Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2020045-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-11-18
Administrative Law Judge Adam D. Stone
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust Counsel
Respondent Haciendas Del Conde Association Counsel Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Alleged Violations

CCRs Section 21(m)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petition on all issues, concluding that the CCRs contained legally enforceable setback language (Section 21(m)) properly passed in 2017 under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). The ALJ rejected Petitioner's arguments regarding improper voting procedures, statute of limitations, and selective enforcement.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The CCRs were deemed valid, and the enforcement action was deemed reasonable.

Key Issues & Findings

Challenge to the validity and enforcement of the 10-foot setback requirement regarding the Petitioner's carport and claims of selective enforcement.

Petitioner asserted that the HOA violated CCR 21(m) by improperly adopting the 2017 CCRs and sought resolution on whether the setback language was enforceable, whether forcing Petitioner to move the carport was reasonable, whether selective enforcement was applied, and whether an easement existed. The ALJ concluded the CCRs were valid and enforceable under A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), rejected the selective enforcement claim, and denied the petition.

Orders: The Petition was denied on all issues. Respondent was deemed the prevailing party. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1817(A)
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • CCRs Section 21(m)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: CCR_enforceability, setback_violation, voting_validity, selective_enforcement, carport
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1817
  • A.R.S. § 10-3708
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 892670.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:29 (47.7 KB)

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:25:33 (132.2 KB)

20F-H2020045-REL Decision – 837850.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:47 (132.2 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision: Trezza Irrevocable Trust vs. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA/Respondent). The ALJ denied the Petitioner’s petition on all issues, finding in favor of the HDCA and deeming it the prevailing party.

The core of the dispute was a carport constructed by the Petitioner in August 2019 without prior approval from the HDCA and in violation of a 10-foot property line setback requirement detailed in the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The Petitioner challenged the validity of the CC&Rs, alleged selective enforcement by the HDCA, and argued the setback rule was unreasonable.

The ALJ’s decision rested on several key conclusions:

• The HDCA’s 2017 CC&Rs, including the 10-foot setback rule in Section 21(m), were properly adopted and are legally enforceable. The Petitioner’s challenge to the voting procedure was unfounded, as it incorrectly cited corporate voting law instead of the statute governing planned communities.

• The HOA has the right to enforce rules that are more restrictive than municipal codes, rendering the Pima County code’s zero-foot setback irrelevant.

• There was no evidence of selective enforcement. The HDCA’s denial was based on the substantive setback violation, not the procedural failure to obtain prior approval, and the Petitioner was given an opportunity to cure the issue.

• The Petitioner is solely responsible for any financial burden associated with bringing the carport into compliance, as the situation was created by the failure to seek prior approval before construction.

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

Case Number: 20F-H2020045-REL

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone

Date of Decision: November 18, 2020

Parties:

Petitioner: Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq.

Respondent: Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

Central Issue: The legal enforceability of the HDCA’s CC&Rs, specifically Section 21(m), which prohibits the construction of structures within ten feet of any side or back property line for specified lots. The Petitioner sought relief after the HDCA denied approval for a carport built in violation of this rule.

II. Factual Background

Steven Trezza, trustee for the Petitioner, testified that he has resided at the property for approximately 14 years. In August 2019, he designed and built a carport on the property. Crucially, he admitted to the following:

• He had not read the community’s CC&Rs prior to the HDCA’s denial of his application.

• He failed to obtain prior approval from the HDCA Board for the carport’s construction.

• He failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

The HDCA Board President, Brad Johns, testified that he first noticed the carport construction in late August 2019 and placed architectural approval forms on the Petitioner’s door. Johns clarified that the eventual denial was not based on the failure to obtain prior approval but on the substantive violation of the 10-foot setback rule.

On November 14, 2019, the HDCA’s Secretary/Treasurer, Philip Worcester, sent formal correspondence informing the Petitioner of the failure to submit a proposal and providing an additional thirty days to do so before facing penalties.

III. Petitioner’s Core Arguments

The Petitioner, represented by Mr. Trezza, presented several arguments to invalidate the HDCA’s enforcement action:

Invalidity of the 2017 CC&Rs Vote: Mr. Trezza claimed the 2017 vote that adopted the current CC&Rs was improper.

◦ He argued the ballot was defective under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide a place to vote “no.”

◦ He contended that Section 21(m), the setback rule, was not “redlined” in the proposed document sent to homeowners, implying it was not a change and therefore not properly adopted.

Invalidity of the 1993 Amendment: The language of Section 21(m) originated in a 1993 Amendment. Mr. Trezza argued this amendment was also passed via an invalid vote. He claimed the statute of limitations had not expired on challenging it, as he only became aware of the 1993 Amendment during the course of the present dispute.

Conflict with Pima County Code: Mr. Trezza testified that the 10-foot setback is incorrect under Pima County code, which he stated requires a zero-foot setback. He argued the HDCA Board had misinterpreted zoning requirements in 1993.

Selective Enforcement: Mr. Trezza asserted that he was not treated fairly, claiming other HDCA members who had failed to obtain prior approval for projects were later granted it.

Unreasonable Withholding of Approval: The Petitioner argued that the HDCA’s approval was unreasonably withheld because the carport was not unattractive, did not devalue community property, and did not violate county code.

IV. Respondent’s (HDCA) Position and Testimony

The HDCA countered each of the Petitioner’s claims through legal arguments and witness testimony:

Validity of the CC&Rs: Ms. Briggs, counsel for the HDCA, argued that the 2017 vote was valid pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1817, the statute governing planned communities. This statute requires only an “affirmative vote or written consent,” which was obtained. She asserted that the “redlining” argument was irrelevant because the entire CC&Rs document was presented to homeowners for a vote, and they could have rejected it if they disagreed with any provision, changed or not. This rendered the challenge to the 1993 amendment moot.

Absence of Discrimination:

◦ HDCA President Brad Johns testified that the denial was based solely on the 10-foot setback violation, not the failure to obtain prior approval.

◦ He stated that the Board had successfully worked with other homeowners who failed to seek prior approval, but Mr. Trezza’s case was different because it involved a stand-alone structure rather than an addition.

◦ Both Mr. Johns and Secretary/Treasurer Philip Worcester testified that they had not known or interacted with Mr. Trezza prior to this issue, negating any claim of personal bias.

Fair Process and Opportunity to Cure: Mr. Worcester testified that he complied with multiple document requests from Mr. Trezza and offered on at least two occasions for Mr. Trezza to accompany him to the association’s storage facility, an offer that was not accepted. The Board provided a 30-day window for the Petitioner to submit a formal proposal to resolve the issue.

V. Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law and Rationale

The ALJ methodically rejected each of the Petitioner’s arguments and found the HDCA’s position to be supported by law and evidence.

1. The CC&Rs Contain Legally Enforceable Setback Language:

◦ The Judge concluded that the 2017 CC&Rs vote was proper. The Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 (corporate voting) was “unfounded.” The correct and controlling statute is A.R.S. § 33-1817(A) (planned community voting), which only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent.”

◦ The argument that Section 21(m) was not “redlined” was deemed “not persuasive,” as the entire proposed document was provided to members, who voted to accept the CC&Rs as written.

◦ An HOA may require different, and more restrictive, setback requirements than a municipality. Therefore, the Pima County code does not override the CC&Rs.

2. The Petitioner is Bound by the CC&Rs:

◦ The Judge found the argument regarding the 1993 Amendment and the statute of limitations “unpersuasive.” Upon purchasing the property, the Petitioner became bound by the CC&Rs in existence at that time, “whether he read them or not.”

3. No Selective Enforcement Occurred:

◦ Evidence showed that the Board “routinely allowed homeowners to provide a chance to cure their failure to obtain prior approval.”

◦ Testimony from Mr. Johns and Mr. Worcester clearly established that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but the substantive setback violation. The Petitioner was offered the same opportunity to cure the problem as others but chose not to.

4. The Cost of Compliance is Reasonable:

◦ The Judge concluded that it is reasonable to compel the Petitioner to comply with the setback requirement, regardless of the cost. The decision states: “it brought the additional expenses upon itself for failure to obtain prior approval.” By not seeking approval beforehand, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the financial burden of a remedy.

VI. Final Order and Implications

Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge issued the following order on November 18, 2020:

• The Petition filed by the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust is denied on all issues.

• The Respondent, Haciendas Del Conde Association, is deemed the prevailing party.

• No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.

The order is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Trezza Irrevocable Trust v. Haciendas Del Conde Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2020045-REL, concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust and the Haciendas Del Conde Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test factual recall, essay questions to encourage deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found within the legal decision.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific provision of the community’s governing documents was at the center of the dispute?

3. What structure did the Petitioner build, and what two key approvals were initially neglected?

4. What was the Petitioner’s primary argument for why the 2017 vote on the CCRs was improper?

5. How did the Petitioner challenge the validity of the original 1993 Amendment concerning the setback?

6. What was the Respondent’s reasoning for denying the carport application, separate from the failure to get prior approval?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) distinguish between the two Arizona statutes cited regarding voting procedures?

8. What was the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the Petitioner’s claim of selective enforcement?

9. Why did the ALJ rule that it was reasonable to force the Petitioner to bear the cost of moving the carport?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust, represented by Trustee Steven Trezza, Esq. The Respondent was the Haciendas Del Conde Association (HDCA), a Homeowners Association represented by Sharon Briggs, Esq.

2. The dispute centered on the Haciendas Del Conde Association’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCRs), specifically Section 21(m). This section mandates a ten-foot setback from any side or back property line for structures on specific lots.

3. The Petitioner, Mr. Trezza, designed and built a carport in August 2019. He failed to obtain prior approval from the HOA’s Board and also failed to obtain a required permit from Pima County.

4. The Petitioner argued that the ballot used for the 2017 vote was defective under A.R.S. § 10-3708 because it did not provide an option to vote “no.” He contended this made the entire vote improper and the resulting CCRs invalid.

5. The Petitioner argued that the 1993 Amendment, which first introduced the 10-foot setback, was itself based on an invalid vote. He also argued that because this language was not “redlined” as a change in the 2017 CCRs, homeowners were not properly notified of its adoption.

6. Brad Johns, President of the HDCA, testified that the denial was not due to the lack of prior approval but specifically because the carport violated the 10-foot setback requirement outlined in Section 21(m) of the CCRs.

7. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s reliance on A.R.S. § 10-3708 was unfounded because it applies to corporation voting. The judge determined that A.R.S. § 33-1817(A), which governs planned community voting and only requires an “affirmative vote or written consent,” was the controlling statute.

8. The ALJ concluded there was no selective enforcement. Evidence showed that the Board routinely worked with other homeowners who failed to get prior approval, and that Mr. Trezza was not discriminated against but was given an opportunity to cure the problem.

9. The ALJ reasoned that by failing to seek prior approval before construction, the Petitioner, not the HDCA, created the expenses required to remedy the situation. Therefore, it was reasonable to make the Petitioner comply with the CCRs, regardless of the cost.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petition be denied on all issues. The judge further ordered that the Respondent (Haciendas Del Conde Association) be deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an argument using only the evidence and legal reasoning presented in the case document.

1. Analyze the Petitioner’s arguments regarding the invalidity of the 1993 Amendment and the 2017 CCRs. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find these arguments, including the “redlining” and statute of limitations claims, to be unpersuasive?

2. Discuss the concept of “selective enforcement” as an affirmative defense in this case. What evidence did the Petitioner and Respondent present on this issue, and how did the judge ultimately rule?

3. Examine the legal distinction made between A.R.S. § 10-3708 and A.R.S. § 33-1817(A). Explain how this distinction was critical to the judge’s conclusion about the validity of the 2017 CCRs and the enforceability of Section 21(m).

4. Evaluate the significance of the Petitioner’s failure to obtain prior Board and Pima County approval for the carport. How did this action impact the judge’s ruling, particularly concerning the reasonableness of the enforcement costs and the allegation of unfair treatment?

5. Compare and contrast the testimony presented by the Petitioner’s side (Steven Trezza, Phil Rosenberg) with the testimony from the Respondent’s side (Brad Johns, Philip Worcester). How did their differing accounts shape the central issues of the hearing?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, in this case, for the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Affirmative Defense

A set of facts or legal arguments presented by the respondent that, if proven, can defeat or mitigate the legal consequences of the petitioner’s claim. In this case, “selective enforcement” was an affirmative defense.

A.R.S.

Abbreviation for Arizona Revised Statutes, which are the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are legally binding rules and regulations that govern a planned community or subdivision, which property owners agree to abide by upon purchasing property.

Easement

A legal right to use another person’s land for a specific purpose. The Petitioner unsuccessfully argued for an easement for the carport under Section 33 of the CCRs.

HOA (Homeowners Association)

An organization in a planned community that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents. The Haciendas Del Conde Association is the HOA in this case.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition initiating a legal action. In this case, it was the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in civil cases, meaning the evidence shows that a contention is more likely true than not. The Petitioner bore this burden to prove their claims.

Redlined

A method of marking a document to show additions, deletions, or changes, typically by underlining new text and striking through deleted text. The Petitioner argued a lack of redlining was misleading.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, it was the Haciendas Del Conde Association.

Setback

The minimum required distance that a building or other structure must be located from a property line, street, or other feature. The dispute centered on a 10-foot setback requirement.

Statute of Limitations

A law that sets the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. The Petitioner argued the statute of limitations had not run for challenging the 1993 Amendment.

Trustee

An individual or entity that holds and administers property or assets for the benefit of a third party. Steven Trezza, Esq. appeared as Trustee for the Petitioner.

Variance

An officially granted exception to zoning ordinances or CCRs. The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought a variance for the carport.

📔

20F-H2020045-REL

1 source

The provided text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust (Petitioner) and the Haciendas Del Conde Association (Respondent). This Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute arose because the Petitioner constructed a carport without prior approval, violating the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CCR’s), specifically a ten-foot setback requirement in Section 21(m). The Petitioner argued that the setback language was unenforceable due to flawed voting procedures in both 1993 and 2017 when the CCR’s were adopted, and also claimed selective enforcement. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that the CCR’s were legally enforceable and properly adopted, concluding that the Petitioner must comply with the setback rule, and denied all issues raised in the petition.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Stephen Trezza (Trustee)
    Shannon Lee Trezza Irrevocable Trust
    Appeared for Petitioner; Testified on behalf of Petitioner
  • Philip Rosenberg (witness)
    Testified for Petitioner

Respondent Side

  • Sharon Briggs (HOA attorney)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
  • Brad Johns (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    President of HDCA; Testified for Respondent
  • Philip Worcester (board member)
    Haciendas Del Conde Association
    Secretary/Treasurer of HDCA; Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Adam D. Stone (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Order transmitted electronically to

Donna M Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-03-30
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The Petition was upheld on all issues asserted by the Petitioner. The Respondent was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) (failure to provide election documents), A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) (failure to hold an annual meeting in 2019), and Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws (improperly prohibiting write-in ballots). Respondent was ordered to supply Petitioner with relevant documents and refund the Petitioner's filing fee of $1,500.00. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.
Filing Fees Refunded $1,500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Donna M Bischoff Counsel
Respondent Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)
Bylaws Article 3, Section 2

Outcome Summary

The Petition was upheld on all issues asserted by the Petitioner. The Respondent was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) (failure to provide election documents), A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) (failure to hold an annual meeting in 2019), and Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws (improperly prohibiting write-in ballots). Respondent was ordered to supply Petitioner with relevant documents and refund the Petitioner's filing fee of $1,500.00. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.

Key Issues & Findings

Voting; proxies; absentee ballots; applicability; definition

Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with the required election materials and documentation from the October 2018 elections, violating statutory requirements for retention and availability of these materials for owner inspection.

Orders: Respondent ordered to supply Petitioner with the relevant documents, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C), within ten (10) days of the Order.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)

Open meetings; exceptions

Respondent postponed its required yearly 2019 meeting until January 2020, resulting in a failure to hold a unit owners' association meeting in 2019 as required by statute.

Orders: Petition upheld on this issue.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)

Selection

Respondent's board of directors declared write-in ballots invalid for the November 20, 2019, election. Since the Bylaws were silent on prohibiting write-in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.

Orders: Petition upheld on this issue.

Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Dispute, Condominium Association, Election Procedures, Annual Meeting, Statutory Violation, Bylaw Interpretation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
  • A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
  • Bylaws Article 3, Section 2
  • Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
  • MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
  • BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)

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Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019033-REL Decision – 778923.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:24:42 (108.5 KB)

20F-H2019033-REL Decision – 778923.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:15 (108.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Donna M. Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019033-REL), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge found entirely in favor of the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, concluding that the Respondent, Country Hills West Condominium Association (“the Association”), committed multiple violations of Arizona state statutes and its own governing documents.

The core violations upheld by the court are:

1. Failure to Hold a Required Annual Meeting: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold its required annual meeting within the 2019 calendar year, repeatedly postponing it until January 2020.

2. Failure to Provide Election Records: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with complete election materials for inspection, including ballots, envelopes, and sign-in sheets from the October 2018 election.

3. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots: The Association violated Article 3, Section 2 of its Bylaws by unilaterally prohibiting write-in ballots for the 2019 election, despite its governing documents being silent on the issue.

As a result, the Association was ordered to provide the requested documents to the Petitioner within ten days and to reimburse her $1,500 filing fee within thirty days. The decision underscores the legal obligation of homeowners’ associations to adhere strictly to statutory requirements for meetings, elections, and record transparency.

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I. Case Overview

The dispute was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by homeowner Donna M. Bischoff with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on December 11, 2019.

