The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to establish the HOA violated CC&R 14.2. The evidence demonstrated that the damages occurred in an exclusive use area that the homeowner is responsible for maintaining, and that the HOA had adequately maintained the roof.
Why this result: The damage was located on a patio/pergola which under CC&R 14.1 is an exclusive use area for which the homeowner holds maintenance responsibility, not the HOA.
Key Issues & Findings
Association's Responsibility
Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&R 14.2 by failing to repair and take responsibility for $11,476.00 in damages resulting from an improperly constructed roof without flashing.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Decision Documents
21F-H2121032-REL Decision – 870534.pdf
Uploaded 2026-02-28T18:23:48 (121.6 KB)
Here is a concise summary of the requested legal hearing:
**Case Title**: *Carla J. Snyder v. Las Hadas Villas Association* (No. 21F-H2121032-REL)
**Key Facts & Main Issue**
Petitioner Carla J. Snyder filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate against the Las Hadas Villas Association (Respondent), alleging a violation of Section 14.2 of the community's Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The dispute centered on $11,476 in water damage and mold remediation costs incurred by the Petitioner. The Petitioner argued that the damage was caused by a construction flaw—specifically, a lack of flashing on the roof—and asserted that the roof was the Homeowners Association's (HOA) responsibility to maintain and repair.
**Hearing Proceedings & Key Arguments**
* **Petitioner’s Arguments:** The Petitioner presented testimony from a general contractor who stated that the absence of roof flashing allowed water to permeate the garage and patio, classifying it as a design flaw. The Petitioner explicitly sought a "finding of negligence" against the HOA regarding the roof's construction to aid in a future civil lawsuit.
* **Respondent’s Arguments:** The HOA argued that a finding of negligence was outside the statutory purview of the administrative hearing. Relying on Section 14.1 of the CC&Rs, the Respondent noted that while the HOA is responsible for the roof, the homeowner is strictly responsible for "exclusive use" areas, which include patios and pergolas. The HOA provided maintenance logs showing the roof was repaired and fitted with proper flashing in 2015, as well as an independent 2019 inspection confirming the roof underlayment was in good condition and that the leak was an "old issue". Furthermore, the Respondent presented evidence that the unit's previous owner had experienced pergola damage but refused to replace the rotted wood, instead hiring a contractor to simply cover the rot with stucco.
**Most Important Legal Points**
* **Burden of Proof:** Under Arizona law, the Petitioner bore the burden of proving the alleged CC&R violations by a preponderance of the evidence.
* **Interpretation of CC&Rs:** The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) utilized a plain reading of the CC&Rs, confirming that the patio and pergola are subject to the homeowner
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Carla J. Snyder(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf
Ray Odom(witness) General contractor who performed mold remediation and drywall repairs
Dr. John Gilderbloom(witness) University of Louisville Professor and Petitioner's fiancé
Respondent Side
David Potts(HOA attorney) Las Hadas Villas Association
Tonia Reynolds(property manager) Las Hadas Villas Association Testified as a witness for Respondent
Neutral Parties
Sondra J. Vanella(ALJ) OAH
Tom Reynolds(witness) 99 Home Improvements Lead for 99 Home Improvements; provided an affidavit
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
The Petition was dismissed because Petitioners failed to prove the Respondent HOA violated the Bylaws regarding the filling of a vacant Board seat. The ALJ determined the Bylaws did not impose a timeframe for filling the vacancy and the Board acted according to Article IV, Section 3.
Why this result: Petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to establish the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The Bylaws do not contain a provision providing a timeframe in which a vacancy on the Board must be filled.
Key Issues & Findings
Violation of Bylaws regarding Board of Directors composition and appointment
Petitioners alleged the HOA violated Bylaws Article 4 Section 1 by leaving a Board seat open following a resignation (August 2020) and not filling it until November 2020. The ALJ found the Bylaws (Sections 1, 2, and 3) did not mandate a timeframe for filling a vacancy, and the HOA followed procedures for appointment.
Orders: Petitioners’ Petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Governance, Board of Directors, Bylaws, Board Vacancy
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2121033-REL Decision – 862059.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:41 (132.3 KB)
Questions
Question
If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?
Short Answer
Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.
Detailed Answer
In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.
Alj Quote
In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
Topic Tags
Board Vacancies
Elections
Bylaws
Question
Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?
Short Answer
Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.
Alj Quote
The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Interpretation
Topic Tags
Board Vacancies
Timelines
Bylaws
Question
Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?
Short Answer
No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.
Detailed Answer
The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.
Alj Quote
Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.
Legal Basis
Testimony / Findings of Fact
Topic Tags
Community Manager
Authority
Board Composition
Question
What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?
Short Answer
The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.
Detailed Answer
This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
Topic Tags
Legal Standards
Burden of Proof
Evidence
Question
Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?
Short Answer
Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.
Alj Quote
Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.
Legal Basis
Findings of Fact / Bylaws
Topic Tags
Elections
Board Terms
Voting
Question
Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?
Short Answer
Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.
Detailed Answer
Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.
Alj Quote
Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.
Legal Basis
Conclusions of Law
Topic Tags
Discrimination/Bias
Enforcement
Board Conduct
Case
Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Questions
Question
If a Board member resigns, does the HOA have to hold an election to fill the seat?
Short Answer
Not necessarily. Bylaws may allow the remaining Board members to appoint a successor for the unexpired term.
Detailed Answer
In this case, the Bylaws explicitly stated that in the event of a resignation, the remaining Board members select the successor. The ALJ found that the Board was not required to put this seat up for a general election, distinguishing it from seats with expiring terms.
Alj Quote
In the event of death, resignation or removal of a director, his successor shall be selected by the remaining members of the Board and shall serve for the unexpired term of his predecessor.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Article IV, Section 3
Topic Tags
Board Vacancies
Elections
Bylaws
Question
Is there a specific deadline for the Board to fill a vacant seat after a resignation?
Short Answer
Only if the governing documents specify one. If the Bylaws are silent, there is no strict timeframe.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ ruled that because the community's Bylaws did not specify a deadline, the HOA did not violate the rules by waiting several months (from August to November) to fill the vacancy.
Alj Quote
The Bylaws do not contain a timeframe in which the Board must appoint a successor director after the resignation of a director.
Legal Basis
Bylaws Interpretation
Topic Tags
Board Vacancies
Timelines
Bylaws
Question
Can the Community Manager appoint or remove Board members?
Short Answer
No. The authority to appoint or remove directors typically lies with the Board or the membership, not the manager.
Detailed Answer
The Community Manager testified that they lacked the authority to make such appointments, confirming that this power resides with the Board itself.
Alj Quote
Mr. Nurse further testified that he does not have the authority to appoint or remove members of the Board.
Legal Basis
Testimony / Findings of Fact
Topic Tags
Community Manager
Authority
Board Composition
Question
What is the 'burden of proof' for a homeowner suing their HOA in an administrative hearing?
Short Answer
The homeowner (Petitioner) must prove the violation by a 'preponderance of the evidence'.
Detailed Answer
This legal standard requires the homeowner to show that their claims are 'more probably true than not.' It is not enough to simply make an allegation; superior evidentiary weight is required.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
Topic Tags
Legal Standards
Burden of Proof
Evidence
Question
Can I force the Board to hold a vote for a vacant seat if the term hasn't expired yet?
Short Answer
Generally, no. If the term is unexpired, it may not be eligible for a member vote if the Bylaws provide for appointment.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ accepted the explanation that a seat vacated by resignation was not eligible for the general member vote because the original term had not yet expired (it ran until 2022), whereas other seats were up for election because their terms had ended.
Alj Quote
Mr. Nurse explained that the term for the Board member who resigned does not expire until 2022, and as such was not eligible for a member vote.
Legal Basis
Findings of Fact / Bylaws
Topic Tags
Elections
Board Terms
Voting
Question
Does personal dislike or bias by the Board constitute a violation of the Bylaws?
Short Answer
Not on its own. The homeowner must prove a specific violation of the governing documents.
Detailed Answer
Although the homeowner claimed the Board disliked her and was trying to keep her out, the ALJ dismissed the petition because the HOA followed the technical requirements of the Bylaws regarding elections and appointments.
Alj Quote
Petitioners failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated the Bylaws as alleged in the Petition.
Legal Basis
Conclusions of Law
Topic Tags
Discrimination/Bias
Enforcement
Board Conduct
Case
Docket No
21F-H2121033-REL
Case Title
Carlos J. Sanchez & Marinda K. Minch v. Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc.
Decision Date
2021-03-09
Alj Name
Sondra J. Vanella
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Carlos J. Sanchez(petitioner) Candidate for Board election
Marinda K. Minch(petitioner) Candidate for Board election; considered for vacancy appointment; testified
Respondent Side
Ashley Moscarello(HOA attorney) Goodman Lawgroup
Bradley Hudson(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board President of the Board; testified as witness
Shawn Nurse(community manager) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Testified as witness; received ballots for election
William Skanadore(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Incumbent candidate; elected
Will Terrick(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Incumbent candidate; elected
Wendelyn Neal(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Made motion to appoint Marinda Minch
Joel Krick(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
Kathy Hudson(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board
Christiane Pieraggi(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Appointed to fill vacancy
Neutral Parties
Sondra J. Vanella(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) ADRE
Other Participants
John Neelsen(unknown) Candidate for Board election
Tania Almonte(board member) Tempe Villages Homeowners Association, Inc. Board Former Board member whose resignation created a vacancy
The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petition because the Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Montelena Master Community Association violated A.R.S. § 33-442 or its CC&Rs regarding the imposition of a transfer fee. The ALJ found that the use of the fee to fund operating expenses and/or reserves was an acceptable purpose under the relevant statute.
Why this result: Petitioner failed to establish Respondent acted in violation of the community documents and A.R.S. § 33-442.
Key Issues & Findings
Challenge to unauthorized/unlawful transfer fees charged by HOA
Petitioner alleged that the $2500.00 transfer fee charged to the purchaser was an unlawful transfer fee in violation of A.R.S. § 33-442 and specific CC&R provisions, arguing that the authorized use of the fee (Master Association’s operating expenses and/or reserves) was not specific enough to meet the statutory exception under A.R.S. § 33-442(C).
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1806
A.R.S. § 33-442
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA transfer fee, A.R.S. 33-442, CC&R violation, Operating expenses, Reserves
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 33-1806
A.R.S. § 33-442
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2120024-REL Decision – 855401.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:36:12 (95.8 KB)
Questions
Question
Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?
Short Answer
The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.
Detailed Answer
In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
Topic Tags
burden of proof
legal procedure
evidence
Question
Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?
Short Answer
Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.
Detailed Answer
Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.
Alj Quote
Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-442(C)
Topic Tags
transfer fees
operating expenses
financial management
Question
Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?
Short Answer
Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.
Detailed Answer
If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.
Alj Quote
The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15
Topic Tags
board authority
CC&Rs
fees
Question
Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?
Short Answer
Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.
Alj Quote
This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.
Legal Basis
Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)
Topic Tags
reserve contribution
transfer fees
closing costs
Question
What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?
Short Answer
It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.
Detailed Answer
This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.
Alj Quote
A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.
Legal Basis
Arizona Law of Evidence § 5
Topic Tags
legal definitions
evidence
standard of proof
Question
Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?
Short Answer
Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.
Detailed Answer
The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'
Alj Quote
Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Section 7.15
Topic Tags
bankruptcy
property transfer
exemptions
Case
Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
Decision Date
2021-02-16
Alj Name
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE
Questions
Question
Who is responsible for proving that an HOA violated the law or community documents during a hearing?
Short Answer
The homeowner (Petitioner) bears the burden of proof.
Detailed Answer
In an administrative hearing, the homeowner filing the petition must prove that the HOA committed the alleged violations. This must be established by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' meaning the homeowner's claims are more likely true than not.
Alj Quote
Petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish that Respondent committed the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2); A.A.C. R2-19-119(A) and (B)(1)
Topic Tags
burden of proof
legal procedure
evidence
Question
Can an HOA charge a transfer fee that is used for general operating expenses rather than a specific project?
Short Answer
Yes, funding operating expenses or reserves is considered a valid purpose.
Detailed Answer
Under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 33-442), transfer fees are generally prohibited unless they fall under specific exceptions. One exception is if the fee is used for a purpose authorized in the document. The ALJ ruled that using fees for 'operating expenses and/or… reserves' satisfies this requirement; it does not need to be for a specific limited purpose like a swimming pool.
Alj Quote
Petitioner offered no authority to support his interpretation that A.R.S. § 33-442 required that the transfer fee had to be for a more specific purpose than those identified in the governing documents.
Legal Basis
A.R.S. § 33-442(C)
Topic Tags
transfer fees
operating expenses
financial management
Question
Can the HOA Board set the amount of a transfer fee without a vote if the CC&Rs allow it?
Short Answer
Yes, if the CC&Rs grant the Board the authority to set the amount.
Detailed Answer
If the community's Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) specifically states that the transfer fee amount is 'to be set by the Board' or established 'from time to time by the Board,' the Board has the authority to determine the fee amount.
Alj Quote
The Master Association may require the new Owner of a Lot or Parcel to pay to the Master Association, or its designated representative, a transfer fee in an amount to be set by the Board . . . .
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Section 6.6; CC&Rs Section 7.15
Topic Tags
board authority
CC&Rs
fees
Question
Can an HOA charge both a Transfer Fee and a Reserve Contribution fee on the same sale?
Short Answer
Yes, an HOA can charge multiple distinct fees if authorized by the governing documents.
Detailed Answer
The ALJ found that a Transfer Fee can be charged in addition to other fees, such as a Reserve Contribution, provided the governing documents (like a Board Resolution or CC&Rs) explicitly state that the fee is in addition to other assessments.
