association failed to fulfill his request for copies of records within the statutory 10-day period because the Association improperly required him to inspect the documents first. The ALJ found the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805, as the statute does not permit an HOA to mandate prior inspection before providing requested copies.

Orders: Petition granted. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds and ordered to henceforth comply with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2), 32-2199.01(A), 32-2199.01(D), 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Records Request, ARS 33-1805, Records Inspection, Timeliness, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102 and 32-2199 et seq.
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2), 32-2199.01(A), 32-2199.01(D), 32-2199.02
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
  • Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 355 ¶ 5, 35 P.3d 114, 116 (App. 2001)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. §32-2199.02(B)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

22F-H2221010-REL Decision – 930949.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:40:34 (139.0 KB)

Questions

Question

Can my HOA force me to inspect records in person before they will provide me with copies?

Short Answer

No. The HOA cannot require an in-person inspection as a prerequisite to providing copies.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Arizona statute allows homeowners to request copies directly. While the HOA can make records available for inspection, they cannot force a member to inspect them first if the member has requested copies. Doing so violates the statutory requirement to provide copies within ten business days.

Alj Quote

Nothing in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 can be read to permit an HOA to require members to first inspect records before it provides copies of records requested by members.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • inspection
  • homeowner rights

Question

How many days does the HOA have to provide copies of records I requested?

Short Answer

The HOA must provide copies within 10 business days.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, once a member requests to purchase copies of records, the association has a strict deadline of ten business days to fulfill that request.

Alj Quote

On request for purchase of copies of records by any member or any person designated by the member in writing as the member's representative, the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • deadlines
  • records request
  • HOA obligations

Question

What is the maximum amount the HOA can charge me for copies of records?

Short Answer

The HOA cannot charge more than 15 cents per page.

Detailed Answer

The statute limits the fee an association may charge for copying records to a maximum of fifteen cents per page.

Alj Quote

An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • records request
  • costs

Question

Can the HOA charge me a fee just to look at or review records?

Short Answer

No. The HOA cannot charge for making materials available for review.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA can charge for copies, they are explicitly prohibited from charging a member for the act of making the material available for examination/review.

Alj Quote

The association shall not charge a member or any person designated by the member in writing for making material available for review.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • records review
  • homeowner rights

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my $500 filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge can order the HOA to reimburse your filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this case, because the homeowner prevailed in proving the violation, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds.

Legal Basis

Order

Topic Tags

  • reimbursement
  • penalties
  • legal costs

Question

Can I authorize someone else to look at the HOA records for me?

Short Answer

Yes, if you designate them in writing.

Detailed Answer

The statute allows records to be examined by the member or any person the member designates in writing as their representative.

Alj Quote

…all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member or any person designated by the member in writing as the member's representative.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • representation
  • records request
  • homeowner rights

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

The petitioner (homeowner) must prove that their contention is more probably true than not. It requires superior evidentiary weight, though not necessarily freedom from all doubt.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

Legal Basis

Legal Standard

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • hearing procedure

Question

Is it a valid excuse if the HOA says mailing the records to the wrong name/address was just a mistake?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA has the correct legal name and address on file, mailing to a nickname or wrong address does not satisfy the requirement to provide records on time.

Detailed Answer

The HOA attempted to shift blame to the homeowner for using a nickname in emails, but the judge noted the HOA had the official member list with the legal name. Failing to use the correct information resulted in a violation of the 10-day deadline.

Alj Quote

Respondent cannot be said to have provided Petitioner with copies of the records he requested within 10 days of his request.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • excuses
  • mailing
  • HOA obligations

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221010-REL
Case Title
Clifford Burnes vs. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-12-09
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can my HOA force me to inspect records in person before they will provide me with copies?

Short Answer

No. The HOA cannot require an in-person inspection as a prerequisite to providing copies.

Detailed Answer

The Administrative Law Judge ruled that Arizona statute allows homeowners to request copies directly. While the HOA can make records available for inspection, they cannot force a member to inspect them first if the member has requested copies. Doing so violates the statutory requirement to provide copies within ten business days.

Alj Quote

Nothing in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 can be read to permit an HOA to require members to first inspect records before it provides copies of records requested by members.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • records request
  • inspection
  • homeowner rights

Question

How many days does the HOA have to provide copies of records I requested?

Short Answer

The HOA must provide copies within 10 business days.

Detailed Answer

Under Arizona law, once a member requests to purchase copies of records, the association has a strict deadline of ten business days to fulfill that request.

Alj Quote

On request for purchase of copies of records by any member or any person designated by the member in writing as the member's representative, the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • deadlines
  • records request
  • HOA obligations

Question

What is the maximum amount the HOA can charge me for copies of records?

Short Answer

The HOA cannot charge more than 15 cents per page.

Detailed Answer

The statute limits the fee an association may charge for copying records to a maximum of fifteen cents per page.

Alj Quote

An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • records request
  • costs

Question

Can the HOA charge me a fee just to look at or review records?

Short Answer

No. The HOA cannot charge for making materials available for review.

Detailed Answer

While the HOA can charge for copies, they are explicitly prohibited from charging a member for the act of making the material available for examination/review.

Alj Quote

The association shall not charge a member or any person designated by the member in writing for making material available for review.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • fees
  • records review
  • homeowner rights

Question

If I win my hearing against the HOA, can I get my $500 filing fee back?

Short Answer

Yes, the judge can order the HOA to reimburse your filing fee.

Detailed Answer

In this case, because the homeowner prevailed in proving the violation, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reimburse the filing fee.

Alj Quote

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent reimburse Petitioner’s filing fee of $500.00 in certified funds.

Legal Basis

Order

Topic Tags

  • reimbursement
  • penalties
  • legal costs

Question

Can I authorize someone else to look at the HOA records for me?

Short Answer

Yes, if you designate them in writing.

Detailed Answer

The statute allows records to be examined by the member or any person the member designates in writing as their representative.

Alj Quote

…all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member or any person designated by the member in writing as the member's representative.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • representation
  • records request
  • homeowner rights

Question

What standard of proof do I need to meet to win a case against my HOA?

Short Answer

Preponderance of the evidence.

Detailed Answer

The petitioner (homeowner) must prove that their contention is more probably true than not. It requires superior evidentiary weight, though not necessarily freedom from all doubt.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

Legal Basis

Legal Standard

Topic Tags

  • burden of proof
  • legal standards
  • hearing procedure

Question

Is it a valid excuse if the HOA says mailing the records to the wrong name/address was just a mistake?

