The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Association's conduct did not violate ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 because the Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the requested records were in existence and subject to disclosure.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that the requested records (communications) were in existence and subject to disclosure.
Key Issues & Findings
Failing to fulfill Petitioner’s records request
Petitioner claimed the HOA failed to provide copies of all communications (written/electronic) related to information requests, open meeting law compliance, and changes to bylaws, arguing they were not exempt from disclosure under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(B). The HOA asserted no disclosable records existed.
Orders: Petitioner's petition and request for civil penalty are denied. Respondent shall not reimburse Petitioner's filing fee.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(A)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Records Request, Records Disclosure, ARIZ. REV. STAT. 33-1805, Burden of Proof, Preponderance of Evidence
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et al.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2120006-REL Decision – 834142.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:55 (147.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120006-REL
Administrative Law Judge Decision: Kupel vs. Hidden Valley Association
Executive Summary
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings denied a petition filed by homeowner Douglas E. Kupel against the Hidden Valley Association (HVA). The core of the dispute was Kupel’s allegation that HVA violated Arizona statute ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to completely fulfill a comprehensive records request. While HVA provided its records retention policy and legal invoices, it withheld two categories of electronic and hard copy communications, claiming no such disclosable records existed.
Kupel argued that statements made in emails by HVA Board President Gary Freed—specifically that certain communications would be “filed as an HVA business record”—proved the existence of the requested records. HVA countered that this statement was a mistake on Freed’s part, resulting from an initial misunderstanding of retention requirements, and that no records subject to disclosure actually existed.
The ALJ ultimately concluded that Kupel failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard required to prove his claim. The judge found that the evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that the requested records existed and were being improperly withheld. Consequently, the petition was denied, and Kupel’s requests for reimbursement of his filing fee and the imposition of a civil penalty against HVA were also denied.
Case Overview
Case Name
Douglas E Kupel, Petitioner, vs. Hidden Valley Association, Respondent
Case Number
21F-H2120006-REL
Jurisdiction
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
Presiding Judge
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Hearing Date
October 22, 2020
Decision Date
October 30, 2020
Key Parties
Douglas E. Kupel (Petitioner), Hidden Valley Association (Respondent), Gary Freed (HVA Board President)
Core Dispute: The Records Request
The central issue of the hearing was whether the Hidden Valley Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to fully comply with a records request submitted by Kupel on June 22, 2020. HVA, through its community manager HOAMCO, provided a partial response on July 1, 2020.
Breakdown of the Records Request:
• Request 1 (Fulfilled): A copy of the HVA records retention policy adopted on January 15, 2020.
• Request 2 (Denied): Copies of all communications (email and hard copy) to or from current and former HVA Board and committee members regarding “information requests or open meeting law compliance” from July 2019 to the present.
• Request 3 (Denied): Copies of all communications (email and hard copy) to or from current and former HVA Board and committee members regarding any proposed, discussed, or adopted changes to the Association bylaws from January 2019 to the present.
• Request 4 (Fulfilled): Copies of invoices, billing statements, and payment records for legal services associated with revisions to the Association bylaws from January 2019 to the present.
HVA and its President, Gary Freed, asserted that the denied communications were not subject to disclosure under the exceptions outlined in ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(B).
Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (Douglas E. Kupel)
• Allegation: Kupel accused HVA of willfully failing to fulfill his request, alleging that non-exempt records did exist and should have been disclosed.
• Primary Evidence: Kupel submitted several email messages from HVA President Gary Freed which contained the statement: “This communication has been received, and will be filed as an HVA business record in the files maintained by HOAMCO for the benefit of HVA” or substantially similar language.
• Argument: Kupel testified that these emails proved the existence of communications that did not meet the statutory exclusions and, therefore, HVA had failed to fully respond to his request.
• Requested Relief:
1. An order compelling HVA to abide by ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.
2. Reimbursement of the $500 filing fee.
3. The levying of a civil penalty against HVA.
Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Hidden Valley Association)
• Witness Testimony: HVA Board President Gary Freed testified on behalf of the association.
• Core Defense: Freed testified that based on HVA’s records retention policy and his understanding of open meeting laws, “no records existed which were subject to disclosure.”
• Explanation of Contested Emails: Freed explained that his prior email statements about filing all communications were a mistake. He testified that he initially believed all communications needed to be retained but later learned this was incorrect.
• Search Process: Freed admitted that neither he nor other board members conducted a one-by-one search of every single email. However, he testified that he “may have scanned his personal e-mail” and did not dismiss the petitioner’s request “out-of-hand.”
• Association Practices: Freed asserted that HVA business was conducted via open meetings, with the exception of a single emergency situation, implying that no discoverable email correspondence regarding official business would exist.
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Conclusion
The ALJ’s decision rested on the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as proof convincing the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The petitioner, Kupel, bore the burden of meeting this standard.
• Evaluation of Evidence: The judge found Kupel’s primary argument unpersuasive. The decision states, “Essentially, Petitioner is claiming that there must be other records in existence because of the language that Mr. Freed used… This is not persuasive as there was no evidence presented by Petitioner to prove that the records were in existence.”
• Credibility of Testimony: The judge gave weight to Freed’s testimony that he had been mistaken about record-keeping protocols. The decision also noted that HVA’s official records retention policy, adopted six months prior to the request, specifically outlined which communications were to be kept.
• Lack of Proof: The judge concluded that Freed believed any documents that might have existed were subject to statutory exemptions and that all relevant business was conducted in open meetings. Ultimately, Kupel failed to provide sufficient proof that discoverable records actually existed.
• Final Ruling: The ALJ concluded that “the Association’s conduct, as outlined above, did not violate the charged provisions of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.”
Final Order
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders:
Outcome
Petitioner’s Petition
Denied
Request for Civil Penalty
Denied
Reimbursement of Filing Fee
Denied (Respondent shall not reimburse Petitioner’s fee)
The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within thirty days of the order’s service.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120006-REL
Study Guide: Kupel v. Hidden Valley Association, No. 21F-H2120006-REL
This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing decision in the matter of Douglas E. Kupel versus the Hidden Valley Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension of the facts, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the specific violation alleged by the Petitioner in his petition to the Department of Real Estate?
3. What four categories of records did the Petitioner request from the Hidden Valley Association (HVA) on June 22, 2020?
4. Which parts of the Petitioner’s records request did the HVA fulfill, and which parts did it deny?
5. What was the Petitioner’s central piece of evidence to argue that the HVA was improperly withholding existing communications?
6. How did HVA Board President Gary Freed explain the discrepancy between his email statements and the association’s refusal to provide the requested communications?
7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party was required to meet this standard?
8. According to Mr. Freed’s testimony, where was all official HVA business conducted?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the HVA’s conduct in this matter?
10. What three specific outcomes were mandated by the final ORDER issued on October 30, 2020?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, Douglas E. Kupel, a property owner and member of the Hidden Valley Association, and the Respondent, the Hidden Valley Association (HVA). The Petitioner brought the complaint against the Respondent, alleging a violation of state law.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Hidden Valley Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to completely fulfill his records request. Specifically, he claimed the association improperly withheld communications records.
3. The Petitioner requested: (1) the records retention policy; (2) communications regarding information requests or open meeting law compliance; (3) communications regarding proposed changes to the association bylaws; and (4) legal invoices and payment records related to bylaw revisions.
4. The HVA fulfilled the request for the records retention policy and the legal invoices. It denied the two requests for communications between board and committee members, claiming the requested records were not subject to disclosure.
5. The Petitioner’s central evidence consisted of several emails from HVA Board President Gary Freed in which Mr. Freed stated, “[t]his communication has been received, and will be filed as an HVA business record.” The Petitioner argued this proved that such communications existed and were official records.
6. Mr. Freed testified that he was initially mistaken in his belief that all communications needed to be retained and that this was why he included that language in his emails. He clarified that based on the HVA’s records retention policy and open meeting laws, no disclosable records of the type requested existed.
7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring the evidence to convince the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Douglas E. Kupel, bore the burden of proving his case by this standard.
8. Mr. Freed testified that all HVA business was conducted via open meetings. He stated that there were no meetings conducted solely by email, with the exception of a single emergency situation.
9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the HVA was in violation of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805. The judge found the HVA’s conduct did not violate the charged statute.
10. The final ORDER (1) denied the Petitioner’s petition, (2) denied the Petitioner’s request for a civil penalty against the Respondent, and (3) ordered that the Respondent shall not be required to reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for in-depth analysis and discussion. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the legal arguments presented by both the Petitioner, Douglas E. Kupel, and the Respondent, Hidden Valley Association. How did each party use the evidence and ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 to support their position?
2. Discuss the significance of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in this case. Explain how the Administrative Law Judge determined that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden of proof.
3. Evaluate the testimony of HVA Board President Gary Freed. How did his explanations regarding his email statements and the association’s record-keeping practices influence the judge’s final decision?
4. Examine ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805(B), which outlines the exceptions for withholding records. Based on the case details, explain why the communications requested by the Petitioner were ultimately deemed non-disclosable or non-existent under this statute.
5. Describe the complete procedural history of the case, from the initial filing of the petition to the final order. Include key dates, entities involved (such as the Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings), and the final remedies sought by the Petitioner versus the actual outcome.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings and makes decisions on behalf of a government agency. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
The Arizona Revised Statute that governs the examination and disclosure of a homeowners’ association’s financial and other records by its members. It outlines the process for requests, a ten-business-day fulfillment window, and specific exemptions allowing an association to withhold certain records.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
The Arizona Revised Statute cited by the Petitioner that allows an administrative law judge to levy a civil penalty against a party found to be in violation of the law.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The official governing documents that establish the rules and obligations for a homeowners’ association and its members.
Department of Real Estate (“Department”)
The Arizona state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions for hearings involving disputes between homeowners and their associations.
Hidden Valley Association (HVA)
The Respondent in the case; a homeowners’ association for the Hidden Valley Ranch subdivision in Prescott, Arizona, governed by CC&Rs and a Board of Directors.
HOAMCO
The company that served as the Community Manager for the Hidden Valley Association and initially responded to the Petitioner’s records request.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
An independent state agency in Arizona to which the Department of Real Estate referred this matter for an evidentiary hearing.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Douglas E. Kupel, a homeowner and member of the HVA.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other, making the contention more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Respondent was the Hidden Valley Association.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120006-REL
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21F-H2120006-REL
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The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings in Arizona, concerning a dispute between Petitioner Douglas E. Kupel and the Hidden Valley Association (HVA), a homeowners’ association. The core issue of the hearing, held on October 22, 2020, was whether the HVA violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805 by failing to fulfill Kupel’s records request for communications regarding open meeting law compliance and bylaw changes. Petitioner Kupel argued that undisclosed records existed based on emails sent by HVA Board President Gary Freed, while Freed testified that no disclosable records existed due to statutory exceptions and a mistaken belief about record retention. Ultimately, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s claim, concluding that Kupel failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated the statute, thereby also denying his request for reimbursement and civil penalties.
What are the legal requirements governing homeowner association record disclosure in Arizona?
What was the core dispute between the petitioner and the homeowner association?
How did the Administrative Law Judge decide the outcome of this specific case?
Audio Overview
Video Overview Video Overview
Mind Map Mind Map
Reports Reports
Flashcards Flashcards
Quiz Quiz
00:00 / 00:00
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Douglas E. Kupel(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Timothy Butterfield(HOA attorney) Hidden Valley Association Represented Respondent
Gary Freed(board member) Hidden Valley Association Hidden Valley Ranch Association Board President and witness for HVA
Mark K. Sahl(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP Received service of the Order
Neutral Parties
Adam D. Stone(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of the Administrative Law Judge Decision
The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption
Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.
Orders: The petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.
Background of the Dispute
The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.
◦ Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).
• Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.
• Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.
• Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.
The Contested 2020 Parking Policy
The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.
• Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.
• Designated Parking Areas:
1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.
2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.
3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).
Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs
The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.
Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)
Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.
• Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.
• Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.
• Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.
Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)
The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.
• Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”
• Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.
• No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.
• Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.
Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs
Article
Section
Provision Text
Article 10
§ 10.11.1
“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”
Article 10
§ 10.11.2
Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.
Article 7
“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”
Article 12
“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.
Legal Standard and Burden of Proof
• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.
• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.
Conclusions of Law
1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”
2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.
3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.
4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”
Final Order
“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”
The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020060-REL
Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.
1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?
2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?
3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.
4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?
5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?
6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?
7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.
8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?
9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Answer Key
1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.
2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.
3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.
4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.
5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.
6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.
7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.
9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.
10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?
2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.
3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?
4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?
5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.
Allowed Vehicles
A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.
An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.
Common Area
Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.
Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.
Notice of Hearing
A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.
An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.
Petition
The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.
Planned Community
A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020060-REL
3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules
For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.
But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.
The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.
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1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip
At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.
The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:
“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”
For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.
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2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)
Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.
The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.
Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.
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3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner
Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.
The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:
“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.
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Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print
This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.
Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.
This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Laura B Ganer(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of herself.
Respondent Side
Mark B. Sahl(HOA attorney) Vincenz Homeowners Association
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Nicole Payne(recipient) Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.
The petition was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent HOA violated its CC&Rs (Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and Article 12 § 2) when adopting the new parking policy.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that Respondent violated its CC&Rs by a preponderance of the evidence.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to new HOA parking policy adoption
Petitioner alleged the VHA's new parking policy was unreasonable and improperly adopted without an amendment, violating specific CC&R sections.
Orders: The petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Briefing Document: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association (Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL)
Executive Summary
This document provides an analysis of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Laura B. Ganer vs. the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA), case number 20F-H2020060-REL. The central dispute concerned a new on-street parking policy adopted by the VHA Board in 2020. The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, alleged this policy violated multiple articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
The Administrative Law Judge, Velva Moses-Thompson, ultimately dismissed the petition. The court concluded that the VHA Board acted within the explicit authority granted to it by the community’s governing documents, specifically CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1, which empowers the Board to designate parking areas. The judge found that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a “preponderance of the evidence”—to establish that the VHA had violated its CC&Rs. The decision affirmed the Board’s right to establish rules and regulations for parking as outlined in the CC&Rs without requiring a full membership vote for an amendment.
Background of the Dispute
The case originated from a single-issue petition filed by homeowner Laura B. Ganer with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about May 20, 2020. The petition alleged that the Vincenz Homeowners Association violated its governing documents by adopting a new parking policy.
• Parties:
◦ Petitioner: Laura B. Ganer, a property owner within the VHA.
◦ Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA).
• Catalyst: The VHA Board of Directors adopted a new on-street parking policy in 2020.
• Alleged Violations: The petition claimed the new policy violated VHA CC&R Article 10, Section 11; Article 7, Section 3; and Article 12, Section 2.
• Legal Forum: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on August 27, 2020.
The Contested 2020 Parking Policy
The policy adopted by the VHA Board resolved to allow on-street parking for specific vehicles in designated areas, provided the parking complied with associated rules.
• Allowed Vehicles: Private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks that do not exceed one ton in capacity.
• Designated Parking Areas:
1. Immediately in front of a Lot, for vehicles associated with the owner, resident, or their guests, or with the lot owner’s consent.
2. Immediately in front of any Common Area park within the Association.
3. Along any public street within the Association that does not border a Lot (e.g., in front of a Common Area tract).
Core Legal Arguments and Cited CC&Rs
The dispute centered on whether the VHA Board had the authority to enact the new parking policy or if doing so violated the foundational CC&Rs.
Petitioner’s Position (Laura B. Ganer)
Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy fundamentally contradicted the intent and letter of the CC&Rs.
• Violation of Article 10: She asserted that the original intention of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 was to limit parking within the VHA.
• Violation of Article 7: She contended the policy violates Article 7, Section 3, because it is “unreasonable” by allowing parking “virtually everywhere” within the community.
• Implicit Amendment: The new policy was so expansive that it effectively constituted an amendment to the CC&Rs, which would require the procedure outlined in Article 12, Section 2 (a 67% member vote), not just a Board resolution.
Respondent’s Position (Vincenz HOA)
The VHA argued that its actions were a proper exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board in the CC&Rs.