Alj Quote
This Transfer Fee shall be in addition to any other fees and assessments due and payable in relation to the transfer of the property, including, but not limited to, a Reserve Contribution pursuant to Article 6, Section 6.9 of the Declaration.
Legal Basis
Board Resolution (Recorded July 23, 2010)
Topic Tags
reserve contribution
transfer fees
closing costs
Question
What does 'preponderance of the evidence' mean in an HOA dispute?
Short Answer
It means the evidence shows a claim is more probably true than not.
Detailed Answer
This legal standard requires the party with the burden of proof to provide evidence that has 'superior evidentiary weight.' It does not mean removing all doubt, but rather sufficient evidence to incline a fair mind to one side over the other.
Alj Quote
A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.
Legal Basis
Arizona Law of Evidence § 5
Topic Tags
legal definitions
evidence
standard of proof
Question
Is a transfer fee valid if I purchased the property out of bankruptcy?
Short Answer
Yes, if the CC&Rs require payment immediately upon becoming the owner.
Detailed Answer
The manner of purchase (e.g., out of bankruptcy) does not automatically exempt an owner from transfer fees if the CC&Rs mandate that 'Each person or entity who purchases a Lot… shall pay… immediately upon becoming the Owner.'
Alj Quote
Therefore, Respondent was able to charge Petitioner the transfer fee pursuant to his purchase of the property out of bankruptcy.
Legal Basis
CC&Rs Section 7.15
Topic Tags
bankruptcy
property transfer
exemptions
Case
Docket No
21F-H2120024-REL
Case Title
Aaron Ricks (Somerstone Properties, LLC) v. Montelena Master Community Association
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated CC&R Section 11.1, as the ALJ found the Board's decision to temporarily delay enforcement pending litigation and settlement discussions fell within the discretion granted by the CC&R.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure of HOA to Enforce Architectural Approval Conditions (Hot Tub Screening)
Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to enforce the mandatory installation of a pergola and screening around a neighbor's hot tub, a condition imposed by the Architectural Review Committee when retroactively approving the installation.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Dispute, Architectural Control, Discretionary Enforcement
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:12 (43.0 KB)
20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:12 (7.1 KB)
20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:35:12 (119.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020053-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the key findings and judicial decision in the administrative case of Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL. The petition, filed by homeowner Erik R. Pierce, was ultimately denied by the Administrative Law Judge on February 10, 2021.
The core of the dispute was Pierce’s allegation that the SMCA failed to enforce its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) against his neighbors, the Kinstles, who installed a hot tub visible from Pierce’s property, creating a privacy violation. While the SMCA Board retroactively approved the hot tub, it did so with the explicit condition that a pergola and screening be installed to mitigate the visibility issue. The Kinstles subsequently failed to install the required screening.
The judge concluded that the SMCA’s conditional approval resolved the initial violation claim under CC&R Section 4.27. The central issue then became whether the SMCA’s subsequent failure to compel the installation of the screening constituted a violation of its enforcement duty under CC&R Section 11.1. The judge ruled that it did not, finding that the CC&Rs grant the Association a discretionary right to enforce its rules, not an absolute obligation. The judge found persuasive the SMCA’s testimony that it delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation and in an attempt to foster a settlement between the neighbors. This exercise of discretion was deemed permissible under the Association’s governing documents.
1. Case Overview
Parties and Legal Representation
Entity
Legal Counsel
Petitioner
Erik R. Pierce
James C. Frisch, Esq. & Michael Resare, Esq. (King & Frisch, P.C.)
Respondent
Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)
Heather M. Hampstead, Esq. & Nicholas C.S. Nogami, Esq. (Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP)
Key Case Details
• Case Number: 20F-H2020053-REL
• Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone, Administrative Law Judge
• Hearing Date: January 25, 2021 (conducted via Google Meet)
• Decision Date: February 10, 2021
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) is statutorily authorized to hear petitions from homeowners’ association members. This case was referred by the ADRE to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.
2. Core Dispute and Allegations
Petitioner’s Complaint
On March 23, 2020, Erik R. Pierce filed a complaint with the ADRE alleging that the SMCA was in violation of its own CC&Rs, specifically Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).
The dispute originated with the installation of a hot tub by Pierce’s neighbors, the Kinstles. Pierce testified that the hot tub and its occupants were visible from inside his house, and that occupants of the hot tub could look directly into his home, violating his right to privacy.
Timeline of Key Events
• September 4, 2019: Pierce submits his initial complaint to the SMCA, noting the hot tub’s visibility and asserting that the Kinstles had failed to obtain prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).
• Post-September 2019: The SMCA informs the Kinstles that they installed the hot tub without approval and directs them to submit plans for the proper approval process.
• February 10, 2020: After several rejections, the SMCA Board approves the Kinstles’ hot tub installation on the condition that a pergola and screening are installed.
• March 3, 2020: Pierce receives a letter from the property management company, AAM, LLC, stating that the installation was approved with the screening requirement and that the complaint was closed.
• January 25, 2021: At the time of the hearing, the Kinstles had still not installed the required pergola and screening.
3. Analysis of Key Testimonies
The decision was informed by testimony from four witnesses presented by the Petitioner.
• Erik R. Pierce (Petitioner): Outlined the timeline of the dispute, the visibility of the neighbors’ hot tub, the resulting privacy violation, and the SMCA Board’s failure to enforce its own conditional approval requiring a pergola and screening.
• Bill Oliver (Former SMCA President, Fall 2019 – April 2020): Confirmed that the Board approved the hot tub retroactively with the stipulation for a pergola and screening. He stated the Board had a “rigorous process of enforcement” but could not recall if a specific violation letter was sent to the Kinstles after the conditional approval was granted.
• Jodie Cervantes (Former Community Manager, 2019 – June 2020): Testified that she believed the CC&Rs were enforced and the matter was closed. She suggested the Kinstles had a six-month period to comply with the screening requirement, which she believed was in the Design Guidelines, but could not point to the specific language.
• Martin Douglas (Current SMCA President, from April 2020): Stated he had been to the Pierce residence for another matter and the hot tub was not visible to him. He attributed the lack of enforcement action to the “ongoing litigation and multiple settlement offers which were being exchanged.” He testified that upon resolution of the case, the Board “will follow through with enforcement actions should the Kinstle’s fail to comply.”
4. Judicial Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of the SMCA’s CC&Rs and the discretionary power of its Board.
Governing CC&R Provisions
The ruling rested on the specific language of two sections of the SMCA CC&Rs:
• Section 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas): This section permits the installation of a hot tub only if it is “properly screened… if neither it nor its occupants are Visible from Neighboring Property, and with the prior written approval of the Architectural Review Committee.”
• Section 11.1 (Enforcement): This section states that “The Association or any Owner shall have the right to enforce the Project Documents… The failure of the Association or an Owner to take enforcement action with respect to a violation of the Project Documents shall not constitute or be deemed a waiver of the right of the Association or any Owner to enforce the Project Documents in the future.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions
1. Resolution of the Section 4.27 Claim: The judge determined that the initial issue regarding the unapproved hot tub “was essentially resolved by the Board instructing the Kinstle’s erect a pergola and install screening.” By making its approval conditional on a privacy solution, the Board addressed the core requirement of the section.
2. The “Heart of the Matter” – Section 11.1 Enforcement: The judge identified the central question as whether the SMCA violated Section 11.1 by failing to enforce the screening requirement against the Kinstles.
3. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Enforcement: The judge concluded that the language of Section 11.1 grants the Board a “right to enforce, not an absolute obligation.”
4. Rationale for Delayed Enforcement: The judge found the testimony of the current SMCA President, Martin Douglas, to be “more persuasive.” Douglas’s explanation—that the Board delayed enforcement to “foster an agreement with the neighbors” amid ongoing litigation—was accepted as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion.
5. Final Ruling: The judge stated, “Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.” Consequently, the judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated CC&R Section 11.1.
Final Order
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.
The order was issued on February 10, 2021, and is binding unless a rehearing is granted.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020053-REL
Study Guide: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL)
This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing concerning the dispute between Erik R. Pierce and the Sierra Morado Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms and entities involved in the case.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each of the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the provided source documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the initial reason for Mr. Pierce’s complaint against his neighbors, the Kinstles?
3. Which two sections of the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA) CC&Rs did Mr. Pierce allege were violated?
4. What action did the SMCA Board take after being informed that the Kinstles had installed a hot tub without prior approval?
5. What specific conditions did the SMCA Board require for the retroactive approval of the Kinstles’ hot tub installation?
6. According to former Board President Bill Oliver’s testimony, what was the Board’s common practice regarding architectural requests made after an installation?
7. What reason did Community Manager Jodie Cervantes give for her belief that no further enforcement action could be taken against the Kinstles?
8. According to current SMCA Board President Martin Douglas, why had the Board delayed enforcement actions against the Kinstles?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision regarding the alleged violation of CC&R Section 11.1?
10. How did the judge interpret the Board’s enforcement power as described in Section 11.1 of the CC&Rs?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Erik R. Pierce, who was the Petitioner filing the complaint, and the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), which was the Respondent. Mr. Pierce is a homeowner and member of the SMCA.
2. Mr. Pierce’s complaint originated because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his backyard. He testified that occupants in the hot tub were visible from inside his house, violating his privacy.
3. The Petitioner, Mr. Pierce, alleged that the Respondent, SMCA, was in violation of sections 4.27 and 11.1 of the SMCA CC&Rs. Section 4.27 pertains to the installation of spas, and Section 11.1 addresses the enforcement of project documents.
4. After Mr. Pierce filed his complaint, the SMCA informed the Kinstles that they had installed the hot tub without approval. The Board then directed the Kinstles to submit their plans and go through the proper architectural approval process.
5. The Kinstles’ hot tub was approved retroactively on February 10, 2020, on the condition that they install a pergola and screening. This was intended to address the visibility of the hot tub from Mr. Pierce’s property.
6. Bill Oliver, the SMCA President from fall 2019 to April 2020, testified that the Board would approve architectural requests retroactively. He confirmed that this is what occurred in the case of the Kinstles’ hot tub.
7. Jodie Cervantes, the Community Manager, testified that she believed the matter was closed because the Kinstles had six months to comply with the pergola and screening requirements. She believed this six-month deadline was outlined in the Design Guidelines, though she could not locate the specific language.
8. Martin Douglas, who became Board President in April 2020, testified that the Board delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation. He stated that multiple settlement offers were being exchanged in an effort to foster an agreement between the neighbors.
9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that Mr. Pierce did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the SMCA had violated CC&R Section 11.1.
10. The judge determined that Section 11.1 grants the Board a right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This interpretation means the Board has the discretion to delay enforcement, which it did in this case to facilitate a potential settlement.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Use evidence and testimony from the case documents to construct a thorough analysis. No answers are provided.
1. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Analyze why the Petitioner, Erik R. Pierce, failed to meet this burden of proof concerning the violation of CC&R Section 11.1.
2. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Pierce’s initial complaint on September 4, 2019, to the final decision on February 10, 2021. Discuss the key actions, delays, and decisions made by the SMCA Board during this period.
3. Compare and contrast the testimonies of Bill Oliver, Jodie Cervantes, and Martin Douglas. How do their different roles and timeframes with the SMCA shape their perspectives on the association’s enforcement process and the specific handling of the Kinstle case?
4. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of CC&R Section 11.1. Discuss the distinction made between a “right to enforce” and an “absolute obligation,” and explain how this interpretation was central to the final ruling.
5. Based on the judge’s findings and the testimony of Martin Douglas, what are the likely next steps for the SMCA regarding the Kinstles’ non-compliance with the pergola and screening requirement? Evaluate the potential for future conflict or resolution between the parties involved.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Entity
Definition
AAM, LLC
The property management company that employed Community Manager Jodie Cervantes and managed the Sierra Morado Community Association during the period of the dispute.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone of the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Architectural Committee (ARC)
The committee within the SMCA responsible for approving construction, installations, and alterations to properties, as referenced in CC&R Section 4.27.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearing from members of homeowners’ associations. Mr. Pierce filed his initial complaint with this department.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents or rules of a planned community. The dispute centered on alleged violations of Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).
Hearing
The formal proceeding held on January 25, 2021, where the parties presented exhibits and witness testimony to the Administrative Law Judge.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or complaint to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Erik R. Pierce.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA).
Retroactive Approval
The act of approving an architectural installation (such as a hot tub) after it has already been completed, which the SMCA Board did in this case.
Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)
The homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, of which Erik R. Pierce and the Kinstles are members.
Stipulation
An agreement between the parties in a legal proceeding. In this case, the parties stipulated to enter all submitted exhibits into the record.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020053-REL
Your HOA Can Ignore Its Own Rules? A Surprising Legal Case Every Homeowner Needs to Understand
Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma
Most homeowners in a planned community operate under a simple assumption: if a neighbor violates a clear rule, you can file a complaint, and the Homeowners Association (HOA) is required to take action. It’s the fundamental promise of an HOA—consistent enforcement to protect property values and quality of life.
But what happens when the HOA agrees a violation has occurred, demands a fix, and then… does nothing to enforce it?
A real-world legal case, Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association, provides a surprising and cautionary answer. The final court decision reveals a critical loophole that may exist in your own HOA agreement. This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from that case that every homeowner should understand.
Takeaway 1: “A Right to Enforce” Isn’t an “Obligation to Enforce”
The core of the dispute was straightforward. Homeowner Erik Pierce filed a complaint because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his property, a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—the legally binding rules that govern the community. The HOA’s Architectural Committee retroactively approved the hot tub, but only on the condition that the neighbors install a pergola and screening to shield it from view.
The neighbors never installed the required screening, yet the HOA took no further enforcement action. This inaction led Mr. Pierce to sue the HOA.
