Tom Barrs vs Desert Ranch HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818035-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $1,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel
Respondent Desert Ranch HOA Counsel

Alleged Violations

Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party on Issues 2 (retention of election materials) and 3 (open meetings violation). Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 objection rule) was dismissed. Respondent was ordered to pay Petitioner $1,000.00, representing the filing fee.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 as the evidence did not show that a Director was restricted by the Member waiver clause from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned.

Key Issues & Findings

Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on Mr. Schoeffler’s objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated Bylaw 2.4 by investigating or acting upon an objection to election results that was raised by a Director after the Annual Meeting adjourned, thereby waiving the claim according to the bylaw.

Orders: Petition dismissed as to Issue 1.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) when it discarded the ballot envelopes at or about the time of the election.

The HOA discarded the ballot envelopes at or about the time of the election, which violated the statutory mandate to retain ballots, envelopes, and related materials for at least one year.

Orders: Petitioner established violation and was deemed the prevailing party regarding this issue. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate. The initial order included an order for Respondent to pay Petitioner the $1,000.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 when it held meetings that were closed and/or without proper notice.

The HOA Board members met with an attorney following the Annual Meeting without providing any notice of the upcoming meeting and/or failing to provide notice that the meeting was closed because it involved legal advice from an attorney.

Orders: Petitioner established violation and was deemed the prevailing party regarding this issue. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate. The initial order included an order for Respondent to pay Petitioner the $1,000.00 filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Election Dispute, Records Retention, Open Meeting Violation, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 655766.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:30 (113.2 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678304.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:34 (117.5 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678305.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:37 (38.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818035-REL


Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the legal dispute between Petitioner Tom Barrs and the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association (HOA) concerning the HOA’s March 18, 2017, Board of Directors election. The petitioner alleged that the HOA improperly overturned the initial election results, mishandled election materials, and held meetings in violation of state law and its own bylaws.

An initial ruling by an Administrative Law Judge found the HOA in violation of state statutes regarding the retention of election materials (A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)) and open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804). However, the judge ruled against the petitioner on the central claim that the HOA violated Bylaw 2.4 by investigating the election after the annual meeting had concluded.

The petitioner requested and was granted a rehearing, which focused exclusively on the alleged violation of Bylaw 2.4. The final decision on rehearing, issued December 26, 2018, reaffirmed the initial ruling. The judge concluded that the investigation was properly initiated by a board member, not a general member, and that the bylaw restricting post-meeting objections did not apply to the Board of Directors itself. Consequently, the petition regarding the overturning of the election was dismissed.

Case Overview

This document details the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the administrative case No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG, heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Tom Barrs

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association

Presiding Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Initial Hearing

Not specified in document

Rehearing Date

December 6, 2018

Decision Date

December 26, 2018

Key Individuals:

Tom Barrs: Petitioner.

Catherine Overby: HOA President, appeared for Respondent.

Brian Schoeffler: HOA Vice President, appeared for Respondent; candidate in the disputed election.

Jerome Klinger: Candidate initially announced as a winner of the election.

Patrick Rice: Board member at the time of the election.

Chronology of the 2017 Election Dispute

1. Pre-March 18, 2017: Absentee ballots are sent to HOA members listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates, with a space for a write-in.

2. March 18, 2017: At the Annual Meeting, ballots are submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and write-in candidate Jerome Klinger are announced as the winners. No members object before the meeting is adjourned. Immediately following, board member Patrick Rice gathers the ballots and expresses concerns about the results.

3. March 19, 2017: Brian Schoeffler sends an email to board members asking for a review and a decision on whether a “revote” is necessary.

4. March 20, 2017: Catherine Overby emails the HOA membership, stating the election has been “contested” and that the board must investigate. She also asserts that bylaws do not allow write-in candidates, meaning she and Schoeffler were the new directors based on the vote count.

5. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Overby and Rice, meet with an attorney at Overby’s house. They discover that duplicate and proxy ballots were improperly counted.

6. Post-March 29, 2017: The board determines the valid votes resulted in a tie between Schoeffler and Klinger. A run-off election is scheduled.

7. April 29, 2017: The run-off election is held. Brian Schoeffler is announced as the winner.

8. May 10, 2017: The Board of Directors holds an organizational meeting.

Procedural History and Allegations

Initial Petition and Hearing

March 19, 2018: Tom Barrs files a single-issue HOA Dispute Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, paying a $500 fee but including a four-page narrative alleging multiple violations.

April 13, 2018: Barrs files an amended petition, adding an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812.

July 30, 2018: Barrs pays to convert the petition to a multiple-issue dispute and submits a “Clarification of Three Issues alleged in Petition.”

The three core issues alleged by the petitioner were:

1. Improper Overturning of Election: The Board of Directors improperly removed Jerome Klinger by overturning the March 18, 2017 election results. The petitioner argued the challenge by the third candidate was barred by Bylaw 2.4, and the methods used violated recall protocols under A.R.S. § 33-1813 and Bylaw 3.3.

2. Improper Handling of Election Materials: The board violated A.R.S. § 33-1812 by disposing of election materials (ballot envelopes) required to be kept for one year and by selectively invalidating votes cast on invalid ballots.

3. Improperly Held Meetings: Meetings related to the 2017 election were held as closed sessions or without proper notice in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Initial Decision

Following the initial hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision with the following conclusions:

Violation Found: The Respondent (HOA) violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by discarding the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.

Violation Found: The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding meetings that were closed and/or without proper notice.

No Violation Found: The Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4.

Rehearing and Final Order

October 1, 2018: Barrs files a request for rehearing, citing misconduct, insufficient penalties, errors of law, and a decision not supported by evidence.

November 2, 2018: The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

December 6, 2018: At the rehearing, the petitioner states he is only seeking reconsideration of Issue 1 (the improper overturning of the election) and not the lack of penalties for Issues 2 and 3.

Judicial Analysis and Final Rulings

The final decision focused solely on whether the HOA’s actions violated its own bylaws regarding election challenges.

Key Bylaw and Legal Standard

Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4: The central bylaw in dispute states:

Burden of Proof: The petitioner bore the burden of proving the violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Analysis of Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4

Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs argued that because candidate Brian Schoeffler did not object to the election results before the March 18, 2017 meeting adjourned, Bylaw 2.4 barred the board from investigating his concerns raised the following day via email. The petitioner contended that board members are also “Members” and thus are bound by this rule.

Evidence Presented: Testimony established that Patrick Rice, acting as a Board member, expressed concerns with the vote count immediately after the meeting adjourned. This, not Mr. Schoeffler’s subsequent email, initiated the board’s investigation. At the rehearing, the petitioner presented selected audio clips he had recorded to support his arguments but did not provide the entire recording.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ made a critical distinction between the terms used in the HOA’s bylaws.

◦ The terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were found to have specific, non-interchangeable meanings throughout the bylaws.

◦ Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member.”

◦ The petitioner made no showing that a “Director” or the “Board of Directors” could not raise questions about the validity of election results after a meeting had adjourned.

◦ Since the investigation was initiated by a board member (Rice) and not exclusively by a member’s untimely objection (Schoeffler), the board’s actions did not violate Bylaw 2.4.

Final Order

Based on the analysis from the rehearing, the judge issued the following order:

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed as to Issue 1.

This order, resulting from a rehearing, is legally binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days of the order’s service date.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL


Study Guide: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association (No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Tom Barrs and Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG, and what were their roles?

2. What specific event on March 18, 2017, served as the catalyst for the entire legal dispute?

3. What were the initial, announced results of the election held at the March 18, 2017, Annual Meeting?

4. According to the Petitioner, how did the HOA Board violate Bylaw 2.4 following the election?

5. In the initial hearing, which two of the Petitioner’s allegations were found to be valid violations committed by the Respondent?

6. Why did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grant the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?

7. During the rehearing on December 6, 2018, what was the single issue that the Petitioner chose to focus on for reconsideration?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what action initiated the Board’s investigation into the election results, separate from Brian Schoeffler’s email?

9. How did the Judge’s interpretation of the terms “Member” and “Director” in the bylaws defeat the Petitioner’s primary argument on rehearing?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Issue 1 after the conclusion of the rehearing?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Tom Barrs, who served as the Petitioner, and the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, appeared on his own behalf, while the Respondent was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler.

2. The dispute was triggered by the election for two vacant seats on the HOA Board of Directors held during the Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017. The subsequent actions by the Board to investigate and ultimately overturn the initial results of this election led the Petitioner to file a dispute.

3. The initially announced results of the March 18, 2017, election declared that Ms. Catherine Overby and Mr. Jerome Klinger were the winning candidates. No members present at the meeting raised an objection to these announced results before the meeting was adjourned.

4. The Petitioner argued that the Board violated Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection to the election results raised by Brian Schoeffler the day after the meeting. The bylaw states that any member who fails to object to an irregularity during a meeting “forever waives that claim,” and the Petitioner argued Mr. Schoeffler, as a member, had waived his right to object.

5. In the initial hearing, the Judge found that the Petitioner successfully established two violations by the Respondent. These were a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) for discarding ballot envelopes and a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 for holding closed meetings without proper notice.

6. The Commissioner granted the rehearing “for the reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s Rehearing Request.” The Petitioner’s request cited multiple grounds, including misconduct by the prevailing party, errors of law, and that the initial findings of fact were not supported by the evidence or were contrary to law.

7. At the rehearing, the Petitioner stated he was only seeking reconsideration of the initial decision as it related to Issue 1. This issue was the allegation that the Board improperly overturned the election results in violation of Bylaw 2.4.

8. The Judge found that the Board’s investigation was initiated by Mr. Patrick Rice, a Board member at the time, who expressed his concerns with the vote “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” This occurred prior to and independent of the email sent by Brian Schoeffler the following day.

9. The Judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. Because the Petitioner made no showing that a “Director” (like Mr. Rice) could not raise questions after a meeting, the restriction on “Members” in Bylaw 2.4 did not apply to the Board’s actions.

10. The final order stated that the Petition was to be dismissed as to Issue 1. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish that the Respondent had violated Bylaw 2.4.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the timeline of events from the Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017, to the run-off election on April 29, 2017. Discuss the key actions taken by the HOA Board—including the meeting with an attorney and the discovery of invalid ballots—and explain how these actions led to the legal dispute.

2. Detail the three distinct issues the Petitioner alleged in his “Clarification of Three Issues alleged in Petition.” Based on the outcome of the initial hearing, evaluate the success of these claims and explain why the Petitioner prevailed on some issues but not others.

3. The Petitioner’s case on rehearing hinged on the interpretation of Bylaw 2.4. Construct the Petitioner’s argument regarding this bylaw and then fully explain the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning for ultimately rejecting it, focusing on the distinction between “Members” and “Directors.”

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and analyze how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this standard led to the dismissal of Issue 1 on rehearing.

5. Examine the procedural history of the case, from the initial single-issue petition to the final binding order after rehearing. What were the key procedural steps, such as amending the petition and filing for a rehearing, and how did these steps shape the final scope and outcome of the case?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the State of Arizona. The Petitioner alleged violations of several statutes, including A.R.S. § 33-1813, § 33-1811, § 33-1812, and § 33-1804.

Bylaw 2.4

The specific bylaw of the Desert Ranch HOA that was the central focus of the rehearing. It states, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with which the Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Director

An elected member of the HOA’s Board of Directors. The ALJ’s decision distinguished this role from that of a general “Member.”

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The governing organization for the planned community of Desert Ranch, responsible for enforcing community documents and statutes.

Member

A homeowner within the planned community. The ALJ’s decision emphasized that in the bylaws, this term has a specific meaning that is not interchangeable with “Director.”

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Tom Barrs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this instance by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, to reconsider the initial decision based on alleged errors.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL


5 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Election Gone Wrong

Introduction: When “The Rules” Aren’t What You Think

Homeowners’ Associations (HOAs) run on rules. From lawn maintenance to paint colors, the governing documents are the ultimate authority. But what happens when the rules themselves become the center of a dispute? Imagine this scenario: your HOA holds its annual board election. The results are announced, the winners are declared, and everyone goes home. Then, the next day, the board decides to overturn the result.

This isn’t a hypothetical. It’s the core of a real-life legal case that reveals surprising truths about community governance, the power of a single word, and what can happen when an election goes off the rails.

——————————————————————————–

1. An Election Isn’t Over Until the Board Says It’s Over

The dispute began at the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017. The ballots for two open board seats were counted, and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates. Crucially, no members present raised an objection before the meeting adjourned. By all appearances, the election was over.

But it wasn’t. Immediately after the meeting, a board member, Mr. Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed his concerns with the election results. The next day, the losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, sent an email asking the board to “review the situation” and consider a “revote.” The board then formally announced that the election had been contested and that it was obligated to investigate.

After consulting an attorney, the board discovered several ballot irregularities, including duplicate ballots and an improperly counted proxy ballot. This new tally resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board then forced a run-off election, which Mr. Schoeffler ultimately won. While the losing candidate’s email drew attention, the true turning point had already occurred moments after the meeting ended, when a board member himself questioned the results—an act that would prove legally decisive.

2. A Single Word in the Bylaws Can Change Everything

The homeowner who filed the legal petition, Tom Barrs, built his case on a seemingly straightforward rule in the HOA’s bylaws. He argued that any challenge to the election was invalid because it wasn’t raised before the Annual Meeting adjourned. The bylaw in question, Section 2.4, reads:

Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting (whether procedural, parliamentary, substantive or technical) forever waives that claim.

The petitioner’s argument was simple: the challenge was raised after the meeting by a “Member,” so the claim was waived. The case seemed open-and-shut.

However, the Administrative Law Judge made a critical distinction that decided the case. The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific meanings and were not interchangeable. While a Member had to object during the meeting, the judge found no rule preventing a Director from raising questions later.

Because a board member, Mr. Rice, had expressed concerns immediately following the meeting, the board’s subsequent investigation was deemed permissible. This razor-thin interpretation of a single word highlights the immense power that definitions and precise language hold in governing documents.

3. The Board Broke the Law, But Still Won on the Main Issue

In a surprising twist, the judge determined that the HOA had, in fact, violated Arizona state law on two separate counts during the election controversy. The petitioner successfully proved that the board failed to follow established statutes.

The two violations established in the initial hearing were:

Improper Destruction of Ballots: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) when it destroyed all of the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. This act made a true, verifiable recount impossible, directly undermining the integrity of the very election the board was claiming to investigate.