• Authority from Article 10: VHA contended that CC&R Article 10, § 10.11.1 expressly allows the Board to create parking rules by permitting parking “within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”
• Inapplicability of Article 7: The Association argued that Article 7, Section 3, which governs general “Association Rules,” did not apply because the parking policy was adopted under the specific authority of Article 10.
• No Amendment Required: VHA maintained that since Article 10 grants the Board the power to adopt parking rules and regulations, an amendment to the CC&Rs under Article 12, Section 2 was not necessary.
• Jurisdictional Argument: VHA also argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ganer failed to allege or provide facts that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.
Relevant Articles from VHA CC&Rs
Article
Section
Provision Text
Article 10
§ 10.11.1
“Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”
Article 10
§ 10.11.2
Governs restrictions on other vehicles like RVs, boats, and commercial vehicles, but allows the Board to designate areas and rules for them.
Article 7
“By a majority vote of the Board, the Association may… adopt, amend and repeal the Association Rules. The Association Rules shall be reasonable… and shall not be inconsistent with this Declaration…”
Article 12
“Except as otherwise provided in this Declaration, this Declaration may be amended only by the affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) or written consent of: (a) Members holding not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes…”
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision, issued on September 16, 2020, was based on a direct interpretation of the VHA’s governing documents and the evidence presented.
Legal Standard and Burden of Proof
• The petitioner, Ms. Ganer, bore the burden of proving her allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence that is more probably true than not.
• In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties, and they must be construed as a whole.
Conclusions of Law
1. Interpretation of Article 10: The judge found that CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 unambiguously forbids parking except in specified locations, including “in an area that has… been designated for parking by the Board.”
2. Board Authority: The court concluded that the VHA’s adoption of the parking policy was a valid exercise of the authority explicitly granted to the Board by Article 10.11.1 to designate such parking areas.
3. Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: Ms. Ganer failed to establish that the VHA violated any of the cited articles. The judge noted that Ganer did not even allege that the VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle.
4. Overall Finding: The decision states, “Upon consideration of all of the evidence presented in this matter, the Administrative Law Judge concludes that VHA did not violate CC&R Article 7 § 3, Article 10 § 10.11, and CC&R Article 12 § 2 when it adopted the parking policy.”
Final Order
“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”
The decision is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020060-REL
Study Guide: Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association
This guide provides a detailed review of the administrative law case Laura B. Ganer v. Vincenz Homeowners Association, Case No. 20F-H2020060-REL. It is designed to test comprehension of the facts, legal arguments, and final decision as presented in the source documents.
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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions
Instructions: Please answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the case decision.
1. Who were the petitioner and the respondent in this case, and what was their relationship within the community?
2. What specific action did the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) take in 2020 that initiated this legal dispute?
3. List the three specific articles of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that petitioner Laura Ganer alleged were violated.
4. According to VHA’s CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, under what three conditions are private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks permitted to be parked?
5. What was Ms. Ganer’s primary argument for why the VHA’s new parking policy was “unreasonable” as defined under Article 7 § 3?
6. Upon what grounds did the VHA argue that the petition should be dismissed, relating to the petitioner’s specific allegations?
7. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.
8. How did the VHA defend its adoption of the new parking policy without obtaining the 67% member vote required for amendments under Article 12 § 2?
9. What was the core reason the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1?
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Answer Key
1. The petitioner was Laura B. Ganer, a property owner. The respondent was the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA). Ganer owned property within the planned community governed by the VHA.
2. In 2020, the VHA’s Board of Directors adopted a new parking policy that formally allowed on-street parking for certain vehicles in designated areas, such as in front of lots and common areas. This new policy prompted Ms. Ganer to file her petition.
3. Ms. Ganer alleged that the VHA violated Article 10, section 11; Article 7, section 3; and Article 12, section 2 of its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.
4. CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 permits these vehicles to be parked within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.
5. Ms. Ganer argued that the new policy was unreasonable because it allows for parking virtually everywhere within the VHA. She asserted that the original intention of the CC&Rs was to limit parking, not expand it so broadly.
6. The VHA argued for dismissal because Ms. Ganer did not contend, nor provide facts to establish, that the VHA had actually parked an automobile or pickup truck in any prohibited area. The VHA stated the Office of Administrative Hearings only had jurisdiction over alleged violations, not the mere adoption of a policy.
7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It is described as the greater weight of evidence that is sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of an issue over the other.
8. The VHA contended that an amendment was not required to adopt the parking policy. It argued that CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 already granted the Board the specific authority to designate parking rules and regulations.
9. The Judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to prove a violation because she did not allege that the VHA had actually parked a vehicle in a prohibited area. The Judge noted that the covenant forbids parking in a roadway or garage unless it is in an area designated by the Board.
10. The final order was that the petition is dismissed. This means the judge ruled in favor of the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners Association, and against the petitioner, Laura Ganer.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed to encourage deeper analysis of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, drawing evidence and arguments directly from the provided legal decision.
1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1 presented by Laura Ganer and the Vincenz Homeowners Association. How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this conflict, and what does this reveal about the judicial interpretation of restrictive covenants?
2. Discuss the legal concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain who held the burden, what the standard was, and why the petitioner ultimately failed to meet it according to the Judge’s findings.
3. Examine the VHA’s argument that CC&R Article 7 § 3 (regarding the adoption of “Association Rules”) was not applicable to its creation of the new parking policy. Based on the text, what is the distinction between a board-designated rule under Article 10 and a formal “Association Rule” under Article 7?
4. Evaluate the petitioner’s claim that the new parking policy constituted an amendment to the Declaration, thereby violating CC&R Article 12 § 2, which requires a 67% member vote. Why was this argument unsuccessful, and what does the decision imply about the scope of a homeowner association board’s power?
5. Using the facts of the case, explain the procedural journey of a homeowner’s dispute within a planned community in Arizona, from the initial filing to the final administrative order.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (in this case, the Office of Administrative Hearings) and makes legal decisions. The ALJ in this matter was Velva Moses-Thompson.
Allowed Vehicles
A term from the VHA’s 2020 parking policy defining the types of vehicles permitted for on-street parking: private passenger automobiles and pickup trucks not exceeding one ton in capacity.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this case, the petitioner bore the burden of proof.
An acronym for Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set out the rules for a planned community or homeowners association.
Common Area
Land within a planned community owned by the association for the shared use and enjoyment of its members, such as a park.
Department
Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency that received the initial petition from Ms. Ganer.
Notice of Hearing
A formal document issued by a legal body that sets the date, time, and location for a hearing and outlines the issues to be discussed. In this case, it was issued on July 1, 2020.
An acronym for the Office of Administrative Hearings, the state office where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held.
Petition
The formal written application filed by a party (the petitioner) to a legal body, initiating a case. Ms. Ganer filed her petition with the Department on or about May 20, 2020.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Laura B. Ganer.
Planned Community
A real estate development that includes common property and is governed by a homeowners’ association, with rules established by CC&Rs.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The evidentiary standard required to win a civil case, defined as proof that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or CC&R that limits the use of real property. In Arizona, if unambiguous, such covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or who is responding to a lawsuit. In this case, the Vincenz Homeowners Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020060-REL
3 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against Her HOA’s New Parking Rules
For millions of homeowners, the relationship with their Homeowners Association (HOA) is often defined by a single, persistent source of frustration: parking rules. Whether it’s restrictions on street parking, rules about commercial vehicles, or limits on guest parking, these regulations are a frequent flashpoint for community disputes. We tend to think of these fights as homeowners pushing back against ever-tightening restrictions.
But what happens when the script is flipped? In a fascinating legal case from Arizona, a homeowner named Laura Ganer took her HOA to court not because the rules were too strict, but because the board enacted a new, more permissive parking policy. She believed the board had overstepped its authority by allowing on-street parking that had previously been forbidden.
The resulting decision from the Administrative Law Judge provides a masterclass in HOA governance. It peels back the layers of community documents to reveal how power is delegated and exercised. The outcome holds several surprising lessons for any homeowner who thinks they understand the rules of their community.
——————————————————————————–
1. The Devil in the Details: How a “Restriction” Became a Permission Slip
At the heart of Ms. Ganer’s case was her belief that the community’s founding documents—the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—were written to severely limit on-street parking. She pointed to what seemed like a clear and unambiguous rule in the Vincenz Homeowners Association (VHA) governing documents.
The rule, found in VHA CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1, begins with a strong prohibition:
“No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.”
For many residents, the rule’s intent seemed clear: keep cars in garages and driveways. The critical turn, however, lay not in the prohibition but in the exceptions that followed. The power was vested in a single, potent phrase authorizing the Board to act: “…or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.” This clause, tucked at the end of the sentence, transformed a restrictive rule into a grant of discretionary power. The judge found this language gave the VHA Board explicit authority to create its new policy. This is a classic example of how governing documents are drafted to provide operational flexibility, allowing a future board to adapt to changing community needs without undergoing the arduous process of a full membership vote to amend the CC&Rs. The Board wasn’t breaking the rules; it was using a specific power granted to it all along.
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2. A Board Rule Isn’t a Bylaw Amendment (And Why It Matters)
Ms. Ganer raised two additional legal arguments. First, she contended that such a fundamental change to the community’s parking landscape was effectively an amendment to the CC&Rs. If it were an amendment, it would have required a community-wide vote and approval of “not less than sixty-seven percent (67%) of all Class A votes,” as stipulated in Article 12 § 2.
The VHA countered, and the judge agreed, that the Board was not amending the CC&Rs. Instead, it was exercising a power the document had already granted it in Article 10: the power to “designate” parking areas. Because the mechanism for the board to act was already in the foundational document, no amendment—and therefore no membership vote—was necessary.
Critically, Ms. Ganer also alleged a violation of Article 7 § 3 of the CC&Rs, which states that any “Association Rules shall be reasonable.” The VHA’s response to this claim was a deft legal maneuver. It argued that Article 7 § 3 did not apply because the Board didn’t adopt the parking policy under its general authority to make rules; it acted under the specific authority granted in Article 10. This distinction is vital in HOA governance, as it illustrates how a specific grant of power can sometimes bypass the general requirements that apply to other board actions.
——————————————————————————–
3. An Opinion Isn’t Proof: The Heavy Burden on the Homeowner
Ms. Ganer’s claim that the new policy was “unreasonable” because it allowed “parking virtually everywhere” was her attempt to prove a violation of Article 7 § 3. To an outside observer, this might seem like a fair point. But in a legal setting, a personal feeling of unreasonableness is not evidence.
The Administrative Law Judge noted that as the petitioner, Ms. Ganer had the “burden of proof” to show the HOA violated the CC&Rs “by a preponderance of the evidence.” This legal standard requires convincing proof, not just a strong opinion. The court document provides a clear definition:
“The greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force; superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Ultimately, the judge concluded that Ms. Ganer failed to meet this burden. Her assertion that the rule was unreasonable could not overcome the VHA’s argument that it had acted within the specific authority granted by Article 10. She did not provide convincing evidence of a violation, and the judge found in favor of the HOA, dismissing her petition entirely.
——————————————————————————–
Conclusion: The Ultimate Authority Is in the Fine Print
This case serves as a powerful lesson in HOA law, illustrating a key principle of document hierarchy. The ultimate authority is not what seems fair or what was historically done, but the exact wording in the community’s governing documents. A specific grant of authority will almost always override arguments based on general principles.
Here, the specific power to “designate” parking areas in Article 10 trumped both the general procedural requirement for a 67% vote for amendments in Article 12 and the general principle that rules must be “reasonable” under Article 7. Ms. Ganer’s challenge failed because the Board’s actions, while contrary to her expectations, were perfectly aligned with the powers the CC&Rs had given it from the start.
This case is a powerful reminder to read the fine print. When was the last time you read your community’s governing documents, and what powers might you be surprised to find your board already has?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Laura B Ganer(petitioner) Appeared on behalf of herself.
Respondent Side
Mark B. Sahl(HOA attorney) Vincenz Homeowners Association
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Other Participants
Nicole Payne(recipient) Received transmission of the decision via US Mail.
The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that VHA violated CC&R section 10.11.1 by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment requested by the Petitioner regarding VHA's waiver of its enforcement rights.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 regarding parking enforcement and waiver
Petitioner alleged VHA waived its right to enforce CC&R 10.11.1 (parking prohibition) because violations had been frequent since inception. The tribunal found Petitioner failed to establish VHA violated section 10.11.1, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction regarding the requested declaratory judgment on waiver of enforcement.
Orders: The petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Parking, Waiver, Jurisdiction
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:53 (95.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020043-REL
Briefing: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (No. 20F-H2020043-REL)
Executive Summary
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Wendy Ellsworth versus the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). The case centered on Ms. Ellsworth’s petition alleging that the VHA had waived its right to enforce a specific parking restriction outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition in its entirety.
The dismissal was based on two fundamental conclusions. First, the petitioner, Ms. Ellsworth, failed to meet her burden of proof. Her petition did not allege, nor did she provide evidence, that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. Instead, her claim focused on the VHA’s alleged failure to enforce the rule against others. Second, and more decisively, the judge determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment. Ms. Ellsworth was effectively asking the tribunal to declare that the VHA had waived its enforcement rights, a legal determination beyond the OAH’s statutory authority. The VHA successfully argued that the OAH’s jurisdiction is limited to hearing alleged violations committed by the association, not to adjudicating the association’s future enforcement capabilities.
Case Background
• Petitioner: Wendy Ellsworth, a property owner within the Vincenz community.
• Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).
• Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.
• Filing Date: Ms. Ellsworth filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about January 15, 2020.
• Hearing Date: An evidentiary hearing was held on August 19, 2020.
• Decision Date: The final decision was issued on September 8, 2020.
The matter was referred to the OAH to determine whether VHA was in violation of its community documents as alleged by the petitioner.
Central Dispute: CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1
The entire dispute revolved around the enforcement of a specific vehicle parking rule within the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.
Article 10 § 10.11.1 provides:
Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.
This provision explicitly restricts the parking of personal vehicles to approved locations: garages, private driveways, or other areas specifically designated by the VHA Board.
Positions of the Parties
Petitioner’s Position (Wendy Ellsworth)
Ms. Ellsworth’s central argument was not that the VHA had violated the parking rule, but that it had lost the ability to enforce it through inaction.
• Core Allegation: The petition claimed VHA had waived its ability to enforce Article 10, Section 10.11.1.
• Stated Rationale: Ms. Ellsworth intended to prove that “violations of the street parking prohibition have been ‘frequent’ since Vincenz’s inception” and that the community’s CC&Rs “do not contain a relevant non-waiver provision.”
• Testimony: At the August 19, 2020 hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, under cross-examination, she later conceded that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.
Respondent’s Position (Vincenz Homeowners’ Association)
The VHA argued for a complete dismissal of the petition, primarily on procedural and jurisdictional grounds.
• Core Argument: The petition failed to state a valid claim because it did not contend that VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.
• Jurisdictional Challenge: VHA contended that the OAH’s jurisdiction, granted under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), is strictly limited to hearing petitions about alleged violations of community documents or state statutes by the association.
• Declaratory Judgment: The VHA characterized Ms. Ellsworth’s request as one for a “declaratory judgment”—a ruling on the VHA’s legal right to enforce the rule—which it argued the OAH has no legal authority to issue.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided entirely with the Respondent, concluding that the petition must be dismissed. The decision was based on a failure of proof by the petitioner and a critical lack of jurisdiction by the tribunal.
Legal Standards Applied
Standard
Description
Burden of Proof
The Petitioner bears the burden to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Preponderance of the Evidence
Defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with “the most convincing force.”
Covenant Interpretation
In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be interpreted as a whole.
Conclusion 1: Failure to Establish a Violation
The ALJ found that Ms. Ellsworth failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision notes:
• Ms. Ellsworth “did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”
• Because no violation by the VHA was alleged or proven, the core requirement for a successful petition was absent.
Conclusion 2: Lack of Jurisdiction
The most significant finding was that the tribunal lacked the authority to grant the relief Ms. Ellsworth sought.