Case Detail

Information

Case Name

Donna M Bischoff, Petitioner, v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2019033-REL

Adjudicator

Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera

Hearing Date

March 10, 2020

Decision Date

March 30, 2020

Petitioner Representative

Donna M. Bischoff (on her own behalf)

Respondent Representative

Doug Meyer, President and Director

II. Petitioner’s Allegations

The Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, asserted that the Country Hills West Condominium Association committed violations of state law and its own governing documents. The specific allegations were:

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B): Failure to hold the mandatory annual unit owners’ association meeting within the 2019 calendar year.

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C): Failure to make election materials, including ballots and related items, available for inspection by a unit owner.

Violation of Bylaws Article 3, Section 2: Improperly invalidating election ballots by prohibiting write-in candidates without any authority from the governing documents.

The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish these violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”

III. Core Issues and Factual Findings

The hearing established several key facts that formed the basis of the Judge’s decision. The testimony from both Ms. Bischoff and the Association’s President, Doug Meyer, was central to these findings.

A. Failure to Hold the 2019 Annual Meeting

Timeline of Events: The Association’s required annual meeting for 2019 was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019. It was subsequently postponed three times: first to December 19, 2019; then to December 30, 2019; and ultimately held on January 24, 2020.

Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer testified that the postponements were necessary because write-in candidates appeared on the ballot, which the board had prohibited. He stated that the board “needed time to reprint the ballot and mail them out.”

Conclusion of Law: The evidence was undisputed that no annual meeting took place during the 2019 calendar year. The Judge concluded that by postponing the meeting into the following year, the Association was in direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B), which mandates that “A meeting of the unit owners’ association shall be held at least once each year.”

B. Denial of Access to Election Records

Petitioner’s Request: In October 2018, Ms. Bischoff requested to see the election results from the October 2018 meeting, specifically seeking to know which units had voted.

Respondent’s Response: The Association initially did not provide the results. A few weeks prior to the March 2020 hearing, it supplied Ms. Bischoff with vote tallies and a list of unit members who voted. However, it failed to provide the full scope of required materials.

Missing Documentation: The Association did not provide the “ballots, envelopes, related materials, and sign-in sheets” as mandated by statute for inspection.

Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer argued that no election actually occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting because there was no quorum. He further made the admission that the Association had not achieved a quorum for any meeting in the preceding 20 years. He claimed that without an election, there was no obligation to publish ballots.

Conclusion of Law: The Judge found that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C). The statute requires that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… and made available for unit owner inspection for at least one year.” The partial and delayed provision of records was insufficient to meet this legal requirement.

C. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots

The Dispute: The November 20, 2019, meeting was cancelled because some ballots contained write-in candidates. The board of directors informed members that write-in ballots were prohibited and would be “thrown out.”

Petitioner’s Argument: Ms. Bischoff argued that the board could not “choose how to interpret a silent document.” She pointed out that the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation do not prohibit write-in ballots and that the same board had allowed them in a 2017 election.

Respondent’s Position: Mr. Meyer acknowledged that the Bylaws were silent on the issue but stated the Association needed to “figure out how to handle” them. A membership meeting to discuss the issue was held on December 30, 2019, but failed to achieve a quorum.

Conclusion of Law: The Judge determined that the Association violated its own Bylaws. The decision states, “absent any clear language in the A.R.S. or the Bylaws prohibiting write in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.” The board’s unilateral prohibition was therefore found to be improper.

IV. Legal Conclusions and Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge upheld the petition on all issues, finding that the Petitioner had successfully proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence.

Final Order:

Based on the foregoing conclusions, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Petition filed by Donna M. Bischoff is upheld on all issues.

2. The Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party in the matter.

3. The Respondent must supply the Petitioner with the relevant election documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) within ten (10) days of the Order.

4. The Respondent must pay the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within thirty (30) days of the Order.

5. No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.

The Order is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.

Study Guide: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2019033-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and a condominium association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the source document.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source document.

1. Who were the primary parties in the legal dispute, and what were their roles?

2. What specific violations did the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, allege against the Respondent?

3. Why was the 2019 yearly meeting for the Country Hills West Condominium Association repeatedly rescheduled?

4. What was the Respondent’s position on the validity of write-in ballots for the November 20, 2019, election?

5. What information did the Petitioner request from the October 2018 election, and what was the initial response?

6. What is the definition of “quorum” according to the association’s Bylaws, and why was it significant in this case?

7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet in this hearing?

8. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) regarding association meetings?

9. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) regarding election materials?

10. What were the key components of the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and the Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner is the homeowner who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the homeowners association accused of violations.

2. The Petitioner alleged violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1250(C) and § 33-1248(B), as well as Article 3, Section 2 of the association’s Bylaws. These allegations related to the handling of yearly meetings and elections.

3. The 2019 yearly meeting was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019, but was rescheduled three times, ultimately taking place in January 2020. The first cancellation was because some ballots contained write-in candidates, which the board deemed prohibited.

4. The Respondent’s representative, Doug Meyer, testified that members were informed that write-in ballots were not valid for the November 20, 2019, election. He stated that any ballots with write-in candidates would have been thrown out.

5. The Petitioner requested to see the election results from the October 2018 election, specifically wanting to know which units voted. While she was eventually given the voting tallies, the Respondent did not initially provide the requested results.

6. Quorum is defined in Article 4, Section 3 of the Bylaws. It was significant because the Respondent’s president, Mr. Meyer, acknowledged that the association had not achieved a quorum for its meetings in the last 20 years, and thus no election occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting.

7. The Petitioner had the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.

8. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold a required yearly meeting within the calendar year of 2019. The evidence showed that the meeting scheduled for 2019 was postponed until January 2020.

9. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with all required election materials from the 2018 election. While vote tallies were eventually provided, the statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related materials be retained and made available for inspection for at least one year.

10. The Administrative Law Judge’s Order upheld the Petition on all issues, deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party, and required the Respondent to supply the relevant documents within 10 days. The Order also mandated that the Respondent reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 within 30 days.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the information presented in the source document to construct a comprehensive argument for each prompt.

1. Analyze the Respondent’s handling of the write-in ballot issue for the 2019 election. Discuss the legal basis (or lack thereof) for their actions as presented in the hearing, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled that their prohibition of these ballots was a violation of the Bylaws.

2. Explain the concept of “quorum” as it relates to this case. How did the association’s failure to achieve a quorum for 20 years impact its governance, specifically regarding the 2018 meeting and the Respondent’s obligation to produce election records?

3. Describe in detail the specific violations of the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that the Country Hills West Condominium Association was found to have committed. For each statute (A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) and A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)), detail the legal requirement and explain how the Respondent’s actions failed to meet that standard.

4. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Using testimony and evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explain how the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof for her allegations.

5. Outline the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge. Beyond the simple outcome, explain the significance of each component of the order, including the validation of the petition, the designation of a “prevailing party,” the directive to supply documents, and the financial remedy awarded.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Antara Nath Rivera.

Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)

The state agency with which a homeowner or planned community organization can file a petition for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)

The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The specific statutes cited were A.R.S. §§ 33-1250(C) and 33-1248(B).

Bylaws

The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, the Bylaws of Country Hills West Association, Inc. were a key document.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state agency where petitions filed with the Department of Real Estate are heard before an Administrative Law Judge.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Donna M. Bischoff.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is met when the evidence presented is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Quorum

The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid. The Respondent had not achieved quorum for 20 years.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed or a legal action is brought. In this case, Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.

Select all sources
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20F-H2019033-REL

1 source

This source is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The document details the hearing held on March 10, 2020, where the Petitioner alleged the Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the association’s Bylaws. Specifically, the Petitioner claimed violations related to the failure to hold a required yearly meeting in 2019, the failure to provide election materials for inspection, and the improper prohibition of write-in ballots where the Bylaws were silent. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately upheld the Petition on all issues, finding the Respondent in violation, and ordered the Association to provide the requested documents and pay the Petitioner’s $1,500.00 filing fee.

1 source

What were the specific legal violations found against the Condominium Association regarding meetings and documents?
How did the lack of clarity in the Bylaws regarding write-in ballots impact the association’s actions?
What was the ultimate outcome of this administrative hearing, including the ordered remedies for the petitioner?

Based on 1 source

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Donna M Bischoff (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Doug Meyer (president, director, witness)
    Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.
    Appeared and testified on behalf of Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
    OAH
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Decision transmitted electronically to Commissioner

Jennie Bennett v. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association

Note: A Rehearing was requested for this case. The dashboard statistics reflect the final outcome of the rehearing process.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-02-26
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Outcome The ALJ ordered the Petition dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited CC&R sections, as the malfunctioning backflow flap was located on the Petitioner's private property and was her responsibility.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jennie Bennett Counsel Maxwell Riddiough
Respondent Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ordered the Petition dismissed because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated the cited CC&R sections, as the malfunctioning backflow flap was located on the Petitioner's private property and was her responsibility.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof that the backflow flap was a common element maintenance responsibility under CC&Rs Sections 12(c) or 12(h)(1).

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of community documents regarding maintenance responsibility for sewage backflow flap.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by refusing to pay for repairs related to a malfunctioning backflow flap that caused a sewage overflow, arguing the item was a common element maintenance responsibility.

Orders: Petitioner Jennie Bennett’s Petition was dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Section 12(c)
  • CC&Rs Section 12(h)(1)
  • CC&Rs Section 15

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, CC&Rs, Maintenance Responsibility, Plumbing, Sewage Overflow, Burden of Proof
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019002-REL-RHG Decision – 771959.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:01 (103.3 KB)

Briefing Document: Jennie Bennett vs. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings, arguments, and conclusions from the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Decision in case number 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG, concerning a dispute between homeowner Jennie Bennett (Petitioner) and the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association (Respondent).

The core of the dispute was the financial responsibility for repairing a malfunctioning sewage backflow valve that caused an overflow at the petitioner’s residence. The petitioner argued that the HOA violated its Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs), specifically Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1), by refusing to cover the repair costs. The petitioner’s claim was complicated by the fact that the HOA had, just two weeks prior to the incident, rescinded a “Sewer Maintenance Policy” that had previously addressed such issues. The petitioner stated she was not notified of this rescission.

The respondent contended that the backflow valve was located on the petitioner’s private property, not in a common area, making its maintenance the petitioner’s responsibility under Section 15 of the CC&Rs. The HOA asserted that the 2017 policy was rescinded precisely because legal guidance confirmed this distinction. The HOA also maintained that notice of the rescission was sent to all homeowners.

The ALJ ultimately ruled in favor of the respondent, dismissing the petitioner’s petition. The decision concluded that the petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof—a preponderance of the evidence—to establish that the backflow valve was a common element covered by the cited CC&R sections. The evidence, including a plat map and photos, demonstrated the valve was on the petitioner’s private property. While the timing of the policy rescission was deemed “extremely unfortunate,” the ALJ found that once rescinded, the HOA was no longer obligated to share repair costs.

I. Case Overview

Case Name: Jennie Bennett, Petitioner, vs. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association, Respondent.

Case Number: 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG

Forum: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Administrative Law Judge: Antara Nath Rivera

Hearing Date: February 7, 2020

Decision Date: February 26, 2020

Core Allegation: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated community documents, specifically Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the CC&Rs.

II. Central Dispute and Timeline of Events

The central issue was whether the HOA was responsible for the cost of repairing a malfunctioning sewage backflow flap on the petitioner’s property.

March 2017: The HOA adopts a “Sewer Maintenance Policy” to outline processes for sewage maintenance.

February 13, 2019: The HOA Board rescinds the Sewer Maintenance Policy.

March 3, 2019: Petitioner Jennie Bennett experiences a sewage overflow at her residence due to a malfunctioning backflow valve.

March – May 2019: The petitioner brings her concerns to the HOA board at multiple meetings but receives no response.

May 22, 2019: The HOA responds to the petitioner after receiving a letter from her attorney.

July 10, 2019: The petitioner files a Dispute Process Petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

III. Petitioner’s Position and Arguments (Jennie Bennett)

The petitioner, a resident for 20 years, argued that the HOA was liable for the repair costs based on the following points:

CC&R Violation: The refusal to pay for the repair constituted a violation of Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the CC&Rs, which pertain to the HOA’s duty to maintain sewer lines and common elements.

Lack of Notice: The petitioner testified she was not notified of the policy rescission on February 13, 2019. The sewage overflow occurred just two weeks later, and upon reporting it, she was informed by a neighbor that the HOA had historically covered such issues.

Procedural Failure: The HOA failed to address her concerns at the March, April, or May board meetings, only engaging after her attorney intervened.

Community Support: The petitioner collected 97 signatures on a grassroots petition asking the HOA to cover the repair due to the short time frame between the policy rescission and the incident, and the lack of notice. The petition stated: “I am asking to be covered because of the 2 week time frame and no notice. I agree with being covered by the HOA for the flap.”

IV. Respondent’s Position and Arguments (Catalina Del Rey HOA)

The HOA, represented by community manager Vanessa Lubinsky of Cadden Community Management, presented a defense centered on the distinction between private and common property.

Private Property Responsibility: The HOA’s primary argument was that the backflow flap was located on the petitioner’s private property and was therefore her responsibility to maintain under Section 15 of the CC&Rs, which governs utilities like plumbing within a homeowner’s lot.

Evidence of Location: The respondent submitted a plat map and photographs as evidence. The photos illustrated that the backflow flap was located “next to Petitioner’s walk up to her front door,” well within her property lines and not on common elements.

Plumbing vs. Sewer Issue: Ms. Lubinsky characterized the problem as a “plumbing issue, not a sewer issue,” because of its location on private property.

Rationale for Policy Change: The 2017 Sewer Maintenance Policy was rescinded after the HOA received “additional legal guidance” confirming that backflow flaps were within homeowners’ units and thus their responsibility under Section 15.

Notice and Procedure: Ms. Lubinsky testified that notice of the rescission was issued to homeowners via both email and postal mail (postcards). She clarified that the rescission was a board decision that did not require a homeowner vote, as it was not an amendment to the CC&Rs.

V. Relevant Sections of the CC&Rs

The dispute hinged on the interpretation of the following sections of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements.

Section

Quoted Text from the Decision

Section 12(c)

“The Association shall maintain and landscape all front and side years open to the street, and shall maintain sewer lines, sidewalks, walkways, brick trim, streets and common recreation areas. …The words “repair or maintain” shall not be construed that the Association shall repair or maintain any individual lot owner’s roof or similar structure.”

Section 12(h)(1)

“Each such lot will be subject to assessments and the owner thereof shall pay to the Associations assessments as follows: Such lots pro rata share of the actual cost to the Association of all repair, maintenance, safety and control of common elements, including but not limited to maintenance of walkways, sidewalks, streets and sewers, care of lawns and landscaping in common areas and front and side yards of residences… .”

Section 15

(Described, not quoted) This section provides that the homeowner is responsible for the maintenance of utilities such as electricity and plumbing on their private property, similar to a single-family residence.

VI. Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Ruling

The ALJ’s decision was based on the petitioner’s failure to meet the required burden of proof.

Burden of Proof: The petitioner was required to establish the HOA’s violation by a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning proof that convinces the trier of fact the contention is more probably true than not.

Factual Determination: The judge found that the evidence, specifically the photos and plat map, demonstrated conclusively that the backflow flap was on the petitioner’s private property near her front door.

Conclusion on CC&Rs: Because the flap was determined not to be located within a common area, the petitioner failed to establish that it fell under the purview of Sections 12(c) or 12(h)(1). Therefore, she failed to prove the HOA had a responsibility to repair it under those sections.

Effect of Policy Rescission: The judge acknowledged, “It was extremely unfortunate that Petitioner experienced such a sewage overflow just after Respondent rescinded the Policy.” However, the ruling stated that once the policy was rescinded, the HOA “was not obligated to share the cost of repairs.”

Final Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner Jennie Bennett’s Petition be dismissed.” The order is binding on the parties, with any appeal required to be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days of service.

Study Guide: Bennett v. Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case text.

1. Who were the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case, and what was the legal case number?

2. What specific sections of the community documents did Petitioner Jennie Bennett allege the Respondent had violated?

3. Describe the incident that prompted the dispute and the date on which it occurred.

4. What was the “Sewer Maintenance Policy,” when was it adopted, and when was it rescinded?

5. According to the Respondent’s manager, Vanessa Lubinsky, why was the repair Jennie Bennett’s financial responsibility?

6. What evidence did the Respondent present to prove the location of the malfunctioning backflow flap?

7. What steps did Jennie Bennett take to rally support from her neighbors after the Respondent did not address her concerns?

8. What is the legal standard for the burden of proof in this case, and which party does it fall on?

9. According to Section 12(c) of the CC&Rs, what specific areas is the Homeowners Association responsible for maintaining?

10. What was the final ruling, or “Order,” issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this case?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Jennie Bennett, represented by attorney Maxwell Riddiough. The Respondent was the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association, represented by attorney Nathan Tennyson. The case number was 20F-H2019002-REL-RHG.

2. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs). This was noted as a single-issue petition.

3. On or about March 3, 2019, the Petitioner experienced a sewage overflow into her house. The overflow was caused by malfunctioning backflow valves.

4. The Sewer Maintenance Policy was a policy adopted in March 2017 to outline the process for sewage maintenance issues. It was rescinded by the HOA Board on February 13, 2019, shortly before the Petitioner’s incident.

5. Vanessa Lubinsky testified that the issue was the Petitioner’s responsibility because the malfunctioning backflow flap was located on her private property. Under Section 15 of the CC&Rs, homeowners are responsible for the maintenance of their own plumbing, electricity, and other utilities.

6. The Respondent presented a plat map, which specified all property lines, and photos. This evidence illustrated that the backflow flap was located inside the lines of the Petitioner’s private property, next to the walk-up to her front door, and not on common elements.

7. The Petitioner obtained 97 signatures on a “Grassroots petition.” The petition explained her situation and argued that she should be covered by the HOA for the repair due to the short time between the policy rescission and her incident, and because she had not received written notice.