Improper Meetings: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding closed meetings without providing proper notice to the members, particularly a meeting at the home of a board member, Ms. Overby, where the decision to hold a run-off was made. By making these critical decisions behind closed doors, the board created an appearance of secrecy that fueled the dispute and eroded member trust.

Despite proving these clear legal violations, the petitioner still lost on his primary complaint—overturning the run-off and reinstating the original election results. This outcome serves as a stark example of a pyrrhic victory. You can successfully prove that an organization broke the rules without achieving your ultimate goal in the dispute.

4. An Investigation Can Uncover a Cascade of Deeper Problems

The board’s decision to contest its own election results was controversial, but the subsequent investigation brought a cascade of other procedural failures to light. The initial challenge acted like a pulled thread that unraveled a series of previously unknown mistakes.

During the board’s meeting with its attorney, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot that were improperly counted” had skewed the original vote. This alone was enough to call the first result into question.

Furthermore, the board itself asserted that its own bylaws “did not allow for a write-in candidate.” This was a significant admission, as one of the original winners, Jerome Klinger, had been a write-in. If true, his victory would have been invalid from the start, regardless of any other challenges. The board’s investigation, initiated to resolve one perceived error, ended up exposing its own systemic incompetence—from improperly counting ballots to being unaware of its own rules regarding write-in candidates. The effort to fix the election proved the election was fundamentally broken from the start.

5. An HOA Board Can Investigate Itself

The petitioner’s case rested on the idea that board members are also “Members” of the association and are therefore bound by the same rules. If a regular member had to object during the meeting, a director should have to as well.

The judge rejected this argument, implicitly affirming the board’s higher-level fiduciary duty to ensure a fair and legal election. The final decision made it clear that the bylaws used “Member” and “Director” with distinct meanings and responsibilities. The bylaw requiring members to object during the meeting was the mechanism for an individual’s challenge; it did not override the board’s inherent duty to govern properly.

The key takeaway from the judge’s decision was unambiguous: The petitioner “made no showing that a Director could not raise questions as to the validity of the election results after the meeting adjourned.” This legally affirms a board’s power to investigate its own processes, a responsibility separate from the rules that govern challenges from the general membership.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Have You Read Your Bylaws Lately?

This case serves as a powerful reminder that the dense, legalistic language of HOA governing documents is not just boilerplate. These documents have immense real-world power, dictating the outcomes of contentious disputes and shaping the governance of a community. The intricate details and specific wording can mean the difference between a final result and one that is just the beginning of a long and costly fight.

This entire, year-long legal battle hinged on the definition of a single word. When was the last time you read the fine print governing your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf,.
  • Stephen Barrs (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner,.

Respondent Side

  • Catherine Overby (board member/president)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent,; Board President,; testified at hearing,.
  • Brian Schoeffler (board member/vice president)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent,; Board Vice President,; testified at hearing,.
  • Patrick Rice (board member)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Board member who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting,,,; involved in meeting with attorney,.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner (ADRE))
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Issued Order Granting Rehearing; recipient of decision copy,.
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.

Other Participants

  • Jerome Klinger (board director)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Initially announced as a winning candidate for director,; later removed after contest; involved in run-off,.
  • Paula Barrs (listed resident)
    Listed with Tom Barrs on mailing address.

Tom Barrs vs Desert Ranch HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-12-26
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Tom Barrs Counsel
Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners' Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

Bylaw 2.4

Outcome Summary

In the initial decision, Petitioner established violations of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) (election materials disposal) and A.R.S. § 33-1804 (closed/improperly noticed meetings), but failed to establish a violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Issue 1). The rehearing only addressed Issue 1, which was ultimately dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner lost Issue 1 (Bylaw 2.4 violation) because the ALJ found that while the Bylaw applied to Members, Petitioner failed to show it prohibited a Director from raising concerns about election validity after the meeting adjourned, and the investigation was initiated by a Board member immediately following the meeting.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of Bylaw 2.4 (Election Objection Waiver)

Whether Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4 when it acted on an objection to the election results raised the day after the Annual Meeting, given that the Bylaw requires members to object to irregularities 'at the meeting' to avoid waiver.

Orders: The Petition was dismissed as to Issue 1.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Election Challenge, Bylaw Violation, Meeting Notice, Record Retention, Rehearing
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1811
  • A.R.S. § 33-1812
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • Bylaw 3.3
  • Bylaw 2.4

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 655766.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:04:26 (113.2 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678304.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:44 (117.5 KB)

18F-H1818035-REL Decision – 678305.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:44 (38.8 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818035-REL


Barrs v. Desert Ranch HOA: Case Briefing

Executive Summary

This briefing document outlines the legal dispute between Petitioner Tom Barrs and the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association (HOA) concerning the HOA’s March 18, 2017, Board of Directors election. The petitioner alleged that the HOA improperly overturned the initial election results, mishandled election materials, and held meetings in violation of state law and its own bylaws.

An initial ruling by an Administrative Law Judge found the HOA in violation of state statutes regarding the retention of election materials (A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7)) and open meeting laws (A.R.S. § 33-1804). However, the judge ruled against the petitioner on the central claim that the HOA violated Bylaw 2.4 by investigating the election after the annual meeting had concluded.

The petitioner requested and was granted a rehearing, which focused exclusively on the alleged violation of Bylaw 2.4. The final decision on rehearing, issued December 26, 2018, reaffirmed the initial ruling. The judge concluded that the investigation was properly initiated by a board member, not a general member, and that the bylaw restricting post-meeting objections did not apply to the Board of Directors itself. Consequently, the petition regarding the overturning of the election was dismissed.

Case Overview

This document details the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the administrative case No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG, heard in the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

18F-H1818035-REL-RHG

Petitioner

Tom Barrs

Respondent

Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association

Presiding Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer, Administrative Law Judge

Initial Hearing

Not specified in document

Rehearing Date

December 6, 2018

Decision Date

December 26, 2018

Key Individuals:

Tom Barrs: Petitioner.

Catherine Overby: HOA President, appeared for Respondent.

Brian Schoeffler: HOA Vice President, appeared for Respondent; candidate in the disputed election.

Jerome Klinger: Candidate initially announced as a winner of the election.

Patrick Rice: Board member at the time of the election.

Chronology of the 2017 Election Dispute

1. Pre-March 18, 2017: Absentee ballots are sent to HOA members listing Catherine Overby and Brian Schoeffler as candidates, with a space for a write-in.

2. March 18, 2017: At the Annual Meeting, ballots are submitted and counted. Catherine Overby and write-in candidate Jerome Klinger are announced as the winners. No members object before the meeting is adjourned. Immediately following, board member Patrick Rice gathers the ballots and expresses concerns about the results.

3. March 19, 2017: Brian Schoeffler sends an email to board members asking for a review and a decision on whether a “revote” is necessary.

4. March 20, 2017: Catherine Overby emails the HOA membership, stating the election has been “contested” and that the board must investigate. She also asserts that bylaws do not allow write-in candidates, meaning she and Schoeffler were the new directors based on the vote count.

5. March 29, 2017: Certain board members, including Overby and Rice, meet with an attorney at Overby’s house. They discover that duplicate and proxy ballots were improperly counted.

6. Post-March 29, 2017: The board determines the valid votes resulted in a tie between Schoeffler and Klinger. A run-off election is scheduled.

7. April 29, 2017: The run-off election is held. Brian Schoeffler is announced as the winner.

8. May 10, 2017: The Board of Directors holds an organizational meeting.

Procedural History and Allegations

Initial Petition and Hearing

March 19, 2018: Tom Barrs files a single-issue HOA Dispute Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, paying a $500 fee but including a four-page narrative alleging multiple violations.

April 13, 2018: Barrs files an amended petition, adding an alleged violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812.

July 30, 2018: Barrs pays to convert the petition to a multiple-issue dispute and submits a “Clarification of Three Issues alleged in Petition.”

The three core issues alleged by the petitioner were:

1. Improper Overturning of Election: The Board of Directors improperly removed Jerome Klinger by overturning the March 18, 2017 election results. The petitioner argued the challenge by the third candidate was barred by Bylaw 2.4, and the methods used violated recall protocols under A.R.S. § 33-1813 and Bylaw 3.3.

2. Improper Handling of Election Materials: The board violated A.R.S. § 33-1812 by disposing of election materials (ballot envelopes) required to be kept for one year and by selectively invalidating votes cast on invalid ballots.

3. Improperly Held Meetings: Meetings related to the 2017 election were held as closed sessions or without proper notice in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Initial Decision

Following the initial hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision with the following conclusions:

Violation Found: The Respondent (HOA) violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) by discarding the ballot envelopes around the time of the election.

Violation Found: The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding meetings that were closed and/or without proper notice.

No Violation Found: The Petitioner failed to prove that the Respondent violated Bylaw 2.4.

Rehearing and Final Order

October 1, 2018: Barrs files a request for rehearing, citing misconduct, insufficient penalties, errors of law, and a decision not supported by evidence.

November 2, 2018: The Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grants the rehearing request.

December 6, 2018: At the rehearing, the petitioner states he is only seeking reconsideration of Issue 1 (the improper overturning of the election) and not the lack of penalties for Issues 2 and 3.

Judicial Analysis and Final Rulings

The final decision focused solely on whether the HOA’s actions violated its own bylaws regarding election challenges.

Key Bylaw and Legal Standard

Desert Ranch Bylaw 2.4: The central bylaw in dispute states:

Burden of Proof: The petitioner bore the burden of proving the violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

Analysis of Issue 1: Violation of Bylaw 2.4

Petitioner’s Argument: Mr. Barrs argued that because candidate Brian Schoeffler did not object to the election results before the March 18, 2017 meeting adjourned, Bylaw 2.4 barred the board from investigating his concerns raised the following day via email. The petitioner contended that board members are also “Members” and thus are bound by this rule.

Evidence Presented: Testimony established that Patrick Rice, acting as a Board member, expressed concerns with the vote count immediately after the meeting adjourned. This, not Mr. Schoeffler’s subsequent email, initiated the board’s investigation. At the rehearing, the petitioner presented selected audio clips he had recorded to support his arguments but did not provide the entire recording.

Conclusion of Law: The ALJ made a critical distinction between the terms used in the HOA’s bylaws.

◦ The terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were found to have specific, non-interchangeable meanings throughout the bylaws.

◦ Bylaw 2.4 applies specifically to a “Member.”

◦ The petitioner made no showing that a “Director” or the “Board of Directors” could not raise questions about the validity of election results after a meeting had adjourned.

◦ Since the investigation was initiated by a board member (Rice) and not exclusively by a member’s untimely objection (Schoeffler), the board’s actions did not violate Bylaw 2.4.

Final Order

Based on the analysis from the rehearing, the judge issued the following order:

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition be dismissed as to Issue 1.

This order, resulting from a rehearing, is legally binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days of the order’s service date.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818035-REL


Study Guide: Barrs v. Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association (No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Tom Barrs and Respondent Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms to facilitate a thorough understanding of the case’s facts, arguments, and legal conclusions.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer each of the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the provided source documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 18F-H1818035-REL-RHG, and what were their roles?

2. What specific event on March 18, 2017, served as the catalyst for the entire legal dispute?

3. What were the initial, announced results of the election held at the March 18, 2017, Annual Meeting?

4. According to the Petitioner, how did the HOA Board violate Bylaw 2.4 following the election?

5. In the initial hearing, which two of the Petitioner’s allegations were found to be valid violations committed by the Respondent?

6. Why did the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate grant the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing?

7. During the rehearing on December 6, 2018, what was the single issue that the Petitioner chose to focus on for reconsideration?

8. According to the Administrative Law Judge’s findings, what action initiated the Board’s investigation into the election results, separate from Brian Schoeffler’s email?

9. How did the Judge’s interpretation of the terms “Member” and “Director” in the bylaws defeat the Petitioner’s primary argument on rehearing?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge regarding Issue 1 after the conclusion of the rehearing?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Tom Barrs, who served as the Petitioner, and the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner, Mr. Barrs, appeared on his own behalf, while the Respondent was represented by its President, Catherine Overby, and Vice President, Brian Schoeffler.

2. The dispute was triggered by the election for two vacant seats on the HOA Board of Directors held during the Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017. The subsequent actions by the Board to investigate and ultimately overturn the initial results of this election led the Petitioner to file a dispute.

3. The initially announced results of the March 18, 2017, election declared that Ms. Catherine Overby and Mr. Jerome Klinger were the winning candidates. No members present at the meeting raised an objection to these announced results before the meeting was adjourned.

4. The Petitioner argued that the Board violated Bylaw 2.4 by acting on an objection to the election results raised by Brian Schoeffler the day after the meeting. The bylaw states that any member who fails to object to an irregularity during a meeting “forever waives that claim,” and the Petitioner argued Mr. Schoeffler, as a member, had waived his right to object.

5. In the initial hearing, the Judge found that the Petitioner successfully established two violations by the Respondent. These were a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) for discarding ballot envelopes and a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 for holding closed meetings without proper notice.

6. The Commissioner granted the rehearing “for the reasons outlined in the Petitioner’s Rehearing Request.” The Petitioner’s request cited multiple grounds, including misconduct by the prevailing party, errors of law, and that the initial findings of fact were not supported by the evidence or were contrary to law.

7. At the rehearing, the Petitioner stated he was only seeking reconsideration of the initial decision as it related to Issue 1. This issue was the allegation that the Board improperly overturned the election results in violation of Bylaw 2.4.

8. The Judge found that the Board’s investigation was initiated by Mr. Patrick Rice, a Board member at the time, who expressed his concerns with the vote “immediately after the Annual Meeting adjourned.” This occurred prior to and independent of the email sent by Brian Schoeffler the following day.

9. The Judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific and non-interchangeable meanings. Because the Petitioner made no showing that a “Director” (like Mr. Rice) could not raise questions after a meeting, the restriction on “Members” in Bylaw 2.4 did not apply to the Board’s actions.

10. The final order stated that the Petition was to be dismissed as to Issue 1. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish that the Respondent had violated Bylaw 2.4.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the timeline of events from the Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017, to the run-off election on April 29, 2017. Discuss the key actions taken by the HOA Board—including the meeting with an attorney and the discovery of invalid ballots—and explain how these actions led to the legal dispute.

2. Detail the three distinct issues the Petitioner alleged in his “Clarification of Three Issues alleged in Petition.” Based on the outcome of the initial hearing, evaluate the success of these claims and explain why the Petitioner prevailed on some issues but not others.