• The ALJ explicitly stated: “To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”
• This conclusion affirmed the VHA’s central argument that the OAH is not the proper forum for determining an association’s prospective enforcement rights.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings, the final order was unambiguous:
“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”
The decision document includes a notice outlining the next steps available to the parties. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the order is binding unless a party files a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020043-REL
Study Guide: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (Case No. 20F-H2020043-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and the final ruling of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
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Review Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific rule, or covenant, was at the center of the dispute?
3. What was the core allegation made by the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, in her initial petition?
4. What was the primary legal argument made by the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association, for why the petition should be dismissed?
5. What change occurred in Ms. Ellsworth’s testimony during the hearing?
6. According to the decision, what is the legal standard for the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing?
7. How does Arizona law interpret “restrictive covenants” when their language is unambiguous?
8. What two key reasons did the Administrative Law Judge give for dismissing the petition?
9. Which government body has jurisdiction to hear petitions from homeowners concerning violations of planned community documents?
10. What action could the parties take after the order was issued, and within what timeframe?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth, a homeowner, and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). Ms. Ellsworth initiated the legal action by filing a petition against the VHA.
2. The rule at the center of the dispute was Article 10, Section 10.11.1 of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section prohibits the parking of private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks on the property or adjacent roadways, except in garages, private driveways, or other Board-designated areas.
3. Ms. Ellsworth’s core allegation was that the VHA had waived its ability to enforce the street parking prohibition (CC&R 10.11.1). She claimed that violations had been “frequent” since the community’s inception and that the VHA’s CC&Rs lacked a relevant non-waiver provision.
4. The VHA argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ellsworth never alleged that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. The VHA contended that the OAH only has jurisdiction over alleged violations by the association, not over a homeowner’s request for a declaratory judgment on the right to enforce a rule.
5. During the hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, upon cross-examination, she admitted that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.
6. The legal standard for the burden of proof is “a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires the petitioner to provide proof that convinces the trier of fact that their contention is more probably true than not.
7. In Arizona, if a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes.
8. The judge dismissed the petition for two main reasons. First, Ms. Ellsworth failed to establish that the VHA itself had violated section 10.11.1. Second, the tribunal (the OAH) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the VHA has waived its right to enforce the covenant.
9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate is the government body that receives petitions for hearings concerning violations of planned community documents. These hearings are then referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
10. After the order was issued on September 8, 2020, either party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. This request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the facts and legal principles from the case to construct your arguments. No answer key is provided.
1. Explain the concept of “waiver” as argued by the petitioner. Why was this argument ultimately ineffective before the Office of Administrative Hearings in this specific case?
2. Analyze the jurisdictional limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) as demonstrated in this decision. Discuss the difference between adjudicating a violation of community documents and issuing a declaratory judgment.
3. Describe the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and explain how the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, failed to meet this burden of proof. Consider both her initial claim and her testimony during the hearing.
4. Evaluate the petitioner’s legal strategy. What was the central flaw in her petition that prevented the Administrative Law Judge from ruling on the merits of her non-enforcement claim?
5. Based on the legal precedent cited (Powell v. Washburn), discuss the principles Arizona courts use to interpret CC&Rs. How did the judge apply this principle to the specific language of Article 10, Section 10.11.1?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (like the OAH) and issues decisions.
Affirmative Defense
A set of facts other than those alleged by the petitioner which, if proven by the respondent, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the respondent’s otherwise unlawful conduct.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the VHA violated its CC&Rs.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision.
Declaratory Judgment
A binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in a matter before any actual harm has occurred. The OAH determined it lacked jurisdiction to issue such a judgment in this case.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The OAH’s jurisdiction was limited to hearing alleged violations of community documents, not requests for declaratory judgments.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held. It conducts hearings for other state agencies.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition to start a legal action. In this case, Wendy Ellsworth.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning that the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than not. It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or a set of CC&Rs that limits the use of the property and prohibits certain uses.
Waiver
The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. The petitioner argued that the VHA, through its inaction, had waived its right to enforce the parking rule.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020043-REL
Why This Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA Was Doomed From the Start: 3 Critical Lessons
The frustration is real. You see your neighbors breaking the rules—parking on the street, letting their lawn go—and it feels like your Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is doing nothing about it. This sense of inconsistent enforcement is one of the most common complaints homeowners have. For Wendy Ellsworth, this frustration led her to file a legal petition against the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).
Her case, however, was dismissed. It wasn’t lost on a minor technicality or a surprise piece of evidence. It was doomed from the start because of fundamental strategic errors. By examining where she went wrong, we can uncover three powerful lessons for any homeowner considering a similar fight.
Lesson 1: You Must Accuse the Right Party of the Right Violation
Ms. Ellsworth’s core grievance was that the VHA was not enforcing its own on-street parking rules against other residents. Her formal petition, however, made a critical mistake: it accused the HOA itself of violating the community’s parking rule, CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1.
This was a fatal flaw. That specific rule governs the actions of homeowners—prohibiting them from parking automobiles or trucks on roadways except in designated areas. It places no duty on the HOA. In her legal filing, Ms. Ellsworth failed to point to any specific rule that the HOA, as an entity, had actually broken. Her petition essentially accused the HOA of illegally parking a car, which was not her complaint at all. The judge noted this fundamental disconnect:
“Ms. Ellsworth did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”
A viable petition would have needed to identify a completely different rule—one that placed a specific duty on the HOA Board to enforce the community documents—and then allege that the Board had violated that duty. This fundamental error of misidentifying the violation was compounded by the fact that she was asking the tribunal for a remedy it had no power to grant. Accusing the wrong party of breaking the wrong rule can cause an entire case to be dismissed before its merits are even considered.
Lesson 2: The “Burden of Proof” is More Than Just a Legal Phrase
In any legal action, the person making the claim (the “petitioner”) has the “burden of proof.” This means it is their responsibility to present evidence that convinces the judge their claim is true. Ms. Ellsworth, as the petitioner, was responsible for proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
The court defined this standard as:
“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
Making an accusation is easy; proving it is hard. Ms. Ellsworth’s own testimony failed to meet this standard. At the hearing, she initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, when questioned further during cross-examination, she admitted that she was “unsure” whether the HOA had ever enforced it. This admission transformed her claim from an assertion of fact into mere speculation. In court, “I’m unsure” is the equivalent of having no evidence at all on that point, making it impossible for the judge to conclude her version of events was “more probably true than not.”
The lesson here is that winning requires more than just a belief you are right. You must present evidence that is solid, consistent, and more convincing than the other side’s. Weak or self-contradictory testimony undermines your own credibility and makes it nearly impossible to meet the burden of proof.
Lesson 3: You Have to Knock on the Right Legal Door
The legal system is highly specialized, and different courts and tribunals have the authority—or “jurisdiction”—to hear different types of cases. A major part of Ms. Ellsworth’s petition was the request for a “declaratory judgment,” essentially asking the judge to declare that the VHA had waived its right to enforce the parking rule in the future because of its alleged past non-enforcement.
The problem was that she brought this request to the wrong venue. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is designed to answer a simple question: “Did the HOA violate an existing rule?” Ms. Ellsworth was asking a far more complex question: “Based on past behavior, should the court declare that this rule is no longer enforceable in the future?” That forward-looking request for a “declaratory judgment” belongs in a court of general jurisdiction (like a state Superior Court), which has broader powers to interpret contracts and establish future rights, not in a specialized administrative tribunal.
The Administrative Law Judge made this point unequivocally:
“To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”
Even if her argument about waiver had merit, it was brought before a body that was legally powerless to grant her request. This serves as a crucial reminder: filing a case in the wrong court is an automatic loss. Understanding the specific jurisdiction of the court or tribunal you are petitioning is a non-negotiable step in legal strategy.
Conclusion: Thinking Like a Lawyer, Not Just a Homeowner
Ms. Ellsworth’s case failed not because of three separate errors, but because of a single, comprehensive breakdown in legal strategy. The “what” (the specific accusation), the “how” (the burden of proof), and the “where” (the legal venue) were all fundamentally misaligned with her ultimate goal. This misalignment created a case that was legally impossible to win, regardless of how valid her underlying frustration may have been.
While a homeowner’s anger may be entirely justified, this case demonstrates that passion alone doesn’t win lawsuits. A sound legal strategy is essential. Before you challenge your HOA, have you moved past the frustration to build a case that can actually win?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Wendy Ellsworth(petitioner) Testified at hearing
Brian Hatch(petitioner attorney) Brian A. Hatch PLLC
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The petition concerning the alleged violation of CC&R section 10.11.1 by the HOA was dismissed because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment request regarding waiver of enforcement.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish that VHA violated CC&R section 10.11.1 by a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on the declaratory judgment requested by the Petitioner regarding VHA's waiver of its enforcement rights.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1 regarding parking enforcement and waiver
Petitioner alleged VHA waived its right to enforce CC&R 10.11.1 (parking prohibition) because violations had been frequent since inception. The tribunal found Petitioner failed to establish VHA violated section 10.11.1, and the tribunal lacked jurisdiction regarding the requested declaratory judgment on waiver of enforcement.
Orders: The petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Violation, Parking, Waiver, Jurisdiction
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1803
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02(B)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020043-REL Decision – 820839.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:39 (95.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020043-REL
Briefing: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (No. 20F-H2020043-REL)
Executive Summary
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Wendy Ellsworth versus the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). The case centered on Ms. Ellsworth’s petition alleging that the VHA had waived its right to enforce a specific parking restriction outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition in its entirety.
The dismissal was based on two fundamental conclusions. First, the petitioner, Ms. Ellsworth, failed to meet her burden of proof. Her petition did not allege, nor did she provide evidence, that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. Instead, her claim focused on the VHA’s alleged failure to enforce the rule against others. Second, and more decisively, the judge determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) lacks the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment. Ms. Ellsworth was effectively asking the tribunal to declare that the VHA had waived its enforcement rights, a legal determination beyond the OAH’s statutory authority. The VHA successfully argued that the OAH’s jurisdiction is limited to hearing alleged violations committed by the association, not to adjudicating the association’s future enforcement capabilities.
Case Background
• Petitioner: Wendy Ellsworth, a property owner within the Vincenz community.
• Respondent: Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).
• Tribunal: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
• Presiding Judge: Administrative Law Judge Velva Moses-Thompson.
• Filing Date: Ms. Ellsworth filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on or about January 15, 2020.
• Hearing Date: An evidentiary hearing was held on August 19, 2020.
• Decision Date: The final decision was issued on September 8, 2020.
The matter was referred to the OAH to determine whether VHA was in violation of its community documents as alleged by the petitioner.
Central Dispute: CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1
The entire dispute revolved around the enforcement of a specific vehicle parking rule within the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions.
Article 10 § 10.11.1 provides:
Vehicles. No private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks shall be parked upon the Property or any roadway adjacent thereto except within a garage, in a private driveway appurtenant to a Dwelling Unit, or within areas designated for such purpose by the Board.
This provision explicitly restricts the parking of personal vehicles to approved locations: garages, private driveways, or other areas specifically designated by the VHA Board.
Positions of the Parties
Petitioner’s Position (Wendy Ellsworth)
Ms. Ellsworth’s central argument was not that the VHA had violated the parking rule, but that it had lost the ability to enforce it through inaction.
• Core Allegation: The petition claimed VHA had waived its ability to enforce Article 10, Section 10.11.1.
• Stated Rationale: Ms. Ellsworth intended to prove that “violations of the street parking prohibition have been ‘frequent’ since Vincenz’s inception” and that the community’s CC&Rs “do not contain a relevant non-waiver provision.”
• Testimony: At the August 19, 2020 hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, under cross-examination, she later conceded that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.
Respondent’s Position (Vincenz Homeowners’ Association)
The VHA argued for a complete dismissal of the petition, primarily on procedural and jurisdictional grounds.
• Core Argument: The petition failed to state a valid claim because it did not contend that VHA itself had improperly parked a vehicle in violation of the CC&Rs.
• Jurisdictional Challenge: VHA contended that the OAH’s jurisdiction, granted under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A), is strictly limited to hearing petitions about alleged violations of community documents or state statutes by the association.
• Declaratory Judgment: The VHA characterized Ms. Ellsworth’s request as one for a “declaratory judgment”—a ruling on the VHA’s legal right to enforce the rule—which it argued the OAH has no legal authority to issue.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusions
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided entirely with the Respondent, concluding that the petition must be dismissed. The decision was based on a failure of proof by the petitioner and a critical lack of jurisdiction by the tribunal.
Legal Standards Applied
Standard
Description
Burden of Proof
The Petitioner bears the burden to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Preponderance of the Evidence
Defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not,” or evidence with “the most convincing force.”
Covenant Interpretation
In Arizona, unambiguous restrictive covenants are enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties and must be interpreted as a whole.
Conclusion 1: Failure to Establish a Violation
The ALJ found that Ms. Ellsworth failed to meet her burden of proof. The decision notes:
• Ms. Ellsworth “did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”
• Because no violation by the VHA was alleged or proven, the core requirement for a successful petition was absent.
Conclusion 2: Lack of Jurisdiction
The most significant finding was that the tribunal lacked the authority to grant the relief Ms. Ellsworth sought.
• The ALJ explicitly stated: “To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”
• This conclusion affirmed the VHA’s central argument that the OAH is not the proper forum for determining an association’s prospective enforcement rights.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings, the final order was unambiguous:
“IT IS ORDERED, the petition is dismissed.”
The decision document includes a notice outlining the next steps available to the parties. Pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes, the order is binding unless a party files a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020043-REL
Study Guide: Ellsworth v. Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (Case No. 20F-H2020043-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and the final ruling of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
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Review Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific rule, or covenant, was at the center of the dispute?
3. What was the core allegation made by the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, in her initial petition?
4. What was the primary legal argument made by the respondent, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association, for why the petition should be dismissed?
5. What change occurred in Ms. Ellsworth’s testimony during the hearing?
6. According to the decision, what is the legal standard for the “burden of proof” in this type of hearing?
7. How does Arizona law interpret “restrictive covenants” when their language is unambiguous?
8. What two key reasons did the Administrative Law Judge give for dismissing the petition?
9. Which government body has jurisdiction to hear petitions from homeowners concerning violations of planned community documents?
10. What action could the parties take after the order was issued, and within what timeframe?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Petitioner Wendy Ellsworth, a homeowner, and Respondent Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA). Ms. Ellsworth initiated the legal action by filing a petition against the VHA.
2. The rule at the center of the dispute was Article 10, Section 10.11.1 of the VHA’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). This section prohibits the parking of private passenger automobiles or pickup trucks on the property or adjacent roadways, except in garages, private driveways, or other Board-designated areas.
3. Ms. Ellsworth’s core allegation was that the VHA had waived its ability to enforce the street parking prohibition (CC&R 10.11.1). She claimed that violations had been “frequent” since the community’s inception and that the VHA’s CC&Rs lacked a relevant non-waiver provision.
4. The VHA argued that the petition should be dismissed because Ms. Ellsworth never alleged that the VHA itself had violated the parking rule. The VHA contended that the OAH only has jurisdiction over alleged violations by the association, not over a homeowner’s request for a declaratory judgment on the right to enforce a rule.
5. During the hearing, Ms. Ellsworth initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, upon cross-examination, she admitted that she was unsure whether the VHA had ever enforced it.
6. The legal standard for the burden of proof is “a preponderance of the evidence.” This standard requires the petitioner to provide proof that convinces the trier of fact that their contention is more probably true than not.
7. In Arizona, if a restrictive covenant is unambiguous, it is enforced to give effect to the intent of the parties. The covenants must be construed as a whole and interpreted in view of their underlying purposes.
8. The judge dismissed the petition for two main reasons. First, Ms. Ellsworth failed to establish that the VHA itself had violated section 10.11.1. Second, the tribunal (the OAH) does not have the jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the VHA has waived its right to enforce the covenant.
9. The Arizona Department of Real Estate is the government body that receives petitions for hearings concerning violations of planned community documents. These hearings are then referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
10. After the order was issued on September 8, 2020, either party could file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate. This request had to be filed within 30 days of the service of the Order.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the facts and legal principles from the case to construct your arguments. No answer key is provided.
1. Explain the concept of “waiver” as argued by the petitioner. Why was this argument ultimately ineffective before the Office of Administrative Hearings in this specific case?