Short Answer

No. If the HOA has the correct legal name and address on file, mailing to a nickname or wrong address does not satisfy the requirement to provide records on time.

Detailed Answer

The HOA attempted to shift blame to the homeowner for using a nickname in emails, but the judge noted the HOA had the official member list with the legal name. Failing to use the correct information resulted in a violation of the 10-day deadline.

Alj Quote

Respondent cannot be said to have provided Petitioner with copies of the records he requested within 10 days of his request.

Legal Basis

A.R.S. § 33-1805

Topic Tags

  • excuses
  • mailing
  • HOA obligations

Case

Docket No
22F-H2221010-REL
Case Title
Clifford Burnes vs. Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-12-09
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Clifford Burnes (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; also identified as Clifford (Norm) Burnes or Norm Burnes,,,.

Respondent Side

  • John T. Crotty (respondent attorney)
    Farley, Choate & Wood
    Represented Saguaro Crest Homeowners Association,,.

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    Listed as Administrative Law Judge.
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Signed the Administrative Law Judge Decision.
  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmission of the Decision.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed for transmission ([email protected]).
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed for transmission ([email protected]).
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed for transmission ([email protected]).
  • vnunez (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Email contact listed for transmission ([email protected]).

Other Participants

  • Joseph Martinez (unknown)
    Petitioner verbally notified him regarding the undelivered certified mail package.

Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919047-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Victor L Pattarozzi Counsel
Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Counsel Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:01 (89.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL


Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?

3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?

4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.

5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?

6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?

7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?

8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?

9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.

2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.

3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.

4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.

5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.

6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.

7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.

8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.

9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.

2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.

4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?

5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.

Dismissed

The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.

Statutory Interpretation

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Victor L Pattarozzi (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Andrew Apodaca (attorney)
    Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C.
    Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
  • Stuart Glenn (board member)
    Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
    Board president who presented testimony for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Listed in the final section of the document

Victor L Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1919047-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-06-05
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Victor L Pattarozzi Counsel
Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association Counsel Andrew Apodaca, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Architectural Committee meetings of the HOA were not 'regularly scheduled' within the meaning of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804, and therefore the HOA was not required to hold them open to association members.

Why this result: The petitioner failed to prove that the committee meetings met the requirement of being 'regularly scheduled' because the committee did not meet at fixed or uniform intervals, but rather considered applications as they were received.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Architectural Committee meetings are 'regularly scheduled' and thus required to be open to members.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated ARS 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings of its Architectural Committee (ARC). The ALJ found that because the ARC did not meet on a set schedule or at uniform intervals, it did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings as required by the statute, and thus was not required to be open.

Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings, Architectural Review Committee, Statutory Interpretation, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • U.S. Parking v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 772 P.2d 33 (App. 1989)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

19F-H1919047-REL Decision – 713039.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:08 (89.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.






Study Guide – 19F-H1919047-REL


Study Guide: Pattarozzi v. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919047-REL, concerning a dispute between Victor L. Pattarozzi and the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association. The guide includes a quiz with an answer key, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, based on the information provided in the source document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific violation did Petitioner Victor L. Pattarozzi allege against the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association?

3. What was the central argument made by the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association to defend its Architectural Review Committee’s meeting practices?

4. Describe the composition of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC) and its method for reviewing applications.

5. What was the “rubber stamp” process used by the ARC, and how many of the 12 applications received in 2019 were approved this way?

6. What suggestion did Mr. Pattarozzi offer for how the ARC could schedule its meetings to comply with his interpretation of the statute?

7. Which of Mr. Pattarozzi’s proposed definitions for the word “regular” did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately accept as the most appropriate interpretation in this context?

8. According to the judge’s Conclusions of Law, why was Mr. Pattarozzi’s argument regarding the open meetings policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) rejected?

9. Who bears the burden of proof in this matter, and what is the required standard of proof?

10. What was the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and on what date was it issued?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, who brought the complaint, and the Respondent, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, which was defending its actions. Mr. Pattarozzi appeared on his own behalf, while the HOA was represented by Andrew Apodaca, Esq. and its Board president, Stuart Glenn.

2. Mr. Pattarozzi alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. sections 33-1804 and 33-1805. His specific claim was that the HOA’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was failing to hold open meetings as required by section 33-1804.

3. The HOA’s position was that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to all members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.” The statute only mandates that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open.

4. The ARC consists of five members and does not meet on a set schedule, instead considering applications as they are received. The Board president, Mr. Glenn, receives applications, determines if they meet “rubber-stamp” criteria, and if not, forwards them to the other four members for their agreement or disagreement.

5. The “rubber stamp” process was a pre-approved method for approving requests for solar panels and repainting using preapproved colors without further review. Of the twelve applications received by the ARC in 2019, eight were subject to this rubber-stamp approval.

6. Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the Respondent could schedule ARC meetings on a weekly basis. If there were no applications pending for a given week, the HOA could simply cancel the meeting.

7. The judge accepted Mr. Pattarozzi’s second definition of “regular,” which was “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” The judge concluded this meant only committee meetings scheduled on a recurring basis at uniform intervals must be open.

8. The argument was rejected because the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F) explicitly references only the “meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors.” Because committee meetings were not mentioned in that specific subsection, the judge ruled that its strong policy in favor of open meetings did not apply to them.

9. The Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi, bears the burden of proof. The standard of proof required to decide all issues in the matter is a “preponderance of the evidence.”

10. The final Order was that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition be dismissed. This Order was issued on June 5, 2019.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1804. Discuss how the judge used principles of statutory interpretation, such as giving meaning to every word and considering legislative intent, to differentiate between board meetings and committee meetings.

2. Evaluate the strength of Victor L. Pattarozzi’s case. What were his key arguments, including his use of dictionary definitions and the policy statement in subsection 33-1804(F), and why did the judge ultimately find them unconvincing?

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision. Explain how this standard of proof applied to Mr. Pattarozzi’s petition and why he failed to meet it.

4. Examine the operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee (ARC). How did the “rubber stamp” process and the ad-hoc nature of their meetings support the Respondent’s position that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled”?

5. Based on the judge’s reasoning, what specific changes would the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee need to make for its meetings to be considered “regularly scheduled” and therefore required to be open to all members under Arizona law?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official, in this case Thomas Shedden, who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal decisions and orders.