3. The Petitioner’s case on rehearing hinged on the interpretation of Bylaw 2.4. Construct the Petitioner’s argument regarding this bylaw and then fully explain the Administrative Law Judge’s legal reasoning for ultimately rejecting it, focusing on the distinction between “Members” and “Directors.”

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it is defined and applied in this case. Explain the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and analyze how the Petitioner’s failure to meet this standard led to the dismissal of Issue 1 on rehearing.

5. Examine the procedural history of the case, from the initial single-issue petition to the final binding order after rehearing. What were the key procedural steps, such as amending the petition and filing for a rehearing, and how did these steps shape the final scope and outcome of the case?

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, the collection of laws for the State of Arizona. The Petitioner alleged violations of several statutes, including A.R.S. § 33-1813, § 33-1811, § 33-1812, and § 33-1804.

Bylaw 2.4

The specific bylaw of the Desert Ranch HOA that was the central focus of the rehearing. It states, “Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting… forever waives that claim.”

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with which the Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition was filed.

Director

An elected member of the HOA’s Board of Directors. The ALJ’s decision distinguished this role from that of a general “Member.”

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The governing organization for the planned community of Desert Ranch, responsible for enforcing community documents and statutes.

Member

A homeowner within the planned community. The ALJ’s decision emphasized that in the bylaws, this term has a specific meaning that is not interchangeable with “Director.”

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Tom Barrs.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case, granted in this instance by the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate, to reconsider the initial decision based on alleged errors.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818035-REL


5 Shocking Lessons from an HOA Election Gone Wrong

Introduction: When “The Rules” Aren’t What You Think

Homeowners’ Associations (HOAs) run on rules. From lawn maintenance to paint colors, the governing documents are the ultimate authority. But what happens when the rules themselves become the center of a dispute? Imagine this scenario: your HOA holds its annual board election. The results are announced, the winners are declared, and everyone goes home. Then, the next day, the board decides to overturn the result.

This isn’t a hypothetical. It’s the core of a real-life legal case that reveals surprising truths about community governance, the power of a single word, and what can happen when an election goes off the rails.

——————————————————————————–

1. An Election Isn’t Over Until the Board Says It’s Over

The dispute began at the Desert Ranch Homeowners’ Association Annual Meeting on March 18, 2017. The ballots for two open board seats were counted, and Catherine Overby and Jerome Klinger were announced as the winning candidates. Crucially, no members present raised an objection before the meeting adjourned. By all appearances, the election was over.

But it wasn’t. Immediately after the meeting, a board member, Mr. Rice, gathered the ballots and expressed his concerns with the election results. The next day, the losing candidate, Brian Schoeffler, sent an email asking the board to “review the situation” and consider a “revote.” The board then formally announced that the election had been contested and that it was obligated to investigate.

After consulting an attorney, the board discovered several ballot irregularities, including duplicate ballots and an improperly counted proxy ballot. This new tally resulted in a tie between Mr. Schoeffler and Mr. Klinger. The board then forced a run-off election, which Mr. Schoeffler ultimately won. While the losing candidate’s email drew attention, the true turning point had already occurred moments after the meeting ended, when a board member himself questioned the results—an act that would prove legally decisive.

2. A Single Word in the Bylaws Can Change Everything

The homeowner who filed the legal petition, Tom Barrs, built his case on a seemingly straightforward rule in the HOA’s bylaws. He argued that any challenge to the election was invalid because it wasn’t raised before the Annual Meeting adjourned. The bylaw in question, Section 2.4, reads:

Any Member who fails to object to any perceived or actual irregularity at the meeting (whether procedural, parliamentary, substantive or technical) forever waives that claim.

The petitioner’s argument was simple: the challenge was raised after the meeting by a “Member,” so the claim was waived. The case seemed open-and-shut.

However, the Administrative Law Judge made a critical distinction that decided the case. The judge noted that throughout the bylaws, the terms “Member,” “Directors,” and “Board of Directors” were used with specific meanings and were not interchangeable. While a Member had to object during the meeting, the judge found no rule preventing a Director from raising questions later.

Because a board member, Mr. Rice, had expressed concerns immediately following the meeting, the board’s subsequent investigation was deemed permissible. This razor-thin interpretation of a single word highlights the immense power that definitions and precise language hold in governing documents.

3. The Board Broke the Law, But Still Won on the Main Issue

In a surprising twist, the judge determined that the HOA had, in fact, violated Arizona state law on two separate counts during the election controversy. The petitioner successfully proved that the board failed to follow established statutes.

The two violations established in the initial hearing were:

Improper Destruction of Ballots: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)(7) when it destroyed all of the ballot envelopes around the time of the election. This act made a true, verifiable recount impossible, directly undermining the integrity of the very election the board was claiming to investigate.

Improper Meetings: The HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804 by holding closed meetings without providing proper notice to the members, particularly a meeting at the home of a board member, Ms. Overby, where the decision to hold a run-off was made. By making these critical decisions behind closed doors, the board created an appearance of secrecy that fueled the dispute and eroded member trust.

Despite proving these clear legal violations, the petitioner still lost on his primary complaint—overturning the run-off and reinstating the original election results. This outcome serves as a stark example of a pyrrhic victory. You can successfully prove that an organization broke the rules without achieving your ultimate goal in the dispute.

4. An Investigation Can Uncover a Cascade of Deeper Problems

The board’s decision to contest its own election results was controversial, but the subsequent investigation brought a cascade of other procedural failures to light. The initial challenge acted like a pulled thread that unraveled a series of previously unknown mistakes.

During the board’s meeting with its attorney, it was discovered that “duplicate ballots and a proxy ballot that were improperly counted” had skewed the original vote. This alone was enough to call the first result into question.

Furthermore, the board itself asserted that its own bylaws “did not allow for a write-in candidate.” This was a significant admission, as one of the original winners, Jerome Klinger, had been a write-in. If true, his victory would have been invalid from the start, regardless of any other challenges. The board’s investigation, initiated to resolve one perceived error, ended up exposing its own systemic incompetence—from improperly counting ballots to being unaware of its own rules regarding write-in candidates. The effort to fix the election proved the election was fundamentally broken from the start.

5. An HOA Board Can Investigate Itself

The petitioner’s case rested on the idea that board members are also “Members” of the association and are therefore bound by the same rules. If a regular member had to object during the meeting, a director should have to as well.

The judge rejected this argument, implicitly affirming the board’s higher-level fiduciary duty to ensure a fair and legal election. The final decision made it clear that the bylaws used “Member” and “Director” with distinct meanings and responsibilities. The bylaw requiring members to object during the meeting was the mechanism for an individual’s challenge; it did not override the board’s inherent duty to govern properly.

The key takeaway from the judge’s decision was unambiguous: The petitioner “made no showing that a Director could not raise questions as to the validity of the election results after the meeting adjourned.” This legally affirms a board’s power to investigate its own processes, a responsibility separate from the rules that govern challenges from the general membership.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Have You Read Your Bylaws Lately?

This case serves as a powerful reminder that the dense, legalistic language of HOA governing documents is not just boilerplate. These documents have immense real-world power, dictating the outcomes of contentious disputes and shaping the governance of a community. The intricate details and specific wording can mean the difference between a final result and one that is just the beginning of a long and costly fight.

This entire, year-long legal battle hinged on the definition of a single word. When was the last time you read the fine print governing your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Tom Barrs (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf,.
  • Stephen Barrs (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner,.

Respondent Side

  • Catherine Overby (board member/president)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent,; Board President,; testified at hearing,.
  • Brian Schoeffler (board member/vice president)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent,; Board Vice President,; testified at hearing,.
  • Patrick Rice (board member)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Board member who expressed concerns immediately after the meeting,,,; involved in meeting with attorney,.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner (ADRE))
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Issued Order Granting Rehearing; recipient of decision copy,.
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision copy.

Other Participants

  • Jerome Klinger (board director)
    Desert Ranch HOA
    Initially announced as a winning candidate for director,; later removed after contest; involved in run-off,.
  • Paula Barrs (listed resident)
    Listed with Tom Barrs on mailing address.

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome total
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:24:07 (142.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818042-REL


Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818042-REL


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818042-REL, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action by the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA) prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. What were the allegations made against candidates Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell prior to the March 20, 2018 election?

4. State the vote counts for the top three candidates who were elected to the Board of Directors on March 20, 2018.

5. What was the reason given by the Board’s president, Lance Van Horne, for calling a special recall election for April 24, 2018?

6. What were the specific outcomes for each of the three board members facing recall in the April 24, 2018 election?

7. Which two Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) were at the center of the legal dispute, and what general topics do they cover?

8. What was the HOA’s primary legal argument for why its president was permitted to call the special recall meeting?

9. What legal principle of statutory construction did the Administrative Law Judge use to resolve the conflict between the two statutes?

10. What two things was the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, ordered to do in the final ruling?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, the Petitioner, who is a homeowner and member of the association, and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner initiated the legal action against the HOA.

2. The Petitioner filed the complaint because the HOA’s president called a special meeting to hold a vote on recalling three recently elected members of the Board of Directors. The Petitioner alleged this action violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition signed by homeowners.

3. Prior to the March election, reports were made that Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell were going door-to-door disseminating allegedly false information about the HOA’s finances. They were also accused of “harvesting ballots” from members based on this information.

4. The top three candidates elected on March 20, 2018, were Roxanne Gould with 30 votes, Steve Brownell with 26 votes, and Trish Brownell with 25 votes.

5. Board president Lance Van Horne called the special recall election because he felt the election’s outcome was compromised. He believed the dissemination of allegedly false information and the harvesting of votes by the Brownells and Ms. Gould had tainted the results.

6. In the April 24 recall election, Roxanne Gould survived the recall with 27 votes against to 25 for. Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell were both removed from the board, with 27 votes for their recall and 25 against.

7. The statutes at the center of the dispute were A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically covers the “Removal of board member; special meeting,” while A.R.S. § 33-1804 is a more general statute concerning “Open meetings.”

8. The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the only procedure for calling a recall meeting. It contended that the procedures in the more general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which allows the president to call a special meeting, could also be used.

9. The judge applied the well-established common law principle that when a general statute and a specific statute on the same subject are in conflict, the specific statute controls. Therefore, the specific procedures for recall in A.R.S. § 33-1813 took precedence over the general meeting rules in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

10. The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the removed board members, Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell. The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Trace the complete timeline of events described in the decision, beginning with the failed meeting on February 20, 2018, and concluding with the judge’s final order. For each key date, describe the event that occurred, the people involved, and the outcome of the event.

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of Arizona state law presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Explain which specific clauses of A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804 each party relied upon to justify their position regarding the legality of the April 24, 2018 recall meeting.

3. The decision states that the case presents a “pure legal issue of statutory interpretation.” Explain what this means and how it affects the burden of proof. Describe in detail the canons of statutory construction cited by the judge and how she applied them to rule in favor of the Petitioner.

4. Discuss the role of the allegations of misconduct (disseminating false information and harvesting ballots) against the newly elected board members. How did these allegations act as a catalyst for the recall election, and what was their ultimate relevance (or lack thereof) to the final legal conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge?

5. Based on the judge’s “Conclusions of Law,” explain the definitive legal procedure for an HOA in Arizona, with 1,000 or fewer members, to initiate the removal of a board member. Detail the petition requirements, signature thresholds, and meeting notice timelines as established by the controlling statute, A.R.S. § 33-1813.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the homeowners’ association, elected by the members.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation.

De Novo Review

A type of review where a court or judge decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the previous party in the case. This was applied because the issue was a pure matter of statutory interpretation.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Standard

The level of proof required to convince the trier of fact. In this case, the standard was a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The organization that governs the Carter Ranch development, of which all lot owners are members.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, it was homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is more probably true than not.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at a meeting for the proceedings of that meeting to be valid. In the March 20 election, the quorum was 47 homeowners.

Recall Election

A special vote held to determine whether to remove an elected official (in this case, board members) from office before the end of their term.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting of an association’s members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled annual meetings. The April 24 recall vote was a special meeting.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge used common-law canons of statutory construction to resolve the conflict between the two A.R.S. sections.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818042-REL


Majority Rules? Not in This HOA: How One Homeowner Overturned a Recall Election on a Technicality

The Unruly World of Neighborhood Politics

In the world of Homeowners Associations, a majority vote is typically the final word. But for the Carter Ranch HOA, a 27-to-25 recall vote meant to oust two board members became the start of a legal battle, not the end. This case reveals a crucial lesson in community governance: when a board president’s unilateral action clashes with statutory procedure, the will of the majority can be rendered completely irrelevant.

A Democratic Vote Can Be Completely Ignored

On April 24, 2018, the Carter Ranch HOA held a special recall election targeting three recently elected board members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell. A quorum of 52 homeowners participated, and the vote was a split decision. Roxanne Gould survived the recall attempt, with 27 votes against her removal and 25 for it. However, Steve and Trish Brownell were successfully voted off the board by a clear majority of 27 to 25.

The twist came later, in a judge’s chambers. Despite the democratic outcome, an Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reinstate the Brownells. This counter-intuitive decision wasn’t the result of voter fraud or a miscount. The entire election was nullified because of a critical procedural error made by the HOA president before a single ballot was cast.

An HOA President Can’t Unilaterally Oust Board Members

The conflict began after a heated board election on March 20, 2018. The board president at the time, Lance Van Horne, felt the election’s outcome was “compromised.” He believed three newly elected members had won their seats by disseminating “allegedly false information” and “harvesting of votes.”

In response, Mr. Van Horne took decisive action. Believing he was correcting a wrong, he personally called for a special meeting to hold a recall election. This unilateral action became the sole basis for the legal challenge that followed. While the president’s concerns about election integrity were the catalyst for the drama, the court’s subsequent decision would demonstrate that his motives were entirely irrelevant. The only thing that mattered was the procedure he followed—or in this case, failed to follow.

The “Specific Beats General” Rule Is King

The HOA’s legal defense rested on a general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which grants an association’s president the power to call special meetings for various purposes. They argued this general power included the authority to call a recall meeting.

However, the homeowner who challenged the recall pointed to a different, more specific law. A.R.S. § 33-1813 is a statute written exclusively for the purpose of removing board members. This specific law dictates that a recall process can only be initiated upon receipt of a petition signed by a required number of homeowners. The president cannot simply decide to do it alone.