2. Analyze the jurisdictional limitations of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) as demonstrated in this decision. Discuss the difference between adjudicating a violation of community documents and issuing a declaratory judgment.
3. Describe the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and explain how the petitioner, Wendy Ellsworth, failed to meet this burden of proof. Consider both her initial claim and her testimony during the hearing.
4. Evaluate the petitioner’s legal strategy. What was the central flaw in her petition that prevented the Administrative Law Judge from ruling on the merits of her non-enforcement claim?
5. Based on the legal precedent cited (Powell v. Washburn), discuss the principles Arizona courts use to interpret CC&Rs. How did the judge apply this principle to the specific language of Article 10, Section 10.11.1?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official (in this case, Velva Moses-Thompson) who presides over hearings at an administrative agency (like the OAH) and issues decisions.
Affirmative Defense
A set of facts other than those alleged by the petitioner which, if proven by the respondent, defeats or mitigates the legal consequences of the respondent’s otherwise unlawful conduct.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. (A.R.S.)
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this case, the petitioner had the burden to prove the VHA violated its CC&Rs.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents that set up the rules for a planned community or subdivision.
Declaratory Judgment
A binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in a matter before any actual harm has occurred. The OAH determined it lacked jurisdiction to issue such a judgment in this case.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The OAH’s jurisdiction was limited to hearing alleged violations of community documents, not requests for declaratory judgments.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state agency where the evidentiary hearing for this case was held. It conducts hearings for other state agencies.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition to start a legal action. In this case, Wendy Ellsworth.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof in most civil cases, meaning that the evidence presented is more convincing and likely to be true than not. It is a lower standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed; the party who must respond to the petitioner’s claims. In this case, Vincenz Homeowners’ Association.
Restrictive Covenant
A provision in a deed or a set of CC&Rs that limits the use of the property and prohibits certain uses.
Waiver
The intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right. The petitioner argued that the VHA, through its inaction, had waived its right to enforce the parking rule.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020043-REL
Why This Homeowner’s Lawsuit Against Her HOA Was Doomed From the Start: 3 Critical Lessons
The frustration is real. You see your neighbors breaking the rules—parking on the street, letting their lawn go—and it feels like your Homeowners’ Association (HOA) is doing nothing about it. This sense of inconsistent enforcement is one of the most common complaints homeowners have. For Wendy Ellsworth, this frustration led her to file a legal petition against the Vincenz Homeowners’ Association (VHA).
Her case, however, was dismissed. It wasn’t lost on a minor technicality or a surprise piece of evidence. It was doomed from the start because of fundamental strategic errors. By examining where she went wrong, we can uncover three powerful lessons for any homeowner considering a similar fight.
Lesson 1: You Must Accuse the Right Party of the Right Violation
Ms. Ellsworth’s core grievance was that the VHA was not enforcing its own on-street parking rules against other residents. Her formal petition, however, made a critical mistake: it accused the HOA itself of violating the community’s parking rule, CC&R Article 10 § 10.11.1.
This was a fatal flaw. That specific rule governs the actions of homeowners—prohibiting them from parking automobiles or trucks on roadways except in designated areas. It places no duty on the HOA. In her legal filing, Ms. Ellsworth failed to point to any specific rule that the HOA, as an entity, had actually broken. Her petition essentially accused the HOA of illegally parking a car, which was not her complaint at all. The judge noted this fundamental disconnect:
“Ms. Ellsworth did not even allege that VHA parked an automobile or a truck in a roadway, garage, or in an area that has not been designated for parking by the Board.”
A viable petition would have needed to identify a completely different rule—one that placed a specific duty on the HOA Board to enforce the community documents—and then allege that the Board had violated that duty. This fundamental error of misidentifying the violation was compounded by the fact that she was asking the tribunal for a remedy it had no power to grant. Accusing the wrong party of breaking the wrong rule can cause an entire case to be dismissed before its merits are even considered.
Lesson 2: The “Burden of Proof” is More Than Just a Legal Phrase
In any legal action, the person making the claim (the “petitioner”) has the “burden of proof.” This means it is their responsibility to present evidence that convinces the judge their claim is true. Ms. Ellsworth, as the petitioner, was responsible for proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
The court defined this standard as:
“A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
Making an accusation is easy; proving it is hard. Ms. Ellsworth’s own testimony failed to meet this standard. At the hearing, she initially testified that the VHA had never enforced the parking rule. However, when questioned further during cross-examination, she admitted that she was “unsure” whether the HOA had ever enforced it. This admission transformed her claim from an assertion of fact into mere speculation. In court, “I’m unsure” is the equivalent of having no evidence at all on that point, making it impossible for the judge to conclude her version of events was “more probably true than not.”
The lesson here is that winning requires more than just a belief you are right. You must present evidence that is solid, consistent, and more convincing than the other side’s. Weak or self-contradictory testimony undermines your own credibility and makes it nearly impossible to meet the burden of proof.
Lesson 3: You Have to Knock on the Right Legal Door
The legal system is highly specialized, and different courts and tribunals have the authority—or “jurisdiction”—to hear different types of cases. A major part of Ms. Ellsworth’s petition was the request for a “declaratory judgment,” essentially asking the judge to declare that the VHA had waived its right to enforce the parking rule in the future because of its alleged past non-enforcement.
The problem was that she brought this request to the wrong venue. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is designed to answer a simple question: “Did the HOA violate an existing rule?” Ms. Ellsworth was asking a far more complex question: “Based on past behavior, should the court declare that this rule is no longer enforceable in the future?” That forward-looking request for a “declaratory judgment” belongs in a court of general jurisdiction (like a state Superior Court), which has broader powers to interpret contracts and establish future rights, not in a specialized administrative tribunal.
The Administrative Law Judge made this point unequivocally:
“To the extent that Ms. Ellsworth is requesting a declaratory judgment that VHA has waived its right to enforce CC&R Article 10, Section 10.11.1., this tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make such a determination.”
Even if her argument about waiver had merit, it was brought before a body that was legally powerless to grant her request. This serves as a crucial reminder: filing a case in the wrong court is an automatic loss. Understanding the specific jurisdiction of the court or tribunal you are petitioning is a non-negotiable step in legal strategy.
Conclusion: Thinking Like a Lawyer, Not Just a Homeowner
Ms. Ellsworth’s case failed not because of three separate errors, but because of a single, comprehensive breakdown in legal strategy. The “what” (the specific accusation), the “how” (the burden of proof), and the “where” (the legal venue) were all fundamentally misaligned with her ultimate goal. This misalignment created a case that was legally impossible to win, regardless of how valid her underlying frustration may have been.
While a homeowner’s anger may be entirely justified, this case demonstrates that passion alone doesn’t win lawsuits. A sound legal strategy is essential. Before you challenge your HOA, have you moved past the frustration to build a case that can actually win?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Wendy Ellsworth(petitioner) Testified at hearing
Brian Hatch(petitioner attorney) Brian A. Hatch PLLC
Respondent Side
Mark K. Sahl(HOA attorney) CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
Neutral Parties
Velva Moses-Thompson(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2019026-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-07-14
Administrative Law Judge
Jenna Clark
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Werner A Reis
Counsel
—
Respondent
Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
Counsel
Edward O’Brien, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs Article III, section 1
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's claim (on rehearing) finding that the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association did not violate CC&Rs Article III section 1 when its Board painted pickleball lines on one of the two existing tennis courts, as the Board acted within its authority to maintain and manage Common Areas, and members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights were not infringed.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Article III section 1 of the CC&Rs. The undisputed facts showed the Association had authority to paint the lines, access was maintained for all members, and one tennis court was always available for tennis use.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents CC&Rs Article III, sec. 1.
Petitioner alleged the Association violated CC&Rs Article III section 1 by painting pickleball lines on one tennis court, arguing this constituted an infringement or impediment of enjoyment rights for tennis players by restricting use of the Common Area easement.
Orders: The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Association violated CC&Rs Article III section 1, and the petition was denied. The Association's governing documents authorized the Board to maintain and manage Common Areas, and Petitioner's easement rights were not violated.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Governance, Common Area Use, Easement Rights, CC&Rs Interpretation, Recreational Facilities, Pickleball
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Briefing Document: Reis v. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowner Werner A. Reis (Petitioner) and the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Respondent) concerning the modification of a common area tennis court. The core of the dispute, adjudicated under case numbers 20F-H2019026-REL and 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG, was the Association’s decision in June 2019 to paint pickleball lines on one of its two community tennis courts. The Petitioner alleged this action violated Article III, section 1 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), infringing upon his nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment. The Association contended that its Board of Directors acted within its authority, as granted by the CC&Rs, to manage, maintain, and improve common areas for the benefit of all members.
Following an evidentiary hearing and a subsequent rehearing, Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark ruled decisively in favor of the Association. The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Key findings established that the Board was fully authorized to make the modification without a member vote, that tennis play was not restricted, and that the Petitioner’s easement rights were not violated. The Petitioner’s arguments, based on a potential future conflict rather than an actual experienced impediment, were deemed “unfounded” and “without merit.” The final order, issued on July 14, 2020, denied the petition, affirming the Association’s right to manage the recreational facilities in this manner.
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I. Case Overview
This matter involves a formal complaint by a homeowner against his townhouse association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Whether the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents (CC&Rs Article III, section 1) by adding pickleball lines to one of two community tennis courts.
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II. Procedural History
The dispute progressed through a formal administrative hearing process, including a petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final order.
• November 18, 2019: Werner Reis files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• December 4, 2019: The Association files its ANSWER, denying all complaint items.
• January 31, 2020: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Jenna Clark.
• February 20, 2020: The ALJ issues a decision denying the Petitioner’s petition, finding he failed to sustain his burden of proof.
• March 26, 2020: The Petitioner submits a REQUEST FOR REHEARING to the Department.
• April 22, 2020: The Department grants the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.
• May 20, 2020: During a prehearing conference, both parties stipulate that no factual dispute exists and agree to adopt the prior hearing record and submit written closing arguments in lieu of a new hearing.
• June 24, 2020: Deadline for written closing arguments. The Association submits a 17-page argument; the OAH receives no closing argument from the Petitioner.
• July 14, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision, again denying the petition and ordering that the initial decision from February be the final order in the matter.
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III. Analysis of the Dispute
The central conflict was the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs regarding the Board’s authority to modify common areas versus a member’s right to their use and enjoyment.
Petitioner’s Position (Werner A. Reis)
The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise that adding pickleball as a competing use for a tennis court fundamentally diminished the rights of tennis-playing members.
• Core Allegation: The Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants every member a “nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment in and to the Common Areas.”
• Argument on Infringement: The Petitioner argued the Association created a situation where “Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play,” which he claimed “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment.”
• Impediment of Enjoyment: He contended that reducing the number of exclusively available tennis courts from two to one amounts to “an impediment of enjoyment rights.”
• Creation of Competition: He accused the Association of “creating a new class of people” (pickleball players) who could access the courts, creating new competition for members on a first-come, first-served basis.
• Hypothetical Conflict: The “crux” of his complaint was the possible future conflict between his desire to play two singles matches simultaneously and up to sixteen “outsiders playing a raucous game of pickleball on the other designated tennis court.”
• Requested Remedy: The Petitioner requested an order requiring the Association to designate the courts for tennis playing only.
Respondent’s Position (Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association)
The Association defended its decision as a reasonable exercise of the Board’s authority to manage community property for the benefit of all residents.
• Board Authority: The Board asserted that its decision was permitted by Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants it the authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” without requiring a member vote. Article VI further requires the Board to maintain and manage recreational facilities.
• Benefit to Community: The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests, and was also considered as a potential means to generate revenue.
• No Restriction of Use: The Association maintained that tennis play was not restricted. Both courts remained available seven days a week on a first-come, first-served basis, with no changes to the reservation system. One court remained available exclusively for tennis at all times.
• Nature of Modification: The modification involved painting lines and using portable nets, which must be detached after play. The permanent tennis nets on both courts remained in place.
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IV. Summary of Evidence and Testimony
Testimony from the Association’s representatives and the Petitioner established the key undisputed facts of the case.
Testimony for the Association (Charles Mitchell & Arland Averell)
• Board Authority Confirmed: Charles Mitchell, the Board Director, testified that CC&Rs Articles II and VI, along with the Association’s Articles of Incorporation, authorize the Board to manage and improve common areas, including painting lines on the tennis courts.
• Historical Context: Arland Averell, a 20-year Board member, explained that a taped pickleball court had existed in 2015 but was damaged. The Board decided in April 2019 to reestablish it with painted lines in response to requests from several families.
• Practical Use: Pickleball is generally played only by a few families, typically on Saturday mornings. When pickleball is being played on the modified court, the other tennis court is always available.
• No Denial of Access: Director Mitchell confirmed that the Petitioner had never been denied access to the tennis courts at any time.
Testimony of the Petitioner (Werner A. Reis)
• Recent Homeowner: The Petitioner described himself as a “snowbird” who had purchased his townhouse in November 2019, shortly before filing his complaint.
• Conflict is Hypothetical: He admitted that he “has not played tennis in ‘years'” and, as a result, “has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.”
• No Direct Observation: The Petitioner testified that he had not personally observed contemporaneous tennis and pickleball games being played. His concerns about safety and inconvenience were speculative.
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V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions consistently found the Petitioner’s arguments to be legally and factually unsupported.
Conclusions of Law
• Undisputed Facts: The Judge concluded that the material facts were not in dispute. The Association’s governing documents clearly authorize the Board to maintain, manage, and improve the Common Areas, including the recreational facilities.
• No Violation of Easement Rights: The ruling stated, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner’s easement rights have not been violated by the Association because the Board painted blue pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts.”
• Petitioner’s Arguments Dismissed: The Judge found the Petitioner’s arguments to be “unfounded” and “without merit.” Specifically, the claim that the availability of only one dedicated court was an “impediment of enjoyment rights” was rejected.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: In both the initial decision and the final order, the Judge concluded that the “Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of proof” by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs.
• Failure to Prosecute Rehearing: The final decision noted that the Petitioner “did not provide OAH with a closing argument in support of his request for rehearing.”
Final Disposition
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.
The decision issued on July 14, 2020, affirmed the initial February 24, 2020, decision and was designated as the FINAL ORDER in the matter, binding on both parties.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Reis vs. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, in his petition filed on November 18, 2019?
2. On what grounds did the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association’s Board of Directors justify its decision to add pickleball lines to a tennis court?
3. According to the testimony of Arland Averell, what prompted the Board to reestablish a pickleball court in April 2019, and what was a prior experience with a pickleball court?
4. Describe the central, or “crux,” of the Petitioner’s complaint as summarized in the hearing evidence.
5. What key admissions did the Petitioner make during his testimony regarding his own tennis activity and his personal experience with the alleged conflict?
6. According to Director Charles Mitchell’s testimony, what is the physical setup of the nets on the courts, and how does this differ between tennis and pickleball?
7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is that standard defined in the legal documents?
8. What was the outcome of the initial evidentiary hearing held on January 31, 2020, and on what basis did the Administrative Law Judge reach this conclusion?
9. Describe the procedural change that occurred for the rehearing after the parties’ prehearing conference on May 20, 2020.
10. What action, or lack thereof, by the Petitioner on June 24, 2020, contributed to the final ruling in the rehearing?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The specific violation claimed was the modification of one of the two existing tennis courts for use as a pickleball court.
2. The Association’s Board of Directors justified the decision as an improvement to the Common Areas for the benefit of the Association, which it was permitted to do under Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs. The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests.
3. Arland Averell testified that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish the pickleball court with painted lines after several families requested it, and the Board also saw it as a way to generate additional revenue. A previous pickleball court established in 2015 had lines made of tape which were damaged approximately four months after being applied.
4. The crux of the Petitioner’s complaint was the possible future conflict between his personal desire to play two singles tennis matches on both courts simultaneously and the potential for up to sixteen “outsiders” to be playing a “raucous game of pickleball” on the modified court.
5. The Petitioner admitted that he had not played tennis in “years” and, as a result, had never actually faced the conflict he was complaining about. He also stated he had never been denied access to the courts and had not observed contemporaneous games of tennis and pickleball being played.