8. The legal standard is “preponderance of the evidence,” which means the proof must convince the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not. The burden of proof fell on the Petitioner, Jennie Bennett, to establish that the Respondent committed the alleged violations.

9. Section 12(c) states the Association is responsible for maintaining and landscaping front and side yards open to the street. It also specifies the Association’s duty to maintain sewer lines, sidewalks, walkways, brick trim, streets, and common recreation areas.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that Petitioner Jennie Bennett’s Petition be dismissed. The judge concluded that the Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated the CC&Rs.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed to test a deeper, analytical understanding of the case. Formulate a detailed essay response for each prompt, using specific evidence and arguments from the provided text to support your conclusions.

1. Analyze and contrast the core arguments presented by the Petitioner, Jennie Bennett, and the Respondent, Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association. How did each party use the CC&Rs and the Sewer Maintenance Policy to support their position?

2. Discuss the significance of the Sewer Maintenance Policy’s rescission. Evaluate the timing of the rescission relative to the Petitioner’s incident and the arguments made regarding notification to homeowners.

3. Explain the legal concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the case document. How did Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera apply this standard to the evidence presented by both parties to reach a final decision?

4. Evaluate the role of physical evidence, specifically the plat map and photographs, in the outcome of this hearing. Why was determining the precise location of the backflow flap the central issue of the case?

5. From an ethical and community governance perspective, discuss the actions of the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association. Consider their decision to rescind the policy, the method of notification, and their initial responses (or lack thereof) to Ms. Bennett’s requests at the board meetings.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Antara Nath Rivera, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes legal decisions and orders.

Burden of Proof

The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.

Common Elements

Areas within the HOA community that are not part of an individual homeowner’s private property and are maintained by the Association. Examples from the text include walkways, sidewalks, streets, sewers, and recreation areas.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions and Easements (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that outline the rules, obligations, and restrictions for a planned community. The Petitioner alleged a violation of Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of these documents.

Homeowners Association (HOA)

The community organization, Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association, responsible for managing and maintaining the common elements of a planned community as defined by the CC&Rs.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was homeowner Jennie Bennett.

Plat Map

A map, drawn to scale, showing the divisions of a piece of land. In this case, it was used as evidence to specify all property lines, including the Petitioner’s.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The evidentiary standard required to win the case, defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.” It is described as the “greater weight of the evidence.”

Rescission

The act of canceling or revoking a policy or decision. The HOA Board rescinded its Sewer Maintenance Policy on February 13, 2019.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association.

A Homeowner’s Sewage Nightmare: 5 Surprising Lessons from a Losing Battle with an HOA

Introduction: The Dreaded HOA Letter

For many homeowners, the greatest fear isn’t a storm or a failing appliance; it’s a sudden, catastrophic repair bill. This anxiety is often magnified for those living in a planned community, where another layer of complexity—the Homeowners Association (HOA)—governs every aspect of property maintenance. A dispute with the HOA can turn a straightforward repair into a frustrating and expensive legal battle.

The case of Jennie Bennett, a resident in her home for 20 years, and the Catalina Del Rey Homeowners Association is a stark cautionary tale. After a sewage overflow caused by a malfunctioning backflow valve, Ms. Bennett found herself in a dispute with her HOA over who should pay for the repair, claiming the association had violated Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of its governing documents. The resulting legal decision reveals critical, and often surprising, insights into how HOA rules are interpreted and enforced. This article breaks down the five most impactful lessons from her losing battle.

1. Location is Everything: The Critical Line Between Private and Common Property

The single most important factor in the judge’s decision was the physical location of the broken part. The entire case hinged on a simple question: was the malfunctioning backflow flap on Jennie Bennett’s private property or in an HOA-maintained common area?

The HOA argued that the plat map and photos proved the flap was located “next to Petitioner’s walk up to her front door,” placing it squarely inside her private property line. While the homeowner claimed the HOA was responsible for “sewer lines” under Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), this argument failed. The HOA’s manager, Vanessa Lubinsky, perfectly synthesized the association’s legal position when she “opined that the backflow flap was a plumbing issue, not a sewer issue, because it was located on Petitioner’s private property.”

Because the backflow flap was deemed to be on private property, it fell under Section 15 of the CC&Rs. This clause stipulated that the homeowner was responsible for the maintenance of their own plumbing, electricity, and other utilities—much like the owner of a single-family residence. The specific location of the failure, not the general nature of the system it belonged to, determined financial responsibility.

2. An HOA ‘Policy’ Can Vanish Overnight

For nearly two years, from March 2017 to February 2019, the Catalina Del Rey HOA had a “Sewer Maintenance Policy” in place. This policy, which had been in effect for nearly two years, outlined a process for handling sewage maintenance; however, once rescinded, the HOA was no longer obligated to share in repair costs. The Board of Directors rescinded this policy on February 13, 2019. The petitioner’s sewage overflow occurred on March 3, 2019—less than three weeks later.

Crucially, the HOA’s action was not arbitrary. According to case testimony, the board rescinded the policy because, “After Respondent received additional legal guidance, it was determined that the backflow flaps were located within the homeowners’ units and on private property.” This reveals a critical insight: the HOA made a calculated, legally-informed decision to shift liability back to homeowners to align with the CC&Rs.

This also highlights the significant difference between a formal, recorded CC&R and a simple board policy. As the HOA manager clarified, rescinding the policy did not require a homeowner vote because it was not an amendment to the core CC&Rs. A board can unilaterally change a policy, altering the financial obligations of every resident without a community-wide vote.

3. The High Cost of “Extremely Unfortunate” Timing

The timing of the sewage backup, occurring just after the policy change, was a devastating coincidence for the homeowner. The administrative law judge acknowledged this directly in the final decision, stating:

It was extremely unfortunate that Petitioner experienced such a sewage overflow just after Respondent rescinded the Policy.

Compounding the issue was a dispute over communication. The petitioner claimed she “was not notified of the rescission.” In her efforts to be covered, she even gathered 97 signatures on a “Grassroots petition” from her neighbors. The petitioner claimed she received no substantive response from the board regarding her repair claim until her attorney sent a formal letter on May 22, 2019. The HOA countered this, stating that notice of the policy change had been sent to homeowners via both email and postcards.

This takeaway is impactful because it demonstrates how quickly a homeowner’s rights and financial obligations can change. A simple board decision, potentially missed in a stack of mail or an overlooked email, can result in thousands of dollars in unexpected costs.

4. The Burden of Proof Is on the Homeowner, Not the HOA

In any legal dispute, one side has the “burden of proof”—the responsibility to convince the judge that their claim is true. In this HOA case, that burden fell entirely on the petitioner, Jennie Bennett.

The legal standard required her to prove her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as evidence that is sufficient to persuade a judge that a claim is more likely true than not. The legal decision provides a clear definition:

“[t]he greater weight of the evidence… sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”

Ultimately, the judge concluded that the homeowner did not meet this standard. The final order states, “Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated Sections 12(c) and 12(h)(1) of the CC&Rs.” This underscores a critical point: when a homeowner challenges an HOA, it is their responsibility to build the winning case with convincing evidence.

Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Know Your Property Lines

The overarching lesson from Jennie Bennett’s experience is that in an HOA, the fine print matters immensely. The precise wording of the governing documents and, as this case proves, the exact location of property lines are paramount. A board policy you rely on today could be gone tomorrow, and a repair you assume is a community responsibility could be deemed yours based on a measurement of inches.

This case serves as a powerful reminder for all homeowners to be proactive. Read your CC&Rs, pay attention to all communications from your board, and understand the difference between binding covenants and changeable policies. It all comes down to one final, critical question: Do you know exactly where your maintenance responsibilities end and your HOA’s begin?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jennie Bennett (petitioner)
    Testified at hearing
  • Maxwell Riddiough (petitioner attorney)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (respondent attorney)
    Brown|Olcott, PLLC
  • Vanessa Lubinsky (property manager)
    Cadden Community Management
    Testified on behalf of Respondent
  • Daniel (staff)
    Cadden
    Informed Petitioner about policy rescission

Neutral Parties

  • Antara Nath Rivera (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • JC Niles (witness)
    Mentioned in Petitioner's Grassroots petition

Robert L Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 20F-H2019018-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2020-01-29
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Bellasera Community Association, Inc. did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the homeowner received constructive notice of the violation and fine structure, satisfying statutory requirements. The petition was dismissed.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Robert L Greco Counsel
Respondent Bellasera Community Association, Inc. Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Bellasera Community Association, Inc. did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the homeowner received constructive notice of the violation and fine structure, satisfying statutory requirements. The petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proving Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), as the evidence showed Petitioner received sufficient constructive notice of the alleged violation and had an opportunity to be heard or appeal.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the HOA violated statutory requirements regarding notice and imposition of monetary penalties/late fees, resulting in suspension of privileges.

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by imposing fines and suspending gate/clubhouse access without providing adequate (actual) notice of the violation and hearing opportunity, and by improperly imposing late fees. The ALJ found the HOA provided constructive notice, satisfying the statute, and was entitled to impose cumulative fines for the ongoing violation.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1220
  • BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1090

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA fines, Constructive notice, Statutory violation, Access suspension, Maintenance violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

20F-H2019018-REL Decision – 766844.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:37 (133.7 KB)

Briefing Document: Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Robert L. Greco (Petitioner) versus the Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Respondent), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, ruling in favor of the Homeowners Association (HOA).

The core dispute originated from a 2013 violation notice regarding a faded garage door. The Petitioner claimed he did not receive the initial notices and only became aware of the issue upon receiving a letter from the HOA’s attorney. Despite subsequently painting the door, an outstanding balance of $750 in fines remained on his account. For six years, the Petitioner paid his quarterly dues but ignored the outstanding fine balance. In June 2019, after failed settlement negotiations, the HOA deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and clubhouse access, prompting him to file the formal dispute.

The judge’s decision rested on two key legal conclusions. First, the court rejected the Petitioner’s argument that “actual notice” was required for the fines to be valid. It ruled that the multiple notices mailed to the Petitioner’s residence constituted sufficient “constructive notice” under Arizona law, providing both notification of the violation and an opportunity to be heard. Second, the court determined that the $750 charge was not an improper late fee but rather three separate, legitimate fines of $250 each, levied for an ongoing, uncorrected violation as per the HOA’s enforcement policy.

Case Overview

Case Name

Robert L Greco, Petitioner, vs. Bellasera Community Association, Inc., Respondent

Case Number

20F-H2019018-REL

Jurisdiction

Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Hearing Date

January 9, 2020

Decision Date

January 29, 2020

Petitioner’s Core Allegation

Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by imposing penalties and revoking privileges without providing proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Core Factual Issue

The denial of automatic gate and clubhouse access to the Petitioner on July 1, 2019, due to unpaid fines from 2013.

Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict between Mr. Greco and the Bellasera Community Association unfolded over six years, escalating from a minor maintenance issue to a formal legal dispute and revocation of privileges.

Initial Violation and Fines (2013)

Details

Feb. 5, 2013

Courtesy Notice

Respondent sent a notice to Petitioner’s address stating his garage door was faded and needed to be repainted, in violation of the Design Guidelines.

Mar. 14, 2013

Final Notice & First Fine

A follow-up notice was sent, stating a $250 fine was posted to Petitioner’s account. It warned that an additional $250 fine would be assessed automatically every 14 days if the violation remained uncorrected.

Apr. 2, 2013

Notice of Remedy & Second Fine

A third notice was sent, posting another $250 fine. This letter explicitly warned that the HOA had the “ability to suspend privileges for use of the Recreational Facilities” and informed the Petitioner of his right to appeal within 14 days.

May 7, 2013

Fourth Notice & Third Fine

A fourth notice was sent, posting another $250 fine to the account. It again noted the right to appeal the fine.

Jun. 5, 2013

Letter from HOA Counsel

Attorney Kelly Oetinger sent a letter demanding the garage door be repainted within 15 days. The letter explicitly stated, “If you do not repaint… the Association may disable the transponder you use to enter the community and may disable the fobs you use for the clubhouse.”

Petitioner’s Response and Aftermath (2013)

July 4, 2013: Petitioner repainted the garage door.

July 5, 2013: Petitioner sent a letter to the HOA stating the attorney’s letter was his “initial alert of the garage door condition.” He explained his delay by stating, “To effectively manage my workload, I dispose of unsolicited mail… In the future, I will exercise greater caution in disposing of unsolicited mail.”

July 5, 2013: The HOA sent a letter acknowledging the repainting and offered to settle the $900 in fines for a payment of $500. The letter reiterated the threat to deactivate gate openers and fobs.

July 17, 2013: The HOA sent a follow-up letter correcting an internal accounting error. The total fines were $750, not $900. A new settlement offer was made: pay $375, and the remaining $375 would be waived.

Period of Inaction (2013 – 2019)

From 2013 to 2019, the Petitioner received quarterly statements from the HOA indicating a $750 balance in addition to current assessments. Each quarter, the Petitioner would physically cross out the $750 balance and pay only the current assessment amount.

Escalation and Revocation of Privileges (2019)

June 2019: Dennis Carson, a friend of the Petitioner serving on the HOA Board of Directors, informed him that his name was on a penalty list and the Board planned to deactivate his security gate and clubhouse access.

June 2019: Settlement negotiations failed. The Petitioner offered $100; the Board countered with $250. The Petitioner then offered $251 ($250 for the fine and $1 to rent the clubhouse), which the Board declined.

July 1, 2019: The Respondent deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and access to the clubhouse.

October 11, 2019: The Petitioner filed the Homeowners Association Dispute Process Petition, initiating the legal proceedings.

Key Arguments and Legal Findings

The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of “notice” as required by state law and the legitimacy of the fines imposed by the HOA.

Petitioner’s Position

1. Lack of Proper Notice: The Petitioner argued that he had not received “actual notice” of the violation or the impending fines until the letter from the HOA’s counsel on June 5, 2013. He asserted that because he acted promptly after receiving that letter, the fines were unjust. His argument implied that warnings in mail he did not personally read could not be held against him.

2. Improper Fines: The Petitioner alleged that the additional $500 in charges on the original $250 fine constituted improper late fees.

Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions of Law

The Judge systematically refuted the Petitioner’s arguments, concluding that the HOA acted within its rights and in accordance with the law.

1. On the Matter of Notice:

• The governing statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), requires “notice and an opportunity to be heard” before imposing penalties.

• The Judge found no legal authority requiring this to be “actual notice.” To accept this argument would create an unworkable standard where a homeowner could “avoid receiving ‘actual notice’ by simply refusing to sign for a certified mailing.”

• The decision established that the Petitioner received constructive notice through the “multiple mailings that were presumably delivered to his residential address.”

• The notices also informed the Petitioner how to appeal the matter, thereby satisfying the requirement for an “opportunity to be heard.”

Conclusion: “Accordingly, Petitioner was provided notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).”

2. On the Matter of Fines:

• The Judge differentiated between late fees and fines for an ongoing violation.

• The notices sent by the Respondent “clearly stated that an ongoing failure to remedy the violation would result in additional fines every 14 days.”

• The violation persisted from before March 14, 2013 (first fine) until July 5, 2013 (when the door was confirmed painted).

Conclusion: The Respondent was entitled to impose three separate fines for the “ongoing condition of the garage door,” making the total of $750 legitimate.

Final Order and Implications

Based on the analysis of the evidence and law, the Administrative Law Judge reached a definitive conclusion.

Final Ruling: “This Tribunal concludes that Respondent did not violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).”

Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”

Binding Nature: The order, dated January 29, 2020, is binding on the parties unless a rehearing is requested with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.

Study Guide: Greco v. Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case of Robert L. Greco (Petitioner) versus Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (Respondent), Case No. 20F-H2019018-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz to test your knowledge, an answer key for review, a set of essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what was the Petitioner’s central complaint that initiated the legal action?

2. What specific violation of the community’s rules was the Petitioner initially accused of, and which governing documents were cited as being violated?

3. Describe the timeline of notices and fines issued by the Respondent between February and May 2013.

4. What was the Petitioner’s explanation for not responding to the initial violation notices from the Respondent before receiving a letter from the association’s attorney?

5. What actions did the Respondent take in or around June 2019 that led the Petitioner to file his petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

6. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument regarding the “notice” required by the Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)?

7. How did the Administrative Law Judge differentiate between “actual notice” and “constructive notice” in her decision?

8. Why did the judge ultimately conclude that the Respondent had provided the Petitioner with adequate “notice and an opportunity to be heard”?

9. Explain the Petitioner’s allegation about improper late fees and the reason the judge rejected this argument.

10. What was the final order of the Administrative Law Judge in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was homeowner Robert L. Greco, and the Respondent was the Bellasera Community Association, Inc. (the HOA). Greco’s central complaint, filed on October 11, 2019, was that the HOA had denied him automatic gate access and use of clubhouse facilities on July 1, 2019, despite his being a long-term resident with timely payment of all quarterly dues.

2. The Petitioner was accused of having a faded garage door that needed to be repainted. The violation was cited as being contrary to the CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions), specifically Article V, Section 5.2, and the community’s Design Guidelines, specifically Article III, Section J.

3. The Respondent sent an initial “Courtesy Notice” on February 5, 2013. This was followed by a “Final Notice” with a $250 fine on March 14, a “Notice of Remedy” with another $250 fine on April 2, and a “Fourth Notice of Non-Compliance” with another $250 fine on May 7, 2013.

4. The Petitioner claimed that the attorney’s letter, received around June 5, 2013, was his “initial alert” regarding the garage door condition. He stated that he routinely disposes of unsolicited mail without reading it and had inadvertently discarded the previous notices sent by the Respondent.

5. In June 2019, after failed settlement negotiations over the outstanding $750 in fines from 2013, the Respondent deactivated the Petitioner’s security gate fob and his access to the clubhouse. This action prompted the Petitioner to file his dispute petition.