The judge’s decision hinged on a foundational principle of legal interpretation. As cited in the final order:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Because the HOA president initiated the recall without first receiving the required petition from the homeowners, he failed to follow the specific procedure mandated by law. As a result, the entire recall election was declared invalid from the start.

One Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge an Entire HOA

This entire case was set in motion not by a group of disgruntled residents, but by a single individual. Homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a “single-issue petition” with the state, challenging the validity of the president’s action. His understanding of the specific rules governing board member removal proved to be the key that unraveled the HOA’s actions.

The final court order was a complete victory for the petitioner:

• His petition was granted.

• The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members, Steve and Trish Brownell.

• The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the petitioner for his $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome serves as an empowering example of how a single member, armed with knowledge of the governing documents and statutes, can hold an association’s leadership accountable and ensure that proper procedures are followed.

Conclusion: Rules, Not Rulers

The Carter Ranch case is a powerful illustration that in community governance, established process is not a technicality—it is the bedrock of legitimacy. The board’s failure to adhere to the specific statute for recalls (A.R.S. § 33-1813) created a fatal procedural flaw that no amount of good intention or majority support could cure. This serves as a stark reminder for all HOA boards: power is derived from the meticulous application of rules, not the perceived authority of rulers. Ignoring this principle doesn’t just invalidate an action; it exposes the association to legal challenges, financial penalties, and a loss of credibility with the community it governs. Do you know the specific rules that govern your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Chad M. Gallacher (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Represented Respondent
  • Mary Chaira (Community Manager)
    Witness for Respondent
  • Lance Van Horne (Board President)
    Called the special recall election which led to the petition,,

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received decision
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Roxanne Gould (board member)
    Elected board member; subject of recall attempt,,
  • Steve Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Trish Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Steve F. (candidate)
    Candidate in board election
  • Dave (candidate)
    Candidate in board election

Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen vs. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818042-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-06-25
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome total
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen Counsel
Respondent Carter Ranch Homeowners Association Counsel Chad M. Gallacher, Esq.

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1813

Outcome Summary

The ALJ granted the petitioner's request, finding that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 by allowing the president to call a special meeting for board member recall without the required petition signed by homeowners. The HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members and refund the petitioner's filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Removal of board member; special meeting

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when the president called a special meeting to recall three recently elected Board members, arguing that the statute requires a petition signed by homeowners. Respondent argued that A.R.S. § 33-1804 procedures could also be used. The ALJ ruled that A.R.S. § 33-1813, as the specific statute regarding removal, requires a petition.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is granted. Respondent shall reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell and reimburse the $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Board Removal, Recall Election, Statutory Interpretation, Petition Requirements
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1813
  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818042-REL Decision – 642530.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:50 (142.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1818042-REL


Briefing Document: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (Case No. 18F-H1818042-REL)

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen versus the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The central dispute concerned the legality of a special meeting called by the HOA Board President to recall three recently elected board members. The petitioner argued this action violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition from homeowners. The HOA contended that the president had the authority to call the meeting under the broader powers granted in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that when a specific statute and a general statute conflict, the specific statute controls. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically governs the removal of board members and mandates a homeowner petition process. Therefore, the president’s unilateral call for a recall election was improper. The judge granted the petitioner’s request, ordering the HOA to reinstate the two board members who were removed and to reimburse the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

Background and Procedural History

The case involves a dispute within the Carter Ranch development, a 253-lot community in Coolidge, Arizona.

Petitioner: Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, a homeowner and member of the Carter Ranch HOA.

Respondent: Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Petition: On or about April 5, 2018, Van Dan Elzen filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate. He alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1813 when its president, Lance Van Horne, called a special meeting to recall three newly elected board members.

Hearing: The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing, which took place on June 20, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky.

The Contested Elections

The dispute originated from a contentious board election process marked by accusations of misconduct, culminating in a recall election that was later found to be procedurally invalid.

March 20, 2018 Board Election

An initial annual meeting on February 20, 2018, failed to achieve the required quorum of 26 ballots. A second meeting was scheduled for March 20, 2018, for which eight candidates ran for five open board positions.

Allegations of Misconduct: Prior to the meeting, Community Manager Mary Chaira received reports that three candidates—Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell—were going door-to-door “disseminating allegedly false information about Respondent’s finances, and harvesting ballots.”

Meeting Conduct: At the March 20 meeting, a quorum of 47 homeowners was present. Board President Lance Van Horne addressed the allegations of false information. However, homeowners who may have filled out ballots based on this information were not permitted to withdraw them. The meeting was described by Ms. Chaira as “unruly and stressful.”

The election results for the top six candidates were as follows:

Candidate

Number of Votes

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Elected

Steve Brownell

Elected

Trish Brownell

Elected

Lance Van Horne

Elected

Steve F.

Tie for 5th position

Tie for 5th position

April 24, 2018 Recall Election

Believing the March 20 election outcome was “compromised” by the alleged dissemination of false information and ballot harvesting, President Van Horne called a special meeting for April 24, 2018, to hold a recall election for the three newly elected members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell.

A quorum of 52 homeowners returned ballots for the recall. The results were:

Board Member

Votes for Recall

Votes against Recall

Outcome

Roxanne Gould

Remained on Board

Steve Brownell

Removed from Board

Trish Brownell

Removed from Board

Following the recall, other members were elected to fill the vacant board positions.

Central Legal Issue: Statutory Interpretation

The case presented a pure legal question of statutory interpretation, as the facts of what occurred were not in dispute. The core issue was which Arizona statute governs the process for recalling an HOA board member.

Competing Legal Positions

Petitioner’s Argument: The recall election was invalid because it violated A.R.S. § 33-1813. This statute, titled “Removal of board member; special meeting,” explicitly states that a recall process is initiated upon the board’s receipt of a petition signed by a specified number or percentage of homeowners. The president’s unilateral action did not meet this requirement.

Respondent’s Argument: The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the exclusive procedure. It claimed that the president could also call such a meeting under the authority of A.R.S. § 33-1804, a more general statute governing meetings, which states that “Special meetings of the members’ association may be called by the president.”

Statutory Analysis by the Court

The Administrative Law Judge highlighted the direct conflict between the two statutes on the subject of board member removal.

Feature

A.R.S. § 33-1813 (Specific Statute)

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) (General Statute)

Meeting Initiation

By homeowner petition only.

By the president, a board majority, or homeowner petition.

Petition Requirement

For HOAs ≤ 1,000 members: petition signed by at least 100 members or 25% of votes, whichever is less.

Petition signed by at least 25% of votes (or lower if specified in bylaws).

Meeting Notice

Within 30 days after receipt of the petition.

Between 10 and 50 days in advance of the meeting.

The judge noted that A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically overrides the petition requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), demonstrating legislative intent for it to be the controlling authority on this specific issue.

The Judge’s Legal Conclusion

The decision rested on the well-established legal principle that a specific statute governs over a general one when they are inconsistent. Citing case law, the judge reasoned:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Applying this canon of statutory construction, the judge concluded that A.R.S. § 33-1813 is the controlling authority for the removal of an HOA board member. Therefore, a valid recall process must be initiated by a homeowner petition as outlined in that statute. The president lacked the authority to call the April 24, 2018 recall meeting on his own initiative.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the legal conclusion that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, the Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended order with the following mandates:

1. Petition Granted: The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. Board Member Reinstatement: The Carter Ranch HOA is required to reinstate Board members Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell.

3. Fee Reimbursement: The HOA must reimburse the petitioner, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

This order is considered binding unless a party files a request for rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1818042-REL


Study Guide: Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1818042-REL, Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen v. Carter Ranch Homeowners Association. It covers the key facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific action by the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association (HOA) prompted the Petitioner to file a complaint with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

3. What were the allegations made against candidates Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell prior to the March 20, 2018 election?

4. State the vote counts for the top three candidates who were elected to the Board of Directors on March 20, 2018.

5. What was the reason given by the Board’s president, Lance Van Horne, for calling a special recall election for April 24, 2018?

6. What were the specific outcomes for each of the three board members facing recall in the April 24, 2018 election?

7. Which two Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) were at the center of the legal dispute, and what general topics do they cover?

8. What was the HOA’s primary legal argument for why its president was permitted to call the special recall meeting?

9. What legal principle of statutory construction did the Administrative Law Judge use to resolve the conflict between the two statutes?

10. What two things was the Respondent, Carter Ranch HOA, ordered to do in the final ruling?

——————————————————————————–

Quiz Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen, the Petitioner, who is a homeowner and member of the association, and the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association, the Respondent. The Petitioner initiated the legal action against the HOA.

2. The Petitioner filed the complaint because the HOA’s president called a special meeting to hold a vote on recalling three recently elected members of the Board of Directors. The Petitioner alleged this action violated A.R.S. § 33-1813, which requires such a recall to be initiated by a petition signed by homeowners.

3. Prior to the March election, reports were made that Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell were going door-to-door disseminating allegedly false information about the HOA’s finances. They were also accused of “harvesting ballots” from members based on this information.

4. The top three candidates elected on March 20, 2018, were Roxanne Gould with 30 votes, Steve Brownell with 26 votes, and Trish Brownell with 25 votes.

5. Board president Lance Van Horne called the special recall election because he felt the election’s outcome was compromised. He believed the dissemination of allegedly false information and the harvesting of votes by the Brownells and Ms. Gould had tainted the results.

6. In the April 24 recall election, Roxanne Gould survived the recall with 27 votes against to 25 for. Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell were both removed from the board, with 27 votes for their recall and 25 against.

7. The statutes at the center of the dispute were A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804. A.R.S. § 33-1813 specifically covers the “Removal of board member; special meeting,” while A.R.S. § 33-1804 is a more general statute concerning “Open meetings.”

8. The HOA argued that A.R.S. § 33-1813 was not the only procedure for calling a recall meeting. It contended that the procedures in the more general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which allows the president to call a special meeting, could also be used.

9. The judge applied the well-established common law principle that when a general statute and a specific statute on the same subject are in conflict, the specific statute controls. Therefore, the specific procedures for recall in A.R.S. § 33-1813 took precedence over the general meeting rules in A.R.S. § 33-1804.

10. The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the removed board members, Steve Brownell and Trish Brownell. The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for his $500.00 single-issue filing fee.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

1. Trace the complete timeline of events described in the decision, beginning with the failed meeting on February 20, 2018, and concluding with the judge’s final order. For each key date, describe the event that occurred, the people involved, and the outcome of the event.

2. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of Arizona state law presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Explain which specific clauses of A.R.S. § 33-1813 and A.R.S. § 33-1804 each party relied upon to justify their position regarding the legality of the April 24, 2018 recall meeting.

3. The decision states that the case presents a “pure legal issue of statutory interpretation.” Explain what this means and how it affects the burden of proof. Describe in detail the canons of statutory construction cited by the judge and how she applied them to rule in favor of the Petitioner.

4. Discuss the role of the allegations of misconduct (disseminating false information and harvesting ballots) against the newly elected board members. How did these allegations act as a catalyst for the recall election, and what was their ultimate relevance (or lack thereof) to the final legal conclusion reached by the Administrative Law Judge?

5. Based on the judge’s “Conclusions of Law,” explain the definitive legal procedure for an HOA in Arizona, with 1,000 or fewer members, to initiate the removal of a board member. Detail the petition requirements, signature thresholds, and meeting notice timelines as established by the controlling statute, A.R.S. § 33-1813.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An independent official who presides over administrative hearings, hears evidence, and makes legal decisions, in this case, Diane Mihalsky from the Office of Administrative Hearings.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the homeowners’ association, elected by the members.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove their allegations. In this matter, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish the violation.

De Novo Review

A type of review where a court or judge decides the issues without reference to any legal conclusion or assumption made by the previous party in the case. This was applied because the issue was a pure matter of statutory interpretation.

Department

Refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency authorized to receive and decide on petitions from HOA members.

Evidentiary Standard

The level of proof required to convince the trier of fact. In this case, the standard was a “preponderance of the evidence.”

Homeowners’ Association (HOA)

The organization that governs the Carter Ranch development, of which all lot owners are members.

Office of Administrative Hearings

An independent state agency in Arizona where evidentiary hearings, like the one in this case, are conducted.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, it was homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in which the trier of fact is convinced that a contention is more probably true than not.

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an association that must be present at a meeting for the proceedings of that meeting to be valid. In the March 20 election, the quorum was 47 homeowners.

Recall Election

A special vote held to determine whether to remove an elected official (in this case, board members) from office before the end of their term.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Carter Ranch Homeowners Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting of an association’s members called for a specific purpose outside of the regularly scheduled annual meetings. The April 24 recall vote was a special meeting.

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge used common-law canons of statutory construction to resolve the conflict between the two A.R.S. sections.






Blog Post – 18F-H1818042-REL


Majority Rules? Not in This HOA: How One Homeowner Overturned a Recall Election on a Technicality

The Unruly World of Neighborhood Politics

In the world of Homeowners Associations, a majority vote is typically the final word. But for the Carter Ranch HOA, a 27-to-25 recall vote meant to oust two board members became the start of a legal battle, not the end. This case reveals a crucial lesson in community governance: when a board president’s unilateral action clashes with statutory procedure, the will of the majority can be rendered completely irrelevant.

A Democratic Vote Can Be Completely Ignored

On April 24, 2018, the Carter Ranch HOA held a special recall election targeting three recently elected board members: Roxanne Gould, Steve Brownell, and Trish Brownell. A quorum of 52 homeowners participated, and the vote was a split decision. Roxanne Gould survived the recall attempt, with 27 votes against her removal and 25 for it. However, Steve and Trish Brownell were successfully voted off the board by a clear majority of 27 to 25.

The twist came later, in a judge’s chambers. Despite the democratic outcome, an Administrative Law Judge ordered the HOA to reinstate the Brownells. This counter-intuitive decision wasn’t the result of voter fraud or a miscount. The entire election was nullified because of a critical procedural error made by the HOA president before a single ballot was cast.

An HOA President Can’t Unilaterally Oust Board Members

The conflict began after a heated board election on March 20, 2018. The board president at the time, Lance Van Horne, felt the election’s outcome was “compromised.” He believed three newly elected members had won their seats by disseminating “allegedly false information” and “harvesting of votes.”

In response, Mr. Van Horne took decisive action. Believing he was correcting a wrong, he personally called for a special meeting to hold a recall election. This unilateral action became the sole basis for the legal challenge that followed. While the president’s concerns about election integrity were the catalyst for the drama, the court’s subsequent decision would demonstrate that his motives were entirely irrelevant. The only thing that mattered was the procedure he followed—or in this case, failed to follow.