The judge’s decision hinged on a crucial interpretation of the HOA’s governing documents. The judge ruled in favor of the HOA because the documents gave the Board the right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This distinction granted the HOA discretion to choose its strategy. The judge found the board’s reasoning for the delay persuasive: it was deliberately choosing negotiation over immediate punitive action to resolve the conflict. The board’s discretion wasn’t just a right to do nothing; it was a right to choose a different path to compliance.
The key phrase here is “shall have the right to enforce.” Had the documents stated the board “shall enforce,” the outcome would likely have been entirely different. This single phrase transforms enforcement from a mandate into a strategic option for the board.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlights this critical point:
“…Section 11.1 only gives the Board a right to enforce, not an absolute obligation. While Petitioner is understandably upset that there has yet to be any follow through on enforcement of the screening requirements, this tribunal finds the testimony of Mr. Douglas more persuasive, namely that the Board has delayed in enforcing because it was trying to foster an agreement with the neighbors. Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.”
This finding is shocking for most homeowners, who reasonably assume that the rules laid out in their CC&Rs are mandates for the board, not a menu of discretionary options.
Takeaway 2: Suing Your HOA Can Ironically Pause Enforcement
The board’s discretionary power was put on full display when Mr. Pierce filed his lawsuit, creating a legal Catch-22. The current SMCA Board President, Martin Douglas, testified that the board deliberately paused formal enforcement actions against the neighbors who had violated the architectural requirement.
The judge ultimately found that the board’s rationale for this pause was a valid exercise of its discretion. The decision to delay was framed not as inaction, but as a strategic choice “to foster an agreement with the neighbors” amidst the complexities of litigation.
This reveals a deep irony: by filing a petition to force the HOA’s hand, the homeowner inadvertently provided the context for the HOA to justify a delay. The judge accepted that the board’s attempt to find a negotiated solution instead of escalating fines and penalties during an active lawsuit was a reasonable use of its discretionary authority. This case demonstrates how legal action, intended to accelerate a resolution, can sometimes be used by an HOA board to justify a different, slower approach.
Takeaway 3: A Clear Rule Violation Doesn’t Guarantee a Win in Court
One of the most surprising aspects of this case is that the facts of the violation were not in dispute. The judge explicitly acknowledged that the neighbors were in violation of the Architectural Review Committee’s requirement. The official decision states:
“Based upon the evidence provided, the Kinstle’s are in violation of the requirement the ARC Committee imposed on them.”
Despite this clear violation by the neighbor, the homeowner, Mr. Pierce, still lost his case against the HOA.
The case was lost on a critical legal distinction: the lawsuit was not about the neighbor’s violation, but about the HOA’s alleged failure to act. Since the judge determined the HOA had the discretionary right—not the mandatory obligation—to enforce the rule, its choice to pursue negotiation rather than immediate punitive action was not considered a violation of its duties.
The lesson here is profound: proving a neighbor is breaking the rules is only the first step. To win a case against your HOA for non-enforcement, you must also prove that its response (or lack thereof) constitutes a breach of its specific duties as outlined in your community’s governing documents.
Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Temper Your Expectations
The case of Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association serves as a stark reminder that HOA governance is often more complex than it appears. The precise wording of your community’s CC&Rs is critically important, as a single phrase can be the difference between a mandatory duty and a discretionary power. This case illustrates that the gap between a rule existing on paper and the board’s power to enforce it can be vast.
As a homeowner, your first step should be to obtain a copy of your community’s most recent CC&Rs and search for the enforcement clause—does it say your board “shall” enforce the rules, or does it say they have the “right” to?
This case forces every homeowner to ask: If your governing documents give your board the ‘right’ to act, what leverage do you truly have to ensure they actually will?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Erik R. Pierce(petitioner)
James C. Frisch(petitioner attorney) King & Frisch, P.C.
Michael Resare(petitioner attorney)
Respondent Side
Nicholas C.S. Nogami(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Heather M. Hampstead(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Jodie Cervantes(property manager/witness) AAM, LLC Community Manager for Respondent SMCA
Bill Oliver(board member/witness) Former SMCA President (Fall 2019 to April 2020)
Martin Douglas(board member/witness) Current SMCA Board President (since April 2020)
Neutral Parties
Adam D. Stone(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
AHansen(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
djones(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
DGardner(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
ncano(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the Respondent HOA did not violate CC&R Section 11.1 because that section grants the Board discretion, rather than a mandatory obligation, in the timing of enforcement actions.
Why this result: The Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof to establish that the Respondent violated CC&R Section 11.1, as the ALJ found the Board's decision to temporarily delay enforcement pending litigation and settlement discussions fell within the discretion granted by the CC&R.
Key Issues & Findings
Failure of HOA to Enforce Architectural Approval Conditions (Hot Tub Screening)
Petitioner alleged that the HOA failed to enforce the mandatory installation of a pergola and screening around a neighbor's hot tub, a condition imposed by the Architectural Review Committee when retroactively approving the installation.
Orders: Petitioner's petition is denied.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Enforcement, CC&R Dispute, Architectural Control, Discretionary Enforcement
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
CC&R Article 4, Section 4.27
CC&R Article 11, Section 11.1
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at page 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850237.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:29 (43.0 KB)
20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 850239.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:31 (7.1 KB)
20F-H2020053-REL Decision – 853778.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:32:32 (119.9 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2020053-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association
Executive Summary
This briefing synthesizes the key findings and judicial decision in the administrative case of Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL. The petition, filed by homeowner Erik R. Pierce, was ultimately denied by the Administrative Law Judge on February 10, 2021.
The core of the dispute was Pierce’s allegation that the SMCA failed to enforce its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) against his neighbors, the Kinstles, who installed a hot tub visible from Pierce’s property, creating a privacy violation. While the SMCA Board retroactively approved the hot tub, it did so with the explicit condition that a pergola and screening be installed to mitigate the visibility issue. The Kinstles subsequently failed to install the required screening.
The judge concluded that the SMCA’s conditional approval resolved the initial violation claim under CC&R Section 4.27. The central issue then became whether the SMCA’s subsequent failure to compel the installation of the screening constituted a violation of its enforcement duty under CC&R Section 11.1. The judge ruled that it did not, finding that the CC&Rs grant the Association a discretionary right to enforce its rules, not an absolute obligation. The judge found persuasive the SMCA’s testimony that it delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation and in an attempt to foster a settlement between the neighbors. This exercise of discretion was deemed permissible under the Association’s governing documents.
1. Case Overview
Parties and Legal Representation
Entity
Legal Counsel
Petitioner
Erik R. Pierce
James C. Frisch, Esq. & Michael Resare, Esq. (King & Frisch, P.C.)
Respondent
Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)
Heather M. Hampstead, Esq. & Nicholas C.S. Nogami, Esq. (Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP)
Key Case Details
• Case Number: 20F-H2020053-REL
• Presiding Judge: Adam D. Stone, Administrative Law Judge
• Hearing Date: January 25, 2021 (conducted via Google Meet)
• Decision Date: February 10, 2021
• Jurisdiction: The Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE) is statutorily authorized to hear petitions from homeowners’ association members. This case was referred by the ADRE to the Office of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing.
2. Core Dispute and Allegations
Petitioner’s Complaint
On March 23, 2020, Erik R. Pierce filed a complaint with the ADRE alleging that the SMCA was in violation of its own CC&Rs, specifically Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).
The dispute originated with the installation of a hot tub by Pierce’s neighbors, the Kinstles. Pierce testified that the hot tub and its occupants were visible from inside his house, and that occupants of the hot tub could look directly into his home, violating his right to privacy.
Timeline of Key Events
• September 4, 2019: Pierce submits his initial complaint to the SMCA, noting the hot tub’s visibility and asserting that the Kinstles had failed to obtain prior approval from the Architectural Review Committee (ARC).
• Post-September 2019: The SMCA informs the Kinstles that they installed the hot tub without approval and directs them to submit plans for the proper approval process.
• February 10, 2020: After several rejections, the SMCA Board approves the Kinstles’ hot tub installation on the condition that a pergola and screening are installed.
• March 3, 2020: Pierce receives a letter from the property management company, AAM, LLC, stating that the installation was approved with the screening requirement and that the complaint was closed.
• January 25, 2021: At the time of the hearing, the Kinstles had still not installed the required pergola and screening.
3. Analysis of Key Testimonies
The decision was informed by testimony from four witnesses presented by the Petitioner.
• Erik R. Pierce (Petitioner): Outlined the timeline of the dispute, the visibility of the neighbors’ hot tub, the resulting privacy violation, and the SMCA Board’s failure to enforce its own conditional approval requiring a pergola and screening.
• Bill Oliver (Former SMCA President, Fall 2019 – April 2020): Confirmed that the Board approved the hot tub retroactively with the stipulation for a pergola and screening. He stated the Board had a “rigorous process of enforcement” but could not recall if a specific violation letter was sent to the Kinstles after the conditional approval was granted.
• Jodie Cervantes (Former Community Manager, 2019 – June 2020): Testified that she believed the CC&Rs were enforced and the matter was closed. She suggested the Kinstles had a six-month period to comply with the screening requirement, which she believed was in the Design Guidelines, but could not point to the specific language.
• Martin Douglas (Current SMCA President, from April 2020): Stated he had been to the Pierce residence for another matter and the hot tub was not visible to him. He attributed the lack of enforcement action to the “ongoing litigation and multiple settlement offers which were being exchanged.” He testified that upon resolution of the case, the Board “will follow through with enforcement actions should the Kinstle’s fail to comply.”
4. Judicial Reasoning and Decision
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision centered on the interpretation of the SMCA’s CC&Rs and the discretionary power of its Board.
Governing CC&R Provisions
The ruling rested on the specific language of two sections of the SMCA CC&Rs:
• Section 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas): This section permits the installation of a hot tub only if it is “properly screened… if neither it nor its occupants are Visible from Neighboring Property, and with the prior written approval of the Architectural Review Committee.”
• Section 11.1 (Enforcement): This section states that “The Association or any Owner shall have the right to enforce the Project Documents… The failure of the Association or an Owner to take enforcement action with respect to a violation of the Project Documents shall not constitute or be deemed a waiver of the right of the Association or any Owner to enforce the Project Documents in the future.”
Administrative Law Judge’s Conclusions
1. Resolution of the Section 4.27 Claim: The judge determined that the initial issue regarding the unapproved hot tub “was essentially resolved by the Board instructing the Kinstle’s erect a pergola and install screening.” By making its approval conditional on a privacy solution, the Board addressed the core requirement of the section.
2. The “Heart of the Matter” – Section 11.1 Enforcement: The judge identified the central question as whether the SMCA violated Section 11.1 by failing to enforce the screening requirement against the Kinstles.
3. Discretionary vs. Mandatory Enforcement: The judge concluded that the language of Section 11.1 grants the Board a “right to enforce, not an absolute obligation.”
4. Rationale for Delayed Enforcement: The judge found the testimony of the current SMCA President, Martin Douglas, to be “more persuasive.” Douglas’s explanation—that the Board delayed enforcement to “foster an agreement with the neighbors” amid ongoing litigation—was accepted as a valid exercise of the Board’s discretion.
5. Final Ruling: The judge stated, “Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.” Consequently, the judge ruled that the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent had violated CC&R Section 11.1.
Final Order
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioners’ petition is denied.
The order was issued on February 10, 2021, and is binding unless a rehearing is granted.
Study Guide – 20F-H2020053-REL
Study Guide: Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2020053-REL)
This study guide provides a review of the administrative hearing concerning the dispute between Erik R. Pierce and the Sierra Morado Community Association. It includes a short-answer quiz, an answer key, suggested essay questions, and a comprehensive glossary of terms and entities involved in the case.
Short-Answer Quiz
Answer each of the following questions in two to three complete sentences, based on the provided source documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What was the initial reason for Mr. Pierce’s complaint against his neighbors, the Kinstles?
3. Which two sections of the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA) CC&Rs did Mr. Pierce allege were violated?
4. What action did the SMCA Board take after being informed that the Kinstles had installed a hot tub without prior approval?
5. What specific conditions did the SMCA Board require for the retroactive approval of the Kinstles’ hot tub installation?
6. According to former Board President Bill Oliver’s testimony, what was the Board’s common practice regarding architectural requests made after an installation?
7. What reason did Community Manager Jodie Cervantes give for her belief that no further enforcement action could be taken against the Kinstles?
8. According to current SMCA Board President Martin Douglas, why had the Board delayed enforcement actions against the Kinstles?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final decision regarding the alleged violation of CC&R Section 11.1?
10. How did the judge interpret the Board’s enforcement power as described in Section 11.1 of the CC&Rs?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Erik R. Pierce, who was the Petitioner filing the complaint, and the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA), which was the Respondent. Mr. Pierce is a homeowner and member of the SMCA.
2. Mr. Pierce’s complaint originated because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his backyard. He testified that occupants in the hot tub were visible from inside his house, violating his privacy.
3. The Petitioner, Mr. Pierce, alleged that the Respondent, SMCA, was in violation of sections 4.27 and 11.1 of the SMCA CC&Rs. Section 4.27 pertains to the installation of spas, and Section 11.1 addresses the enforcement of project documents.
4. After Mr. Pierce filed his complaint, the SMCA informed the Kinstles that they had installed the hot tub without approval. The Board then directed the Kinstles to submit their plans and go through the proper architectural approval process.
5. The Kinstles’ hot tub was approved retroactively on February 10, 2020, on the condition that they install a pergola and screening. This was intended to address the visibility of the hot tub from Mr. Pierce’s property.
6. Bill Oliver, the SMCA President from fall 2019 to April 2020, testified that the Board would approve architectural requests retroactively. He confirmed that this is what occurred in the case of the Kinstles’ hot tub.