6. Director Mitchell testified that both tennis courts have fixed tennis nets. The pickleball court, however, has portable nets which must be attached for use and then detached at the end of play.
7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, representing the greater weight of evidence.
8. Following the January 31, 2020, hearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The judge concluded that the Petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of proof and that the evidence showed his easement rights had not been violated, as one tennis court always remained available.
9. During the prehearing conference, the parties stipulated that no factual dispute existed. They agreed to vacate the scheduled rehearing, adopt the evidentiary record from the first hearing without presenting new evidence, and submit written closing arguments instead.
10. On the deadline of June 24, 2020, the Office of Administrative Hearings received a 17-page closing argument from the Respondent (the Association). The Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, failed to submit a closing argument, which was noted in the final decision denying his petition again.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Formulate your answers by synthesizing information from across the case documents. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the conflict between the rights granted to members under CC&Rs Article III, section 1 (“easement of use and enjoyment”) and the powers granted to the Board under CC&Rs Article II, section 1 (“manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas”). How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent tension in the final decision?
2. Discuss the concept of the “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain why Werner Reis’s testimony and arguments ultimately failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.
3. Trace the procedural history of this case from the initial petition on November 18, 2019, to the final order on July 14, 2020. Identify the key events and decisions at each stage, including the initial hearing, the request for rehearing, and the final disposition.
4. Evaluate the strength of the Petitioner’s case. Focus specifically on the evidence he presented versus the evidence presented by the Association’s witnesses, Charles Mitchell and Arland Averell.
5. The Petitioner argued that the availability of only one tennis court when pickleball is in play constituted an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” Explain the Association’s counter-arguments and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s argument to be “unfounded” and “without merit.”
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The presiding official (Jenna Clark) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who reviews evidence, makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and issues orders and decisions.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for the Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature that regulate planned communities and govern the administrative hearing process.
Association
The Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association, a non-profit Arizona corporation serving as the property owner’s association for the development. In this case, it is the Respondent.
Board of Directors (Board)
The governing body of the Association, empowered by the CC&Rs and Articles of Incorporation to manage, maintain, and improve the Common Areas.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial (in this case, the Petitioner) to produce the degree of evidence required to prove their case. The standard required here was “preponderance of the evidence.”
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, controlling property use within the development. The Restated Declaration was recorded on June 8, 2015.
Common Areas
Property within the development, such as the tennis courts, for the mutual benefit of all owners. The Association’s Board is granted authority to manage and improve these areas.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings regarding disputes in planned communities.
Easement of use and enjoyment
A non-exclusive, perpetual right granted to every member of the Association to use and enjoy the Common Areas, as established in CC&Rs Article III, section 1.
OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)
An independent state agency to which the Department refers cases for evidentiary hearings.
Petitioner
The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Werner A. Reis, a townhouse owner and member of the Association.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and representing the “greater weight of the evidence.”
Respondent
The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association.
Snowbird
A colloquial term used by the Petitioner to describe himself as an out-of-state retiree who resides in Arizona during the winter months.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG
5 Surprising Lessons from a Bizarre HOA Lawsuit Over a Pickleball Court
Introduction: The Battle for the Tennis Court
Disputes with a homeowner association (HOA) are a common feature of suburban life, often revolving around landscaping, paint colors, or parking. But when you combine the rigid world of HOA rules with the explosive popularity of pickleball, you get a conflict that is uniquely modern. In a real-life legal case from Sedona, Arizona, one homeowner took his HOA to court over the decision to add pickleball lines to one of the community’s two tennis courts.
What might seem like a minor neighborhood squabble became a formal legal challenge, complete with hearings, testimony, and an official judicial decision. The court documents from this case offer a surprisingly revealing look into community rules, personal grievances, and the peculiar nature of legal battles. More importantly, they reveal several counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living in a planned community.
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1. You Can Sue Over a Problem That Doesn’t Exist (But You Probably Won’t Win)
The core of the legal challenge was filed by Werner Reis, a new homeowner in the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association. His complaint was over the modification of one of two community tennis courts to accommodate pickleball. The “crux” of his complaint was a concern over a possible future conflict: a hypothetical scenario where he might want to play two singles tennis matches while a large group of “outsiders” played a “raucous game of pickleball.”
This seems like a specific, if forward-thinking, concern. But the timeline and testimony revealed a truly bizarre situation. According to court records, Reis purchased his townhouse in November 2019 and filed his lawsuit on or about November 18, 2019—meaning he initiated a formal legal action within days or weeks of becoming a member of the community. Even more stunning was this fact from his own testimony:
Petitioner has not played tennis in “years.” As such, Petitioner has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.
The entire legal challenge—filed almost immediately upon moving in—was based on a hypothetical grievance for a sport the petitioner hadn’t even played in years. Unsurprisingly, the Administrative Law Judge found his argument “unfounded.” The lesson is clear: a legal claim based on “what if” is unlikely to succeed without any actual harm.
2. Your HOA’s Governing Documents Are a Legally Binding Contract
Many homeowners view their HOA’s rules as guidelines, but legally, they are a binding contract called Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). When you buy a property, you agree to their terms.
In its defense, the HOA pointed directly to its governing documents. Article VI requires the Board to manage all recreational facilities, and Article II, section 1, gives it the explicit authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” for the “general welfare and benefit of the Owners”—all without a member vote. This clause was the legal bedrock of the Board’s defense; in the eyes of the law, painting lines to accommodate a popular new sport is not a degradation of an amenity, but an improvement of it, squarely within the Board’s mandate.
The tennis courts are legally defined as “Common Areas.” This gave the Board the unambiguous right to paint new lines on them. This is an impactful takeaway for all homeowners: while you may feel a sense of personal ownership over shared amenities, the Board has broad, legally-defined powers to manage them for the entire community.
3. A Board’s Duty Is to Adapt to the Community’s Evolving Interests
The HOA Board’s decision wasn’t a whim; it was a response to a persistent community interest with a history. Testimony from a 20-year Board member, Arland Averell, revealed that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish a pickleball court “after several families requested they do so.” As a secondary benefit, the Board also saw it as a way to “generate additional revenue.”
But this wasn’t the community’s first foray into the sport. Court records show that back in 2015, the association had a pickleball court with taped lines, but it was damaged after only four months. This context is crucial. The 2019 decision to paint permanent lines was not just a reaction to new requests but an institutional lesson learned. It shows the Board was responding to a long-term, evolving interest and choosing a more durable solution, fulfilling its duty to adapt common resources to meet new demands.
4. An “Infringement” Requires an Actual Impediment
The petitioner’s legal argument was very specific. He claimed that adding pickleball “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment” and that having only one guaranteed tennis court is an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” He summarized his grievance with the line:
“Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play.”
However, the facts presented in court systematically dismantled this argument. The evidence showed:
• One of the two courts remained exclusively for tennis at all times.
• Both courts were still available for tennis on a first-come, first-served basis.
• The pickleball nets were portable and had to be detached at the end of play, leaving the court ready for tennis.
• Most critically, the petitioner himself testified that he had “never been denied access to the tennis courts at issue at any time.”
The judge determined that no violation occurred because the petitioner’s rights were never actually impeded. This reveals the critical legal distinction between an inconvenience and an infringement. The petitioner’s entire case rested on a hypothetical future inconvenience, but the law requires an actual, demonstrable impediment to rights. Since his own testimony confirmed one had never occurred, his claim was impossible to prove.
5. If You Demand a Rehearing, You Should Probably Show Up with an Argument
In a final, bizarre twist, the story doesn’t end with the initial ruling in February 2020. The petitioner filed a “REQUEST FOR REHEARING,” which the court granted, giving him a second chance to make his case.
To streamline the process, both parties agreed to skip a new evidentiary hearing and instead submit written “Closing Arguments” to the judge. The HOA’s legal team submitted a detailed, 17-page argument. What happened next was documented in the final court order:
OAH did not receive a closing argument from Petitioner.
The petitioner, who had initiated the entire legal process and successfully demanded a second chance, was given the final word. He had the opportunity to submit a closing argument that could have vindicated his entire complaint. Instead, he offered only silence. By ghosting his own rehearing, he left the judge with no choice but to conclude that he had once again “failed to sustain his burden of proof” and make the original ruling against him final.
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Conclusion: The Court of Community Opinion
This case is a fascinating lesson in the difference between a personal annoyance and an actual legal violation. It demonstrates that in the world of HOAs, feelings and hypothetical concerns carry little weight compared to the cold, hard text of the governing documents. Those documents give boards significant power, but also charge them with the difficult task of balancing the desires of all residents, not just the grievance of one.
As pickleball courts continue to replace shuffleboard courts and community gardens pop up in unused green spaces, this story leaves us with a critical question: As our communities change, how do we balance protecting the familiar traditions we love with making space for the new ones our neighbors are asking for?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Werner A Reis(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Edward O’Brien(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
Mark Sall(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Also cited as Mark Sahl)
Charles Mitchell(board member, witness) Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association Current Director of the Association's Board
Arland Averell(board member, witness) Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association Served on the Board for the past twenty years
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) ADRE Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
DGardner(department contact) ADRE Electronic contact for ADRE
c. serrano(staff) OAH Administrative staff/Clerk noted on document transmission
Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.
Case Summary
Case ID
20F-H2019026-REL-RHG
Agency
ADRE
Tribunal
OAH
Decision Date
2020-07-14
Administrative Law Judge
Jenna Clark
Outcome
loss
Filing Fees Refunded
$0.00
Civil Penalties
$0.00
Parties & Counsel
Petitioner
Werner A Reis
Counsel
—
Respondent
Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
Counsel
Edward O’Brien, Esq.
Alleged Violations
CC&Rs Article III, section 1
Outcome Summary
The Administrative Law Judge issued a Final Order denying the Petitioner's claim on rehearing. The ALJ found that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Article III section 1 when its Board painted pickleball lines on one of the two existing tennis courts, as the action was within the Board's authority to manage Common Areas and did not infringe on members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and the undisputed material facts supported the finding that the Association's actions were authorized by the governing documents (CC&Rs Articles II and VI) and did not deny or impede member access or use of the Common Areas.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents CC&Rs Article III, sec. 1.
Petitioner alleged that the Board's decision to paint pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts constituted an infringement or impediment of enjoyment rights for tennis players, thereby violating CC&Rs Article III section 1.
Orders: The ALJ denied the petition (on rehearing), concluding that Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof. The Association was authorized to manage and maintain Common Areas, and members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights were not violated.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Governance, CC&Rs Interpretation, Common Area Use, Easement Rights, Recreational Facilities, Pickleball
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Briefing Document: Reis v. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the legal dispute between homeowner Werner A. Reis (Petitioner) and the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Respondent) concerning the modification of a common area tennis court. The core of the dispute, adjudicated under case numbers 20F-H2019026-REL and 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG, was the Association’s decision in June 2019 to paint pickleball lines on one of its two community tennis courts. The Petitioner alleged this action violated Article III, section 1 of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), infringing upon his nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment. The Association contended that its Board of Directors acted within its authority, as granted by the CC&Rs, to manage, maintain, and improve common areas for the benefit of all members.
Following an evidentiary hearing and a subsequent rehearing, Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark ruled decisively in favor of the Association. The Judge found that the Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Key findings established that the Board was fully authorized to make the modification without a member vote, that tennis play was not restricted, and that the Petitioner’s easement rights were not violated. The Petitioner’s arguments, based on a potential future conflict rather than an actual experienced impediment, were deemed “unfounded” and “without merit.” The final order, issued on July 14, 2020, denied the petition, affirming the Association’s right to manage the recreational facilities in this manner.
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I. Case Overview
This matter involves a formal complaint by a homeowner against his townhouse association, brought before the Arizona Department of Real Estate and adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH).
Whether the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents (CC&Rs Article III, section 1) by adding pickleball lines to one of two community tennis courts.
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II. Procedural History
The dispute progressed through a formal administrative hearing process, including a petition, a hearing, a decision, a request for rehearing, and a final order.
• November 18, 2019: Werner Reis files a single-issue petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• December 4, 2019: The Association files its ANSWER, denying all complaint items.
• January 31, 2020: An evidentiary hearing is held before ALJ Jenna Clark.
• February 20, 2020: The ALJ issues a decision denying the Petitioner’s petition, finding he failed to sustain his burden of proof.
• March 26, 2020: The Petitioner submits a REQUEST FOR REHEARING to the Department.
• April 22, 2020: The Department grants the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.
• May 20, 2020: During a prehearing conference, both parties stipulate that no factual dispute exists and agree to adopt the prior hearing record and submit written closing arguments in lieu of a new hearing.
• June 24, 2020: Deadline for written closing arguments. The Association submits a 17-page argument; the OAH receives no closing argument from the Petitioner.
• July 14, 2020: The ALJ issues a final decision, again denying the petition and ordering that the initial decision from February be the final order in the matter.
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III. Analysis of the Dispute
The central conflict was the interpretation of the Association’s CC&Rs regarding the Board’s authority to modify common areas versus a member’s right to their use and enjoyment.
Petitioner’s Position (Werner A. Reis)
The Petitioner’s case was built on the premise that adding pickleball as a competing use for a tennis court fundamentally diminished the rights of tennis-playing members.
• Core Allegation: The Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants every member a “nonexclusive perpetual easement of use and enjoyment in and to the Common Areas.”
• Argument on Infringement: The Petitioner argued the Association created a situation where “Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play,” which he claimed “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment.”
• Impediment of Enjoyment: He contended that reducing the number of exclusively available tennis courts from two to one amounts to “an impediment of enjoyment rights.”
• Creation of Competition: He accused the Association of “creating a new class of people” (pickleball players) who could access the courts, creating new competition for members on a first-come, first-served basis.
• Hypothetical Conflict: The “crux” of his complaint was the possible future conflict between his desire to play two singles matches simultaneously and up to sixteen “outsiders playing a raucous game of pickleball on the other designated tennis court.”
• Requested Remedy: The Petitioner requested an order requiring the Association to designate the courts for tennis playing only.
Respondent’s Position (Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association)
The Association defended its decision as a reasonable exercise of the Board’s authority to manage community property for the benefit of all residents.
• Board Authority: The Board asserted that its decision was permitted by Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs, which grants it the authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” without requiring a member vote. Article VI further requires the Board to maintain and manage recreational facilities.
• Benefit to Community: The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests, and was also considered as a potential means to generate revenue.
• No Restriction of Use: The Association maintained that tennis play was not restricted. Both courts remained available seven days a week on a first-come, first-served basis, with no changes to the reservation system. One court remained available exclusively for tennis at all times.
• Nature of Modification: The modification involved painting lines and using portable nets, which must be detached after play. The permanent tennis nets on both courts remained in place.
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IV. Summary of Evidence and Testimony
Testimony from the Association’s representatives and the Petitioner established the key undisputed facts of the case.
Testimony for the Association (Charles Mitchell & Arland Averell)
• Board Authority Confirmed: Charles Mitchell, the Board Director, testified that CC&Rs Articles II and VI, along with the Association’s Articles of Incorporation, authorize the Board to manage and improve common areas, including painting lines on the tennis courts.
• Historical Context: Arland Averell, a 20-year Board member, explained that a taped pickleball court had existed in 2015 but was damaged. The Board decided in April 2019 to reestablish it with painted lines in response to requests from several families.
• Practical Use: Pickleball is generally played only by a few families, typically on Saturday mornings. When pickleball is being played on the modified court, the other tennis court is always available.
• No Denial of Access: Director Mitchell confirmed that the Petitioner had never been denied access to the tennis courts at any time.
Testimony of the Petitioner (Werner A. Reis)
• Recent Homeowner: The Petitioner described himself as a “snowbird” who had purchased his townhouse in November 2019, shortly before filing his complaint.
• Conflict is Hypothetical: He admitted that he “has not played tennis in ‘years'” and, as a result, “has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.”
• No Direct Observation: The Petitioner testified that he had not personally observed contemporaneous tennis and pickleball games being played. His concerns about safety and inconvenience were speculative.
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V. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge’s decisions consistently found the Petitioner’s arguments to be legally and factually unsupported.