The “Specific Beats General” Rule Is King

The HOA’s legal defense rested on a general statute, A.R.S. § 33-1804, which grants an association’s president the power to call special meetings for various purposes. They argued this general power included the authority to call a recall meeting.

However, the homeowner who challenged the recall pointed to a different, more specific law. A.R.S. § 33-1813 is a statute written exclusively for the purpose of removing board members. This specific law dictates that a recall process can only be initiated upon receipt of a petition signed by a required number of homeowners. The president cannot simply decide to do it alone.

The judge’s decision hinged on a foundational principle of legal interpretation. As cited in the final order:

“When provisions of a general statute are inconsistent with those of a special nature on the same subject, the special statute controls.”

Because the HOA president initiated the recall without first receiving the required petition from the homeowners, he failed to follow the specific procedure mandated by law. As a result, the entire recall election was declared invalid from the start.

One Homeowner Can Successfully Challenge an Entire HOA

This entire case was set in motion not by a group of disgruntled residents, but by a single individual. Homeowner Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen filed a “single-issue petition” with the state, challenging the validity of the president’s action. His understanding of the specific rules governing board member removal proved to be the key that unraveled the HOA’s actions.

The final court order was a complete victory for the petitioner:

• His petition was granted.

• The Carter Ranch HOA was ordered to reinstate the two removed board members, Steve and Trish Brownell.

• The HOA was also ordered to reimburse the petitioner for his $500.00 filing fee.

This outcome serves as an empowering example of how a single member, armed with knowledge of the governing documents and statutes, can hold an association’s leadership accountable and ensure that proper procedures are followed.

Conclusion: Rules, Not Rulers

The Carter Ranch case is a powerful illustration that in community governance, established process is not a technicality—it is the bedrock of legitimacy. The board’s failure to adhere to the specific statute for recalls (A.R.S. § 33-1813) created a fatal procedural flaw that no amount of good intention or majority support could cure. This serves as a stark reminder for all HOA boards: power is derived from the meticulous application of rules, not the perceived authority of rulers. Ignoring this principle doesn’t just invalidate an action; it exposes the association to legal challenges, financial penalties, and a loss of credibility with the community it governs. Do you know the specific rules that govern your own community?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Thomas J. Van Dan Elzen (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Chad M. Gallacher (attorney)
    Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
    Represented Respondent
  • Mary Chaira (Community Manager)
    Witness for Respondent
  • Lance Van Horne (Board President)
    Called the special recall election which led to the petition,,

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Received decision
  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Transmitted decision

Other Participants

  • Roxanne Gould (board member)
    Elected board member; subject of recall attempt,,
  • Steve Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Trish Brownell (board member)
    Elected board member; removed by recall, reinstated by recommended order,,,
  • Steve F. (candidate)
    Candidate in board election
  • Dave (candidate)
    Candidate in board election

Gary W. Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:37 (106.4 KB)

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1817005-REL/605190.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:42 (77.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Briefing on the Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association Case

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions regarding a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA or Respondent). The core of the case, No. 18F-H1817005-REL, is the legal interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as it appears in Arizona’s open meeting statute for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The conflict arose when the DMMA Communications Committee held a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, which Mr. Moselle was barred from attending. He contended this violated the statute’s open meeting requirements. The DMMA argued the committee was exempt because its meetings were infrequent and not held at fixed intervals.

In two separate decisions—an initial ruling on December 7, 2017, and a second after a rehearing on May 10, 2018—Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer consistently ruled in favor of the DMMA. The judge concluded that “regularly scheduled” applies to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly). Since the Communications Committee met only four times in two years without a set schedule, it was not subject to the open meeting law. The judge determined that the statute’s general policy favoring openness does not override its more specific provisions. Ultimately, the petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute proceeded through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, culminating in a definitive ruling after a granted rehearing.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging DMMA violated open meeting laws.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Mr. Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

An initial hearing is conducted before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Tammy L. Eigenheer.

December 7, 2017

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

January 4, 2018

Mr. Moselle files a request for rehearing, citing “newly discovered material evidence” and arguing the decision was contrary to law.

January 26, 2018

The Department of Real Estate grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted before the ALJ.

May 10, 2018

The ALJ issues a final decision after rehearing, again denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

Core Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The central legal question was whether the DMMA Communications Committee was subject to the open meeting requirements mandated by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804. The resolution of the case hinged on the interpretation of specific language within the statute.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): “It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.”

Arguments Presented by the Parties

The petitioner and respondent presented starkly different interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled.”

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Mr. Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting scheduled in a “normal manner” or “ordinary fashion,” not necessarily one that recurs at fixed intervals.

Primacy of Openness Policy: He emphasized the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), asserting that the statute’s clear preference for open meetings should guide the interpretation of any ambiguous terms.

Arguments for Rehearing: In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Moselle cited newly discovered evidence (an email sent by the DMMA after the first hearing) and suggested the ALJ should evaluate whether the DMMA had misled the court regarding the Board’s actions on the committee’s recommendation.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA contended that the phrase “regularly scheduled” plainly refers to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals, “such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: As evidence, the DMMA testified that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed pattern, holding only four meetings in 2016 and 2017 (twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and the contested meeting of September 6, 2017).

Lack of Board Action: The DMMA further argued that a recommendation from the committee to the Board of Directors was not acted upon, which it presented as evidence that the committee was not “conducting any actual business of the Board.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Rulings

Across both decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided a consistent legal analysis that ultimately favored the respondent’s interpretation of the statute.

Initial Decision (December 7, 2017)

• The ALJ concluded that the DMMA Communications Committee does not hold “regularly scheduled meetings.”

• Based on this finding, the committee was deemed not subject to the open meetings law.

• The decision to hold a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, was therefore ruled not to be a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

• The petitioner’s petition was denied.

Decision After Rehearing (May 10, 2018)

Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ reaffirmed the conclusion that the “plain language” of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) applies to meetings that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the ALJ settled on this interpretation.

Policy vs. Specifics: The decision explicitly states that the general policy favoring open meetings in subsection (F) “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

Petitioner’s Testimony: The ALJ noted that during the rehearing, Mr. Moselle’s own testimony on cross-examination appeared to support the court’s interpretation. When questioned about other DMMA committees, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

Final Ruling: The ALJ again concluded that the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings at the time of the incident and was therefore not in violation of the statute. The petition was denied for a final time.

Final Disposition

The petition filed by Gary W. Moselle against the Desert Mountain Master Association was denied. The Administrative Law Judge’s order of May 10, 2018, issued after the rehearing, was declared binding on the parties. As per the final notice, any further appeal would require a party to seek judicial review in superior court within thirty-five days of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (Respondent) concerning Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific event on September 6, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file his complaint?

3. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for why its Communications Committee was not subject to the open meetings law?

5. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the key statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

6. What evidence did the Respondent present regarding the frequency of the Communications Committee’s meetings in 2016 and 2017?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party had the responsibility to meet it?

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the meaning of “regularly scheduled” in the context of the statute?

9. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued on December 7, 2017?

10. How did the judge weigh the general policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) against the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Gary W. Moselle, the Petitioner, and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), the Respondent. Mr. Moselle was a homeowner who filed a petition against the DMMA, which is the homeowners association for the community.

2. The Petitioner filed his complaint after he was not allowed to attend a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee that was held on September 6, 2017. He alleged this violated Arizona’s open meeting statute.

3. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804. This statute governs open meetings for planned communities, such as homeowners associations.

4. The Respondent argued that the Communications Committee did not meet at regular, established intervals and therefore its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” as required by the statute to be open. They also asserted that the committee’s recommendation was not acted upon by the Board, suggesting it was not conducting official business.

5. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting that was scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He asserted this interpretation was supported by the statute’s general policy favoring open meetings.

6. The Respondent provided testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set interval, having held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017. These meetings occurred twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and on September 6, 2017.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring evidence to show that a fact is more probable than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, bore the burden of proving the Respondent’s violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the plain language of the statute meant “regularly scheduled” referred to meetings that occur at regular intervals, such as monthly, quarterly, or annually. The judge rejected the Petitioner’s alternate interpretation.

9. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing by citing newly discovered material evidence (an email sent after the first hearing) and arguing the need to evaluate whether the Respondent had misled the judge. He also contended that the initial decision was contrary to law.

10. The judge acknowledged the state’s policy favoring open meetings as stated in subsection (F). However, the judge ruled that this general policy statement did not override the specific provision in subsection (A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing upon the facts, arguments, and legal reasoning presented in the case documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the principles of statutory construction used by the Administrative Law Judge to resolve this dispute and explain why one interpretation was favored over the other.

2. Examine the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to the final order issued after the rehearing. What were the key legal steps, decisions, and turning points in the process?

3. Discuss the evidence presented by the Desert Mountain Master Association to support its case. How did testimony regarding meeting frequency and the Board’s actions on committee recommendations contribute to the final outcome?

4. Explain the legal relationship between A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). Based on the judge’s decision, what is the hierarchy between a statute’s specific provisions and its general policy declarations?

5. During the rehearing, the Petitioner’s own testimony about other committees was noted by the Administrative Law Judge. Explain this apparent contradiction in the Petitioner’s argument and discuss its potential impact on the case.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions on behalf of a government agency.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the dispute, which governs open meetings for planned communities and their boards of directors and committees.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the burden was on the Petitioner.

Conclusions of Law

The judge’s application of legal principles to the facts of the case to reach a decision.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and homeowners associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA)

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners association located in Scottsdale, Arizona, classified as a Planned Unit Development.

Findings of Fact

The determination of factual events made by a judge from the evidence presented in a trial or hearing.

Gary W. Moselle

The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner within the DMMA who filed the complaint.

Jurisdiction

The official power of a court or agency to hear a case and make legal decisions and judgments.

Open Meetings Law

A law, in this case A.R.S. § 33-1804, that requires meetings of certain entities to be open to all members or the public.

Petition

The formal written request filed with an administrative body or court to initiate a case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition and initiates a legal action.

Planned Unit Development (PUD)

A type of real estate development and community governed by specific state laws, such as those in A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows a fact is more probable than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the previous decision, typically granted due to new evidence or an argument of legal error.

Regularly Scheduled

The key statutory phrase in dispute. The judge interpreted it to mean meetings that occur at regular, established intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party defending against the complaint.

Statutory Construction

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, starting with the plain text of the statute.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Your HOA Committee Might Be Meeting in Secret—And It Could Be Perfectly Legal

As a homeowner in a planned community, you likely know you have the right to attend your HOA’s board of directors meetings. But what about the committee meetings? The finance, architectural, or communications committees often lay the critical groundwork for decisions that ultimately affect your property and fees. Do you have a right to observe their deliberations?

A recent legal case in Scottsdale, Arizona, hinged on the interpretation of a single, seemingly straightforward phrase and exposed a surprising rule about HOA transparency. The case, Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association, reveals critical lessons for any homeowner about the letter of the law and how it can sometimes create legal loopholes that allow committee meetings to happen behind closed doors.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Crucial Loophole: “Regularly Scheduled” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The entire dispute rested on how to interpret the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as written in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.

The Homeowner’s Argument The petitioner, homeowner Gary Moselle, argued that when the Communications Committee of the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA) scheduled a meeting for September 6, 2017, it should be open to all members. His logic was simple: a meeting that is formally scheduled and placed on the calendar is, by any common-sense definition, a “regularly scheduled” meeting.

The HOA’s Counter-Argument The DMMA countered with a different interpretation. They argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” implies a recurring, predictable pattern, such as meetings held monthly, quarterly, or on the third Thursday of every month. The association presented evidence that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set pattern, having convened only four times in 2016 and 2017. Because the meetings were sporadic, the HOA contended they were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore not subject to the open meeting law.

To bolster its case, the HOA added a second point: the committee’s work wasn’t essential to board business anyway. They noted that a recommendation from the committee was never acted upon by the board, suggesting the committee was not conducting “any actual business of the Board” and thus did not require the same level of transparency.

The Surprising Verdict Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer sided with the HOA. The final decision concluded that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings that occur at regular intervals. This created a legal distinction: HOA committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule must be open, but those that meet on an as-needed basis may not be.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Law’s “Spirit” Can Be Trumped by Its “Letter”

Adding another layer to the case was the law’s own powerful statement about its intent. The petitioner pointed to a specific section of the statute designed to ensure transparency.

The Policy Statement The Arizona law contains a strong policy statement declaring that all HOA meetings should be conducted openly. It explicitly directs anyone interpreting the law to favor open meetings.

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

The Legal Reasoning Despite this clear declaration, Judge Eigenheer ruled that a general policy statement does not override the specific and explicit language of the law. The statute does not say all committee meetings must be open; it says “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open. The judge concluded that this specific wording created a clear exception, and the broad policy in favor of transparency could not erase it.

The Impact This is a critical takeaway for understanding how laws are interpreted. This outcome reflects a fundamental principle of statutory construction: while the “spirit” or stated policy of a law provides guidance, it cannot override the plain meaning of the specific words—the “letter”—that the legislature chose to write.

——————————————————————————–

3. A Cautionary Tale: How a Petitioner Undermined His Own Case

The petitioner was granted a rehearing, giving him another chance to argue his case. However, a statement he made during his own testimony dramatically weakened his position.

The Key Testimony During the rehearing on April 20, 2018, the petitioner was asked about other committees within the DMMA. In explaining how they operated, he unintentionally adopted the very definition of “regularly scheduled” that the HOA was using against him. The judge recorded his exact words in the final decision:

…five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

The Consequence The judge seized on this admission in the final ruling. The decision notes that while “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the petitioner himself used the phrase to differentiate between committees that meet at fixed intervals and those that do not. By describing committees that “meet at the request of the chair” as being “not regularly scheduled,” he validated the very interpretation the court was now adopting.

The Lesson This moment serves as a dramatic lesson in the power and precision of language in legal proceedings. In an attempt to describe the function of other committees, the petitioner inadvertently validated his opponent’s core legal argument.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: A Question of Transparency

The ruling in Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association clarifies a significant point in HOA governance. Under this legal interpretation, committees that meet on an ad-hoc basis or “at the call of the chair” may not be subject to open meeting laws. Only those committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule are explicitly required to be open to homeowners.