7. Jodie Cervantes, the Community Manager, testified that she believed the matter was closed because the Kinstles had six months to comply with the pergola and screening requirements. She believed this six-month deadline was outlined in the Design Guidelines, though she could not locate the specific language.
8. Martin Douglas, who became Board President in April 2020, testified that the Board delayed enforcement actions due to the ongoing litigation. He stated that multiple settlement offers were being exchanged in an effort to foster an agreement between the neighbors.
9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Petitioner’s petition be denied. The judge concluded that Mr. Pierce did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the SMCA had violated CC&R Section 11.1.
10. The judge determined that Section 11.1 grants the Board a right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This interpretation means the Board has the discretion to delay enforcement, which it did in this case to facilitate a potential settlement.
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Essay Questions
The following questions are designed for longer, essay-style responses. Use evidence and testimony from the case documents to construct a thorough analysis. No answers are provided.
1. Explain the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence” as defined in the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. Analyze why the Petitioner, Erik R. Pierce, failed to meet this burden of proof concerning the violation of CC&R Section 11.1.
2. Trace the timeline of events from Mr. Pierce’s initial complaint on September 4, 2019, to the final decision on February 10, 2021. Discuss the key actions, delays, and decisions made by the SMCA Board during this period.
3. Compare and contrast the testimonies of Bill Oliver, Jodie Cervantes, and Martin Douglas. How do their different roles and timeframes with the SMCA shape their perspectives on the association’s enforcement process and the specific handling of the Kinstle case?
4. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of CC&R Section 11.1. Discuss the distinction made between a “right to enforce” and an “absolute obligation,” and explain how this interpretation was central to the final ruling.
5. Based on the judge’s findings and the testimony of Martin Douglas, what are the likely next steps for the SMCA regarding the Kinstles’ non-compliance with the pergola and screening requirement? Evaluate the potential for future conflict or resolution between the parties involved.
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Glossary of Key Terms
Term / Entity
Definition
AAM, LLC
The property management company that employed Community Manager Jodie Cervantes and managed the Sierra Morado Community Association during the period of the dispute.
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official who presides over administrative hearings. In this case, the ALJ was Adam D. Stone of the Office of Administrative Hearings.
Architectural Committee (ARC)
The committee within the SMCA responsible for approving construction, installations, and alterations to properties, as referenced in CC&R Section 4.27.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE)
The state agency authorized by statute to receive and decide Petitions for Hearing from members of homeowners’ associations. Mr. Pierce filed his initial complaint with this department.
Burden of Proof
The obligation on a party in a legal case to prove its allegations. In this case, the Petitioner had the burden to establish his claim by a “preponderance of the evidence.”
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. These are the governing documents or rules of a planned community. The dispute centered on alleged violations of Sections 4.27 (Swimming Pools and Spas) and 11.1 (Enforcement).
Hearing
The formal proceeding held on January 25, 2021, where the parties presented exhibits and witness testimony to the Administrative Law Judge.
Office of Administrative Hearings
An independent state agency that conducts evidentiary hearings for other state agencies, such as the Department of Real Estate.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or complaint to initiate a legal proceeding. In this case, the Petitioner was Erik R. Pierce.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The evidentiary standard required for the Petitioner to win the case. It is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is “more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed. In this case, the Respondent was the Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA).
Retroactive Approval
The act of approving an architectural installation (such as a hot tub) after it has already been completed, which the SMCA Board did in this case.
Sierra Morado Community Association (SMCA)
The homeowners’ association in Tucson, Arizona, of which Erik R. Pierce and the Kinstles are members.
Stipulation
An agreement between the parties in a legal proceeding. In this case, the parties stipulated to enter all submitted exhibits into the record.
Blog Post – 20F-H2020053-REL
Your HOA Can Ignore Its Own Rules? A Surprising Legal Case Every Homeowner Needs to Understand
Introduction: The Homeowner’s Dilemma
Most homeowners in a planned community operate under a simple assumption: if a neighbor violates a clear rule, you can file a complaint, and the Homeowners Association (HOA) is required to take action. It’s the fundamental promise of an HOA—consistent enforcement to protect property values and quality of life.
But what happens when the HOA agrees a violation has occurred, demands a fix, and then… does nothing to enforce it?
A real-world legal case, Erik R. Pierce versus the Sierra Morado Community Association, provides a surprising and cautionary answer. The final court decision reveals a critical loophole that may exist in your own HOA agreement. This article will break down the three most counter-intuitive takeaways from that case that every homeowner should understand.
Takeaway 1: “A Right to Enforce” Isn’t an “Obligation to Enforce”
The core of the dispute was straightforward. Homeowner Erik Pierce filed a complaint because his neighbors, the Kinstles, installed a hot tub that was visible from his property, a violation of the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs)—the legally binding rules that govern the community. The HOA’s Architectural Committee retroactively approved the hot tub, but only on the condition that the neighbors install a pergola and screening to shield it from view.
The neighbors never installed the required screening, yet the HOA took no further enforcement action. This inaction led Mr. Pierce to sue the HOA.
The judge’s decision hinged on a crucial interpretation of the HOA’s governing documents. The judge ruled in favor of the HOA because the documents gave the Board the right to enforce the rules, not an absolute obligation to do so. This distinction granted the HOA discretion to choose its strategy. The judge found the board’s reasoning for the delay persuasive: it was deliberately choosing negotiation over immediate punitive action to resolve the conflict. The board’s discretion wasn’t just a right to do nothing; it was a right to choose a different path to compliance.
The key phrase here is “shall have the right to enforce.” Had the documents stated the board “shall enforce,” the outcome would likely have been entirely different. This single phrase transforms enforcement from a mandate into a strategic option for the board.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision highlights this critical point:
“…Section 11.1 only gives the Board a right to enforce, not an absolute obligation. While Petitioner is understandably upset that there has yet to be any follow through on enforcement of the screening requirements, this tribunal finds the testimony of Mr. Douglas more persuasive, namely that the Board has delayed in enforcing because it was trying to foster an agreement with the neighbors. Section 11.1 expressly granted the Board this discretion, and it should not be disturbed.”
This finding is shocking for most homeowners, who reasonably assume that the rules laid out in their CC&Rs are mandates for the board, not a menu of discretionary options.
Takeaway 2: Suing Your HOA Can Ironically Pause Enforcement
The board’s discretionary power was put on full display when Mr. Pierce filed his lawsuit, creating a legal Catch-22. The current SMCA Board President, Martin Douglas, testified that the board deliberately paused formal enforcement actions against the neighbors who had violated the architectural requirement.
The judge ultimately found that the board’s rationale for this pause was a valid exercise of its discretion. The decision to delay was framed not as inaction, but as a strategic choice “to foster an agreement with the neighbors” amidst the complexities of litigation.
This reveals a deep irony: by filing a petition to force the HOA’s hand, the homeowner inadvertently provided the context for the HOA to justify a delay. The judge accepted that the board’s attempt to find a negotiated solution instead of escalating fines and penalties during an active lawsuit was a reasonable use of its discretionary authority. This case demonstrates how legal action, intended to accelerate a resolution, can sometimes be used by an HOA board to justify a different, slower approach.
Takeaway 3: A Clear Rule Violation Doesn’t Guarantee a Win in Court
One of the most surprising aspects of this case is that the facts of the violation were not in dispute. The judge explicitly acknowledged that the neighbors were in violation of the Architectural Review Committee’s requirement. The official decision states:
“Based upon the evidence provided, the Kinstle’s are in violation of the requirement the ARC Committee imposed on them.”
Despite this clear violation by the neighbor, the homeowner, Mr. Pierce, still lost his case against the HOA.
The case was lost on a critical legal distinction: the lawsuit was not about the neighbor’s violation, but about the HOA’s alleged failure to act. Since the judge determined the HOA had the discretionary right—not the mandatory obligation—to enforce the rule, its choice to pursue negotiation rather than immediate punitive action was not considered a violation of its duties.
The lesson here is profound: proving a neighbor is breaking the rules is only the first step. To win a case against your HOA for non-enforcement, you must also prove that its response (or lack thereof) constitutes a breach of its specific duties as outlined in your community’s governing documents.
Conclusion: Know Your Documents, Temper Your Expectations
The case of Pierce v. Sierra Morado Community Association serves as a stark reminder that HOA governance is often more complex than it appears. The precise wording of your community’s CC&Rs is critically important, as a single phrase can be the difference between a mandatory duty and a discretionary power. This case illustrates that the gap between a rule existing on paper and the board’s power to enforce it can be vast.
As a homeowner, your first step should be to obtain a copy of your community’s most recent CC&Rs and search for the enforcement clause—does it say your board “shall” enforce the rules, or does it say they have the “right” to?
This case forces every homeowner to ask: If your governing documents give your board the ‘right’ to act, what leverage do you truly have to ensure they actually will?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Erik R. Pierce(petitioner)
James C. Frisch(petitioner attorney) King & Frisch, P.C.
Michael Resare(petitioner attorney)
Respondent Side
Nicholas C.S. Nogami(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Heather M. Hampstead(respondent attorney) Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Bolen, LLP
Jodie Cervantes(property manager/witness) AAM, LLC Community Manager for Respondent SMCA
Bill Oliver(board member/witness) Former SMCA President (Fall 2019 to April 2020)
Martin Douglas(board member/witness) Current SMCA Board President (since April 2020)
Neutral Parties
Adam D. Stone(ALJ)
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
AHansen(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
djones(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
DGardner(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
ncano(unknown) Arizona Department of Real Estate Transmission recipient
CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5
Outcome Summary
The ALJ concluded that Foothills demonstrated Respondents' violation of the community governing documents by commencing and continuing construction of a second-story Addition without obtaining the required Architectural Committee approval. Foothills was deemed the prevailing party, and Respondents' appeal was dismissed.
Key Issues & Findings
Unauthorized 2nd story addition
Respondents constructed a second-story Addition to their property without first obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee, violating the community governing documents.
Orders: Respondents’ appeal is dismissed, and Foothills is deemed the prevailing party with regard to its Petition.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3
CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3
CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4
CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5
Analytics Highlights
Topics: architectural review, cc&r violation, unapproved construction, second story addition, prevailing party
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. §§ 32-2102
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199 et al.
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199(2)
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.01(D)
A.R.S. §§ 32-2199.02
A.R.S. § 32-2199.05
A.R.S. § 41-1092
A.R.S. §32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz. 195, 165 P.3d 173 (App. 2007)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
21F-H2120004-REL Decision – 839537.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:34:43 (135.4 KB)
Briefing Doc – 21F-H2120004-REL
Briefing Document: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Foothills Club West Homeowners Association v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust (No. 21F-H2120004-REL), adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core dispute involved the construction of a second-story addition by homeowners (Respondents) without the prior approval of the Homeowners Association (Petitioner), a direct violation of the community’s governing documents.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found conclusively in favor of the Foothills Club West HOA. The evidence demonstrated that the Respondents not only began construction without seeking approval but continued the project even after receiving a formal denial from the HOA’s Architectural Committee. A subsequent agreement between the parties, wherein the Respondents would demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines, was not honored by the Respondents. The ALJ dismissed the Respondents’ appeal and declared the HOA the prevailing party, validating its authority to enforce the community’s architectural standards as outlined in its Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).
I. Case Overview
• Case Name: Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, Petitioner, v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust, Respondent.
• Case Number: 21F-H2120004-REL
• Jurisdiction: Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
• Administrative Law Judge: Kay Abramsohn
• Hearing Date: October 5, 2020
• Decision Date: November 27, 2020
• Central Issue: The petition filed by Foothills HOA on July 24, 2020, alleged that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. This action was alleged to be in violation of CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5.
II. Chronology of Key Events
The hearing record established the following undisputed sequence of events:
Oct. 2018
Respondents begin construction of the second-story addition.
Nov. 7, 2018
The City of Phoenix issues a stop-work order, noting a permit is required.
Nov. 7, 2018
Foothills HOA issues a violation notice to the Respondents.
Dec. 17, 2018
Respondents obtain a permit from the City of Phoenix.
Jan. 18, 2019 (approx.)
Respondents submit a request for approval to the Foothills Architectural Committee.
Jan. 18, 2019
Foothills HOA issues a penalty notice to the Respondents, with further notices issued monthly.
Feb. 22, 2019
Foothills HOA issues a formal denial of the application.
Mar. 15, 2019
The City of Phoenix gives final approval to the construction and issues a Certificate of Occupancy.
Post Feb. 2019
The parties reach an agreement for Respondents to demolish the addition in exchange for a waiver of fines.
July 24, 2020
Foothills HOA files its petition, noting Respondents have not complied with the demolition agreement.
Oct. 5, 2020
The administrative hearing is held.
Nov. 27, 2020
The Administrative Law Judge issues the final decision.
III. Arguments of the Parties
A. Petitioner: Foothills Club West HOA
• Violation of CC&Rs: The HOA argued that the Respondents violated CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 by commencing construction without first obtaining approval from the Architectural Committee.
• Disregard for Denial: The HOA asserted that the Respondents completed the addition after receiving a formal denial of their application.
• Breach of Agreement: The HOA noted that the parties had reached a settlement agreement for demolition, which the Respondents failed to honor. The HOA requested that the Tribunal enforce this agreement.
• Jurisdictional Distinction: The HOA maintained that approval from the City of Phoenix was a separate matter and did not negate the requirement to obtain approval from the HOA as mandated by the governing documents.
B. Respondents: Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust
• Initial Ignorance: Respondents claimed they were initially unaware of the HOA approval requirements.
• Attempted Compliance: They argued that once notified, they followed the association’s guidance, met with the Board, and sought approval.