Conclusions of Law
• Undisputed Facts: The Judge concluded that the material facts were not in dispute. The Association’s governing documents clearly authorize the Board to maintain, manage, and improve the Common Areas, including the recreational facilities.
• No Violation of Easement Rights: The ruling stated, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner’s easement rights have not been violated by the Association because the Board painted blue pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts.”
• Petitioner’s Arguments Dismissed: The Judge found the Petitioner’s arguments to be “unfounded” and “without merit.” Specifically, the claim that the availability of only one dedicated court was an “impediment of enjoyment rights” was rejected.
• Failure to Meet Burden of Proof: In both the initial decision and the final order, the Judge concluded that the “Petitioner has failed to sustain his burden of proof” by a preponderance of the evidence that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the CC&Rs.
• Failure to Prosecute Rehearing: The final decision noted that the Petitioner “did not provide OAH with a closing argument in support of his request for rehearing.”
Final Disposition
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is denied.
The decision issued on July 14, 2020, affirmed the initial February 24, 2020, decision and was designated as the FINAL ORDER in the matter, binding on both parties.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG
Study Guide: Reis vs. Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, drawing exclusively from the information provided in the case documents.
1. What was the specific allegation made by the Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, in his petition filed on November 18, 2019?
2. On what grounds did the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association’s Board of Directors justify its decision to add pickleball lines to a tennis court?
3. According to the testimony of Arland Averell, what prompted the Board to reestablish a pickleball court in April 2019, and what was a prior experience with a pickleball court?
4. Describe the central, or “crux,” of the Petitioner’s complaint as summarized in the hearing evidence.
5. What key admissions did the Petitioner make during his testimony regarding his own tennis activity and his personal experience with the alleged conflict?
6. According to Director Charles Mitchell’s testimony, what is the physical setup of the nets on the courts, and how does this differ between tennis and pickleball?
7. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and how is that standard defined in the legal documents?
8. What was the outcome of the initial evidentiary hearing held on January 31, 2020, and on what basis did the Administrative Law Judge reach this conclusion?
9. Describe the procedural change that occurred for the rehearing after the parties’ prehearing conference on May 20, 2020.
10. What action, or lack thereof, by the Petitioner on June 24, 2020, contributed to the final ruling in the rehearing?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated Article III, section 1 of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The specific violation claimed was the modification of one of the two existing tennis courts for use as a pickleball court.
2. The Association’s Board of Directors justified the decision as an improvement to the Common Areas for the benefit of the Association, which it was permitted to do under Article II, section 1 of the CC&Rs. The decision was made to offer pickleball as an additional recreational feature to satisfy growing interest from owners, renters, and guests.
3. Arland Averell testified that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish the pickleball court with painted lines after several families requested it, and the Board also saw it as a way to generate additional revenue. A previous pickleball court established in 2015 had lines made of tape which were damaged approximately four months after being applied.
4. The crux of the Petitioner’s complaint was the possible future conflict between his personal desire to play two singles tennis matches on both courts simultaneously and the potential for up to sixteen “outsiders” to be playing a “raucous game of pickleball” on the modified court.
5. The Petitioner admitted that he had not played tennis in “years” and, as a result, had never actually faced the conflict he was complaining about. He also stated he had never been denied access to the courts and had not observed contemporaneous games of tennis and pickleball being played.
6. Director Mitchell testified that both tennis courts have fixed tennis nets. The pickleball court, however, has portable nets which must be attached for use and then detached at the end of play.
7. The Petitioner was required to prove his case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not, representing the greater weight of evidence.
8. Following the January 31, 2020, hearing, the Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner’s petition. The judge concluded that the Petitioner had failed to sustain his burden of proof and that the evidence showed his easement rights had not been violated, as one tennis court always remained available.
9. During the prehearing conference, the parties stipulated that no factual dispute existed. They agreed to vacate the scheduled rehearing, adopt the evidentiary record from the first hearing without presenting new evidence, and submit written closing arguments instead.
10. On the deadline of June 24, 2020, the Office of Administrative Hearings received a 17-page closing argument from the Respondent (the Association). The Petitioner, Werner A. Reis, failed to submit a closing argument, which was noted in the final decision denying his petition again.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Formulate your answers by synthesizing information from across the case documents. Answers are not provided.
1. Analyze the conflict between the rights granted to members under CC&Rs Article III, section 1 (“easement of use and enjoyment”) and the powers granted to the Board under CC&Rs Article II, section 1 (“manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas”). How did the Administrative Law Judge resolve this apparent tension in the final decision?
2. Discuss the concept of the “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Explain why Werner Reis’s testimony and arguments ultimately failed to meet the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.
3. Trace the procedural history of this case from the initial petition on November 18, 2019, to the final order on July 14, 2020. Identify the key events and decisions at each stage, including the initial hearing, the request for rehearing, and the final disposition.
4. Evaluate the strength of the Petitioner’s case. Focus specifically on the evidence he presented versus the evidence presented by the Association’s witnesses, Charles Mitchell and Arland Averell.
5. The Petitioner argued that the availability of only one tennis court when pickleball is in play constituted an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” Explain the Association’s counter-arguments and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s argument to be “unfounded” and “without merit.”
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The presiding official (Jenna Clark) at the Office of Administrative Hearings who reviews evidence, makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and issues orders and decisions.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for the Arizona Revised Statutes, the laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature that regulate planned communities and govern the administrative hearing process.
Association
The Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association, a non-profit Arizona corporation serving as the property owner’s association for the development. In this case, it is the Respondent.
Board of Directors (Board)
The governing body of the Association, empowered by the CC&Rs and Articles of Incorporation to manage, maintain, and improve the Common Areas.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a trial (in this case, the Petitioner) to produce the degree of evidence required to prove their case. The standard required here was “preponderance of the evidence.”
CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions)
The governing documents that form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner, controlling property use within the development. The Restated Declaration was recorded on June 8, 2015.
Common Areas
Property within the development, such as the tennis courts, for the mutual benefit of all owners. The Association’s Board is granted authority to manage and improve these areas.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions for hearings regarding disputes in planned communities.
Easement of use and enjoyment
A non-exclusive, perpetual right granted to every member of the Association to use and enjoy the Common Areas, as established in CC&Rs Article III, section 1.
OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)
An independent state agency to which the Department refers cases for evidentiary hearings.
Petitioner
The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, Werner A. Reis, a townhouse owner and member of the Association.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this case, defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not” and representing the “greater weight of the evidence.”
Respondent
The party against whom the petition is filed. In this case, the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association.
Snowbird
A colloquial term used by the Petitioner to describe himself as an out-of-state retiree who resides in Arizona during the winter months.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019026-REL-RHG
5 Surprising Lessons from a Bizarre HOA Lawsuit Over a Pickleball Court
Introduction: The Battle for the Tennis Court
Disputes with a homeowner association (HOA) are a common feature of suburban life, often revolving around landscaping, paint colors, or parking. But when you combine the rigid world of HOA rules with the explosive popularity of pickleball, you get a conflict that is uniquely modern. In a real-life legal case from Sedona, Arizona, one homeowner took his HOA to court over the decision to add pickleball lines to one of the community’s two tennis courts.
What might seem like a minor neighborhood squabble became a formal legal challenge, complete with hearings, testimony, and an official judicial decision. The court documents from this case offer a surprisingly revealing look into community rules, personal grievances, and the peculiar nature of legal battles. More importantly, they reveal several counter-intuitive lessons for anyone living in a planned community.
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1. You Can Sue Over a Problem That Doesn’t Exist (But You Probably Won’t Win)
The core of the legal challenge was filed by Werner Reis, a new homeowner in the Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association. His complaint was over the modification of one of two community tennis courts to accommodate pickleball. The “crux” of his complaint was a concern over a possible future conflict: a hypothetical scenario where he might want to play two singles tennis matches while a large group of “outsiders” played a “raucous game of pickleball.”
This seems like a specific, if forward-thinking, concern. But the timeline and testimony revealed a truly bizarre situation. According to court records, Reis purchased his townhouse in November 2019 and filed his lawsuit on or about November 18, 2019—meaning he initiated a formal legal action within days or weeks of becoming a member of the community. Even more stunning was this fact from his own testimony:
Petitioner has not played tennis in “years.” As such, Petitioner has not yet found himself facing any such actual conflict.
The entire legal challenge—filed almost immediately upon moving in—was based on a hypothetical grievance for a sport the petitioner hadn’t even played in years. Unsurprisingly, the Administrative Law Judge found his argument “unfounded.” The lesson is clear: a legal claim based on “what if” is unlikely to succeed without any actual harm.
2. Your HOA’s Governing Documents Are a Legally Binding Contract
Many homeowners view their HOA’s rules as guidelines, but legally, they are a binding contract called Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). When you buy a property, you agree to their terms.
In its defense, the HOA pointed directly to its governing documents. Article VI requires the Board to manage all recreational facilities, and Article II, section 1, gives it the explicit authority to “manage, maintain, repair, replace and improve the Common Areas” for the “general welfare and benefit of the Owners”—all without a member vote. This clause was the legal bedrock of the Board’s defense; in the eyes of the law, painting lines to accommodate a popular new sport is not a degradation of an amenity, but an improvement of it, squarely within the Board’s mandate.
The tennis courts are legally defined as “Common Areas.” This gave the Board the unambiguous right to paint new lines on them. This is an impactful takeaway for all homeowners: while you may feel a sense of personal ownership over shared amenities, the Board has broad, legally-defined powers to manage them for the entire community.
3. A Board’s Duty Is to Adapt to the Community’s Evolving Interests
The HOA Board’s decision wasn’t a whim; it was a response to a persistent community interest with a history. Testimony from a 20-year Board member, Arland Averell, revealed that in April 2019, the Board decided to reestablish a pickleball court “after several families requested they do so.” As a secondary benefit, the Board also saw it as a way to “generate additional revenue.”
But this wasn’t the community’s first foray into the sport. Court records show that back in 2015, the association had a pickleball court with taped lines, but it was damaged after only four months. This context is crucial. The 2019 decision to paint permanent lines was not just a reaction to new requests but an institutional lesson learned. It shows the Board was responding to a long-term, evolving interest and choosing a more durable solution, fulfilling its duty to adapt common resources to meet new demands.
4. An “Infringement” Requires an Actual Impediment
The petitioner’s legal argument was very specific. He claimed that adding pickleball “constitutes an infringement of tennis players’ right of use and enjoyment” and that having only one guaranteed tennis court is an “impediment of enjoyment rights.” He summarized his grievance with the line:
“Members have the right to play tennis unless pickleball is in play.”
However, the facts presented in court systematically dismantled this argument. The evidence showed:
• One of the two courts remained exclusively for tennis at all times.
• Both courts were still available for tennis on a first-come, first-served basis.
• The pickleball nets were portable and had to be detached at the end of play, leaving the court ready for tennis.
• Most critically, the petitioner himself testified that he had “never been denied access to the tennis courts at issue at any time.”
The judge determined that no violation occurred because the petitioner’s rights were never actually impeded. This reveals the critical legal distinction between an inconvenience and an infringement. The petitioner’s entire case rested on a hypothetical future inconvenience, but the law requires an actual, demonstrable impediment to rights. Since his own testimony confirmed one had never occurred, his claim was impossible to prove.
5. If You Demand a Rehearing, You Should Probably Show Up with an Argument
In a final, bizarre twist, the story doesn’t end with the initial ruling in February 2020. The petitioner filed a “REQUEST FOR REHEARING,” which the court granted, giving him a second chance to make his case.
To streamline the process, both parties agreed to skip a new evidentiary hearing and instead submit written “Closing Arguments” to the judge. The HOA’s legal team submitted a detailed, 17-page argument. What happened next was documented in the final court order:
OAH did not receive a closing argument from Petitioner.
The petitioner, who had initiated the entire legal process and successfully demanded a second chance, was given the final word. He had the opportunity to submit a closing argument that could have vindicated his entire complaint. Instead, he offered only silence. By ghosting his own rehearing, he left the judge with no choice but to conclude that he had once again “failed to sustain his burden of proof” and make the original ruling against him final.
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Conclusion: The Court of Community Opinion
This case is a fascinating lesson in the difference between a personal annoyance and an actual legal violation. It demonstrates that in the world of HOAs, feelings and hypothetical concerns carry little weight compared to the cold, hard text of the governing documents. Those documents give boards significant power, but also charge them with the difficult task of balancing the desires of all residents, not just the grievance of one.
As pickleball courts continue to replace shuffleboard courts and community gardens pop up in unused green spaces, this story leaves us with a critical question: As our communities change, how do we balance protecting the familiar traditions we love with making space for the new ones our neighbors are asking for?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Werner A Reis(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Edward O’Brien(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
Mark Sall(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association (Also cited as Mark Sahl)
Charles Mitchell(board member, witness) Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association Current Director of the Association's Board
Arland Averell(board member, witness) Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association Served on the Board for the past twenty years
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) ADRE Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
DGardner(department contact) ADRE Electronic contact for ADRE
c. serrano(staff) OAH Administrative staff/Clerk noted on document transmission
The Administrative Law Judge issued a Final Order denying the Petitioner's claim on rehearing. The ALJ found that the Association did not violate CC&Rs Article III section 1 when its Board painted pickleball lines on one of the two existing tennis courts, as the action was within the Board's authority to manage Common Areas and did not infringe on members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, and the undisputed material facts supported the finding that the Association's actions were authorized by the governing documents (CC&Rs Articles II and VI) and did not deny or impede member access or use of the Common Areas.
Key Issues & Findings
Whether Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association violated community documents CC&Rs Article III, sec. 1.
Petitioner alleged that the Board's decision to paint pickleball lines on one of two tennis courts constituted an infringement or impediment of enjoyment rights for tennis players, thereby violating CC&Rs Article III section 1.
Orders: The ALJ denied the petition (on rehearing), concluding that Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof. The Association was authorized to manage and maintain Common Areas, and members' nonexclusive perpetual easement rights were not violated.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Governance, CC&Rs Interpretation, Common Area Use, Easement Rights, Recreational Facilities, Pickleball
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092 et seq.
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092.04
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1092.05(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 41-1061(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.08(H)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-904(A)
Decision Documents
20F-H2019026-REL Decision – 770924.pdf
Uploaded 2025-12-17T18:18:18 (153.6 KB)
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Werner A Reis(petitioner) Appeared on his own behalf
Respondent Side
Edward O’Brien(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association
Mark Sall(attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP Counsel for Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association; Mark Sahl is used in some electronic transmissions
Charles Mitchell(board member/witness) Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association Current Director of the Board; testified as a witness in the original hearing
Arland Averell(board member/witness) Canyon Mesa Townhouse Association Served on the Board for twenty years; testified as a witness in the original hearing
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) ADRE Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate
DGardner(department contact) ADRE Electronic contact for ADRE transmissions
c. serrano(staff/clerk) OAH Staff noted on document transmission
The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the required threshold of 21 valid signatures from eligible voters needed to compel the Association to call a special meeting under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243. The petition was consequently denied.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to provide the minimum required 21 valid signatures from eligible unit owners (only 13 were valid) as required by the Association's Bylaws and state statute.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of failure to call a special meeting to remove a board member.
Petitioner filed a petition alleging the Association failed to call a special meeting to remove a board member after collecting what Petitioner believed were sufficient signatures (36 collected, 21 required). The Association countered that only 13 of those signatures were valid (excluding non-owners, duplicates, and delinquent members ineligible to vote).
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Condominium, Special Meeting, Board Member Removal, Petition Signature Validity, Voting Rights, Delinquency
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919060-REL Decision – 737890.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:17 (142.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919060-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Kelly vs. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919060-REL, a dispute between Petitioner John H. Kelly and the Respondent, Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (“the Association”). The core issue was whether the Association violated Arizona state law by refusing to call a special meeting to remove a board member, as demanded by a petition initiated by Mr. Kelly.
The Association’s bylaws require a petition signed by at least 25% of eligible voting members—in this case, 21 of the 84 unit owners—to compel such a meeting. Mr. Kelly submitted a petition with 36 signatures. However, upon review, the Association invalidated 23 signatures for specific reasons: 11 were from non-owner renters, 6 were duplicate signatures from units that had already signed, and 6 were from owners whose voting rights were suspended due to being over 15 days delinquent on payments.