This ruling draws a bright line between standing committees with fixed schedules and ad-hoc committees that meet “at the call of the chair.” Homeowners should now ask: Which of our committees fall into this second category, and are we comfortable with decisions being shaped behind closed doors?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gary W. Moselle (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Desert Mountain Master Association (respondent)
    Organizational party (HOA)
  • Curtis Ekmark (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Charles Markle (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • AHansen (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • djones (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • DGardner (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • ncano (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)
    Transmitting staff/clerk

Gary W. Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, ruling that the DMMA Communication Committee was not subject to the open meetings law (A.R.S. § 33-1804) because it did not hold 'regularly scheduled meetings',,,.

Why this result: The committee met too infrequently and without regular intervals to be deemed 'regularly scheduled' for the purposes of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether a Communications Committee meeting must be open to members under the open meetings law.

Petitioner alleged that Respondent violated the open meetings statute by closing the September 6, 2017 meeting of the Communications Committee. The issue was whether this committee constituted a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A),,,,.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the DMMA Communication committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings, meaning it was not subject to the open meetings law under A.R.S. § 33-1804,,,.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990)
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Open Meetings Law, Committee Meetings, Statutory Interpretation, Planned Community
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Sections 33-1801 to 33-1818
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.08(H)
  • A.R.S. § 12-904(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:03 (106.4 KB)

18F-H1817005-REL-RHG Decision – ../18F-H1817005-REL/605190.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-20T13:45:58 (77.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Briefing on the Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association Case

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes two Administrative Law Judge Decisions regarding a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA or Respondent). The core of the case, No. 18F-H1817005-REL, is the legal interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as it appears in Arizona’s open meeting statute for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The conflict arose when the DMMA Communications Committee held a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, which Mr. Moselle was barred from attending. He contended this violated the statute’s open meeting requirements. The DMMA argued the committee was exempt because its meetings were infrequent and not held at fixed intervals.

In two separate decisions—an initial ruling on December 7, 2017, and a second after a rehearing on May 10, 2018—Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer consistently ruled in favor of the DMMA. The judge concluded that “regularly scheduled” applies to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly). Since the Communications Committee met only four times in two years without a set schedule, it was not subject to the open meeting law. The judge determined that the statute’s general policy favoring openness does not override its more specific provisions. Ultimately, the petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute proceeded through the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, culminating in a definitive ruling after a granted rehearing.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging DMMA violated open meeting laws.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Mr. Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

An initial hearing is conducted before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Tammy L. Eigenheer.

December 7, 2017

The ALJ issues a decision denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

January 4, 2018

Mr. Moselle files a request for rehearing, citing “newly discovered material evidence” and arguing the decision was contrary to law.

January 26, 2018

The Department of Real Estate grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted before the ALJ.

May 10, 2018

The ALJ issues a final decision after rehearing, again denying Mr. Moselle’s petition.

Core Legal Issue: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The central legal question was whether the DMMA Communications Committee was subject to the open meeting requirements mandated by Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804. The resolution of the case hinged on the interpretation of specific language within the statute.

Relevant Statutory Provisions

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A): “Notwithstanding any provision in the declaration, bylaws or other documents to the contrary, all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

A.R.S. § 33-1804(F): “It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.”

Arguments Presented by the Parties

The petitioner and respondent presented starkly different interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled.”

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Mr. Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting scheduled in a “normal manner” or “ordinary fashion,” not necessarily one that recurs at fixed intervals.

Primacy of Openness Policy: He emphasized the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), asserting that the statute’s clear preference for open meetings should guide the interpretation of any ambiguous terms.

Arguments for Rehearing: In his request for a rehearing, Mr. Moselle cited newly discovered evidence (an email sent by the DMMA after the first hearing) and suggested the ALJ should evaluate whether the DMMA had misled the court regarding the Board’s actions on the committee’s recommendation.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA contended that the phrase “regularly scheduled” plainly refers to meetings that occur at regular, predictable intervals, “such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: As evidence, the DMMA testified that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed pattern, holding only four meetings in 2016 and 2017 (twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and the contested meeting of September 6, 2017).

Lack of Board Action: The DMMA further argued that a recommendation from the committee to the Board of Directors was not acted upon, which it presented as evidence that the committee was not “conducting any actual business of the Board.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Rulings

Across both decisions, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) provided a consistent legal analysis that ultimately favored the respondent’s interpretation of the statute.

Initial Decision (December 7, 2017)

• The ALJ concluded that the DMMA Communications Committee does not hold “regularly scheduled meetings.”

• Based on this finding, the committee was deemed not subject to the open meetings law.

• The decision to hold a closed meeting on September 6, 2017, was therefore ruled not to be a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

• The petitioner’s petition was denied.

Decision After Rehearing (May 10, 2018)

Statutory Interpretation: The ALJ reaffirmed the conclusion that the “plain language” of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) applies to meetings that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the ALJ settled on this interpretation.

Policy vs. Specifics: The decision explicitly states that the general policy favoring open meetings in subsection (F) “does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

Petitioner’s Testimony: The ALJ noted that during the rehearing, Mr. Moselle’s own testimony on cross-examination appeared to support the court’s interpretation. When questioned about other DMMA committees, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

Final Ruling: The ALJ again concluded that the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings at the time of the incident and was therefore not in violation of the statute. The petition was denied for a final time.

Final Disposition

The petition filed by Gary W. Moselle against the Desert Mountain Master Association was denied. The Administrative Law Judge’s order of May 10, 2018, issued after the rehearing, was declared binding on the parties. As per the final notice, any further appeal would require a party to seek judicial review in superior court within thirty-five days of the order.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative case between Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (Respondent) concerning Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences, based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific event on September 6, 2017, prompted the Petitioner to file his complaint?

3. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner allege the Respondent had violated?

4. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for why its Communications Committee was not subject to the open meetings law?

5. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the key statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

6. What evidence did the Respondent present regarding the frequency of the Communications Committee’s meetings in 2016 and 2017?

7. What is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard, and which party had the responsibility to meet it?

8. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the meaning of “regularly scheduled” in the context of the statute?

9. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully request a rehearing after the initial decision was issued on December 7, 2017?

10. How did the judge weigh the general policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) against the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Gary W. Moselle, the Petitioner, and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), the Respondent. Mr. Moselle was a homeowner who filed a petition against the DMMA, which is the homeowners association for the community.

2. The Petitioner filed his complaint after he was not allowed to attend a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee that was held on September 6, 2017. He alleged this violated Arizona’s open meeting statute.

3. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804. This statute governs open meetings for planned communities, such as homeowners associations.

4. The Respondent argued that the Communications Committee did not meet at regular, established intervals and therefore its meetings were not “regularly scheduled” as required by the statute to be open. They also asserted that the committee’s recommendation was not acted upon by the Board, suggesting it was not conducting official business.

5. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean a meeting that was scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He asserted this interpretation was supported by the statute’s general policy favoring open meetings.

6. The Respondent provided testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set interval, having held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017. These meetings occurred twice in April 2016, once in June 2017, and on September 6, 2017.

7. “Preponderance of the evidence” is the standard of proof requiring evidence to show that a fact is more probable than not. In this proceeding, the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, bore the burden of proving the Respondent’s violation by a preponderance of the evidence.

8. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the plain language of the statute meant “regularly scheduled” referred to meetings that occur at regular intervals, such as monthly, quarterly, or annually. The judge rejected the Petitioner’s alternate interpretation.

9. The Petitioner was granted a rehearing by citing newly discovered material evidence (an email sent after the first hearing) and arguing the need to evaluate whether the Respondent had misled the judge. He also contended that the initial decision was contrary to law.

10. The judge acknowledged the state’s policy favoring open meetings as stated in subsection (F). However, the judge ruled that this general policy statement did not override the specific provision in subsection (A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings are required to be open.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing upon the facts, arguments, and legal reasoning presented in the case documents.

1. Analyze the conflicting interpretations of the phrase “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and the Respondent. Discuss the principles of statutory construction used by the Administrative Law Judge to resolve this dispute and explain why one interpretation was favored over the other.

2. Examine the procedural history of this case, from the initial petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to the final order issued after the rehearing. What were the key legal steps, decisions, and turning points in the process?

3. Discuss the evidence presented by the Desert Mountain Master Association to support its case. How did testimony regarding meeting frequency and the Board’s actions on committee recommendations contribute to the final outcome?

4. Explain the legal relationship between A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) and A.R.S. § 33-1804(F). Based on the judge’s decision, what is the hierarchy between a statute’s specific provisions and its general policy declarations?

5. During the rehearing, the Petitioner’s own testimony about other committees was noted by the Administrative Law Judge. Explain this apparent contradiction in the Petitioner’s argument and discuss its potential impact on the case.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions on behalf of a government agency.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the dispute, which governs open meetings for planned communities and their boards of directors and committees.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to prove their allegations. In this case, the burden was on the Petitioner.

Conclusions of Law

The judge’s application of legal principles to the facts of the case to reach a decision.

Department of Real Estate

The Arizona state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and homeowners associations under A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA)

The Respondent in the case; a homeowners association located in Scottsdale, Arizona, classified as a Planned Unit Development.

Findings of Fact

The determination of factual events made by a judge from the evidence presented in a trial or hearing.

Gary W. Moselle

The Petitioner in the case; a homeowner within the DMMA who filed the complaint.

Jurisdiction

The official power of a court or agency to hear a case and make legal decisions and judgments.

Open Meetings Law

A law, in this case A.R.S. § 33-1804, that requires meetings of certain entities to be open to all members or the public.

Petition

The formal written request filed with an administrative body or court to initiate a case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition and initiates a legal action.

Planned Unit Development (PUD)

A type of real estate development and community governed by specific state laws, such as those in A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows a fact is more probable than not.

Rehearing

A second hearing of a case to reconsider the previous decision, typically granted due to new evidence or an argument of legal error.

Regularly Scheduled

The key statutory phrase in dispute. The judge interpreted it to mean meetings that occur at regular, established intervals (e.g., monthly, quarterly).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the party defending against the complaint.

Statutory Construction

The process by which judges interpret and apply legislation. The primary goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, starting with the plain text of the statute.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG


Your HOA Committee Might Be Meeting in Secret—And It Could Be Perfectly Legal

As a homeowner in a planned community, you likely know you have the right to attend your HOA’s board of directors meetings. But what about the committee meetings? The finance, architectural, or communications committees often lay the critical groundwork for decisions that ultimately affect your property and fees. Do you have a right to observe their deliberations?

A recent legal case in Scottsdale, Arizona, hinged on the interpretation of a single, seemingly straightforward phrase and exposed a surprising rule about HOA transparency. The case, Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association, reveals critical lessons for any homeowner about the letter of the law and how it can sometimes create legal loopholes that allow committee meetings to happen behind closed doors.

——————————————————————————–

1. The Crucial Loophole: “Regularly Scheduled” Doesn’t Mean What You Think

The entire dispute rested on how to interpret the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings” as written in Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1804, which governs open meetings for planned communities.

The Homeowner’s Argument The petitioner, homeowner Gary Moselle, argued that when the Communications Committee of the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA) scheduled a meeting for September 6, 2017, it should be open to all members. His logic was simple: a meeting that is formally scheduled and placed on the calendar is, by any common-sense definition, a “regularly scheduled” meeting.

The HOA’s Counter-Argument The DMMA countered with a different interpretation. They argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” implies a recurring, predictable pattern, such as meetings held monthly, quarterly, or on the third Thursday of every month. The association presented evidence that its Communications Committee met infrequently and without a set pattern, having convened only four times in 2016 and 2017. Because the meetings were sporadic, the HOA contended they were not “regularly scheduled” and therefore not subject to the open meeting law.

To bolster its case, the HOA added a second point: the committee’s work wasn’t essential to board business anyway. They noted that a recommendation from the committee was never acted upon by the board, suggesting the committee was not conducting “any actual business of the Board” and thus did not require the same level of transparency.

The Surprising Verdict Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer sided with the HOA. The final decision concluded that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings that occur at regular intervals. This created a legal distinction: HOA committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule must be open, but those that meet on an as-needed basis may not be.

——————————————————————————–

2. A Law’s “Spirit” Can Be Trumped by Its “Letter”

Adding another layer to the case was the law’s own powerful statement about its intent. The petitioner pointed to a specific section of the statute designed to ensure transparency.

The Policy Statement The Arizona law contains a strong policy statement declaring that all HOA meetings should be conducted openly. It explicitly directs anyone interpreting the law to favor open meetings.

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly… Toward this end, any person or entity that is charged with the interpretation of these provisions… shall take into account this declaration of policy and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

The Legal Reasoning Despite this clear declaration, Judge Eigenheer ruled that a general policy statement does not override the specific and explicit language of the law. The statute does not say all committee meetings must be open; it says “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open. The judge concluded that this specific wording created a clear exception, and the broad policy in favor of transparency could not erase it.

The Impact This is a critical takeaway for understanding how laws are interpreted. This outcome reflects a fundamental principle of statutory construction: while the “spirit” or stated policy of a law provides guidance, it cannot override the plain meaning of the specific words—the “letter”—that the legislature chose to write.

——————————————————————————–

3. A Cautionary Tale: How a Petitioner Undermined His Own Case

The petitioner was granted a rehearing, giving him another chance to argue his case. However, a statement he made during his own testimony dramatically weakened his position.

The Key Testimony During the rehearing on April 20, 2018, the petitioner was asked about other committees within the DMMA. In explaining how they operated, he unintentionally adopted the very definition of “regularly scheduled” that the HOA was using against him. The judge recorded his exact words in the final decision:

…five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

The Consequence The judge seized on this admission in the final ruling. The decision notes that while “regularly scheduled” could have multiple meanings, the petitioner himself used the phrase to differentiate between committees that meet at fixed intervals and those that do not. By describing committees that “meet at the request of the chair” as being “not regularly scheduled,” he validated the very interpretation the court was now adopting.

The Lesson This moment serves as a dramatic lesson in the power and precision of language in legal proceedings. In an attempt to describe the function of other committees, the petitioner inadvertently validated his opponent’s core legal argument.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: A Question of Transparency

The ruling in Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association clarifies a significant point in HOA governance. Under this legal interpretation, committees that meet on an ad-hoc basis or “at the call of the chair” may not be subject to open meeting laws. Only those committees that meet on a fixed, recurring schedule are explicitly required to be open to homeowners.