Architectural Review Committee (ARC)

A committee of the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, consisting of five members, responsible for reviewing and approving member applications for things like solar panels and house painting.

ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE

The Arizona Administrative Code, a set of state regulations. In this case, § R2-19-119 established the standard of proof.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.

Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. Sections 33-1804 and 33-1805 were the statutes central to this case.

Burden of Proof

The obligation to prove one’s assertion. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner, Mr. Pattarozzi.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with legal authority over this matter, which issued the initial Notice of Hearing.

Dismissed

The legal term for the final Order in this case, meaning the Petitioner’s petition was rejected and no action was taken against the Respondent.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The venue where the hearing for this case was held on May 16, 2019.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another. In this case, Victor L. Pattarozzi.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this case, defined as “The greater weight of the evidence…sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or an action is brought. In this case, the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association.

Statutory Interpretation

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The decision outlines several principles, such as giving words their ordinary meanings and ensuring no part of a statute is redundant.






Blog Post – 19F-H1919047-REL


Briefing Document: Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL)

Executive Summary

This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter of Victor L. Pattarozzi vs. Estrella Vista Homeowners Association, Case No. 19F-H1919047-REL. The central issue was whether the homeowner association’s Architectural Review Committee (ARC) was in violation of Arizona state law by not holding open meetings for its members.

The petition, brought by Mr. Pattarozzi, was ultimately dismissed. The Administrative Law Judge, Thomas Shedden, concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The decision hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Judge found that since the ARC did not meet at fixed, uniform, or recurring intervals, but rather on an as-needed basis to review applications, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” within the meaning of the statute. Consequently, the legal requirement for such meetings to be open to all association members did not apply. The Judge further determined that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings explicitly referenced only the association’s and board of directors’ meetings, not committee meetings, and therefore could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Case Overview

Case Number

19F-H1919047-REL

Petitioner

Victor L. Pattarozzi

Respondent

Estrella Vista Homeowners Association

Presiding Judge

Thomas Shedden, Administrative Law Judge

Hearing Date

May 16, 2019

Decision Date

June 5, 2019

Jurisdiction

Office of Administrative Hearings, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Allegation: The Petitioner, Victor L. Pattarozzi, alleged that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804 by failing to hold open meetings for its Architectural Committee (referred to as the Architectural Review Committee or ARC).

Defense: The Respondent association contended that its ARC meetings were not required to be open to members because the meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”

The case revolved entirely around the interpretation of a key phrase within Arizona’s planned community statutes.

Governing Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804(A) states:

“Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association….”

The core legal question was whether the ARC’s method of conducting business constituted “regularly scheduled” meetings.

Competing Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Mr. Pattarozzi):

◦ Mr. Pattarozzi argued that the association could hold weekly ARC meetings and simply cancel them if no applications were pending for review.

◦ He supplied dictionary definitions for “regular” and “regularly” to support his interpretation:

Regularly: (1) “in a regular manner”; (2) “on a regular basis: at regular intervals”.

Regular: (1) “constituted, conducted, scheduled, or done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”; (2) “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals”.

◦ He also contended that the state’s declared policy in favor of open meetings, as outlined in subsection 33-1804(F), should be broadly construed to require ARC meetings to be open.

Respondent’s Position (Estrella Vista HOA):

◦ The association maintained that its ARC meetings were not required to be open because they do not occur on a set schedule. Instead, they are convened only as needed when applications are received.

Findings of Fact

The decision outlined the specific operational procedures of the Architectural Review Committee.

Composition and Process: The ARC consists of five members. It does not meet on a predetermined schedule. Instead, applications are forwarded by the management company to the Board President, Stuart Glenn.

“Rubber Stamp” Approvals: The ARC has a pre-approved “rubber stamp” process for certain requests, such as solar panel installations and repainting with a pre-approved color. These requests are approved without further review by the full committee.

Application Volume: As of the May 16, 2019 hearing, the ARC had received twelve applications in 2019. Of these, eight were subject to the “rubber stamp” approval process.

Non-Standard Applications: For any application not meeting the rubber-stamp criteria, Mr. Glenn forwards it to the other four ARC members, who individually report back on their approval or disapproval.

Legal Reasoning and Decision

The Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law provided a detailed statutory interpretation that led to the dismissal of the petition.

Interpretation of “Regularly Scheduled”

The Judge determined that the legislature intentionally distinguished between different types of meetings. While the law mandates that all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors must be open, it applies a specific qualifier—”regularly scheduled”—to committee meetings. This implies that not all committee meetings must be open.

The Judge adopted the Petitioner’s second definition of “regular”: “recurring, attending, or functioning at fixed, uniform, or normal intervals.” This interpretation was deemed to provide a fair and sensible result.

The Judge explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s first definition—”done in conformity with established or prescribed usages, rules, or discipline”—on the grounds that it would render the word “regular” redundant. The Judge reasoned that all committee meetings are presumed to be conducted according to established rules, so applying this definition would make the statutory language trivial.

Rejection of the “Open Meeting Policy” Argument

The Petitioner argued that subsection 33-1804(F), which declares a state policy in favor of open meetings, should apply. The Judge rejected this argument based on the specific text of the statute:

“It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly ….”

The Judge noted that this policy statement explicitly references only meetings of the “members’ association” and the “board of directors,” and omits any mention of committee meetings. Therefore, the policy could not be used to compel the ARC meetings to be open.

Final Order

Ruling: IT IS ORDERED that Victor L. Pattarozzi’s petition is dismissed.

Justification: The Petitioner, who bore the burden of proof, did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Estrella Vista Homeowners Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1804. The Judge concluded that the ARC “does not hold ‘regularly scheduled’ meetings within the meaning of” the statute.

Next Steps: The decision is binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Victor L Pattarozzi (petitioner)
    Appeared and testified on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Andrew Apodaca (attorney)
    Goering, Roberts, Rubin, Brogna, Enos & Treadwell-Rubin, P.C.
    Attorney for Respondent Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
  • Stuart Glenn (board member)
    Estrella Vista Homeowners Association
    Board president who presented testimony for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (ADRE Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of transmittal
  • Felicia Del Sol (Administrative Staff)
    Listed in the final section of the document

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Brad W. Stevens Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Greg Stein, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A). The increase in the regular assessment (14.1%) was below the statutory 20% limit, and the overall increase included a special assessment which the statute does not cover.

Why this result: The Petitioner's definition of 'regular assessment' was rejected as not supported by statutory construction principles, and the issue was limited to the definition and application of ARS § 33-1803(A).