This left only 13 valid signatures, well short of the 21 required. The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The evidence clearly demonstrated that the number of valid signatures was insufficient to legally compel the Association to call a special meeting. Consequently, the judge ruled that the Association did not violate Arizona statute § 33-1243 and denied Mr. Kelly’s petition.
Case Overview
Parties Involved
Name / Entity
Details
Petitioner
John H. Kelly
A condominium owner and member of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. Appeared on his own behalf.
Respondent
Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
The homeowners’ association for the Cortez Canyon condominium development in Phoenix, AZ. Represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq.
Witness
Saundra Garcia
President of the Association’s Board of Directors.
Adjudicator
Jenna Clark
Administrative Law Judge, Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
Core Dispute
The central issue adjudicated was whether the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member after receiving a petition from unit owners. The Petitioner alleged that the required number of signatures had been collected, while the Respondent denied this claim, asserting that the petition lacked the requisite number of valid signatures from eligible voters.
Legal and Governance Framework
The dispute was governed by Arizona state law and the Association’s own internal documents.
• Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243(H)(4): This statute mandates that an association with 1,000 or fewer members must call a special meeting to remove a board member upon receipt of a petition signed by at least 25% of the eligible voters in the association.
• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 2: Mirrors the state statute, stipulating that a special meeting may be called by unit owners holding at least 25% of the votes in the Association.
• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 7: Critically, this section states that a unit owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if they are in arrears on payments (assessments, penalties, etc.) for a period of 15 days. This suspension remains until all payments are brought current.
Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (John H. Kelly)
Mr. Kelly initiated the petition to recall an Association board member. His position and the evidence he presented are summarized as follows:
• Petition Submission: Mr. Kelly, with assistance from others, collected 36 signatures and submitted them to the Association’s then-property management group, Golden Valley.
• Initial Confirmation: He testified that Golden Valley initially informed him that he had secured enough signatures to compel the special meeting.
• Reversal by New Management: A short time later, after the Association’s contract with Golden Valley expired on June 1, 2019, a new property management company informed him that the petition did not meet the signature threshold.
• Key Admission: Mr. Kelly testified that neither he nor his assistants verified whether the signatories were unit owners eligible to vote prior to submitting the petition.
• Argument at Hearing: Mr. Kelly argued that he had submitted a minimum of 23 valid signatures. This included the signature of Jeffery Law, an owner of six units, which Mr. Kelly contended should be counted six times. However, it was established that Mr. Law’s signature was secured after the initial submission and was never provided to the management company.
• Formal Allegation: In his April 29, 2019, filing with the Department, Mr. Kelly stated: “Cortez Canyon has 84 units and 25% is 21 units. Homeowners have collected more than the required 21 home-owner’s signatures. The Cortez Canyon HOA board has stated that they will not schedule the required special meeting.”
Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Cortez Canyon Association)
The Association, represented by its Board President Saundra Garcia, presented a detailed rebuttal based on a thorough review of the submitted petition.
• Receipt of Petition: The Association received the petition with 36 purported unit owner signatures on or about April 19, 2019.
• Signature Verification Process: Upon review, the Association determined that a significant number of signatures were invalid based on the community’s governing documents.
• Disqualification of Signatures: The Association provided a specific breakdown of the 23 signatures it disqualified:
◦ 11 signatures were removed because they were from non-owner renters or occupants.
◦ 6 signatures were removed because they were from units for which another owner’s signature had already been collected (only one vote is permitted per unit).
◦ 6 signatures were removed because the unit owner was ineligible to vote, being more than 15 days delinquent on fines, fees, or dues owed to the Association, as stipulated in the Bylaws.
• Final Tally: After removing the 23 invalid signatures from the 36 submitted, the Association concluded that the petition contained only 13 valid signatures.
• Conclusion: Since 13 signatures is below the required threshold of 21, the Association determined it was not obligated by law or its bylaws to call the special meeting. The signature from the multi-unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not part of the petition received by the Association and was therefore not considered in its count.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling
The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, reviewed the evidence and testimony from both parties and issued a decision decisively in favor of the Respondent.
Conclusions of Law
• Burden of Proof: The Judge established that the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association had violated the statute. A preponderance of evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.
• Undisputed Facts: The material facts of the case were not at issue. Both parties agreed that 21 valid signatures were required to compel the special meeting.
• Evidence of Record: The Judge found that the evidence presented demonstrated the Petitioner’s failure to meet the required threshold. The decision states, “While Petitioner is correct that he submitted more than twenty-one signatures to the Association, he is incorrect that all of signatures provided were valid.”
• Final Determination on Signatures: The ruling affirmed the Association’s count, concluding, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner only provided thirteen valid signatures along with his petition to the Association, which was not enough to compel the Association to call a special meeting.”
Final Order
Based on the failure of the Petitioner to sustain his burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on September 13, 2019:
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919060-REL
Study Guide: Kelly v. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919060-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Petitioner John H. Kelly and Respondent Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. It is designed to test and reinforce understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, governing documents, and final outcome.
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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences, based solely on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the specific violation of Arizona law alleged by the Petitioner in his initial petition to the Department of Real Estate?
3. How many condominium units are in the Cortez Canyon development, and what number of valid signatures was consequently required to compel a special meeting?
4. According to the Association’s Bylaws, what circumstances would cause a Unit Owner to have their voting rights suspended?
5. List the three categories of invalid signatures that the Association identified in its review of the Petitioner’s submission.
6. Who was Jeffery Law, and why was his signature ultimately not counted by the Association?
7. What was the initial assessment given to the Petitioner by the property management group, Golden Valley, and how did it differ from the Association’s final determination?
8. In this type of legal proceeding, who bears the “burden of proof,” and what standard of proof must be met?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim?
10. What was the final ORDER issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Part II: Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John H. Kelly, the “Petitioner,” who appeared on his own behalf, and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the “Respondent,” which was represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq. Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark presided over the hearing. Saundra Garcia, the Association’s Board President, appeared as a witness for the Respondent.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member. He claimed to have collected the required number of signatures from homeowners to compel such a meeting.
3. The Cortez Canyon development has 84 units. Based on the requirement for signatures from 25% of the votes in the Association, a total of 21 valid Unit Owner signatures were required to compel a special meeting.
4. According to Bylaws Article II, Section 7, a Unit Owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if the owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties, or other fees for a period of fifteen days. This suspension remains in effect until all payments are brought current.
5. The Association determined that of the 36 submitted signatures, 23 were invalid. The categories for invalidation were: eleven signatures from non-owner renters or occupants, six signatures from units where another signature had already been collected, and six signatures from Unit Owners who were ineligible to vote due to being delinquent on payments.
6. Jeffery Law was an Association member and owner of six condominium units. His signature was not counted because the Petitioner secured it after submitting the petition to the management company and never provided it to the Association as part of the formal submission.
7. The former property management group, Golden Valley, initially informed the Petitioner that he had secured enough valid signatures to compel a special meeting. However, after the Association directly reviewed the petition, it determined that only 13 of the signatures were valid, far short of the required 21.
8. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means providing evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight than the evidence presented by the opposing side.
9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof. The credible evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner submitted only thirteen valid signatures, which was insufficient to compel the Association to call a special meeting under its Bylaws and state law.
10. The final ORDER, based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.
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Part III: Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. They require a deeper analysis of the case’s themes, legal principles, and procedural elements. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means in this context, who held the burden, and how the failure to meet this standard was the central reason for the judge’s final decision.
2. Discuss the critical importance of an association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) in resolving internal disputes. Use specific articles and sections from the Cortez Canyon Bylaws to illustrate how they definitively established the rules for calling a special meeting and determining voter eligibility, leaving little room for interpretation.
3. Evaluate the Petitioner’s strategy and execution in collecting signatures for his petition. Identify the critical errors he and his assistants made in the process, and outline the specific steps he could have taken to verify signatures and ensure his petition was valid before its submission.
4. Explain the legal and practical distinctions between a Unit Owner, an occupant/renter, and an “eligible voter” within the context of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. How did the Petitioner’s failure to understand these distinctions become the central point of failure for his petition?
5. Imagine you are advising the Cortez Canyon Board of Directors following this hearing. Based on the evidence and outcome of the case, what recommendations would you make regarding their procedures for validating petitions and their communication with Unit Owners about voting rights, petition requirements, and the consequences of financial delinquency?
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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official (Jenna Clark) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, reviews evidence, and makes legal findings and conclusions.
Answer
The formal written response filed by the Respondent (the Association) on May 28, 2019, denying the Petitioner’s allegations.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at issue was § 33-1243.
Association
The Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the governing body for the condominium development, comprised of all unit owners.
Board of Directors (the Board)
The group of individuals that oversees the Association, as empowered by the CC&Rs. The petition sought to remove a member of this board.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation on one party in a dispute (in this case, the Petitioner) to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim.
Bylaws
The set of rules adopted by the Association on June 14, 2000, that govern its internal operations, including meetings and voting rights.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The primary governing documents for the development, recorded on May 9, 2000, which form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.
Eligible Votes
A term defined in the Bylaws as the total number of votes that can be lawfully cast, excluding those from members whose voting rights are suspended.
Findings of Fact
The section of the legal decision that outlines the established, undisputed facts of the case based on the hearing evidence.
OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)
An independent state agency where evidentiary hearings are conducted by Administrative Law Judges.
The final, legally binding command issued by the judge at the conclusion of the decision. In this case, the Order was to deny the petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, John H. Kelly.
Petition
The formal document filed by the Petitioner on April 29, 2019, with the Department to initiate the hearing process against the Association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, meaning that the evidence must be sufficient to convince the judge that the contention is more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association.
Special Meeting
A meeting of Association members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled meetings. The petition sought to compel a special meeting to remove a board member.
Unit Owner
An individual who holds legal title to a condominium within the Cortez Canyon development and is a member of the Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919060-REL
He Gathered 36 Signatures to Oust His HOA Board. Here’s Why Only 13 Counted.
Introduction: The Power and Pitfalls of Community Action
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of trying to enact change within their community, especially when it involves challenging the decisions of a Homeowners Association (HOA) board. It can feel like an uphill battle, but the right to petition and call for special meetings is a cornerstone of community governance.
However, a real-world case involving homeowner John H. Kelly and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association serves as a critical cautionary tale. Mr. Kelly gathered what he believed were more than enough signatures to force a special meeting to remove a board member. Despite his significant effort, his petition failed spectacularly. This article breaks down the key legal and procedural reasons why, offering essential lessons for every homeowner.
1. Not All Signatures Are Created Equal: The Validity Gauntlet
The core of the issue began with a simple numbers game. The Cortez Canyon HOA has 84 units, meaning a petition required signatures from 25%, or 21, of the unit owners to compel a special meeting. Mr. Kelly successfully collected 36 signatures—a number that seemed to guarantee his success.
In a moment of false victory, the association’s property management company at the time, Golden Valley, informed Mr. Kelly that he had indeed secured enough signatures. But this assurance was short-lived. A new management company took over, and after a formal review, the association delivered devastating news: only 13 of the 36 signatures were valid. The petition was dead on arrival.
The association disqualified 23 signatures for specific, documented reasons:
• Non-Owners: Eleven signatures were from renters or other residential occupants who were not the legal owners of the unit.
• Duplicate Units: Six signatures were removed because another signature had already been collected from the same unit, upholding the “one vote per unit” principle.
• Ineligible Owners: Six signatures were from homeowners who were technically owners but were found to be ineligible to vote at the time they signed.
This reveals the petitioner’s first critical, and ultimately fatal, assumption: that the HOA would do the work of verifying his supporters. In reality, the burden of proof was his alone. The legal findings state it plainly: “Neither Petitioner nor his assistants verified if the signatures that were collected belonged to Unit Owners eligible to vote.” From a governance perspective, this initial culling of signatures is where most grassroots community efforts fail.
2. The Fine Print That Disenfranchises: “Good Standing” and Your Right to Vote
Here, we find the kind of boilerplate legal language that is often ignored by homeowners but wielded with immense power by boards. The ineligibility of six homeowners stemmed from a specific clause in the association’s bylaws related to financial standing.
The bylaw states:
“In the event any Unit Owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties or other fees and charges due under the terms of the Condominium Documents for a period of fifteen (15) days, the Unit Owner’s right to vote as a member of the Association shall be automatically suspended…”
This single provision had a profound impact. Six of the signatures Mr. Kelly collected were from homeowners who were more than 15 days late on their dues or fines. Their voting rights were suspended, and their signatures were rendered invalid. This highlights a crucial preparatory step for any petitioner: confidentially requesting a list of members in good standing from the association before collecting signatures, if the governing documents allow, or at minimum, reminding potential signatories to ensure their accounts are current.
3. Process is Paramount: The Signature That Never Was
Facing a losing battle at the administrative hearing, the petitioner made a final argument to salvage his petition. He contended that he had also secured the signature of a member named Jeffrey Law, who owned six separate units. Mr. Kelly argued this single signature should count as six votes, which would have put him over the required threshold.
However, this argument failed due to a simple but fatal procedural error. According to the court’s findings, the signature from Mr. Law was never actually submitted with the petition to the association.
The Administrative Law Judge’s finding was unambiguous: “The signature Petitioner collected from the multiple unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not a part of the petition received by the Association and therefore was not counted.” This procedural error, while seemingly minor, is an absolute bar to success in administrative law. Unlike a casual disagreement, there is no room for “I meant to” or “I thought I had.”
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power in an HOA
Because the petitioner could only provide 13 valid signatures instead of the required 21, the Administrative Law Judge denied his petition. The HOA was not required to call the special meeting, and the board member remained in place. Mr. Kelly’s story is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort are not enough to navigate the complexities of community governance. The case provides three clear takeaways for any homeowner:
1. Quality Over Quantity: A short, verified list of eligible voters is infinitely more powerful than a long list of unverified names.
2. Bylaws are Your Battlefield: The governing documents contain the rules of engagement. Ignoring them—especially clauses on voter eligibility—is a unilateral surrender.
3. Documentation is Everything: If it wasn’t formally submitted to the correct party, it legally never happened. Your ability to prove submission is as important as the submission itself.
This case is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort aren’t enough. The real question every homeowner should ask is: Do you truly know the rules that govern your rights in your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John H. Kelly(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Jonathan A. Dessaules(attorney) Dessaules Law Group Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Saundra Garcia(board member) Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association Called as a witness and testified as Board President
Jacob A. Kubert(attorney) Dessaules Law Group Counsel receiving notice of decision
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision transmitted to Commissioner
Other Participants
Jeffery Law(owner) Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association Unit owner whose signature Petitioner secured but was not submitted to the Association
The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the required threshold of 21 valid signatures from eligible voters needed to compel the Association to call a special meeting under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243. The petition was consequently denied.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to provide the minimum required 21 valid signatures from eligible unit owners (only 13 were valid) as required by the Association's Bylaws and state statute.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of failure to call a special meeting to remove a board member.
Petitioner filed a petition alleging the Association failed to call a special meeting to remove a board member after collecting what Petitioner believed were sufficient signatures (36 collected, 21 required). The Association countered that only 13 of those signatures were valid (excluding non-owners, duplicates, and delinquent members ineligible to vote).
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA, Condominium, Special Meeting, Board Member Removal, Petition Signature Validity, Voting Rights, Delinquency
Additional Citations:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199(2)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(A)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.01(D)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.02
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092 et seq.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243(H)(4)(c)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
19F-H1919060-REL Decision – 737890.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:29:30 (142.6 KB)
Briefing Doc – 19F-H1919060-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Kelly vs. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
Executive Summary
This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 19F-H1919060-REL, a dispute between Petitioner John H. Kelly and the Respondent, Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (“the Association”). The core issue was whether the Association violated Arizona state law by refusing to call a special meeting to remove a board member, as demanded by a petition initiated by Mr. Kelly.
The Association’s bylaws require a petition signed by at least 25% of eligible voting members—in this case, 21 of the 84 unit owners—to compel such a meeting. Mr. Kelly submitted a petition with 36 signatures. However, upon review, the Association invalidated 23 signatures for specific reasons: 11 were from non-owner renters, 6 were duplicate signatures from units that had already signed, and 6 were from owners whose voting rights were suspended due to being over 15 days delinquent on payments.