6. The Petitioner’s primary argument was that he did not receive “actual notice” of the violation until the attorney’s letter. He contended that because he acted promptly to correct the violation after receiving actual notice, he should not have been fined.

7. The judge used definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary. “Actual notice” was defined as notice given directly to, or personally received by, a party. “Constructive notice” was defined as notice arising by presumption of law from facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.

8. The judge concluded that the multiple notices mailed to the Petitioner’s residential address constituted “constructive notice” of the violation. Because the relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), does not explicitly require “actual notice,” and the mailings also advised him of his right to appeal, the judge found the Respondent had fulfilled its obligation to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard.

9. The Petitioner alleged that the additional $500 in fines were improper late fees on the original $250 fine. The judge rejected this, clarifying that the Respondent’s notices stated that additional fines would be assessed every 14 days for an ongoing failure to remedy the violation. Therefore, the additional charges were three separate fines for the “ongoing condition of the garage door,” not late fees.

10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed. The parties were notified that this order was binding unless a request for rehearing was filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for deeper analysis and discussion. No answers are provided.

1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s reasoning for favoring “constructive notice” over “actual notice” in the context of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B). Discuss the potential consequences for homeowners and HOAs if the ruling had required “actual notice.”

2. Trace the negotiation attempts between the Petitioner and the Respondent in 2013 and 2019. Evaluate the effectiveness of these attempts and discuss whether the dispute could have been resolved without formal legal proceedings.

3. The Petitioner argued that the fines imposed after the initial $250 were improper late fees. The judge, however, characterized them as new fines for an “ongoing condition.” Based on the evidence presented in the notices, construct an argument supporting both the Petitioner’s and the judge’s interpretation.

4. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” in this case. Explain what “preponderance of the evidence” means and identify the key pieces of evidence that allowed the judge to conclude the Respondent did not violate the statute.

5. Examine the roles of the various community governing documents cited in this case (CC&Rs, Design Guidelines, Violation Enforcement policy). Explain how these documents worked together to grant the Respondent the authority to take action against the Petitioner.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

The Arizona Revised Statute central to this case, which permits an HOA board to impose reasonable monetary penalties for violations after providing “notice and an opportunity to be heard.”

Actual Notice

As defined in the decision, it is “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.”

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues a decision. In this case, it was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Bellasera Community Association, Inc.

The Respondent in the case; the homeowners association (HOA) for the Bellasera Community in Arizona.

An acronym for Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing legal documents for the community, which the Petitioner was found to have violated (specifically Article V, Section 5.2).

Constructive Notice

As defined in the decision, it is “[n]otice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.” The judge ruled that mail sent to a residence constitutes this form of notice.

Design Guidelines

A set of rules established by the HOA governing the aesthetic appearance of properties. The Petitioner was found in violation of Article III, Section J of these guidelines.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition seeking a ruling. In this case, it was the homeowner, Robert L. Greco.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof required in this hearing. It is defined as “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, it was the HOA.

He Threw Away His Mail for Years. His HOA’s Response Is a Warning to Every Homeowner.

That official-looking envelope from your Homeowners Association sits on the counter, a silent challenge. It’s easy to dismiss it as a newsletter or a bland reminder, just another piece of paper to be sorted later. But what if it isn’t? What if that envelope is a legal summons in disguise, the first shot in a battle you don’t even know you’re fighting?

For Robert L. Greco, a resident in his community for 17 years, this hypothetical became a harsh reality. He learned that ignoring HOA correspondence can ignite a conflict that smolders for years before erupting into severe consequences. Originating from a maintenance issue as simple as a faded garage door, his case offers a masterclass in the powerful lessons every homeowner should heed.

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1. The “I Didn’t Read It” Defense Doesn’t Work

The central pillar of the homeowner’s defense was disarmingly simple: he claimed he never received the first four violation notices because he habitually throws away what he considers “unsolicited mail.” He argued that without having read the warnings, he couldn’t be held responsible for the fines.

The judge’s ruling, however, invoked a foundational legal concept that extends far beyond HOA disputes into areas like property deeds and public records: the difference between “actual notice” and “constructive notice.” While actual notice means you personally saw the information, constructive notice presumes you have knowledge of something because it was delivered properly—in this case, mailed to the correct address. Whether you open the envelope is irrelevant.

In a July 5, 2013 letter, the homeowner unwittingly sealed his own fate by describing his mail-handling routine:

Routinely, Saturdays are my mail-pick-up days, and invariably, I walk straight to the re-cyclable container, and deposit the mail in the receptacle… I was astonished to learn that my garage door failed inspection. This is my initial alert of the garage door condition.

For homeowners, the takeaway is a stark one: in the eyes of the law, your recycling bin is not a valid legal defense. The burden doesn’t fall on an HOA to ensure you read your mail, only to send it. The responsibility to open and review all official correspondence rests squarely on the homeowner.

2. A Tiny Issue Can Snowball into a Years-Long Standoff

The timeline of this dispute reveals a classic case of conflict avoidance, where a minor, fixable problem was allowed to spiral into a major legal battle. The cost of a can of paint and a Saturday afternoon of work was ultimately dwarfed by a six-year, $750 dispute that cost the homeowner his access to his own community.

February 5, 2013: The HOA sends its first “Courtesy Notice” regarding a faded garage door in need of repainting.

March – May 2013: After no response, the HOA issues three more notices, levying escalating fines that total $750.

2013 to 2019: For six years, the homeowner receives quarterly statements showing the $750 balance. Each time, he would “cross out the $750.00 balance and pay the current assessment.”

June/July 2019: The HOA finally forces the issue by deactivating his security gate fob and his access to the clubhouse.

This progression shows how a simple lack of communication transformed a weekend chore into a years-long standoff. By ignoring the notices and the subsequent fines, the homeowner allowed a molehill to grow into a mountain of conflict.

3. “Continuing Violation” Fines Are Not Late Fees

The homeowner contended that the HOA was improperly stacking late fees on top of an initial $250 penalty. However, the administrative law judge highlighted a critical distinction embedded in the association’s rules.

The HOA wasn’t charging late fees on a single, past-due penalty. It was levying new fines for a “continuing violation.” The notice sent on March 14, 2013, explicitly warned that “an additional fine of $250 will be assessed automatically every 14 days… if the violation remains uncorrected.”

This is a crucial detail found in many HOA bylaws. An unpainted garage door is not a one-time offense; it is an ongoing breach of community standards. A homeowner who thinks they are simply letting a single fine sit unpaid may actually be incurring entirely new violations over time, dramatically increasing their financial liability.

4. Failed Negotiations Can Cost More Than Money

Twice, this dispute could have been resolved. The breakdown in negotiations, however, reveals how ego and principle can prove more costly than the fines themselves.

The first attempt came in 2013, after the homeowner had finally painted the garage. The HOA initially offered to settle a supposed $900 balance for $500. This, however, was based on an “internal accounting error.” In a subsequent letter, the HOA apologized, corrected the record to show the true balance was $750, and made a formal offer: pay half—just $375—and the matter would be closed. The offer was not accepted. Including this error shows the HOA was not infallible, making the subsequent stalemate more complex.

The second negotiation occurred in 2019, prompted by a friend on the Board who urged a settlement. The homeowner offered $100. The Board countered with $250. The homeowner’s final offer was exquisitely specific: “$251.00, $250.00 to settle the outstanding fines and $1.00 to rent the clubhouse on a specific date.”

This offer was a tactical and psychological blunder. That extra dollar wasn’t about money; it was a message. Whether intended as a sarcastic jab or a principled stand to assert his rights as a member, it transformed a financial negotiation into a battle of wills. For a Board of Directors, accepting such an offer could be seen as capitulating to a petty gesture, setting a precedent that defiance works. They declined. Shortly after, the homeowner’s access to community facilities was cut off, leading to the legal petition he ultimately lost.

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Conclusion: A Lesson in Communication

This case serves as a powerful warning. The legal force of “constructive notice” makes you responsible for the mail you receive, not just the mail you read. The six-year standoff over a can of paint shows how inaction can have disproportionate consequences. And the failed $251 offer demonstrates that good-faith negotiation is paramount.

Ultimately, the homeowner was left still owing the money and locked out of his own amenities—a casualty of a battle he prolonged at every turn. It leaves every homeowner with a critical question to consider: in a dispute with your HOA, where is the line between standing on principle and causing yourself unnecessary harm?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert L Greco (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (attorney)
    Brown|Olcott, PLLC
  • David Reid (board member)
    Testified for Respondent
  • Annette McCarthy (manager)
    Acting Manager; Testified for Respondent
  • Kelly Oetinger (attorney)
    Counsel for Respondent in 2013
  • Dennis Carson (board member)

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    ADRE

Annette Cohen vs. CBS 136 Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818033-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-06-26
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party because Respondent established a technical violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested documents within the 10-day limit. However, the Administrative Law Judge found a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Annette Cohen Counsel
Respondent CBS 136 Homeowners Association Counsel Brian E. Ditsch

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party because Respondent established a technical violation of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested documents within the 10-day limit. However, the Administrative Law Judge found a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide requested association records within 10 business days

Petitioner requested sign-in sheets for the January 10, 2018, and February 15, 2018, CBS HOA meetings. Respondent acknowledged a technical violation of the statute by failing to provide the requested documents within the required 10-day timeframe, although they were ultimately provided prior to the hearing.

Orders: Respondent must comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future, and pay Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: records request, failure to provide documents, condominium owners association, filing fee refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)
  • A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
  • A.R.S. § 41-1092.09

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 642888.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:47 (74.5 KB)

18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 655537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:50 (83.3 KB)

18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 642888.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:22 (74.5 KB)

18F-H1818033-REL Decision – 655537.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:23:25 (83.3 KB)

Administrative Hearing Briefing: Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and decision from the administrative hearing case Annette Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association (No. 18F-H1818033-REL). The core of the dispute was the Homeowners Association’s (HOA) failure to provide requested documents—specifically, meeting sign-in sheets—to a member, Annette Cohen, within the ten-business-day timeframe mandated by Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1258.

At the hearing, the Respondent HOA acknowledged this “technical violation,” attributing the delay to operational difficulties arising from a recent change in management companies. The Petitioner, Ms. Cohen, argued the delay was intentional and warranted a civil penalty.

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, found that the HOA did violate the statute. In the final order, the Judge declared Ms. Cohen the prevailing party and mandated future compliance by the HOA. While a civil penalty was deemed inappropriate under the circumstances, the Judge ordered the HOA to reimburse Ms. Cohen’s $500 filing fee.

Case Overview

Entity / Individual

Petitioner

Annette Cohen

Respondent

CBS 136 Homeowners Association (CBS)

Respondent’s Counsel

Brian Ditsch, Sacks Tierney P.A.

Respondent’s Mgmt. Co.

Key Witness

Susan Rubin (PRM)

Adjudicating Body

Office of Administrative Hearings, Phoenix, Arizona

Administrative Law Judge

Tammy L. Eigenheer

Case Number

18F-H1818033-REL

Hearing Date

June 6, 2018

Decision Date

June 26, 2018

Chronology of the Dispute

The dispute centered on two separate sets of document requests made by Petitioner Annette Cohen.

Request 1 (January 10 Meeting):

On or about Jan. 10, 2018: Ms. Cohen requested the sign-in sheets from the annual meeting held on this date.

Jan. 2018: The management company PRM took over management of the CBS 136 HOA.

Feb. 15, 2018: After more than a month, and after two scheduled review appointments were cancelled by the management company, the sign-in sheets were finally provided to Ms. Cohen by email.

Request 2 (February 15 Meeting):

Feb. 19, 2018: Ms. Cohen requested the sign-in sheets from the February 15, 2018 HOA meeting. Receipt of this request was acknowledged by PRM.

Feb. 21, 26, 27 & March 5, 2018: Ms. Cohen made repeated follow-up requests for the same information.

Formal Proceedings:

March 9, 2018: Ms. Cohen filed a formal petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

April 10, 2018: The Respondent HOA filed an answer denying all allegations.

June 6, 2018: An administrative hearing was held. The documents had been provided to Ms. Cohen at some point prior to this hearing.

June 26, 2018: The Administrative Law Judge issued the final decision.

Core Allegation and Legal Framework

Petitioner’s Allegation

Annette Cohen alleged that the CBS 136 Homeowners Association violated A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, Section 33-1258 by failing to provide association records for review and copying within the statutorily required timeframe.

Governing Statute: A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

The legal basis for the petition is Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1258(A), which governs a member’s right to access association records. The statute states, in relevant part:

“all financial and other records of the association shall be made reasonably available for examination by any member… The association shall have ten business days to fulfill a request for examination. On request for purchase of copies of records by any member… the association shall have ten business days to provide copies of the requested records. An association may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per page.”

The petitioner bears the burden of proving a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, defined as evidence that “shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Arguments and Evidence Presented at Hearing

Once the Respondent acknowledged the delay, the hearing focused solely on determining the appropriate remedy.

Petitioner’s Position (Annette Cohen)

Intentional Negligence: Ms. Cohen argued that the Respondent “intentionally ignored her request for the documents.”

Request for Penalty: Based on the belief of intentional neglect, she asserted that a civil penalty was an appropriate remedy.

Unreasonable Delay: She noted that the documents “could have easily been emailed to her within the 10 day deadline,” but that the HOA’s management company did not present this as an option until after the deadline had already passed.

Respondent’s Position (CBS 136 HOA)

Acknowledged Violation: At the June 6, 2018 hearing, the Respondent “acknowledged that the requested documents were not provided within the 10 day timeframe set forth in statute.”

Mitigating Circumstances: The defense centered on testimony from Susan Rubin of the management company, PRM. Ms. Rubin testified to the following:

◦ No requests are “ever purposefully ignored.”

◦ PRM had only taken over management of the HOA in January 2018.

◦ At the time of the requests, PRM was “still getting documents from the former management company.”

◦ The delay was not due to ignoring the request, but because it “took a little longer than expected to provide the documents.”

Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Order

Findings and Conclusions

Violation Established: The Judge concluded there was “no dispute that Respondent failed to provide the requested documents within 10 days.” Therefore, the Petitioner “established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).”

Rejection of Civil Penalty: Despite the Petitioner’s argument, the Administrative Law Judge did “not find such a penalty to be appropriate given the circumstances in this matter.”

Final Order

The Judge issued a three-part order binding on the parties:

1. Prevailing Party: The Petitioner, Annette Cohen, is “deemed the prevailing party.”

2. Future Compliance: The Respondent, CBS 136 Homeowners Association, is ordered to “comply with the applicable provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future.”

3. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: The Respondent must pay the Petitioner her filing fee of $500.00 directly to her within thirty (30) days of the order.

Study Guide: Cohen v. CBS 136 Homeowners Association

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Please answer the following ten questions in 2-3 complete sentences, using only the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in case No. 18F-H1818033-REL, and what were their respective roles?

2. What specific documents did the Petitioner, Annette Cohen, request from the Respondent?

3. According to the petition, what was the core legal violation alleged by Ms. Cohen against the Homeowners Association?

4. What was the timeline for the Respondent’s failure to produce the sign-in sheets from the January 10, 2018 meeting?

5. How did the Respondent initially respond to the petition after it was filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate?

6. What admission did the Respondent make at the June 6, 2018 hearing?

7. What was the Respondent’s explanation for the delay in providing the requested documents to the Petitioner?

8. What remedy did the Petitioner argue was appropriate for the violation, and on what grounds?

9. What legal standard of proof was the Petitioner required to meet, and did the judge find that she met it?

10. What were the three components of the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Annette Cohen, who was the Petitioner, and the CBS 136 Homeowners Association, which was the Respondent. The Petitioner is the party who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the party against whom the complaint was filed.

2. The Petitioner requested the sign-in sheets from two separate meetings. She requested the sign-in sheets from the January 10, 2018 annual meeting and the sign-in sheets from the February 15, 2018 CBS HOA meeting.

3. The core legal violation alleged by Ms. Cohen was that the Respondent had violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) Title 33, Chapter 16, Section 33-1258. This statute requires homeowner associations to provide requested records to members for examination or copying within a ten-business-day timeframe.

4. Ms. Cohen requested the January 10, 2018 sign-in sheets on or about that same date (January 10). She did not receive them via email until February 15, 2018, which is well beyond the ten-business-day limit stipulated by law.

5. On or about April 10, 2018, the Respondent filed an answer to the petition. In this official response, the Respondent denied all of the allegations made by the Petitioner.

6. At the June 6, 2018 hearing, the Respondent acknowledged its failure to comply with the law. The Respondent admitted that the requested documents were not provided within the 10-day timeframe set forth in the statute, constituting a technical violation.

7. The Respondent, through the testimony of Susan Rubin from its management company PRM, explained the delay was not intentional. Ms. Rubin stated that PRM had just taken over management of the HOA in January 2018 and was still in the process of getting documents from the former management company.

8. The Petitioner argued that a civil penalty was the appropriate remedy. She contended that the Respondent intentionally ignored her requests and could have easily emailed the documents within the deadline, but failed to do so until after the deadline had passed.

9. The Petitioner had the burden of proving her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” The judge found that she successfully met this standard because there was no dispute that the Respondent failed to provide the documents within the required 10 days.

10. The three components of the final Order were: 1) The Petitioner, Annette Cohen, was deemed the prevailing party; 2) The Respondent was ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) in the future; and 3) The Respondent was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, essay-format responses. Use the provided case documents to formulate a comprehensive analysis.

1. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent regarding the appropriate remedy for the acknowledged statutory violation. Evaluate the mitigating circumstances offered by the Respondent and discuss why the Administrative Law Judge may have found them persuasive enough to deny a civil penalty while still finding in favor of the Petitioner.

2. Discuss the legal framework governing disputes between property owners and condominium associations in Arizona as outlined in the case documents. Explain the roles of the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings, and detail the specific requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1258(A).