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated ARS § 33-1803(A) by increasing the regular assessment more than 20%.

Petitioner alleged that the HOA's total assessment increase of $325 (which was 39.4% over the previous assessment of $825) constituted an unlawful increase of the 'regular assessment' under ARS § 33-1803(A). The HOA argued the increase to the 'regular assessment' was only 14.1% ($116 increase), and the remaining $209 was a separate, one-time assessment.

Orders: Petitioner Brad W. Stevens’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Assessment, Statutory Interpretation, Regular Assessment, Special Assessment, ARS 33-1803(A)
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:06:21 (102.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG)

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in the matter of Brad W. Stevens versus Mogollon Airpark, Inc., a case centered on the legality of a homeowner association (HOA) assessment increase. The ALJ, Thomas Shedden, ultimately dismissed the petition filed by Mr. Stevens, finding he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mogollon Airpark violated Arizona state law.

The core of the dispute was a $325 increase to the annual assessment for 2018, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year’s $825 fee. The petitioner alleged this violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), which prohibits HOAs from increasing a “regular assessment” by more than 20% without member approval. The respondent, Mogollon Airpark, argued the increase was composed of two distinct parts: a 14.1% ($116) increase to the regular assessment to cover a budget shortfall, and a separate $209 one-time “special assessment” to replenish a reserve fund.

The ALJ’s decision rested on a critical interpretation of statutory language, concluding that “regular assessments” and “special assessments” are legally distinct categories. The judge rejected the petitioner’s argument that “regular” refers to the process of an assessment rather than its type, deeming this interpretation contrary to principles of statutory construction and nonsensical. Furthermore, the judge found the petitioner’s legal citations to be inapplicable and confirmed that the scope of the hearing was limited strictly to the alleged violation of the 20% rule, not the HOA’s general authority to levy special assessments.

Case Background and Procedural History

Parties:

Petitioner: Brad W. Stevens

Respondent: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (HOA)

Adjudicating Body: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, on behalf of the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden.

Timeline:

June 7, 2018: Mr. Stevens files a single-issue petition with the Department of Real Estate.

September 28, 2018: An initial hearing is conducted on the matter, consolidated with two others.

January 2, 2019: The Department of Real Estate issues a Notice of Rehearing.

February 11, 2019: The rehearing is conducted.

March 1, 2019: The Administrative Law Judge Decision is issued, dismissing the petition.

The matter came before the Office of Administrative Hearings for a rehearing after Mr. Stevens alleged errors of law and an abuse of discretion in the original hearing’s decision.

The Core Dispute: The 2018 Assessment Increase

The central facts of the case revolve around a decision made at a Mogollon Airpark board meeting in November 2017. To address a shortage in its operating budget and to replenish approximately $53,000 borrowed from its reserve fund, the Board approved a two-part increase to its annual fees.

Assessment Component

Previous Year (2017)

2018 Increase

Justification

Percentage Increase

Regular Assessment

+ $116

Cover operating budget shortfall

Special Assessment

+ $209

Replenish reserve fund

Total Assessment

+ $325

Total for 2018

This total 39.4% increase formed the basis of Mr. Stevens’s legal challenge under A.R.S. § 33-1803(A), which limits increases to “regular assessments” to 20% over the preceding fiscal year.

Analysis of Arguments

Petitioner’s Position (Brad W. Stevens)

Mr. Stevens’s case was built on the assertion that the entire $325 increase constituted a single “regular assessment” and was therefore illegal. His key arguments were:

Definition of “Regular”: He contended that “regular” in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created—i.e., one that is “according to rule.” He argued that it does not denote a type of assessment (e.g., recurring vs. one-time).

Lack of Authority for Special Assessments: Mr. Stevens argued that Mogollon Airpark has no authority to issue special assessments. Therefore, any assessment it imposes, regardless of its label, must legally be considered a “regular assessment.”

Legal Precedent: He cited Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona to define a “special assessment,” arguing that the $209 charge did not qualify because he received no “particularized benefit” as required by that case. He also presented definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.)

Mogollon Airpark’s defense was straightforward and relied on the distinction between the two components of the assessment increase:

Statutory Limitation: The respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) applies only to “regular assessments.”

Compliance with Statute: The increase to the regular assessment was $116, a 14.1% rise over the previous year’s $825 fee. This amount is well within the 20% statutory limit.

Distinct Nature of Assessments: The $209 charge was a separate, one-time “special assessment” intended for a specific purpose (replenishing the reserve fund) and is not subject to the 20% limitation governing regular assessments.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions

The ALJ systematically dismantled the petitioner’s arguments, finding they were not supported by evidence or principles of statutory construction.

Rejection of Petitioner’s Statutory Interpretation

• The ALJ found that Mr. Stevens’s definition of “regular” as referring to the assessment process was an insupportable interpretation. If all validly passed assessments were “regular,” the word “regular” in the statute would be “void, inert, redundant, or trivial.”

• To support this conclusion, the decision points to A.R.S. § 33-1806, where the legislature explicitly references “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s],” demonstrating a clear intent to treat them as different types of assessments.

• The judge characterized the petitioner’s logic as leading to a “nonsensical result.” Under Mr. Stevens’s reasoning, an unauthorized special assessment would become a valid regular assessment, a position deemed not to be a “sensible interpretation of the statute.” A more reasonable conclusion, the judge noted, would be that an unauthorized assessment is simply void.

Misapplication of Legal Precedent

• The petitioner’s reliance on Northwest Fire District was deemed “misplaced.” The judge clarified that this case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, a legal framework that does not govern an HOA like Mogollon Airpark.

Scope of the Hearing and Burden of Proof

• The ALJ emphasized that the hearing was limited by the petitioner’s “single-issue petition.” The only question properly before the tribunal was whether A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) had been violated.

• Consequently, the broader question of whether Mogollon Airpark’s bylaws grant it the authority to impose special assessments was “not at issue.” This rendered the various definitions of “special assessment” offered by Mr. Stevens as having “no substantial probative value” to the case at hand.

• The final legal conclusion was that Mr. Stevens, who bore the burden of proof, failed to show by a “preponderance of the evidence” that Mogollon Airpark violated the statute.

Final Order and Disposition

Based on the findings and conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

Order: The petition of Brad W. Stevens is dismissed.

Prevailing Party: Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is deemed the prevailing party.

Binding Nature: The decision, issued as a result of a rehearing, is binding on the parties.