• Vague Denial: Respondents stated they did not understand the meaning of the denial reason, “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community,” or how the addition specifically violated community rules.
• Lack of Due Process: They argued they did not receive a letter indicating an appeal process was available and therefore felt they had not received a final “denial.”
• Demolition Delay: While not disputing the existence of the demolition agreement, Respondents cited COVID-19 issues and safety concerns for their at-risk family as reasons for requesting more time.
• Final Appeal: At the hearing, Respondents reversed their position on the agreement and requested to be allowed to keep the addition.
IV. Analysis of Governing Documents
The decision centered on specific provisions within the Foothills Club West governing documents, which constitute the contract between the HOA and the homeowners.
• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.3 (Architectural Approval): This section was central to the case. It states in pertinent part:
• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.4 (Obligation to Obtain Approval): This provision explicitly sets forth a homeowner’s obligation to secure approval from the Architectural Committee.
• CC&R Article 9, Section 9.5 (Exterior Appearance): This section clarifies that while the HOA cannot limit interior remodeling, it retains jurisdiction over any changes that are “visible from outside such [home] … or affects the exterior appearance of such [home].”
• Amended Architectural Guidelines (2013): These guidelines reinforce the CC&Rs, specifying that a homeowner’s plans must be submitted for approval through the Architectural Committee on a case-by-case basis.
V. Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The ALJ’s conclusions of law provided a clear framework for the final order.
A. Burden of Proof
The ALJ established that in this proceeding, the petitioner (Foothills HOA) bore the burden of proving by a “preponderance of the evidence” that the Respondents had violated the governing documents. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
B. Core Conclusion on Violations
The ALJ found that the HOA had successfully met its burden of proof. The central conclusion of law states:
“The Administrative Law Judge concludes that Foothills has demonstrated Respondents’ violation of the community governing documents, as stated in CC&R Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5, because Respondents began to construct a modification, the Addition, to their existing home prior to obtaining approval from Foothills Architectural Committee and, further, Respondents continued to construct the Addition despite receiving a denial of approval from Foothills Architectural Committee.”
This finding affirmed that the Respondents committed two distinct violations: starting work without approval and continuing work after being explicitly denied approval.
VI. Final Order and Implications
Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the ALJ issued a decisive order.
• Order:
• Binding Nature: The decision notes that the order is binding on both parties unless a rehearing is requested. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 21F-H2120004-REL
Study Guide: Foothills Club West HOA v. Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust
This guide provides a detailed review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case No. 21F-H2120004-REL. It includes a short-answer quiz to test factual recall, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a comprehensive glossary of key terms found within the document.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following ten questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the information provided in the source document.
1. Who are the Petitioner and Respondent in this case, and what is their relationship?
2. What was the single issue raised in the petition filed by Foothills Club West Homeowners Association?
3. According to the Petition, which specific articles and sections of the governing documents did the Respondents allegedly violate?
4. What action did the City of Phoenix take on November 7, 2018, regarding the Respondents’ construction project?
5. What reasons did the Foothills Architectural Committee provide for denying the Respondents’ application on February 22, 2019?
6. Prior to the hearing, what agreement did the parties reach in an attempt to resolve the dispute?
7. What was the Respondents’ primary argument for their actions and for their failure to comply with the association’s denial?
8. What is the legal standard of proof required in this case, and which party bore the burden of meeting it?
9. Explain the difference between the City of Phoenix’s approval and the Foothills Architectural Committee’s approval, as argued by the Petitioner.
10. What was the final order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in this matter?
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Answer Key
1. The Petitioner is the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association (“Foothills”). The Respondent is the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust. Their relationship is that of a homeowners’ association and a member homeowner residing within the planned community for 22 years.
2. The single issue raised was that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized and unapproved second-story addition to their property. The construction was completed even after the Foothills Architectural Committee had issued a denial of the project.
3. Foothills alleged that the Respondents violated the CC&Rs Article 7, Section 7.3, and Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. These articles pertain to the rights and obligations of the association and the architectural standards requiring prior approval for modifications.
4. On November 7, 2018, the City of Phoenix issued a stop-work order for the Respondents’ construction project. The order noted that the work being performed required a permit, which had not yet been obtained.
5. The Foothills Architectural Committee denied the application because it needed copies of the City permit, the plans were incomplete, and there was no documentation on the roof line or roofing materials. Furthermore, the denial stated that the project “Fails aesthetics of surrounding community.”
6. The parties came to an agreement wherein the Respondents would complete the demolition of the second-story addition. In exchange, Foothills agreed to waive the penalties that had been imposed on the Respondents for the violation.
7. The Respondents argued that they initially did not know what was required and that they cooperated with the association’s Board once notified. They claimed they did not understand what “Fails aesthetics” meant, did not receive a letter about an appeal process, and therefore did not feel they had received a final “denial.”
8. The legal standard of proof is a “preponderance of the evidence,” which is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. The Petitioner, Foothills, bore the burden of proving the Respondents’ violation by this standard.
9. Foothills argued that approval from the City of Phoenix and approval from the association’s Architectural Committee were two different and separate matters. Even though the Respondents eventually received a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy, this did not override the CC&R requirement to first obtain approval from Foothills.
10. The Administrative Law Judge ordered that the Respondents’ appeal be dismissed. The Judge deemed Foothills the prevailing party with regard to its petition, finding that Foothills had demonstrated the Respondents’ violation of the community’s governing documents.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Formulate an essay-style answer for each, drawing evidence and support directly from the provided legal decision.
1. Analyze the arguments presented by both the Petitioner (Foothills) and the Respondents at the hearing. Discuss the key evidence and claims each party used to support their position and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately found the Petitioner’s case more persuasive.
2. Explain the distinct roles and jurisdictions of the Homeowners Association’s Architectural Committee and the City of Phoenix regarding the Respondents’ construction project. Why was obtaining a City permit and a Certificate of Occupancy insufficient for the Respondents to proceed without violating the community’s governing documents?
3. Trace the procedural history of case No. 21F-H2120004-REL, from the filing of the initial petition to the final order. Discuss key filings, motions, and deadlines mentioned in the document, including the Respondents’ attempt to consolidate another case.
4. Discuss the significance of the “contract” between the parties, as defined in footnote 15. How do the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines function as this contract, and which specific sections were central to the judge’s conclusion that a violation occurred?
5. Evaluate the Respondents’ attempt to justify their failure to demolish the addition as per their agreement with Foothills, citing COVID-19 issues. How did their request at the hearing to keep the addition conflict with their prior agreement, and what does this reveal about their position in the dispute?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
The official, in this case Kay Abramsohn, who presides over administrative hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and issues decisions.
Architectural Committee
A committee appointed by the Foothills HOA, as established by CC&R Article 9, with the authority to review, approve, or disapprove plans for construction, modifications, and additions to properties within the community.
An abbreviation for the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions. These are the governing documents that form a binding contract between the homeowners association and the property owners, outlining their rights and obligations.
Disclosure
The formal process by which parties in a legal case provide evidence, exhibits, and information to each other before a hearing. The deadline for disclosure in this case was September 29, 2020.
Governing Documents
The set of rules for the planned community, including the CC&Rs and the amended Architectural Guidelines, which have the same force and effect as association rules.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a legal proceeding by filing a petition. In this case, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association.
Petition
The formal document filed with the Arizona Department of Real Estate to initiate a hearing concerning violations of community governing documents. In this case, it was a “single-issue petition.”
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this administrative hearing. It is defined as “proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed and who is required to respond to the allegations. In this case, the Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust.
Tribunal
The Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, the state agency authorized by statute to hear and decide contested matters referred to it, such as this dispute.
Blog Post – 21F-H2120004-REL
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21F-H2120004-REL
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This text is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings concerning a dispute between the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association and the Subrahmanyam & Sudhakar Living Trust. The Petitioner, the Foothills Club West Homeowners Association, filed a petition alleging that the Respondents constructed an unauthorized second-story addition to their property in violation of the association’s governing documents, specifically the CC&Rs Article 9, Sections 9.3, 9.4, and 9.5. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the Respondents violated these community documents by beginning construction prior to obtaining approval from the Foothills Architectural Committee and continuing the work despite receiving a denial. The judge ultimately concluded that Foothills was the prevailing party and dismissed the Respondents’ appeal, effectively upholding the violation finding.
What are the specific governing document violations alleged and proven against the homeowners?
How did the legal and administrative process address the unauthorized construction dispute?
What was the final resolution ordered regarding the unapproved second-story home addition?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
John Halk(HOA attorney) BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC Represented Petitioner Foothills Club West Homeowners Association
Nathan Tennyson(HOA attorney) BROWN/OLCOTT, PLLC Counsel for Petitioner
Respondent Side
Mary T. Hone(Respondent attorney) Mary T. Hone, PLLC Counsel for Respondent Trustees Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar
Subrahmanyam Sudhakar(respondent) Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust
Sheila Sudhakar(respondent) Subrahmanyam & Sheila Sudhakar Living Trust Trustee of the Respondent Living Trust
Neutral Parties
Kay Abramsohn(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings Administrative Law Judge
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
AHansen(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
djones(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
DGardner(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
ncano(Agency Staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of electronic transmission of Order
The Petition was upheld on all issues asserted by the Petitioner. The Respondent was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) (failure to provide election documents), A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) (failure to hold an annual meeting in 2019), and Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws (improperly prohibiting write-in ballots). Respondent was ordered to supply Petitioner with relevant documents and refund the Petitioner's filing fee of $1,500.00. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.
Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with the required election materials and documentation from the October 2018 elections, violating statutory requirements for retention and availability of these materials for owner inspection.
Orders: Respondent ordered to supply Petitioner with the relevant documents, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C), within ten (10) days of the Order.
Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
Open meetings; exceptions
Respondent postponed its required yearly 2019 meeting until January 2020, resulting in a failure to hold a unit owners' association meeting in 2019 as required by statute.
Orders: Petition upheld on this issue.
Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)
Selection
Respondent's board of directors declared write-in ballots invalid for the November 20, 2019, election. Since the Bylaws were silent on prohibiting write-in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2019033-REL Decision – 778923.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:47 (108.5 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019033-REL
Briefing Document: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Donna M. Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019033-REL), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge found entirely in favor of the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, concluding that the Respondent, Country Hills West Condominium Association (“the Association”), committed multiple violations of Arizona state statutes and its own governing documents.
The core violations upheld by the court are:
1. Failure to Hold a Required Annual Meeting: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold its required annual meeting within the 2019 calendar year, repeatedly postponing it until January 2020.
2. Failure to Provide Election Records: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with complete election materials for inspection, including ballots, envelopes, and sign-in sheets from the October 2018 election.
3. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots: The Association violated Article 3, Section 2 of its Bylaws by unilaterally prohibiting write-in ballots for the 2019 election, despite its governing documents being silent on the issue.
As a result, the Association was ordered to provide the requested documents to the Petitioner within ten days and to reimburse her $1,500 filing fee within thirty days. The decision underscores the legal obligation of homeowners’ associations to adhere strictly to statutory requirements for meetings, elections, and record transparency.
——————————————————————————–
I. Case Overview
The dispute was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by homeowner Donna M. Bischoff with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on December 11, 2019.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Donna M Bischoff, Petitioner, v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent
Case Number
20F-H2019033-REL
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Hearing Date
March 10, 2020
Decision Date
March 30, 2020
Petitioner Representative
Donna M. Bischoff (on her own behalf)
Respondent Representative
Doug Meyer, President and Director
II. Petitioner’s Allegations
The Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, asserted that the Country Hills West Condominium Association committed violations of state law and its own governing documents. The specific allegations were:
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B): Failure to hold the mandatory annual unit owners’ association meeting within the 2019 calendar year.
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C): Failure to make election materials, including ballots and related items, available for inspection by a unit owner.
• Violation of Bylaws Article 3, Section 2: Improperly invalidating election ballots by prohibiting write-in candidates without any authority from the governing documents.
The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish these violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
III. Core Issues and Factual Findings
The hearing established several key facts that formed the basis of the Judge’s decision. The testimony from both Ms. Bischoff and the Association’s President, Doug Meyer, was central to these findings.
A. Failure to Hold the 2019 Annual Meeting
• Timeline of Events: The Association’s required annual meeting for 2019 was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019. It was subsequently postponed three times: first to December 19, 2019; then to December 30, 2019; and ultimately held on January 24, 2020.
• Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer testified that the postponements were necessary because write-in candidates appeared on the ballot, which the board had prohibited. He stated that the board “needed time to reprint the ballot and mail them out.”
• Conclusion of Law: The evidence was undisputed that no annual meeting took place during the 2019 calendar year. The Judge concluded that by postponing the meeting into the following year, the Association was in direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B), which mandates that “A meeting of the unit owners’ association shall be held at least once each year.”
B. Denial of Access to Election Records
• Petitioner’s Request: In October 2018, Ms. Bischoff requested to see the election results from the October 2018 meeting, specifically seeking to know which units had voted.
• Respondent’s Response: The Association initially did not provide the results. A few weeks prior to the March 2020 hearing, it supplied Ms. Bischoff with vote tallies and a list of unit members who voted. However, it failed to provide the full scope of required materials.
• Missing Documentation: The Association did not provide the “ballots, envelopes, related materials, and sign-in sheets” as mandated by statute for inspection.
• Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer argued that no election actually occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting because there was no quorum. He further made the admission that the Association had not achieved a quorum for any meeting in the preceding 20 years. He claimed that without an election, there was no obligation to publish ballots.
• Conclusion of Law: The Judge found that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C). The statute requires that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… and made available for unit owner inspection for at least one year.” The partial and delayed provision of records was insufficient to meet this legal requirement.
C. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots
• The Dispute: The November 20, 2019, meeting was cancelled because some ballots contained write-in candidates. The board of directors informed members that write-in ballots were prohibited and would be “thrown out.”
• Petitioner’s Argument: Ms. Bischoff argued that the board could not “choose how to interpret a silent document.” She pointed out that the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation do not prohibit write-in ballots and that the same board had allowed them in a 2017 election.
• Respondent’s Position: Mr. Meyer acknowledged that the Bylaws were silent on the issue but stated the Association needed to “figure out how to handle” them. A membership meeting to discuss the issue was held on December 30, 2019, but failed to achieve a quorum.
• Conclusion of Law: The Judge determined that the Association violated its own Bylaws. The decision states, “absent any clear language in the A.R.S. or the Bylaws prohibiting write in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.” The board’s unilateral prohibition was therefore found to be improper.
IV. Legal Conclusions and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge upheld the petition on all issues, finding that the Petitioner had successfully proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Final Order:
Based on the foregoing conclusions, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The Petition filed by Donna M. Bischoff is upheld on all issues.
2. The Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
3. The Respondent must supply the Petitioner with the relevant election documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) within ten (10) days of the Order.
4. The Respondent must pay the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within thirty (30) days of the Order.
5. No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.
The Order is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019033-REL
Study Guide: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2019033-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and a condominium association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the source document.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties in the legal dispute, and what were their roles?
2. What specific violations did the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, allege against the Respondent?
3. Why was the 2019 yearly meeting for the Country Hills West Condominium Association repeatedly rescheduled?
4. What was the Respondent’s position on the validity of write-in ballots for the November 20, 2019, election?
5. What information did the Petitioner request from the October 2018 election, and what was the initial response?
6. What is the definition of “quorum” according to the association’s Bylaws, and why was it significant in this case?
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet in this hearing?
8. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) regarding association meetings?
9. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) regarding election materials?
10. What were the key components of the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and the Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner is the homeowner who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the homeowners association accused of violations.
2. The Petitioner alleged violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1250(C) and § 33-1248(B), as well as Article 3, Section 2 of the association’s Bylaws. These allegations related to the handling of yearly meetings and elections.
3. The 2019 yearly meeting was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019, but was rescheduled three times, ultimately taking place in January 2020. The first cancellation was because some ballots contained write-in candidates, which the board deemed prohibited.
4. The Respondent’s representative, Doug Meyer, testified that members were informed that write-in ballots were not valid for the November 20, 2019, election. He stated that any ballots with write-in candidates would have been thrown out.
5. The Petitioner requested to see the election results from the October 2018 election, specifically wanting to know which units voted. While she was eventually given the voting tallies, the Respondent did not initially provide the requested results.
6. Quorum is defined in Article 4, Section 3 of the Bylaws. It was significant because the Respondent’s president, Mr. Meyer, acknowledged that the association had not achieved a quorum for its meetings in the last 20 years, and thus no election occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting.
7. The Petitioner had the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.
8. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold a required yearly meeting within the calendar year of 2019. The evidence showed that the meeting scheduled for 2019 was postponed until January 2020.
9. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with all required election materials from the 2018 election. While vote tallies were eventually provided, the statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related materials be retained and made available for inspection for at least one year.
10. The Administrative Law Judge’s Order upheld the Petition on all issues, deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party, and required the Respondent to supply the relevant documents within 10 days. The Order also mandated that the Respondent reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 within 30 days.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the information presented in the source document to construct a comprehensive argument for each prompt.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s handling of the write-in ballot issue for the 2019 election. Discuss the legal basis (or lack thereof) for their actions as presented in the hearing, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled that their prohibition of these ballots was a violation of the Bylaws.
2. Explain the concept of “quorum” as it relates to this case. How did the association’s failure to achieve a quorum for 20 years impact its governance, specifically regarding the 2018 meeting and the Respondent’s obligation to produce election records?
3. Describe in detail the specific violations of the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that the Country Hills West Condominium Association was found to have committed. For each statute (A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) and A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)), detail the legal requirement and explain how the Respondent’s actions failed to meet that standard.
4. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Using testimony and evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explain how the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof for her allegations.
5. Outline the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge. Beyond the simple outcome, explain the significance of each component of the order, including the validation of the petition, the designation of a “prevailing party,” the directive to supply documents, and the financial remedy awarded.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Antara Nath Rivera.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which a homeowner or planned community organization can file a petition for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)
The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The specific statutes cited were A.R.S. §§ 33-1250(C) and 33-1248(B).
Bylaws
The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, the Bylaws of Country Hills West Association, Inc. were a key document.
Homeowners Association (HOA)
An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The state agency where petitions filed with the Department of Real Estate are heard before an Administrative Law Judge.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Donna M. Bischoff.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is met when the evidence presented is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Quorum
The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid. The Respondent had not achieved quorum for 20 years.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or a legal action is brought. In this case, Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019033-REL
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This source is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The document details the hearing held on March 10, 2020, where the Petitioner alleged the Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the association’s Bylaws. Specifically, the Petitioner claimed violations related to the failure to hold a required yearly meeting in 2019, the failure to provide election materials for inspection, and the improper prohibition of write-in ballots where the Bylaws were silent. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately upheld the Petition on all issues, finding the Respondent in violation, and ordered the Association to provide the requested documents and pay the Petitioner’s $1,500.00 filing fee.
What were the specific legal violations found against the Condominium Association regarding meetings and documents?
How did the lack of clarity in the Bylaws regarding write-in ballots impact the association’s actions?
What was the ultimate outcome of this administrative hearing, including the ordered remedies for the petitioner?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Donna M Bischoff(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf
Respondent Side
Doug Meyer(president, director, witness) Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. Appeared and testified on behalf of Respondent
Neutral Parties
Antara Nath Rivera(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision transmitted electronically to Commissioner
The Petition was upheld on all issues asserted by the Petitioner. The Respondent was found in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) (failure to provide election documents), A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) (failure to hold an annual meeting in 2019), and Article 3, Section 2 of the Bylaws (improperly prohibiting write-in ballots). Respondent was ordered to supply Petitioner with relevant documents and refund the Petitioner's filing fee of $1,500.00. No Civil Penalty was found appropriate.
Respondent failed to provide Petitioner with the required election materials and documentation from the October 2018 elections, violating statutory requirements for retention and availability of these materials for owner inspection.
Orders: Respondent ordered to supply Petitioner with the relevant documents, pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C), within ten (10) days of the Order.
Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)
Open meetings; exceptions
Respondent postponed its required yearly 2019 meeting until January 2020, resulting in a failure to hold a unit owners' association meeting in 2019 as required by statute.
Orders: Petition upheld on this issue.
Filing fee: $1,500.00, Fee refunded: Yes
Disposition: petitioner_win
Cited:
A.R.S. § 33-1248(B)
Selection
Respondent's board of directors declared write-in ballots invalid for the November 20, 2019, election. Since the Bylaws were silent on prohibiting write-in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.
Vazanno v. Superior Court, 74 Ariz. 369, 372, 249 P.2d 837 (1952)
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5 (1960)
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 1999)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2019033-REL Decision – 778923.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:31:15 (108.5 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019033-REL
Briefing Document: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association
Executive Summary
This document synthesizes the findings and decision in the case of Donna M. Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. (No. 20F-H2019033-REL), heard by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The Administrative Law Judge found entirely in favor of the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, concluding that the Respondent, Country Hills West Condominium Association (“the Association”), committed multiple violations of Arizona state statutes and its own governing documents.
The core violations upheld by the court are:
1. Failure to Hold a Required Annual Meeting: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold its required annual meeting within the 2019 calendar year, repeatedly postponing it until January 2020.
2. Failure to Provide Election Records: The Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with complete election materials for inspection, including ballots, envelopes, and sign-in sheets from the October 2018 election.
3. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots: The Association violated Article 3, Section 2 of its Bylaws by unilaterally prohibiting write-in ballots for the 2019 election, despite its governing documents being silent on the issue.
As a result, the Association was ordered to provide the requested documents to the Petitioner within ten days and to reimburse her $1,500 filing fee within thirty days. The decision underscores the legal obligation of homeowners’ associations to adhere strictly to statutory requirements for meetings, elections, and record transparency.
——————————————————————————–
I. Case Overview
The dispute was adjudicated by the Office of Administrative Hearings following a petition filed by homeowner Donna M. Bischoff with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on December 11, 2019.
Case Detail
Information
Case Name
Donna M Bischoff, Petitioner, v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent
Case Number
20F-H2019033-REL
Adjudicator
Administrative Law Judge Antara Nath Rivera
Hearing Date
March 10, 2020
Decision Date
March 30, 2020
Petitioner Representative
Donna M. Bischoff (on her own behalf)
Respondent Representative
Doug Meyer, President and Director
II. Petitioner’s Allegations
The Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, asserted that the Country Hills West Condominium Association committed violations of state law and its own governing documents. The specific allegations were:
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B): Failure to hold the mandatory annual unit owners’ association meeting within the 2019 calendar year.
• Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1250(C): Failure to make election materials, including ballots and related items, available for inspection by a unit owner.
• Violation of Bylaws Article 3, Section 2: Improperly invalidating election ballots by prohibiting write-in candidates without any authority from the governing documents.
The Petitioner bore the burden of proof to establish these violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as “such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.”
III. Core Issues and Factual Findings
The hearing established several key facts that formed the basis of the Judge’s decision. The testimony from both Ms. Bischoff and the Association’s President, Doug Meyer, was central to these findings.
A. Failure to Hold the 2019 Annual Meeting
• Timeline of Events: The Association’s required annual meeting for 2019 was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019. It was subsequently postponed three times: first to December 19, 2019; then to December 30, 2019; and ultimately held on January 24, 2020.
• Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer testified that the postponements were necessary because write-in candidates appeared on the ballot, which the board had prohibited. He stated that the board “needed time to reprint the ballot and mail them out.”
• Conclusion of Law: The evidence was undisputed that no annual meeting took place during the 2019 calendar year. The Judge concluded that by postponing the meeting into the following year, the Association was in direct violation of A.R.S. § 33-1248(B), which mandates that “A meeting of the unit owners’ association shall be held at least once each year.”
B. Denial of Access to Election Records
• Petitioner’s Request: In October 2018, Ms. Bischoff requested to see the election results from the October 2018 meeting, specifically seeking to know which units had voted.
• Respondent’s Response: The Association initially did not provide the results. A few weeks prior to the March 2020 hearing, it supplied Ms. Bischoff with vote tallies and a list of unit members who voted. However, it failed to provide the full scope of required materials.
• Missing Documentation: The Association did not provide the “ballots, envelopes, related materials, and sign-in sheets” as mandated by statute for inspection.
• Respondent’s Justification: Mr. Meyer argued that no election actually occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting because there was no quorum. He further made the admission that the Association had not achieved a quorum for any meeting in the preceding 20 years. He claimed that without an election, there was no obligation to publish ballots.
• Conclusion of Law: The Judge found that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C). The statute requires that “Ballots, envelopes and related materials… shall be retained… and made available for unit owner inspection for at least one year.” The partial and delayed provision of records was insufficient to meet this legal requirement.
C. Improper Prohibition of Write-In Ballots
• The Dispute: The November 20, 2019, meeting was cancelled because some ballots contained write-in candidates. The board of directors informed members that write-in ballots were prohibited and would be “thrown out.”
• Petitioner’s Argument: Ms. Bischoff argued that the board could not “choose how to interpret a silent document.” She pointed out that the Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation do not prohibit write-in ballots and that the same board had allowed them in a 2017 election.
• Respondent’s Position: Mr. Meyer acknowledged that the Bylaws were silent on the issue but stated the Association needed to “figure out how to handle” them. A membership meeting to discuss the issue was held on December 30, 2019, but failed to achieve a quorum.
• Conclusion of Law: The Judge determined that the Association violated its own Bylaws. The decision states, “absent any clear language in the A.R.S. or the Bylaws prohibiting write in ballots, Respondent failed to show how the ballots were invalid.” The board’s unilateral prohibition was therefore found to be improper.
IV. Legal Conclusions and Final Order
The Administrative Law Judge upheld the petition on all issues, finding that the Petitioner had successfully proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Final Order:
Based on the foregoing conclusions, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The Petition filed by Donna M. Bischoff is upheld on all issues.
2. The Petitioner is deemed the prevailing party in the matter.
3. The Respondent must supply the Petitioner with the relevant election documents pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) within ten (10) days of the Order.
4. The Respondent must pay the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 directly to the Petitioner within thirty (30) days of the Order.
5. No Civil Penalty is found to be appropriate in this matter.
The Order is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the Order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019033-REL
Study Guide: Bischoff v. Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.
This study guide provides a review of the Administrative Law Judge Decision in case number 20F-H2019033-REL, concerning a dispute between a homeowner and a condominium association. It includes a quiz with an answer key, essay questions for deeper analysis, and a glossary of key terms found in the source document.
——————————————————————————–
Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2-3 sentences each, based on the provided source document.
1. Who were the primary parties in the legal dispute, and what were their roles?
2. What specific violations did the Petitioner, Donna M. Bischoff, allege against the Respondent?
3. Why was the 2019 yearly meeting for the Country Hills West Condominium Association repeatedly rescheduled?
4. What was the Respondent’s position on the validity of write-in ballots for the November 20, 2019, election?
5. What information did the Petitioner request from the October 2018 election, and what was the initial response?
6. What is the definition of “quorum” according to the association’s Bylaws, and why was it significant in this case?
7. What is the legal standard of proof the Petitioner was required to meet in this hearing?
8. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) regarding association meetings?
9. According to the decision, how did the Respondent violate A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) regarding election materials?