This left only 13 valid signatures, well short of the 21 required. The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, concluded that the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof. The evidence clearly demonstrated that the number of valid signatures was insufficient to legally compel the Association to call a special meeting. Consequently, the judge ruled that the Association did not violate Arizona statute § 33-1243 and denied Mr. Kelly’s petition.
Case Overview
Parties Involved
Name / Entity
Details
Petitioner
John H. Kelly
A condominium owner and member of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. Appeared on his own behalf.
Respondent
Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association
The homeowners’ association for the Cortez Canyon condominium development in Phoenix, AZ. Represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq.
Witness
Saundra Garcia
President of the Association’s Board of Directors.
Adjudicator
Jenna Clark
Administrative Law Judge, Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.
Core Dispute
The central issue adjudicated was whether the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association violated Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member after receiving a petition from unit owners. The Petitioner alleged that the required number of signatures had been collected, while the Respondent denied this claim, asserting that the petition lacked the requisite number of valid signatures from eligible voters.
Legal and Governance Framework
The dispute was governed by Arizona state law and the Association’s own internal documents.
• Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1243(H)(4): This statute mandates that an association with 1,000 or fewer members must call a special meeting to remove a board member upon receipt of a petition signed by at least 25% of the eligible voters in the association.
• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 2: Mirrors the state statute, stipulating that a special meeting may be called by unit owners holding at least 25% of the votes in the Association.
• Association Bylaws, Article II, Section 7: Critically, this section states that a unit owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if they are in arrears on payments (assessments, penalties, etc.) for a period of 15 days. This suspension remains until all payments are brought current.
Petitioner’s Position and Evidence (John H. Kelly)
Mr. Kelly initiated the petition to recall an Association board member. His position and the evidence he presented are summarized as follows:
• Petition Submission: Mr. Kelly, with assistance from others, collected 36 signatures and submitted them to the Association’s then-property management group, Golden Valley.
• Initial Confirmation: He testified that Golden Valley initially informed him that he had secured enough signatures to compel the special meeting.
• Reversal by New Management: A short time later, after the Association’s contract with Golden Valley expired on June 1, 2019, a new property management company informed him that the petition did not meet the signature threshold.
• Key Admission: Mr. Kelly testified that neither he nor his assistants verified whether the signatories were unit owners eligible to vote prior to submitting the petition.
• Argument at Hearing: Mr. Kelly argued that he had submitted a minimum of 23 valid signatures. This included the signature of Jeffery Law, an owner of six units, which Mr. Kelly contended should be counted six times. However, it was established that Mr. Law’s signature was secured after the initial submission and was never provided to the management company.
• Formal Allegation: In his April 29, 2019, filing with the Department, Mr. Kelly stated: “Cortez Canyon has 84 units and 25% is 21 units. Homeowners have collected more than the required 21 home-owner’s signatures. The Cortez Canyon HOA board has stated that they will not schedule the required special meeting.”
Respondent’s Position and Evidence (Cortez Canyon Association)
The Association, represented by its Board President Saundra Garcia, presented a detailed rebuttal based on a thorough review of the submitted petition.
• Receipt of Petition: The Association received the petition with 36 purported unit owner signatures on or about April 19, 2019.
• Signature Verification Process: Upon review, the Association determined that a significant number of signatures were invalid based on the community’s governing documents.
• Disqualification of Signatures: The Association provided a specific breakdown of the 23 signatures it disqualified:
◦ 11 signatures were removed because they were from non-owner renters or occupants.
◦ 6 signatures were removed because they were from units for which another owner’s signature had already been collected (only one vote is permitted per unit).
◦ 6 signatures were removed because the unit owner was ineligible to vote, being more than 15 days delinquent on fines, fees, or dues owed to the Association, as stipulated in the Bylaws.
• Final Tally: After removing the 23 invalid signatures from the 36 submitted, the Association concluded that the petition contained only 13 valid signatures.
• Conclusion: Since 13 signatures is below the required threshold of 21, the Association determined it was not obligated by law or its bylaws to call the special meeting. The signature from the multi-unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not part of the petition received by the Association and was therefore not considered in its count.
Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling
The Administrative Law Judge, Jenna Clark, reviewed the evidence and testimony from both parties and issued a decision decisively in favor of the Respondent.
Conclusions of Law
• Burden of Proof: The Judge established that the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Association had violated the statute. A preponderance of evidence is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.
• Undisputed Facts: The material facts of the case were not at issue. Both parties agreed that 21 valid signatures were required to compel the special meeting.
• Evidence of Record: The Judge found that the evidence presented demonstrated the Petitioner’s failure to meet the required threshold. The decision states, “While Petitioner is correct that he submitted more than twenty-one signatures to the Association, he is incorrect that all of signatures provided were valid.”
• Final Determination on Signatures: The ruling affirmed the Association’s count, concluding, “What the evidence of record reflects is that Petitioner only provided thirteen valid signatures along with his petition to the Association, which was not enough to compel the Association to call a special meeting.”
Final Order
Based on the failure of the Petitioner to sustain his burden of proof, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on September 13, 2019:
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition be denied.
Study Guide – 19F-H1919060-REL
Study Guide: Kelly v. Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association (Case No. 19F-H1919060-REL)
This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between Petitioner John H. Kelly and Respondent Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. It is designed to test and reinforce understanding of the case’s facts, legal arguments, governing documents, and final outcome.
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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in two to three complete sentences, based solely on the information provided in the case document.
1. Who were the primary parties involved in this hearing, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the specific violation of Arizona law alleged by the Petitioner in his initial petition to the Department of Real Estate?
3. How many condominium units are in the Cortez Canyon development, and what number of valid signatures was consequently required to compel a special meeting?
4. According to the Association’s Bylaws, what circumstances would cause a Unit Owner to have their voting rights suspended?
5. List the three categories of invalid signatures that the Association identified in its review of the Petitioner’s submission.
6. Who was Jeffery Law, and why was his signature ultimately not counted by the Association?
7. What was the initial assessment given to the Petitioner by the property management group, Golden Valley, and how did it differ from the Association’s final determination?
8. In this type of legal proceeding, who bears the “burden of proof,” and what standard of proof must be met?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim?
10. What was the final ORDER issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?
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Part II: Answer Key
1. The primary parties were John H. Kelly, the “Petitioner,” who appeared on his own behalf, and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the “Respondent,” which was represented by Jonathan A. Dessaules, Esq. Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark presided over the hearing. Saundra Garcia, the Association’s Board President, appeared as a witness for the Respondent.
2. The Petitioner alleged that the Association violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1243 by failing to call a special meeting for the purpose of removing a board member. He claimed to have collected the required number of signatures from homeowners to compel such a meeting.
3. The Cortez Canyon development has 84 units. Based on the requirement for signatures from 25% of the votes in the Association, a total of 21 valid Unit Owner signatures were required to compel a special meeting.
4. According to Bylaws Article II, Section 7, a Unit Owner’s right to vote is automatically suspended if the owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties, or other fees for a period of fifteen days. This suspension remains in effect until all payments are brought current.
5. The Association determined that of the 36 submitted signatures, 23 were invalid. The categories for invalidation were: eleven signatures from non-owner renters or occupants, six signatures from units where another signature had already been collected, and six signatures from Unit Owners who were ineligible to vote due to being delinquent on payments.
6. Jeffery Law was an Association member and owner of six condominium units. His signature was not counted because the Petitioner secured it after submitting the petition to the management company and never provided it to the Association as part of the formal submission.
7. The former property management group, Golden Valley, initially informed the Petitioner that he had secured enough valid signatures to compel a special meeting. However, after the Association directly reviewed the petition, it determined that only 13 of the signatures were valid, far short of the required 21.
8. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, John H. Kelly, bore the burden of proof. The standard of proof required was a “preponderance of the evidence,” which means providing evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight than the evidence presented by the opposing side.
9. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof. The credible evidence demonstrated that the Petitioner submitted only thirteen valid signatures, which was insufficient to compel the Association to call a special meeting under its Bylaws and state law.
10. The final ORDER, based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, was that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.
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Part III: Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. They require a deeper analysis of the case’s themes, legal principles, and procedural elements. Do not provide answers.
1. Analyze the concept of “burden of proof” as it applies to this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means in this context, who held the burden, and how the failure to meet this standard was the central reason for the judge’s final decision.
2. Discuss the critical importance of an association’s governing documents (CC&Rs and Bylaws) in resolving internal disputes. Use specific articles and sections from the Cortez Canyon Bylaws to illustrate how they definitively established the rules for calling a special meeting and determining voter eligibility, leaving little room for interpretation.
3. Evaluate the Petitioner’s strategy and execution in collecting signatures for his petition. Identify the critical errors he and his assistants made in the process, and outline the specific steps he could have taken to verify signatures and ensure his petition was valid before its submission.
4. Explain the legal and practical distinctions between a Unit Owner, an occupant/renter, and an “eligible voter” within the context of the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association. How did the Petitioner’s failure to understand these distinctions become the central point of failure for his petition?
5. Imagine you are advising the Cortez Canyon Board of Directors following this hearing. Based on the evidence and outcome of the case, what recommendations would you make regarding their procedures for validating petitions and their communication with Unit Owners about voting rights, petition requirements, and the consequences of financial delinquency?
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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official (Jenna Clark) who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings, reviews evidence, and makes legal findings and conclusions.
Answer
The formal written response filed by the Respondent (the Association) on May 28, 2019, denying the Petitioner’s allegations.
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona. The specific statute at issue was § 33-1243.
Association
The Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association, the governing body for the condominium development, comprised of all unit owners.
Board of Directors (the Board)
The group of individuals that oversees the Association, as empowered by the CC&Rs. The petition sought to remove a member of this board.
Burden of Proof
The legal obligation on one party in a dispute (in this case, the Petitioner) to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim.
Bylaws
The set of rules adopted by the Association on June 14, 2000, that govern its internal operations, including meetings and voting rights.
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)
The primary governing documents for the development, recorded on May 9, 2000, which form an enforceable contract between the Association and each property owner.
Department
The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide petitions from members of homeowners’ associations.
Eligible Votes
A term defined in the Bylaws as the total number of votes that can be lawfully cast, excluding those from members whose voting rights are suspended.
Findings of Fact
The section of the legal decision that outlines the established, undisputed facts of the case based on the hearing evidence.
OAH (Office of Administrative Hearings)
An independent state agency where evidentiary hearings are conducted by Administrative Law Judges.
The final, legally binding command issued by the judge at the conclusion of the decision. In this case, the Order was to deny the petition.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, John H. Kelly.
Petition
The formal document filed by the Petitioner on April 29, 2019, with the Department to initiate the hearing process against the Association.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, meaning that the evidence must be sufficient to convince the judge that the contention is more probably true than not.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association.
Special Meeting
A meeting of Association members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled meetings. The petition sought to compel a special meeting to remove a board member.
Unit Owner
An individual who holds legal title to a condominium within the Cortez Canyon development and is a member of the Association.
Blog Post – 19F-H1919060-REL
He Gathered 36 Signatures to Oust His HOA Board. Here’s Why Only 13 Counted.
Introduction: The Power and Pitfalls of Community Action
Many homeowners have felt the frustration of trying to enact change within their community, especially when it involves challenging the decisions of a Homeowners Association (HOA) board. It can feel like an uphill battle, but the right to petition and call for special meetings is a cornerstone of community governance.
However, a real-world case involving homeowner John H. Kelly and the Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association serves as a critical cautionary tale. Mr. Kelly gathered what he believed were more than enough signatures to force a special meeting to remove a board member. Despite his significant effort, his petition failed spectacularly. This article breaks down the key legal and procedural reasons why, offering essential lessons for every homeowner.
1. Not All Signatures Are Created Equal: The Validity Gauntlet
The core of the issue began with a simple numbers game. The Cortez Canyon HOA has 84 units, meaning a petition required signatures from 25%, or 21, of the unit owners to compel a special meeting. Mr. Kelly successfully collected 36 signatures—a number that seemed to guarantee his success.
In a moment of false victory, the association’s property management company at the time, Golden Valley, informed Mr. Kelly that he had indeed secured enough signatures. But this assurance was short-lived. A new management company took over, and after a formal review, the association delivered devastating news: only 13 of the 36 signatures were valid. The petition was dead on arrival.
The association disqualified 23 signatures for specific, documented reasons:
• Non-Owners: Eleven signatures were from renters or other residential occupants who were not the legal owners of the unit.
• Duplicate Units: Six signatures were removed because another signature had already been collected from the same unit, upholding the “one vote per unit” principle.
• Ineligible Owners: Six signatures were from homeowners who were technically owners but were found to be ineligible to vote at the time they signed.
This reveals the petitioner’s first critical, and ultimately fatal, assumption: that the HOA would do the work of verifying his supporters. In reality, the burden of proof was his alone. The legal findings state it plainly: “Neither Petitioner nor his assistants verified if the signatures that were collected belonged to Unit Owners eligible to vote.” From a governance perspective, this initial culling of signatures is where most grassroots community efforts fail.
2. The Fine Print That Disenfranchises: “Good Standing” and Your Right to Vote
Here, we find the kind of boilerplate legal language that is often ignored by homeowners but wielded with immense power by boards. The ineligibility of six homeowners stemmed from a specific clause in the association’s bylaws related to financial standing.
The bylaw states:
“In the event any Unit Owner is in arrears in the payment of any Assessment, monetary penalties or other fees and charges due under the terms of the Condominium Documents for a period of fifteen (15) days, the Unit Owner’s right to vote as a member of the Association shall be automatically suspended…”
This single provision had a profound impact. Six of the signatures Mr. Kelly collected were from homeowners who were more than 15 days late on their dues or fines. Their voting rights were suspended, and their signatures were rendered invalid. This highlights a crucial preparatory step for any petitioner: confidentially requesting a list of members in good standing from the association before collecting signatures, if the governing documents allow, or at minimum, reminding potential signatories to ensure their accounts are current.
3. Process is Paramount: The Signature That Never Was
Facing a losing battle at the administrative hearing, the petitioner made a final argument to salvage his petition. He contended that he had also secured the signature of a member named Jeffrey Law, who owned six separate units. Mr. Kelly argued this single signature should count as six votes, which would have put him over the required threshold.
However, this argument failed due to a simple but fatal procedural error. According to the court’s findings, the signature from Mr. Law was never actually submitted with the petition to the association.
The Administrative Law Judge’s finding was unambiguous: “The signature Petitioner collected from the multiple unit owner, Jeffrey Law, was not a part of the petition received by the Association and therefore was not counted.” This procedural error, while seemingly minor, is an absolute bar to success in administrative law. Unlike a casual disagreement, there is no room for “I meant to” or “I thought I had.”
Conclusion: Knowledge is Power in an HOA
Because the petitioner could only provide 13 valid signatures instead of the required 21, the Administrative Law Judge denied his petition. The HOA was not required to call the special meeting, and the board member remained in place. Mr. Kelly’s story is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort are not enough to navigate the complexities of community governance. The case provides three clear takeaways for any homeowner:
1. Quality Over Quantity: A short, verified list of eligible voters is infinitely more powerful than a long list of unverified names.
2. Bylaws are Your Battlefield: The governing documents contain the rules of engagement. Ignoring them—especially clauses on voter eligibility—is a unilateral surrender.
3. Documentation is Everything: If it wasn’t formally submitted to the correct party, it legally never happened. Your ability to prove submission is as important as the submission itself.
This case is a powerful reminder that enthusiasm and effort aren’t enough. The real question every homeowner should ask is: Do you truly know the rules that govern your rights in your own community?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John H. Kelly(petitioner)
Respondent Side
Jonathan A. Dessaules(attorney) Dessaules Law Group Appeared on behalf of Respondent
Saundra Garcia(board member) Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association Called as a witness and testified as Board President
Jacob A. Kubert(attorney) Dessaules Law Group Counsel receiving notice of decision
Neutral Parties
Jenna Clark(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision transmitted to Commissioner
Other Participants
Jeffery Law(owner) Cortez Canyon Unit Owners Association Unit owner whose signature Petitioner secured but was not submitted to the Association