Appeal Process: Any appeal must be filed for judicial review with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date the order was served.


Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-10-18
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge ruled partially in favor of Petitioner Warren R. Brown, finding that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) by imposing a $25 late payment fee, and ordered the fee rescinded and the $500 filing fee refunded,,,. The ALJ ruled against both Petitioners (Brown and Stevens) regarding the challenge to the $325 assessment increase, dismissing those petitions because they failed to prove the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,,.

Why this result: Petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the combined $325 assessment increase violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) because their definition of 'regular assessment' as encompassing all assessments enacted through proper procedures was not supported by statutory construction principles,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Brown Docket 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG)

Petitioner Brown alleged the combined $325 increase, consisting of a $116 regular increase and a $209 special assessment, violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) because 'regular assessment' refers to the creation process, making the total increase subject to the 20% cap,,,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. deemed the prevailing party in the 029 matter,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 4
  • 6
  • 32
  • 33
  • 35
  • 36
  • 73
  • 74
  • 76
  • 77

Challenge to assessment increase exceeding 20% limit (Stevens Docket 18F-H1818054-REL)

Petitioner Stevens alleged the total $325 assessment increase violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) and raised accompanying allegations of deceptive accounting and lack of authority to impose special assessments,,.

Orders: Petition dismissed. Respondent deemed the prevailing party in the 054 matter,,,,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 7
  • 20
  • 32
  • 33
  • 35
  • 36
  • 38
  • 61
  • 73
  • 74
  • 76
  • 77
  • 79
  • 94
  • 99
  • 101

Challenge to late payment charges (Brown Docket 18F-H1818045-REL)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late fee and 18% interest charged by Mogollon violated the statutory limits set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1803(A),,. The ALJ found the $25 late charge violated the statute because the limit applies to all 'assessments',.

Orders: Petitioner Warren R. Brown deemed the prevailing party. Mogollon Airpark Inc. must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Mr. Brown his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty days,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • 5
  • 7
  • 32
  • 34
  • 37
  • 46
  • 47
  • 59
  • 73
  • 75
  • 78

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA assessment cap, Late fee violation, Statutory construction, Regular assessment definition, Special assessment, Filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-19-119
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Deer Valley, v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – 692388.pdf

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18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818054-REL/666285.pdf

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18F-H1818054-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1818054-REL/672623.pdf

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Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Briefing Document: Brown and Stevens vs. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from a consolidated administrative law case involving petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens against their homeowners’ association (HOA), Mogollon Airpark, Inc. The central dispute concerned a 2018 assessment increase of $325, which represented a 39.4% increase over the previous year, and the imposition of a new $25 late fee.

The petitioners argued that the entire assessment increase violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1803(A), which limits annual regular assessment increases to 20%. They contended that the term “regular” describes the procedural enactment of an assessment, making the entire 325increaseasingleregularassessment.Conversely,theHOAassertedthatithadbifurcatedtheincreaseintoacompliant14.1116) regular assessment increase and a separate $209 special assessment, which is not subject to the 20% statutory cap.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ultimately sided with Mogollon Airpark on the assessment increase, dismissing the petitions of both Mr. Brown and Mr. Stevens. The ALJ’s rationale, based on principles of statutory construction, was that “regular assessment” refers to a type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that to rule otherwise would render the word “regular” meaningless in the statute. A subsequent rehearing requested by Mr. Stevens was also denied on the same grounds.

However, the ALJ ruled in favor of Mr. Brown on the matter of the late fee. The decision found that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all “assessments,” not just regular ones, making the HOA’s $25 fee a clear violation. Underlying the legal challenges were substantial allegations by the petitioners of deceptive accounting and financial mismanagement by the HOA to create a “fabricated shortfall,” though the ALJ noted these issues were outside the narrow scope of the administrative hearing and better suited for civil court.

Case Overview and Parties Involved

This matter consolidates three separate petitions filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, which were heard by the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Petitioners:

◦ Warren R. Brown (Docket Nos. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG & 18F-H1818045-REL)

◦ Brad W. Stevens (Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL)

Respondent:

◦ Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Venue and Adjudication:

Tribunal: Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Administrative Law Judge: Thomas Shedden

Hearing Date (Consolidated Matters): September 28, 2018

Rehearing Date (Stevens Matter): February 11, 2019

Key Financial Figures

Amount/Rate

Calculation/Note

Previous Year’s Assessment (2017)

The baseline for calculating the increase percentage.

Total 2018 Assessment Increase

The total amount disputed by the petitioners.

Total Increase Percentage

($325 / $825)

“Regular Assessment” Increase

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc. (14.1% increase).

“Special Assessment”

As classified by Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

New Late Fee

Challenged as exceeding statutory limits.

New Interest Rate

For past-due accounts.

Statutory Late Fee Limit

Greater of $15 or 10%

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Statutory Assessment Increase Limit

20% over prior year

Per ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A), applies to regular assessments.

Analysis of Core Legal Disputes

The hearings focused on two primary violations of Arizona statute alleged by the petitioners.

The 2018 Assessment Increase (39.4%)

The crux of the case in dockets 029 and 054 was the interpretation of the term “regular assessment” within ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803(A).

Petitioners’ Position (Brown & Stevens):

◦ The total $325 increase, constituting a 39.4% hike, is a clear violation of the 20% statutory cap.

◦ The term “regular assessment” as used in the statute refers to the process by which an assessment is created (i.e., by motion, second, and vote). As the entire $325 was passed via this standard procedure, it constitutes a single regular assessment.

◦ They further argued that Mogollon Airpark, Inc.’s governing documents (Bylaws and CC&Rs) do not provide any explicit authority to impose “special assessments,” meaning any assessment levied must be a regular one.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The assessment was properly bifurcated into two distinct parts: a $116 increase to the regular assessment (a 14.1% increase, well within the 20% limit) and a $209 special assessment.

◦ “Regular assessment” and “special assessment” are established terms of art in the HOA industry, denoting different types of assessments, not the process of their creation.

◦ The existence of both terms in other parts of Arizona law, such as § 33-1806, demonstrates the legislature’s intent to treat them as separate categories.

Late Fees and Interest Charges

In docket 045, Mr. Brown challenged the legality of the newly instituted penalties for late payments.

Petitioner’s Position (Brown):

◦ The statute explicitly limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.”

◦ The HOA’s imposition of a flat $25 late fee is a direct violation of this provision. An invoice provided as evidence showed Mr. Brown was charged this $25 fee plus $1.57 in interest.