3. Examine the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the judge’s decision. Explain how the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof, particularly in light of the Respondent’s initial denial of all allegations versus its later admission at the hearing.

4. Deconstruct the final Order issued by Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer. What were the three distinct parts of the Order, and what legal and practical purpose did each part serve in resolving the dispute, compensating the Petitioner, and ensuring future compliance by the Respondent?

5. Trace the procedural history of this case, creating a timeline of key events from Ms. Cohen’s first document request to the issuance of the final Order. Discuss the significance of each step, including the multiple requests, the petition filing, the Respondent’s answer, the hearing, and the final decision.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge

The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision.

A.R.S. § 33-1258(A)

The specific section of Arizona Revised Statutes cited in the case. It mandates that a homeowners association must make records available for member examination within ten business days and may charge up to fifteen cents per page for copies.

Burden of Proof

The obligation on a party in a legal proceeding to prove their assertions. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the Respondent violated the statute.

CBS 136 Homeowners Association

The Respondent in the case; an association of condominium owners located in Sun City West, Arizona.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with jurisdiction to hear disputes between property owners and condominium owners associations.

Findings of Fact

The section of the decision that outlines the factual history and evidence presented in the case, as determined by the judge.

Office of Administrative Hearings

The state office where the formal hearing on the petition was conducted.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the Petitioner was Annette Cohen.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as evidence that is more convincing and shows that the fact sought to be proved is “more probable than not.”

The management company that took over management of the CBS 136 Homeowners Association in January 2018.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the CBS 136 Homeowners Association.

Technical Violation

An acknowledged infringement of a rule or statute where the substance of the rule may not have been maliciously violated. The Respondent admitted to a technical violation of the 10-day timeframe for document production.

Select all sources
642888.pdf
655537.pdf

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18F-H1818033-REL

2 sources

Both documents are identical excerpts from an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, concerning a dispute between Annette Cohen (Petitioner) and the CBS 136 Homeowners Association (Respondent). The case, No. 18F-H1818033-REL, addressed the Petitioner’s claim that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1258(A) by failing to provide requested association meeting sign-in sheets within the mandated ten-day period. Though the Respondent acknowledged a technical violation of the statute, the Administrative Law Judge determined that a civil penalty was not appropriate given the circumstances, such as the change in management. Ultimately, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, and the Respondent was ordered to comply with the statute in the future and reimburse the Petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

2 sources

Based on 2 sources

NotebookLM can be inaccurate; please double check its responses.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Annette Cohen (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Brian Ditsch (respondent attorney)
    Sacks Tierney P.A.
  • Susan Rubin (witness)
    PRM (management company)
    Testified for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of decision notice

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (clerical staff)
    Transmitted the decision

John Paul Holyoak vs. Camelback Country Club Estates I & II

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818030-REL, 18F-H1818031-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-25
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition related to landscaping (18F-H1818030-REL), but deemed Petitioner the prevailing party and ordered the refund of the $500 filing fee regarding the petition concerning the additional mailbox (18F-H1818031-REL) because the HOA improperly based the fine on CC&R Section 12.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak Counsel
Respondent Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association Counsel Diana J. Elston, J. Gary Linder

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs Section 12

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition related to landscaping (18F-H1818030-REL), but deemed Petitioner the prevailing party and ordered the refund of the $500 filing fee regarding the petition concerning the additional mailbox (18F-H1818031-REL) because the HOA improperly based the fine on CC&R Section 12.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the olive tree was alive, and a dead tree could be reasonably considered a violation of CC&R Section 28 requiring neatly trimmed/properly cultivated plantings (Case 18F-H1818030-REL).

Key Issues & Findings

Improper fine regarding additional freestanding mailbox

Petitioner challenged fines for an additional mailbox lacking architectural approval. The ALJ found that CC&R Section 12 (related to 'building') could not be applied to a mailbox, rendering the fine imposed under that section a violation by the Respondent. Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party in this docket number (18F-H1818031-REL).

Orders: Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner $500.00 filing fee refund within thirty days.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 8
  • CC&Rs Section 12
  • CC&Rs Section 27

Analytics Highlights

Topics: landscape_maintenance, architectural_review, fines, mailbox, ccrs, consolidated_cases, prevailing_party
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • CC&Rs Section 8
  • CC&Rs Section 12
  • CC&Rs Section 27
  • CC&Rs Section 28

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 636748.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:41:00 (130.5 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637227.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:41:12 (57.9 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637433.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-28T10:41:23 (56.5 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 636748.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:00 (130.5 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637227.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:06 (57.9 KB)

18F-H1818030-REL Decision – 637433.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:11:10 (56.5 KB)

Briefing Document: Holyoak v. Camelback Country Club Estates HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and conclusions from an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning two consolidated petitions filed by homeowner Jon Paul Holyoak against the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (HOA). The disputes centered on HOA-issued violations for landscaping maintenance and the presence of a freestanding mailbox.

The final judgment produced a split decision. The Petitioner, Mr. Holyoak, failed to prove the HOA acted improperly in the landscaping case and his petition was denied. However, he was deemed the prevailing party in the mailbox case, with the judge concluding the HOA had violated its own community documents (CC&Rs) by imposing a fine based on an inapplicable section. As the prevailing party in one of the two matters, Mr. Holyoak was awarded his $500 filing fee, to be paid by the HOA. The initial decision document required two subsequent nunc pro tunc orders to correct typographical errors.

Key Takeaways:

Landscaping Petition (Denied): Mr. Holyoak was cited for failing to remove a “dead” olive tree. He argued the tree was merely “in distress.” The judge ruled that a reasonable person would consider the tree dead and that Mr. Holyoak failed to provide sufficient evidence to the contrary. A dead tree was found to be a potential violation of CC&R Section 28, which requires plantings to be “neatly trimmed” and “properly cultivated.”

Mailbox Petition (Upheld): Mr. Holyoak was cited for an “additional mailbox” that was present when he purchased the property in 2012. The judge found the HOA’s enforcement problematic for two primary reasons:

1. The HOA cited three different CC&R sections across multiple notices.

2. The fine was ultimately based on Section 12, which pertains to “buildings” and was deemed inapplicable to a mailbox.

Final Order: The HOA was ordered to pay the Petitioner’s $500 filing fee. The decision is binding on the parties.

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Case Overview

The matter involves two petitions filed on February 2, 2018, by Petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Respondent, Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association. The petitions alleged that the HOA had improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for violations of the community’s Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The two cases were consolidated for a single hearing.

Detail

Information

Case Numbers

18F-H1818030-REL (Landscaping)
18F-H1818031-REL (Mailbox)

Petitioner

Jon Paul Holyoak

Respondent

Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (represented by Gary Linder and Diana Elston)

Hearing Date

May 2, 2018

Decision Date

May 25, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

Legal Framework

The Petitioner bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated the community CC&Rs and A.R.S. § 33-1805(A).

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Petition 1: Landscaping Violations (Case No. 18F-H1818030-REL)

This petition alleged that the HOA improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for violating Section 28 of the CC&Rs, which governs landscape maintenance.

HOA Actions and Timeline

The HOA, through its inspection team Associa Arizona, issued a series of notices regarding the landscaping on Mr. Holyoak’s property.

Notice Type

Description

Oct 17, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the dead foliage on your lot.”

Dec 13, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the dead olive tree in the front yard.”

Dec 13, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“There are several other trees that need to be removed as they have dead branches including the cassia…”

Jan 25, 2018

Notice of Violation

“2nd notice…There are several other trees that need to be removed as they have dead branches…” (Included photo of backyard).

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Holyoak):

◦ The olive tree in the front yard was not “dead” but rather “in distress,” and he was actively trying to nurse it back to health. He eventually had the tree removed on April 25, 2018, after months of effort.

◦ Regarding the backyard photo attached to the fine notice, he argued that the olive tree visible was healthy and that no dead trees were depicted.

◦ He requested that the fine be abated.

Respondent’s Position (HOA):

◦ Board member Terry Rogers testified that the front yard olive tree had no leaves, appeared dead from the roadway, and was therefore not “properly trimmed” as required.

◦ He stated the backyard notice referred to a eucalyptus tree with several dead branches visible from the sidewalk bordering the property.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The judge ruled in favor of the HOA in this matter.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence, beyond “his self-serving statements,” that the olive tree was alive.

Reasonable Interpretation: The judge concluded that “Any reasonable person viewing the olive tree, as depicted in the photographs presented, would understand the tree to be dead.”

Violation of CC&Rs: A dead tree could reasonably be considered as not being “neatly trimmed” or “properly cultivated” in accordance with Section 28.

Verdict: The Petitioner’s petition was denied. The judge found that the HOA had not improperly fined him for the landscaping violation.

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Petition 2: Unapproved Structure/Mailbox (Case No. 18F-H1818031-REL)

This petition alleged that the HOA improperly cited Mr. Holyoak for having an “additional mailbox” in violation of the CC&Rs.

HOA Actions and Timeline

The HOA’s notices for the mailbox cited three different sections of the CC&Rs over time.

Notice Type

Description

CC&R Section Cited

Oct 17, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“Please remove the additional mailbox on your lot.”

Section 27

Dec 14, 2017

Courtesy Notice

“…there is an additional mailbox on your lot. In research of our files, there is no architectural application on file for the modification.”

Section 12

Jan 25, 2018

Notice of Violation

“2nd notice…Please remove the mailbox or provide the approved architectural application.” (Mailbox was painted bright pink and yellow at this time).

Section 12

Jan 25, 2018¹

Notice of Violation

“3rd notice…Please remove the mailbox or provide the approved architectural application.”

Section 8

¹The decision document states this notice was sent on January 25, 2018, but references a violation noted on March 15, 2018. The judge’s conclusions later clarify a notice referencing Section 8 was issued April 11, 2018, and was not properly before the tribunal.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Holyoak):

◦ The freestanding mailbox was already in place when he purchased the home in 2012.

◦ At the time of purchase, he received a statement that there were no known covenant violations on the property.

◦ He argued the mailbox is required by the United States Postal Service (USPS), which no longer provides walking delivery and requires mailboxes to be reachable from a vehicle. The home’s other mailbox, built into a monument, is approximately 15 feet from the curb.

◦ A USPS mail carrier had confirmed this delivery requirement.

Respondent’s Position (HOA):

◦ Board member Terry Rogers testified that the USPS mail carrier told him he would prefer to deliver to the permanent monument mailbox because the freestanding one was not secure.

◦ The mailbox had become an “eyesore,” as it was faded, peeling, and “listing to one side.”

◦ Of the 61 homes in the community, only three have freestanding mailboxes, and the Petitioner is the only one with two mailboxes.

Administrative Law Judge’s Findings and Conclusion

The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner in this matter.

Inconsistent Enforcement: The judge found it “problematic” that the HOA relied on three different sections of the CC&Rs in its notices.

Pre-existing Structure: The Petitioner established that the mailbox was present at the time of his 2012 home purchase and that he was told of no existing violations. Therefore, the HOA’s argument regarding the lack of an architectural approval was “without merit.”

Inapplicable CC&R Section: The fine was imposed based on Section 12 of the CC&Rs. The judge determined the plain language of this section relates to a “building” and “cannot be read to apply to Petitioner’s mailbox.”

Violation by HOA: By imposing a fine based on an inapplicable section, the HOA was in violation of the CC&Rs.

Verdict: The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party. The judge noted that the HOA could potentially impose fines for failure to maintain the mailbox or for painting it without approval, but those specific violations were not before the court.

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Final Order and Subsequent Corrections

Order of May 25, 2018:

1. Petitioner’s petition in Case Number 18F-H1818030-REL (Landscaping) is denied.

2. Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818031-REL (Mailbox).

3. Respondent (HOA) is ordered to pay Petitioner his $500.00 filing fee within thirty days.

Order Nunc Pro Tunc of May 30, 2018:

◦ This order corrected a typographical error in the original decision. The original text mistakenly stated the petition for the mailbox case (31-REL) was denied.

Correction: The denial was correctly applied to the landscaping case: “it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition in Case Number 18F-H1818031-REL 18F-H1818030-REL is denied.”

Order Nunc Pro Tunc of May 31, 2018:

◦ This order corrected a typographical error in the May 30 order, which had misstated the date of the original decision.

Correction: “On April 26 May 25, 2018, the Administrative Law Judge issued the Administrative Law Judge Decision…”

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Key CC&R Sections Cited

Section 8 (Architectural Control): Requires written approval from the Committee before any “building or other structure” is erected, altered, or repaired. This includes exterior finish, color, and architectural style.

Section 12 (Buildings): States that “No building may be erected or maintained upon any Lot except one single family dwelling with private appurtenant garage and customary outbuildings” without prior written approval.

Section 27 (Maintenance): Prohibits any building or structure from falling into disrepair and requires owners to keep them in good condition and adequately painted.

Section 28 (Landscaping): Requires the owner of each lot to “at all times keep shrubs, trees, grass and plantings of every kind, on his lot mostly trimmed, properly cultivated, and free of trash, weeds and other unsightly material.”

Study Guide: Holyoak v. Camelback Country Club Estates I & II HOA

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative hearing case between petitioner Jon Paul Holyoak and the respondent, Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association. It covers the core disputes, arguments, legal interpretations, and the final decision rendered by the Administrative Law Judge.

Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case documents.

1. Who were the primary parties in this administrative case, and what were their roles?

2. What were the two distinct case numbers, and what violation did each one address?

3. According to Section 28 of the CC&Rs, what is the responsibility of a lot owner regarding landscaping?

4. What was the petitioner’s primary defense regarding the citation for a “dead” olive tree in his front yard?

5. What was the respondent’s argument for why the olive tree was a violation of the CC&Rs?

6. What key fact did the petitioner establish regarding the freestanding mailbox that was central to the judge’s decision in that matter?

7. Why did the Administrative Law Judge find the respondent’s enforcement actions regarding the mailbox to be “problematic”?

8. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge rule that the respondent violated the CC&Rs by fining the petitioner for the mailbox under Section 12?

9. What was the final outcome and financial penalty ordered in the consolidated cases?

10. What is an “Order Nunc Pro Tunc,” and why were two such orders issued after the initial decision?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Jon Paul Holyoak, the homeowner, who acted as the Petitioner. The Respondent was the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association, which was represented by Gary Linder and Diana Elston.

2. The first case, No. 18F-H1818030-REL, addressed alleged landscaping violations under Section 28 of the CC&Rs concerning dead trees and foliage. The second case, No. 18F-H1818031-REL, addressed an alleged violation for an additional freestanding mailbox, primarily under Section 12 of the CC&Rs.

3. Section 28 of the CC&Rs requires that the owner of each lot shall at all times keep shrubs, trees, grass, and plantings neatly trimmed, properly cultivated, and free of trash, weeds, and other unsightly material.

4. The petitioner testified that the olive tree was not “dead” but was “in distress,” and that he and his landscaper were actively trying to nurse it back to health. He argued he should not be forced to remove a tree with dead branches while attempting to save it.

5. The respondent’s board member, Terry Rogers, testified that the olive tree had no leaves and appeared dead from the roadway. He contended that a dead tree could not be considered “properly trimmed” as required by the CC&Rs.

6. The petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that the freestanding mailbox was already in place when he purchased the property in 2012. Furthermore, at the time of purchase, he was notified that there were no known covenant violations on the property.

7. The Judge found the respondent’s actions problematic because, over the course of four notices sent to the petitioner about the mailbox, the respondent relied on three different sections of the CC&Rs (Sections 27, 12, and 8). This inconsistency weakened the respondent’s position.

8. The Judge ruled that the plain language of Section 12 of the CC&Rs relates to a “building,” such as a single-family dwelling or garage. The Judge concluded that a mailbox cannot be considered a “building” under this section, making the fine imposed under this rule a violation of the CC&Rs by the respondent.

9. The petitioner’s petition regarding landscaping (18F-H1818030-REL) was denied. However, the petitioner was deemed the prevailing party in the mailbox case (18F-H1818031-REL), and the respondent was ordered to pay the petitioner’s $500.00 filing fee.

10. “Nunc Pro Tunc” is a legal term for an order that corrects a clerical error in a prior court decision, with the correction being retroactive. The first order corrected the case number in the final ruling, and the second order corrected a date referenced in the first corrective order.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Consider the following questions. Formulate a detailed response that synthesizes facts and arguments from the case documents to support your position.

1. Explain the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the decision and analyze how the petitioner met this burden of proof in the mailbox case but failed to meet it in the landscaping case.

2. Discuss the legal significance of the HOA’s inconsistent application of its CC&Rs in the mailbox dispute. Why did citing three different sections (27, 12, and 8) undermine the HOA’s case?

3. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of Section 12 of the CC&Rs. How does the “plain language” of the rule factor into the decision that a mailbox is not a “building”?

4. Examine the arguments presented by both parties regarding the freestanding mailbox, including the conflicting accounts of conversations with the USPS mail carrier. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s position.

5. The Judge noted that while the fine under Section 12 was improper, the HOA could potentially impose fines for failure to maintain the mailbox or for painting it without approval. Based on the facts presented, construct a hypothetical argument the HOA could have made that might have been successful.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

To reduce or remove. In the context of the hearing, the Petitioner asked that the fines be abated, meaning he requested they be cancelled or removed.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions, similar to a judge in a court of law. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

Conditions, Covenants, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that set forth the rules and regulations for a planned community or subdivision. The petitioner and respondent both based their arguments on interpretations of these documents.

Conclusions of Law

The section of a legal decision where the judge applies legal principles and rules (like the CC&Rs and state statutes) to the facts of the case to reach a final judgment.

Findings of Fact

The section of a legal decision that establishes the factual record of the case based on the evidence and testimony presented during the hearing.