10. What were the key components of the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge?
——————————————————————————–
Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and the Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The Petitioner is the homeowner who filed the complaint, and the Respondent is the homeowners association accused of violations.
2. The Petitioner alleged violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 33-1250(C) and § 33-1248(B), as well as Article 3, Section 2 of the association’s Bylaws. These allegations related to the handling of yearly meetings and elections.
3. The 2019 yearly meeting was initially scheduled for November 20, 2019, but was rescheduled three times, ultimately taking place in January 2020. The first cancellation was because some ballots contained write-in candidates, which the board deemed prohibited.
4. The Respondent’s representative, Doug Meyer, testified that members were informed that write-in ballots were not valid for the November 20, 2019, election. He stated that any ballots with write-in candidates would have been thrown out.
5. The Petitioner requested to see the election results from the October 2018 election, specifically wanting to know which units voted. While she was eventually given the voting tallies, the Respondent did not initially provide the requested results.
6. Quorum is defined in Article 4, Section 3 of the Bylaws. It was significant because the Respondent’s president, Mr. Meyer, acknowledged that the association had not achieved a quorum for its meetings in the last 20 years, and thus no election occurred at the October 18, 2018, meeting.
7. The Petitioner had the burden of proof to establish the alleged violations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” This standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not.
8. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) by failing to hold a required yearly meeting within the calendar year of 2019. The evidence showed that the meeting scheduled for 2019 was postponed until January 2020.
9. The Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1250(C) by failing to provide the Petitioner with all required election materials from the 2018 election. While vote tallies were eventually provided, the statute requires that ballots, envelopes, and related materials be retained and made available for inspection for at least one year.
10. The Administrative Law Judge’s Order upheld the Petition on all issues, deemed the Petitioner the prevailing party, and required the Respondent to supply the relevant documents within 10 days. The Order also mandated that the Respondent reimburse the Petitioner’s filing fee of $1,500.00 within 30 days.
——————————————————————————–
Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for longer, more analytical responses. Use the information presented in the source document to construct a comprehensive argument for each prompt.
1. Analyze the Respondent’s handling of the write-in ballot issue for the 2019 election. Discuss the legal basis (or lack thereof) for their actions as presented in the hearing, and explain why the Administrative Law Judge ultimately ruled that their prohibition of these ballots was a violation of the Bylaws.
2. Explain the concept of “quorum” as it relates to this case. How did the association’s failure to achieve a quorum for 20 years impact its governance, specifically regarding the 2018 meeting and the Respondent’s obligation to produce election records?
3. Describe in detail the specific violations of the Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) that the Country Hills West Condominium Association was found to have committed. For each statute (A.R.S. § 33-1248(B) and A.R.S. § 33-1250(C)), detail the legal requirement and explain how the Respondent’s actions failed to meet that standard.
4. Discuss the legal standard of “preponderance of the evidence.” Using testimony and evidence presented by both the Petitioner and the Respondent, explain how the Petitioner successfully met this burden of proof for her allegations.
5. Outline the final Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge. Beyond the simple outcome, explain the significance of each component of the order, including the validation of the petition, the designation of a “prevailing party,” the directive to supply documents, and the financial remedy awarded.
——————————————————————————–
Glossary of Key Terms
Definition
Administrative Law Judge
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders. In this case, Antara Nath Rivera.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which a homeowner or planned community organization can file a petition for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or statutes.
Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)
The collection of laws enacted by the Arizona state legislature. The specific statutes cited were A.R.S. §§ 33-1250(C) and 33-1248(B).
Bylaws
The rules and regulations that govern the internal operations of an organization, such as a homeowners association. In this case, the Bylaws of Country Hills West Association, Inc. were a key document.
Homeowners Association (HOA)
An organization in a subdivision, planned community, or condominium that makes and enforces rules for the properties and its residents.
Office of Administrative Hearings
The state agency where petitions filed with the Department of Real Estate are heard before an Administrative Law Judge.
Petitioner
The party who files a petition or brings a legal action against another party. In this case, Donna M. Bischoff.
Preponderance of the evidence
The standard of proof in this civil administrative case. It is met when the evidence presented is sufficient to “incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other.”
Quorum
The minimum number of members of an assembly or society that must be present at any of its meetings to make the proceedings of that meeting valid. The Respondent had not achieved quorum for 20 years.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or a legal action is brought. In this case, Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc.
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20F-H2019033-REL
1 source
This source is an Administrative Law Judge Decision from the Office of Administrative Hearings regarding a dispute between Donna M. Bischoff, the Petitioner, and Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc., the Respondent. The document details the hearing held on March 10, 2020, where the Petitioner alleged the Condominium Association violated Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and the association’s Bylaws. Specifically, the Petitioner claimed violations related to the failure to hold a required yearly meeting in 2019, the failure to provide election materials for inspection, and the improper prohibition of write-in ballots where the Bylaws were silent. The Administrative Law Judge ultimately upheld the Petition on all issues, finding the Respondent in violation, and ordered the Association to provide the requested documents and pay the Petitioner’s $1,500.00 filing fee.
What were the specific legal violations found against the Condominium Association regarding meetings and documents?
How did the lack of clarity in the Bylaws regarding write-in ballots impact the association’s actions?
What was the ultimate outcome of this administrative hearing, including the ordered remedies for the petitioner?
Based on 1 source
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Donna M Bischoff(petitioner) Appeared on her own behalf
Respondent Side
Doug Meyer(president, director, witness) Country Hills West Condominium Association, Inc. Appeared and testified on behalf of Respondent
Neutral Parties
Antara Nath Rivera(ALJ) OAH
Judy Lowe(commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate Decision transmitted electronically to Commissioner
CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes
Outcome Summary
The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.
Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.
Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:33 (48.3 KB)
20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf
Uploaded 2025-10-09T03:34:33 (109.1 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019014-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)
Executive Summary
On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.
The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.
The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.
Case Overview
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.
Detail
Information
Case Name
Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association
Case Number
20F-H2019014-REL
Adjudicating Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Petition Filed
On or about September 25, 2019
Hearing Date
December 16, 2019
Decision & Order Date
January 27, 2020
Petitioner
Paul L. Moffett
Petitioner’s Counsel
Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
Respondent
Vistoso Community Association
Respondent’s Counsel
Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments
Petitioner’s Allegation
On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.
The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:
• Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.
• Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.
Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.
Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions
The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.
Key Governing Document Provisions
• Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”
• Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.
Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)
The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:
• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.
• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.
• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.
Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)
The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:
• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”
• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.
• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.
• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.
Established Findings of Fact
The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.
• March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.
• March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.
• August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.
• October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.
• January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.
• March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.
• Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”
The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.
Legal Interpretation
The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.
The decision states:
“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”
The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.
Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy
The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”
Final Order
Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”
• Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019014-REL
Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?
3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?
4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?
5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?
6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?
7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?
8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?
10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.
2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.
3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.
4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”
5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.
6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.
7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.
8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.
9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.
10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.
2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.
3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?
4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.
5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.
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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities
Term / Entity
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.
Article VII, Section 7.3.1
The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”
Article VIII, Section 8.3
The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
Declarant
The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.
Developer Owner
An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.
Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019014-REL
The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head
For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.
This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.
The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote
The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.
The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:
• Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.
• Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.
On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.
The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years
The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.
• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.
• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.
However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.
The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole
This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”
The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.
In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.
The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:
Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.
The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote
Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.
The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).
While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.
This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.
Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details
This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.
The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Paul L Moffett(petitioner) Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
Richard M. Rollman(petitioner attorney) Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
Alyssa Leverette(legal staff) Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C. Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list
Respondent Side
Jason E. Smith(respondent attorney) CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
Kimberly Rubly(witness) Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
Sean K. Moynihan(respondent attorney) CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC Recipient of Order
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
Other Participants
Sarah Nelson(board member (elected)) Vistoso Community Association Recipient of votes in disputed election
Patrick Straney(board member (elected)) Vistoso Community Association Recipient of votes in disputed election
Dennis Ottley(board member (elected)) Vistoso Community Association Recipient of votes in disputed election
CC&Rs Article VII Membership and Voting section 7.3.1 Voting Classes
Outcome Summary
The ALJ dismissed the petition because the Petitioner failed to sustain the burden of proof that the Vistoso Community Association committed a violation of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 by allowing certain owners to vote. The ALJ reasoned that the specific restriction on voting for those paying reduced assessments was inapplicable in this case.
Why this result: The restriction on voting found in Section 7.3.1 applies only when the owner is paying a reduced assessment 'pursuant to Section 8.3.' Since the reduced assessment period permitted under Section 8.3 had expired for the developer owners, they were not paying reduced assessments 'pursuant to Section 8.3,' and were therefore entitled to vote.
Key Issues & Findings
Alleged violation of community document regarding the voting rights of Developer Owners paying reduced assessments.
Petitioner filed a Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition alleging the Respondent HOA violated the community documents (CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1) by allowing Developer Owners (Vistoso Highlands and Pulte) to vote in an election while they were paying reduced assessments, which Petitioner argued was prohibited.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.
Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: petitioner_loss
Cited:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
Analytics Highlights
Topics: HOA Election, Voting Rights, Reduced Assessment, Community Document Violation
Additional Citations:
A.R.S. § 32-2199
CC&Rs Article VII, Section 7.3.1
CC&Rs Article VIII, Section 8.3
A.R.S. § 41-1092.07(G)(2)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(A)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(1)
A.A.C. R2-19-119(B)(2)
Vazanno v. Superior Court
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZONA LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
A.R.S. § 32-2199.02(B)
A.R.S. § 32-2199.04
A.R.S. § 41-1092.09
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766242.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:28 (48.3 KB)
20F-H2019014-REL Decision – 766243.pdf
Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:30:31 (109.1 KB)
Briefing Doc – 20F-H2019014-REL
Administrative Hearing Briefing: Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)
Executive Summary
On January 27, 2020, Administrative Law Judge Tammy L. Eigenheer of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings dismissed a petition filed by Paul L. Moffett against the Vistoso Community Association. The core of the dispute was the validity of 207 votes cast by two developer-owners, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, in a Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019.
The petitioner argued that because these entities were paying reduced assessments on their lots, they were prohibited from voting under the community’s governing documents (CC&Rs). The respondent association contended that the voting prohibition was narrowly tied to a specific provision allowing reduced assessments for a limited time, a period which had long expired for both entities.
The judge ruled in favor of the Vistoso Community Association, concluding that the votes were valid. The decision hinged on a strict interpretation of the CC&Rs. Although the developers were factually paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so pursuant to the specific section that triggers the voting prohibition. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments was a separate “financial concern for the association,” but it did not invalidate the votes cast in the election. The petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof required to establish a violation of the community documents.
Case Overview
This briefing analyzes the Administrative Law Judge Decision in the matter between petitioner Paul L. Moffett and respondent Vistoso Community Association concerning an alleged violation of community CC&Rs.
Detail
Information
Case Name
Paul L Moffett vs. Vistoso Community Association
Case Number
20F-H2019014-REL
Adjudicating Body
Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
Administrative Law Judge
Tammy L. Eigenheer
Petition Filed
On or about September 25, 2019
Hearing Date
December 16, 2019
Decision & Order Date
January 27, 2020
Petitioner
Paul L. Moffett
Petitioner’s Counsel
Richard M. Rollman, Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
Respondent
Vistoso Community Association
Respondent’s Counsel
Jason E. Smith, CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
The Core Dispute: Voter Eligibility and Reduced Assessments
Petitioner’s Allegation
On September 25, 2019, Paul L. Moffett filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Real Estate, alleging that the Vistoso Community Association violated its own governing documents. The specific violation cited was of Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Classes) of the community’s Declaration.
The dispute centered on the Board of Directors election held on March 29, 2019. In the days leading up to the election, property management solicited votes from two developer-owners:
• Vistoso Highlands: Owner of 39 lots.
• Pulte: Owner of 168 lots.
Both entities cast their total available votes—207 votes—for three candidates: Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley. Mr. Moffett’s petition argued that these 207 votes were invalid because, at the time of the election, both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments on their lots, which he contended made them ineligible to vote under the CC&Rs.
Analysis of Arguments and Key Provisions
The decision in this case rested entirely on the interpretation of two interlinked sections within the Vistoso Community Association’s Declaration.
Key Governing Document Provisions
• Article VII, Section 7.3.1 (Voting Prohibition): This section states, in pertinent part, that “a Class A Member shall not be entitled to vote with respect to any Lots, Parcels or Apartment Units in regard to which the Owner is paying only a reduced Assessment pursuant to Section 8.3.”
• Article VIII, Section 8.3 (Reduced Assessment Eligibility): This section permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment on lots for a maximum of two years after the initial Developer Owner obtains ownership from the Declarant.
Petitioner’s Position (Paul L. Moffett)
The petitioner’s argument was straightforward:
• Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments.
• Section 7.3.1 prohibits voting for members who pay reduced assessments.
• Therefore, their votes should not have been counted.
Respondent’s Position (Vistoso Community Association)
The respondent’s argument focused on the precise qualifying language in the CC&Rs:
• The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 is conditional and applies only when members are paying reduced assessments specifically “pursuant to Section 8.3.”
• The eligibility window for paying reduced assessments under Section 8.3 had expired years prior for both entities.
• Therefore, although they were factually paying reduced assessments, this was not being done under the authority or conditions of Section 8.3.
• Consequently, the voting prohibition of Section 7.3.1 was not applicable to them.
Established Findings of Fact
The evidence presented at the hearing established a clear timeline regarding the ownership of the lots and the expiration of the reduced assessment periods.
• March 20, 2007: Vistoso Highlands obtained ownership of 39 lots from the Declarant.
• March 20, 2009: The two-year maximum period for Vistoso Highlands to pay reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.