Respondent’s Position (Mogollon Airpark, Inc.):

◦ The HOA argued that the statutory limitation on late fees applied only to regular assessments, not to special assessments. This argument was explicitly rejected by the ALJ.

Underlying Allegations of Financial Misconduct

While the administrative hearings were limited to the specific statutory violations, the petitions were motivated by deep-seated concerns over the HOA’s financial management. These allegations were not adjudicated but were noted by the ALJ.

Core Allegation: The petitioners claimed the HOA treasurer and others engaged in “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods” to manufacture a financial crisis and justify the assessment increase.

Specific Claims:

◦ Mr. Brown alleged that the accounting was “deliberately misleading” to obscure the fact that the 2016 board left the treasury approximately “$200,000 better off.”

◦ Mr. Stevens submitted a 45-page petition with over 600 pages of exhibits detailing the alleged improprieties, including “keeping two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall.” He testified that he believed the HOA possessed over $1 million and did not need an increase.

Judicial Comment: The ALJ noted that these complex financial allegations were not addressed in the hearing and suggested that “the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.”

Judicial Decisions and Rationale

The ALJ issued separate findings and orders for each docket, culminating in a split decision. The rulings on the assessment increase were further solidified in a subsequent rehearing.

Summary of Outcomes

Docket No.

Petitioner

Core Issue

Ruling

Prevailing Party

18F-H1818029-REL-RHG

Warren R. Brown

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818054-REL

Brad W. Stevens

Assessment Increase

Petition Dismissed

Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

18F-H1818045-REL

Warren R. Brown

$25 Late Fee

Violation Found

Warren R. Brown

Rationale for Initial Decision (October 18, 2018)

On the Assessment Increase: The ALJ found that the petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation occurred. The ruling rested on statutory interpretation:

◦ The petitioners’ definition of “regular assessment” as a process was rejected because it would render the word “regular” in the statute “trivial or void,” as all assessments are presumed to follow a regular process.

◦ The only “fair and sensible result” that gives meaning to every word in the statute is to interpret “regular” and “special” as distinct types of assessments.

On the Late Fees: The ALJ found that Mr. Brown successfully proved a violation.

◦ The statutory text on late fees applies to “assessments” generally, without the qualifier “regular.”

◦ Mogollon’s argument required adding the word “regular” where the legislature did not use it, which violates principles of statutory construction.

Order: Mogollon was ordered to rescind the $25 fee assessed against Mr. Brown and reimburse his $500 filing fee.

Rationale for Rehearing Decision (March 1, 2019)

Mr. Stevens’s request for a rehearing on his dismissed petition was granted but ultimately denied again.

Mr. Stevens’s Rehearing Arguments: He argued the ALJ erred by not applying a definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona and reasserted that an assessment unauthorized by the HOA’s documents must logically be a regular one.

ALJ’s Rejection:

◦ The reliance on Northwest Fire District was “misplaced” because that case applies to special taxing districts created under a different state title, not private HOAs.

◦ The argument that an unauthorized special assessment becomes a regular one was deemed “nonsensical.” The ALJ noted, “More reasonably, if Mogollon has no authority to issue a special assessment, any such assessment would be void.”

◦ The core statutory interpretation from the initial hearing was affirmed. The petition was dismissed a final time.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Brown and Stevens v. Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided legal documents.

1. Identify the petitioners and the respondent in this consolidated legal matter and describe their relationship.

2. What specific financial changes did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. implement in 2018 that led to the legal dispute?

3. What was the central legal argument presented by petitioners Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens regarding the assessment increase?

4. How did Mogollon Airpark, Inc. justify its total assessment increase of $325 in the face of the legal challenge?

5. Explain the Administrative Law Judge’s primary reason for dismissing the petitions concerning the assessment increase (the 029 and 054 matters).

6. What was the specific subject of the petition in the 045 matter, and what was the final ruling in that case?

7. What was the judge’s legal reasoning for finding Mogollon’s $25 late fee to be in violation of the statute?

8. Why did the hearing not address the petitioners’ underlying allegations of deceptive accounting and financial impropriety?

9. What is the standard of proof required in this matter, and which parties were responsible for meeting it?

10. In the rehearing for the 054 matter, what was Brad Stevens’s argument regarding the definition of “special assessment,” and why did the judge find his reliance on the Northwest Fire District case to be misplaced?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The petitioners were Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens, who were members of the homeowners’ association (HOA). The respondent was Mogollon Airpark, Inc., the HOA itself. The dispute arose from actions taken by the HOA board that the petitioners, as members, believed to be unlawful.

2. In 2018, Mogollon Airpark, Inc. raised its total annual assessment by $325 over the previous year’s $825. Additionally, the HOA instituted a new late payment fee of $25 and began charging 18% interest on past-due accounts.

3. The petitioners’ central argument was that the total $325 assessment increase, representing a 39.4% hike over the prior year, violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A). This statute prohibits an HOA from imposing a “regular assessment” that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s assessment without member approval.

4. Mogollon Airpark, Inc. argued that the $325 increase was composed of two separate parts: a $116 increase to the “regular assessment” (14.1%) and a $209 “special assessment.” They contended that the 20% statutory limit in section 33-1803(A) applies only to regular assessments, not special assessments, and therefore their actions were lawful.

5. The judge dismissed the petitions based on principles of statutory construction. He concluded that “regular assessment” is a specific type of assessment, distinct from a “special assessment,” and that if “regular” merely referred to the process of passing an assessment (motion, second, vote), the word would be redundant and meaningless in the statute. Since the regular assessment portion of the increase was below the 20% threshold, no violation occurred.

6. The 045 matter, filed by Warren R. Brown, specifically challenged Mogollon’s new $25 late fee and 18% interest charge. The judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown, deeming him the prevailing party, and ordered Mogollon to rescind the $25 late fee and refund his $500 filing fee.

7. The judge found the $25 late fee violated the statute because the section of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) limiting late charges applies to “assessments” generally, not just “regular assessments.” Unlike the clause on assessment increases, the legislature did not use the limiting word “regular,” so applying that limitation would violate principles of statutory construction.

8. The hearing did not address the allegations of deceptive accounting because the petitions filed by Mr. Brown (029) and Mr. Stevens (054) were “single-issue petitions.” This limited the scope of the hearing strictly to the question of whether Mogollon violated the specific statute, section 33-1803(A). The judge noted that civil courts may be a more suitable venue for the financial allegations.

9. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence.” The burden of proof was on the petitioners, Messrs. Brown and Stevens, to prove their respective allegations against the respondent, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

10. Mr. Stevens argued that the definition of “special assessment” from the case Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona should be applied, which it failed to meet. The judge found this reliance misplaced because that case applies to special taxing districts created under ARIZ. REV. STAT. Title 48, and Mogollon Airpark, Inc. is an HOA, not such a taxing district.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-format response. Do not provide answers.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of the term “regular assessment” as presented by the petitioners and the respondent. Discuss the Administrative Law Judge’s final interpretation and the principles of statutory construction used to arrive at that conclusion.

2. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision distinguishes between the legality of the assessment increase and the legality of the late fee. Explain the legal reasoning behind this split decision, focusing on the specific wording of ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A) and the different statutory construction applied to each clause.

3. Discuss the procedural limitations of the hearings as described in the legal decision, specifically referencing the concept of a “single-issue petition.” How did this limitation affect the scope of the case and prevent the judge from ruling on certain serious allegations made by Brown and Stevens?

4. Based on the “Findings of Fact,” describe the background allegations of financial misconduct made by the petitioners against Mogollon’s treasurer and board. Although not ruled upon, explain how these allegations served as the primary motivation for their legal challenges regarding the assessment and fee increases.

5. Trace the procedural history of the “029 matter,” from its original petition and dismissal to the eventual rehearing and final order. What does this process reveal about the requirements for filing a successful petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and makes legal rulings and decisions, in this case, Judge Thomas Shedden.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A)

The specific Arizona statute at the heart of the dispute. It limits HOA regular assessment increases to 20% over the prior year and caps late payment charges to the greater of $15 or 10% of the unpaid assessment.

Assessment

A fee or charge levied by a homeowners’ association on its members to cover operating expenses, reserve funds, and other costs.

Bylaws

A set of rules adopted by an organization, like an HOA, to govern its internal management and operations. Part of the governing documents.

Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions. These are legal obligations recorded in the deed of a property, governing its use and maintenance. Part of the governing documents.

Consolidated Matter

A legal procedure where multiple separate cases or petitions involving common questions of law or fact are combined into a single hearing to promote efficiency.

Docket Number

A unique number assigned by a court or administrative office to identify a specific case. The matters in this case were identified as 029, 045, and 054.

Governing Documents

The collection of legal documents, including CC&Rs and Bylaws, that establish the rules and authority of a homeowners’ association.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action in an administrative or court proceeding. In this case, Warren R. Brown and Brad W. Stevens.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this case. It means the greater weight of the evidence shows that a fact is more likely than not to be true.

Regular Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a specific type of recurring annual assessment for an HOA’s general operating budget, subject to the 20% increase limit in section 33-1803(A).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, Mogollon Airpark, Inc.

Single-Issue Petition

A petition that limits the scope of the administrative hearing to a single, specific legal question or alleged violation, as was the case for the 029 and 054 matters.

Special Assessment

As interpreted by the ALJ, a one-time or non-recurring assessment levied for a specific purpose (e.g., replenishing a reserve fund). The ALJ found it is not subject to the 20% annual increase cap that applies to regular assessments.

Statutory Construction

The process and principles used by judges to interpret and apply legislation. The judge used these principles to determine the meaning of “regular” and “assessment” in the statute.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG


How One Word Let an HOA Raise Dues by 40%—And 4 Surprising Lessons for Every Homeowner

Imagine opening your annual bill from your Homeowner’s Association (HOA) and discovering your dues have skyrocketed by nearly 40% overnight. This isn’t a hypothetical scenario. It’s precisely what happened to homeowners in the Mogollon Airpark community in Arizona when their HOA board raised the annual assessment by $325, from $825 to $1,150—a staggering 39.4% increase.

But the homeowners weren’t just angry about the amount; they alleged the increase was justified by a “fabricated shortfall” created through “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods.” At first glance, the hike also seemed legally impossible. Arizona state law, specifically ARIZ. REV. STAT. section 33-1803(A), clearly states that an HOA cannot impose a regular assessment that is more than 20% greater than the previous year’s. So how did the Mogollon Airpark board legally circumvent this cap? The answer, found in the fine print of an administrative law judge’s decision, reveals critical lessons for every homeowner about the power of language, legal strategy, and reading the fine print.

1. The Power of a Name: The “Special Assessment” Loophole

The HOA’s strategy was deceptively simple. Instead of raising the annual assessment by the full $325, the Mogollon Airpark board split the increase into two distinct parts. First, it raised the “regular assessment” by $116. This amounted to a 14.1% increase over the previous year’s $825, keeping it well within the 20% legal limit. The remaining $209 was then levied as a separate fee, which the board classified as a “special assessment.”

When homeowners challenged this, the Administrative Law Judge sided with the HOA. The judge’s ruling was based on a strict reading of the statute: the 20% cap applies only to “regular assessments,” not “special assessments.” By simply calling a portion of the increase a “special assessment,” the HOA legally circumvented the very law designed to protect homeowners from massive, sudden fee hikes.

Lesson 1 for Homeowners: The name of a fee is everything. State-mandated caps on “regular” assessments offer zero protection if your HOA can simply reclassify an increase as a “special” assessment.

2. Every Word Is a Battlefield: “Regular” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The homeowners, petitioners Warren Brown and Brad Stevens, built their case on a common-sense interpretation of the law. They argued that the term “regular assessment” in the statute referred to the process by which an assessment is created—that is, any fee approved through a regular motion, second, and vote by the board. By this logic, the entire $325 increase was a single “regular assessment” and therefore violated the 20% cap. They also argued that the HOA had no authority under its own governing documents to impose a special assessment in the first place.

The judge, however, rejected this definition. The judge reasoned that lawmakers don’t add words to statutes for no reason. If “regular” simply meant “voted on normally,” the word would be redundant, as all assessments are assumed to be passed this way. To give the word meaning, it must refer to a specific type of assessment. To support this interpretation, the judge pointed to another Arizona statute, 33-1806, which explicitly uses the distinct terms “regular assessments” and “special assessment[s].” This proved that the state legislature intended for them to be entirely different categories of fees, cementing the HOA’s victory on the main issue.

Lesson 2 for Homeowners: Every word in a statute has a purpose. Courts assume lawmakers don’t use words accidentally, and a layperson’s “common-sense” definition of a term can be easily defeated by established principles of legal interpretation.