Jurisdiction

The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. The Arizona Department of Real Estate was determined to have jurisdiction to hear disputes between a property owner and a homeowners association.

Nunc Pro Tunc

A Latin phrase meaning “now for then.” It refers to a legal order that corrects a clerical error in a previous order, making the correction retroactive to the original date of the decision.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a lawsuit or files a petition seeking a legal remedy. In this case, Jon Paul Holyoak was the Petitioner.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil cases. It means the greater weight of the evidence shows that a fact is more likely than not to be true. The Petitioner bore this burden of proof.

Prevailing Party

The party in a lawsuit who is found to have won the legal dispute. In case 18F-H1818031-REL, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party, which entitled him to have his filing fee reimbursed.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; the defending party. In this case, the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association was the Respondent.

Select all sources
636748.pdf
637227.pdf
637433.pdf

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18F-H1818030-REL

3 sources

The sources document an Administrative Law Judge Decision concerning a dispute between Jon Paul Holyoak (Petitioner) and the Camelback Country Club Estates I & II Homeowners Association (Respondent), along with subsequent orders correcting clerical errors. The initial decision addresses two consolidated petitions: one regarding landscaping violations (dead trees) under CC&R Section 28, and a second concerning a disputed mailbox under various CC&R sections, particularly Section 12. While the Petitioner failed to prove the association improperly fined him for the dead tree, the judge determined the association was in violation of the CC&Rs for improperly citing Section 12 for the mailbox issue, leading the Petitioner to be deemed the prevailing party in the mailbox case and awarded his $500 filing fee. The subsequent documents, titled Order Nunc Pro Tunc, are procedural corrections to typographical errors found in the original decision’s text and date.

3 sources

Based on 3 sources

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John Paul Holyoak (petitioner)
    Also appears as 'Jon Paul Holyoak'

Respondent Side

  • Terry Rogers (board member)
    Camelback Country Club Estates I & II HOA
    Testified at hearing
  • Gary Linder (attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.
    Also listed as 'J. Gary Linder'
  • Diana J. Elston (attorney)
    Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
  • Judy Lowe (commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • Felicia Del Sol (clerk)
    Transmitting agent
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)

Rex E. Duffett vs. Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1818025-REL / 18F-H1818027-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-04-24
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome Petitioner won the statutory claim regarding access to association documents (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) and was refunded the $500 filing fee. Petitioner lost the claim regarding the failure to maintain exterior walls (CC&Rs) due to insufficient evidence.
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Rex E. Duffett Counsel
Respondent Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association Counsel Nathan Tennyson

Alleged Violations

CC&Rs
A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

Petitioner won the statutory claim regarding access to association documents (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) and was refunded the $500 filing fee. Petitioner lost the claim regarding the failure to maintain exterior walls (CC&Rs) due to insufficient evidence.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove the maintenance issue by a preponderance of the evidence (for case 18F-H1818025-REL).

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to repair and maintain exterior walls

Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to repair damage (crack) to the exterior wall of his unit as required by the CC&Rs. The ALJ found that Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence (black and white photographs did not clearly show the damage) to establish a violation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • CC&Rs
  • 5
  • 17

Failure to provide requested association records

Petitioner requested meeting notices and minutes in December 2017. Respondent's former management company failed to respond in a timely fashion. Petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the statute.

Orders: Petitioner deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL. Respondent ordered to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) in the future and pay Petitioner the filing fee of $500.00.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • 19
  • 20
  • 21
  • 22

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA, Document Request, Records Disclosure, Maintenance, CC&Rs, Filing Fee Refund
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)
  • CC&Rs

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1818025-REL Decision – 630610.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:10:12 (114.0 KB)

Administrative Hearing Brief: Duffett vs. Suntech Patio Homes HOA

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in two consolidated cases filed by homeowner Rex E. Duffett against the Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association (HOA). The ruling presents a split decision, with the petitioner prevailing on one claim while failing to provide sufficient evidence for the other.

The first petition, concerning the HOA’s alleged failure to repair exterior walls, was denied. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof, as the submitted photographic evidence was unclear and did not sufficiently establish the existence or severity of the damage requiring immediate repair.

The second petition, concerning the HOA’s failure to provide association records upon request, was upheld. The judge found that the HOA, through its former management company, violated state law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)) by not responding to a formal document request within the mandated ten-business-day window.

As a result, Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in the records-request case. The HOA was ordered to pay his $500 filing fee and to ensure future compliance with the relevant statutes. The case highlights critical issues of evidence quality in homeowner disputes and demonstrates the legal liability an HOA retains for the failures of its management agents, particularly during periods of transition.

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Case Overview

Case Numbers

18F-H1818025-REL and 18F-H1818027-REL (Consolidated)

Petitioner

Rex E. Duffett

Respondent

Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association

Hearing Date

April 4, 2018

Decision Date

April 24, 2018

Presiding Judge

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer

The hearing addressed two separate petitions filed by Rex E. Duffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate:

1. Petition 1 (18F-H1818025-REL): Alleged the HOA violated community CC&Rs by failing to repair exterior walls of the petitioner’s unit.

2. Petition 2 (18F-H1818027-REL): Alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide requested documents.

Petition 1: Failure to Repair Exterior Walls (Denied)

Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence

Core Claim: The petitioner alleged the HOA failed its duty, as defined by a March 1993 amendment to the CC&Rs, to maintain the exterior walls of his unit. The CC&Rs state, “The Suntech Patio Homeowners Association shall be responsible for the painting and maintenance of the following: A) Exterior walls of all units . . . .”

Initial Request (July 14, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed the HOA’s management company, The Management Trust, stating, “While inspecting the outside of my property I noticed a crack in the exterior wall. Please inspect, repair and paint the wall as soon as possible to prevent any damage which could result from rain water in the interior of the wall.”

Follow-Up Request (August 21, 2017): In a certified letter, Mr. Duffett provided more detail, identifying a crack in the entryway wall allowing “rain water to seep into the interior wall,” a “bare concrete” area on the garage, and a previously cracked garage wall that had been repaired by a roofing company but not painted.

Hearing Testimony: Mr. Duffett testified that a roofing company he hired to find a leak in his garage ceiling determined the source was not the roof but a crack in the exterior wall.

Submitted Evidence: The petitioner submitted five black-and-white photographs of his home’s exterior across his two communications.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence

Management Transition: Pride Community Management took over from The Management Trust on February 1, 2018. The new manager, Rebecca Stowers, and owner, Frank Peake, testified to a difficult transition where The Management Trust initially provided only one box of records, later discovering seven or eight more boxes in storage. Mr. Peake stated that Pride had not seen the petitioner’s communications regarding the damage until the hearing.

Inspection: Ms. Stowers testified that she inspected the petitioner’s home on March 27, 2018. While she noted “a missing area of stucco on the front of the garage that needed to be repaired,” she “denied being able to identify a crack in the stucco anywhere else on the front of the house.”

Community-Wide Repair Plan: Ms. Stowers stated that the HOA intended to repair the stucco and paint all exterior walls in the community during the 2018 calendar year at a projected cost of $46,000, to be funded potentially through a special assessment due to the HOA being underfunded.

Conclusion of Law and Ruling

Burden of Proof: The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that the petitioner bore the burden of proving his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Evidence Failure: The ALJ found the submitted evidence insufficient. The decision states: “The black and white photographs submitted at hearing did not clearly show the crack Petitioner alleged existed on the exterior wall of his unit… The Administrative Law Judge was unable to identify the location or severity of the alleged crack, and therefore, cannot conclude that such a crack exists and/or that it is necessary to be repaired immediately.”

Final Ruling: The petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof. The petition in Case Number 18F-H1818025-REL was denied.

Petition 2: Failure to Provide Association Records (Upheld)

Petitioner’s Allegations and Evidence

Core Claim: The petitioner alleged that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), which requires an association to fulfill a request for records within ten business days.

The Request (December 22, 2017): Mr. Duffett faxed The Management Trust a request for specific documents, citing a statement made by the HOA in a separate case. He requested copies of:

◦ Meeting notices and minutes for all meetings where “rules and regulations were discussed” in August/September 2017.

◦ Meeting notices and minutes for meetings where the last HOA dues increase was discussed.

◦ A copy of the notice for the last association rate increase.

Respondent’s Position and Evidence

Lack of Awareness: The HOA’s initial response on January 29, 2018, indicated it had only become aware of the request upon receiving notice of the petition. The current management company, Pride, testified they had not seen the original communication from the petitioner.

Vagueness of Request: Frank Peake of Pride testified that the request for minutes of meetings “where the rules and regulations were discussed” was unclear “because rules and regulations are discussed in some form at virtually every meeting of the association.”

Claim of Privilege: The initial response from The Management Trust on January 29, 2018, claimed that the requested minutes were for “closed executive meetings and were only available to Board members.”

Conclusion of Law and Ruling

Statutory Violation: The ALJ concluded that the petitioner clearly made a request for documents and that the HOA, via its former management company, failed to act as required by law.

Failure of Former Management: The decision explicitly faults the prior management company: “The Management Trust should have responded or requested additional clarification of what documents Petitioner was requesting as it was the management company during the ten day window Respondent had to respond pursuant to the statute.”

Final Ruling: The petitioner successfully established by a preponderance of the evidence that the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). Mr. Duffett was deemed the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL.

Final Order and Implications

The Administrative Law Judge issued the following orders based on the conclusions of law:

Case Number

Subject

Ruling

18F-H1818025-REL

Exterior Wall Repairs

Petition Denied

18F-H1818027-REL

Document Request

Petitioner Deemed Prevailing Party

Directives to the Respondent (Suntech Patio Homes HOA):

1. Future Compliance: The HOA must comply with the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) going forward.

2. Payment of Filing Fee: The HOA must pay the petitioner his filing fee of $500.00 within thirty (30) days of the order.

This order is considered binding on the parties unless a rehearing is granted.

Study Guide: Duffett v. Suntech Patio Homes HOA

This guide provides a comprehensive review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the consolidated cases of Rex E. Duffett v. Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association, Case Numbers 18F-H1818025-REL and 18F-H1818027-REL. The decision, issued by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, addresses two separate petitions filed by a homeowner against his Homeowners Association (HOA), one concerning property maintenance and the other concerning access to association records.

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Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences, drawing all information directly from the case decision.

1. Who were the primary parties in this administrative hearing, and what were their respective roles?

2. What were the two distinct allegations made by the Petitioner in the petitions that were consolidated for this hearing?

3. According to the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs), what specific responsibility did the HOA have regarding the exterior of residential units?

4. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge rule against the Petitioner in his claim for wall repairs (Case No. 18F-H1818025-REL)?

5. What specific Arizona statute did the Petitioner claim the HOA violated in his second petition regarding access to records (Case No. 18F-H1818027-REL)?

6. Describe the roles and performance of the two management companies, The Management Trust and Pride Community Management, as detailed in the hearing evidence.

7. What was the final outcome of the petition concerning the HOA’s failure to provide documents, and who was named the prevailing party?

8. What specific types of documents did the Petitioner request from the HOA in his fax dated December 22, 2017?

9. What was the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet, and for which petition did he successfully meet it?

10. What financial penalty was imposed upon the Respondent as part of the final Order?

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Answer Key

1. The Petitioner was Rex E. Duffett, a homeowner who filed the petitions. The Respondent was the Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association, the entity Mr. Duffett alleged had violated community rules and state law.

2. The first petition alleged that the HOA violated the CC&Rs by failing to respond to repeated requests for repairs to the exterior walls of his unit. The second petition alleged the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide requested association documents.

3. A March 1993 amendment to the CC&Rs states that the Suntech Patio Homeowners Association “shall be responsible for the painting and maintenance of the… Exterior walls of all units.”

4. The judge ruled against the Petitioner because he failed to establish his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. The black and white photographs submitted did not clearly show the alleged crack’s location or severity, so the judge could not conclude that a repair was immediately necessary.

5. The Petitioner claimed the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). This statute requires an association to make records reasonably available for examination and to provide copies of requested records within ten business days.

6. The Management Trust was the HOA’s management company when the incidents occurred and failed to properly respond to the Petitioner’s requests. Pride Community Management took over on February 1, 2018, and testified that the transition was difficult due to the sparse documentation initially provided by The Management Trust.

7. The judge ruled in favor of the Petitioner, deeming him the prevailing party in Case Number 18F-H1818027-REL. The judge ordered the HOA to comply with the applicable statute in the future.

8. The Petitioner requested copies of meeting notices and minutes for meetings where rules and regulations were discussed and where the last HOA dues increase was discussed. He also requested a copy of the notice of the last rate increase and any associated signed written consents.

9. The legal standard was “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence with the most convincing force. The Petitioner failed to meet this standard for the wall repair petition but successfully met it for the document request petition.

10. The Respondent (HOA) was ordered to pay the Petitioner his filing fee of $500.00. The payment was to be made directly to the Petitioner within thirty days of the Order.

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Suggested Essay Questions

Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth analysis of the case. Formulate a response using only the information and evidence presented in the provided decision.

1. Analyze the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it is defined and applied in this case. How did the quality of evidence submitted by the Petitioner lead to two different outcomes for his two petitions?

2. Discuss the role and responsibilities of a homeowners association’s management company, using the actions of The Management Trust and the subsequent challenges faced by Pride Community Management as primary examples. How did the transition between these two companies impact the case?

3. Evaluate the Respondent’s arguments and actions in both petitions. In the wall repair case, what was their stated plan, and why was it ultimately not considered by the judge? In the document request case, what was their defense, and why did it fail?

4. Based on the text of A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), explain the specific obligations of an HOA regarding member requests for records. Detail how the Suntech Patio Homes HOA, through its management, failed to meet these obligations, leading to the ruling against them.

5. Examine the communication breakdown between the Petitioner and the Respondent. Citing specific examples from the “Findings of Fact” and “Hearing Evidence” sections, explain how miscommunication and lack of timely response exacerbated the conflict.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

An official who presides over administrative hearings, weighs evidence, and issues a legally binding decision. In this case, the ALJ was Tammy L. Eigenheer.

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

An Arizona Revised Statute that legally requires homeowners associations to make financial and other records available for member examination and to provide copies upon request within ten business days.

A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

The section of the Arizona Revised Statutes that grants jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate to hear disputes between homeowners and their associations.

Conditions, Covenants and Restrictions (CC&Rs)

The governing legal documents that establish the rules, obligations, and restrictions for a planned community and its homeowners association.

Consolidated for Hearing

A procedural step where two or more separate legal cases involving the same parties are combined into a single hearing for efficiency.

Department

Within the context of this case, refers to the Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency where the Petitioner initially filed his petitions.

The final, legally binding ruling issued by the Administrative Law Judge at the conclusion of the hearing.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, homeowner Rex E. Duffett.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof required in this proceeding. It is met when the evidence presented has “the most convincing force” and is more likely true than not.

Prevailing Party

The party who is found to have won the legal dispute. The Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party in the document request case.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed and who must respond to the allegations. In this case, the Suntech Patio Homes Homeowners Association.

A Homeowner Sued His HOA Over a Cracked Wall. He Lost Because of Bad Photocopies.

Introduction: The David vs. Goliath Battle Against Your HOA

For many homeowners, a dispute with their Homeowners Association (HOA) can feel like an uphill battle. It’s a common story of frustration, complex rules, and feeling unheard. The legal case of Rex E. Duffett versus the Suntech Patio Homes HOA is a perfect example, but with a twist. This isn’t just a story about winning or losing; it’s a fascinating cautionary tale filled with surprising lessons for any homeowner navigating a conflict with their association. This breakdown of the real-life administrative court decision reveals the unexpected details that can make or break a case.

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1. Takeaway #1: The Quality of Your Proof Matters More Than the Truth

The dispute began when Rex Duffett filed a petition alleging his HOA had failed to repair a crack in his exterior wall that he claimed was causing a water leak. According to the association’s own CC&Rs, maintaining exterior walls was the HOA’s responsibility. To document the problem, he diligently sent faxes and certified mail to the management company, including photographs of the damage.

Despite his efforts, the Administrative Law Judge denied his petition for repairs.

The reason was as surprising as it was simple: the evidence he submitted was not clear enough. The black and white copies of the photographs he provided at the hearing “did not clearly show any damage.” The judge’s finding was blunt and highlights a critical point for any legal dispute:

The Administrative Law Judge was unable to identify the location or severity of the alleged crack, and therefore, cannot conclude that such a crack exists and/or that it is necessary to be repaired immediately.

The lesson here is critical. In a legal dispute, having proof is not enough; the proof must be clear, convincing, and well-presented. Mr. Duffett’s primary case failed not because he was necessarily wrong, but because his evidence failed to persuade the judge. In an administrative hearing, a handful of high-resolution color photographs, or even a short video, would have provided irrefutable evidence and could have changed the entire outcome of his primary petition.

2. Takeaway #2: Your HOA is on the Hook for Its Management Company’s Failures

Mr. Duffett also filed a second petition against the HOA for failing to provide records he requested, such as meeting minutes. Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)), an association must fulfill such a request within ten business days. The HOA failed to do so.

The root of the problem was the HOA’s previous management company, “The Management Trust.” This company not only failed to respond to the homeowner’s request but also failed to notify the new management company about it. The relationship between the HOA and this vendor was so poor that the HOA had previously tried to terminate the contract, but the management company “refused to acknowledge the termination and held Respondent to the full two year contract.” The transition was chaotic; the old company initially provided only one box of information before later discovering “seven or eight more boxes” in storage.

Even though the management company was clearly at fault, the Judge ruled that the HOA violated the law. This provides a powerful insight for both boards and homeowners: an HOA cannot blame its vendors. Legally, the association is the responsible party. Hiring an incompetent or unresponsive management company creates significant legal and financial liability for the association and, by extension, every homeowner. This is not an abstract risk; in this case, the management company’s failure to forward a simple request directly led to a legal violation that cost the association—and thus, its members—the $500 filing fee ordered by the judge.