• August 21 & October 14, 2014: Pulte’s predecessor obtained ownership of 168 lots from the Declarant.
• October 14, 2016: The two-year maximum period for these 168 lots to have reduced assessments under Section 8.3 officially terminated.
• January 2, 2019: Pulte obtained ownership of the 168 lots from its predecessor.
• March 29, 2019: The Board of Directors election was held.
• Key Fact: The judge found that “For whatever reason, neither Vistoso Highlands nor Pulte had been paying the full assessment as required by the Declaration as of the date of the election.”
The Administrative Law Judge’s Decision and Rationale
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sided with the respondent’s interpretation of the governing documents, leading to the dismissal of the petition.
Legal Interpretation
The ALJ concluded that the two articles could not be read in isolation. The critical legal finding was that the voting prohibition was explicitly and inextricably linked to the conditions set forth in Section 8.3.
The decision states:
“Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.”
The judge reasoned that since the eligibility period under Section 8.3 had expired in 2009 and 2016, respectively, the developers were no longer paying reduced fees “pursuant to” that section at the time of the 2019 election.
Acknowledgment of Financial Discrepancy
The ALJ acknowledged the underlying issue that the developers were not paying the full assessments they owed. However, this was deemed a separate matter from voter eligibility. The judge noted that the failure to be invoiced for and to pay the full amount “is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole,” but “that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.”
Final Order
Based on this legal interpretation, the ALJ found that the petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, failed to sustain his burden of proof to establish a violation of the community documents by a preponderance of the evidence.
• Official Order: “IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s petition is dismissed.”
• Notice: The decision is binding on the parties unless a request for rehearing is filed with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of the order.
Study Guide – 20F-H2019014-REL
Study Guide: Moffett v. Vistoso Community Association (Case No. 20F-H2019014-REL)
This guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Petitioner Paul L. Moffett and Respondent Vistoso Community Association, based on the Administrative Law Judge Decision issued on January 27, 2020. It is designed to test and deepen understanding of the facts, legal arguments, and final ruling of the case.
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Short-Answer Quiz
Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three complete sentences, using only information provided in the source documents.
1. Who were the primary parties in this case, and what were their respective roles?
2. What specific article and section of the community documents did the Petitioner allege was violated?
3. When was the Board of Directors election held, and what was the total number of votes cast by Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?
4. According to the community’s Declaration, under what specific condition is a Class A Member not entitled to vote?
5. What did Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allow for, and what was the maximum time limit for this provision?
6. Based on the timeline provided, when should the reduced assessment period have ended for Vistoso Highlands and for Pulte?
7. What was the Petitioner’s core argument for why Pulte and Vistoso Highlands should not have been allowed to vote?
8. How did the Respondent counter the Petitioner’s argument regarding the voting rights of Pulte and Vistoso Highlands?
9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s final conclusion regarding the voting eligibility of Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, and what was the reasoning?
10. What was the final order in this case, and what recourse was available to the parties after the decision?
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Answer Key
1. The primary parties were Paul L. Moffett, who served as the Petitioner, and the Vistoso Community Association, which was the Respondent. Moffett initiated the dispute by filing a petition against the association.
2. The Petitioner alleged a violation of “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes” of the community documents (CC&Rs). This was the single issue presented for the hearing.
3. The Board of Directors election was held on or about March 29, 2019. In that election, Pulte and Vistoso Highlands collectively cast 207 votes for candidates Sarah Nelson, Patrick Straney, and Dennis Ottley.
4. According to Article VII, Section 7.3.1 of the Declaration, a Class A Member is not entitled to vote with respect to any lots for which the owner is paying only a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”
5. Article VIII, Section 8.3 of the Declaration allowed Developer Owners to pay a reduced assessment on lots purchased from the Declarant. This provision was permitted for a maximum period of two years (24 months) after the initial Developer Owner obtained ownership.
6. The reduced assessment period for Vistoso Highlands should have terminated on March 20, 2009. For the lots owned by Pulte, the reduced assessments should have terminated on October 14, 2016.
7. The Petitioner argued that because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were, in fact, paying reduced assessments at the time of the election, they were not entitled to vote. The argument was based on the fact that they were paying reduced fees, regardless of whether they were supposed to be.
8. The Respondent argued that the voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 was not applicable. Their reasoning was that while Pulte and Vistoso Highlands were paying reduced assessments, they were not doing so “pursuant to Section 8.3” because the time limit for that provision had long expired.
9. The Judge concluded that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were entitled to vote in the election. The reasoning was that the prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to reduced assessments paid as authorized by Section 8.3; since the authorization period had passed, the prohibition no longer applied, even if they were improperly paying a lower rate.
10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition was dismissed. After the order was served, the parties had 30 days to file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Department of Real Estate pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1092.09.
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Essay Questions
Instructions: The following questions are designed for a more in-depth, essay-style response. Use the source material to construct a thorough and well-supported argument.
1. Analyze the Administrative Law Judge’s interpretation of the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3” from Article VII, Section 7.3.1. Explain how this interpretation was central to the case’s outcome and discuss the distinction made between paying a reduced assessment and paying a reduced assessment under the authority of Section 8.3.
2. Describe the timeline of property ownership and assessment obligations for both Vistoso Highlands and Pulte. Explain how the failure to adhere to the timeline for ending reduced assessments created the central conflict in this dispute.
3. Discuss the concept of “burden of proof” as it applied in this case. Who held the burden, what was the standard required (preponderance of the evidence), and why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden?
4. The judge noted that the failure to collect full assessments from Vistoso Highlands and Pulte was a “financial concern for the association as a whole.” Elaborate on the potential implications of this financial issue for the Vistoso Community Association, even though it did not affect the outcome of the election dispute.
5. Outline the procedural history of the case, starting from the filing of the petition. Include key dates, the entities involved (Petitioner, Respondent, Department of Real Estate, Office of Administrative Hearings), the legal representatives, and the final step available to the parties after the judge’s order.
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Glossary of Key Terms and Entities
Term / Entity
Definition
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official, in this case Tammy L. Eigenheer, who presides over hearings at the Office of Administrative Hearings and makes decisions on disputes.
Arizona Department of Real Estate (Department)
The state agency with which the Petitioner filed the initial Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition.
Article VII, Section 7.3.1
The section of the Vistoso Community Association Declaration that prohibits a Class A Member from voting on lots for which they are paying a reduced assessment “pursuant to Section 8.3.”
Article VIII, Section 8.3
The section of the Declaration that permits a Developer Owner to pay a reduced assessment for a maximum of two years after purchasing a parcel from the Declarant.
Burden of Proof
The obligation of a party in a legal case to provide sufficient evidence to support their claim. In this case, the Petitioner bore the burden of proof.
Declarant
The original entity that owned the land before selling lots to Developer Owners like Vistoso Highlands and Pulte’s predecessor.
Developer Owner
An owner, such as Vistoso Highlands or Pulte, who obtained lots from the Declarant and was eligible for reduced assessments for a limited time under Section 8.3.
Homeowners Association (HOA) Dispute Process Petition
The formal document filed by Paul L. Moffett with the Arizona Department of Real Estate on September 25, 2019, to initiate the legal dispute.
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)
The state office where the formal hearing for this case was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge.
Petitioner
The party who initiates a lawsuit or petition. In this case, Paul L. Moffett.
Preponderance of the Evidence
The standard of proof required in this case, defined as evidence that is more convincing and has superior weight, inclining an impartial mind to one side over the other.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed. In this case, the Vistoso Community Association.
Blog Post – 20F-H2019014-REL
The Legal Loophole That Flipped an HOA Election on Its Head
For anyone living in a planned community, the thick binder of Homeowners Association (HOA) rules is a familiar reality. These documents govern everything from mailbox colors to lawn maintenance, and their dense language can be a source of constant confusion. But beyond the day-to-day frustrations lies a deeper legal truth: the precise wording of these documents is absolute. This principle, known in contract law as strict constructionism, holds that a text’s literal meaning must be followed, even if it leads to an outcome that seems unfair.
This is the story of a homeowner who believed he had uncovered a clear-cut violation during a critical HOA election. Developers who were underpaying their dues had cast hundreds of votes, seemingly in direct contravention of the community’s own governing documents. But when the case was adjudicated, the outcome hinged on a single phrase, providing a textbook example of how strict constructionism can create a mind-bending loophole and turn a seemingly open-and-shut case completely upside down.
The Rule Seemed Simple: Pay a Discount, You Don’t Get a Vote
The petitioner, Paul L. Moffett, filed a formal complaint against the Vistoso Community Association, alleging a violation of a specific clause in the governing documents: “Article VII Membership and Voting, Section 7.3.1 Voting Classes.” His case was built on what appeared to be a straightforward set of rules designed to ensure fairness.
The community’s governing documents contained two key sections:
• Article VIII, Section 8.3: This rule allowed “Developer Owners” who purchased property from the original Declarant to pay a reduced assessment. However, this discount was explicitly limited to a maximum of two years.
• Article VII, Section 7.3.1: This rule stated that any member paying a reduced assessment pursuant to Section 8.3 was not entitled to vote with respect to those properties.
On the surface, the logic was simple and equitable: if you aren’t paying your full share as authorized by the rules, you don’t get a say in the community’s governance.
The Smoking Gun: Developers Were Underpaying for Years
The petitioner presented evidence that seemed to prove his case conclusively. Two developers, Vistoso Highlands and Pulte, owned a combined 207 lots. According to the two-year limit, their eligibility for reduced assessments should have ended long ago.
• Vistoso Highlands’ reduced assessment period should have terminated on March 20, 2009.
• Pulte’s predecessor’s reduced assessment period should have terminated on October 14, 2016.
However, at the time of the Board of Directors election on March 29, 2019, both developers were still paying the discounted rate—years after their eligibility had expired. Making matters worse, the evidence showed that in the days preceding the election, the property management staff had actively reached out to both developers to obtain their votes. They cast all 207 of them, which appeared to be a direct violation of the rule prohibiting voting by members paying reduced fees.
The Twist: A Single Phrase Created a Mind-Bending Loophole
This is where the case took a sharp, unexpected turn. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case did not focus on the fact that the developers were underpaying, but on the precise legal language connecting the two rules. The dispositive element of the case was the phrase “pursuant to Section 8.3.”
The ALJ noted that, “for whatever reason,” the developers had been underpaying for years. However, she reasoned that because the two-year time limit for reduced payments under Section 8.3 had long since expired, the developers were no longer paying their reduced fees “pursuant to Section 8.3.” They were, in fact, simply underpaying their dues improperly and in violation of the documents.
In essence, the developers’ long-term violation of the payment rule served as their shield against the voting penalty. By breaking the rule governing their assessment amount, they had inadvertently immunized themselves from the rule governing voting rights. The voting prohibition in Section 7.3.1 only applied to members who were correctly paying a reduced assessment as authorized by Section 8.3. Since their discount was no longer authorized, the voting ban no longer applied.
The ALJ summarized this stunning conclusion in the final decision:
Because Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were paying reduced assessments but not pursuant to Section 8.3, the prohibition on them voting found in Section 7.3.1. was not applicable to them.
The Verdict: A Financial Problem Doesn’t Invalidate a Vote
Ultimately, the petition was dismissed, and all 207 votes cast by the developers were deemed valid. The ALJ acknowledged that the developers’ failure to pay their full assessments was a serious financial issue for the association but clarified that it was a separate matter from their right to vote.
The ALJ effectively severed the financial issue from the question of voting eligibility. This separation of issues is a fundamental tenet of legal analysis, preventing one breach of contract (underpaying dues) from automatically triggering penalties associated with a completely different clause (voting rights).
While the failure to be invoiced and to pay a full assessment on the 207 parcels at issue is certainly a financial concern for the association as a whole, that does not necessitate a finding that Vistoso Highlands and Pulte were not entitled to cast votes in the election.
This highlights a critical aspect of legal interpretation: issues that seem causally linked in a common-sense way can be treated as entirely distinct under a strict reading of the law.
Conclusion: The Devil is Always in the Details
This case serves as a powerful reminder that in the world of legal documents, every single word matters. It is a perfect demonstration of strict constructionism, where an outcome that seems to defy logic and fairness can be perfectly valid based on the literal, unambiguous phrasing of a rule. What appeared to be a clear prohibition on voting was undone by a loophole created by the developers’ own long-term failure to comply with assessment rules.
The outcome forces us to confront a difficult question at the heart of our legal system: When the literal interpretation of a contract conflicts with our sense of fairness, which should prevail? This case provides a clear, if unsettling, answer.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
Paul L Moffett(petitioner) Appeared at hearing and testified on his own behalf
Richard M. Rollman(petitioner attorney) Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C.
Alyssa Leverette(legal staff) Gabroy, Rollman & Bosse, P.C. Listed below Petitioner's attorney on service list
Respondent Side
Jason E. Smith(respondent attorney) CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC
Kimberly Rubly(witness) Vice President of Southern Region (testified for Respondent)
Sean K. Moynihan(respondent attorney) CARPENTER HAZLEWOOD DELGADO & WOOD, PLC Recipient of Order
Neutral Parties
Tammy L. Eigenheer(ALJ) Office of Administrative Hearings
Judy Lowe(Commissioner) Arizona Department of Real Estate
LDettorre(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
AHansen(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
djones(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
DGardner(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
ncano(ADRE staff) Arizona Department of Real Estate Recipient of Order
Other Participants
Sarah Nelson(board member (elected)) Vistoso Community Association Recipient of votes in disputed election
Patrick Straney(board member (elected)) Vistoso Community Association Recipient of votes in disputed election
Dennis Ottley(board member (elected)) Vistoso Community Association Recipient of votes in disputed election