3. A Small Victory on a Technicality: Why You Should Still Read the Fine Print

While the homeowners lost the battle over the 39.4% dues increase, one petitioner, Mr. Brown, secured a small but significant win on a separate issue: late fees. The Mogollon Airpark board had instituted a new $25 late fee, which Mr. Brown challenged.

Arizona law limits late fees to “the greater of fifteen dollars or ten percent of the amount of the unpaid assessment.” The HOA argued that this limit, like the 20% cap, only applied to regular assessments. This time, the judge disagreed. The judge’s logic was a textbook example of statutory interpretation: when lawmakers include a specific word in one part of a law but omit it from another, courts assume the omission was deliberate. In the section of the law governing late fees, the limit applies to “assessments” in general; the word “regular” is conspicuously absent.

Because the HOA’s $25 fee exceeded the legal limit, the judge ruled in favor of Mr. Brown. The court ordered the HOA to rescind the illegal late fee and, importantly, to reimburse Mr. Brown for his $500 filing fee.

Lesson 3 for Homeowners: The fine print cuts both ways. While one word can create a loophole for an HOA, the absence of that same word elsewhere can be your most powerful weapon.

4. Fighting the Right Battle in the Right Place: The Allegations a Judge Couldn’t Hear

Underlying the dispute over the 20% cap were much more serious allegations. The homeowners’ petitions claimed the HOA board used “deceptive and nonstandard accounting methods,” including keeping “two sets of books,” to create a “fabricated shortfall” and justify the massive fee increase.

Yet, none of these explosive claims were ever addressed during the hearing. The reason was a crucial matter of legal procedure. The homeowners had filed what are known as “single-issue petitions,” which focused narrowly and exclusively on the violation of the 20% assessment cap in statute 33-1803(A). This strategic choice legally prevented the judge from considering the broader allegations of financial mismanagement, regardless of their merit.

In a pointed footnote, the judge highlighted the procedural constraints and suggested the homeowners had chosen the wrong legal venue for their most serious claims:

Considering the nature of Messrs. Brown and Stevens’s allegations, the civil courts may be better suited than an administrative tribunal to address the issues they raise.

Lesson 4 for Homeowners: Your legal strategy is as important as your evidence. Choosing the right claims to file and the right venue to file them in can determine whether a judge is even allowed to hear your most compelling arguments.

Conclusion: Your Most Powerful Tool

The case of Mogollon Airpark is a powerful illustration of how legal battles are won and lost not on broad principles of fairness, but on the precise definitions of individual words. The presence of the word “regular” in one clause of the law cost the homeowners their central fight, allowing the HOA to circumvent the 20% cap. In a stunning contrast, the absence of that very same word in another clause handed them a clear victory on late fees.

This case is a stark reminder of the power hidden in legal definitions and fine print. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question: Do you really know what your governing documents—and the state laws that bind them—truly allow?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared pro se; presented testimony/evidence

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Spelled Mark K. Saul in some transmissions

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk/staff)
    Transmitting staff

Brad W. Stevens vs. Mogollon Aripark, Inc.,

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG, 18F-H1818045-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL, 18F-H1818054-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-03-01
Administrative Law Judge Thomas Shedden
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Warren R. Brown Counsel
Respondent Mogollon Airpark, Inc. Counsel Gregory A. Stein, Esq.; Mark K. Sahl, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled that Mogollon Airpark, Inc. violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(A) by charging a $25 late fee, as the statutory limit applies to all assessments,. However, the ALJ found no violation regarding the $325 assessment increase because the $209 portion was a special assessment and the remaining regular increase did not exceed the 20% limit,,.

Why this result: The Petitioners' primary loss on the assessment cap issue was due to a failed legal interpretation that 'regular assessment' encompasses all assessments, a view the ALJ found would render statutory language redundant,.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to $325 Assessment Increase (Docket 029-RHG)

Petitioner Brown argued that 'regular assessment' refers to the procedure (motion, second, vote) and thus the entire $325 increase should be subject to the 20% cap,. The ALJ rejected this, finding that $116 was a regular increase (14.1%) and $209 was a special assessment, to which the cap did not apply,.

Orders: Petition in Docket No. 18F-H1818029-REL-RHG is dismissed.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • Deer Valley v. Houser

Excessive Late Fee and Interest (Docket 045)

Petitioner Brown alleged that the $25 late charge and interest rate exceeded the limits of A.R.S. § 33-1803(A). The ALJ ruled that the statutory limit on late fees applies to all 'assessments', not just 'regular assessments', and found the HOA in violation,.

Orders: Respondent must rescind the $25 late fee and pay Petitioner his $500 filing fee within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix

Challenge to $325 Assessment Increase (Docket 054 & Rehearing)

Petitioner Stevens argued the entire $325 must be a regular assessment because the HOA lacked authority to impose special assessments or used deceptive accounting to justify the increase,,. The ALJ found that 'regular assessment' is a specific type of assessment and the $116 increase (14.1%) did not exceed the cap,,.

Orders: Petition in Docket No. 18F-H1818054-REL and the subsequent rehearing are dismissed,.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona

Analytics Highlights

Topics: Assessment Increase Cap, Regular Assessment vs Special Assessment, Late Fee Limit, Statutory Construction, Accounting Impropriety Allegations, Rehearing, Consolidated Matter
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(A)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1806
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. Title 32, Ch. 20, Art. 11
  • A.A.C. § R2-19-119
  • Deer Valley v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296, 152 P.3d 490, 493 (2007)
  • U.S. Parking Sys v. City of Phoenix, 160 Ariz. 210, 211, 772 P.2d 33, 34 (App. 1989)
  • McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 382 P.3d 1216 (2016 App.)
  • Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
  • Gutierrez v. Industrial Commission of Arizona
  • State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 238, 439 P.2d 805, 809 (1968)
  • Northwest Fire District v. U.S. Home of Arizona, 215 Ariz. 492 (2007)

Decision Documents

18F-H1818054-REL Decision – 666285.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:24 (151.9 KB)

18F-H1818054-REL Decision – 672623.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-19T15:21:25 (144.6 KB)

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Warren R. Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Brad W. Stevens (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf and testified

Respondent Side

  • Gregory A. Stein (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Counsel for Respondent, referred to as Greg Stein in rehearing
  • Mark K. Sahl (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
    Counsel for Respondent (also spelled Sahl/Saul)

Neutral Parties

  • Thomas Shedden (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff/clerk)
    Transmitting staff