This ruling draws a bright line between standing committees with fixed schedules and ad-hoc committees that meet “at the call of the chair.” Homeowners should now ask: Which of our committees fall into this second category, and are we comfortable with decisions being shaped behind closed doors?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gary W. Moselle (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Desert Mountain Master Association (respondent)
    Organizational party (HOA)
  • Curtis Ekmark (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Charles Markle (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • AHansen (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • djones (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • DGardner (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order
  • ncano (agency staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of order

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (unknown)
    Transmitting staff/clerk

Gary W Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:03:08 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.


Gary W Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 605190.pdf

Uploaded 2025-12-09T10:04:02 (77.0 KB)

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:32:01 (106.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1817005-REL


Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.






Study Guide – 18F-H1817005-REL


Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association (No. 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Gary W. Moselle and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

——————————————————————————–

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific event and action by the Respondent prompted the Petitioner to file his initial petition?

3. What was the Respondent’s primary argument at the November 17, 2017, hearing for why the Communications committee was not subject to the open meetings law?

4. What was the initial outcome of the case following the first hearing, as decided on December 7, 2017?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully file for a rehearing of the case?

6. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

7. How did the Respondent, DMMA, interpret the same phrase, “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

8. According to the document, what is the primary goal when construing a statute, and what is the first step in that process?

9. What was the significance of the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) regarding open meetings, and how did the judge rule on its applicability?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on May 10, 2018, and what was its legal effect on the parties?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Gary W. Moselle, a homeowner, and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), an association of homeowners in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Moselle filed a petition against the DMMA.

2. The Petitioner filed his petition after the Chair of the DMMA’s Communications Committee alleged that a scheduled meeting was “closed” and not subject to Arizona’s open meeting statute. The Petitioner was subsequently not allowed to attend the closed committee meeting held on September 6, 2017.

3. The Respondent argued that the Communications committee did not meet regularly and was therefore not subject to the open meetings law. To support this, they presented testimony that the committee had only met four times in 2016 and 2017.

4. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision on December 7, 2017, in which the Petitioner’s petition was denied.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing based on what he cited as newly discovered material evidence, specifically an email sent by the Respondent after the first hearing concluded. He also argued the initial decision was contrary to law and that the Respondent may have misled the judge.

6. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He contended that because the September 6, 2017, meeting was scheduled in this manner, it should have been open.

7. The Respondent argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” meant meetings that occurred at regular intervals, such as on a specific day each month, quarterly, or annually. They contended that since the Communications committee met infrequently and without an established interval, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

8. The primary goal when construing a statute is to ascertain the legislature’s intent. The first step is to look at the text of the statute itself and ascribe its plain meaning if the language is clear.

9. The policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) declares that it is the state’s policy for all meetings of a planned community to be conducted openly. The judge ruled that this general policy statement does not override the specific provision in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings must be open.

10. The final order, issued on May 10, 2018, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. As this order was the result of a rehearing, it was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and Respondent. Discuss which argument the Administrative Law Judge found more compelling and explain the legal reasoning provided in the decision.

2. Discuss the role and significance of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(F) in this case. Explain how the Petitioner used this section to support his argument and why the Administrative Law Judge concluded it did not override the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

3. Trace the procedural history of the case from the initial petition filing on September 1, 2017, to the final order on May 10, 2018. Include key dates, events (hearings, decisions, requests), and the outcomes at each stage.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by the Respondent regarding the meeting frequency of the DMMA Communication committee. How did this evidence support the Respondent’s legal argument and influence the final decision?

5. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the standard of proof required in this proceeding (preponderance of the evidence) and the principles of statutory construction the judge applied to interpret the relevant statute.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the legal dispute. It mandates that meetings of a members’ association, its board of directors, and any “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open to all members of the association.

Cross-examination

A phase during the hearing where a party or their representative questions a witness from the opposing side. Petitioner Moselle underwent cross-examination during the April 20, 2018, rehearing.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with which the Petitioner filed his initial petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between homeowners and condominium owners associations.

An abbreviation for Desert Mountain Master Association, the Respondent in the case and the homeowners association for a planned community in Scottsdale, Arizona.

Open Meetings Law

The legal requirement, as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804, that certain meetings of a homeowners association must be open to all members, who must be permitted to attend and speak.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the petitioner was homeowner Gary W. Moselle.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The burden of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA).

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge noted that the primary goal is to ascertain legislative intent, first by looking at the plain language of the statute’s text.






Blog Post – 18F-H1817005-REL


Your HOA Can Legally Hold Secret Committee Meetings. Here’s How.

Most homeowners operate under a reasonable assumption: meetings that concern their community association should be open for them to attend. Transparency is a cornerstone of trust between residents and their HOA board. But what if some of those meetings, like committee meetings, could be held in private, entirely legally? The answer, revealed in a contentious Arizona case, lies in a two-word loophole that every homeowner should understand.

A legal case from Scottsdale, Arizona, Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association, hinged on this very issue. It revealed a surprising and important nuance in the law, showing how specific wording can create exceptions to the general rule of open governance.

——————————————————————————–

1. The “Regularly Scheduled” Loophole That Allows for Closed Meetings

The central conflict of the case began when a homeowner, Gary Moselle, was barred from attending a Communications Committee meeting for his HOA, the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA). He filed a petition, arguing this action violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities.

But the homeowner’s argument ran into a wall: the precise text of the law. The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling hinged on the wording of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which mandates openness for “any regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The judge found that the Communications Committee meeting was legally closed because it was not “regularly scheduled.”

Everything came down to the court’s interpretation of two words: “regularly scheduled.”

The Homeowner’s Argument: Mr. Moselle contended that “regularly scheduled” simply meant “scheduled in a normal fashion.”

The Court’s Conclusion: The HOA and the judge determined that the phrase means meetings that “occur at regular intervals,” such as monthly, quarterly, or annually.

The evidence supported the court’s conclusion. The DMMA Communications committee had only met four times in 2016 and 2017. This ad-hoc pattern was crucial evidence that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled” in the way the law required.

——————————————————————————–

2. Why a Law’s General Policy Doesn’t Always Overrule Its Specific Text

The petitioner argued that the law’s explicit policy statement, which strongly favors open meetings, should have been the guiding principle. He pointed to the text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F):

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

The judge’s conclusion illustrates a fundamental principle of legal interpretation: the specific almost always trumps the general. Despite the clear declaration of policy, the judge found that it did not override the more precise provision in the law. The general policy favoring open meetings could not change the fact that A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) explicitly limits the open meeting requirement to only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings.

——————————————————————————–

3. A Petitioner’s Own Words Undercut His Argument

The case took a surprising turn, however, when the petitioner himself handed the association its strongest piece of evidence. While trying to make a point about other committees within the DMMA, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

This statement was a moment of legal irony that proved devastating to his case. The judge noted in the final decision that the petitioner’s own language aligned perfectly with the court’s ultimate interpretation. In a formal hearing, Mr. Moselle inadvertently defined the key term against his own interest, drawing a clear distinction between meetings called on an as-needed basis (“at the request of the chair”) and those that are “regularly scheduled.” This admission provided the exact plain-language interpretation the judge needed to resolve the ambiguity in the case at hand, significantly weakening the petitioner’s entire position.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: A Lesson in Legal Precision

The ultimate lesson from this case is that while homeowner transparency laws are powerful, their protections are defined by precise legal wording. Seemingly small details can have significant consequences. In this Arizona case, the distinction between ad-hoc meetings called as needed and those that occur at regular, predictable intervals was the deciding factor that allowed a committee meeting to be held behind closed doors.

This raises a critical question for homeowners and boards alike: Does this legal distinction provide necessary flexibility for informal committee work, or is it a loophole that ultimately undermines the spirit of open governance in our communities?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gary W. Moselle (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Chair of the Communications Committee

Respondent Side

  • Curtis Ekmark (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Charles Markle (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Served order upon parties

Jerry Wheeler vs. Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1717036-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-09-06
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $250.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry Wheeler Counsel
Respondent Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The Administrative Law Judge found that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the required annual meeting for several years. The Respondent was ordered to hold a meeting, refund the filing fee to the Petitioner, and pay a $250.00 civil penalty.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to hold required annual meeting

Petitioner, a homeowner, alleged the HOA had not held an annual meeting since April 1, 2014, violating A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). The unconverted evidence established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the statutorily required annual meeting for several years.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was granted. Respondent was ordered to hold a meeting in accordance with the planned community statutes as currently scheduled on December 28, 2017. Respondent was ordered to pay the filing fee to the Petitioner pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), and pay a $250.00 civil penalty to the planned community hearing office fund.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $250.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA annual meeting violation, statutory requirement, default judgment
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1717036-REL Decision – 586602.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:44 (65.3 KB)

18F-H1717036-REL Decision – 588549.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-08T07:02:44 (592.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1717036-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Wheeler v. Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and orders from the case of Jerry Wheeler versus the Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association (HOA). The central issue was the HOA’s failure to conduct annual meetings as legally required by Arizona state law. The petitioner, Jerry Wheeler, provided uncontested evidence that the HOA had not held a meeting for several years, specifically since his tenure began on April 1, 2014.

The case was complicated by the death of the HOA’s president prior to the hearing and the association’s subsequent failure to appoint a new representative or appear at the proceedings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted the hearing in the respondent’s absence and ruled decisively in favor of the petitioner.

The final judgment, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate, found the Beaver Dam Estates HOA in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). The HOA was ordered to hold a meeting on a specified date, reimburse the petitioner’s filing fee, and pay a civil penalty of $250.00 for the violation.

Case Overview

The matter was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and was subsequently referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing and decision.

Case Detail

Information

Petitioner

Jerry Wheeler

Respondent

Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Case Number (OAH)

18F-H1717036-REL

Case Number (Dept. of Real Estate)

HO 17-17/036

Petition Filed

June 8, 2017

Hearing Date

September 5, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

September 6, 2017

Final Order Date

September 13, 2017

Presiding Judge

Suzanne Marwil, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Adopting Authority

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence

The petitioner’s case was built on the central allegation that the Beaver Dam Estates HOA had failed to comply with its statutory duty to hold annual meetings.

Core Allegation: The HOA was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(B), which mandates that a members’ association meeting “shall be held at least once each year.”

Petitioner Testimony: Jerry Wheeler testified that since moving into the community on April 1, 2014, the HOA had not held a single meeting. He also testified regarding his numerous efforts to compel the HOA president, Randy Hawk, to convene a meeting for the purpose of reviewing the association’s financial statements with homeowners.

Supporting Evidence: The petitioner submitted numerous written statements from other homeowners within the Beaver Dam Estates community. These statements corroborated his testimony, confirming that no HOA meeting had been held for several years. This evidence was referred to as “Exhibit B” in the proceedings.

Respondent’s Actions and Procedural Failures

The respondent’s engagement with the legal process was minimal and ultimately ceased, leading to a judgment in its absence.

Initial Response: The HOA’s then-president, Randy Hawk, initially responded to the petition by agreeing to hold a meeting.

First Meeting Attempt: A meeting was scheduled for July 18, 2017. However, only about ten people attended, prompting Hawk to reschedule for December 28, 2017. A letter was sent to all members notifying them of the new date and the intent to hold an election for a new president and vice president.

Death of Representative: The petitioner subsequently informed the Tribunal that Randy Hawk had passed away, leaving the HOA without a clear representative for the legal matter.

Failure to Appoint New Representative: On August 16, 2017, the Tribunal issued an order, mailed to the respondent’s address of record, requesting that the HOA name a new representative. The HOA failed to do so.

Failure to Appear: The respondent did not appear for the scheduled hearing on September 5, 2017, nor did it request to appear telephonically. After a 20-minute grace period, the ALJ proceeded with the hearing in the respondent’s absence.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

The ALJ’s decision was based on a clear statutory requirement and the uncontested evidence presented by the petitioner. The burden of proof was on the petitioner, with the standard of proof being a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Violation: The central finding was that the respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). The pertinent text of the statute states:

Key Conclusion: The ALJ determined that “The unconverted evidence established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the statutorily required annual meeting of Respondent for several years prior to the filing of the petition.”

Recommended Action: Based on this conclusion, the ALJ stated that the respondent “should hold an annual meeting in accordance with the planned community statutes.”

Final Order and Penalties

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, making it a binding Final Order. The order mandated several actions by the respondent.

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. The respondent must hold a meeting in accordance with planned community statutes as scheduled on December 28, 2017.

3. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), the respondent shall pay the petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

4. The respondent shall pay to the planned community hearing office fund a civil penalty of $250.00 for the violation.

This Final Order was declared a final administrative action, effective immediately upon service on September 13, 2017. The parties were notified of their right to apply for a rehearing within thirty days or to appeal the decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.


Jerry Wheeler vs. Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1717036-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-09-06
Administrative Law Judge Suzanne Marwil
Outcome full
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $250.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry Wheeler Counsel
Respondent Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)

Outcome Summary

The Petitioner's petition was granted. The Administrative Law Judge found that the Respondent HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the required annual meeting for several years. The Respondent was ordered to hold a meeting, refund the filing fee to the Petitioner, and pay a $250.00 civil penalty.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to hold required annual meeting

Petitioner, a homeowner, alleged the HOA had not held an annual meeting since April 1, 2014, violating A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). The unconverted evidence established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the statutorily required annual meeting for several years.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was granted. Respondent was ordered to hold a meeting in accordance with the planned community statutes as currently scheduled on December 28, 2017. Respondent was ordered to pay the filing fee to the Petitioner pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), and pay a $250.00 civil penalty to the planned community hearing office fund.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes, Civil penalty: $250.00

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA annual meeting violation, statutory requirement, default judgment
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.01
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1717036-REL Decision – 586602.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:53 (65.3 KB)

18F-H1717036-REL Decision – 588549.pdf

Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:31:53 (592.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 18F-H1717036-REL


Administrative Hearing Briefing: Wheeler v. Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and orders from the case of Jerry Wheeler versus the Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association (HOA). The central issue was the HOA’s failure to conduct annual meetings as legally required by Arizona state law. The petitioner, Jerry Wheeler, provided uncontested evidence that the HOA had not held a meeting for several years, specifically since his tenure began on April 1, 2014.

The case was complicated by the death of the HOA’s president prior to the hearing and the association’s subsequent failure to appoint a new representative or appear at the proceedings. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted the hearing in the respondent’s absence and ruled decisively in favor of the petitioner.