3. Takeaway #3: A “Win” Can Be More Complicated Than It Looks

When you look at the final outcome, Mr. Duffett’s case presents a nuanced picture of what a “win” really means in an HOA dispute. The judge issued a split decision:

Petition for Repairs: Denied. The homeowner lost.

Petition for Documents: The homeowner was deemed the “prevailing party.” He won.

As the prevailing party in the second petition, the homeowner received a clear victory. The judge ordered the HOA to comply with the document access law in the future and, crucially, to pay the homeowner back his $500 filing fee.

This highlights a common reality in legal disputes: a homeowner can secure a clear procedural victory (enforcing the right to documents and recovering fees) while simultaneously failing to achieve their core substantive goal (getting the wall repaired). The outcome shows that legal victories can be partial and may not address the real-world problem that initiated the dispute in the first place.

4. Takeaway #4: Vague Requests and Messy Records Create Chaos

This case is a masterclass in how poor communication from both sides can create a perfect storm of dysfunction.

First, the homeowner’s request for documents was “somewhat vague.” The new management company testified it was “unclear because rules and regulations are discussed in some form at virtually every meeting.” While the HOA still violated the law by failing to respond at all, this highlights a crucial lesson for homeowners: be as specific and clear as possible in all written communication to avoid ambiguity.

This vague request then ran headlong into the second problem: the HOA’s institutional chaos. The new Community Manager testified that the only relevant document they possessed was the minutes from a single meeting, and that “seven or eight more boxes” of records were missing after a disastrous transition between management companies. The homeowner’s ambiguous request met an organization that likely couldn’t have responded effectively even if it wanted to.

For both sides, meticulous documentation is a shield. For homeowners, a clear, specific, and undeniable paper trail strengthens their position. For HOA boards, organized records are essential for smooth operations, seamless transitions between management companies, and, most importantly, avoiding legal liability.

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Conclusion: The Devil is in the Details

The case of Duffett v. Suntech Patio Homes HOA is a powerful reminder that in legal disputes, the outcome often hinges on the small stuff. Small details—the quality of a photocopy, the precise wording of a request, the competence of a vendor, the location of a box of files—can have massive consequences. They can mean the difference between winning and losing, between getting a problem solved and walking away with only a partial victory.

This case shows how easily things can go wrong. The next time you’re in a dispute, what’s the one small detail you might be overlooking that could change everything?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Rex E. Duffett (petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Nathan Tennyson (attorney)
    BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC
  • Rebecca Stowers (property manager)
    Pride Community Management
    Community Manager
  • Frank Peake (property manager)
    Pride Community Management
    Owner of Pride
  • Shawn Mason (property manager)
    The Management Trust
    Former management company staff

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • LDettorre (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • AHansen (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • djones (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • DGardner (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • ncano (ADRE staff)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
  • F. Del Sol (staff)
    Signed transmission document

Gary W Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2018-05-10
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gary W. Moselle Counsel
Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association Counsel Curtis Ekmark

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the Petitioner's petition, concluding that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was not subject to the open meetings law because the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1804, as the committee meeting in question did not meet the definition of a 'regularly scheduled committee meeting' required to be open to members.

Key Issues & Findings

Whether the Respondent violated the open meeting statute by closing a committee meeting.

Petitioner alleged that the DMMA Communications committee meeting was improperly closed and subject to open meeting laws. The ALJ determined the committee did not hold 'regularly scheduled' meetings (defined as meetings occurring at regular intervals) and was therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Orders: Petitioner’s petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA Open Meetings Law, Committee Meeting, Regularly Scheduled
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • State ex rel. Thomas v. Contes, 216 Ariz. 525, 527, 169 P.3d 115, 117 (App. 2007)
  • Marsoner v. Pima County, 166 Ariz. 486, 488, 803 P.2d 897, 899 (1991)

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 634096.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:07:35 (106.4 KB)

18F-H1817005-REL Decision – 605190.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:07:41 (77.0 KB)

Briefing Document: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association

Executive Summary

This document summarizes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG, a dispute between homeowner Gary W. Moselle (Petitioner) and the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA/Respondent). The central issue was whether a “closed” meeting of the DMMA Communications Committee on September 6, 2017, violated Arizona’s open meetings law for planned communities, A.R.S. § 33-1804.

The case hinged on the interpretation of the phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The Petitioner argued this meant any meeting scheduled in a normal fashion, while the Respondent contended it applied only to meetings occurring at fixed, regular intervals. The Respondent provided evidence that the committee in question met infrequently and without a set schedule.

The Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, concluding that “regularly scheduled” refers to meetings held at regular intervals. The judge found that the specific language of the statute requiring only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings to be open superseded the statute’s general policy statement in favor of open meetings. The Petitioner’s petition was denied.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from a petition filed by Gary W. Moselle with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the DMMA violated state law by holding a closed committee meeting. The case progressed through an initial hearing, a decision, a successful request for a rehearing based on new evidence, and a final binding decision.

September 1, 2017

Gary W. Moselle files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.

September 5, 2017

The Department issues a notice to DMMA regarding the petition.

September 6, 2017

The DMMA Communications Committee holds a closed meeting, which Moselle is not permitted to attend.

September 18, 2017

DMMA files an answer to the petition, denying all allegations.

November 17, 2017

The initial hearing is held before the Office of Administrative Hearings.

December 7, 2017

The Administrative Law Judge issues an initial decision denying the petition.

January 4, 2018

Moselle files a request for a rehearing, citing newly discovered material evidence.

January 26, 2017

The Department grants the request for a rehearing.

April 20, 2018

A rehearing is conducted.

May 10, 2018

The Administrative Law Judge issues a final, binding decision denying the Petitioner’s petition.

The Central Legal Question: Interpretation of A.R.S. § 33-1804

The core of the dispute was the correct interpretation of Arizona Revised Statute § 33-1804(A), which governs open meetings for planned communities. The key statutory language under scrutiny was:

“…all meetings of the members’ association and the board of directors, and any regularly scheduled committee meetings, are open to all members of the association…”

The case required the Administrative Law Judge to define the term “regularly scheduled” in the context of homeowners’ association committee meetings.

Arguments Presented

Petitioner’s Position (Gary W. Moselle)

The Petitioner’s case was built on a broad interpretation of the statute, emphasizing the legislative intent for transparency.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: Moselle argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean “scheduled in a normal fashion,” rather than strictly meaning meetings held at fixed intervals (e.g., monthly or quarterly).

Legislative Policy: He pointed to A.R.S. § 33-1804(F), which states a broad policy that “all meetings of a planned community… be conducted openly.” He argued this policy statement should guide the interpretation of subsection (A) in favor of openness for all committee meetings.

Committee Practices: In his prehearing brief, Moselle asserted that five of the six “functioning DMMA committees” meet “at the request of the chair,” implying this was the normal scheduling method and should fall under the statute.

Respondent’s Position (Desert Mountain Master Association)

The Respondent advocated for a narrower, more literal interpretation of the statute.

Definition of “Regularly Scheduled”: DMMA argued the phrase meant meetings that “occurred at regular intervals, such as on the third Thursday of every month, quarterly, or even annually.”

Evidence of Infrequent Meetings: DMMA presented testimony that the Communications Committee met infrequently and without a fixed interval. The committee held only four meetings in 2016 and 2017: two in April 2016, one in June 2017, and the contested meeting on September 6, 2017.

Lack of Board Action: To support the claim that the committee was not conducting core business of the Board, DMMA asserted that a recommendation made by the committee (to send an email blast) was not acted upon by the DMMA Board of Directors.

Judicial Findings and Legal Conclusions

The Administrative Law Judge, Tammy L. Eigenheer, denied the petition, siding with the Respondent’s interpretation of the statute. The decision was based on principles of statutory construction and the evidence presented.

1. Statutory Interpretation and Plain Language

The primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent by first looking at the plain language. The Judge concluded that the plain language of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) supports the interpretation that “regularly scheduled committee meetings” are those that “occur at regular intervals.” While acknowledging that the phrase could have multiple meanings, this did not preclude an interpretation based on its plain language.

2. Petitioner’s Contradictory Testimony

A key factor in the decision was the Petitioner’s own testimony during cross-examination. When asked about his assertion that five DMMA committees meet at the request of the chair, the Judge noted:

“Petitioner stated that five of the committees listed in the Volunteer Request page ‘meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.'” (Hearing record 30:52 – 31:15)

The Judge found that in this statement, the Petitioner himself used the phrase “not regularly scheduled” to describe meetings that were called as needed rather than held at fixed intervals, thereby undermining his own legal argument.

3. Specific Language Overrides General Policy

The Judge addressed the Petitioner’s argument regarding the statute’s broad policy statement in favor of open meetings (A.R.S. § 33-1804(F)). The decision explicitly states:

“The general policy statement in favor of open meetings set forth in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) does not override the specific provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only ‘regularly scheduled’ committee meetings must be open to the members.”

This conclusion establishes that the specific qualifier “regularly scheduled” in subsection (A) creates a deliberate exception to the general policy for certain committee meetings.

Final Order and Implications

Order: The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied.

Conclusion: The Judge concluded that at the time of the September 6, 2017 meeting, the DMMA Communication Committee did not hold “regularly scheduled” meetings as defined by the statute. Therefore, the Respondent’s decision to hold a closed meeting was not a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804.

This decision, issued on May 10, 2018, is binding on the parties. Any appeal must be filed with the superior court within thirty-five days from the date of service.

Study Guide: Moselle v. Desert Mountain Master Association (No. 18F-H1817005-REL-RHG)

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner Gary W. Moselle and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association. It includes a quiz with an answer key to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the case document.

1. Who were the primary parties involved in this case, and what were their roles?

2. What specific event and action by the Respondent prompted the Petitioner to file his initial petition?

3. What was the Respondent’s primary argument at the November 17, 2017, hearing for why the Communications committee was not subject to the open meetings law?

4. What was the initial outcome of the case following the first hearing, as decided on December 7, 2017?

5. On what grounds did the Petitioner successfully file for a rehearing of the case?

6. How did the Petitioner, Gary W. Moselle, interpret the statutory phrase “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

7. How did the Respondent, DMMA, interpret the same phrase, “regularly scheduled committee meetings”?

8. According to the document, what is the primary goal when construing a statute, and what is the first step in that process?

9. What was the significance of the policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) regarding open meetings, and how did the judge rule on its applicability?

10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge on May 10, 2018, and what was its legal effect on the parties?

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Answer Key

1. The primary parties were Petitioner Gary W. Moselle, a homeowner, and Respondent Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA), an association of homeowners in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mr. Moselle filed a petition against the DMMA.

2. The Petitioner filed his petition after the Chair of the DMMA’s Communications Committee alleged that a scheduled meeting was “closed” and not subject to Arizona’s open meeting statute. The Petitioner was subsequently not allowed to attend the closed committee meeting held on September 6, 2017.

3. The Respondent argued that the Communications committee did not meet regularly and was therefore not subject to the open meetings law. To support this, they presented testimony that the committee had only met four times in 2016 and 2017.

4. Following the first hearing, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision on December 7, 2017, in which the Petitioner’s petition was denied.

5. The Petitioner requested a rehearing based on what he cited as newly discovered material evidence, specifically an email sent by the Respondent after the first hearing concluded. He also argued the initial decision was contrary to law and that the Respondent may have misled the judge.

6. The Petitioner argued that “regularly scheduled” should be interpreted to mean scheduled in a normal or ordinary fashion. He contended that because the September 6, 2017, meeting was scheduled in this manner, it should have been open.

7. The Respondent argued that the phrase “regularly scheduled” meant meetings that occurred at regular intervals, such as on a specific day each month, quarterly, or annually. They contended that since the Communications committee met infrequently and without an established interval, its meetings were not “regularly scheduled.”

8. The primary goal when construing a statute is to ascertain the legislature’s intent. The first step is to look at the text of the statute itself and ascribe its plain meaning if the language is clear.

9. The policy statement in A.R.S. § 33-1804(F) declares that it is the state’s policy for all meetings of a planned community to be conducted openly. The judge ruled that this general policy statement does not override the specific provision in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) that only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings must be open.

10. The final order, issued on May 10, 2018, was that the Petitioner’s petition is denied. As this order was the result of a rehearing, it was binding on the parties, with any further appeal requiring judicial review in the superior court.

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Essay Questions

The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Answers are not provided.

1. Analyze the competing interpretations of “regularly scheduled” as presented by the Petitioner and Respondent. Discuss which argument the Administrative Law Judge found more compelling and explain the legal reasoning provided in the decision.

2. Discuss the role and significance of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1804(F) in this case. Explain how the Petitioner used this section to support his argument and why the Administrative Law Judge concluded it did not override the specific language in A.R.S. § 33-1804(A).

3. Trace the procedural history of the case from the initial petition filing on September 1, 2017, to the final order on May 10, 2018. Include key dates, events (hearings, decisions, requests), and the outcomes at each stage.

4. Evaluate the evidence presented by the Respondent regarding the meeting frequency of the DMMA Communication committee. How did this evidence support the Respondent’s legal argument and influence the final decision?

5. Based on the “Conclusions of Law” section, explain the standard of proof required in this proceeding (preponderance of the evidence) and the principles of statutory construction the judge applied to interpret the relevant statute.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues a decision on the matter.

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The specific Arizona Revised Statute at the center of the legal dispute. It mandates that meetings of a members’ association, its board of directors, and any “regularly scheduled committee meetings” must be open to all members of the association.

Cross-examination

A phase during the hearing where a party or their representative questions a witness from the opposing side. Petitioner Moselle underwent cross-examination during the April 20, 2018, rehearing.

Department

The Arizona Department of Real Estate, the state agency with which the Petitioner filed his initial petition and which has jurisdiction to hear disputes between homeowners and condominium owners associations.

An abbreviation for Desert Mountain Master Association, the Respondent in the case and the homeowners association for a planned community in Scottsdale, Arizona.

Open Meetings Law

The legal requirement, as outlined in A.R.S. § 33-1804, that certain meetings of a homeowners association must be open to all members, who must be permitted to attend and speak.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action by filing a petition. In this case, the petitioner was homeowner Gary W. Moselle.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The burden of proof required in this proceeding. It is defined as “Evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not.”

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the respondent was the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA).

Statutory Construction

The process of interpreting and applying legislation. The judge noted that the primary goal is to ascertain legislative intent, first by looking at the plain language of the statute’s text.

Your HOA Can Legally Hold Secret Committee Meetings. Here’s How.

Most homeowners operate under a reasonable assumption: meetings that concern their community association should be open for them to attend. Transparency is a cornerstone of trust between residents and their HOA board. But what if some of those meetings, like committee meetings, could be held in private, entirely legally? The answer, revealed in a contentious Arizona case, lies in a two-word loophole that every homeowner should understand.

A legal case from Scottsdale, Arizona, Moselle vs. Desert Mountain Master Association, hinged on this very issue. It revealed a surprising and important nuance in the law, showing how specific wording can create exceptions to the general rule of open governance.

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1. The “Regularly Scheduled” Loophole That Allows for Closed Meetings

The central conflict of the case began when a homeowner, Gary Moselle, was barred from attending a Communications Committee meeting for his HOA, the Desert Mountain Master Association (DMMA). He filed a petition, arguing this action violated Arizona’s open meeting law for planned communities.

But the homeowner’s argument ran into a wall: the precise text of the law. The Administrative Law Judge’s ruling hinged on the wording of A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), which mandates openness for “any regularly scheduled committee meetings.” The judge found that the Communications Committee meeting was legally closed because it was not “regularly scheduled.”

Everything came down to the court’s interpretation of two words: “regularly scheduled.”

The Homeowner’s Argument: Mr. Moselle contended that “regularly scheduled” simply meant “scheduled in a normal fashion.”

The Court’s Conclusion: The HOA and the judge determined that the phrase means meetings that “occur at regular intervals,” such as monthly, quarterly, or annually.

The evidence supported the court’s conclusion. The DMMA Communications committee had only met four times in 2016 and 2017. This ad-hoc pattern was crucial evidence that the meetings were not “regularly scheduled” in the way the law required.

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2. Why a Law’s General Policy Doesn’t Always Overrule Its Specific Text

The petitioner argued that the law’s explicit policy statement, which strongly favors open meetings, should have been the guiding principle. He pointed to the text of A.R.S. § 33-1804(F):

It is the policy of this state as reflected in this section that all meetings of a planned community, whether meetings of the members’ association or meetings of the board of directors of the association, be conducted openly… and shall construe any provision of this section in favor of open meetings.

The judge’s conclusion illustrates a fundamental principle of legal interpretation: the specific almost always trumps the general. Despite the clear declaration of policy, the judge found that it did not override the more precise provision in the law. The general policy favoring open meetings could not change the fact that A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) explicitly limits the open meeting requirement to only “regularly scheduled” committee meetings.

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3. A Petitioner’s Own Words Undercut His Argument

The case took a surprising turn, however, when the petitioner himself handed the association its strongest piece of evidence. While trying to make a point about other committees within the DMMA, Mr. Moselle stated that five of them “meet at the request of the chair and they’re not regularly scheduled.”

This statement was a moment of legal irony that proved devastating to his case. The judge noted in the final decision that the petitioner’s own language aligned perfectly with the court’s ultimate interpretation. In a formal hearing, Mr. Moselle inadvertently defined the key term against his own interest, drawing a clear distinction between meetings called on an as-needed basis (“at the request of the chair”) and those that are “regularly scheduled.” This admission provided the exact plain-language interpretation the judge needed to resolve the ambiguity in the case at hand, significantly weakening the petitioner’s entire position.