The final judgment, adopted by the Arizona Department of Real Estate, found the Beaver Dam Estates HOA in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). The HOA was ordered to hold a meeting on a specified date, reimburse the petitioner’s filing fee, and pay a civil penalty of $250.00 for the violation.

Case Overview

The matter was initiated by a petition filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate and was subsequently referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing and decision.

Case Detail

Information

Petitioner

Jerry Wheeler

Respondent

Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Case Number (OAH)

18F-H1717036-REL

Case Number (Dept. of Real Estate)

HO 17-17/036

Petition Filed

June 8, 2017

Hearing Date

September 5, 2017

ALJ Decision Date

September 6, 2017

Final Order Date

September 13, 2017

Presiding Judge

Suzanne Marwil, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

Adopting Authority

Judy Lowe, Commissioner, Arizona Department of Real Estate

Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence

The petitioner’s case was built on the central allegation that the Beaver Dam Estates HOA had failed to comply with its statutory duty to hold annual meetings.

Core Allegation: The HOA was in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(B), which mandates that a members’ association meeting “shall be held at least once each year.”

Petitioner Testimony: Jerry Wheeler testified that since moving into the community on April 1, 2014, the HOA had not held a single meeting. He also testified regarding his numerous efforts to compel the HOA president, Randy Hawk, to convene a meeting for the purpose of reviewing the association’s financial statements with homeowners.

Supporting Evidence: The petitioner submitted numerous written statements from other homeowners within the Beaver Dam Estates community. These statements corroborated his testimony, confirming that no HOA meeting had been held for several years. This evidence was referred to as “Exhibit B” in the proceedings.

Respondent’s Actions and Procedural Failures

The respondent’s engagement with the legal process was minimal and ultimately ceased, leading to a judgment in its absence.

Initial Response: The HOA’s then-president, Randy Hawk, initially responded to the petition by agreeing to hold a meeting.

First Meeting Attempt: A meeting was scheduled for July 18, 2017. However, only about ten people attended, prompting Hawk to reschedule for December 28, 2017. A letter was sent to all members notifying them of the new date and the intent to hold an election for a new president and vice president.

Death of Representative: The petitioner subsequently informed the Tribunal that Randy Hawk had passed away, leaving the HOA without a clear representative for the legal matter.

Failure to Appoint New Representative: On August 16, 2017, the Tribunal issued an order, mailed to the respondent’s address of record, requesting that the HOA name a new representative. The HOA failed to do so.

Failure to Appear: The respondent did not appear for the scheduled hearing on September 5, 2017, nor did it request to appear telephonically. After a 20-minute grace period, the ALJ proceeded with the hearing in the respondent’s absence.

Legal Framework and Conclusions of Law

The ALJ’s decision was based on a clear statutory requirement and the uncontested evidence presented by the petitioner. The burden of proof was on the petitioner, with the standard of proof being a preponderance of the evidence.

Statutory Violation: The central finding was that the respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). The pertinent text of the statute states:

Key Conclusion: The ALJ determined that “The unconverted evidence established that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) by failing to hold the statutorily required annual meeting of Respondent for several years prior to the filing of the petition.”

Recommended Action: Based on this conclusion, the ALJ stated that the respondent “should hold an annual meeting in accordance with the planned community statutes.”

Final Order and Penalties

The ALJ’s decision was formally adopted by the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate, making it a binding Final Order. The order mandated several actions by the respondent.

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The petitioner’s petition is granted.

2. The respondent must hold a meeting in accordance with planned community statutes as scheduled on December 28, 2017.

3. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(A), the respondent shall pay the petitioner the filing fee required by section 32-2199.01.

4. The respondent shall pay to the planned community hearing office fund a civil penalty of $250.00 for the violation.

This Final Order was declared a final administrative action, effective immediately upon service on September 13, 2017. The parties were notified of their right to apply for a rehearing within thirty days or to appeal the decision by filing a complaint for judicial review.






Study Guide – 18F-H1717036-REL


Study Guide for Wheeler v. Beaver Dam Estates HOA

Short Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following ten questions based on the provided legal documents. Each answer should be approximately 2-3 sentences.

1. Who were the primary parties in the case Wheeler v. Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association, and what were their roles?

2. What was the central allegation made by the Petitioner against the Respondent?

3. According to the Findings of Fact, how long had the Petitioner lived in the community, and why is this duration significant?

4. What specific Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) did the Respondent violate, and what does this statute require?

5. What event involving the Respondent’s president, Randy Hawk, complicated the case proceedings?

6. What was the outcome of the hearing held on September 5, 2017, regarding the Respondent’s attendance?

7. What standard of proof was required in this matter, and which party had the burden of proof?

8. Describe the key components of the Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge.

9. What two monetary penalties were imposed on the Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association?

10. According to the Final Order, what steps could an aggrieved party take after the decision was issued?

——————————————————————————–

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jerry Wheeler, the Petitioner, and the Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association, the Respondent. As the Petitioner, Mr. Wheeler initiated the legal action by filing a petition, while the Homeowners Association was the entity required to respond to the allegations.

2. The central allegation was that the Respondent had violated state law by failing to hold a meeting of the members’ association for several years. The Petitioner specifically sought to have the association convene a meeting to review financial statements.

3. The Petitioner, Jerry Wheeler, testified that he had moved into the community on April 1, 2014. This duration is significant because he stated that no meeting of the association had been held during his entire tenure, providing a multi-year timeframe for the alleged violation.

4. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B). This statute mandates that, notwithstanding any provisions in community documents, a meeting of the members’ association must be held at least once each year within the state of Arizona.

5. After responding to the petition and scheduling a future meeting, the Respondent’s president, Randy Hawk, passed away. The Petitioner informed the Tribunal of this event, which created uncertainty about who could serve as the Respondent’s representative in the matter.

6. The Respondent, Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association, failed to appear for the hearing on September 5, 2017. After a 20-minute grace period, the Administrative Law Judge proceeded with the hearing in the Respondent’s absence.

7. The standard of proof was a “preponderance of the evidence,” as stated in A.A.C. R2-19-119(A). Pursuant to A.A.C. R2-19-119(B), the Petitioner, Jerry Wheeler, had the burden of proving his case.

8. The Order granted the Petitioner’s petition and mandated that the Respondent hold a meeting on the currently scheduled date of December 28, 2017. It also imposed financial penalties on the Respondent and affirmed that the order was binding on the parties unless a rehearing was granted.

9. The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s filing fee required by section 32-2199.01. Additionally, the Respondent was ordered to pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the planned community hearing office fund.

10. A person aggrieved by the decision could apply for a rehearing by filing a petition with the Commissioner within thirty (30) days. The Final Order is also considered a final administrative action, which a party may appeal by filing a complaint for judicial review.

——————————————————————————–

Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay-style response for each.

1. Trace the procedural history of case No. 18F-H1717036-REL from the initial petition filing to the issuance of the Final Order. Discuss the key dates, actions taken by the parties and the Tribunal, and the legal significance of each step.

2. Analyze the legal reasoning behind the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Explain how the “Findings of Fact” supported the “Conclusions of Law,” with a specific focus on the violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) and the application of the “preponderance of the evidence” standard.

3. Discuss the role and authority of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Department of Real Estate in this dispute. How do the statutes cited (e.g., A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.) empower these bodies to adjudicate disputes and enforce compliance among homeowners associations?

4. Evaluate the impact of the Respondent’s failure to appear at the September 5, 2017 hearing. How did this absence affect the proceedings and the evidence presented, and in what way did it likely influence the final outcome?

5. Examine the remedies and enforcement mechanisms outlined in the Final Order. Discuss the specific purpose of ordering a meeting, reimbursing the filing fee, and imposing a civil penalty, and explain the legal process for appealing the decision.

——————————————————————————–

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions. In this case, Suzanne Marwil served as the ALJ.

A.R.S. (Arizona Revised Statutes)

The codified collection of laws for the state of Arizona. The case frequently cites statutes within Title 32 and Title 33, such as A.R.S. § 33-1804(B), which governs HOA meetings.

A.A.C. (Arizona Administrative Code)

The official compilation of rules and regulations of Arizona state agencies. A.A.C. R2-19-119 established the burden and standard of proof for the hearing.

Burden of Proof

The legal obligation of a party in a dispute to provide sufficient evidence to prove their claim. In this matter, the burden of proof was on the Petitioner.

Civil Penalty

A monetary fine imposed by a government agency for a violation of a law or regulation. The Respondent was ordered to pay a $250.00 civil penalty.

Conclusions of Law

The section of a legal decision that applies the relevant laws and legal principles to the established facts of the case to reach a judgment.

Final Administrative Action

A final decision by an administrative agency that is legally binding and can be appealed to a court through a process of judicial review.

Findings of Fact

The section of a legal decision that details the factual circumstances of the case as determined by the judge based on the evidence presented.

A formal directive from a judge or administrative body that requires a party to perform a specific act or refrain from doing so. The final decision in this case included an Order for the Respondent to hold a meeting and pay penalties.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Jerry Wheeler.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases, which requires that the evidence presented by one side is more convincing and likely to be true than the evidence of the opposing side.

Rehearing

A request to have a case heard again by the same administrative body or court, typically based on new evidence or an error in the original proceeding. A party had 30 days to petition for a rehearing.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Respondent was the Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association.

Tribunal

A general term for a body, including a court or administrative hearing office, that has the authority to judge or determine claims and disputes.






Blog Post – 18F-H1717036-REL


4 Key Lessons from One Homeowner’s Winning Fight Against His HOA

Introduction: When Your HOA Becomes Dysfunctional

For many homeowners, a Homeowners Association (HOA) is a background presence, collecting dues and ensuring community standards. But what happens when the HOA itself fails in its duties? When legally required meetings stop, financial transparency disappears, and the leadership becomes unresponsive, residents can feel powerless. It’s a common frustration that leaves homeowners wondering what recourse they have when the very organization meant to maintain order violates its own governing laws.

This was the exact situation faced by Jerry Wheeler, a resident of Beaver Dam Estates in Arizona. After years of his HOA failing to hold its legally required annual meeting, he decided he had enough. Instead of letting his frustration simmer, he took formal action, setting in motion a legal process that offers powerful lessons for any homeowner living in a planned community. His story is a clear example of how one determined individual can hold an association accountable.

——————————————————————————–

1. One Determined Homeowner Can Hold an Entire HOA Accountable

It can feel daunting to challenge an organization, but Jerry Wheeler’s case proves that a single person can be the catalyst for change. The core of his dispute extended beyond procedure into a fundamental issue of financial transparency. On June 8, 2017, Wheeler filed a petition because since moving in on April 1, 2014, no annual meeting had been held. His stated goal was clear: he wanted the HOA to convene a meeting to “review Respondent’s financial statements with the homeowners.”

Initially, the HOA president, Randy Hawk, responded to the petition by agreeing to hold a meeting. However, the execution faltered. A meeting scheduled for July 18, 2017, failed when only about ten people attended. Hawk then rescheduled for December 28, 2017. While Wheeler initiated the petition alone, he strengthened his case by presenting numerous written statements from other homeowners confirming no annual meetings had been held for several years. This demonstrates that one person’s courageous action, aimed at securing accountability and supported by the community, can successfully trigger the legal mechanisms designed to protect homeowners’ rights.

2. Annual Meetings Aren’t Just a Suggestion—They’re the Law

The core of Jerry Wheeler’s complaint wasn’t based on a simple grievance; it was rooted in a specific violation of Arizona state law. The Administrative Law Judge’s decision found that the Beaver Dam Estates HOA was in direct violation of a statute requiring annual meetings. This law is not a guideline or a best practice—it is a legal mandate.

For any homeowner in Arizona, the relevant section of the law is crystal clear:

A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)

Notwithstanding any provision in the community documents, all meetings of the members’ association and the board shall be held in this state. A meeting of the members’ association shall be held at least once each year…

This statute is a cornerstone of transparency and accountability for planned communities. It ensures that residents have a regular, guaranteed opportunity to hear from the board, review financials, elect new leadership, and have their voices heard. Understanding that this is a legal requirement—not just a courtesy—is critical knowledge for any homeowner.

3. Ignoring the Process Has Financial Consequences

The Beaver Dam Estates HOA’s strategy of inaction ultimately backfired, resulting in financial penalties. The association’s failure to appear at its own hearing on September 5, 2017, meant that Wheeler’s evidence was uncontested, leading directly to a default judgment and the resulting financial penalties. The judge’s final order wasn’t just a request to do better; it was a binding decision with specific consequences.

Because the judge granted the petitioner’s petition, the HOA was ordered to take three specific actions:

• Hold the legally required meeting as scheduled on December 28, 2017.

• Pay the Petitioner (Jerry Wheeler) back for his filing fee.

• Pay a civil penalty of $250.00 to the planned community hearing office fund.

This outcome makes it clear that avoiding legal and administrative responsibilities is not a viable strategy. The process is designed to proceed with or without the respondent’s participation, and ignoring it leads directly to mandated actions and financial penalties.

4. The System Can Work, Even Under Strange Circumstances

The proceedings in this case were complicated by unusual and unfortunate events, yet the legal framework proved resilient. After attempting to schedule the required meetings, the HOA’s president, Randy Hawk, passed away. The tribunal ordered the association to name a new representative, but it failed to do so. Compounding the issue, no one from the HOA showed up for the scheduled hearing.

Despite these significant obstacles—the death of the board’s president and the association’s complete failure to participate—the process did not grind to a halt. The Administrative Law Judge was able to conduct the hearing, review the uncontested evidence presented by Jerry Wheeler, make official Findings of Fact, and issue a final, binding order. This remarkable persistence shows that the administrative system is robust and designed to deliver a resolution, ensuring that a petitioner’s rights are upheld even when a respondent organization is in disarray.

——————————————————————————–

Conclusion: Know Your Rights

The case of Jerry Wheeler vs. Beaver Dam Estates is a powerful reminder that community living is governed by rules that apply to everyone—including the association itself. An HOA cannot simply cease to function or ignore its legal obligations without consequence. The systems in place, from state statutes to administrative hearings, are designed to provide a path for homeowners to seek and achieve recourse.

This case serves as an empowering example of how knowledge and determination can lead to accountability. It underscores the importance of understanding the specific laws that govern your community association. This case was in Arizona, but it raises a universal question: Do you know the specific laws that govern your own HOA, and is your board in compliance?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry Wheeler (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Randy Hawk (president)
    Beaver Dam Estates Homeowners Association

Neutral Parties

  • Suzanne Marwil (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • Dan Gardner (HOA coordinator)