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Conclusion: A Lesson in Legal Precision

The ultimate lesson from this case is that while homeowner transparency laws are powerful, their protections are defined by precise legal wording. Seemingly small details can have significant consequences. In this Arizona case, the distinction between ad-hoc meetings called as needed and those that occur at regular, predictable intervals was the deciding factor that allowed a committee meeting to be held behind closed doors.

This raises a critical question for homeowners and boards alike: Does this legal distinction provide necessary flexibility for informal committee work, or is it a loophole that ultimately undermines the spirit of open governance in our communities?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gary W. Moselle (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf; Chair of the Communications Committee

Respondent Side

  • Curtis Ekmark (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP
  • Charles Markle (respondent attorney)
    CARPENTER, HAZLEWOOD, DELGADO & BOLEN LLP

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate

Other Participants

  • Felicia Del Sol (staff)
    Served order upon parties

William Brown vs. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 18F-H1717041-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2017-10-11
Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer
Outcome The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the Petitioner received constructive notice of the infraction committee meeting before the penalties and suspension were imposed.
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Dax R. Watson

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the Petitioner's request, finding that the Respondent HOA did not violate A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) because the Petitioner received constructive notice of the infraction committee meeting before the penalties and suspension were imposed.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prove that the notice required by A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) must be 'actual notice,' and the evidence supported a finding that Petitioner received constructive notice.

Key Issues & Findings

Prior to imposing reasonable monetary penalties on Petitioner for violations of the declaration, bylaws and rules of the association, Respondent failed to provide Petitioner proper notice in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) by failing to provide proper notice before imposing penalties ($2,500 fine and $5,000 recoupment of expenses) and indefinitely suspending his membership privileges. The ALJ found that Petitioner received constructive notice of the hearing and that Respondent did not violate the statute.

Orders: Petitioner's petition in this matter is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Analytics Highlights

Topics: notice, constructive notice, monetary penalties, suspension, certified mail, HOA violation
Additional Citations:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)
  • A.A.C. R2-19-119
  • A.R.S. § 32-2199 et seq.

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

18F-H1717041-REL Decision – 593953.pdf

Uploaded 2026-04-24T11:06:42 (83.6 KB)

18F-H1717041-REL Decision – 593953.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:21:22 (83.6 KB)

Administrative Law Judge Decision Analysis: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document synthesizes the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in case number 18F-H1717041-REL, concerning a dispute between homeowner William Brown (Petitioner) and the Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Respondent). The ALJ ultimately ruled in favor of the Respondent, denying the Petitioner’s claim that the homeowners association violated Arizona state law regarding notification procedures before imposing penalties.

The central issue revolved around the interpretation of “notice” as required by Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1803(B). The Petitioner argued that the statute requires “actual notice”—proof of personal receipt of a notification—which he claimed he never received for a critical disciplinary hearing. The ALJ rejected this argument, establishing that “constructive notice” is legally sufficient. Constructive notice was deemed to have been achieved through the Respondent’s documented efforts to deliver notice via both certified and first-class mail.

A key factor in the decision was the ALJ’s finding that the Petitioner’s testimony was “not credible” regarding his claim that the United States Postal Service (USPS) failed to notify him of a certified letter. The decision upholds the sanctions imposed by the association, which include an indefinite suspension of membership privileges, a $2,500 fine, and the recoupment of $5,000 in related expenses.

Case Background and Timeline

The dispute originated from an incident on November 29, 2016, where Petitioner William Brown was alleged to have left a box of matches at the Respondent’s clubhouse containing papers listing several club properties. This act was interpreted as a threat, leading the Terravita Country Club to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Brown subsequently filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on June 28, 2017, alleging the club failed to provide proper notice before taking action.

Nov 29, 2016

William Brown allegedly leaves a box of matches and notes at the clubhouse.

Dec 2, 2016

The club’s General Manager sends a letter to Brown notifying him of an immediate suspension pending a review.

Dec 8, 2016

Brown signs for and receives the certified mail delivery of the December 2 suspension letter.

Dec 14, 2016

The club sends a letter via first-class and certified mail notifying Brown of a January 9, 2017, Infractions Committee hearing.

Dec 24, 2016

USPS tracking shows the December 14 certified letter is “out for delivery” at Brown’s temporary address in Coldspring, Texas.

Jan 9, 2017

The Infractions Committee meets; Brown does not attend. The Committee sends a letter recommending indefinite suspension and fines.

Jan 12, 2017

The unclaimed December 14 certified letter is returned by the USPS to the club.

Jan 31, 2017

The club’s Board of Directors meets; Brown does not attend. The Board ratifies the sanctions.

Jan 31, 2017

The Board sends a letter to Brown detailing its decision: indefinite suspension, a $2,500 fine, and $5,000 in expense recoupment.

Jun 28, 2017

Brown files a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging a violation of A.R.S. § 33-1803.

Sep 22, 2017

The Office of Administrative Hearings holds a hearing on the matter.

Oct 11, 2017

Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer issues the decision, denying Brown’s petition.

Central Legal Issue: The Definition of “Notice”

The core of the legal dispute was the interpretation of the notice requirement within A.R.S. § 33-1803(B), which states, in part:

“After notice and an opportunity to be heard, the board of directors may impose reasonable monetary penalties on members for violations of the declaration, bylaws and rules of the association.”

The Petitioner argued that this statute requires “actual notice,” defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.” Because there was no evidence he personally received the December 14, 2016, letter notifying him of the initial hearing, he contended that all subsequent actions by the club were invalid.

The ALJ rejected this interpretation for two primary reasons:

1. Statutory Silence: The governing statute, A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 16, does not define the term “notice” or specify that it must be “actual notice.”

2. Legal Precedent and Practicality: The ALJ reasoned that requiring actual notice would create an unworkable loophole. A homeowner could “avoid receiving ‘actual notice’ by simply refusing to sign for a certified mailing,” thereby thwarting any disciplinary process.

Instead, the ALJ determined that “constructive notice” was sufficient. Constructive notice is defined as “notice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.” The Respondent’s actions of sending notice via multiple methods met this standard.

Key Findings and Rulings

The ALJ made several critical findings of fact and conclusions of law that led to the denial of the petition.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner, William Brown, bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondent violated the statute. The ALJ concluded he failed to meet this burden.

Finding on Credibility: The ALJ explicitly stated that the Petitioner’s assertion was not credible. The decision notes: “Petitioner’s assertion that the USPS failed to notify him of the certified letter at any time between December 24, 2016, and January 12, 2017, was not credible.”

Ruling on Constructive Notice: The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner received constructive notice of the January 9, 2017, Infractions Committee meeting through two distinct actions taken by the Respondent:

1. The certified mailing of the December 14, 2016, letter, for which USPS tracking showed an attempted delivery and which the Petitioner was deemed to have refused.

2. The simultaneous first-class mailing of the same letter, which was “presumably delivered to his temporary address in Coldspring, Texas.”

Notice for Subsequent Meetings: The ALJ further presumed that the first-class mailing of the January 9, 2017, letter—notifying the Petitioner of the Board of Directors meeting—was also delivered, thus satisfying notice requirements for the final decision-making body.

Final Decision and Sanctions

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The ruling affirmed that Terravita Country Club, Inc. did not violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).

This decision effectively upholds the sanctions imposed by the club’s Board of Directors on January 31, 2017, which include:

Indefinite suspension of membership privileges.

• A fine of $2,500.00.

Recoupment of expenses incurred related to the infraction, totaling $5,000.00.

The order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is granted pursuant to A.R.S. § 32-2199.04.

Study Guide: Brown v. Terravita Country Club, Inc. (Case No. 18F-H1717041-REL)

This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the case between Petitioner William Brown and Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. It includes a quiz to test comprehension, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences, based on the provided source material.

1. Who were the primary parties in this legal dispute, and what was their relationship?

2. What was the specific statutory violation that William Brown alleged Terravita Country Club had committed?

3. Describe the incident on November 29, 2016, that initiated the actions taken by the Respondent.

4. What was the immediate consequence imposed on the Petitioner by the Respondent’s General Manager on December 2, 2016?

5. How did a temporary change of address filed by the Petitioner affect the delivery of the certified mail notice sent on December 14, 2016?

6. What was the Petitioner’s primary legal argument regarding the type of notice he was required to receive for the disciplinary hearing?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge find the Petitioner’s claim about not being notified by the USPS of certified mail to be “not credible”?

8. What two forms of notice did the Administrative Law Judge conclude the Petitioner had received for the January 9, 2017 meeting?

9. What were the final penalties that the Respondent’s Board of Directors imposed on the Petitioner on January 31, 2017?

10. What was the final recommended order from the Administrative Law Judge regarding the Petitioner’s petition?

Answer Key

1. The primary parties were the Petitioner, William Brown, and the Respondent, Terravita Country Club, Inc. Terravita Country Club is a homeowners association in Arizona, and William Brown is a property owner and member of that association.

2. William Brown alleged that the Terravita Country Club violated Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 33-1803. The specific issue was that the Respondent failed to provide proper notice before imposing monetary penalties for violations of the association’s rules.

3. On or about November 29, 2016, the Petitioner allegedly left a box of matches at the Respondent’s clubhouse. Inside the box were three pieces of paper with the typed names of three locations: Director’s House, Desert Pavilion, and Country Club Clubhouse.

4. On December 2, 2016, the Respondent’s General Manager, Thomas Forbes, sent the Petitioner a letter immediately suspending him from all rights and privileges of the country club property. This suspension was to remain in effect until the disciplinary process was completed.

5. Because the Petitioner had filed a temporary change of address with the USPS, the certified letter was forwarded to Coldspring, Texas. USPS tracking showed it was “out for delivery” on December 24, 2016, but the Petitioner failed to claim it, and it was eventually returned to the Respondent.

6. The Petitioner argued that A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) required “actual notice” of the January 9, 2017 hearing. He asserted that because there was no evidence he personally received the December 14, 2016 letter, the notice requirement was not met.

7. The decision document does not explicitly state the evidence for why the claim was not credible. However, the Judge’s conclusion implies that the documented evidence from the USPS showing the letter was “out for delivery” in Coldspring, Texas, between December 24, 2016, and January 12, 2017, was more convincing than the Petitioner’s denial.

8. The Judge concluded that the Petitioner received “constructive notice” via the certified mailing for which he refused to sign. Additionally, it was presumed that the first-class mailing of the same letter was delivered to his temporary address in Coldspring, Texas.

9. The Board of Directors suspended the Petitioner’s membership privileges indefinitely. They also imposed a fine of $2,500.00 and sought to recoup $5,000.00 in expenses incurred related to the infraction.

10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The Judge concluded that the Respondent did not violate the provisions of A.R.S. § 33-1803(B) regarding notice.

Essay Questions

1. Analyze the legal distinction between “actual notice” and “constructive notice” as defined and applied in this case. Explain why accepting the Petitioner’s argument for requiring “actual notice” would have created a potential loophole, according to the Judge’s reasoning.

2. Trace the complete timeline of events and communications, beginning with the incident on November 29, 2016, and ending with the final decision from the Administrative Law Judge on October 11, 2017. Detail each key date, the action taken, and the method of communication used.

3. Discuss the concept of “preponderance of the evidence” as it applies to this case. Explain what the Petitioner was required to prove and why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found that he failed to meet this burden.

4. Describe the multi-step disciplinary process employed by the Terravita Country Club. Identify the roles and recommendations of the General Manager, the Infractions Committee, and the Board of Directors in addressing the Petitioner’s alleged violation.

5. Evaluate the Respondent’s communication strategy for notifying the Petitioner of the disciplinary proceedings. Discuss the methods used (first-class mail, certified mail) and explain how these methods became a central point of contention and the ultimate basis for the Judge’s decision.

Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.A.C. R2-19-119

A reference to the Arizona Administrative Code rule establishing that the Petitioner bears the burden of proof in this type of proceeding.

A.R.S. § 33-1803(B)

The specific section of Arizona Revised Statutes at the heart of the case. It provides that a homeowners association’s board of directors may impose reasonable monetary penalties on members for violations after providing “notice and an opportunity to be heard.”

Actual Notice

Defined as “[n]otice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.” This was the standard of notice the Petitioner argued was required.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

The presiding official (Tammy L. Eigenheer) in the hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings who hears evidence, makes findings of fact, and issues a decision.

Board of Directors

The governing body of the Terravita Country Club, Inc. that made the final determination on penalties, including the indefinite suspension and fines imposed on the Petitioner.

Constructive Notice

Defined as “[n]otice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of” or “notice presumed by law to have been acquired by a person and thus imputed to that person.” The Judge ruled the Petitioner received this type of notice.

Notice

Defined as “[l]egal notification required by law or agreement, or imparted by operation of law as a result of some fact…; definite legal cognizance, actual or constructive, of an existing right or title.” The term is not specifically defined in the relevant state statute (Title 33, Chapter 16).

Petitioner

The party who filed the petition initiating the legal action. In this case, William Brown.

Preponderance of the evidence

The standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet. It is defined as “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force.”

Respondent

The party against whom the petition was filed. In this case, Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Terravita Country Club Infractions Committee

A committee within the homeowners association that met on January 9, 2017, to hear evidence regarding the Petitioner’s alleged infraction and make a recommendation to the Board of Directors.

He Ignored a Letter From His HOA. It Cost Him $7,500. Here Are 5 Legal Lessons From His Case.

Introduction: The Dreaded Envelope

It’s a feeling many homeowners know: the sight of a formal, certified letter from the homeowners association (HOA). But for homeowner William Brown, the stakes were far higher than a dispute over landscaping or dues. His troubles began after he allegedly left a box of matches at the country club’s front desk, along with a list of three club properties. The HOA, Terravita Country Club, Inc., interpreted this as an implied threat of arson and took immediate action.

When Mr. Brown ignored the subsequent legal notices, it resulted in an indefinite suspension, a $2,500 fine, and an order to pay $5,000 in expenses. This article distills the official administrative court decision from his case into five surprising and critical legal takeaways that every homeowner should understand.

1. You Can Be Legally Notified—Even If You Never Open the Letter

The core of this case hinged on a crucial legal distinction. The judge’s decision rested on the critical difference between two types of legal notice:

Actual Notice: “Notice given directly to, or received personally by, a party.”

Constructive Notice: “Notice arising by presumption of law from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of.”

Because the HOA sent the meeting notice via both certified and first-class mail, the judge concluded that the homeowner had received “constructive notice.” The certified mail provided a documented attempt at delivery, while the first-class mail carried a legal presumption of delivery. Together, this combination was legally sufficient, and the law presumed Mr. Brown was aware of the meeting. This distinction is a fundamental principle that every property owner must grasp.

2. Dodging Certified Mail Is a Terrible Legal Strategy

The homeowner’s primary argument was that because he never signed for or received the certified letter notifying him of the January 9, 2017 hearing, he could not be held responsible. The judge directly rejected this line of reasoning.

To accept Petitioner’s argument, a homeowner would be able to avoid receiving “actual notice” by simply refusing to sign for a certified mailing, as Respondent alleged Petitioner did in this case.

The court viewed this as an attempt to create a loophole to evade responsibility. Allowing someone to claim ignorance by simply avoiding a signature would undermine the entire legal notification process. The lesson for homeowners is that actively avoiding mail is interpreted by the courts not as ignorance, but as a deliberate attempt to evade responsibility.

3. First-Class Mail Is More Powerful Than You Think

A critical fact in the case was that the HOA didn’t rely solely on trackable certified mail; it also sent the notices via standard USPS first-class mail. This proved to be a savvy “belt and suspenders” legal strategy. By using both methods, the HOA created a redundant and legally robust notification system that was almost impossible to defeat. The judge noted the legal presumption about this standard mail:

…it is presumed that the first class mailing of the same letter was delivered to Petitioner at his address of record.

This concept of “presumed delivery” is a powerful tool in legal proceedings. In many contexts, proof that a letter was properly addressed and sent via standard mail is sufficient to assume it was delivered, unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary. This case demonstrates that even a standard envelope in your mailbox should be treated with the utmost seriousness.

4. In a Dispute, Credibility Is Everything

The case wasn’t decided on technicalities alone; a subjective, human element played a pivotal role. Because the homeowner had filed an official temporary change of address with the USPS, the certified letter was forwarded to his location in Texas. He claimed that the USPS never even left a notice for him to pick it up. The judge’s assessment of this claim was devastating to his case.

Petitioner’s assertion that the USPS failed to notify him of the certified letter at any time between December 24, 2016, and January 12, 2017, was not credible.

In the end, the outcome hinged on the judge’s assessment of believability. With no hard evidence to back up his claim, the homeowner’s story was found to be unconvincing, which fatally undermined his entire argument. The lesson is clear: when a dispute comes down to your word against theirs, your credibility can be your most valuable asset—or your most fatal liability.

5. The Burden of Proof Is on You, the Accuser

A fundamental legal concept that worked against the homeowner was the “burden of proof.” Because Mr. Brown filed the complaint, the responsibility was on him to prove that the HOA had violated the law, not the other way around. The judge stated this rule directly:

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1803(B).

“Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as “[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force.” In other words, Mr. Brown had to prove that his version of events was more likely true than not true. As the petitioner, he failed to provide enough convincing evidence to support his accusation, and his case collapsed.

Conclusion: A $7,500 Lesson

This case is a stark reminder that legal communication is a serious process. Ignoring notices, dodging mail, and hoping problems will disappear is a strategy that carries severe financial and personal consequences. For Mr. Brown, the final outcome was an indefinite suspension from the country club, a $2,500 fine, and an order to pay $5,000 for the expenses the HOA incurred.

The next time a formal notice arrives in your mailbox, will you see it as just a piece of paper, or as a legal process you can’t afford to ignore?

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William Brown (petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Dax R. Watson (HOA attorney)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.
  • Thomas Forbes (General Manager)
    Terravita Country Club, Inc.

Neutral Parties

  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate